SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 15, No. 14, October 3, 2016

INDIA	PAKISTAN

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Paradigm Shift?
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, ICM & SATP

In the wake of the Uri attack on September 18, 2016, in which 20 Indian soldiers lost their lives, strident demands for retaliation had been matched by arguments that, as one prominent commentator expressed it, “action limited to PoK (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir)... may not be sufficient to compel the Pakistanis to shut down their jihad factory.”

In just four days since the ‘surgical strikes’ there have been at least six intense ceasefire violations by Pakistan, one infiltration bid across the Line of Control (LoC) in Mendhar tehsil (revenue unit) of Poonch District and another across the International Border (IB) in Gurdaspur, Punjab, and two lesser terrorist attacks, in which one civilian lost his life, to be capped by the attack at Baramulla on the joint camp of the 46^th Bn, Rashtriya Rifles (RR), and 40^th Bn, Border Security Force (BSF). In the last of these, one BSF trooper has been killed and another injured, while two terrorists have also been killed. Search operations to locate and neutralize the remaining terrorists involved in the Baramulla incident are still ongoing at the time of writing.

The very day after India's multiple and simultaneous "surgical strikes" against terrorist launch pads in PoK, there was an alleged 'infiltration bid', reportedly at Behigam at Shopian (likely referring to an incident of exchange of fire at Behi Bagh in Kulgam), to which one writer reacted by observing:

Today a group of militants attempted to cross over in Shopian area. This is apple country and a hotbed of militancy. It shows that the attack of Indian Army earlier had no effect on the jihadis.

These observations, both before and after the ‘surgical strikes’ expose strategic unintelligibility and the astonishing expectations that afflict much of what passes for the ‘strategic community’ in India. The idea that a single strike ‘surgical’ or otherwise, or any other single initiative – military or non-military, and including dialogue and any surprise agreement with Pakistan – is going to magically bring the over 25-year long (and much longer by some calculations) Pakistan-backed jihad in India to an abrupt and final end, reflects an incoherence that borders on folly.

And while these voices have presently and substantially been marginalized, advocates of uninterrupted dialogue as a ‘solution’ to the ‘problem of Kashmir’, despite the experience of at least the past 25 years of jihad, and nearly 70 years of Pakistan’s relentless hostility, fall into another category of comparable folly.

While both perspectives have currently been pushed into the margins of strident media debates in the wake of the surgical strikes, they are important, as they reflect the long-established ‘default setting’ of the Indian establishment. As the triumphalism of the surgical strikes recedes, and as Islamabad suitably adjusts its postures and projections, they will tend, inevitably, to reassert themselves. It is, consequently, crucial to understand the common thread between these two apparently contradictory positions.

Much of the discourse on counter-terrorism in India has often been dismissed by the opposite side as reflecting either ‘pessimism’ or ‘optimism’, and the two exemplars above fall, respectively, into these categories. But both these are not categories of strategic assessment; they are mindsets or belief systems, and both tend to policy paralysis. The pessimist dismisses all initiatives on the grounds that the situation cannot be improved; the optimist insists that things will necessarily improve, so it is best to choose the path of least resistance, lest we upset the applecart. It is these opposing attitudes, not any coherent, reality based strategic calculus, that have been decisive in India’s responses to the challenge of Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorism over the past decades.

This mould has now been shattered, not only by the scale of the surgical strikes (which was likely unprecedented, though such cross LoC operations themselves are not), but more importantly, by their openness, and their official and global projection, and also by the visible and dramatic shift in posture and policy that preceded these. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s statements on rights’ violations in Balochistan, on the occasion of India’s Independence Day; the calm and authoritative response to Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif’s crass harangue at the United Nations General Assembly, delivered by Eenam Gambhir, the junior-most  diplomat at India’s Permanent Mission at the UN in New York; the reiteration of this message by Sushma Swaraj, India’s Minister of External Affairs, almost as an aside, in a speech that focused principally on critical human issues of the environment, poverty, inequality and development; the mobilisation of regional support at the UN, expressed in direct criticism of Islamabad as the fountainhead of terrorism in South Asia, by both Afghanistan and Bangladesh; and the eventual boycott of the SAARC Summit at Islamabad by four member-states, in addition to India – Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan and Sri Lanka; all these were part of the swelling theme that created the global context of the surgical strikes.

For decades now, Pakistan has manipulated international opinions and perceptions with an aggressive diplomatic campaign, and Islamabad believed nothing could change this. Sharif’s speech at the UN General Assembly was evidently based on precisely such an assessment, relying on all the established tropes of the Pakistani state, including denial, counter-accusations and implicit threats, including the threat of nuclear catastrophe. Far from working, as they had, so often in the past, these devices only sharpened the focus of global responses, with every major country in the world, including many traditional Pakistan supporters among the Organisation of Islamic Countries (OIC), rejecting the Pakistani position. Indeed, even China – the “all weather friend” who was soon to veto the effort at the UN Security Council to pronounce Jaish-e-Muhammad chief Azahar Masood a UN designated terrorist – chose to sit on the fence, exhorting India and Pakistan to resolve their differences through “dialogues”.

As Islamabad’s rhetoric escalated to include nuclear threats in the wake of the surgical strikes, moreover, a sharp message, delivered publicly by Mark Toner, US State Department spokesman, cautioned Pakistan to “exercise restraint” in talking about the use of nuclear weapons, observing, “I would just say nuclear-capable states have a very clear responsibility to exercise restraint regarding nuclear weapons and missile capabilities... And that’s my message publicly and that’s certainly our message directly to the Pakistani authorities."

Worse, at this juncture, Presidential candidate Hillary Clinton warned that Islamist terrorists could get access to nuclear weapons from Pakistan. Significantly, her adversary at the other end of the political spectrum, Donald Trump has, in the past, referred repeatedly to Pakistan as a primary source of Islamist terrorism, and to the need to “deal with” the issue of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.

Pakistan has threatened the use of its ‘tactical’ nuclear devices on many occasions, but it must be abundantly clear now, in the prevailing global scenario, that this will be a simple act of suicide, not only because of India’s retaliatory action, but also the inevitable and overwhelming response of Western nations.

There are tremendous opportunities for India in the new regional and global context, but these could easily be squandered in the absence of coherent and sustained strategic initiatives, with the will to stay the course as long as needed to finally neutralize Islamabad’s campaigns of terrorism. While the seeds of such strategy are making their appearance in the Government’s actions and pronouncements, the necessary coherence remains substantially lacking.

The success of the surgical strike and the dramatically altered international context in India’s favour has generated a new confidence and unwanted loquacity in India. There is much talk of a range of new “strategic paradigms”, including, among others, the idea of “offensive defence” alluded to by National Security Advisor Ajit Doval before he assumed his present avatar; and talk of something called the “pre-emptive escalation dominance model”, among others. But these are just slogans unless they are translated into a consistent and enduring gameplan to be implemented over the years and possibly decades, backed by a necessary and condign augmentation of capacities. 

There is some evidence of the will to pursue such a gameplan, but its content is far from crystallization. Over the past weeks since the Uri attack, there has certainly been an inexorable widening of the spectrum of policies under consideration. Unfortunately, most of the options being evaluated have been plucked out of the strident media debate calling for everything from nuclear war, limited war and punitive strikes, and a random range of non-military initiatives prominently including squeezing the river waters flowing into Pakistan from India, “point to point competition” on exports, withdrawal of the Most Favoured Nation (MFN) status to Pakistan, and banning of commercial over flights to Pakistani carriers. Very few of the most voluble advocates on Television appear to have any depth of understanding of these various proposals and appear to have picked these up from random and occasional readings or from seminars and conferences where these ideas may have been mentioned. These avenues of response have never before been part of the official spectrum and have largely been explored on a tiny margin of the better informed among security commentators who proliferate on mass media. Even among these, few have written or spoken about protracted war strategies and there constituent elements of compellence before the present and abrupt glut of this idea. Nor is there any clear understanding within Government of these constituent elements or their broader context.

Nevertheless, and crucially, the introduction of a new vocabulary within a given, in the present case long stagnant, discourse, itself constitutes the creation of a new reality. However, proposals and assessments of the expanding spectrum of strategic alternatives need to be driven quietly and firmly underground, and cannot remain the subject of cacophonous Television debates. Unfortunately, that would conflict directly with the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party’s domestic agenda, which would naturally be focused on crucial elections in the imminent future, and hence to proclivities to a jingoistic debate on the many harms that can be inflicted on Pakistan. As always, the strategic and the political appear in direct conflict.

There has, in the past days, also been an overwhelming focus on what Pakistan will do. This is difficult to answer in specific terms, but the broad contours of Pakistan’s option are well known, and have been ‘gamed’ into the Indian Armed Forces’ perspectives. The crucial question, however, is what will India do from this point on. Despite the shift in perspective at Raisina Hill, the fundamental realities and equations of power remain largely unchanged. While there is great enthusiasm at present, the momentum can easily be lost, or the hand, as easily, overplayed.

If sufficient pressure is generated, moreover, Pakistan is liable to quickly shift positions and appear to seek accommodation – preliminary indicators of such an ‘adjustment’ are already visible. This has been an old ploy, even as the instrumentalities of terrorism are kept in reserve. Pakistan’s proficiency in deception and systemic disinformation must be factored into India’s responses. Islamabad has mastered the art of being a minimal satisfier, and the avoidance of direct confrontation has been the hallmark of its strategy of terrorism in both Afghanistan and India. But this is a game two can play.

However, as Pakistan projects a more ‘reasonable’ mien, pressures in New Delhi – and perhaps internationally – will grow to revert to the more comfortable paradigm of ‘talks’. There is no need to believe that these are necessarily excluded from the policy spectrum – but just as Pakistan does not dismantle its infrastructure of terrorism when it comes to the negotiating table, there would be no need for India to suspend its strategic continuum every time tactical talks are initiated.

Between India and Pakistan, over the past at least three decades and more, there has been a situation best described as neither war, nor peace. This is the paradigm that must be mastered by New Delhi.

Pakistan is trapped on the wrong side of history; and history appears, now, to be positioning its inexorable correctives. For far too long, New Delhi has been paralysed by constant worry about Islamabad’s next move. It is now time to allow Pakistan to worry about what India will do next.

INDIA	NEPAL

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Restoring Balance
S. Binodkumar Singh
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

Nepal’s Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda in his first foreign trip since resuming office on August 3, 2016 (he was Prime Minister between August 18, 2008, and May 23, 2009), visited India from September 15-18, 2016, leading a 125-member delegation. He held wide-ranging talks and sealed three significant deals with India. Significantly, Dahal stated, on September 17, 2016, “We will not allow any activity that is against our neighbouring countries from our soil.” Dahal now seems to be a changed man and has recognized the need for cordial relations with India as a priority. During his previous innings as Prime Minister, Dahal chose to put relations with China on fast track. Within a week of oath as Prime Minister then, Dahal had gone to China in August 2008, to become the first elected premier to visit China in the history of Nepal.

Earlier, Dahal’s predecessor, Prime Minister K.P. Sharma Oli, during his visit to India between February 19 to 24, 2016, signed seven agreements, prominently including the utilization of a USD 250 million Grant component of the Government of India’s Assistance package for post-earthquake reconstruction assistance. However, just before the visit, linking his maiden foreign trip to India and the then ongoing ‘border blockade’, on January 26, 2016, Oli noted, “It would not be appropriate for me to visit India unless the situation returns to normal.”  The ‘border blockade’, which began on September 24, 2015, and was officially lifted on February 8, 2016, was imposed by ethnic Madhesis inhabiting the southern plains of Nepal, who believe that the new Constitution adopted on September 20, 2015, did not give them fair representation in Parliament. The Government of Nepal accused India of imposing an undeclared blockade, though India denied the allegation, stating that supply shortages were imposed by Madhesi demonstrators within Nepal, and that India had no role in the protests.

The political violence, in fact, had already begun on July 1, 2015, when cadres of the United Democratic Madhesi Front (UDMF), a four party alliance of Madhesi People's Rights Forum Nepal (MPRF-N), Tarai Madhes Democratic Party (TMDP), Sadbhavana Party (SP) and National Madhes Shadbhavana Party (NMSP), burnt copies of the preliminary draft of the new Constitution in Kathmandu, the Capital city, because it failed to incorporate their demands. Despite the protests, the Constituent Assembly (CA) endorsed “Nepal’s Constitution” by an overwhelming 88.5 per cent of the 601-member CA, and by over 95 per cent of the Members present and voting on September 16, 2015. On September 20, 2015, in a historical step, Nepal adopted its first democratic Constitution.

While the adoption of the new Constitution was welcomed by most national and international groups and leaders, a large segment of the population, particularly the Madhesis and Tharus, residing in the Tarai region contested its provisions. The Tarai region is an area located along Nepal’s Southern border with India, and covers 23 per cent of Nepal’s total land area of 147,181 square kilometers. Approximately 30 to 40 per cent of the population falls within this region. Out of the country’s 75 Districts, 20 are located in the Terai, including, from east to west, Jhapa, Morang, Sunsari, Saptari, Siraha, Dhanusha, Mahottari, Sarlahi, Rautahat, Bara, Parsa, Chitwan, Nawalparasi, Rupandehi, Kapilvastu, Dang, Banke, Bardiya, Kalaiya and Kanchanpur.

For its part, India tried to delay the promulgation of the Constitution by sending Indian Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar to intervene at the eleventh hour, but he was rebuffed by the Nepalese parties. Consequently, for the first time India took a stand against Nepal at the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) on November 5, 2015, during Nepal's Universal Periodic Review, stating:

The Nepal government should consolidate the Constitution building and democratization process by accommodating all sections of Nepal to enable broad-based ownership and participation. It should ensure effective functioning of Truth and Reconciliation Commission and full implementation of its recommendations, including prosecution of those responsible for violent insurgency.

India also made a reference to Nepal in the European Union (EU)-India Joint Statement on March 30, 2016:

The need for a lasting and inclusive Constitutional settlement in Nepal that will address the remaining Constitutional issues in a time bound manner, and promote political stability and economic growth.

This brought out a strongly worded rebuke from the Nepalese Foreign Ministry, who responded by stating:

EU-India Joint Statement not only hurts the sentiments of the people of Nepal but also defies the fundamental principle of non-interference in internal affairs of a country in breach of UN Charter and norms of international law. The Government of Nepal calls on all to fully respect the sovereign and democratic rights of the people of Nepal and refrain from making uncalled for statements.

At this stage, India-Nepal relations reached their lowest point since the economic blockade of 1989 by the then Rajiv Gandhi Government.

Earlier, in a historic visit, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi made the first Indian Prime Ministerial visit to Nepal in 17 years, from November 25 to 27, 2014, and signed 16 agreements and MoUs, including the Line of Credit for USD One billion to the Government of Nepal, to utilize for hydropower, irrigation and infrastructural development projects. On touching down in Nepal, Modi had stated, "I request all political stakeholders to draft the Constitution by early next year as committed through consensus, which will reflect aspirations of all communities, including Madhesis, Pahadis and Maoists ... failing to do so can cause difficulties to Nepal and your difficulty despite our expertise to help you in this field is a matter of sadness."

In the meantime, then-Prime Minister Oli made a week-long official visit to China from March 21 to 27, 2016, sealing 10 separate agreements and MoUs on using the northern neighbor’s sea port facility, building a regional international airport in Pokhara, exploring the possibilities of signing a bilateral free trade agreement and finding oil and gas reserves in Nepal, among others. Clarifying the motivation behind these moves, Rajan Bhattarai, a Member of Parliament (MP) from the ruling Communist Party of Nepal-Unified Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) on March 23, 2016, observed, “We have been an India-locked country. We are now developing a strong partner in China and opening up new transit routes.”

Dahal’s visit suggests a shift from this stance, and appears to have irked Beijing. The official media in China has accused India of ‘interfering’ in its relations with Nepal and 'pressuring' Prime Minister Dahal to move away from Beijing. Writing in the Global Times, one of the publications of the People’s Daily establishment, Xu Liang, Executive Director of the Indian Studies Center at Beijing International Studies University, observed, "It looks like the bilateral relationship between China and Nepal has suddenly turned fragile and sensitive."

There are, no doubt, various domestic issues in Nepal, including the most important among these, the amendment of the Constitution, as promised in the Three-Point Agreement signed on August 2, 2016, by the then-ruling coalition of the Communist Party of Nepal-Maoist Centre (CPN- Maoist Centre) and Nepali Congress (NC), with the UDMF, to secure the support of the Madhesi parties. According to the agreement, the Government would implement the Madhesi Front’s demands, including acknowledging those killed during the Madhes agitation as ‘martyrs’, providing free treatment to the injured, and amending the Constitution to redraw provincial boundary. Significantly, the first two points have been fulfilled, but the issue of the Constitutional amendment remains thorny. The Constitutional Amendment Bill must be passed by a two-thirds majority in Parliament, that is, at least 397 lawmakers have to vote in its. However, the present ruling coalition has about 370 lawmakers on its side.

Another big question facing Nepal is the holding of three elections – local, provincial and federal – by December 2017, as envisaged in the new Constitution. In a proposed roadmap, the Government plans to hold the local body elections by December 2016, state assembly elections by May 2017 and elections to the federal parliament by December 2017. Holding these crucial elections within the stipulated time is the key to implementing the new Constitution. But Election Commission (EC) officials said that holding elections by the end of 2016 is fraught with huge challenges as the Commission would need at least 3-4 months for technical preparations. The last time local elections were held in Nepal was some 19 years ago, in 1997. Since then, the local bodies – Village Development Committees (VDCs), municipalities, District Development Committees (DDCs), metropolitan councils – have been without people’s representatives.

New Delhi appears to have repaired relationships with Kathmandu for the time being, and might have more say with the new CPN-Maoist Centre – NC Government, but it has a long way to go to regain the popular adulation that was visible during Prime Minister Modi's first visit to Nepal in 2014, and during India's humanitarian response following the April 2015 earthquake. Moreover, amending the Constitution to address Madhesi demands to redraw boundaries of federal provinces, is a domestic affair and needs to be addressed internally. Nevertheless, the change of Government is an opportunity to recalibrate what has for some time now been a fraught relationship, and restore the special bonds of common culture and enduring shared interests that have long existed between these two peoples and states.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

INDIA

Assam

Jammu and Kashmir

Meghalaya

Left-Wing Extremism

Bihar

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

FATA

KP

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)