SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 1, July 11, 2011

INDIA

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Andhra Pradesh: Wilful Blindness
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management & SATP

Political myopia, folly, and sheer mischief have undermined counter-insurgency gains in many theatres across India, making a mockery of the tremendous sacrifices Security Forces (SFs) must accept to secure even limited successes. Unfortunately, there is no indication that the political leadership in this country has learned anything from the past, or that its wilful blindness and disruptive opportunism are yielding to any greater sagacity or concern for the national interest.

The situation in Andhra Pradesh, with particular regard to the Telangana region, is an immediate case in point. Over the past years, the Andhra Pradesh Police has struggled against great odds, and at great cost in blood, to bring a rampaging Maoist movement under control.

The Telangana region has always been at the heart of the Maoist insurrection, but by 2005, each one of Andhra Pradesh’s 23 Districts was in the Maoist-affected category. The situation had been substantially worsened by the ill-advised deal between the Congress Party and the Maoists in the run-up to the 2004 elections, and the ‘ceasefire’ that the new Congress regime unilaterally announced in one of its first moves after its electoral victory. Despite significant and further Maoist consolidation, however, the Andhra Pradesh Police were able to fight back after the breakdown of the so-called ‘peace process’ in early 2005, and by 2007, almost the entire State had been cleared of the Maoist menace.

Fatalities in Maoist related violence provide an index of the astonishing turnaround that was achieved in this short while. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal, in 2005, there were 320 Maoist related fatalities (132 civilians, 21 SF personnel, 167 Maoists); 2010 saw just 33 such fatalities (17 civilians, 16 Maoists). To date, there have been just 4 fatalities in 2011 (2 civilians and 2 Maoists). There have been no SF fatalities since 2009.

The Maoists made a concerted attempt to regroup in the Nalamalla Forest area in Central Andhra, and in the Telangana region, in 2010, but their attempts were quickly neutralised with the arrest or killing of their leadership cadres, forcing them out of the State once again.

A residual problem of sporadic violence, essentially by armed groups located across the border, principally in Odisha and Chhattisgarh, persists in eight border Districts of Andhra Pradesh. However, even this has been substantially handled with effective coordination with SFs in these States, and in Joint Operations. Today, the Maoist operational capabilities in Andhra are minimal.

The Maoists have also been increasingly aware that the improving social and economic profile of populations in the region no longer lends itself to their patterns of mobilisation and recruitment. The socio-economic transformation of the Telangana region has been elaborately documented by the Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee, which has debunked the entire ‘separatist’ argument on grounds of economic neglect and backwardness. It is not the intention, here, to review the Srikrishna Report. However, the extensive indices of human and economic development compiled, demonstrate the most dramatic improvements in the Telangana region, and force the Committee to the conclusion that, “In recent years… the shares of Telangana for many common development parameters are in league with the share of population / area, often being higher… Additionally, the rate of growth of most of the parameters of development has shown robust growth in Telangana… Thus, on the whole, it would appear that the deprived region is Rayalaseema not Telangana.”

The Srikrishna Report has, of course, been accused of bias and political prejudice by the votaries of a separate Telangana, which is why the Maoist perspective becomes the more significant. Indeed, in their Social Investigation of North Telangana: Case Study of Warangal, probably drafted towards the end of 2001 or early 2002, the Maoists concede that a wide range of social, political and economic transformations in the region have made recruitment difficult, and popular cooperation with the Police far more frequent, undermining the very possibility of effective Maoist mobilization. The tone of much of this document verges on the comical, as there is constant lamentation over precisely these improvements, and the impact they have had on the ‘revolutionary potential’ in what was, for decades, the Maoist heartland. A few samples are instructive:

This, precisely, is what makes the separatist movement in Telangana integral to Maoist designs in the region. The only possibility of the recovery of Maoist influence and dominance in Andhra Pradesh is envisaged through the Telangana agitation. Significantly, a detailed plan to encourage such separatism was drawn up in the Fourth North Telangana Special Zonal Committee Meeting of the People's War Group (PWG, now CPI-Maoist) in 1997, where it was concluded that, "when it comes to separate Telangana issue, it cannot be entrusted to others" and that "It is not proper to say that only constitutional means would be adopted." Indeed, in the PWG's State Conference in 1995, a resolution had already been passed to start an agitation for the formation of a separate Telangana. What we are seeing in the Telangana region today is a slow and systematic unfolding of the Maoist plan for a sundering of the State, through various proxies, in order to restore their own disruptive dominance.

All the formations currently spearheading the separatist movement, including the Telangana Rashtra Samiti (TRS) and the Telangana Praja Front (TPF), have a large representation of ex-Maoist cadres and leaders, and have synchronised their campaigns with various Maoist directives on the issue.

The observations of the Sri Krishna Report in this regard, in its 'secret' Chapter 8, are significant:

• With the bifurcation of the state and Hyderabad in Telangana region, incidents of agitations, dharnas and even violence, are expected. This may result in flight of capital, stagnant growth and disincentive for entrepreneurs, leading to slow down of economic activity.

• The Maoists are also likely to gain by the creation of a new state. The new state is likely to be soft towards them initially, given that they have over the years supported the struggle for the formation of Telangana. By the time the state realizes the Maoist menace, it may be too late for the state to handle them with a bifurcated police force contributing to a weaker response to the problem. The CPI (Maoist) will also use political boundaries of state and districts, to their advantage. It is not without reason that most of the Maoist zones, sub- zones etc., straddle state and district boundaries.

• Telangana is also contiguous with other highly affected Maoist areas viz., Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra States. As such it is likely that the Maoists will extend their activities from these neighbouring states to Telangana, especially the districts of Adilabad, Karimnagar, Warangal, Khammam, parts of Nizamabad and Medak in north Telangana and Mahboobnagar and Nalgonda in south Telangana. It is important to note that it is not entirely a coincidence that the increased spread of Maoist violence in Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, has been after the creation of these states. Increase in poverty which is a natural corollary to a slowdown in economic activity, will drive more people into the arms of the CPI ( Maoist). This may again lead to a vicious cycle of Naxalism, leading to less of economic activity and greater impoverishment, which may provide fillip to left wing extremism.

• An important development that has to be noted is that after K. Chandra Shekar Rao gave up his fasting protest on 30.11.2009, Gaddar organized wide spread protests and later the top leadership of Maoists including Kishanji @ Mallojula Koteshwar have organized various protests programs through students of Osmania University and other universities of Telangana. Thus, while the student's involvement in the Telangana agitation became very intense due to the encouragement of the local committees of the Maoists, Telangana Rashtra Samithi was also forced to utilize simmering sentiment in the students. When the intensity of the agitation by TRS started ebbing down, Gaddar floated a new front called Telangana Praja Front (TPF) on the instructions of the underground cadre of the Maoists to sustain agitation for a very prolonged duration. This front, which is totally Maoist backed and motivated, tried to project itself as an alternate to KCR and TRS. Thus, the Maoists are trying to make a come back through the Telangana agitation. The impact of possible growth of Maoist/ Naxal influence in Telangana has to be evaluated in the right perspective keeping in mind that a large number of important and sensitive industries are located in and around Hyderabad.

It is unfortunately the case that the Centre’s policies and pronouncements, and especially the December 9, 2010, announcement of an imminent division of Andhra Pradesh by Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram, have inflamed the agitators further. The resignation of Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs) and Members of Parliament (MPs) from the Telangana region since July 4, 2011, can only worsen the situation. The problem has been aggravated significantly by the succession war within the Congress Party after the death of Chief Minister YSR Reddy in a helicopter accident in September 2009, and the claims of his son, Jagan Reddy, with his breakaway YSR Party.

All parties and groups opposed to state division have been intimidated by the threat of a violent backlash to maintain their silence. Some political formations have opportunistically changed their positions, sensing some electoral advantage in the Telangana region by shifting from an integrationist to a separatist position.

There is a grave and imminent danger of a Maoist revival in the Telangana region if a separate State is created there. Indeed, the increasing chaos of the Telangana agitation has already created new spaces for Maoist revival and consolidation, though the operation of armed cadres is still being effectively contained by the Police. The rising apprehensions and potential backlash in the coastal Andhra and Rayalaseema regions can only widen such spaces. The Maoist leadership and cadres from this State have played – and continue to play – a historically pivotal role in the armed insurrection across all affected areas of the country. A Maoist revival in Andhra Pradesh will not only wipe out hard-won gains in Telangana and in the wider State; it would have disastrous consequences for the Maoist ‘red corridor’ States, and for the internal security situation in India at large.

PAKISTAN

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Karachi: Murder Hub
Ambreen Agha
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

At least 114 persons were killed in just five days of violence, commencing July 5, 2011, in Karachi. Unidentified assailants on a shooting spree in several neighbourhoods in Pakistan’s commercial hub, killed 14 persons on July 5; another 25 on July 6; 36 on July 7; 35 on July 8; and 4 on July 9. On July 7, President Asif Ali Zardari ordered the Sindh Government to give ‘shoot at sight’ powers to the Police and the Law Enforcement Agencies (LEA) against those suspected to be involved in the incidents.

According to South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) data, a total of 453 persons have been killed in Karachi in incidents connected with a range of armed non-state actors, over the last six months. These include 378 are civilians, 36 Security Force personnel and 38 militants. In addition, the Karachi Chapter of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), records a total of 1,138 killings, including a range of criminal and ‘target’ killings, between January and June 2011.                        

The present spike in violence emerged a week after the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) parted ways with the Pakistan People's Party (PPP)-led coalition Government at the Federal and Provincial levels on June 27, 2011. The MQM withdrew support after increasing bitterness between the two parties during the course of Elections in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK).

Urban ethnic violence in Karachi has a complex history, dating back to the formation of Pakistan. There have always been tense relations between Mohajirs (Urdu speaking ‘refugees’ from what became India) and Pashtuns, who have struggled to consolidate power in Karachi. The Mohajirs who came to Karachi, faced resistance from established Sindhi families. The Pashtuns had their difficulties with Pakistan, translating into rising aspirations for Pashtunistan – a separate homeland for the Pashtuns. The radicalization of these diverse ethnic grievances has created a dynamic of entrenched violence in Karachi.

The current spate of killings in Karachi principally resulted from clashes between MQM and PPP‘s ally, Awami National Party (ANP), drawing a line of blood between the 45 per cent of Urdu speaking Mohajirs in the city, on whose behalf the MQM claims to act; and the ANP, ‘representing’ the city’s 25 per cent  Pashtun population. [The remaining 30 per cent comprise Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochs, etc.] The MQM has retained power since it became part of mainstream politics in 1985, by entering into alliances with major political parties [at different times, the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and the PPP]. This radical ethnic formation has also enjoyed the support of the Army, with the aim of undermining the Pashtun groups. Meanwhile, counter-insurgency operations in the Pashtun-dominated North Western areas (Federally Administered Tribal Areas – FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa) have resulted in the displacement of tens of thousands of people from their homes, with an estimated 300,000 Internally Displaced Persons pushing into Karachi, destabilizing established equations.

The consequent and drastic demographic shift embittered the Mohajir-dominated MQM, which accused the ANP of Talibanising Karachi. On May 11, 2009, the party’s Coordination Committee had alleged that PPP elements in the Sindh Government and ‘criminal elements’ in the ANP were “not only patronising ‘Talibanisation’ in the city” but also “harming the country’s sovereignty”; and further, that the ANP enjoyed the support of some PPP leaders in protecting Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) elements and patronising the drug and land mafia.  

Earlier, on August 5, 2008, the TTP chief Maulana Faqeer Muhammad and spokesman Maulvi Umar had declared, at a joint Press Conference at Inayat Kalay in Karachi: “This is a warning for Altaf Hussain to cease his statements against the Taliban and end his kingdom in Karachi, otherwise we will launch attacks against the MQM and its leaders.” Umar boasted that the TTP had ‘massive’ support of Karachi’s residents and it “could take control of the city whenever it wanted to”.

Later, on June 7, 2009, Karachi Senior Superintendent of Police, Fayyaz Khan, following the recovery of 10 suicide jackets, 60 kilograms of explosives and 10 hand grenades with the arrest of a TTP militant, Naeemur Rehman, had observed, “Terrorists have a network here and whenever they get a chance to carry out an attack, they will grab it… They want to do something major because when something happens here, it creates much more pressure on the Government.” Conspicuously, while the military was clearing Swat of militants, the TTP was holing up in Karachi, not only as an escape mechanism but to expand their militant base.

Meanwhile, confirming the presence of TTP in Katti Pahari and other areas of Karachi, the Federal Minister of Interior Rehman Malik stated, on July 8, 2011, “Intelligence Agencies have identified presence of the TTP in Karachi and the Government is working on it.”

The problem of violence in Karachi exacerbates further with a huge inflow and circulation of arms. Since 2009, there have been calls for de-weaponisation of Karachi, but the situation has only worsened. On July 6, 2011, Karachi Police recovered 87 Russian made hand grenades from a drum near a flood relief camp situated on the Super Highway near the Sabzi Mandi area. There are a thousands of illegal weapons hoarded in Karachi, which need to be eliminated for sustainable peace According to a November 30, 2010 report, Federal Minister of Interior Rehman Malik acknowledged that there are over 30,000 illegal arms licenses, acquired fraudulently through corrupt officials, in the city – and that individuals often hold up to 10 weapons against each such license. Earlier, on August 1, 2010, Malik had said that “some people in Karachi are keeping around 50 weapons on a single licence”. Interior Secretary Qamar Zaman Chaudhry on January 24, 2011, told the Public Accounts Committee that out of 45,000 weapons’ licenses issued in Karachi, only 15,000 were ‘legal’. In addition, thousands of illegal weapons are smuggled into the city each year by a range of non-state actors, including terrorist groups; armed, ethnic, sectarian and political formations; organized crime groups, as well as significant numbers of individuals.

There has also been a shift in the nature of violence in Karachi. The issues of ethnicity and control of power has shifted and expanded to include sectarianism and jihadism. Farrukh Saleem, Executive Director of the Center for Research and Security Studies, observes, “To be sure, the primary driver behind the current mayhem is political in nature. Secondary drivers include sectarianism, ethnic rivalry, criminal gangs, drug mafia, land mafia, and other criminal elements and a powerful weapons mafia.” 

Worse, these domestic and regional wars have strained the already exhausted resources of this commercial city. The Islamabad Center for Research and Security Studies in its January 2011 Report warns of the huge economic costs of violence in Karachi, for the national economy. According to the report, Karachi makes up over 50 per cent of the total revenue collected by the Federal Bureau of Revenue, and accounts for about 20 per cent of the total Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Pakistan. This high GDP is attributed to the concentration of main centres of finance and industrial production. The World Bank identified Karachi as the most business friendly city in Pakistan. The Report observed that Karachi’s economic potential has been seriously jeopardized, and that there has been a flight of capital from the city.

Any effective state response would primarily require the Government to pick up elements among its own allies, and even its own ranks. Unsurprisingly, there is a complete lack of political will to act against the extremists responsible for the bloodshed in Karachi. With military operations once again targeting the Kurram Agency in FATA, a renewed inflow of refugees and Talibanised militants into Karachi becomes likely. The spectre of increasing Talibanisation, the entrenchment of TTP networks, and the further radicalization and militarization of various political and sectarian formations looms over this beleaguered city.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

Assam

Meghalaya

Jammu & Kashmir

Left-wing Extremism

Bihar

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Maharashtra

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)