SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 39, April 11, 2005

INDIA

Andhra Pradesh: Back to square one… and worse
Saji Cherian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The charade of peace talks has finally ended in Andhra Pradesh after nearly ten months of a purported truce, with just one unsuccessful round of talks between the Naxalites (Left Wing extremists) and the State Government on October 15, 2004. Finally, on April 4, 2005, emissaries of the Left Wing extremist groups in Hyderabad announced their decision to pull out of the process. Addressing a Press Conference, Kalyan Rao, Gaddar and Varavara Rao, whom the Communist Party of India - Maoist (CPI-Maoist) had nominated, and Chandranna, the CPI-ML-Janashakthi representative, accused the Andhra Pradesh Government of executing 'fake encounters' and of carrying out combing operations, and stated that the atmosphere was no longer conducive for peace talks. This announcement was just a formality. On January 17, 2005, Ramakrishna and Amar, 'state secretaries' of the CPI-Maoist and Janashakthi respectively, had already declared they were no longer keen to continue with the talks.

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On June 16, 2004, the Congress Party led Andhra Pradesh Government had declared a ceasefire with the declared intention to end bloodshed and reach common ground with the extremists who were depicted as 'homegrown boys', 'prodigal sons' and 'our own people'. There was every indication throughout this truce period that the extremists continued to work to bolster their strength vis-à-vis the state, while the state committed 'tactical harakiri'.

Open source data compiled by the Institute for Conflict Management demonstrates that, in year 2004, fatalities in Naxalite violence totaled 88 [42 civilians, 3 security force (SF) and 43 Naxalites] as against where 280 in 2003; 191 in 2002, and 311 in 2001. The first three months of 2005, however, have already seen 116 deaths (50 civilians, 11 security forces and 55 Naxalites); a trend that threatens to escalate as the year goes by. There have been 27 encounters reported between security forces and Naxalites in this period alone, with incidents involving Naxalites reported from 19 out of the State's 23 districts. All 23 districts in the State have, for some time now, been affected by Naxalite activity.

Naxalite consolidation through the period of the talks has been confirmed by official quarters. In March 2005, Andhra Pradesh Director General of Police (DGP) Swaranjit Sen stated that the hardcore fighting strength of the Naxalites in the State was an estimated 700; through the ceasefire, it grew to between 1,100 and 1,200. In addition to cadre augmentation, the CPI-Maoist has been judiciously altering its political and military structure to streamline its functioning. K. Srinivas Reddy noted in The Hindu on February 25, 2005, "Having succeeded in 'reclaiming' domination over several areas in Telengana districts during the 'peace time', the Maoists are now putting in place a comprehensive plan to make Telengana the beacon of revolutionary movement again… Plans are also afoot to galvanize the otherwise dormant militant network in Telengana in addition to formation of front organisations to mobilise women, students, coal miners and the peasantry. On the military side, the Maoists have already formed at least eight Local Guerrilla Squads (LGSs) in the five North Telangana districts, which had (earlier) been wound up as part of a tactical withdrawal of forces in view of a severe crackdown by the police." Another commentator, M.V. Subramanyam, observes, "the CPI-Maoist has formed 30-member 'platoons' in the State, by re-organising Special Guerrilla Squads. Ten-member dalams (squads) have been re-organised into sections and a strategy has been evolved to organise mass attacks by platoons and individual attacks by sections."

The March 11 Naxalite attack on the Chilakaluripet Police Station in Guntur district (seen as revenge for the March 7 encounter at Manala in Nizamabad district in which 10 Maoists were killed) highlights the strategy being prepared over the months to target police stations. Documents seized from Naxalites, during the ceasefire period, including the January 16 seizure at Kamaram village in Warangal District, first exposed the plans to attack police stations.

The recent attacks have also shown the emergence of greater co-operation among the erstwhile People's War Group (PWG) and Maoist Communist Centre (MCC) cadres after their merger in September 2004. A new trend is now emerging, with exceptional brutality involved in the killings, which Intelligence officials believe is the consequence of increasing numbers of MCC cadres from Bihar being involved in the local teams. Thus, a senior Police official in Hyderabad was quoted by Deccan Chronicle stating, "in the Chilakaluripet incident, they axed police personnel to death apart from firing at them. The barbaric nature of the killing is the trademark of the MCC's violent activities. Also, MCC is given to attacking others apart from targets, which is not a common practice by the People's War."

There is also reciprocity in this functioning as, prior to the Assembly Elections in Bihar and Jharkhand in February this year, reports citing Bihar Home Department sources stated that a group of armed Naxalites from Andhra Pradesh were camping in Bihar to help their counterparts.

This 'outsourcing of terror' is not just limited to Bihar and Jharkhand, but also to the neighbouring states of Orissa (the Koraput attacks on February 6, 2004) and to Karnataka, with the recent killing of seven police personnel and one civilian at Venkammanahalli under Pavagada Revenue Division of the Tumkur District on February 11, 2005. The Karnataka Government has reportedly identified 33 police stations spread across 10 districts in the State as "hypersensitive and vulnerable" to attack by the extremists. Of these, 23 are spread across seven districts that border Andhra Pradesh. Meanwhile, on March 8, 2005, Tamil Nadu Chief Minister Jayalalitha stated that security had been strengthened along the State's borders to stop infiltration of Naxalites from Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka into Tamil Nadu.

The extremist threat is no longer confined to rural areas, as the Naxalite leadership appears to have set its eyes on major cities as well. Reports suggest that the CPI-Maoist are planning a 'big action' in New Delhi to capture the nation's attention. Senior CPI-Maoist leader, K. Seshagiri Rao alias Gopanna, arrested on March 8 at Rajahmundry, revealed that the group's 'central committee' had entrusted this mission to Patel Sudhakar Reddy alias Suryam and Takkelapalli Vasudeva Rao alias Ashanna, both prime suspects in the October 2003 assassination attempt on the then Andhra Chief Minister, Chandrababu Naidu, at Alipiri.

The police have not been idle over this period, and their strategy in Andhra Pradesh has ranged from strengthening the informer network, surrender schemes for freshly-recruited Naxalites, and the merging of police stations to make them stronger and more effective. In reply, the Naxalites have targeted Police informers as well as surrendered Naxalites; in the first three months of 2005, of the 50 civilians killed, at last 10 were former Naxalites and eight were 'informers'.

In a radical departure from the past, the Indian Army at its Commanders Conference on April 6-7, 2005, discussed the threat of Naxalism for the very first time. The Army Chief, General Joginder Jaswant Singh, asserted, "Any indication of something not going well in the country concerns us directly. We will try to nip the evil in the bud." He added further that the Army was likely to extend support to the police and paramilitary forces in countering Naxalite violence.

The folly of Indian policy makers, however, lies in not recognizing the difference between a 'bud' stage and a 'bloom' stage! In November 2003, the number of districts affected by Naxalism was stated to be 55 across nine states. This increased to 170, spread across 15 states by February 2005. If this is the 'bud' stage, it is difficult to imagine what would happen when Naxalism 'blooms'. This lack of vision and clarity in policies has percolated down to the ground level, incapacitating and confusing the footsoldiers, who bears the brunt of anti-state violence. An example of this strategic incoherence was played out in the Nallamala forests in Andhra Pradesh on February 3, 2005, when about 2,000 elite Greyhound commandos cordoned off a CPI-Maoist hideout and zeroed in on 'state secretary' Ramakrishna and a number of other leaders and cadre, but refrained from opening fire as Home Minister Jana Reddy ordered the troops to 'exercise restraint'. Ramakrishna was subsequently allowed to escape the dragnet. Ironically, the State Government has now ordered major operations in the Nallamala forest to 'flush out' Ramakrishna, and a major exercise is currently ongoing.

Surprisingly, DGP Swaranjit Sen on March 24, 2005, ruled out any possibility of re-imposing the ban on the Naxal groups in the State, saying it would be counterproductive. "It does not alter the basic situation. What will happen in a ban situation is that the Maoists will go into a cocoon. We won't know more about them as we are getting to know now….Ultimately it is possible that they may strengthen themselves. So I feel a freer atmosphere is better," he said.

On February 13, 2005, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, speaking at Ranchi in Jharkhand, had stated that the Centre would soon come out with a 'comprehensive strategy' to cope with the Naxalite problem. Even as the Centre and state governments like Andhra Pradesh gropes for strategy in their self-inflicted perplexity, the CPI-Maoist has articulated a succinct plan of action. In the November 2004 edition of the People's March, Ganapathy, 'General Secretary' of the CPI-Maoist, reiterated in an interview, "Depending on the specific characteristics of the Indian revolution, we decided that the path of revolution is that of protracted people's war. That is by first setting up Base Areas in the backward areas and spreading these to the other areas and thereby ultimately encircling the cities from the countryside. So, it is according to this strategic understanding alone that work must be done in any area, whether forest, plain or urban."

As clarity confronts confusion, the current year threatens to be the bloodiest in the unending 'People's War', both in Andhra Pradesh and other parts of the country. It is India's irresponsible political leadership - with the Andhra Pradesh Chief Minister's ill-conceived 'peace initiative', encouraged enthusiastically by the Home Ministry at Delhi as the most visible exemplars of its suicidal blindness - that has created the grounds for this tide of violence. Regrettably, as more and more lives - including those of civilians and SF personnel - are lost, there is no reason to believe that anyone in the political leadership is ever going to be called to account.