SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 30, February 7, 2005

NEPAL

The King's Folly
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management
P.G. Rajamohan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Nepal's slide into chaos will be enormously accelerated by King Gyanendra's dismissal of Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's Government on February 1, 2005. The move was justified on the tenuous grounds of Deuba's failure to secure a dialogue with the Communist Party of Nepal - Maoist rebels in the country, as well as the Prime Minister's apparent inability to organize elections - conditionalities that would have been impossible for any regime to secure under present circumstances. The fact is, the King simply lost patience and grasped absolute power in the country on impulse, with little evidence of a plan.

Also Read Waiting for Prachanda -- Keshab Poudel Maoist Insurgencies: The Eclipse of Governance -- Ajai Sahni

There has, of course, been a crescendo of international protests on the 'stifling of democracy' in Nepal, but the morality or otherwise of the King's move is not the primary consideration here. For one thing, democracy in Nepal had been 'stifled' quite some time ago, and the puppet regimes that have been charged with running the country since the May 2002 dissolution of Parliament have had very feeble links with representative government. For another, even among the King's most voluble critics most would concede that, eventually, in the realpolitik of the international order, purely pragmatic considerations will prevail in dealings with the new dispensation at Kathmandu. It is, however, on the power and capacities of the new order that the King has established that the efficacy of his moves must finally be judged, and it is on this account that the most significant reservations arise.

Regrettably, far from enhancing the capacities of the state at this critical juncture, the 'Palace coup' will, in fact, severely circumscribe the range of policy options available to the King and will undermine the state's capabilities. This is despite the temporary illusion of strength created by the concentration of all executive power in the Palace, the declaration of an Emergency, the detention - in prison or under house arrest - of almost the entire top political leadership of the various Constitutional parties in the country, total Press censorship and the arrest of some prominent Press persons who protested the King's move, as well as some crude intimidatory tactics against the people of Kathmandu by the Army.

By his precipitate action, the King has lost all constituencies of support within Nepal, except the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), a small band of conservative loyalists and a handful of opportunists. He has, moreover, at least momentarily alienated the various countries - most prominently India, USA and UK - as well as the many international agencies who had committed extraordinary resources and support to Nepal over the past traumatic years, and whose continued support will remain critical, not only in the war against the Maoists, but to the very survival of the regime at Kathmandu. At least some of these entities will not find it possible to reconcile their proclaimed positions and postures with a resumption of aid to the new regime - and the regime's conduct may make it particularly difficult for others to sustain support.

Essentially, it would appear, that the King's strategy over the coming months will lean inordinately on heavy-handed repression to 'restore order' in the country. In this, the risks of failure are extraordinary. For one thing, the armed Forces available to Kathmandu are far from sufficient to manage the scale and spread of the insurgency in Nepal, and these Forces have, in fact, been operationally diminished as a result of the withdrawal of significant numbers to Kathmandu for the protection and management of the capital. The 4,000 troops and 5,100 police personnel permanently stationed at Kathmandu would certainly be inadequate to retain a semblance of order in this city of three million in the present circumstances, and, while specific numbers are not available, reports suggest that this Force has been substantially augmented by a withdrawal of troops from other parts of the country. As troops mass in Kathmandu, the rest of the country would become the more unstable, the more vulnerable to Maoist consolidation, and Kathmandu itself will become the more susceptible to 'encirclement' by the rebels.

Indeed, Kathmandu's vulnerabilities have been demonstrated again and again by repeated boycotts and blockades which have effectively choked its transport lifelines for days at end. And while the saturation of Forces and the shock of the Royalist takeover may have resulted in a measure of immediate disorientation, Kathmandu's susceptibility to direct militant action is also significant. Indeed, after the collapse of the ceasefire on August 27, 2003, and till December 31, 2004, the 'fortified' Kathmandu Valley has topped the list for incidents of bomb blasts, with at least 68 explosions registered, including 55 in Kathmandu, nine in Bhaktapur and four in the Lalitpur area. Though total fatalities in these incidents have been low - the insurgents have killed 11 Security Force personnel and 8 civilians - their disruptive and demoralizing impact has been significant. The Maoists have also established a 'Special Task Force' with six to seven 'waves' or groups, each comprising 12 to 24 sharpshooters, to operate in and around the Valley. The potential for a sustained campaign of harassment and terror in Kathmandu, consequently, is significant.

With an estimated strength of just 80,000 soldiers in the RNA, 17,000 personnel in the newly raised Armed Police Force (APF) and a poorly equipped Police Force comprising 47,000 men, Nepal simply does not have the numbers to contain an insurgency of the magnitude of the Maoist movement, in a population of nearly 27 million people, with every one of its 75 districts currently afflicted. The Maoists have a current estimated strength of between 8,000 to 10,000 well-armed and trained 'regulars' and an additional 25,000 (on conservative estimates) 'militia' armed with relatively primitive weapons, such as pipe guns and crude bombs. These are backed up by a substantial number of 'sympathisers' who can, under certain circumstances, be mobilised - voluntarily or coercively - for violent action. The current strength of 144,000 men in all state Forces cannot even provide a fraction of a minimally acceptable counter-insurgency Force ratio, which would have to exceed at least 1:10, and arrives at desirable (though far from optimal) levels at 1:20. Indeed, even such ratios may not allow the state Forces to dominate the entire countryside, given the nature of the terrain - which overwhelmingly favours guerrilla and irregular Forces - in Nepal.

The very inadequacy of Forces implies, essentially, that a strategy of repression would have to depend overwhelmingly on relatively indiscriminate violence in 'target areas' deemed to be 'Maoist infested'. Irrespective of the brutality of such operations, however, the state's Forces would not be able to establish a permanent presence or control over the country's sprawling hinterland - there simply are not enough 'boots on the ground'. Indeed, the Maoists themselves would not be particularly averse to such 'state brutality'. It is useful to recall that it was precisely at the time of the most brutal phase of its military campaign against the rebels - after the collapse of the ceasefire in August 2003 - that Kathmandu lost control of its territories at the most rapid rate. Given this record, the possibility that the Maoists may, in fact, actively seek to provoke indiscriminate state violence, cannot be ruled out. This would feed their ranks and may, eventually, so sicken the RNA's soldiery that they would begin to ask themselves whether such a King and such a regime, which commands them to fight and slaughter their own countrymen, is worth fighting for. It is this outcome, and not some dramatic military confrontation at the gates of Kathmandu, that the Maoists will seek to engineer with a combination of demonstrations, disruptive activities, blockades and targeted violence. It is useful to note that the RNA and the APF recruit from the same villages and communities that have been, and will continue to be, targeted in the counter-insurgency campaign and, though no numbers are currently available, there has been a steady trickle of desertions from these Forces since the Army was drawn into operations after the Dang attack (in November 2001).

Worse, Gyanendra is a far from popular King, and whatever the truth may be, the taint of suspicion of his involvement in the Palace massacre of June 2001 has never been entirely removed from the collective mind of the people of Nepal. He has, moreover, a particularly unpopular son in Paras, and the Prince's misdeeds have filled the capital with sordid rumours. While Kathmandu is currently being held down with sheer force, and while the memory of the incompetence of the fractious democratic parties is presently fresh in the public mind, it will not take much before people begin speaking of the 'better times' under the democratic leadership. Indeed, this is the critical flaw in the King's strategy - he has removed the buffer between the palace and the people. Henceforth, while all credit for improbable successes would no doubt flow directly to him, so, indeed, would all blame for failure and governmental incapacity in every sphere.

This process has already begun. The Deuba Government was dismissed for failure to open negotiations with the Maoists, and the new dispensation immediately declared that, with the King wielding executive authority "it would be easier for the rebels to come for peace talks. It is what they have been wanting." But the rebels have rejected these overtures outright, stating that "The King has closed the door to any possibility of talks." The Maoist 'chief', Pushpa Kamal Dahal @ 'Prachanda', has also called on "all pro-people forces" to unite against the King's dismissal of the Deuba Government and the imposition of the Emergency.

There are also indications that the most of the fractious Constitutional parties have now been, in some measure, united against the King. Most of the leadership that is not already under detention has gone underground, and some are believed to have crossed over into India. The actual strength and capacities of this movement will only be discovered over time, but any such moves can only make the King's situation more untenable.

External players - particularly India, the US and UK - cannot be indifferent to these various considerations or to objective calculations of the probable success or failure of the King's current enterprise. In this, of course, the King has also sought to force their hand by playing up traditional geopolitical rivalries - and there have been rather obvious overtures in the past few days to both China and (particularly for India's benefit) Pakistan. But here, the King may well have overplayed his hand. The delusions of the 'absolute power' of the monarch notwithstanding, the truth is, Kathmandu has always been, and remains, a weak and immensely dependent centre of power. Those who are acquainted with the history of Nepal's monarchy over the past half century, particularly in the early 1960s and the late 1980s, will be aware of how susceptible the King would be to external, especially Indian, pressure.

There may still be some scope for the international community, particularly the countries aiding Kathmandu, to try to convince King Gyanendra that he has made a gross miscalculation, and that the possibilities of the long-term survival of Nepal's beleaguered monarchy are greatest under a stable Constitutional order, which can still be restored through immediate correctives that would address the consequences of his present and acute lapse of judgement.

It is, nevertheless, also time, now, for India and the international community, to begin imagining and assessing the possibilities and character of the successor state at Kathmandu, and containing the possibility of Nepal's spiral into chaos in case the King is led to his own downfall by continued lapses of judgement. Such a process would require envisaging radical options, including the reactivation of effective backchannel processes to work out a stable and comparatively democratic solution with the Maoists and the Constitutional political parties. A number of alternative scenarios need to be projected, and at least some of these may be 'unorthodox' and may involve support to radical alternative structures of power in the country.

INDIA

Naga Talks: Jeopardizing the Peace
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati

After nearly eight years of peace talks, it now appears to be clear that the faction of the rebel National Socialist Council of Nagaland headed by chairman Isak Chishi Swu and general secretary Thuingaleng Muivah (NSCN-IM) is ready to give up its demand for a 'sovereign' Naga homeland. New Delhi is obviously happy, and, consequently, not rejecting outright the next best option that the NSCN-IM is pushing for - the integration of all Naga-inhabited areas in the Northeast with the existing State of Nagaland to constitute a single politico-administrative unit.

Also Read Naga Peace Overtures -- Ajai Sahni A Frozen 'Peace' -- Bibhu Prasad Routray

By failing to gather the courage to tell the NSCN-IM leadership that the redrawing of the maps of this volatile region was no easy task, however, the Government of India will not only lose the Naga rebel group, sooner rather than later when this reality has to be faced, but will also create more enemies within.

This was more than demonstrated in the June 2001 uprising in Manipur when New Delhi announced the extension of the ceasefire with the NSCN-IM "without territorial limits", which was interpreted by the people as a prelude to slicing off Naga-dominated areas of the State for integration in a 'Greater Nagaland'. The bloody protests that forced a reversal of that announcement - eighteen protestors were killed in police firing in the capital, Imphal, the Manipur State Assembly Complex and dozens of Government buildings were set ablaze by angry mobs - are still fresh in the minds of the people of the region.

It is not the NSCN-IM, but New Delhi that is to blame for the lack of direction in its handling of the peace negotiations. The Manmohan Singh-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government had stated in its Common Minimum Programme (CMP) that "the territorial integrity of existing states will be maintained" in the Northeast, and that existing geographical boundaries would not be altered. If that is indeed the position of the Congress-led coalition in New Delhi, the question of redrawing the map of the northeastern States should not arise.

Regrettably, New Delhi has tended to muddy the waters, and Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil's contradictory statements over the past week have exposed an insensitivity to both the sentiments of the NSCN-IM and of the people in the States of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh, whose territory the Naga rebel group has set its sights on.

On a visit to Assam's capital Guwahati, Patil reminded journalists about the UPA's stand on not altering existing geographical boundaries of the States. Once back in Delhi, however, Patil refused to confirm reports that had quoted him on this, and his ministry officials said they were not aware of Patil having given any assurances to anyone in Assam, Manipur or Arunachal Pradesh that their territories would not be dismembered.

On February 3, 2005, moreover, after a meeting with Patil, NSCN-IM leader Muivah declared that the Home Minister had made it clear to them that the issue of integration of Naga areas would definitely constitute part of the negotiations that would follow between the insurgent outfit and the group of Union Ministers specially appointed to raise the peace talks to a political level.

On its part, the NSCN-IM has been consistent on its integration demand, while it has now chosen silence on its key slogan of an independent Naga homeland. At the end of the two-day Naga People's Consultative Meeting that ended on January 21, 2005, at Camp Hebron, the NSCN-IM headquarters near Nagaland's commercial hub, Dimapur, the rebel group issued a four-point declaration:

• unification of all Naga inhabited areas is a legitimate demand of the Nagas and therefore non-negotiable;
• support for an honourable solution to the 'Indo-Naga problem' should be on the basis of the uniqueness of Naga history and situation;
• political solution should be found through peaceful means;
• Government of India and the NSCN-IM should both uphold utmost honesty and sincerity towards reaching a political solution.

The NSCN-IM has come to regard the decision arrived at the Consultative Meeting, attended by up to 10,000 people, as a 'mandate' from the Nagas for the integration of all areas inhabited by them. Armed with this 'mandate', Muivah stated in an interview at New Delhi on February 1, 2005, that any attempt by the Government of India to resolve the Naga issue by 'appeasing' the Assamese, Meiteis (of Manipur) or the Arunachalese, would be futile.

Muivah & Co. have certainly hardened their position on the integration issue, though there is a parallel and clear realization that pushing for sovereignty was not going to lead to a solution of the 58-year-long insurrection. The next best alternative, from their perspective, was clearly to try and annex parts of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh to achieve a 'Greater Nagaland.'

New Delhi is certainly aware of the public mood in the three states bordering Nagaland. Any dismemberment of their geographical boundaries would certainly lead to mass violence. Nevertheless, the Centre appears still to be hoping to concede some areas to the Nagas in the hope of ending the protracted conflict. In this, the UPA Government at the Centre may be gambling on the expectation that it may be able to bulldoze the Congress-ruled states of Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh into accepting whatever decision it might eventually take to 'solve' the Naga problem. This may tempt the Manmohan Singh Government to push things forward in a hurry, before a non-Congress Government comes to rule any of these three states. Only Congress Governments would be prepared to listen to the 'high command', though even that is suspect in the present case.

A tricky situation confronts the Indian Government negotiators in the days ahead. If the talks with the NSCN-IM hinge on signals for the integration of the Naga areas, a sharp polarization of rebel and mainstream forces is bound to take place in Assam, Manipur and Arunachal Pradesh. Insurgent groups in these three states are most likely to close ranks with the otherwise moderate sub-national forces and pressure groups, triggering mass uprisings. If New Delhi is then forced to change its soft approach towards the NSCN-IM on the issue of integration, the Naga rebel group could be pushed to the wall, and react by either snapping or threatening to snap the prevailing truce, to begin with. Either way, Delhi's ambivalence is progressively trapping it in a Catch 22 situation, with no solution and no winners in sight.