SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 13, No. 42, April 20, 2015

INDIA

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Maoists: Chhattisgarh: TCO Escalates
Deepak Kumar Nayak
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

There has been an abrupt spike in Maoist violence in the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh, with 14 Security Force (SF) personnel killed, and 17 vehicles set on fire, by cadres of the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist) between April 11 and 15, 2015.    

On April 11, seven personnel of the Special Task Force (STF) of Chhattisgarh Police, including Platoon Commander Shankar Rao, were killed and 11 others were injured when Maoists ambushed an STF team of 49 personnel in the forests near Pidmal village under the Polampalli Police Station in Sukma District.

Barely, 24 hours had passed, when the Maoists set afire at least 17 vehicles engaged in mining work at the Barbaspur iron ore mining site under the limits of the Korar Police Station in Kanker District on April 12.

Striking on the same day, the Maoists attacked a Border Security Force (BSF) contingent that was patrolling the Chhote Baithiya BSF Camp under the Bande Police Station area, in Kanker District, late in the night of April 12, killing a trooper. Later, the body of one Maoist, killed in the return of fire, was recovered.

On April 13, five Chhattisgarh Armed Force (CAF) personnel were killed and another seven were injured, when Maoists blew up a mine protected vehicle (MPV) near Khudiyapara village on Kirandul-Cholnar Road in Dantewada District.

On April 15, the body of Bira Basant, a District Force (DF) trooper who was abducted by Maoists on April 7, was found on the Gangaloor-Bijapur Road with Maoist pamphlets strewn around.

On April 10, in an incident that did not received much attention, armed Maoists numbering around 30 to 40, set ablaze an under-construction Police Station in the Mudhia Mohara village in the Dongargarh area of Rajnandgaon District.

The spate of violence has again brought the focus on the Maoists and their surviving strengths and capabilities. According to the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) database, in all theatres of Left Wing Extremist (LWE) violence across States, there were 314 fatalities, including 128 civilians, 87 Security Forces (SFs) personnel and 99 CPI-Maoist cadres, in LWE-related incidents in 2014. This was less than a third of such fatalities in the peak year, 2010, when at 1,180 fatalities were recorded. Maoist violence has come down to zero fatalities in West Bengal, from a peak of 425 killed in 2010; and has declined sharply in other States, including Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Odisha, Maharashtra and Bihar. The situation in Jharkhand has also seen major reverses for the Maoists.

Significantly, the Bastar Division of Chhattisgarh alone accounted for 55 out of 87 SF fatalities across the States in 2014; as against 45 out of 111 in 2013. The deteriorating trend seems to be continuing, with the Bastar Division accounts for 24 of 30 SF fatalities across all States, in 2015, as of April 19. That Bastar Division has, consequently, emerged as the nucleus of the Maoist Tactical Counter-offensive (TCO). In the current year, as of April 19, Chhattisgarh has recorded 37 fatalities in LWE-related violence – including nine civilians, 24 SF personnel and four Maoists. All these fatalities have occurred in Bastar Division.

Beyond the crude data, among the latest incidents, two are significant because they buck the trend and in view of their potential ramifications. Firstly, unlike most of the past major incidents where the Central Armed Police Forces (CAPFs) were principally targeted, it was the Chhattisgarh Police that has now suffered major casualties.

In the Pidmal ambush, an STF team of 49 personnel led by platoon commander Shankar Rao had gone for a swift operation, based on intelligence received by Rao. The probably planted intelligence appears to have been extremely tempting, seducing Rao into launching the operation without due clearances and sufficient backup. The unit made a journey of 18 kilometres through the jungles in the dark of night, but was ambushed in the morning. The eventual encounter was spread over three kilometres and involved three gun battles. Shankar Rao was killed in the first round of fire. Two subsequent engagements killed three troopers each. However, the STF managed to withdraw, managing to keep the total casualties low and losing just two weapons.

The pattern reflected the February 2, 2015, Kanker ambush, in which Bande Station House Officer (SHO) Avinash Sharma and Gopniya Sainik (secret agent) Sonu Ram Gawde were killed and another six SF personnel — three each from the Police and BSF – were injured, the team was led by Sharma, who received the apparently planted intelligence. Sharma was killed in the first hail of bullets from Maoists.

The Khudiyapara village MPV blast incident (April 13) was a clearly avoidable tragedy. The last incident of MPV blast before this in Chhattisgarh was on August 6, 2012 and Movements in MPVs have been banned by the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) since June 30, 2013. In the latest MPV blast incident at Khudiyapara, the Maoists used about 80-100 kilograms of explosives that tossed the 50-tonne vehicle up in the air and created an 18-foot deep crater. After the blast, the Maoists resorted to indiscriminate firing, including Under Barrel Grenade Launcher (UBGL) fire, to inflict more casualties. Dantewada Superintendent of Police (SP) Kamalochan Kashyap observed, "The Maoists were agitated ever since the Police post (at) Cholnar was set up in February. This barred them from entering 100 villages, which they ruled earlier. They coaxed the locals to take out rallies in protest of the Police camp. But in vain."

Official reactions to incidents have been as usual. Condemning the Pidmal attack [April 11], Chhattisgarh Chief Minister Raman Singh, termed it "cowardly" and "shameful"; while Union Home Minister Rajnath Singh declared, "The Centre will take stringent action against the Naxalites (LWEs) who killed seven Policemen in Sukma District in Chhattisgarh." And when asked about the central government's stand against Naxalites, Rajnath Singh responded tersely, "The Centre as well as the State Governments have initiated action against the Naxalites operating in the region to keep up the morale of the forces… Appropriate directions have been given to the state Chief Minister but I am not going to disclose the strategy just now before media." Union Minister of State for Home Affairs, Kiren Rijiju added that, as the strategy followed so far had resulted in SF casualties, it would be reviewed in consultation with the States, especially in relation to the situation in Chhattisgarh.     

Among the critical elements of any such review would need to be the deployment and use of the various Forces available for counter-insurgency operations in Maoist affected areas. The issue of coordination between CAPFs and State Police Forces has been a recurrent obstacle to effective action, and the CRPF had repeatedly complained that it was suffering heavy casualties because it received inadequate support from the State Police in Chhattisgarh. An overwhelming majority of SF fatalities in Chhattisgarh have been among the CAPFs, suggesting that State Forces were relatively inactive – or extraordinarily and inexplicably successful in avoiding casualties. Worse, after the December 1, 2014, debacle in which 14 CRPF personnel were killed in an ambush near Kasalpara village in Sukma District, the CRPF has given orders that all major operations must be cleared by headquarters. Media reports suggest that CPRF personnel have since virtually kept themselves confined to barracks. The onus of anti-Naxalite operations in Chhattisgarh had, before this, largely been borne by the 31 battalions of CAPFs deployed in the State. STF, the dedicated anti-Maoist force of the State Police, has only two battalions, which is extraordinary, since at least 22,000 Chhattisgarh Police personnel have been trained at the Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare College (CIJWC) at Kanker. There is no publicly available figure of how many of the CIJWC-trained personnel have actually been deployed in anti-Maoist operations, but unconfirmed reports suggest that an overwhelming proportion has been assigned to other duties.

Interestingly, the draft counter-Naxal strategy prepared by the Union Home Ministry in October 2014 is yet to be cleared by the Cabinet. The Union Government, in its 2015-16 Budget, has reduced the Central allocation to the States for Police Modernisation by INR eight billion, arguing that the States have been allocated an additional 10 per cent share from Central taxes, according to the recommendations of the 14^th Finance Commission, and are expected draw on the increased allocation for Police modernization. Allocations for the Integrated Action Plan (IAP) [which was renamed as “Additional Central Assistance to LWE affected Districts” by the new NDA government at Centre] were also stopped on the same logic. However, allocations for the Special Infrastructure Scheme (SIS), which were also stopped, were subsequently restored.

The problem with the revised process is that States have seldom coughed up funds for Policing, beyond the minimum necessary for maintenance, and are likely to continue to neglect pressing aspects of Police modernization. Indeed, if even some of the affected States falter in this regard, all of them are likely to suffer the consequences.

Both at a policy and operational level, consequently, there appears to be a measure of persistent disarray in the state’s responses to the Maoist challenge. This is particularly unfortunate at the present juncture, when the Maoists have suffered enormous losses, particularly at leadership level, and are hemorrhaging cadres, with increasing numbers of surrenders and desertions. Indeed, the current Maoist TCO is a transient (the rains will soon bring it to an end) and desperate measure to restore a degree of morale among the rank and file in a situation of sustained reverses that the rebels have suffered. In a supplement to People’s March (Vol. 13, September 2014) CPI-Maoist General Secretary, Muppala Lakshmana Rao aka Ganapathy acknowledges:

There is an unprecedented opportunity for state consolidation at this juncture. This, however, will require the crystallization of a coherent strategy and enormous tactical coordination between available Forces of the States and the Centre, and across State boundaries. This, however, has been the gaping lacuna in the past, and there is much to suggest that this is yet to be filled.

PAKISTAN

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Balochistan: Enduring Tragedy
Ambreen Agha
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On April 10, 2015, Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) militants shot dead at least 20 Punjabi and Sindhi construction labourers at point blank range at their camp in the Gagdan area of Turbat District. Out of the 20 deceased labourers, 16 were Punjabis, and four were Sindhis from the Hyderabad District in Sindh. A senior administration official Akbar Hussain Durrani disclosed that the militants had lined the labourers up and shot them at point blank range after confirming their identity.

BLF 'spokesman' Goran Baloch claimed responsibility for the attack, asserting, “We will continue our fight against Pakistani occupation until (the) liberation of Balochistan.”

Retaliating to the killing, the Frontier Corps killed at least 13 BLF militants in a raid on April 13, 2015, including one key militant 'commander' Hayat Bewas in the same area. Leveling charges of extrajudicial killing on the SFs, leader of the Voice for Baloch Missing Persons (VBMP) Abdul Qadeer Baloch, also known as Mama Qadeer, at a Press Conference at the Karachi Press Club in Karachi, on April 16, 2015, claimed that five of the 13 suspects killed had been missing for some time. The claim leaves the incident shrouded in controversy. As SAIR has noted in the past, extrajudicial killings by state agencies have become a recurring problem in the Province.

The April 10 killing was the first incident of ethnic violence in Balochistan in 2015. There are, however, other precedents in the Province, such as the October 19, 2014, incident in which at least nine Punjabi poultry farm labourers were found dead in the Sakran area of Hub tehsil (revenue unit) in Lasbela District. Unidentified militants had abducted the 11 workers from a poultry farm in Sakran on October 18, 2015, and had killed nine of them after checking their identity cards. The remaining two were set free because they were from the Lasbela District of Balochistan. The United Baloch Front (UBF) had claimed responsibility for the October 2014 killings.

In another such incident, at least two persons were killed and a child was injured when unidentified militants opened fire at a barber shop on Sariab Road in the provincial capital Quetta, on April 15, 2014. Superintendent of Police (SP) Imran Qureshi had disclosed that the victims belonged to Punjab and had been working on Sariab Road for a long time.

Some other major attacks (each resulting in three or more fatalities) inside Balochistan targeting settlers from outside Balochistan include:

August 6, 2013: At least 14 Punjabis, including three security personnel, were killed in an attack by Baloch Liberation Army (BLA) militants on five passenger buses in the Machh area of Bolan District. The buses were on their way from Quetta to Punjab when 200 militants intercepted them in Machh and abducted the passengers. The militants killed Punjabi passengers after inspecting their national identity cards (NICs).

July 6, 2012: At least 18 Punjabi-speaking persons, who were travelling to Iran, were shot dead and another two were injured, when Balochistan Liberation Tigers (BLT) militants attacked their vehicles in the Basoli area of Turbat District.

July 23, 2011: Five labourers of Punjabi ethnicity were shot dead by unidentified assailants in the Kisankuri area of Nushki town in Nushki District.

August 14, 2010: Unidentified assailants singled out Punjabi passengers travelling on a bus, killing 10 and injuring five near Ahd-e-Gham in Mach town, Bolan District.

According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), a total of 159 settlers have been killed in Balochistan since the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, leader of the Bugti tribe and President of the Jamhoori Watan Party (JWP), on August 26, 2006, in a military operation in the Chalgri area of the Bhamboor Hills in Dera Bugti District. The killings of settlers started only after the Bugti killing, when Baloch militant organizations such as the BLA, BLF and Baloch Republican Army (BRA), among others, began to voice anti-Punjabi sentiments in their slogans. The killing of Akbar Bugti led to a series of attacks on Punjabi and other non-Baloch settlers in Balochistan, as well as the destruction of national infrastructure.

Out of the 159 ‘outsiders’ killed, at least 146 were Punjabis. 33 Punjabi settlers have already been killed in the current year (data till April 19, 2015). In 2014, the number of such fatalities stood at a total of 17; in 2013, at 29; 2012, at 26; 2011, at 13; 2010, at 21; 2009, at 18; and one in 2008. No such fatality was recorded in 2007 and 2006. While Punjabis have been the main targets, other ethnic groups, like Urdu-speaking people from Karachi and Hindko-speaking settlers from Haripur District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), have also been singled out in acts of ethnic violence. A media report published on June 28, 2011, noted, “Almost all non-Baloch are on their hit-list.” Muhammad Khalid of Balochistan Punjabi Ittehad stated, “The militants began to target the Punjabi settlers after Nawab Bugti was taken out by the military (in August, 2006). Before that there were occasional incidents in which Punjabis were targeted.”

Most of the Punjabi settler killings are recorded in South Balochistan (principally in Bolan, Turbat, Gwadar, Panjgur, Khuzdar, Sibi and Lasbela Districts) which accounts for 122 killings; followed by 24 in North Balochistan (mostly in Nushki, Quetta and Mustang District). The overwhelming concentration of such killings in the South is because of the presence and dominance of Baloch insurgent groups, while the North is dominated by Islamist extremist formations such as the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), who are primarily engaged in sectarian killings. The latter groups of Islamist terrorist formations enjoy the tacit support of Islamabad, which has, for long, used Islamist extremist violence as an instrument of domestic political management, engaged in a selective campaign against the Baloch people, and sought to aggressively alter the region's demography

Targeted killings have now created an atmosphere of fear and terror among settlers across the Province. According to the a report by the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) dated October 15, 2014, more than 300,000 people have fled the Province over the past 10 years due to the growing unrest. Tahir Hussain Khan, President of the Balochistan Chapter of the independent HRCP asserted that 90,000 people who had fled were from Punjabi and Urdu-speaking communities, and had left to avoid violence by Baloch nationalists.

An unnamed Punjabi-speaking member of the Barbershop Owners’ Association in Quetta, way back on August 23, 2007, demanded that the Government provide them security as they were facing threats due to their ethnic background, and had claimed, "Since Nawab Akbar Bugti’s killing last year, more than 12 attacks have been made on barbershops. The number of attacks in interior Balochistan is higher.”

Of the 3,367 civilian fatalities recorded in Balochistan since 2004 [data till April 19, 2015], at least 837 civilian killings are attributable to one or other militant outfit. Of these, 325 civilian killings (202 in the South and 123 in the North) have been claimed by Baloch separatist formations while the Islamist and sectarian extremist formations, primarily LeJ, TTP and Ahrar-ul-Hind (Liberators of India), claimed responsibility for another 512 civilian killings, 506 in the North (mostly in and around Quetta) and six in the South. The 325 civilian killings attributed to Baloch formations include at least 146 Punjabi settlers since 2006. The remaining 2,530 civilian fatalities - 1,535 in the South and 995 in the North - remain ‘unattributed’. A large proportion of the ‘unattributed’ fatalities, particularly in the Southern region, are believed to be the result of enforced disappearances carried out by state agencies, or by their proxies, prominently including the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Aman Balochistan (TNAB, Movement for the Restoration of Peace, Balochistan). The large number of unattributed civilian fatalities strengthens the widespread conviction that the Security Agencies are busy with “kill and dump” operations against local Baloch dissidents, a reality that Pakistan’s Supreme Court has clearly recognized.

In a demonstration of Islamabad’s belligerent strategy on the Baloch crisis, unnamed official sources revealed that Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, during his meeting with Army Chief General Raheel Sharif on April 15, 2015, decided to expand the ongoing Operation Zarb-e-Azb to Balochistan, to target the Baloch insurgents. The Army launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb against terrorists of the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and associated Islamist terrorist formations in the North Waziristan Agency of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on June 15, 2014, in the aftermath of the attack on the Jinnah International Airport, Karachi, on June 8-9, 2014. The Army, thus far, has claimed to have killed 2,000 ‘terrorists’ (no independent confirmation of this categorization is available, as media and outside access to the areas of conflict is severely restricted) in the ongoing Operation.

Baloch separatists allege that the Federal Government is systematically suppressing development in Balochistan to keep the Baloch people weak. The attacks on Punjabi settlers are claimed as retaliation by the Baloch people against the Pakistani establishment’s efforts to alter the region’s demography, and for continuously ignoring the genuine grievances of the Baloch people. One of these grievances, as evident from the recent killings of workers, is the outsourcing of labour from other Provinces, deliberately keeping the local Baloch away from development work in the Province and depriving them of their own resources. 

Further compounding ethnically targeted violence is Islamabad’s strategy of supporting armed Islamist extremist formations and other violent proxies that have enormously worsened the situation in Balochistan. Turning a blind eye to the ground realities of the Province, the Federal and Provincial Governments have remained complicit in the State-backed repression of Baloch groups articulating the genuine demands of the community. The most basic issues, including the urgent crisis of extra judicial killings, have been studiously ignored by authorities, and judicial proceedings have been actively thwarted to prevent effective prosecution of the guilty. Under the circumstances, the possibility of relief to the people of Balochistan – both locals and ‘outsiders’ – remains slim.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist

INDIA

Jammu and Kashmir

Left-wing Extremism

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

KP

Sindh

PAKISTAN (Total)