SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 5, No. 30, February 5, 2007

BANGLADESH: The JMB Survives - Bibhu Prasad Routray INDIA - Assam: Karbi Anglong: Hotbed of Violence - Sandipani Dash

The JMB Survives
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

On January 28, 2007, authorities fixed February 17 as the date for the execution of six of the seven militants of the Jama’atul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), including its chief, Abdur Rahman, its ‘operations commander’ Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai, who is also the chief of the Jagrata Janata Muslim Bangladesh (JMJB), Majlish-e-Shura (the highest decision-making body) members, Ataur Rahman Sunny, Abdul Awal, Khaled Saifullah and suicide squad member Iftekhar al Mamun. Another convict, Asadul Islam alias Arif, is absconding. All of them have been sentenced to death for their involvement in the Jhalakathi bomb attack that killed two judges in November 2005. There is, however, little chance of the sentence being carried out on the appointed day as all the convicts have filed mercy petitions with the President. Authorities have indicated that, in case the President rejects the petitions, the militants will be hanged in March. President Iajuddin Ahmed, temporarily presiding over the fate of a politically polarised nation that faces an uncertain poll in a few months, is not expected to take a decision on the petitions any time soon.

Previously, on January 27, all the convicted JMB leaders and cadres, barring Bangla Bhai had submitted their mercy petitions to the jail authorities. Bangla Bhai, who has been kept in Kashimpur Jail, submitted his mercy petition a day later on January 28. Interestingly, some of the letters to the President from the JMB militants, which have been described as ‘mercy petitions’, were nothing but reassertions and justifications of the past criminal actions of the group. After submitting a three- page letter which the jail authorities described as a compilation of quotations from Quran and the Hadith and an invitation to the President to "join the path of Islam", for instance, Rahman reportedly announced that "in Islamic law, the President does not have the jurisdiction to show mercy", so "he (Rahman) does not want the President's mercy". Similarly, Bangla Bhai’s three-and-a-half page ‘mercy petition’ defended his activities by referring to different verses of the Quran and Hadith. The official explanation for considering such an assertion as a ‘mercy petition’, consequently, defied logic. A jail official said, "Whether he (Bangla Bhai) appeals for mercy or not, whatever he has written in the letter would be considered as his mercy petition and we will send it to the President through the Home Ministry." Both Rahman and Bangla Bhai had earlier made similar claims in their letters to the Supreme Court justifying the killing of people in order to establish Islamic rule. They even went to the extent of asserting that all judges, who held trials under Taguti (non-Islamic) laws, neglecting Shariah, deserve death. At that stage also, the Supreme Court had accepted their letters as appeals and had stayed the execution of the death sentence before, confirming it thereafter, on November 28, 2006.

Despite the appeals pending before the President, however, it would seem that these radical groups are nearing the end of the road. Nevertheless, notwithstanding the fate of the JMB militants in coming months, as has repeatedly been emphasized in SAIR, the execution of the death sentences on the JMB militants is not likely to bring about a dramatic change in the course of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh.

The arrests of the top JMB leadership had been expected to bring out the group’s entire dynamics into public knowledge, but these expectations have been belied. Much current information about the outfit, which, before the August 17, 2005, country-wide bombings, functioned in relative anonymity, however, remains largely speculative, with little hard evidence or information available to the public. It is not clear whether the absence of hard information in the public sphere is part of a collusive arrangement, but the JMB’s complex and widely hypothesized linkages with the state establishment remain entirely hidden away.

Open source information indicates that 57 JMB cadres were arrested between April 26, 2006 – the day last Majlish-e-Shura member of the group, Khaled Saifullah was arrested from a rented house in Dhaka city’s Paradagair locality – and January 31, 2007. These arrests took place across 11 Districts: Narayanganj, Rangpur, Tangail, Gazipur, Chittagong, Kishoreganj, Chapainawabganj, Rajshahi, Mymensingh, Bogra and Sherpur. All but three of the arrested were lower-rung cadres of the outfit. Three middle level operatives of the JMB who were arrested during this period were:

• Belal Hejati, a top aide to Siddiqul Islam alias Bangla Bhai, who was arrested in Bagmara in the Rajshahi District on July 23, 2006.

• Abdul Khalek, a close aide of Bangla Bhai and brother of Abdus Sattar, JMJB’s second-in-command for the Baghmara sub-District, who was arrested at Biprokaya village in the Rajshahi District on August 30, 2006.

• Jahangir Alam alias Mokhlesur Rahman alias Adnan Sami alias Ammar, the ‘Bogra zone commander’ of the JMB, who was arrested from the Charmatha area of Bogra District on May 2, 2006.

The political leadership in Bangladesh has repeatedly claimed to have ‘broken the back’ of Islamist militancy through the high-profile arrests. The neutralisation effort appeared also to have consisted of occasional raids on ‘militant dens’ leading to the recovery of explosives and ‘bomb-making material’, though only four such raids were reported between April 26, 2006, and January 31, 2007. Two of these raids were conducted in the Savar Police Station area of Dhaka District and the Badda locality of Dhaka city. Moreover, whereas intelligence reports indicated that following the arrests of the top leadership, the JMB cadres were trying to regroup in the north and north-eastern regions of the country, most recent arrests and raids have taken place largely in a few of the north and north-western Districts. JMB’s extensive network during the August 2005 country-wide attacks was known to have consisted of hundred thousands of cadres and sympathizers and a group of ‘2000 suicide bombers’. A few arrests and raids are not expected to significantly dent the outfit’s strike capability. Further, there are even lesser indications that the official drives against the group have had any impact on its lifeline – its financial networks and international linkages, especially those with the Islamist charities based abroad.

There is also much to suggest that the authorities were largely playing to the galleries by their drive against militancy, as was evident in episodes such as the August 2, 2006 incident: a few weeks before Begum Khaleda Zia’s Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP)-led alliance went through the mandatory process of passing on its powers to a caretaker government, Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) personnel claimed to have swooped on a forest area adjoining a madrassa (seminary) near Jibontola village in Mymensingh’s Bhaluka sub-District and arrested 26 JMB militants, including an Afghan war veteran and two suicide bombers. The militants, aged between 16 and 20, were said to have been undergoing training in the militant den. Bomb-making materials and training equipment were reportedly recovered. However, on August 3, police produced the militants in a court and asked for a remand of only seven of those arrested, claiming that no specific charges existed against the rest.

It is, of course, the case that the period after the arrest of the JMB leaders has been marked by an absence of any significant militant activity in Bangladesh, other than a few incidents when JMB militants issued threats. These included a June 21, 2006, bomb threat to Sonali, Agrani and Grameen Banks in the Gaibandha District and the November 8, 2006, death threat to the Mymensingh municipality chairman. The complete absence of a terrorist attack subsequent to the arrests of the JMB top brass is, however, grounds for no more than limited comfort. The silent growth of the outfit had caught the country unawares before it revealed its capabilities in August 2005, and further, in November-December 2005, and there is reason to believe that such a process of consolidation is ongoing even now. It is useful to recall that there was a gap of just six months between the Government’s authoritative denials of the group’s existence (in February 2005) and the outfit’s demonstration of strength in August 2005.

While the judiciary in Bangladesh is seen to have acted fairly independently and swiftly on the fate of the JMB top brass, a large number of the arrested lower-rung cadres have either been released on bail or have been able to secure freedom by taking advantage of the extremely vague or soft charges that have been brought against them. The cases in which JMB cadres have been released include:

• January 12, 2007: A court in Satkhira granted bail to a suspected JMB cadre.

• December 20, 2006: The Barisal Divisional Speedy Trial Tribunal acquitted all nine accused JMB cadres in one of the 12 cases lodged in connection with the series bomb blasts at 18 places of Barisal city on August 17, 2005.

• December 13, 2005: JMB military trainer Mohinuddin was released after a ruling alliance leader forced the Barisal District police and administration to release him. The Police hurriedly submitted the charge sheet in the case to the Court on December 12, 2006, stating that no proof in support of the allegations against Mohiuddin was found.

• May 2, 2005: Four JMB militants were granted bail by a court in Natore. While three of them jumped bail and went into hiding, one of them subsequently surrendered on March 6, 2006.

The ‘neutralization’ of the JMB’s top leadership was achieved by a regime that had been the most potent force behind its growth, and this was done under tremendous pressure from international actors as well as the domestic public, to set things right before the general elections. What is missed out in this is that the arrests of the visible leadership have only reinforced the anonymity of the shadowy group of controllers who supported the group behind the scenes. Today, the outfit’s cadres and the middle level leadership are scattered all over the country, giving the group a dispersed and amorphous form – much like that of the al Qaeda – and it is a question of time before the middle-level leadership finds its feet, and initiates moves, once again, to realize the JMB’s grandiose plans for a radicalized Islamist Bangladesh.

 

INDIA

Assam
Karbi Anglong: Hotbed of Violence
Sandipani Dash
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

When Karbi Anglong was declared an autonomous District in October 1976 under the provisions of the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, this was intended to resolve the tensions arising out of the disparate aspirations of the District's overwhelmingly tribal population. Thirty years later, Karbi Anglong remains conflict-ridden, with 13-militancy related fatalities (seven per cent of the total militancy-related fatalities in Assam), including six civilians and seven security force personnel. The relatively small number of fatalities, however, is not an accurate index of the instability and violence that continue to wreak havoc in the lives of the people of the State’s largest District.

Karbi Anglong, spread over 10,434 square kilometers, consists of three Sub-Divisions – Diphu (the District headquarters), Bokajan and Hamren. Located in the central part of Assam, Karbi Anglong is abutted by Golaghat District in the east, Meghalaya State and Morigaon District in the west, Nagaon and Golaghat Districts in the north and the North Cachar Hills District and the State of Nagaland in the south. With three per cent of Assam’s population of 26.7 million (according to the 2001 Census), and 13 per cent of the State’s land mass, Karbi Anglong is home to a minority non-tribal population as well as several tribes. While the majority Karbis are spread throughout the District, Bodos live in the Langhin area; Kukis (also called Thadous or Hmars) in the Singhason and Koilamati areas; Dimasas in the Dhansiri or Mohendijua area; Tiwas in areas bordering Nagaon and Morigaon Districts; Mans in Bokajan sub-division; Garos and Khasis in the Hamren sub-division; Chakmas in the Borlangphar area; and Rengma Nagas in the Nilip Block.

Nearly 89 per cent of Karbi Anglong’s population lives in its 2,633 villages. Some 47 per cent of the District is forested, consisting of 14 State Reserve Forests and 17 District Council Reserve Forests. Compared to a State population density of 340, Karbi Anglong is sparsely populated with a density of 78 persons per square kilometre. District headquarters Diphu is 213 kilometres away from Dispur, the State capital.

In recent years, Karbi Anglong has been a theatre of bitter ethnic strife. Clashes erupted in 2005 between Karbis and Dimasas and, on October 29, 2005, a total of 88 people were officially reported killed and 1,014 houses were set ablaze. People belonging to other ethnic groups – Bodo, Nepali and Assamese – also lost their lives in the violence, in which the involvement of local insurgents of the United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS) and Dima Halim Daogah (DHD), was confirmed by the Government. A year and half earlier, on March 24, 2004, at least 34 Karbi villagers had been killed by the Manipur-based Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) militants at Uden Tisso and Sarpo Terong villages under Bokajan Police Station, and Jari Teron under the Manja Police Outpost. Clashes had started over the issue of extortion from Kuki ginger cultivators in the Singhasan Hills, but soon took the shape of an extended ethnic conflict involving UPDS and KRA militants, which continued for three months.

UPDS was formed in March 1999 with the merger of two outfits, the Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) and Karbi People’s Front (KPF), with the objective of creating a separate homeland for the Karbis, and entered into an extended cease-fire agreement with the Union Government in May 23, 2002. In January 2006, UPDS dropped its main demand for an autonomous State and, instead, settled for additional powers to the existing Autonomous Council. However, in September 2006, the outfit announced the suspension of its ‘peace talks’ with New Delhi, without discontinuing the cease-fire. A month later, media reportage indicated its involvement in an intensified extortion drive, with incidents reported from Nahorjan, Tongkory, Tinglijan, Ramsing Terang and Dikoi Terang in the Karbi Anglong District. Prominent incidents in 2006 and early 2007 included:

• March 5, 2006: A trader and a civil society activist was abducted from Mentila village and later killed by UPDS militants at Nahorjan. The victim’s wife was earlier served a demand note for a ransom of INR one million for the release of her husband.
• April 10, 2006: Two persons were killed by unidentified UPDS militants in the Tongkory area.
• April 29, 2006: A pharmacist was abducted by UPDS militants from Tinglijan medical sub-centre under Bokajan Police Station.
• January 19, 2007: A senior leader of the Autonomous State Demand Committee, Kuthor Hanse, was killed by UPDS militants at his residence at Hidim Teron village. The militants also assaulted villagers at Ramsing Terang and Dikoi Terang under Manja police station.

The ceasefire between the UPDS and the Union Government led to a split in the outfit, with a splinter group rechristened the Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF). The KLNLF also formed an ‘armed wing’, the Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Resistance Force on May 16, 2004. Apart from engaging in internecine clashes with the UPDS, the KLNLF has engaged in violence targeting civilians in Karbi Anglong and adjoining areas. Significant incidents involving KLNLF cadres include:

• June 15, 2006: Bokajan Police recovered the dead body of a KLNLF cadre who was abducted from Japarajan and later killed by UPDS militants.
• December 5, 2006: KLNLF militants hurled two grenades and opened fire at Dongamukam.
• December 18, 2006: Acivil convoy was damaged when suspected KLNLF militants opened fire on it at Silvetta under Diphu Police Station.
• December 24, 2006: Acivil convoy was damaged by KLNLF militants at Kohra
• January 6, 2007: At least eight polling personnel were killed and eight others were injured during elections to the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council, when the KLNLF exploded an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) and opened fire. The polling personnel were targeted while they were returning from the No. 16 Hapjan Polling Station under Dokmoka Police Station, to Parakhowa.

Militancy from Karbi Anglong also spilled over into the neighbouring States, especially the Jaintia Hills and its adjoining Ri-Bhoi District, in Meghalaya, which witnessed an extortion drive by the Karbi militants. On June 24, 2006, several villagers of Moolaber, Skap, Deinler, Saba, Myntang, Psiar, Lum Moojem, Khatkhasla, Mooshrot, Mukroh and other neighbouring villages near Labang-Nongphyllut in the Jaintia Hills Distict were forced to pay INR 200 each by UPDS militants. Again, on July 1, 2006, several farmers of Mawlasnai area in the Ri-Bhoi District, with their cultivable lands in the Madan Umwang and Khlieh Umwang areas, were served demand notes by the UPDS to pay ‘levies’. They were later asked by the militants to attend a meeting at Madan Umwang, and were threatened with dire consequences in case of failure to meet the demands. Similarly, Khasi farmers in the Block-II areas of the Ri-Bhoi District alleged that they were subjected to extortion, on October 24, 2006, by the KNV. On June 28, 2006, several civil society groups and chiefs of local self-governance institutions, Rangbah Shnongs, urged the Government to create more Police outposts and deploy additional Police personnel to prevent the UPDS from harassing Khasi-Pnar families in the Block-I and II areas of the Jaintia Hills District. Meghalaya Chief Minister J.D. Rymbai, on July 5, 2006, accused the UPDS of violating rules of the cease-fire agreement by engaging in unlawful activities along the Assam-Meghalaya border.

Karbi Anglong also witnessed violence by militants primarily based and active in other Districts of the State. The National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), for instance, which has been under a cease-fire agreement with the Union Government since May 25, 2005, has extended its ‘operations’ into this District:

• June 26, 2006: Two NDFB extortionists were killed by security personnel at an unspecified location under the Dokmoka Police Outpost. Three other militants, however, managed to escape from the site of the encounter.
• July 5, 2006: Two cadres of the erstwhile Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT) were killed by suspected NDFB militants at Langhing.
• November 16, 2006: Two NDFB militants were shot dead by the Assam Police in a counter-insurgency operation at Langkin Manikpur.

Similarly, the DHD and its renegade group, the Black Widow, based in neighbouring North Cachar Hills District, also operate in Karbi Anglong. An internecine clash among Black Widow cadres occurred at Lanfer village under Kheroni Police Station in the Hamren sub-division on August 20, 2006, following the escape of five cadres of the outfit from its camp in North Cachar Hills. Further, on December 1, 2006, two DHD militants were arrested during a search operation at Diphu.

Karbi Anglong comprises six Police Station jurisdictions – Diphu, Howraghat, Bokajan, Baithalangso, Hamren and Kheroni. These police stations have further been divided into 11 police outposts: Diphu Town, Manja, Dhansiri, Bakulia, Dokmoka, Uttorborbil, Dillai, Borpathar, Khotkhoti, Donkamoka and Ulukunchi. There are also 10 Border Outposts (BOPs), including Lahorijan, Sankartilla, Monglamukh, Doldoli, Daujingphang and Rongapahar along the Assam-Nagaland border and Khanduli, Mokoiram, Sabuda and Mukroh along Assam-Meghalaya border. Against the back drop of the continuing militancy, the security set up in the District appeared to have registered some successes, including:

• January 9, 2006: The UPDS ‘publicity secretary', Tongeeh Nongloda, was arrested from Dillai for carrying a 9mm pistol.
• April 10, 2006: The UPDS 'defence secretary', Thong Teron, was killed by security personnel at Satgaon under the Dongkamokam police outpost.
• November 13, 2006: At least seven suspected UPDS militants were arrested at Kaniya Bey Village near Diphu for violating cease-fire rules.
• November 26, 2006: A suspected UPDS militant was arrested from the Lahorijan area under Khatkhati police station.

Regrettably, the state of militancy in Karbi Anglong fails to register in the consciousness of mainstream Assam, both among the intelligentsia and among policy makers. Despite the many peace processes and ceasefire agreements with various groups in and around the District, the unfortunate reality is that area will continue to fester in the shadow of official neglect.