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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 4, August 9, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Balochistan: A
Rising Insurgency
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant
Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution
"We are certainly winning, that's my assessment."
President Pervez Musharraf voiced his confidence during
a panel interview with Dawn at his Rawalpindi camp
office on August 4, 2004, declaring that Pakistan was winning
its war on terrorism, which, he said, the military regime
was 'confronting frontally'.
But within the current churning process within Pakistan
and the rising portents of trouble, such optimism may just
be the mirage that the military regime chooses to project.
Among others, events of the past week in the Balochistan
province, the site of a revitalized insurgency - three previous
guerrilla wars have been fought in Balochistan since the
creation of Pakistan, the last of these in 1973-77 - suggest
that such sanguinity may well be incompatible with the realities
of the ground.
Amidst a series of rocket attacks on vital installations
in the recent past, Balochistan witnessed two major acts
of violence in just the last week. On August 1, 2004, five
soldiers and a civilian were killed when three unidentified
gunmen attacked their vehicle near Zinda Pir road at Khuzdar,
a military cantonment. Mir Azad Baloch, representing the
little known Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA), has claimed
that the Khuzdar attack was a reaction to the ongoing military
operations in Turbat and the construction of a new military
cantonment.
On August 2, Balochistan Chief Minister Jam Muhammad Yousaf
escaped unhurt when his cavalcade was attacked by unidentified
terrorists near Surab, about 180 kilometers south west of
Quetta, the provincial capital. A police constable and one
of the attackers were reportedly killed during the incident.
Located in western Pakistan, Balochistan is bordered by
Afghanistan on the northwest and Iran on the west, with
the Arabian Sea to its south. With a geographical spread
of approximately 347,641 square kilometres, Balochistan
is the largest province in Pakistan covering almost 43 per
cent of the country's total area, but accounts for just
six per cent of the country's population.
The contours of insurgency in Balochistan envelop the familiar
loop of underdevelopment, discrimination by the Federal
Government, and political grievances - real or perceived.
There is a concurrent and intense resentment towards the
presence of the Army in the province, as well as vivid public
memories of the brutal repression of the military campaigns
in the region in 1973-77. The underdevelopment matrix includes
the absence of infrastructure and basic facilities like
clean drinking water, health and educational facilities.
The province has the largest proportion - 55 per cent -
of the population living below the poverty line, and the
lowest literacy rates in the country (Men: 34 per cent;
Women - 14.1 per cent). The prevailing circumstances have
long led the Balochis to protest against the 'hegemony'
of the Punjab province. For instance, Balochistan has some
of the largest gas reservoirs in Pakistan at Sui, Pir Koh,
and Marri, and while the province accounts for approximately
40 per cent of the country's total gas production, it exports
80 per cent of its output to Punjab. Utilization within
Balochistan is a mere17 per cent of its output. The province
is also rich in iron ore and copper, among an extended range
of other minerals of great economic value, but this wealth
is exclusively 'managed' by the Federal Government.
Protests against the Federal Government's acquisition of
vast tracts of land for mega military ventures, such as
the Gwadar Port and City project, are snowballing, and feed
the insurgency. The strategically located port, scheduled
to be operational by 2005, is intended to handle transit
trade with Central Asia, Afghanistan and western China.
However, a relatively large section of the Balochis believe
that the benefits will overwhelmingly be cornered by the
Pakistani Army and non-Balochis, while Balochis will emerge
the principal losers, as is in part the already the case
as large tracts of land are acquired by outsiders, primarily
from Punjab.
While Islamabad debates the best course of action in Balochistan,
recent reportage from the province indicates a broad acceptance
and justification of anti-state violence. Voicing popular
discontent, Nawab Akber Khan Bugti, chief of the Jamhoori
Watan Party, in his August 1 interview to the BBC said,
"They force you to take up arms, and you are compelled to
put up resistance. After all nobody quarrels or dies eagerly."
The current outbreak of violence has also generated a critique
of the continuing dualism in the military regime's understanding
of terrorism and sub-conventional conflict. Habib Jalib,
Secretary General of the Balochistan National Party (BNP)
and a former Senator, states, "They are terming it [the
August 1 attack at Khuzdar] as a terrorist incident but
I do not agree... I think the Pakistan Government does not
recognise national political and economic sovereignty of
the people. It demands (the) right of self-determination
of Kashmir but is not granting it to Balochistan…" He added,
further, "Military operations are underway at the moment
in Kohlu, Dera Bugti, Gwadar and Turbat district."
While outfits like the BLA seek to demonstrate their capacity
for violence in areas like Khuzdar, there are also reports
of a broad understanding emerging between the disparate
Baloch political groups. While a four-party Baloch alliance,
led by the Bugti and Mengal tribes in Balochistan, has protested
in Turbat, Gwadar, Kalat, Dera Bugti, Kohlu and Nushki,
the Pakistan Oppressed Nations Movement (PONM) has accused
the Musharraf regime of launching an 'unannounced military
operation' in Balochistan.
Gas pipelines in Sui have been under constant attack from
the local tribes over the past years. In May 2004 alone,
approximately 140 rockets were fired in Sui, while at least
120 rocket attacks were reported in June. Attacks have also
targeted the Gwadar project, with the most recent among
significant attacks on May 3, 2004, when three Chinese engineers
were killed and 11 persons, including nine Chinese nationals,
sustained injuries in a car bomb attack. Other notable incidents
of violence in 2004 were:
July 18: Islamist leader and Member of National Assembly,
Maulana Muhammad Khan Sherani, survives an attempt on his
life at Chena Baratkhel in the Qilla Saifullah district.
July 2: Seven Frontier Constabulary personnel are
wounded during a landmine blast at Dera Murad Jamali in
the Sui area.
June 27: At least two police personnel and three
tribesmen are killed during an encounter at Maiwand.
June 19: Terminal of the Sui airport was destroyed
after a bomb blast.
June 6: Two persons are killed and two others sustained
injuries during a landmine explosion in Kohlu district.
As a result of the escalating violence, the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees decided to limit its operations
on June 7, 2004, while other foreign non-governmental organisations
have closed their offices in Quetta, despite assurances
from the Home Department regarding the provision of security
to them.
Increasing violence at sensitive locations has been used
by the Federal Government to justify its decision to establish
new military cantonments inside Balochistan, including three
at Gwadar, Dera Bugti and Kohlu, adding to the existing
cantonments at Quetta and Khuzdar.
The fact that Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, who hails from
Balochistan was recently forced to resign as Prime Minister,
has evidently not had a positive impact on the insurgency
dynamic. Jamali was at least partly responsible for the
delayed decision to send in troops to the province, and
his 'removal' has reportedly been received very unfavourably
in Balochistan.
While Pakistan's economic capital, Karachi, and the borders
with Afghanistan are already under siege, renewed violence
encompassing the protracted insurgency in Balochistan can
only cause further apprehension in military circles. The
provincial capital, Quetta, has long been wracked by sectarian
bloodshed, and any immediate expansion of the sphere of
violence across the rest of the province can be expected
to provoke larger military commitments of the kind currently
being witnessed in South and North Waziristan along the
Afghan border. But military operations to quell dissidence,
insurgency and terrorism, irrespective of the nature of
grievances, have been riddled with complexities in Pakistan.
Musharraf may seek to portray the operations in Balochistan
as targeting 'terrorists' affiliated to Al
Qaeda. However, the Baloch groups have insisted
on their identity as 'Baloch nationalists' and have rejected
the label of Islamist extremists. There is evidence, moreover,
that the Islamists have, till now chosen not to get involved
in the ongoing insurgency. However, given the recent trajectory
of terrorism in the region, it is likely that the Islamists
will eventually try to appropriate the 'Baloch cause', and
to exploit the discontent in the province in order to further
undermine the beleaguered Musharraf regime. Balochistan
could, in such a scenario, emerge as a new staging post
for Islamist extremists.
The linkages, in this context, are already crystallizing.
The Islamist alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, deeply
sympathetic to the Taliban, is a coalition partner in the
Pakistan Muslim League - Quaid-e-Azam (PML-QA) led Government
in Balochistan. A substantial number of Al Qaeda operatives
have been arrested from the province since 9/11, and Pushtun
nationalism has created significant spaces for the Taliban
presence in the province.
However, a deep divide between the Pashtun-dominated northern
areas, and the Baloch south, remains a barrier to a unification
of Islamist Pashtun elements and nationalist Baloch factions
in the immediate future.
Nevertheless, US intelligence is reportedly concerned that,
after earlier Pakistani Army operations in South Waziristan,
some Al Qaeda operatives relocated to the Balochistan ranges.
Islamabad-based writer Mohammad Shehzad told South Asia
Intelligence Review on August 7 that there are a substantial
number of jehadis present in the province, waiting
to harness the operational possibilities that may be created
by an escalating Baloch insurgency, and the current violent
situation has the potential to worsen rapidly. Sections
of Balochis have also accused Islamabad of masterminding
terrorist acts in the province to justify plans to build
Army cantonments and increase troop deployment.
With the arc of instability widening in Pakistan, there
are grave dangers that what is currently a low-level conflict
in Balochistan, may be transformed into a full-scale conflagration.
J&K: The Hawks
Strike Back
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
New Delhi Chief of Bureau, Frontline magazine, and
also writes for its sister publication, The Hindu
Tragedy, drama, farce: it is almost as if the peace process
in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) is being authored by someone
who has a day job scripting television soap opera.
On August 1, the Jamaat-e-Islami readmitted hardline Islamist
leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani to its ranks, and announced
its intention to revive its Political Affairs Committee,
a body it had shut down last year as part of a long-running
moderate initiative to extricate the organisation from secessionist
politics in J&K. The decision was announced at the end of
a two-day meeting of the Markazi Majlis-e-Shoora [Central
Consultative Council], the Jamaat's 25-member executive.
A Jamaat spokesperson announced that Geelani would be free
both to hold membership of the organisation as well as his
newly-launched party, the Tehreek-e-Hurriyat. Most important
of all, the Jamaat decisively broke ranks with the centrist
All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC)
faction, until recently led by the Shia cleric, Maulvi Abbas
Ansari.
Geelani's return to the Jamaat marked a humiliating defeat
for the centrists. Days earlier, Geelani had announced that
he planned to hold a meeting of the Arakeen Ijtimaa,
or convention of empanelled members, at the Jamaat's offices
on August 8. Nasir Ahmad Kashani, the Amir or chief of the
Jamaat, had claimed the move violated the Jamaat constitution,
arguing that, as the Amir, calling such a convention was
his exclusive prerogative. An electoral college of about
2,000 empanelled members had elected Kashani as Amir for
a three-year term in 2003, along with the 25 delegates to
the Markazi Majlis-e-Shoora. Kashani had, at the
time, beaten off a tough challenge from Geelani's political
protégé, Mohammad Ashraf Sehrai. He then refused to help
Geelani's campaign against the centrists in the Hurriyat,
and secured the hardliner's removal from the frontlines
of the Jamaat - braving direct threats to his life from
the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HM)
leadership.
What explains the turn-around in the Jamaat? Kashani isn't
talking, but one explanation is that the Jamaat Amir feared
a vertical split in the organisation. Five of the six district
presidents of the Jamaat in the Kashmir Valley threw their
weight behind Geelani, support perhaps linked to none-to-discreet
lobbying by the Pakistan-based leadership of the HM. Although
Geelani did not have the backing of the bulk of the Jamaat's
basic membership, he did appear to command a majority in
the district of Baramulla, and a solid following in Srinagar
and Kupwara. By contrast, the moderates in the Jamaat were
unable to carry the fight to their rank-and-file, afraid
of terrorist attacks. Kashani was unable to safely travel
even in the moderate strongholds of Pulwama and Kulgam.
He could also have been concerned about the chaos among
the Hurriyat moderates, and fearful of being caught, so
to speak, on the wrong end of a rotting bough.
Outside J&K, the full import of these events has been little
understood - most notably the enormous significance of the
reversal within the Jamaat. In 1997, G.M. Bhat, the then-Amir
of the Jamaat, came out of jail, gave an interview calling
for an end to the "gun culture", and set about distancing
the organisation from the HM. Geelani was incensed, but
the tide was against him. In the spring of 1999, former
Hurriyat chairman Abdul Gani Bhat called for a dialogue
between mainstream political parties and secessionists,
a marked departure from the organisation's demand for a
three-way dialogue between itself, India and Pakistan. Both
the leaders' initiatives laid the ground for dissident HM
commander Abdul Majid Dar declaring a unilateral ceasefire
in July 2000 - which the then Prime Minister Atal Behari
Vajpayee promptly reciprocated.
Vajpayee's ceasefire fell apart six months later: Islamist
groups simply had no interest in participating in a dialogue
that would lead to their marginalisation, and Pakistan was,
predictably, uninterested in a peace process whose structure
it did not have a role in shaping. Terror, then as now,
was the instrument chosen to silence the doves. Bhat's enthusiasm
for dialogue dulled considerably after a near-successful
February 22, 2001, attempt on his life. The General Council
of the Hurriyat, in turn, rejected the Centrists' calls
for direct dialogue after a grenade went off during the
meeting called to discuss the issue. Dar, too, was shot
dead by his one-time Hizb comrades on March 23, 2003. At
a 2001 remembrance of the assassination of Mirwaiz Umar
Farooq's father, Mirwaiz Mohammad Farooq, armed men gathered
around the rostrum and shouted Bhat down. Exactly a year
later to the day, key moderate leader Abdul Gani Lone was
assassinated, making clear the costs of pursuing peace.
Lone's assassination - for which his son and political heir
Sajjad Lone publicly held Geelani responsible - constituted
a setback, but did not put an end to the peace process.
Behind the scenes, the Jamaat Amir, Bhat, also worked quietly
to strengthen the HM dissidents. Shortly before his arrest
in the build-up to the 2002 Assembly elections, Geelani
found himself increasingly forced to turn to fringe extreme-right
organisations outside the Jamaat-e-Islami, like Nayeem Khan's
Kashmir Front and Shakeel Bakshi's Islamic Students' League.
Matters came to a head soon after, with Geelani refusing
to attend Hurriyat executive meetings unless Sajjad Lone
was expelled for having put up proxy candidates in the Assembly
elections. In May last year, the Jamaat moderates hit back,
'retiring' Geelani as their political representative in
the Hurriyat and refusing to back his Islamist faction of
the secessionist coalition.
From early this year, the Islamists began to retaliate.
They clearly understood the central problem: no Government
in New Delhi could make the kind of concessions that Pakistan
would find acceptable, or that the moderates could sell
- and the moderates, in turn, could not deliver the de-escalation
in hostilities New Delhi desperately needed. A string of
terror attacks on individuals close to Mirwaiz Farooq were
used to drive home to the moderates the consequences of
bucking the Islamist fiat. Mirwaiz Farooq's efforts to buy
peace with a section of the Islamists, by attending the
last rites of slain terrorist Rafiq Ahmad Dar, provoked
Sajjad Lone to leave the ranks of the moderates. Ansari
finally responded to the deteriorating security situation
with panic, and abandoned his post at the bridge of the
moderate APHC.
Where might events go from here? It seems unlikely that
Mirwaiz Farooq, the most visible moderate Hurriyat leader,
will be willing to assume a vanguard role in the near future.
Apart from his political and security concerns, sources
indicate, personal considerations have imposed considerable
pressures on the religious leader. Command of his religious
organisation, the Anjuman-e-Nusrat-ul-Islam, passes from
father to son, and Farooq, who married three years ago,
is yet to sire an heir. The family is deeply concerned about
the risk of assassination, and wishes him to stay distant
from controversy until an heir is born. Mirwaiz Farooq has
bucked this pressure in the past, but is now likely to focus
his attentions on bringing about some kind of rapprochement
within the Hurriyat factions. As such, further dialogue
between the moderates and New Delhi seems a distant prospect.
Kashani and his fellow moderates will closely watch the
course of events in Geelani's new party. If Geelani is unable
to attract a significant number of Jamaat rukuns,
or rank-and-file members, the moderates could once again
move to contain his authority. Yet, the ongoing chaos could
not have come at a worse time for New Delhi. On the edge
of talks with Pakistan on the future of J&K, Indian strategists
have found their ace - direct negotiations with moderate
secessionists - has been stolen from the pack. It is hard
to say, of course, whether the peace process is actually
dead - it might just be comatose, or even just lying there
with its eyes closed, waiting for an opportunity to spring
to life and surprise the villain - but signs are, the next
few episodes will be filled with bloodshed.
Manipur: Impending
Collapse of Governance
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
On April 19, 2004, the Army's 44 Mountain Brigade, under
the command of Brigadier V.P.P.S. Gusain, moved into the
militant infested Sajek Tampak mountains in Northeast India's
Manipur State. Soldiers of the 7 Sikh Light Infantry, 27
Madras Regiment and 9 Rajput, arrived in the inaccessible
frontier district of Chandel, right on the border with Myanmar,
100 kilometres northwest of the capital, Imphal, ostensibly
to carry out 'area domination' exercises ahead of the Lok
Sabha (Lower House of Parliament) elections, although their
actual mission was to neutralize and flush out an estimated
3,000 rebels from their hub.
Militants of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF),
People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)
and the People's Liberation Army (PLA)
- who jointly operate under the banner of the Manipur People's
Liberation Front (MPLF) - obviously saw the troops coming.
They mined their bases and laid ambushes. Top security sources
in Imphal told this writer that, on the day the soldiers
moved in (April 19), suspected PLA rebels ambushed and killed
four Army troopers, including a Lieutenant.
The Army is yet to launch a frontal attack, but appears
to be cutting off the rebels' lines of communication. The
Army is also working at bringing the impoverished villagers
inhabiting the approaches to the hills to its side. Considering
the vantage points in which the rebels are located, with
a rear that gives them free access to Myanmar, and armed
with sophisticated military hardware, securing the support
of the civilians is an important exercise, and explains
why the Army is carrying out health and veterinary camps,
setting up water points and building roads.
If an entire Brigade is thought to be necessary to confine
and neutralize a band of militants in a single location,
the overall insurgency situation in the whole of Manipur
can well be imagined. According to the State's Director
General of Police, A.K. Parashar, 30 rebel groups, including
different factions of a single group, operate in Manipur.
The rebels are well armed - the rebels in Sajek Tampak,
for instance, have in their arsenal, rocket propelled grenades,
2 inch mortars, universal and light machine guns, Chinese
M-16 rifles, land mines, AK series rifles, and possibly
a few anti-aircraft guns.
Statistics indicate that the situation in the State has,
indeed, been bad. Official sources note that, between January
6, 2004 and July 28, 2004, there were 22 fatal attacks on
security forces alone, across the State, in which 39 men
and officers have lost their lives. In the last incident
on July 28, 2004, three soldiers of the 19 Assam Rifles
were killed by suspected UNLF rebels, who decamped with
3 weapons, 9 magazines and more than 200 rounds of ammunition.
In 2003, as many as 196 people were killed in insurgency-related
violence, and between January and June 2004, another 114
persons were killed. Between 1992 and 2000, at least 1,335
civilians have fallen victim to militants' bullets across
Manipur.
In view of the situation, the application of a tough anti-terror
law is, perhaps, unavoidable. Despite the month-long mass
uprising, which has paralyzed normal life in Imphal and
elsewhere in Manipur, over the arrest and subsequent death
of a 32 year old woman, Thangjam Manorama, New Delhi is
in no mood to lift the Armed Forces (Assam and Manipur)
Special Powers Act, 1958 (AFSPA).
Both Defence Minister Pranab Mukherjee and Home Minister
Shivraj Patil made it clear on August 7, 2004, that the
Act was needed in Manipur, where militant activities remain
high.
Both the Army and the State Police insist Manorama was a
hardcore PLA cadre, involved in planting improvised explosive
devices (IED). A section of the intelligence community have
even claimed that she had been in Punjab for a month in
2003, where she may have been in touch with operatives of
the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). But these
claims beg the question: the real issue at present relates
to the murky circumstances under which her death occurred
while she was in the custody of the 17 Assam Rifles. The
soldiers had picked her up from her home before dawn on
July 11, 2004, handing the family an 'arrest memo' signed
by Havaldar (Sergeant) Suresh Kumar. The Army leadership's
subsequent and questionable defense of the action, and the
incremental exposure of actual details of the incident,
have done a great deal of harm to the state's case, and
have fed public anger against a backdrop of orchestrated
and escalating protests.
The aberrant action of a few Army troopers engaged in operations
in sensitive theatres of insurgency, and the failure of
the military leadership to contain the obvious fallout of
probable deviance, has contributed to the neutralization
of immense tactical gains secured by the security agencies
over months and years. Clearly, a system of effective checks
and balances is necessary if troops operating with the aid
of stringent anti-terror laws are to be held to account
in cases of the abuse of such powers. While the use of force
by the state's agencies is obviously a necessity in the
insurgency-wracked State, not all use of force can be deemed
proportionate or justifiable. For instance, according to
records with the Manipur Police, thirty-three people have
been killed by security forces between January 1, 2004,
and July 11, 2004. Significantly, as many as 17 of them,
according to the police records, have no listed linkages
with insurgent groups. While it is possible that these were,
in fact, insurgents with no previous police records, a stronger
case needs to be built to establish such claims, beyond
the contention of the security agencies themselves.
Within the chaotic circumstances that have been created
through protests over the Thangjam Manorama case, an argument
has gained ground that, since militants in Manipur continue
to have a field day despite the fact that the AFSPA has
been in use since September 1980, it was time to look for
alternatives. One of the alternatives being voiced is for
the duly elected State Government to be more 'pro-active'
and improve governance in all spheres. But this is, at best,
theory, and the possibilities of good governance in Manipur
are remote, a fact admitted by none other than some ruling
Congress leaders. As N. Biren, a ruling Congress Member
of the Legislative Assembly (MLA), expresses it, "The people
have lost trust in politicians and the political system.
Unless we take drastic measures and regain the people's
confidence, we cannot help restore order in the State".
The role and effectiveness of Manipur's 14,000 strong Police
force is also in question. The Police has long been marginalized
in anti-insurgency operations, and demoralisation is endemic.
In the past, the State Police has also mutinied over salaries.
Manipur is in a financial mess, and on August 2, 2004, the
policemen, along with other Government employees, received
their salaries for the months of May, June and July 2004,
after three months without pay.
The lack of coherent political perspectives and leadership
on the insurgency issue is another major problem. In April
2004, the Manipur Cabinet deliberated on whether the State
should establish a 'unified command' for the Army, Police
and Paramilitary Forces on the lines of the system in Assam,
where it has worked quite well. Chief Minister Okram Ibobi
Singh is believed to have rejected the idea, possibly because
of the fear that his position as head of such a unified
command could have a dramatic and adverse fallout on his
political career.
In any case, Ibobi Singh's tenure as Manipur's Chief Minister
may not last long. If the AFSPA is lifted or toned down,
he stays. If not, President's rule is imminent.
In the meanwhile, the mass agitation shows no signs of dying
down. From Monday, August 9, 2004, the protagonists of the
protest movement (it is being jointly spearheaded by 32
organizations) have threatened to shut down State and Central
Government offices. Transporters and bus operators have
announced the suspension of inter-state services, and a
section of the leaders of the agitation have issued a 'ban'
on public transport, traffic on the highways, and the arrival
and departure of flights, with the intention to 'cut off'
Manipur from the 'mainland' till the Centre agrees to the
withdrawal of the AFSPA. The self-imposed deadline of August
15, 2004, set separately by the agitators and Chief Minister
Singh, to have the AFSPA lifted, is fast approaching. All
said and done, Manipur's insurgents may have the last laugh,
seeing thousands marching in the streets and clashing with
the men in uniform, demanding the repeal of a legislation
that is tough on the extremists.
|
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
August
2-8, 2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
2
|
1
|
0
|
3
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
3
|
1
|
1
|
5
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
11
|
18
|
12
|
41
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Manipur
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Tripura
|
8
|
0
|
0
|
8
|
West
Bengal
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
24
|
19
|
15
|
58
|
NEPAL
|
6
|
2
|
28
|
36
|
PAKISTAN
|
29
|
10
|
1
|
40
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
INDIA
Geelani
announces
formation
of
the
Tehreek-e-Hurriyat
Jammu
and
Kashmir:
On
August
7,
2004,
senior
separatist
leader
Syed
Ali
Shah
Geelani
floated
his
own
party,
the
Tehreek-e-Hurriyat
Jammu
and
Kashmir.
With
support
from
his
parent
organisation,
Jamaat-e-Islami,
Geelani
announced
that
he
would
function
as
chairman
of
the
new
party
as
well
as
his
faction
of
the
All
Parties
Hurriyat
Conference
(APHC).
While
addressing
a
news
conference
in
Srinagar,
Geelani
said
that
"un-Islamic
ideologies
like
secularism,
socialism,
nationalism
and
even
Communism"
had
become
the
"source
of
inspiration"
for
the
Hurriyat
faction
led
by
Maulvi
Abbas
Ansari
and
Mirwaiz
Umar
Farooq.
Daily
Excelsior,
August
8,
2004.
Nine
police
personnel
killed
during
terrorist
attack
on
CRPF
camp
in
Srinagar:
Nine
Central
Reserve
Police
Force
(CRPF)
personnel,
including
a
company
commander,
and
one
terrorist
were
killed
and
nine
people
sustained
injuries
during
an
encounter
after
two
terrorists
stormed
a
CRPF
camp
in
the
Rajbagh
locality
of
capital
Srinagar
on
August
4-night.
The
encounter
ended
after
a
final
assault
was
launched
by
security
forces
to
flush
out
the
terrorists
holed
up
inside
the
camp
in
the
early
hours
of
August
5.
Unconfirmed
reports
said
the
second
terrorist
had
managed
to
escape.
Earlier,
two
terrorists
had
stormed
a
camp
in
the
Dal
Lake
area
on
July
27-28
and
killed
five
CRPF
personnel.
Daily
Excelsior,
August
6,
2004
NEPAL
India
urges
Nepal
to
probe
Dawood
Ibrahim
link
with
media
firm:
Indian
underworld
fugitive,
Dawood
Ibrahim,
has
reportedly
invested
huge
sums
of
money
in
a
cable
network
in
Nepal,
and
uses
it
to
support
his
business
interests
and
also
to
influence
public
opinion,
especially
against
India.
The
Indian
embassy,
in
a
letter
to
the
Nepalese
Foreign
Ministry,
asked
Kathmandu
to
enquire
into
the
ownership
and
financing
of
Space
Time
Network,
which
runs,
among
others,
a
Nepali
daily
and
a
television
channel,
and
to
take
immediate
action
against
the
company
in
case
the
charges
are
proved.
Dawood
is
reported
to
be
currently
based
in
Pakistan.
Hindustan
Times,
August
9,
2004.
PAKISTAN
Banned
outfit
chief
arrested
for
suicide
attack
on
President
Musharraf
released:
Maulana
Abdul
Jabbar,
chief
of
the
proscribed
Khudam-ul-Furqan
(a
breakaway
faction
of
the
Jaish-e-Mohammed),
has
reportedly
been
released
by
security
agencies
after
a
long
detention
for
the
December
2003-suicide
attack
on
President
Pervez
Musharraf.
"The
security
agencies
after
the
completion
of
investigations
released
Mr
Jabbar
last
week
but
restricted
his
movements
throughout
the
country,"
unnamed
sources
told
Daily
Times
on
August
6,
2004.
Jabbar
was
detained
because
the
suicide
bomber,
namely
Mohammad
Jamil,
had
worked
under
his
command
when
he
was
in
the
outlawed
Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM).
Daily
Times,
August
7,
2004.
19
persons
killed
during
clashes
in
South
Waziristan:
At
least
11
persons
were
reportedly
killed
and
12
others
sustained
injuries
in
an
exchange
of
fire
between
troops
and
terrorists
in
different
parts
of
South
Waziristan
on
August
5,
2004.
Separately,
an
unconfirmed
report
said
that
terrorists
ambushed
an
Army
convoy
at
Khomrang,
close
to
the
Shakai
valley
in
South
Waziristan,
killing
at
least
eight
soldiers.
Jang,
August
6,
2004.
Balochistan
Chief
Minister
escapes
assassination
attempt:
The
Balochistan
Chief
Minister
Jam
Muhammad
Yousaf
escaped
unhurt
when
his
cavalcade
was
attacked
by
unidentified
terrorists
on
August
2,
2004
near
Surab,
about
180
kilometers
south
west
of
Quetta.
A
constable
and
one
of
the
attackers
were
reportedly
killed
and
three
persons
sustained
injuries
during
the
incident.
Daily
Times,
August
3,
2004.
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