SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 13, No. 35, March 2, 2015

INDIA

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Chhattisgarh: Counter-offensive amidst Losses
Fakir Mohan Pradhan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Continuing the momentum after the December 1, 2014, Kasalpar [Sukma] attack on Security Forces (SFs), in which 14 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel, including two officers, were killed, Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres killed at least seven civilians in six incidents, and 10 SF personnel in nine incidents, while losing just three cadres in two incidents, as of February 25, 2015, in Chhattisgarh. Interestingly, there has not been a single major incident [resulting in a total of three or more casualties] in this period, indicating that the Maoists are going about their business steadily, without drawing much attention to themselves.

On January 1, 2015, Maoists killed a top surrendered Maoist, Korsa Jagaram aka Shivaji, in Kottapal village, Bijapur District. Shivaji, a native of Silger in Sukma, was a member of the West Bastar Division Committee of the CPI-Maoist and carried a reward of INR 900,000 before his surrender. He was recruited as a Gopniya Sainik (secret informer) by the Bijapur Police after his surrender. Due to his involvement in several prominent attacks on the security forces and proximity to top Maoists, he was a major intelligence source for the Police. “His death is a major loss for us,” an unnamed officer conceded.

Further, in what appeared to be a planted intelligence trap, the Maoists ambushed a joint party of the District Police and Border Security Force (BSF) near the Bande area of Kanker District on February 2, 2015, killing Bande Station House Officer (SHO) Avinash Sharma and Gopniya Sainik (secret agent) Sonu Ram Gawde, while injuring another six SF personnel — three each from the Police and BSF. While all the personnel were on motorcycles, at least Sharma and Gawde were in formals rather than fatigues, indicating that they were not expecting an armed engagement at all. The incident assumed significance as Kanker had not reported the death of any SF personnel in Maoist attacks through 2014.

According to partial data compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal, Chhattisgarh regained the dubious distinction of recording the highest fatalities in LWE-related violence in India in 2014, with a total of 113 killed, including 25 civilians 55 SF personnel and 33 Maoists. In 2013, 128 fatalities had been recorded in the State, including 48 civilians 45 SF personnel and 35 Maoists. The trends indicate a decrease in civilian and an increase in SF fatalities, with Maoist casualties decreasing only marginally in 2014, as against 2013. Data released by the Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) confirms, to be uploaded in SATP] these trends, recording 146 total fatalities, including 52 civilians 59 SF personnel and 35 Maoists, in 2014; in comparison to 149 fatalities, including 67 civilians 44 SF personnel and 38 Maoists, in 2013.

Significantly, the number of SF personnel killed in Chhattisgarh is disproportionately high, in comparison to other Maoist-affected States. According to SATP data, in 2014 Chhattisgarh alone accounted for 55 SF fatalities, out of a total of 87 in all States. In 2013, Chhattisgarh accounted for a much lower 45 out of 111 SF fatalities in all States, with Jharkhand and Bihar accounting for 26 and 25 fatalities, respectively. The SF to Maoist fatality ratio is also exceptionally adverse and worsening, at 1.7:1 in 2014, as against 1.29:1 in 2013.

It is clear that Chhattisgarh remains the nerve centre of Maoist movement and functions as the locus of their ‘tactical counter offensive’ campaigns. District-level fatalities data further indicates that almost all fatalities in Chhattisgarh have been restricted to the Bastar Division - comprising Sukma, Bijapur, Dantewada, Bastar, Kondagaon, Narayanpur and Kanker Districts. The only exception is Rajnandgaon District (two fatalities), which shares its border with Gadchiroli in Maharashtra.   

Chhattisgarh recorded 11 major incidents through 2014, in which SFs suffered principal losses in five; the Maoists suffered principal losses in another five; while civilians (polling officials) bore the brunt in one incident when Maoists mistook them for SF personnel. The Maoists lost 15 cadres in these incidents, while SFs lost 43 personnel, indicating that the Maoist retaliation was much stronger. It is clear, moreover, that despite assessments of significant weakening of the rebel Forces and leadership – judgments that have been confirmed by internal appraisals by the Maoists -, the Maoists still retain sufficient residual strength to sustain their counter-offensive.

While Maoist-Police encounters as well as attacks on the Police have increased in frequency, a range of other parameters remain more or less comparable over 2013-2014. Significantly, the number of surrenders of Maoist cadres has also risen sharply.

SFs have made several significant arrests, including Raghunath Yadav, an active member of Military Company Number-6, carrying reward money of INR 800,000; a Maoist couple - Sanjeev Himchi aka Sanju aka Nagesh (26) and his wife Navotin Himachi aka Santila, with reward money of INR 800,000 and INR 300,000, respectively; Manku, with a reward money of INR 800,000; Jairam, a member of the Kiskodo Area Committee, arrested with an AK-47 in Kanker District; Jyoti, a woman Maoist ‘deputy commander’ belonging to the Basur ‘area committee’, with a reward of INR 300,000; and Ayutu (27) a 'deputy commander', carrying a reward of INR 300,000.

Similarly, there have been important surrenders in the State as well, within the context of a wider wave of surrenders. There have, however, been some apprehensions regarding the quality of surrenders, with allegations that the overwhelming numbers are comprised of sympathisers or others only peripherally connected – in some cases allegedly unconnected – with the Maoists. These apprehensions notwithstanding, the surrenders include high profile Maoists including Chambala Ravinder aka Arjun, reportedly the 'commander' of the '2nd Battalion' of the People's Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA), suggesting a measure of discontent within the rebel leadership.

Despite the erosion in popular support, the Maoists continue to exercise considerable ‘power’ in the Bastar region. Thus, on January 9, 2015, some 130 Sarpanch (elected heads of village self-government bodies) candidates were herded by Maoists into the core forest area near the Gonguda Hill range in Sukma District with the assurance that they would be released after a meeting with senior Maoists. The candidates were held hostage till January 15, when CPI-Maoist 'divisional committee' member Jaggu, along with Kerlapal 'area committee 'commander' Bhime aka Reena, and armed cadres, finally reached there to warn them against participating in the elections.

In the Panchayat elections eventually held in four phases between January 28, 2015 and February 10, 2015, of 22,416 panches (village representatives) elected in the seven Districts of the Bastar Division, nearly 50 per cent, or 11,098 candidates, won unopposed, presumably as a result of pressure from the Maoists on other candidates not to contest. 212 sarpanchs also won unopposed. At least 90 per cent of these, the Chhattisgarh Police claimed, either had links with the Maoists or were supported by them. The maximum presence of Maoist-backed representatives was in the Narayanpur, Dantewada, Bijapur and Sukma Districts of Bastar Division, where, out of a total 6,963 panches, 5,186 (75 per cent) won unopposed. Of 1,107 panches in Narayanpur, 938 were elected unopposed. Of 2,169 panches in Bijapur, 1,785 were elected unopposed, while 1,335 of 1,709 panches in Dantewada, and 1,128 of 1,978 panches in Sukma won unopposed. With various Government schemes worth at least INR10 billion annually, implemented through the panchayats, preventing leakages to the Maoists will be an uphill task, as hardly any officer is likely to visit interior areas to audit the actual implementation of works and expenditure. An officer who has worked in the area commented: “Collectors are strictly asked to not travel beyond a point. Who will monitor the schemes? We have to rely on these panch only.” Ironically, according to media reports, Dantewada District won the award for best implementation of MNREGA, when the panchayat polls were on.

The response from the political establishment to the Maoist insurgency has failed to go beyond posturing and rhetoric. Even as Maoists killed a Special Task Force trooper in the Gadiras area and a secret police agent in Konta town, both of Sukma District], and derailed a goods train engine at the Kamalur Station in Dantewada District on February 19, 2015, Chief Minister Raman Singh tweeted, “Our gallant police jawans (troopers) and their sacrifices have brought us closer to the end of Naxalism.”

In a candid interview, Dilip Trivedi, the outgoing Director General of the CRPF, observed, on November 27, 2014, "For some States, continuing Naxal violence is beneficial. It helps them get central funds. And then it's not their men who die but those from outside the State (central force personnel)." Sources indicate that Trivedi was pointing to Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Odisha. It remains the case that, despite the training of over 22,000 Chhattisgarh Police personnel at the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare College at Kanker, the overwhelming proportion of the anti-Maoist fighting continues to be done by Central Forces, whose total deployment in Chhattisgarh amounts to some 31 Battalions, with each battalion yielding approximately 400 personnel on the ground - that is, barely 12,400 Central Paramilitary Force (CPMF) personnel. The highly affected Bastar Division alone covers nearly 40,000 square kilometres.

A political establishment that is in power in the Chhattisgarh for the third consecutive term still leaves too much to be desired even in terms of basic governance. The condition in Maoist-affected areas remains distressing. According to media reports, data provided by Sukma, Bijapur and Dantewada Districts to UMHA indicates that these three Districts have only 44 bank and regional rural bank branches, in total. Sukma and Bijapur have just 10 ATMs. Sukma, 13 mobile towers out of 32 are non-functional. It has only four sub-post offices and all 61 branch post offices are non-functional. Bijapur has five sub-post offices and 53 branch post offices but only two of these are functional. Dantewada has six sub post offices and 59 branch post offices, of which nine don’t have a single employee, and a total of 50 per cent of all posts are lying vacant. In Bijapur, 14 mobile towers are functional but another 14 sanctioned towers are yet to be installed. In Dantewada, three of 20 mobile towers are non-functional. Governance in Sukma and Bijapur continues to be rudimentary, at best.

Based on underground and over-ground activities of the Maoists, Sukma, Bijapur, Dantewada, Bastar, Kanker, Narayanpur and Kondagaon Districts remain highly-affected. Rajnandgaon is moderately affected, while Raipur, Joshpur, Balod, Balarampur, Gairabnd and Dhamtari remain marginally affected.

The Maoist movement has lost vigour in many other States, and has suffered significant reverses in Chhattisgarh as well. However, the Bastar region of Chhattisgarh remains the nerve centre of the Maoist counter offensive. The Maoists continue to use their depleted manpower and resources with a high measure of ingenuity, even as the state’s responses continue to display a lack of coherence and focus.

There is no dearth of evidence to show that determined efforts have succeeded in defeating the Maoists in other theatres and at other times in the history of the movement. India has had several counter-insurgency successes, and after the new National Democratic Alliance (NDA) Government came to power at the Centre, there has been some talk about using the experience and successful counter-insurgency strategies employed in Punjab, Tripura and Andhra Pradesh, to fight the Maoists. Unfortunately, little of this has actually translated into any strategic shift on the ground.

Nevertheless, the Centre has shown its willingness to send more troops into Bastar, and the long-delayed establishment of a base for Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) operations in Bhilai has now been pushed forward, and a UAV made its first test-reconnaissance from the airstrip in the Bhilai Steel Plant campus on February 27, 2015. The UAV is likely to be connected with certain Strategic locations within months for live inputs.

Increasing pressure from the Centre has, in the past, tended to act overwhelmingly on the Central Forces and organisations engaged in anti-Maoist operations in Chhattisgarh, at least on occasion, with unfortunate consequences. Unless the State Police, with its critical asset of local manpower, takes on its necessary responsibilities in the counter-insurgency operations in the State, successes will remain fitful, and the Maoist potential for resurgence intact.

INDIA

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Bihar: Self-Goals
Mrinal Kanta Das
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

Two troopers of the Commando Battalion for Resolute Action (CoBRA) - Constable Gulab Yadav and Constable Narottam Das – were killed and another 12 were injured when Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres blew up a mini-bus carrying personnel near Nandai on the Imamganj - Dumaria route in Gaya District on February 24, 2015. The unit also came under fire from the Maoists after the improvised explosive device (IED) blast. According to Police sources, there was ‘heavy force mobilization’ in the area in the wake of an encounter in the vicinity a day earlier. The site of the explosion was part of an area believed to be safe, with regular traffic flows, and was not, prima facie in the ‘vulnerable’ category, which is why the COBRA unit took the liberty of travelling in a mini bus. A measure of complacency may also have crept in because of the decline in Maoist violence in the State in 2014.

According to the partial data compiled by South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), Bihar recorded 17 fatalities in Left Wing Extremism (LWE) related incidents in 2014, including seven civilians, seven Security Force (SF) personnel and three Maoists; these numbers represented a sharp drop from the 48 fatalities in 2013, including 21 civilians, 25 SF personnel and two Maoists. Indeed, on January 9, 2015, Bihar Police claimed that it had successfully contained LWE in the State, with the arrest of a number of Maoists and the recovery of explosives. According to figures released by Bihar Police Headquarters, though there were 105 incidents of Maoist violence in 2014, as against 103 in 2013, only 20 civilians were killed in 2014, against 36 in 2013. The number of Police killed also saw a sharp drop, to six in 2014, from 25 in 2013. [Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) data indicates that the number of civilians killed by Maoists in 2014 in Bihar was 26]. Maoists were also able to drastically reduce their own casualties in the State over 2013 and 2014, suggesting that the decline in Maoist violence may not entirely have been enforced by state, and could represent a choice by the Maoists to observe strategic silence. The February 24, 2015, explosion in Gaya is a reminder that Maoist strike capabilities are intact. 

Bihar recorded one major incident (resulting in three or more fatalities) in 2014, in comparison to five such incidents in 2013. Three SFs were killed and another eight were injured under the Dhibra Police Station limits in Aurangabad District on April 7, 2014, while diffusing an IED.

The Maoists engaged in six encounters, 11 arson incidents, three attacks involving their Peoples Militia, and three recorded incidents of abduction in 2014. Crucially, as in 2013, Gaya, Aurangabad and Jamui saw the maximum number of violent incidents. The Maoists were also involved in several act of violence during the 16^th Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) election. On March 27, 2014, for instance, about 100 Maoist cadres blew up two mobile towers, exploding powerful bombs at Manjhauli and Dumaria Bazar villages of Gaya District, ahead of then Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) Prime Ministerial Candidate Narendra Modi's election rallies. Further on April 5, 2014, the Maoists ordered the closure of Janata Dal-United and BJP election offices at the Dumaria Block Headquarters in Gaya District. However, despite these actions, threats, and calls for election boycott, the voter turn-out in Bihar during the 2014 Lok Sabha election, at 56.28 per cent, was 11.82 per cent higher than the 2009 elections (44.46 per cent).

Huge amounts of arms and ammunition were recovered from 10 Districts of the State in 2014, particularly from Rohtas and Munger. East Champaran (21), Munger (25), Patna (6) and Muzaffarpur (31) recorded the maximum number of arrests, 83, out of a total of 164 arrests in the State in 2014, as compared to 110 in 2013. Among those arrested in 2014 were Azad Paswan, ‘secretary’ of the Sone Vindhyanchal Zonal Committee; Sunil Kumar aka Shambhuji aka Lambuji,  a member of the ‘special area committee’; five ‘commanders’, one ‘central zonal area commander’, two ‘zonal commanders,’ two ‘sub-zonal commanders’ and five ‘area commanders.’ 

Maoist-related incidents (both violent and non-violent) were reported from 21 Districts, out of a total of 38 Districts in Bihar. On the basis of underground and over ground activities, three Districts - Aurangabad, Gaya, and Jamui – were categorized as highly affected in 2014; another three - Rohtas, Muzaffarpur and Munger – were moderately affected; while fifteen Districts - East Champaran, Patna, Arwal, Banka, Nawada, Kaimur, Lakhisarai, Jehanabad, Sheohar, Buxar, Vaishali, Saran, Khagaria, Bhojpur, Begusarai – remained marginally affected. 

Under pressure of a rapidly changing situation, the Maoists claimed to have introduced ‘structural changes’ in their organization, introducing a ‘new committee’ with a focus on the Jharkhand-Bihar region, dismantling the existing Bihar-Jharkhand Special Area Committee (BJSAC). The newly constituted East Bihar Eastern Jharkhand Special Area Committee (EBEJSAC) will include Dumka, Godda, Pakur and Jamtara under Santhal Pargana Division of Jharkhand; and Bhagalpur, Banka, Jamui, Lakhisarai and Monghyr in Bihar. This was part of the strategy adopted during the ‘fourth central committee meeting’ held in 2013.

The decline in tactical errors by state Forces was reflected in comparable declines in Maoist violence and strength. Unfortunately, the political situation in Bihar hardly provides a conducive environment to a sustained response to the enduring Maoist challenge in the State. Chief Minister Nitish Kumar has often reiterated his position that development will result in a decline in Maoist activities, and this mantra was repeated by Jitan Ram Manjhi, who briefly served as the State’s Chief Minister between 20 May 2014 and 20 February 2015. On June 28, 2014, Manjhi declared that he disagreed with Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh’s position that no talks would be held with the Maoists and that a befitting reply would be given to Maoist attacks: "Theoretically I disagree with what he (Singh) has said. Naxalism cannot be solved with the help of gun. We have to find the underlying reasons behind it. The only solution lies in all-round development of society… Frustration over lack of socio-economic-educational development and employment, as well as unavailability of justice among the weaker sections has led to Naxalism. The answer to it lies only in development." Going a step further, on January 4, 2015, Manjhi stated, at a gathering at Tarapur in Munger District, that Maoists were "not wrong in demanding levy from contractors if quality of work is poor." He also recounted his interaction with three Naxals before he became Chief Minister. According to media reports, Maoists were happy that in the wake of the Aurangabad Police firing on July 19, 2014, [two persons killed], Manjhi effectively intervened and ordered a high-level inquiry into the Police firing. The then Chief Minister also questioned the Police claim that the villagers, who were fired upon by the Police, were, in fact, Maoist sympathisers. Media reports suggest that anti-Maoist operations in the State slowed down considerably after the Aurangabad Police firing and the then Chief Minister’s intervention.

Taking a serious stand on the State Government’s lackadaisical attitude, the UMHA, on June 30, 2014, warned that the Centre could stop allocating substantial funds to the Bihar Government under various schemes for security and development in areas affected by Naxalism if the State Government failed to act in accordance with a uniform national policy against the Maoists.

According to National Crimes Record Bureau (NCRB) data, Bihar had 77 Police personnel per 100,000 population, as on December 31, 2013, the worst ratio in the country, and far below the national average of 141. At the request of the State, at least six battalions of Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) have been deployed in the State, though this number is far from what is required to cover the shortfall. On October 1, 2014, the State Government decided to recruit Police Women from the Scheduled Tribes category and deploy them in the Maoist affected zones as part of a ‘two-pronged strategy’ to provide employment to tribal women and check the Maoists. A proposal to this effect was forwarded by Police Headquarters to the State's Home Department, arguing that, since tribal women were hard-working and well-versed with the topography of the difficult terrain, a separate battalion of tribal policewoman should be raised. The Cabinet meeting, chaired by the then Chief Minister Jitan Ram Manjhi, approved the proposal, though recruitment is yet to take place. In any event, this is seen more as a gesture to play to the galleries, rather than any serious response to the Maoist insurgency.

Bihar has long been at odds with the Centre on the strategy to counter the Maoist insurgency, and this is unlikely to change till Assembly elections take place in the State late in 2015. With the State currently in the control of an opportunistic alliance between former political rivals, and all focus on the impending elections, it is unlikely that any substantive initiatives to deal with the Maoists are going to go forward.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist

Total (BANGLADESH)

INDIA

Jammu and Kashmir

Manipur

Left-wing Extremism

Bihar

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

KP

Sindh

PoK

Gilgit-Baltistan

PAKISTAN (Total)