SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 8, September 6, 2004

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal

ASSESSMENT

THE GLOBAL WAR

A Loss of Direction
K.P.S. Gill
Publisher, SAIR; President, Institute for Conflict Management

As the third year since the catastrophic attacks of September 11, 2001, in USA approaches completion, with much of the world sliding, once again, slowly but steadily into a torpor of denial, terrorism has once again issued multiple reminders over the past weeks that liberal democracies everywhere are under siege.

The worst of shocks were reserved for Russia, where Chechen terrorists, apparently aided by a number of Arab nationals, took over 1,200 persons hostage - a majority of them children - in a school in Beslan. The bloody dénouement of this operation left 338 dead, including at least 155 children. But this was only the worst of what Russia had already been subjected to in the preceding week: two Russian passenger planes were blown up, apparently by Chechen women suicide bombers, killing 89 persons on August 24. Then, on August 31, another suspected woman suicide bomber blew herself up, along with 10 commuters, at a Moscow subway.

In Iraq, on August 31, terrorists of the Ansar-al-Sunna slaughtered 12 Nepali hostages in cold blood, because they were "working for Jews and the Christians". A number of other hostages of various nationalities continue to be under threat in the custody of a variety of Iraqi groups, including two French journalists, who they have threatened to execute if the French Government fails to lift its ban on headscarves for Muslim schoolgirls.

And so it has been over the past three years, with some tactical and operational variations. Americans, Spaniards, the French, Italians, Russians, Indians, Iraqis, Philippinos, Afghans, even Pakistanis and Saudis - the terrorists' now-ambivalent allies and supporters - , along with others of various nationalities, have repeatedly been targeted over the past three years by Islamist extremists hell-bent on imposing their fantastical vision of a 'cleansed' and 'Islamised' world order.

The liberal democratic response, however, has been, at best, tentative and inconsistent. Indeed, the pattern of Islamist terrorist attacks is itself at least partially responsible for this. While targets have been attacked across the world, there has been no attempt to engineer simultaneous attacks in a wide range of countries. While part of the reason for this would be purely operational, it is also the case that this has resulted in a substantial fragmentation of responses. There is clearly a deliberate, calibrated terrorist strategy, relying on a systematic exploitation of the ideological divisions, the historical faultlines and the geopolitical tensions in the free world - everything, in fact, that creates obstacles to the emergence of a concerted and coordinated global counter-terrorism response.

These multiple tensions within the loose global counter-terrorism coalition remain visible even at moments of the greatest crisis and tragedy. In the aftermath of the terrible catastrophe at Beslan, at least some expressions of shock and condolence - most notably, those emanating from Europe - were qualified by entirely inappropriate riders seeking 'explanations' from the Russian Government about how such a tragedy 'was allowed to happen'. Some commentators dwelt on the 'root causes' and 'legitimate grievances' of the Chechens at a time when all such political issues should have been clearly and unambiguously subordinated to the unqualified condemnation of the enormity and inhumanity that had far transgressed any conceivable borders of explicable violence. It is useful, in this context, to recall that Chechen separatism and terror continues to receive 'diplomatic support' and 'moral sympathy' at a number of international, particularly including European, fora, as well as a substantial measure of material support from sympathetic state sources that largely remain outside the ambit of the international condemnation of the 'sponsorship of terrorism'.

Within this context, it is useful to note that no single country in the world has, in fact, any concrete idea, policy or strategy on how it would deal with the kind of mass hostage situations - particularly those targeting 'sensitive' segments of the population, such as children, women, or very important personalities - on the pattern of the Beslan Operation. For those who believe that it is too soon after Beslan to expect state institutions to have devised an operational policy of response, it is useful to recall that this is far from the first hostage crisis at this scale, and Russia itself has witnessed several in the past. Among the more prominent of these, on October 25, 2002, Chechen rebels took 800 people hostage in a Moscow theatre, demanding the withdrawal of Russian troops from Chechnya. All 41 attackers were shot dead, and 129 hostages also died as a result of the anaesthetic used to immobilize the terrorists. Earlier, on January 9, 1996, militants seized as many as 3,000 hostages in Kizlyar. They were eventually attacked by Russian troops, and at least 78 persons were killed. On June 14, 1995, rebels took 2,000 hostages in Budyonnovsk. In this case, Russia eventually negotiated the release of hostages in exchange for the rebels' escape, but more than 100 persons were killed during the crisis.

Most Governments across the world would respond to comparable crises with hysteria, despair and confusion, adding to the natural risks attending such calamities. It is, consequently, imperative that hard answers now be defined for the many questions of morality, policy and tactics raised by such horrific possible scenarios. A clear, detailed, unequivocal and unremitting policy for dealing with hostage situations needs to be defined at the earliest, and this must secure the sanction, if not of the entire 'international community', at least of those within it who are committed to the 'war against terrorism'. Regrettably, the struggle against terrorism needs an ideological commitment far beyond the opportunism and political expediency that currently dominates the policies of most countries.

It is imperative, moreover, to revaluate our understanding of the 'war on terror'. This struggle cannot simply be conceptualised as a military operation, and has far deeper and more complex dimensions, which require inputs across a wide range of non-military parameters. Unfortunately, the world has substantially failed to recognize these parameters, and existing institutional responses, sanctions and penalties are simply not enough.

The reasons for this failure are not, by any means, rooted in the impossibility of the task. Indeed, responses are not all that difficult to work out. The tragedy is, most of the 'experts' currently working in this field are mere academics, desk officers, policy makers and politicians, most of whom have little real experience of the field, and who jealously guard their 'turf' against hard practitioners of counter-terrorism strategy and tactics. The examples of the miscalculations and misadventures of these doctrinaire 'experts' are too numerous to be listed and can, indeed, be multiplied ad infinitum. What is needed, however, is to evolve systems within and between countries that will optimize coordinated responses on a day-to-day operational basis. It is critical to realize, today, that we are in fact confronted with the challenge of policing a menace that is dispersed across the globe, and the formalism of international treaties, bilateral agreements, and the joint working group mechanisms that have been hammered out between some countries, remain mired in legal and diplomatic formalism, and are simply not working. Unless we develop instrumentalities beyond these paper exercises, we will only see horrifying events like 9/11 and the Beslan tragedy multiply in ever-widening areas of the world. Any country that believes that it is safe, or that it can exempt itself through policies designed to appease or conciliate the terrorists is simply deluding itself.

INDIA

J&K: The Bus to Peace Remains Stalled
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
New Delhi Chief of Bureau, Frontline magazine, and also writes for its sister publication, The Hindu

The bus to peace in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) may be headed to that alternate destination its passengers know so well: a place called 'impasse'.

Last month, Pakistan helped restore Islamist leader Syed Ali Shah Geelani to the centre-stage in J&K politics, giving both Islamabad and the jihadi groups it backs a voice in Srinagar. Now, Islamabad seems to be considering what message it wishes to deliver from its newly-acquired pulpit. In New Delhi for talks with his Indian counterpart, Pakistan's Foreign Minister, Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, summoned the rival secessionist leaders from J&K for a parallel stream of negotiations. Nothing is known of what transpired between Geelani and Kasuri at the two meetings they held on September 5, 2004. Geelani's centrist rival, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, told journalists he emphasised the need for softer borders and re-uniting divided families; on Kasuri's response, the Srinagar religious leader was silent.

Also Read

The Hawks Strike Back -- Praveen Swami

Decapitated Nightingale -- Praveen Swami

Secessionist politicians in Srinagar expect that Kasuri will have placed considerable pressure on Mirwaiz Farooq to temper his opposition to the Islamist faction of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) led by Geelani, and backed by the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) - and to reduce the visibility of the pro-dialogue, centrist factions he heads. Hit by the assassination of several close relatives and aides, frightened by the burning down of his seminary, under threat from both the Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HM) and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), and without an heir to carry on his clerical legacy, Mirwaiz Farooq may well choose the second option. Yet, the stakes for the centrists he represents are also high. Should they fail to shape a political agenda in coming weeks, Geelani's position will consolidate - and hopes that centrists will be able to directly negotiate a peace with New Delhi would receive a potentially fatal blow.

In recent weeks, Geelani has had considerable success in drawing in fringe groupings from among J&K secessionists into the ranks of his party. On August 30, the People's League chairman Sheikh Abdul Aziz formally joined the Geelani faction of the APHC. Mirwaiz Farooq's APHC, he claimed, had "deviated from the Hurriyat constitution and entered into talks [with the Indian government]", which he described as "a futile exercise". Aziz said his organisation would only participate in three-way talks between India, Pakistan and representatives of the people of J&K, a formulation New Delhi has traditionally rejected. APHC centrists had begun to abandon this formulation in the wake of the Kargil war, instead pushing for direct dialogue with New Delhi.

Days later, on September 3, the chairman of Mahaz-e-Azadi, Azam Inqilabi, urged non-aligned secessionist groups, notably Yasin Malik's Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) and Shabbir Shah's Democratic Freedom Party, to join Geelani. Speaking to journalists in Srinagar on September 3, Inqilabi used a formulation similar to that of Aziz, asserting that future dialogue needed to involve not just India and Pakistan, but representatives of Kashmir. Although both Malik and Shah have stayed away from the centrist APHC's dialogue with New Delhi, and sought for some time to reconcile the warring faction's, these secessionist leaders have so far resisted being corralled into Geelani's formation.

Geelani, interestingly, has adopted a position of opposition to any dialogue - including the ongoing process between India and Pakistan. A recent statement issued by his APHC faction said that confidence building measures like the opening of the Srinagar-Muzaffarabad route, "or sticking to the ego for menial interests" would not help solve the conflict in J&K. The press release had opposed the scheduled meeting between Kasuri and India's Foreign Minister, Natwar Singh, arguing that that bilateral talks had historically failed to produce workable solutions to the problem. "These talks are doomed to fail until the people of Jammu & Kashmir are associated with the process", the statement read. Geelani reiterated this position after speaking to Kasuri, declaring, "bilateral dialogue has no effect on ground situation in J&K. Until the contentious issue of J&K is resolved, nothing will be achieved. All efforts are in vain."

This rejectionist polemic was provoked by the killing of the HM's 'intelligence chief', Abdul Rashid Dar, on the eve of the Kasuri-Singh meeting. Operating under the alias Tariq Aziz, Dar had served over the past eight years as the HM's 'Deputy District Commander' and 'District Commander' in Pulwama, before assuming charge of its 'intelligence wing'. Indian forces have not taken responsibility for Dar's killing, but the Geelani faction of the Hurriyat said he had been "martyred". Representatives of the group later visited Dar's family. Significantly, the HM itself said nothing on Dar's killing - a sign of how similar Geelani's activities now are to those of a political wing of the grouping.

At least some believe Geelani's rejectionist position could have Pakistan's tacit support, as a means of slowing down the dialogue and confidence-building measures until major political concessions by India are forthcoming. Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, speaking before the talks began, made it clear that further political progress would depend on an end to cross-border terrorism, something Pakistan has repeatedly promised in the past. Within Pakistan's Kashmir-policy establishment, however, there seems to be considerable confusion on the issue, with some arguing that an end to violence will strip that country of the sole leverage it has to extract concessions from India.

Desperate for some face-saving measures which would give a resumption of dialogue with New Delhi political saleability among their constituency, the centrist APHC leadership is finding the political climate inhospitable. On August 31, the centrist APHC - like the Islamist APHC - attacked the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) Government's handling of J&K, criticising it for placing "conditions and pre-conditions" for dialogue. The grouping, which had held two rounds of dialogue with the earlier National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government, said that both India and Pakistan had at that time realised the futility of rigid positions, and had decided to move ahead. However, it argued, the coming to power of the UPA Government had meant that the situation had "returned to square one".

What isn't clear is just what New Delhi can do to bring the centrists back on board. Proposals like a phased reduction in troop strength in J&K, or a unilateral ceasefire, are simply unworkable as long as terrorist violence continues. Nor can the centrists deliver anything to New Delhi in return, most notably a reduction in levels of violence. Islamists like Geelani, for their part, have no real reason to allow dialogue to go ahead as long as India is unwilling to make the kinds of significant territorial concessions that would be acceptable to Pakistan. Pakistan, in turn, has brought about a phased reduction in levels of support to terror since 2002, but seems unwilling to go further until Indian concessions are made. India cannot make those concessions, because of their implications for its sovereignty and domestic political opinion.

So what might happen next? Almost unnoticed by observers, Kasuri held out a threat. Kashmiri groups, he said on September 5, had "complained that human rights violations had increased since November." Its hard to see just what factual basis Kasuri's claim has - both killings of terrorists and of civilians by Indian forces are at record lows this year - but infiltration had fallen sharply from December 2003, as part of a calibrated Pakistani response to open up the way for talks with New Delhi. Read through this prism, Kasuri could be signalling that in the absence of a breakthrough, or at least a reduction in Indian military presence in J&K, cross-border terrorism will be unleashed at full-scale levels again. With 17 Brigades tied down in Wana, the Pakistan Army may be feeling insecure about its eastern flanks and wish to ensure that Indian forces are occupied.

The fact is, since the peace process began in 2000, the fundamentals of the problem in J&K have not changed - and seem unlikely to do so any time soon.

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
August 30-September 5, 2004

	Civilian	Security Force Personnel	Terrorist	Total
BANGLADESH	2	0	2	4
BHUTAN	2	0	0	2
INDIA
Assam	0	0	5	5
Jammu & Kashmir	8	4	15	27
Left-wing extremism	0	4	0	4
Manipur	0	0	1	1
Tripura	0	0	2	2
Total (INDIA)	8	8	23	39
NEPAL	5	6	26	37
PAKISTAN	1	3	1	5

Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.

BANGLADESH

Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami training Indian terrorists: The Harkat-ul-Jehad-al-Islami (HuJI) is reported to be running camps in different parts of Bangladesh imparting training to terrorist groups from India and Myanmar. The outfit is also suspected to be behind the August 21-grenade attack on Awami League leader Sheikh Hasina's rally in the capital Dhaka. A five-part article in the Bangladeshi newspaper Prothom Alo has reported that HuJI, which has been declared a terrorist outfit by the US State Department for its Al Qaeda and Taliban connections, has established an active network through Madrassas (seminaries) and local NGOs to carry out its activities. The areas, where the newspaper sent reporters to investigate the camps, are Bandarban, Naikhangchari, Ukhia, Dailpara, Chandgaon and Khatunganj among others in Cox's Bazaar and Chittagong district of southeastern Bangladesh. The 'central command headquarters' of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), active in India's Northeast, are based in these areas. Times of India, September 2, 2004.

BHUTAN

Two persons killed during bomb blast in Gelephu town: Two people were reportedly killed and 27 others sustained injuries in a bomb blast which occurred in the Sunday market shopping area of Gelephu town on September 5. The dead are reported to be Indians but have not been identified. Kuensel Online, September 6, 2004.

111 persons convicted for collaborating with terrorist groups active in India's northeast: After eight months of court proceedings which reportedly concluded on September 3, 2004, a hundred and eleven people, including seven women, were sentenced to prison terms ranging from four years to life imprisonment in connection with aiding and abetting the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and Kamtapur Liberation Organisation, terrorist groups active in India's Northeast, when they were illegally camped in Bhutan. Two people received life sentence (above 20 years), five people were sentenced from 15 to 18 years, 14 people from 10 to 15 years and rest from four years to 10 years in accordance with the provisions of the National Security Act of Bhutan, 1992. Those convicted include civil servants, road workers from the national work force, private workers, business people, drivers and farmers. Kuensel Online, September 4, 2004.

INDIA

India and Pakistan agree on incremental steps to take dialogue process forward: On September 5, 2004, India and Pakistan agreed on incremental steps to take the dialogue process forward even as they differed on the issues of cross-border terrorism and Jammu and Kashmir during a meeting between their respective Foreign Ministers, Natwar Singh and Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri, at Hyderabad House in New Delhi. The Ministers also reviewed the progress made in the first round of the eight-subject composite dialogue. Both countries have reportedly agreed to hold technical talks on the Khokrapar-Munabao rail link, continue discussions on nuclear confidence-building measures, hold a dialogue between the respective Coast Guards and a dialogue on narcotics control and trade-related issues. The Hindu, September 6, 2004.

All three Indian hostages released by Iraqi captors: The three Indians held hostage by their Iraqi captors at an undisclosed location were released on September 1, 2004. Three Kenyans and an Egyptian, who were held captive along with the Indians since July 21, 2004, were also released. The hostages - Antaryami, Tilak Raj and Sukhdev Singh - were brought to the Indian Embassy in Baghdad and subsequently arrived in the Indian capital New Delhi on September 3. Working for a Kuwaiti transport company, Kuwait and Gulf Link Transport Company (KGL), the Indians and the other four, were driving trucks in Iraq when they were taken hostage by a hitherto unknown terrorist group 'Islamic Secret Army - Holders of Black Banners'. Meanwhile, confirming the release at a press conference in Delhi, E. Ahamed, the Minister of State for External Affairs, said "We have got them released consistent with our policy and without sacrificing any of the principles." The Hindu, September 2, 2004.

NEPAL

Iraqi terrorists kill 12 Nepalese hostages: On August 31, 2004, the Islamist Army of Ansar-al-Sunna is reported to have killed the twelve Nepalese who they had taken hostage in Iraq on August 20, international news agencies said citing information posted by the terrorist group on an Islamic website. "The statement by the Al-Qaeda linked group was accompanied by pictures of what was claimed to be the bodies of the hostages, one of whom was apparently beheaded while the rest had their throats cut," reported the AFP. The Nepalese Ambassador to Qatar, Shayamananda Suman, said "I have confirmed the news through al-Zajeera TV and it is already in the website of the militant group." Describing the incident as unfortunate, Suman said, "The problem was that there was no communication from the other side. Nepalese officials had put a lot of efforts and had contacted Iraqi religious leaders to help release the hostages." Nepal News, September 1, 2004.

Government unveils modalities of Peace Committee: The Nepalese Government made public the modalities of the high-level Peace Committee on August 31, 2004. The Peace Committee headed by Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba will have two departments - the Advisory and Cooperation Subcommittee and the Peace Secretariat. The Advisory and Cooperation Subcommittee, to be manned with representatives of civil society, legal experts and defence and foreign affairs experts, will be suggesting the know-how of the peace process, while the Peace Secretariat, headed by the Government's chief secretary, will be dealing mainly with administrative aspects. Nepal News, September 1, 2004.

The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni

A Project of the
Institute For Conflict Management

To receive FREE advance copies of SAIR by email Subscribe.

Recommend South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) to a friend.

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW Weekly Assessments & Briefings Volume 3, No. 8, September 6, 2004

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 8, September 6, 2004