The Maoists: Dance of the Tarantula | Gilgit-Baltistan: Murder most Foul | South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR), Vol. No. 10.35
Show/Hide Search
HomePrint
 
  Click to Enlarge
   

SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 10, No. 35, March 5, 2012

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal


ASSESSMENT


INDIA
Click for PrintPrint

The Maoists: Dance of the Tarantula
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management & SATP

The trajectory of the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) movement across India demonstrates conflicting trends which give, at once, great relief to the state and to affected populations across wide areas, even as assessments of the Maoist threat allow little scope for any measure of complacence.

There has, over the years 2010-2011, been an abrupt geographical and operational contraction of the movement, resulting in a dramatic drop in fatalities, declining incidents of Maoist violence, and a retraction from a number of areas, principally in regions where the Maoists sought to make new inroads in the execution of their decision to “extend the people’s war throughout the country”. There has, nevertheless, been a troubling extension in some new areas, most prominently in India’s troubled Northeast, where a multiplicity of ethnicity-based insurgencies have collapsed, creating new spaces for radical expansion by the Maoists.

In 2008, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) had indicated that a total of 223 Districts across 20 States were variously affected by the Maoist movement. By 2011, this assessment had dropped to just 182 Districts (as on October 31, 2011) in 20 States – though a breakdown of the intensity of the movement in these Districts is not available. Partial data compiled from the open source by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) confirms these broad trends, with total affected Districts dropping from 194 in 2008 to just 141 in 2011. Significantly, SATP enumerates just 48 of these Districts in the Highly Affected category in 2011, down from 58 in 2008; another 47 and 46 Districts, respectively, were listed in the moderately and marginally affected categories in 2011, as against 54 and 83 Districts in these categories in 2008.

State-wise Distribution of Maoist-affected Districts - 2008 and 2011

States

 

2008
2011
SATP
UMHA
SATP
UMHA

Andhra Pradesh

23
22
12
11

Bihar

32
33
27
29

Jharkhand

23
24
20
23

Madhya Pradesh

06
07
06
03

Uttar Pradesh

06
09
05
08

Odisha

22
20
18
19

Maharashtra

07
06
11
07

West Bengal

17
18
08
12

Chhattisgarh

14
16
13
14

Delhi

0
03
02
07

Haryana

07
03
0
02

Karnataka

12
09
03
08

Kerala

03
14
0
08

Tamil Nadu

08
09
01
04

Uttarakhand

09
12
0
04

Punjab

0
08
0
09

Tripura

0
02
0
02

Assam

0
04
11
10

Rajasthan

03
01
0
01

Arunachal Pradesh

0
0
02
01

Gujarat

02
03
0
0

Manipur

0
0
01
0

Nagaland

0
0
01
0

Total

194
223
141
182

Significantly, all the Red Corridor States have recorded a decline in the number of affected Districts, even as reverses have been registered in several of the newer ‘extension’ areas. Andhra Pradesh – which was already significantly on the mend in 2008 – has seen the most dramatic recovery, with affected Districts down from 22 (23. All data in brackets from SATP) to 11 (12). SATP data indicates that just two – Khammam and Vishakapatnam – of 12 affected Districts in the State are currently in the ‘highly affected’ category. Uttarakhand has seen a drop from 12 (9) affected District to just four (0).

There is troubling news from the Northeast, with Assam registering a rise from four (0) to 10 (11) affected Districts; Arunachal Pradesh has one (two) new entrant; and Tripura maintains two (0) Districts affected by Maoist activities. Nagaland also records one affected District in 2011 on SATP data, though UMHA data records no Maoist activities in the State.

Far afield from their traditional areas of dominance, the Maoists have also registered noticeable activities in Punjab, with nine (0) affected Districts, up from eight (0); and Delhi, with seven (two) affected Districts, up from three (0).

Harayana, Karnataka, Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Rajasthan and Gujarat, again, lying outside traditional areas of Maoist activity, have registered a decline in the numbers of Districts affected. Intelligence sources indicate that the Maoists are exerting particular efforts to set up bases on the tri-junction of Karnataka, Kerala and Tamil Nadu.

Fatalities data also reflects remarkable shifts. From a peak of 1,005 Maoist-related fatalities in 2010 according to MHA data (1,180 according to SATP), total fatalities in 2011 had dropped sharply to 606 (602). The most dramatic decline was recorded in West Bengal, which had emerged, abruptly, as the State with the highest number of incidents and fatalities in 2010, according to SATP data, with killings dropping from 258 (425) in 2010 to just 41 (53) in 2011. The spike in fatalities in West Bengal in 2009-10 was, of course, the consequence of the pre-election scenario, with an alliance of opportunity forming between the Trinamool Congress and the Maoists in a range of widespread populist mass mobilisations, backed by Maoist violence, intended to unseat the entrenched Communist Party of India – Marxist (CPI-M) Government that had ruled the State for the 34 years, before it was routed in the elections of April-May 2011. With the installation of the TC Government in Kolkata, a ceasefire – part of the pre-election deal between the Maoists and the TC – brought violence down to a trickle, though a upward trend was again visible towards the end of the year, as the unprincipled deal between the TC and the Maoists collapsed, as expected, with TC cadres and leaders increasingly targeted by the rebels. Significantly, West Bengal recorded just three Maoist-linked fatalities in 2007, 26 in 2008, and 158 in 2009.

MHA data indicates that Chhattisgarh has consistently remained the worst affected State, in terms of fatalities, over the past years – though SATP data suggests that this position of pre-eminence was briefly relinquished to West Bengal in 2010. Chhattisgarh recorded 202 (176) fatalities in 2011, down from 343 (327) in 2010. 2011 also recorded 182 fatalities in Jharkhand; 64 in Bihar, 54 in Maharashtra, and 53 in Odisha.

SF fatalities in Maoist-related violence dropped from 285 (277) in 2010 to 142 (128) in 2011; while civilian fatalities fell from 720 (626) to 464 (275) over the same period.

The number of major incidents (involving three or more fatalities) also registered a significant decline, from 60 such incidents in 2010, to 47 in 2011. Of the latter, four incidents in 2011 saw double-digit fatalities, as against 11 in 2010. Incidents which saw double-digit fatalities in 2011 included:

December 3-4: 11 persons, including 10 Policemen, were killed when CPI-Maoist cadres attacked the convoy of Member of Parliament and former Jharkhand Speaker Inder Singh Namdhari, in Latehar District in Jharkhand. Namdhari, however, escaped unhurt. The Maoists looted 10 weapons, 2,000 rounds of ammunition and one wireless set in this incident.

August 19: 11 Policemen and a civilian were killed, and three sustained injuries, in an ambush set by CPI-Maoist cadres in the forest near Metlaperu village under the Bhadrakali Police Station area of Bijapur District in Chhattisgarh. A force of about 70 Policemen had set out from Bhadrakali for operational and logistical operations. The Police claimed ‘four or five Maoists’ were also killed.

June 10: The CPI-Maoist cadres blew up an anti-landmine vehicle and opened fire on the survivors, killing 10 Security Force (SF) personnel – seven SPOs and three Police constables – and injuring another three at a bridge near Gatan village in Katekalyan area in Dantewada District in Chhattisgarh.

May 3: 11 SF personnel were killed and nearly 40 injured when CPI-Maoist cadres set off landmines in a trap laid out in the Lohardaga District in Jharkhand. After a tip off about Maoists having assembled there, the SF personnel drawn from the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), Jharkhand Jaguars, Jharkhand Armed Police (JAP) and the District Armed Police (DAP) went to Urumuru village, but returned after failing to find any Maoists. On their return, they were ambushed in the Dhardhariya Hills under the Senha Police Station. The Maoists had planted improvised explosive devices (IEDs) across an area of two kilometres, each at a distance of 1.5 to 2 feet, according to the Police.

The most significant reverses suffered by the Maoists, however, were in the neutralization (arrest or killing) of their top leadership cadres. While total Maoist fatalities have registered significant declines, from 219 (294) in 2009, through 172 (277) in 2010, to 99 (199) in 2011, the attrition at the top has been devastating. SATP data indicates that, of the 16-member Politburo of 2007, two have been killed, while another seven are in custody. This has left just Muppala Lakshman Rao aka Ganapathy, the party General Secretary, Prashant Bose aka Kishan Da, Nambala Keshavarao aka Ganganna, Mallojula Venugopal Rao aka Bhupathi, Katakam Sudershan aka Anand, Malla Raji Reddy aka Sathenna and Misir Besra aka Sunirmal, still underground and active out of the Politburo members. 

Of the 39 member Central Committee (including the Politburo), eighteen have been neutralized – with five killed, and 13 in custody. Comparable attrition has been recorded in the Regional, State and District level leaderships, sending the movement into a defensive tailspin. As many as 1,972 Maoists have been arrested in 2011, adding to 2,916 in 2010 and 1,981 in 2009; and another 393 surrendered in 2011, as against 266 in 2010 and 150 in 2009. Significantly, an overwhelming proportion of top leadership cadres have been neutralized across the country as a result of intelligence based-operations led by the Andhra Pradesh Police and, in particular, the State’s Special Intelligence Branch.

In the meanwhile, state responses have also shifted track, with the vaunting ‘clear, hold and develop’ strategies aggressively advocated by the UMHA, and enthusiastically embraced by some States – particularly including Chhattisgarh – having been entirely abandoned. Indeed, after the Chintalnad incident of April 2010, in which 76 SF personnel were killed, the aggressive ‘area domination’ approach was abruptly discarded, as the disconnect between objectives and capabilities became obvious even to those who had deliberately blinded themselves to the realities of the ground. The UMHA has, since, shifted its rhetoric to a ‘holistic’ approach, increasingly emphasising development, on the one hand, and the responsibility of the States for ‘law and order’ operations, and emphasising ‘capacity building’ and the ‘containment of violence’ rather than any ambitious campaigns to wipe out the Maoists in their heartland areas. The UMHA’s reports increasingly emphasise financial allocations to the States under the Integrated Action Plan (with an outlay of INR 15 billion in 2010-11, and INR 18 billion in 2011-12), as well as Central support to the States for various modernization and capacity building projects. In addition, the UMHA has emphasised a range of capacity building measures for Central Paramilitary Forces, including the sanction of 116 additional battalions, of which 36 had been raised, and another 21 were in the ‘process of being raised’. The States have enthusiastically embraced this approach, shifting the emphasis from operational successes and ‘kills’, to the more leisurely rhythm of purported developmental interventions under various ‘integrated action plans’. Regrettably, anecdotal evidence from most of the States suggests that implementation of these plans is riddled with corruption and irregularities, and only a tiny proportion of the very considerable allocations actually reach intended beneficiaries in the Maoist-affected areas, and at least a significant fraction of these actually flows into Maoist coffers.

Most of the Red Corridor States have substantially increased Police recruitment, and have improved Police-population ratios. According to data compiled annually by the National Crime Records Bureau, the Indian average remained static at 133 between end-2009 and end-2010 (the UMHA claimed, at different points in 2011, ratios of 160 and 176 per 100,000 population, but these claims are, likely, based on a fudging of data, since the sheer quantum of recruitment that would be required to secure these ratios has simply and visibly not occurred). However, several of the Red Corridor States improved their ratios significantly between 2009 and 2010. Andhra Pradesh recorded an increase from 128 per 100,000 to 131; Chhattisgarh from 164 to 170; and Jharkhand, from 139 to 151. However, Bihar, with the worst ratio in the country, went up from an abysmal 62 to just 64; and West Bengal, from 93 to 95. Maharashtra actually dropped from 166 to 164; and Orissa from 108 to 106.

Nevertheless, while significant – though still far from adequate – transformations have occurred in the strength at the level of the constabulary in many afflicted States, these have not resulted in proportionate increases in State Forces deployed for counter-insurgency duties, and there is also an acute and persistent crisis at leadership level. At the apex, the Indian Police Service registered a shortfall of over 28 per cent against a sanctioned strength of 4,720, despite an accelerated intake, up from 135 in 2010 to 150 in 2011. In Chhattisgarh, for instance, the Police population ratio has gone up from 103 in 2005, through 164 in 2009 to as much as 170 in 2010. Further, more than 18,000 Chhattisgarh Police personnel and officers have been trained for counter-insurgency at the Counter-insurgency and Jungle Warfare School at Kanker. Yet, the operational counter-insurgency deployment of State Police Forces remains at barely 3,000. Significant improvements in capacity in terms of Police modernization, fortification of Police Stations, and training are yet to create a decisive operational impact.

The Maoists have, in essence, suffered tremendously as a result of their strategic overreach, to extend their people’s war into areas where conditions were far from favourable for radical and armed mobilisation, even as the state has been forced to dilute its ‘massive and coordinated’ offensive operations after the dramatic losses suffered by SFs in a succession of high profile incidents through end-2009 and early 2010. On both sides, there is some evidence, both, of disarray, and of a more concerted, coherent, effort towards consolidation and towards reconciling strategies and tactics with capacities and capabilities. The visible decline in a range of parameters of Maoist activities coincides with a frenzied effort behind the scenes to recover from the reverses of the recent past, and there is little reason to believe that the next cycle of overt and aggressive confrontation between the rebels and the state will be less bloody than the last.

PAKISTAN
Click for PrintPrint

Gilgit-Baltistan: Murder most Foul
Ambreen Agha
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

.…The Shias and Sunnis have always peacefully coexisted in Gilgit-Baltistan. Even today they do not consciously take up fights with each other, unless pushed. The history of violence here is old. It goes back to the days when Pakistan established a fake autonomy over us. It is since the last 40 years that our lives have been plagued by the ever present Pakistan military here.”
Spokesman of a Gilgit-Baltistan nationalist organization, on condition of anonymity, in an interview to SAIR, March 2, 2012.

At least 18 Shias from Gilgit-Baltistan were killed on February 28, 2012, by armed assailants in military uniforms on the Karakoram Highway in the Kohistan District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while they were returning in a convoy from a pilgrimage to Iran. According to the Police, the assailants flagged down four buses, boarded them, and asked the passengers whether they were Shia or Sunni. They then asked the Shias to step out of the buses and checked their identity cards before pumping bullets into them. All those killed were men, while the eight injured included women and children.

Soon after, tension started brewing in Gilgit.  In a clash with law enforcement agencies in Gilgit District on February 29, a man, identified as Naveed was killed and two others were injured. The Police also recovered a dead body from a mountain in the Napur area of Gilgit on March 1. Earlier, on February 28, the Gilgit District Administration had imposed Section 144, prohibiting public assemblies or demonstrations and the display of arms, in Gilgit city, and had closed all private and Government organisations for three days.

Meanwhile, the anti-Shia outfit Jandullah ‘commander’ Ahmed Marwat claimed responsibility for the attack, declaring, “they were Shias and our mujahideen shot them dead”. However, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Assembly Member, Mehboob Khan, in a bizarre statement, blamed the people of Gilgit-Baltistan for carrying out the attacks in Kohistan to settle ‘personal scores’. Abdul Sattar Khan, Member Provincial Assembly (MPA) from Kohistan’s Dassu tehsil (revenue unit) in an attempt to give credence to the theory, noted that two persons belonging to the Sunni-populated Chilas area had earlier been killed in sectarian clashes in Gilgit-Baltistan, and the people of Chilas had vowed to avenge the two deaths. He claimed that the killings could be the result of the sectarian strife within Gilgit-Baltistan.

The MPAs’ observations appear to be misplaced. Despite a fear of the revival of sectarian skirmishes in Gilgit-Baltistan on the day of fateful incident, a media report from The Express Tribune on March 2, 2012, stated that the elders of the Shia dominated Nagar Valley in Hunza Nagar District took at least 35 Sunni labourers working in the area into protective custody and handed them over to the Police, who escorted them safely to Gilgit, the next day. Quoting this incident during his telephonic interview, the spokesman of a Gilgit-Baltistan nationalist organisation observed,
.A sense of belonging to this region is inherent in the people of Gilgit-Baltistan and binds them together across sectarian lines. Faith based killings, or killing for one's identity is not common among the people of Gilgit-Baltistan. Pakistan’s brutal encroachment and the eventual fanning of the Shia-Sunni divide by the military and corrupt officialdom installed by Islamabad has sometimes led to some stray acts of sectarian killings. The general perception of a low level of sectarian violence in Gilgit, compared to other ‘explosive regions’ of Pakistan, is correct, because people here are not divided on any sectarian or ethnic lines; in fact, they are united on a common goal of attaining their rightful political autonomy and achieving their basic rights.

Gilgit-Baltistan has historically remained a peaceful region, with occasional cycles of orchestrated tension and violence. Shias were a majority in the region until the Government of Pakistan breached the State Subject Rules (SSR) promulgated in 1927 by the last Dogra Maharaja Hari Singh, in a massive effort at demographic re-engineering. According to the State Subject Rules, no non-local could take up permanent residence or acquire property in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. The rule, however, was suspended and violated when the Pakistan Government in the 1970’s, during the Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto era, settled thousands of people from the then North West Frontier Province (NWFP, now Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa) in Gilgit-Baltistan, converting the local majority into a minority. The first reported sectarian clash took place during Bhutto’s regime in the mid-1970s, when Bhutto prohibited the Shias from setting up stages on the streets. The consequent Shia resentment resulted in firing by the Police, injuring many.

Later, in May 1988, military dictator General Zia-ul-Haq, in an attempted massive sectarian attack, sent a Lashkar (army) of militants, comprising natives of Afghanistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, to attack the Shias living there. The fire of sectarianism was lit by Zia during the last days of his rule.

In the words of International Crisis Group’s (ICG) report Discord in Pakistan’s Northern Areas:
.…Sunni zealots, predominantly from NWFP’s tribal areas, assisted by local Sunnis from Chilas, Darel and Tangir, [on May 17, 1988] attacked several Shia villages on the outskirts of Gilgit. For three days, they killed, looted and pillaged with impunity while the authorities sat back and watched. Although contingents of the paramilitary Frontier Constabulary (FC) were eventually sent in, they too looked the other way while Sunni attackers wreaked havoc. By the time army units were sent in to quell the violence, at least 150 people were killed, several hundred injured and property worth millions of rupees destroyed.

The brunt of the radical Islamisation policy of General Zia-ul-Haq in this region focused on settling outsiders in the area, impacting directly and adversely on the local people. The policy of Islamization, the Afghan crisis in the 1980s, the revolution in Iran in 1979, each had a cumulative impact on sectarian turmoil. Even after these events subsided and the General Pervez Musharraf regime announced a policy of ‘enlightened moderation,’ nothing spectacular happened to assuage the wounds of the people of Gilgit-Baltistan.

Gilgit had come under the firm grip of sectarian violence in 1992 following the assassination of Gayyasuddin, a Sunni leader, on May 30 that year, leading to at least 30 killings. The subsequent conciliatory peace talks ended when Latif Hassan, a Shia leader, was shot dead on August 4, 1993, again leading to clashes that claimed more than two dozen lives. Also, the year 2003 saw trouble brewing in the Northern Areas over the Islamic textbooks that the Pakistan Ministry of Education had issued as part of the curriculum for the schools in the region. According to Shia community leaders, the textbooks promote Sunni thought and values and are an attempt to promote sectarian hatred between the two sects.

Apart from cycles of violence and sustained oppression from above, a low literacy rate and acute poverty act as powerful deterrents to any movement to further the region’s democratic demands, and contribute directly to the growth of sectarian fanaticism. The Zia era witnessed the creation of extremist groups like the anti-Shia Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) and, in response, the Shia Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Fiqah-e-Jafaria. In 1996, the SSP created an armed wing, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ). At the other end, the Shias formed their own armed outfit, the Sipah-e-Mohammedi Pakistan (SMP). The aggressive Sunni Islamisation drive initiated by General Zia impacted substantially on Shia-dominated Gilgit-Baltistan, with  the Pakistan Army and politicians in Islamabad seeking to divide the region along sectarian lines to retain tight control over this strategically important area.

On December 7, 2005, for instance, a Daily Times editorial noted that intelligence agents had discovered that the LeJ and SSP were planning to use suicide-bombers to target Shia members of the Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Council. Earlier in October 2005, hired Sunni militants had attacked a group of Shias in Basen, 58 kilometres from Gilgit Town on the Ghezer road, killing two and wounding others. Two of the gunmen escaped, but a third was injured and thereafter arrested by the local police, and taken to the District Hospital, Gilgit. Some documents recovered from his possession indicated that he came from Kohistan in the NWFP. Shortly thereafter, however, the Pakistani Rangers, on orders from the ‘highest quarters’, forcibly removed the perpetrator from the hospital, apparently to avoid his identification and interrogation by the local police, which, sources in Gilgit indicate, would have exposed a larger conspiracy. A majority of those killed have been demonstrators who have fallen to the bullets of the state’s paramilitary force, the Pakistan Rangers, and sources in Gilgit claim that, contrary to the official position, there is no tension between local Shias and Sunnis, but rather a deliberate effort from the outside, part of a long-drawn campaign, to create mischief in the region.

A report by Freedom House in 2010, noted, further: 
A number of Islamist militant groups, including those that receive patronage from the Pakistani military, operate from bases in Pakistani-administered Kashmir. Militant groups that have traditionally focused on attacks in Indian-administered Kashmir are reportedly expanding their influence and activities in Pakistani Kashmir, including the establishment of new madrassas (religious schools) in the area. They have also increased cooperation with other militants based in Pakistan's tribal areas, such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)…… In August (2010), the Pakistani Government banned 25 militant groups operating within the country, including those focused on Kashmir. Although the Government claimed to have raided and sealed off the Muzaffarabad headquarters of the LeT, also known as the Jama’at-ud-Dawa, other reports indicated that the group continued to operate training camps in the region.

Though the changed demographic nature of the region and continuous Pakistani attempt to foster sectarian strife to divide the people and thus deprive them of a ‘united formation’ has led to some sectarian strife, the local culture has remained substantially resistant to violence. Significantly, media reports indicate that five people were killed and another eight were injured in sectarian-motivated killings in the month of November 2011. However, with little media presence in the region, and tremendous manipulation of reports, suspicions persist that these killings may have been orchestrated by the Pakistani establishment, rather than motivated by local sectarian sentiment.  

Moreover, Security Forces (SFs) are accused of barging into the houses without search and arrest warrants. Islamabad and its “state apparatus” have been accused of engineering ‘disappearances’ and illegal detentions in the region. In one glaring incident of excesses, Manzoor Parwana, a leading politician in Gilgit-Baltistan, was abducted by Pakistan’s SFs on July 28, 2011, for demanding the rights of the more than ten thousand Ladakhi refugees, who reside in different parts of Gilgit-Baltistan, and desire reunification with their relatives in India. He is yet to be released.

In September 2011, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) expressed alarm at the arrest of over two dozen political activists in Gilgit-Baltistan and reports of maltreatment of some of them in detention. In connection with the August 11, 2011 protests over non-payment of compensation to the victims of the Attabad landslide, an HRCP statement observed,
The Commission takes serious exception to the manner in which the authorities have chosen to deal with public resentment following the August 11 killings. The Policemen accused of the killings have yet to be arrested but many political and civil society activists have been held in a crackdown against the protesters. HRCP has noted with concern reports of mistreatment of some of the activists.

The population of Gilgit-Baltistan is silenced by an overwhelming military and intelligence presence, arbitrary detentions and ‘disappearances’. A devastating report by the European Union Rapporteur, Baroness Emma Nicholson, while deploring “documented human rights violations by Pakistan” declared unambiguously that “the people of Gilgit and Baltistan are under the direct rule of the military and enjoy no democracy”. Nicholson’s report was scathing on the sheer oppression of the people, on the complete absence of legal and human rights and a Constitutional status, as well as on the enveloping backwardness that had evidently been engineered as a matter of state policy in the region.

The President of Pakistan ‘selects’ the Chief Ministers of Gilgit-Baltistan, and they are not, consequently, answerable to the local people. They remain subject to military and bureaucratic pressures from Islamabad. Not surprisingly, Chief Minister Mehdi Shah of Pakistan People’s Party, in a startling revelation, disclosed that he had been forbidden to take action against corrupt officials in the past by sitting Assembly Members, on political and sectarian grounds. However, the speaker of Gilgit-Baltistan Legislative Assembly, Wazir Baig, of Pakistan People’s Party Parliamentarian (PPPP), an electoral extension of PPP in Gilgit-Baltistan, accused the Chief Minister of orchestrating recent extra judicial killings and the arrest of dozens of innocent local youth.

Despite a fitful focus on the more extreme developments in the region, Gilgit-Baltistan has largely been ignored by the international media and community, substantially as a result of its remoteness and intentional isolation by Islamabad. The denial of basic rights is a quotidian reality in the region, with periodic escalation of orchestrated excesses by state agencies or Islamist extremist proxies. Despite clear directives from the Supreme Court of Pakistan, the ambiguity of the region’s constitutional status – and hence the denial of legal and constitutional protection to the population – persists. Islamabad has combined the military jackboot with the instrumentalisation of extremist majoritarian Islam as its principal strategy of political management in Gilgit-Baltistan, and the population continues to despair for any proximate relief in a situation where every dissenting voice is immediately and effectively suffocated.


NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
February 27-March 4, 2012

 

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

 

Assam

0
0
1
1

Nagaland

0
0
2
2

Left-wing Extremism

 

Bihar

2
0
0
2

Total (INDIA)

2
0
3
5

NEPAL

3
0
0
3

PAKISTAN

 

Balochistan

8
3
3
14

FATA

3
10
92
105

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

28
3
2
33

Sindh

9
0
0
9

Gilgit-Baltistan

1
0
0
1

Total (PAKISTAN)

49
16
97
162
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


BANGLADESH

US Special Forces are in Bangladesh, says USPACOM chief Admiral Robert William: US Pacific Command (USPACOM) chief Admiral Robert Willard told lawmakers at a Congressional hearing on March 1 that US Special Forces teams are currently stationed in five South Asian countries, including Bangladesh, as part of the counter-terrorism co-operation with these nations. He stated, "We have currently special forces assist teams laid down in Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Maldives and India as part of the effort to enhance their counter-terrorism capabilities." bdnews24, March 3, 2012.


INDIA

MEA and MoD deny presence of US Special Forces in India: The Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD) on March 2 denied US Pacific Command (USPACOM) chief Admiral Willard's statement that crack US military troops were based in India besides Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and the Maldives to counter threats from organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). Both Ministries dismissed the claim as "factually incorrect so far as the reference to India is concerned'', sources said. The Hindu, March 3, 2012.

Centre may soon approve increased military presence across Naxal belt in east and central India, says report:The Central Government is finalizing a series of decisions to increase military presence across the Naxal [left-wing extremist] belt in east and central India. Among them is a plan to raise the first Territorial Army battalion comprising of local tribals. Times of India, March 2, 2012.

Three CRPF battalions de-inducted and 39 CPMFs bunkers removed from Srinagar: The Jammu and Kashmir Government de-inducted three Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) battalions and removed 39 Central Paramilitary Forces (CPMFs) bunkers from Srinagar. "The foot prints of security forces are being reduced. As many as three CRPF battalions have been de-linked, 39 security bunkers removed in Srinagar city and 52 buildings vacated from forces occupation," Chief Minister Omar Abdullah said on February 29. DNA, March 1, 2012.


NEPAL

13 PLA cantonments to be closed down by March 10: Prime Minister Baburam Bhattarai led Special Committee on February 29 decided to shut down 13 People's Liberation Army (PLA) cantonments and relocate Unified Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist (UCPN-M) combatants opting for integration to the remaining 15 cantonments within the next 10 days. The move follows a petition to the Prime Minister on February 28 by Nepali Congress (NC) and Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) members of the committee, calling for immediate progress on the stalled peace process. ekantipur, March 1, 2012.


PAKISTAN

92 militants and 10 SFs among 105 persons killed during the week in FATA: Four militants were killed and two others received injuries in clashes between two rival outfits in Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency in Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on March 3.

25 Lashkar-e-Islam (LI) militants were killed in a suicide attack carried out by a rival group, targeting a mosque after Friday prayers on March 2 in Tirah Valley of Khyber Agency.

23 LI militants and 10 Army personnel were killed in fresh clashes in Lakaro Baba area of Tirah Valley.

17 Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants, including two key 'commanders', were killed and 13 injured, while five of their hideouts were destroyed after jetfighters pounded their hideouts in Akhun Kot, Bilrass and Chappar areas of Manozai areas of Upper Orakzai Agency.

At least 20 militants were killed and their five hideouts were destroyed by Security Forces (SFs) in different areas of Orakzai Agency on March 1. Dawn; Daily Times; The News; Tribune, February 28 - March 5, 2012.

Islamabad denies WikiLeaks claim on links between its intelligence and Army officials and Osama bin Laden: Pakistan on February 29 rubbished WikiLeaks disclosure that some of its intelligence and Army officers were in touch with slain al Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden and knew his whereabouts before his killing in Abbottabad on May 1-2, 2011. "These kinds of charges are not new… far from the truth," said Pakistan military spokesman Major General Athar Abbas. Tribune, February 28, 2012.

SC petitioned again to permanently end the political wing of ISI: Another petition filed on February 29 before Pakistan Supreme Court by Chairman of Al-Jihad Trust, Habib Wahabul Khairi, asking it to shut the political wing of Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI). The petitioner, Khairi, accused former Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto of forming the ISI's political cell for his personal interests in 1975. Indian Express, March 1, 2012.

ATA to be amended to check money-laundering in Pakistan, informs SBP Governor Yasin Anwar: The State Bank of Pakistan (SBP) on February 27 informed Senate Committee on Finance that Pakistan would amend its Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA). It said it is working on a draft legislation to ensure enforcement of ATA provisions in financial services sector for conviction of persons found involved in money-laundering. Daily Times, February 28, 2012.

US express concern over Pakistan diverting aid money for other purposes: United States (US) Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and lawmakers on February 28 expressed concern over diversion of its aide money by Pakistan for other purposes, even as the US has tried to build a firewall in this regard. "Well, we certainly have constructed one," Clinton told lawmakers. Indian Express; Dawn, February 29, 2012.

Time to get rid of 'strategic depth' hangover, says Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar: Foreign Minister Hina Rabbani Khar on March 2 said that it is time to get rid of 'strategic depth' hangover. She hoped for a relationship with Afghanistan based on trust and called for leaving behind the past associated with interference in that country and support for Taliban. Dawn, March 3, 2012.


SRI LANKA

Army to scale down its presence in North and East: Army Commander Lieutenant General Jagath Jayasuriya said that the Army is to scale down its presence in the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The Army is now completely ready for far-reaching reforms in its structural composition regarding ground realities, security and needs of island-wide ongoing development projects, he added. Colombo Page, March 3, 2012.

Terrorism countered without any racial discrimination, says President Mahinda Rajapaksa: President Mahinda Rajapaksa on February 28 said that the Protest in North and East along with other parts of country on February 27, irrespective of all differences, against a resolution before the UN Human Rights Council in Geneva against Sri Lanka proved that ruthless terrorism was defeated without rousing racist passions by the State. The President also stated that the international community does not have a genuine desire to build unity among peoples of this country. Daily News, February 29, 2012.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni


A Project of the
Institute For Conflict Management



To receive FREE advance copies of SAIR by email Subscribe.

Recommend South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) to a friend.

 

 

 

 

 
Copyright © 2001 SATP. All rights reserved.