SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 12, No. 32, February 10, 2014

PAKISTAN

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Balochistan: Deepening Catastrophe
Anurag Tripathi
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On January 17-18, 2014, at least 13 highly decomposed bodies were found buried in the Tootak area of Khuzdar District in Balochistan Province. On February 4, 2014, the Deputy Commissioner (DC) of Khuzdar, Syed Abdul Hameed Shah, submitted a report to the Supreme Court, stating that 13 dead bodies had been recovered from a mass grave on the indication of a local shepherd who informed the DC's office. Balochistan Home Secretary Asad Jillani informed the Court that a one-man inquiry commission had been constituted and would complete its inquiry within one month. The Apex Court has now directed the Balochistan Government to submit DNA and inquiry commission reports on March 7, 2014.

On February 1, 2014, the Supreme Court had taken notice of the issue following a statement by the Chairman of the Voice for Balochistan Missing Persons (VFBMP) Nasrullah Baloch, who had claimed on January 31, 2014, that around 100 bodies had been recovered from mass graves in Khuzdar, and among them three had been identified as missing persons. This is the continuation of an entrenched trend. On December 31, 2013, Nasrullah Baloch had alleged that 161 Baloch political workers had been subjected to extra-judicial killings in different parts of Balochistan through 2013, and that “Secret services picked up 510 Baloch political workers.”

Significantly, the Supreme Court has been hearing the Balochistan missing people case since 2012 and has already reprimanded the Government for its failure to comply with its order on several occasions. At times, the Government has pleaded helplessness in the matter. Crucially, on January 30, 2014, the Balochistan Provincial Government conceded before the Supreme Court that it was handicapped in recovering missing Baloch persons, because it had no effective control over the Frontier Corps (FC), which was accused of 'detaining' these persons. In March 2013, the Commission on the Inquiry of Enforced Disappearances, a government-sponsored judicial commission, admitted that total number of missing person cases stood at 621 at that time. However, Nasrullah Baloch, dismissed the figure: “Absolutely wrong figures. 621? Not at all. 23,000 is the number of registered cases. From this, a whole 14,000 came during the current Government’s tenure.”

Indeed, extra-judicial killings have become the order of the day in the restive Province. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), the Province has recorded at least 3,073 civilian fatalities since 2004. 276 civilian killings (174 in the South and 102 in the North) have been claimed by Baloch separatist formations such as the Baloch Republican Army (BRA), Baloch Liberation Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT) and United Baloch Army (UBA). The Islamist and sectarian extremist formations, primarily Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), claimed responsibility for the killing of another 489 civilians, all in North, mostly in and around Quetta. The remaining 2,308 civilian fatalities - 1426 in South and 882 in North - remain ‘unattributed’. As SAIR has noted, a large proportion of the ‘unattributed’ fatalities, particularly in the Southern region, are believed to be the result of enforced disappearances carried out by state agencies, or by their proxies, prominently including the Tehrik-e-Nafaz-e-Aman Balochistan (TNAB, Movement for the Restoration of Peace, Balochistan).

Sectarian violence orchestrated by Islamabad-backed Islamist formations is also responsible for a significant proportion of civilian fatalities. SATP data indicates that at least 239 Hazara Shias were killed in Balochistan through 2013. SATP recorded at least 396 Hazara Shia fatalities in Balochistan between 2001 and 2012. In the most recent incident, on January 21, 2014, at least 24 Shia pilgrims returning from Iran were killed and 40 were injured in a bomb attack targeting their bus at Khusak in the Kanak area of Mastung District, Balochistan. The attack was claimed by LeJ.

Northern Balochistan is dominated by Islamist terrorist groups and Sunni sectarian formations such as the TTP and the LeJ. A multiplicity of Baloch nationalist groupings operate principally in South Balochistan. South Balochistan has accounted for at least 1,848 fatalities, including 1,056 civilians, 429 Security Force (SF) personnel and 3370 terrorists, since 2004. The Northern areas of the Province, recorded 2,758 fatalities, including 2,017 civilians, 424 SF personnel and 307 terrorists, over the same period.

The security scenario in Balochistan continues to deteriorate. Balochistan recorded at least 960 fatalities, including 718 civilians, 137 SF personnel and 105 militants in 2013. In 2012, total fatalities stood at 954, including 690 civilians, 178 SF personnel and 86 militants. 711 fatalities were recorded in 2011, including 542 civilians, 122 SF personnel and 47 militants. The first 40 days of 2014 have already seen at least 108 killed, including 79 civilians, 14 SF personnel and 15 militants. Since 2007, Balochistan has recorded a continuous year on year increase in the number of civilians killed. 

The number and lethality of suicide attacks in the Province has also increased considerably, with nine such incidents resulting in 233 fatalities and 407 injuries in 2013; as against three such attacks resulting in 30 deaths and 60 injuries in 2012 and 60 fatalities and 124 injuries in four attacks in 2011.

Further, as against 70 major incidents of killing (each involving three or more fatalities) resulting in 213 fatalities in 2012, 63 such incidents were recorded in 2013, but fatalities rose to 433 fatalities. The Province also recorded fewer bomb attacks, but with considerably higher fatalities in 2013, 138 and 440 respectively; as compared to 148 resulting in 205 fatalities in 2012.

There were 18 attacks on NATO convoys through 2013, with six killed and seven injured, following ten such attacks in 2012, with six injured and none killed.

Through the year, Baloch rebels in the southern part of the Province continued to carry out attacks overwhelmingly targeting the economic infrastructure, mainly gas pipelines, power pylons and railway tracks. The attacks remained principally non-lethal in intent. According to partial data compiled by SATP, there have been at least 206 incidents of sabotaging of gas pipelines since 2004.

Given the state of Governance, acts of violence were, crucially, not restricted to a few areas, but occurred in practically each one of the 29 Districts of the Province, including the capital, Quetta. Quetta bore the brunt of terrorism through the year, with 190 terrorism-related incidents, including six suicide attacks. Out of the 138 bomb blasts recorded in Balochistan through 2013, 51 were reported from Quetta alone.

Commenting on the deteriorating law and order situation during a debate in the Provincial Assembly on August 28, 2013, Chief Minister (CM) Abdul Malik Baloch observed:

Most of the Baloch dominated areas in Balochistan were “no go” areas. Right from the Sariab Road area of Quetta to Mand in Turbat District, nobody feels safe to go there. Even Taliban style judgments are being issued in different parts of Balochistan. 78 gangs involved in kidnapping and other subversive activities were operating in Quetta alone.

Major General Ejaz Shahid, Inspector General, Frontier Corps (FC), similarly admitted on January 22, 2014, "we are struggling to establish the writ of the Government along Balochistan's western border. We are quite far away from even playing the national anthem in state-run schools in Panjgur, Turbat [Kech] and adjacent cities in Makran Division."

Meanwhile, the Provincial Government, on December 30, 2013, resolved to disarm ‘all armed groups’ in Balochistan, as part of a ‘smart and effective security policy’. Under the new strategy, the operation will begin against the BLA, BRA, UBA, Baloch United Liberation Front and Baloch Liberation Front. The scope of the operation will then extend to separatist groups such as the Balochistan Bunyad Parast Army, Baloch Musalla Difa Tanzeem, Balochistan National Liberation Army, Baloch Republican Party-Azad, Baloch Student Organisation Azad, Balochistan Waja Liberation Army and Lashkar-e-Balochistan.

It is both significant and unsurprising that Islamist terrorist formations find no mention in this listing, though they are responsible for the greater proportion of attributable attacks and killings in Balochistan. Indeed, terming reports about the presence of the Afghan Taliban as baseless and far from reality, Balochistan Home Minister Mir Sarfaraz Bugti on January 6, 2014, declared that there was no Taliban Shura (council) in Quetta and that there was "no sign of Afghan Taliban factor in the Province. I have no information about the killing of Taliban leaders." He added, further, that 'foreign hands' were involved in the prevailing unrest in Balochistan. Significantly, on January 4, 2014, Afghan Taliban sources had been quoted claiming that unidentified assailants had assassinated two senior members of the Afghan Taliban in Quetta a few days earlier. The deceased were identified as Mulla Noorullah Hotak (50), a member of the Taliban shura headed by Mulla Mohammad Omar and also serving as Taliban’s shadow governor for Afghanistan’s Zabul Province; and Mulla Abdul Malik, member of the Taliban commission responsible for making high-level appointments.

However, contradicting his Home Minister’s implied allegation, as well as Islamabad's standard rhetoric about India’s role in the troubles in Balochistan, on October 20, 2013, Chief Minister Baloch stated that he had no evidence of alleged Indian involvement in the volatile region. Earlier, on September 25, 2013, Baloch had expressed the view in London, that the Pakistani establishment was responsible for the deteriorating situation in Balochistan and for pursuing 'flawed policies'.

Islamabad’s policy of appeasing Islamist extremists while suppressing the genuine demands of the Baloch people by raising the bogey of the 'foreign hand' continues to wreak devastation in the Province. Despite Chief Minister Baloch's vocal opposition to this disruptive and bloody approach to domestic political management there can be little hope of any respite from violence in Balochistan in the foreseeable future. 

INDIA

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Chhattisgarh: Hide and Seek
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Two Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, including a Deputy Commandant, were killed and 12 security personnel were injured in a landmine blast triggered by the Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres in Sukma District of Chhattisgarh on February 9, 2014. The incident took place in the morning in a forest near Bodhrajpadar village within the Bhejji Police Station limits. Constable Rajiv Rawat, of 219 Battalion, CRPF, and Deputy Commandant Nihil Alam, were killed. A joint squad of the CRPF, its specialised unit Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (COBRA) and District Police personnel had been engaged in an anti-Maoist operation in the region over the preceding few days.

Just the previous evening, on February 8, three Maoists had been killed in a gunbattle with a joint team of the Chhattisgarh and Maharashtra Police, during combing operations in the Badekakler Forest in the Farsegarh Police Station limits in Bijapur District. Bodies of the three Maoists and a muzzle-loading gun, a tiffin bomb, Maoist literature and some items of daily use were later found on the spot. The dead were identified as Naveen Mandavi (38), his wife Mase Telam (27) and Sannu Udde (23). Mandavi was the ‘section commander’ in ‘Military Platoon II’ of the CPI-Maoist in the area.

While these two incidents give the superficial impression of an even contest for dominance between the Security Forces (SFs) and the Maoists, the reality is different and unpleasant. On October 25, 2013, Union Home Secretary Anil Goswami had pulled up the CRPF and Border Security Force (BSF) for the "purely defensive strategy" adopted by the SFs in the State. He is believed to have expressed his displeasure with the Chhattisgarh administration and Central Forces over the "lull" in action, despite the Centre asking them to step up anti-Naxal operations, especially after the May 25, 2013, Darbha attack on a convoy of Congress Party leaders and supporters. Goswami had also conveyed that CoBRA teams needed to be deployed extensively, with result-oriented tasks.

A review of the major incidents (each involving three or more fatalities) documented by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) confirms Goswami's assessment. Through 2013, a total of eight major incidents were recorded in Chhattisgarh. Of these, the SFs suffered principal losses in as many as five, and in one incident there were two fatalities on each side. Only in one incident did the Maoists suffer heavily. That operation, however, was planned and executed by the Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh just inside the Chhattisgarh border. The only incident where the SFs deployed in Chhattisgarh took the initiative was a botched operation that ended with the killing of at least seven villagers, one SF trooper and one Maoist.

Unsurprisingly, Chhattisgarh has succeeded in avoiding the dubious distinction of recording the highest fatalities in Left Wing Extremism related incidents in a State - an unfortunate position it has often held in the past, and has only marginally edged out by Jharkhand in 2012 and 2013: fatalities in Jharkhand stood at 170 and 162, respectively, in these two years, as against 147 and 148 in Chhattisgarh. There has been little significant change in the security situation in Chhattisgarh in terms of fatalities and incidents between 2012 and 2013.

According to partial data compiled by SATP, in 2013, fatalities in LWE related incidents have been reported from 10 out of 27 Districts in the State: Sukma (56), Bijapur (36), Bastar (14), Narayanpur (6), Dantewada (5), Kanker (5), Kondagaon (2), Rajnandgaon (2), Raigarh (1) and Dhamtari (1). A total of 128 fatalities were recorded by the SATP database. In 2012, fatalities were reported from 11 Districts.            

A range of other parameters also remain more or less comparable over 2012 and 2013. However, one significant indicator – the number of attacks on the Police - rose sharply from 77 to 102. Another two significant indicators - arms training camps held and Jan Adalats (‘People’s Courts’, kangaroo courts organized by the Maoists) organized – report a decline from 26 to 14, and 14 to seven, respectively.     

Beyond crude data, the Maoist attack on the Congress Party convoy in Darbha Valley (Bastar District) on May 25, 2013, which led to the killing of controversial Salwa judum leader Mahendra Karma and other Congress leaders, including former Union Minister V. C . Shukla, Pradesh (State) Congress Committee chief Nandkumar Patel and Patel's son, more dramatically expose the levels of security preparedness in Chhattisgarh.  

While Chhattisgarh continues to tie itself in knots, the reasons behind the mess are not difficult to find. With the arrest of eight persons between January 15 and 17, 2014, from different places in Raipur and Kanker District, Chhattisgarh Police claimed to have uncovered a "massive urban network" of the CPI-Maoist, which clearly demonstrates a shocking nexus between businessmen, Maoists and politicians. Niraj Chopra, a Public Works Department (PWD) contractor based in Kanker and his businessman uncle Dharmendra Chopra, who resides in his palatial bungalow in Raipur, were the alleged lynchpins of the 'urban network'. Dharmendra Chopra was the last to be arrested among the eight, on January 17, 2014, near Raipur Airport, apparently while trying to escape in the vehicle of Kanker Member of Parliament (MP) Sohan Potai of the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). The other six arrested persons were Santosh Dhurva, Chetram Darro, Baliram Usendi, Phool Singh, Sukhnath Nareti and Ravi Kadiyam. Hailing from Bhanupratappur in tribal Kanker District, the arrested persons allegedly worked under Prabhakar, the CPI-Maoist 'divisional committee' member of the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC). The Police allege that the arrested group was providing all kinds of logistical support to the Maoists, including supplies of consumables, laptops, mobiles phones, transportation arms  and ammunition, and were also delivering millions of rupees to other States to fund the purchase of weapons and allegedly “fixing deals” between mining companies and Maoist leaders. They also acted as couriers for the Maoists and facilitated their stay in urban concentrations within Chhattisgarh.

Media reports indicate that Dharmendra Chopra was closely connected with Prabhakar and Gopanna, both senior Maoists, since he first met them in the late 1990s. He bought and carried mobile phones, tablets and medicines for them, arranged vehicles, and received payments on occasion. Chopra also claimed to having close links with political leaders Sohan Potai, Vikram Usendi and Mohan Mandavi. Interestingly, he also maintained that these leaders knew that he had contacts with senior Maoists. He further asserted that he had funded the election campaigns of these leaders, and 'managed things' for them. All three are elected leaders from Kanker District. Potai is a BJP MP, Usendi a BJP Member of Legislative Assembly (MLA), and Mandavi a Congress MLA. Mandavi was a Minister in the Ajit Jogi Government, while Usendi was a Minister during Raman Singh’s second tenure as Chief Minister.

Dharmendra Chopra also claimed to have helped two mining companies - Jayaswal Neco and Godawari Power and Ispat Ltd - to negotiate deals with the Maoists. Both have leases in Kanker, where Maoists have declared a 'ban' on mining. Chopra claimed that Neco had made him their contractor to facilitate a deal and asserted that he had introduced the company's officials to Maoists. He also maintained that Godawari’s contractor Manik Chand Jain provided him a 30 per cent share of profits for his services. While Godawari Power refused to comment on Chopra's claims, Jayaswal Neco insisted that the company gave the contract based on his reputation, unaware about his 'other activities'. His political associates have made comparable claims.

Among the other arrested persons, Phool Singh and Sukhnath Nareti were wanted in eight cases of attempt to murder and murder, while Niraj was running extortion activities. During interrogation, Baliram Usendi admitted that he was the village 'sarpanch' of his native place, Metabodli. A few months earlier, the 'sarpanch' of Metabodli village was allegedly murdered by the Maoists during the proceedings of a so-called "people's court", after which Baliram was elected unopposed to the post.

In a new trend of sorts, the Maoists took responsibility for the killing of two journalists - Nemichand Jain (February 12, 2013) and Sai Reddy (December 6, 2013) - in the Bastar Division, on the grounds that they were working for the Police. Journalists in Bastar have made strong protests against these killings and organised a protest march through the Maoist dominated Abujhmarh Forest area on January 26, 2014, though on a lesser scale than was earlier expected. The killings exposed the conditions under which journalists work in the Bastar area, sandwiched between the demands of the Maoists and SFs. What makes things more difficult is that Bastar journalists generally receive inadequate or no salaries, and are required to 'raise money' from private parties, not only for their own sustenance, but also towards advertising revenues for their publications, forcing them into compromises that put them at inordinate risk.

One bright spot in this dismal picture was the relatively peaceful conduct of Assembly Elections albeit under unprecedented security arrangements. Significantly, the voter turnout was unexpectedly high, at 75.53 per cent in phase one in the Maoist-dominated areas, and 78.5 per cent in phase two across the rest of the State, yielding an average participation of over 77 per cent across the State. One constituency (Kurud) saw an incredible 88 per cent vote. However, there is reason to believe that such a high voter turnout would not have been possible without the Maoists' tacit instruction for voters to cast their ballots in favour of certain candidates.

There are also indications of growing popular discontent against Left Extremists (LWE). In one case, residents of some 500 villages in the Maoist-hit Jashpur District, bordering Jharkhand in north Chhattisgarh, took a collective decision to help the Police in anti-Naxal operations. The villagers said they were fed up with the activities of the Peoples’ Liberation Front of India (PLFI), a breakaway faction of the CPI-Maoist, mainly active in Jharkhand.

While at least 30 battalions of Central Armed Police Force (CAPF) personnel are presently deployed in Chhattisgarh, the Centre has decided to deploy an additional six battalions for specialised tasks in the anti-Maoist operations grid in Chhattisgarh. Chhattisgarh has a Police population ratio of 174 per 100,000 population (as on December 31, 2012), substantially higher than the national average of 138, but significantly below the required strength, in view of the scale of the ongoing Maoist insurgency. In the absence of reliable data, the impact of the Counter-terrorism and Jungle Warfare College, Kanker, on the operational efficiency of the Chhattisgarh Police can only be guessed. 

The CPI-Maoist's overall strength across the country has clearly weakened, a fact explicitly acknowledged by the Maoist leadership. However, there is little sign of any dramatic deterioration of capacities and capabilities in Chhattisgarh. The surrender of senior Maoist leader G.V.K. Prasad Rao aka Gudsa Usendi in Andhra Pradesh may provide some succor to the Police, as he was active in Chhattisgarh, though the real impact of this move is yet to register on the ground.

On the other hand, the Maoists released one abducted Special Police Force (SPO) turned constable, Oyami Podiyami, who used to be in the gang of the dreaded Koya Commando Kartam Surya (who was killed by Maoists on February 9, 2012), after Podiyami had been interrogated for several days. He was released before the villagers who promised that they would ensure that he won't leave the village and would never join Police. The Maoists reportedly told the abducted SPO that they had changed their policy of killing villagers. It is yet to be seen what impact this will have on civilian fatalities in Chhattisgarh. It is, however, unlikely that the Maoists will stop targeting perceived threats, including those thought (rightly or otherwise) to be 'police informers' or 'collaborators'. Nevertheless, the decision not to target civilians can be expected to have some impact on the operational environment in the State, even as it suggests a growing measure of inner confidence among the Maoists.

INDIA

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Meghalaya: Renewed Challenge
Veronica Khangchian
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

On January 27, 2014, Meghalaya got central clearance to form its own special multi-task Police Force, christened ‘Special Force 10’, to deal with internal security challenges ranging from militancy to disaster management. The sanctioned strength of the Force is 1,795, including support staff. One company of the Force will be fully reserved for women. Justifying the creation of the State's own 'special Force', Chief Minister Mukul Sangma stated that, in the past, the State Government had to "run from pillar to post" to convince the Centre to deploy paramilitary Forces in the State during adverse situations. The State's Home Minister, Roshan Warjri, added that ‘Special Force 10’ would not only be tasked with counter insurgency operations, but would also be deployed to tackle riots, communal disharmony and various agitations.

During 2013, Meghalaya witnessed several agitations relating to demands from statehood to Inner Line Permit (ILP), as well as significant insurgency-related activity. It is in this context that the multi-task ‘Special Force 10’ assumes significance. 2013 also saw the formation of new Garo militant outfits: the United Achik Liberation Army (UALA); A’chik Matgrik Liberation Front (AMLF) formed in September; Achik National Liberation Army (ANLA) formed in October; Achik Tiger Force (ATF-formed by some cadres of the Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC), formed in November; the Achik National Liberation Central Army (ANLCA), also formed in November; as well as the Garo National Liberation Army-Faction (GNLA-F) and Achik Youth Liberation Front (AYLF), both formed in December. With the formation of ATF, ANVC has already seen two splits in recent years, the first one coming with the discovery of ANVC-B in March 2012. The UALA then split from ANVC-B in February 2013.  The ANVC had also faced embarrassment when Sohan D. Shira, the then leader of ANVC, formed the GNLA towards the end of 2009, after he had surrendered as a member of ANVC in 2007. The GNLA has also now suffered a major jolt with formation of GNLA-F under the leadership of Reading T. Sangma, GNLA's former ‘finance secretary’. The AMLF, ANLA, ANLCA and AYLF are reportedly new outfits. With this proliferation of insurgent factions, the security situation in the State, and particularly of the Garo Hills, deteriorated.

According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, insurgency related fatalities increased during the year, from 48 in 2012, to 60 in 2013. After dramatic declines between 2004 and 2008, there has been a continuous year on year increase in fatalities in the State.

Insurgent violence had declined after the signing of a ceasefire agreement with ANVC on July 23, 2004, but resurfaced again with the formation of GNLA, followed by the emergence of various new and splinter groups. The GNLA continues to be responsible for the largest proportion of violent activities in the State.

Worryingly, Security Force (SF) fatalities have spiked from just two in 2012 to nine in 2013. On November 5, 2013, the Garo Hills Police suffered one of its biggest casualties in its fight against militancy, with five State security personnel killed in an ambush laid by a heavily armed group of GNLA cadres at the remote Kolapara village in Baghmara, the District headquarters of South Garo Hills.

2013 recorded a total of six major incidents (each resulting in 3 or more fatalities) in which 22 persons were killed [9 militants, 5 SF personnel and 8 civilians]. In the most recent of these incidents, in the morning of November 28, three UALA militants were shot dead and another was captured alive after Williamnagar Police attacked their camp at Chiokgre village in East Garo Hills District. One of the militant leaders who masterminded the November 3, 2013, attack on a Rabha village in Goalpara (Assam) during Diwali celebrations, resulting in the death of seven villagers, was killed in the encounter. In a major attack on civilians in the year, the GNLA attacked a village in the Garobadha region, 32 kilometres from Tura in the West Garo Hills District, shooting dead three persons, including a youth and two women, in the night of September 16, 2013. 

The year recorded 39 incidents of killing, resulting in 60 fatalities. Of 28 civilian killings, 17 involved GNLA, seven were executed by UALA, one by ANVC-B and 3 fatalities remained unattributed. Of the nine SF personnel killed, ANVC-B was responsible for four, and GNLA for five. The 23 militants killed included 11 GNLA, six ANVC, three UALA, one ATF, one United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) and one unspecified.

The State recorded 26 encounters between militants and SFs in 2013, resulting in 18 fatalities [seven SF personnel and 11 militants]. Of these, GNLA was involved in 22 incidents; ANVC-B in two incidents; and AMLF and UALA in one incident each. 2012 had witnessed 17 encounters.

There were at least 17 incidents of abduction in 2013, with 36 persons abducted (a significant proportion of such incidents go unreported). Of these, 26 persons were abducted by GNLA; one by GNLA-F; one by the National democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB); while the remaining were unspecified. In one incident, the ‘area commander’ of GNLA in Songsak abducted as many as 15 secretaries of the Village Employment Council dealing with Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MGNREGA). They were released after paying INR 10,000 each from the MGNREGA funds. There were 21 recorded incidents of abduction, resulting in 39 abductions, in 2012.

17 incidents of extortion were also recorded in 2013, as against 20 such incidents in 2012 (again, a large proportion of such incidents go unreported). Of the reported incidents, 10 involved GNLA; ANVC-B and UALA were responsible for two each; NDFB and ANLCA, one each; while one incident was unattributed. A November 13, 2013, report noted that coal traders in Borsora and Nongjri areas in South West Khasi Hills District were concerned about the activities of militants from the Garo Hills and Assam, with these groups demanding sums ranging from INR 500,000 to INR two million from each trader.

64 militants were arrested through 2013: 40 GNLA, three Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC), nine ANVC-B, three UALA, four AYLF, two AMLF and three NDFB. 99 militants had been arrested in 2012. Further, nine militants surrendered in 8 incidents in 2013; three GNLA cadres, four UALA, one ANVC-B and one HNLC.

Talks with the militant formations have not been very encouraging. On December 20, 2013, at the group's 19th Raising Day celebration at Ballonggre near Tura, ANVC ‘chairman’ Dilash Marak alias Susime Marak, expressed his disappointment over the delay of the final settlement between the Centre, State and the outfit. Expressing concern and disappointment, Marak declared that, though the Centre, State and ANVC had signed an agreement in early January 2013, a final settlement was yet to be reached. On January 5, 2013, the Union and Meghalaya State Government had signed a draft agreement with both ANVC and ANVC-B, for the enhancement of the powers of the existing Garo Hills Autonomous District Council (GHADC). Reports also stated that, with dwindling resources to maintain camps and feed cadres, ANVC-B had entered the coal business for survival. Doang D. Shira, ‘publicity secretary’ ANVC-B stated, “Hundreds of cadres are at various camps with no proper food and clothing, waiting for the final solution which is being delayed and making it tough for us each passing day.” The peace pact with the two outfits now awaits the all-important Cabinet approval. Shambu Singh, Joint Secretary in charge of the North-East in the Union Ministry of Home Affairs observed, on February 5, 2014, “The matter has gone to the Cabinet and we cannot make any comment now since the Cabinet will take up the matter shortly.”

Significantly, after displaying apparent disinterest in talks with GNLA, a January 28, 2014, report claimed that the State Government had created a channel to bring GNLA to the negotiating table. While Governor K.K. Paul announced, during his Republic Day speech on January 26, that the Government had offered the path of dialogue to GNLA: “The Government has offered the path of dialogue to GNLA. I urge the leadership of GNLA to consider this seriously. It is the most opportune time to restore peace and normalcy in the Garo Hills, which the people of the region are entitled to. Violence only results in all-round misery.” On January 27, Chief Minister Mukul Sangma went further, declaring that an exercise was on to bring the outfit to the negotiating table.

The flow of ‘outsiders’ into the State has also been a long term issue. 2013 saw an intensive three month long agitation for the implementation of ILP regulations, resulting in three deaths, several arrests and enormous loss of property. A December 2013 report stated that over 71 pro-ILP activists were arrested in connection with 86 cases related to arson, murder and other charges, during the three-month agitation in Meghalaya. The estimated loss due to damage inflicted during the agitation was over INR 500 million, with over INR 210 million lost in the destruction of the Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited (BSNL) stockyard alone. On October 6, 2013, an unprotected BSNL store room-cum-warehouse at Mawlai Mawiong in East Khasi Hills District was set ablaze.

Report indicates that the Border Security Force (BSF), in 2013, arrested as many as 99 illegal Bangladeshi immigrants from the Meghalaya Frontier. In addition, the BSF arrested fifty six arms smugglers, forty of whom were from Bangladesh, while the rest were Indian. According to official statistics cited in the media, over the preceding five years (2008 to September 2013), 18,951 Bangladeshis were “detected” in the State; 978 were “prosecuted” and the remaining 17,973 were “pushed back”. From 2008 to 2011, the figures ranged between 1,500 and 3,200 per year. In 2012, however, detection of illegal Bangladeshi migrants shot up to 6,182, and till September 2013, another 3,163 were identified.

The year also saw agitations for a renewed Garoland demand, which has periodically been raised since 1974. The latest agitation was  led by the the Garo Hills State Movement Committee (GHSMC) following the resolution of the Congress Working Committee (CWC), on July 30, 2013, to sanction statehood to Telengana by bifurcating Andhra Pradesh. GHSMC general secretary Augustine Marak asserted that the Government should consider creation of Garoland based on the linguistic criteria of the States Reorganisation Act (SRA), 1956.

Even as the GHSMC threatened to intensify its stir for a separate Garoland, the Hill State People's Democratic Party (HSPDP), on August 13, 2013, renewed its demand for creating a separate Khasi-Jaintia State, arguing that this had been a long-pending demand of the party, HSPDP general secretary Enbin K. Raswai stated that the Centre should consider the creation of separate Garo and Khasi-Jaintia States in Meghalaya based on linguistic lines as envisaged in the SRA, 1956. The UALA, purportedly formed to fight for the rights of the Garos in Assam, also declared its support for a ‘Garoland’ State in November. The outfit is reported to have links with GNLA, which is also fighting for a ‘Garoland’ State, to include the Goalpara and Kamrup Districts of Assam, in addition to the Garo Hills of Meghalaya.

Meanwhile, concerned over the spurt in militant activities in the Garo Hills, National People's Party (NPP) leader Purno A. Sangma, alleged in December, that the Congress-led Meghalaya United Alliance (MUA) Government was colluding with various militant groups in the region: “It is very clear from the current law and order situation in Garo Hills that there is a nexus between insurgents and the Government.” Chief Minister Mukul Sangma had earlier asserted that a nexus between some politicians and rebel outfits operating in the State could not be ruled out, though he insisted that such a nexus was not confined to any one political party.

In what appeared to be a positive development, a meeting of citizens from all the Districts of the Garo Hills, including non-Government organisations (NGOs) working in the region, was held on January 25, 2014, to initiate a ‘Unified Peace Movement for Garo Hills’. A February 6, 2014, report further observed that the Unified Movement was preparing a “Peace Pact” that would be revealed to the public within two months.

In December 2013, Inspector General of Police, Administration and Operations, G.H.P. Raju, while dismissing the idea of involving the Army in counter insurgency operations in the Garo Hills, asserted that, with the help of the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) unit of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), and with the support of the Central Government, the State Police would win the war against militants operating in Garo Hills. Meghalaya’s present situation, however, gives much cause for concern, and the deteriorating law and order situation needs to be addressed urgently. Fast tracking the raising and deployment of the ‘Special Force 10′ is only one among the wide range of initiatives that are necessary to meet the renewed challenge in the State.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist Terrorism

INDIA

Assam

Manipur

Meghalaya

Left-wing Extremism

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

Punjab

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)