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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 3, No. 9, September 13, 2004

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal



ASSESSMENT


 
INDIA
NEPAL

Political Pilgrimage in Search of Security
Guest Writer: S.D. Muni
Professor of South Asian Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi

Nepalese Prime Ministers generally prefer to call on New Delhi for their first foreign visit after assuming office. The urgency for Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba's visit was, however, accentuated by nearly a week-long effective blockade of Kathmandu imposed by the Maoist insurgents. That week exposed the vulnerability of the Deuba Government and its capacity to govern. India sent strong signals to assure Kathmandu that it would not allow the Nepalese state to collapse. Foreign Secretary Shyam Saran's unusual detour to Kathmandu Airport, on his way to Myanmar, during the period of the blockade, appeared to have convinced Deuba that it was time for a serious discussion with his Indian counterpart on the Maoist challenge.
  Also Read
Blockade Ends, but no Signs of a Ceasefire -- Keshab Poudel
Maoist Rhetoric for United Nations Mediation -- P.G. Rajamohan

On leaving Kathmandu for New Delhi, Deuba described his journey as a 'goodwill visit'. He brought along a large entourage of 66 members drawn from various walks of life, including business and tourism. The most thinly (or even non-) represented sections in his delegation were the home and defence ministries as well as the Royal Nepalese Army (RNA), though his core concern was the Maoist insurgency. Other issues in his agenda included discussion on projects to harness water resources, the problem of Bhutanese refugees, and visits to temples and holy places in India. There was strong criticism of his visit not only from customary political baiters like the Nepali Congress President Girija Prasad Koirala, but also from members of his coalition Government and civil society representatives. He was warned against signing any major Agreement with India and was even asked to raise some of the major irritants in relations between Kathmandu and New Delhi, including the revision of the 1950 Treaty that define the basis of Indo-Nepal relations, and the question of alleged border encroachments by India.

India has preferred to treat the five-day tour as a working visit, and not as a State visit. There were no delegation level discussions with the Prime Minister, nor any state banquets or lunches. All the official discussions with the Prime Minister and the Ministers of Defence, External Affairs, Home and Water Resources were wound up only in a day and half. In between, Deuba also had time to call on the President and meet with other Indian leaders, such as Sonia Gandhi, President of the Congress Party, and L.K. Advani, the Leader of the Opposition. He also had a private dinner with Indian intellectuals and sympathizers. Agreements on culture, sports and exchange of weather information were signed during the visit.

On the core concern of the Maoist insurgency, Deuba got all the assurances he was looking for. India described the Maoists as a "common security concern" and pledged "every possible help, military or otherwise". India's worries arise on account of the Maoists' close and growing links with Left Wing extremist insurgents (referred to as Naxalites) in India, and the increasingly strident portrayal of India as an expansionist neighbour by the Nepalese Maoist Chief, Pushpa Kamal Dahal @ Prachanda, as well as attacks on Indian business interests in Nepal, along with attacks on enterprises with Royal and American stakes. Deuba's shopping-list of military hardware was considered sympathetically in New Delhi, and transfer of equipment, including Advanced Light Helicopters (not mounted with guns, but to carry troops) was confirmed. India has also agreed to train 400 to 500 Nepalese police personnel in counter insurgency operations. The setting up of a Joint Committee to monitor the security situation and suggest appropriate measures was 'noted' by the two sides. India assured Nepal it would take all possible steps to coordinate legal actions to deal with the terrorist problem, but ongoing discussions on an Extradition Treaty could not be concluded. The Nepalese side is keen to ink an extradition arrangement, as they want to get hold of some top Maoist leaders under detention in India. Both the sides agreed that they would not allow their territories to be used against each other, implying that, while India would tighten its border security to deter the movement of Maoists across the border, Nepal would also do every thing possible to curb the activities of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) aimed at fuelling cross-border terrorism against India.

Besides providing security support, India also tried to impress upon the visiting Nepalese Prime Minister that military means to address the Maoist challenge were not sufficient, and that steps would also have to be initiated to seek a 'negotiated political solution' of the problem. This Indian message was not only communicated in one-to-one meetings at the higher political level, but was also made public in the Indian Foreign Secretary's Statement on September 10. The significance of this position lies in the fact that the RNA and the Nepalese establishment do not favour any talks with the Maoists at present, for fear that this may give the impression that the RNA was succumbing to Maoist pressures, since the rebels clearly have an upper hand at the moment. In these one-to-one discussions, the Indian side also appears to have discouraged Deuba from accepting any third party role in the peace process with the rebels. The Maoists have favoured international mediation in talking to the King directly. They have refused to talk to the Deuba Government as this is 'neither a legitimate nor a credible Government' from their point of view. Many international third parties, including the United Nations, have shown interest in acting as facilitators or mediators for talks between the Nepalese Government and the rebels. Switzerland and Norway are the latest candidates volunteering such a role. India's apprehensions, not without reasons, are that the third parties will complicate the Nepalese conflict without having any capacity to discipline either of the parties from betraying good-faith.

On the whole, Deuba has expressed great 'satisfaction' on the outcome of his India tour. Discerning Nepalese observers, however, are of the view that, for some military goodies, political assurances, advice on seeking a 'peaceful solution' and caution against the role of third parties, their Prime Minister did not have to travel to New Delhi. All this could have been obtained through normal diplomatic channels. Their contention is that the real purpose behind Deuba's visit was to get political support for his own continuation as Prime Minister. There were rumours - and rumours have considerable political significance in Kathmandu - that, following his Government's failure during the Kathmandu blockade, the King, while relaxing at his private resort in Pokhara, was having second thoughts on Deuba's Prime Ministership. Differences of approach are also crystallizing. Deuba has set up a 'Peace Secretariat', with American support, but the King and the Army do not want any dialogue with the Maoists, at least for the time being. Further, the United Marxist Leninists (UML) of Nepal are Deuba's coalition partners in the Government, but they are breathing heavily down the Prime Minister's neck. Perhaps the political pilgrimage to New Delhi could help Deuba somewhat in easing his crisis of self-confidence.

There are no signs that Deuba's visit to New Delhi would deter the Maoists from mounting further pressure on Kathmandu. Just a couple of days before Deuba's departure, they had warned 35 business establishments to cease operations. In the meanwhile, they bombed Malla Hotel in Kathmandu (close to the Royal Palace) and Fishtail Hotel in Pokhara. And on the day Deuba concluded his official engagements in New Delhi, they blasted the American Information Centre complex in Kathmandu. The Maoists, it seems, are on their 'strategic offensive', the penultimate stage in their 'peoples' war' strategy. Their war on the Nepalese state is definitely being expanded from the rural theatre to urban centres. Their front organizations are displaying robust competitive initiatives in destroying the credibility of the monarchical order by attacking businesses and public structures. The explosion at the American Centre on the eve of the 9/11 anniversary may alarm terrorism-watchers about the possibilities of their developing links with Al Qaeda affiliates.

No matter how well India equips the Nepalese security forces, they are far away from being capable of dealing with the Maoists. India's own experience in the northeast and in Naxalite affected regions is that military methods may, at best, help, but cannot deliver a solution to internal revolts and insurgencies. India is now planning a co-ordinated political strategy for all the insurgency affected States of the Union. It must, therefore, seriously pursue a similar approach in Nepal, as indicated during Deuba's visit. Towards that end, Indian policy will have to break from the legacy of supporting the Monarchy as the symbol of order and stability in Nepal. The Monarchy is part of the problem in the Himalayan Kingdom, it can hardly be a part of the solution to the present crisis. Indian policy urgently needs to relate itself to the grass roots and popular forces. Such forces include the Maoists. India should therefore work with Nepal towards redefining its political order so as to help the rebels shed their arms and violent methods for a respectable and democratic place in the mainstream of Nepali national politics.

 
INDIA

Manipur: Mismanaged Crisis
Guest Writer: Pradip Phanjoubam
Editor, Imphal Free Press

Visiting Manipur on September 5, nearly two months after the current wave of public unrest in the State following the killing of Thangjam Manorama by personnel of the Assam Rifles on July 11, Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil, had little to offer to the aggrieved protestors, nor indeed, was any coherent solution to promote the restoration of peace and order in the State apparent during his interactions there. Throughout his visit, which included a much publicized and utterly failed round of negotiations with the Apunba Lup, the umbrella body heading the protests, the Minister reflected little understanding of the ground situation. The innocuous statement on September 5, at the end of his visit, summed up his manifestly modest 'achievements' during the tour: "The visit to Manipur was helpful, enlightening and encouraging to understand the issues."
  Also Read
Impending Collapse of Governance -- Wasbir Hussain
Lessons Never Learnt -- Bibhu Prasad Routray

Patil, it appears, is simply wishing that the problem will go away with the passage of time. Earlier, the July 20 visit of his junior colleague, Minister of State Sriprakash Jaiswal, had also proven a failed venture, as the Minister remained non-committal on the withdrawal of the controversial Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1958, and offered little else by way of 'resolution'. It appears, in fact, that the Central political leadership's approach to the situation has been uniformly unproductive, not because they have refused to concede to the protestors' demands, but rather because they have failed miserably to articulate any alternate plans of action that could help diffuse the situation.

The whirlwind that has been sweeping the Valley areas of Manipur for the past two months was always seen as coming by close observers of the turmoil in the State, at least over the five months prior to the outbreak of the latest 'troubles'. An apparent shift in the Army's counter insurgency strategy reportedly resulted in the elimination of 18 militant suspects after they were arrested. The last among these included Jamkholet Khongsai, a Kuki village pastor from Saijang village, found buried on July 10 after being taken away by personnel of the 28 Assam Rifles on July 8, and Thangjam Manorama, whisked away by personnel of the 17 Assam Rifles on July 11, and found shot under controversial circumstance a few hours later. Of all the 18, only in the case of Manorama were formal procedures of issuing arrest and seizure memos observed, and at least two cases, that of K. Tejkumar and P. Sanajit, involved mistaken identities. Ironically, Tejkumar was an Army aspirant. The rest of the victims were, almost without exception, either surrendered or 'retired' underground cadres, with possibly some links still alive with their former organizations as a result of the compulsions of their backgrounds.

It may be difficult for people in the metropolii to understand this, but such affiliations are known to everybody in a traditional society with very strong grassroots civil society bodies, as represented by the Meira Paibis and local youth clubs. Because of these bodies, every locality, except perhaps in the commercial core of Imphal, would have an unwritten database of the background of everybody in that locality. So when any youth makes an unexplained disappearance, everybody in the locality soon knows why, how and where he or she has gone. Whether they join any particular underground organization, or whether they belong to the lumpenised groups in the 'trouble maker' category or were the 'idealistic type', holding promise even in mainstream pursuits. This is also why, when known active underground cadres are killed, people have been known to join the mourning, but seldom have these resulted in anger of the kind currently being witnessed. It was inevitable that the blatant and systematic fashion in which society's 'prodigal sons and daughters' were being picked up and eliminated, would evoke a backlash. The killing of Manorama, also a retired cadre of the PLA, a virgin till shortly before the time of her violent death, according to the post mortem report, was the last straw that snapped the public's patience.

A more sympathetic understanding of this mass psychology would certainly have saved lives. A paranoid establishment has generally inclined to the view that people are 'partial' to the insurgents, and that is the 'cause' of the present agitation, but this is far from the case. While protests against the state attract maximum coverage, the truth is, the insurgents' atrocities have also resulted in demonstrations of public outrage in the past. The protests over the killing of the Satya Book House proprietor because of a failure to meet extortion demands, or of cloth retailer Manoj Sethi, or the Lilong bus bomb blast, or the mistaken gunning down of ten passengers of a Tata Sumo near Jiribam, all by insurgents, are testimony to the people's anger against lawless violence. Unfortunately, since there is a multiplicity of such insurgent groups in the State, and no mechanism exists to address such outrage, public protests are more in the nature of punching the air.

Given the circumstance, the official interpretation of the agitation for the repeal of the AFSPA, following the Manorama killing, as being entirely 'sponsored' by underground organizations, is simplistic, though expected. Past records testify to this attitude, and any complex issue defying easy official comprehension or handling has always been treated in this way. Not long ago, the convenient cover was the unseen 'foreign hand'. Today, it is 'underground instigation'. Underground organizations are obviously eager to take advantage of the situation and to instigate trouble, but the claim that this was the sole cause of the passions that have recently erupted amounts to gross distortion and a total failure of understanding of popular sentiments. All kinds of vested interests - including the political opposition in the State - have naturally sought to exploit the situation to the extent possible, but the circumstances are not of their creation. The danger is, a wrong diagnosis appears to be leading to persistently wrong prescriptions.

The theory that the entire episode is an orchestrated, stage-managed street show, entirely undermines the integrity of the civil population in the State. Every mass protest is, in some measure, 'organised', but this is not the same as it being 'stage managed'. Public apprehensions and indignation have been very real, and it has been the failure of leadership at every level - both within the military and political establishment - that has allowed the situation to snowball to its current and disturbing dimensions. Simple official initiatives at the early stages could have contained public passions. Excesses and aberrant action by members of security forces when handled correctly even at the local level, have seldom led to the kind of disorders noticed in Manipur over the past months. It is useful, in this context, to recall the recent case in the Kokrajhar district of Assam, where a tribal woman was raped by two soldiers on June 30 this year. Immediate action by the Army, a quick court martial and a sentence of 10 years imprisonment for the two accused soldiers by August 13 - far more swift and well in excess of anything that could conceivably have resulted in India's ailing criminal courts - ensured that justice was both done and seen to be done. Earlier, in 1998, the rape of a Bodo woman, in the Nalbari district, also in Assam, by two soldiers, threatened to bring public anger to a boil, but immediate action by the Corps Commander, the District Police Chief and the Administration, in the form of a personal apology to the girl and her family, along with assurances of that the culprits would be dealt with severely, helped diffuse the situation. The two soldiers were subsequently found guilty on charges of assault and rape, and were sentenced to 12 years in prison.

By contrast, the response, both of the military and political leadership in the present case, has been tardy, ambivalent and unconscionable. A flurry of contradictory statements and of actions that fall into the 'too little too late' category - including the belated and fruitless visit by Union Home Minister Shivraj Patil last week - have kept the State on a boil for two months. Principled action can still help restore the situation, but the Centre appears to have decided that the 'problem will take time to solve'. As Patil expressed it rather abstractedly, "All dialogues are useful. We will solve the problem but all of it may not be solved in one go... But we can go ahead in the right direction".

It is useful to remember, however, that time is not always a healer; situations most often worsen in neglect.

 

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
September 6-12, 2004

 
Civilian
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total

BANGLADESH

4
0
1
5

INDIA

     Assam

1
0
8
9

     Jammu &
     Kashmir

11
11
16
38

     Left-wing
     extremism

2
0
4
6

     Manipur

0
4
1
5

     Meghalaya

0
0
8
8

     Nagaland

0
0
1
1

     Tripura

2
0
1
3

Total (INDIA)

16
15
39
70

NEPAL

5
5
10
20

PAKISTAN

14
14
65
93
 Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


BANGLADESH

World Bank Country Director leaves Dhaka after receiving death threat: The World Bank Country Director, Christine I. Wallich, has reportedly left Bangladesh after receiving a death threat on September 7, 2004, an official with the multilateral lending agency said on September 10. A letter was sent to her residence in the Gulshan area of the capital Dhaka, marking her as the next target of bomb attacks. Wallich, an American citizen, is the first foreigner known to have received a death threat since the August 21 grenade attack on an Awami League rally in Dhaka in which at least 20 people died. Meanwhile, the Prime Minister's Political Secretary Harris Chowdhury told BBC Radio on September 10 that, "We have no idea if she (Wallich) has received a bomb threat. The threat could be for fun or real." The Daily Star, September 11, 2004.

India to give fresh list of terrorist camps to Bangladesh: According to The Hindu, India will give Bangladesh a fresh list of terrorist training camps operating in that country when the Home Secretary, Dhirendra Singh, pays a three-day visit to Dhaka from September 15, 2004. India is also likely to seek custody of fugitive insurgent leaders, including the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) chief, Paresh Baruah. Sources in the Union Home Ministry at Delhi said the revised list of camps will include those serving as shelter-cum-transit points for terrorists active in India's North-east. These camps belong to the ULFA, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) and other outfits active in Manipur, Nagaland, Assam and Tripura. During talks with the Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) in August 2004, the Border Security Force (BSF) had submitted a list of 195 camps run from Bangladeshi territory. The BDR, however, denied the existence of these camps. The list of fugitive leaders, whose handover is to be demanded, includes Baruah, who is hiding in Dhaka with the alleged connivance of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), his deputy Arabinda Rajkhowa and the NLFT leader, Biswamohan Debbarma. The Hindu, September 9, 2004.


INDIA

Tamil Nadu imposes ban on People's War Group: The Tamil Nadu Government has banned the left-wing extremist outfit, the People's War Group (PWG), to protect the State from possible infiltration by its cadres from neighboring States like Andhra Pradesh and Karnataka. The State Government, on September 10, 2004, invoked provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1908, to declare the PWG an unlawful organisation in Tamil Nadu, and justified the action by stating that the outfit's cadres and sympathisers were likely to sneak into the State to indulge in acts prejudicial to public peace, and then slip back into Andhra Pradesh. An official release stated that the PWG was distributing seditious literature and inciting violence against the Government machinery by its wall writings, posters and pamphlets "to achieve its objective of establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat." The Hindu, September 11, 2004.

Cease-fire with Pakistan on the Line of Control to continue: On September 6, 2004, India and Pakistan decided to continue the cease-fire along the Line of Control (LoC) which came into force on November 25, 2003. This was reportedly decided during the two-day talks between External Affairs Minister Natwar Singh and his visiting Pakistani counterpart, Khurshid Mehmood Kasuri, in New Delhi. Meanwhile, the two sides, while claiming 'progress' on the composite dialogue process, also agreed on a series of military and other Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) to improve relations, but differed on the Jammu and Kashmir issue and cross-border terrorism. Emerging after an hour-long meeting with Kasuri, Singh told reporters that 'differences' in perception persisted, and India's serious concerns on cross-border infiltration remained. At the joint press conference, Kasuri spoke of the centrality of the Kashmir issue and the 'human rights situation' in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian Express, September 7, 2004.


NEPAL

India and Nepal to jointly combat terrorism: On September 12, 2004, India and Nepal expressed their determination to jointly combat terrorism. The Indian assurance was contained in a joint statement issued at the end of the five-day visit of the Nepalese Prime Minister Sher Bahadur Deuba. "The Prime Ministers reiterated the determination of the two countries in combating the scourge of terrorism. They agreed to further intensify cooperation in curbing the activities of the extremists. "In this context they expressed satisfaction at the ongoing cooperation under the existing mechanism in the areas of equipment, training and exchange of information," the statement said. The two Prime Ministers also emphasized the need for an early conclusion to the Extradition Treaty and Agreement on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters and directed the Home Secretaries to take up the matter in the next meeting to finalise the documents. The Hindu, September 12, 2004.


PAKISTAN

New police recruits in NWFP being scrutinized for extremist links: Federal and Provincial security agencies are reportedly scrutinising records of new lower cadre recruits in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) police to ascertain if they have any links with Islamist extremist groups. The decision to purge the police of extremists was taken during an August 2004-meeting in Islamabad in the wake of the Moharram killings in Quetta [March 2, 2004], the Hyderi Mosque bomb explosion in Karachi [May 7, 2004] and the arrest of a constable from Lahore who was deputed at the official residence of Punjab Chief Minister Choudhury Pervez Elahi. "It is very important to conduct verifications of the new lot in the police department in the wake of the current spate of terrorism in the country and the alleged involvement of low-ranking policemen in terrorist incidents occurring this year," said Senior Superintendent of Police (Operations) Abid Ali. Dawn, September 13, 2004.

50 terrorists killed during aerial raid on training camp in South Waziristan: At least 50 terrorists, including some Chechens, Uzbeks and Arabs, are reported to have been killed and 120 others were wounded during an aerial raid on their training camp at Bad Awaz Garang in the Kaikhel area of South Waziristan on September 9, 2004. However, some television channels and foreign news agencies put the toll at over 60. F-7 jets commenced the operation at around 6 AM (PST) and dropped bombs on the camp in Bad Awaz Garang, about 70 kilometres to the northwest of Wana, the regional headquarters of South Waziristan. An Inter-Services Public Relations statement said, "There were confirmed reports of training activity being conducted by foreign elements, including Uzbeks, Chechens and a few Arabs… The facility was successfully knocked out through a precisely-targeted operation which lasted for about two hours." Among the 50 dead, at least 35 to 40 are reported to be foreign terrorists. There were unconfirmed reports that some civilians also died during the aerial raid. Dawn; Daily Times, September 10, 2004.

 



The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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