SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 15, No. 2, July 11, 2016

INDIA

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J&K: Political Defalcation
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow Institute for Conflict Management

In a major operational success, Security Forces (SFs) eliminated a top ‘commander’ of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), Burhan Wani, along with two associates, in a shootout in the Kokernag area of Anantnag District in the evening of July 8, 2016. Wani, according to media reports, had joined militancy in 2010, and carried a reward of INR one million on his head.

Following the recent trend of orchestrated and violent street protests during and after most encounters in parts of Kashmir Valley, violent demonstrations followed Wani’s death. The magnitude of the violence, was, however, much greater, with at least 22 protestors and one trooper killed, and more than 200 persons, including 102 civilians and 100 SF personnel sustaining injuries since the protests began on July 8. Four Police Stations, 36 civil administration offices and dozens of vehicles were destroyed in the protests, which were still ongoing at the time of writing. In comparison, according to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), 16 incidents of protests during and after encounters have been recorded since the beginning of 2016, resulting in three fatalities (all civilians) and 116 persons injured, including 87 civilians and 29 SF personnel.      

The primary reason behind large scale violence following Wani’s death was the projection by a section of the media of Wani as a ‘cult figure’, the image of a ‘poster boy’ for ‘local militants’. Indeed, Imtiyaz Hussain, Senior Superintendent of Police (SSP) Baramullah, in his Facebook Post on Burhan Wani's killing, wrote on July 9, 2016,

*The truth is, despite all his "virtual" bravado, despite being a poster boy, he could not carry out a single action against security forces...!!!_*. His life #glamorized by #media power, and his death celebrated in same way... by people who just stand on sidelines, and cheer gleefully..."

Another reason for the large-scale violence was the failure of SFs to identify the potential areas of trouble at the early stages of the protests. Additional Director General (ADG) of the Jammu and Kashmir Police, Criminal Investigation Department (CID), S.M. Sahai thus observed, on July 9, “If you look at what happened… difficulty has come in isolated pockets on the fringes. All these incidents, if you notice, are not in the main area where you normally expect trouble…” A day later he was more forthright:

We admit that our focus was not on some areas. We are seeing how it happened. We faced trouble from the outlying areas. Government buildings, Police Stations and Army camps were attacked in the areas we least expected trouble. The areas Police expected trouble were put under control.

Sahai added, “Now that we are aware of what has happened, we will definitely try to prepare for it,” and on July 10, noted, “The situation as of now is better…”

Significantly, 12 protestors died on July 9 and another six, who were injured in clashes on July 9, succumbed to their injuries the next day. Another five protestors, and one SF trooper, were killed in clashes on July 10.

The situation is likely to veer towards normalcy over time. Far more intensive and dispersed protests have been contained and eventually neutralized by SFs in J&K during the anti-Amarnath Yatra demonstrations of 2008, which resulted in 51 civilian fatalities; and the orchestrated stone pelting campaign of 2010 when around 112 persons were killed in the streets. Street violence backed by Pakistan’s Inters-Services Intelligence (ISI) and its proxies are not new in Kashmir, and the current surge has the hallmarks of past campaigns.  

What is worrying, however, is the utter failure of the political class to learn lessons and its persistence with inept policies in dealing with the situation on the political front, despite extraordinary gains delivered by the operational successes of the SFs, and a dramatic decline in the intensity and spread of the insurgency.

For instance, 634 persons facing stone-pelting charges were given amnesty on the occasion of Eid, with the State Government approving withdrawal of 104 cases against them on July 5, 2016. Significantly, the decision of the State Home Department approving withdrawal of the cases came after Chief Minister Mehbooba Mufti gave instructions for the review of such cases pertaining to the period between 2008 and 2014, and the setting up of a three-member Committee for this purpose. The Committee reviewed cases for the period between 2008 and 2009 in the first phase and recommended the withdrawal of the 104 cases registered during this period. The Committee has sought another three weeks to review the cases pertaining to the 2010-2014 period. In a similar move in 2013, the previous Omar Abdullah Government had released 1,811 persons involved in cases of stone-pelting in the Valley during the 2010 summer unrest under its amnesty scheme.

Though the successive state Governments have argued that these actions are part of confidence building measures, the ground situation demonstrates their failure to deal with ground realities, and the fact that the released miscreants overwhelmingly return to their campaigns of street violence, exacerbating tensions and eroding the gains on the security front.

Significantly, according to National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) data, there were 662 incidents of Police firing recorded in J&K during 2010, in which 91 civilians were killed and another 494 were injured.  The number of incidents of firing came down to 132 in 2011, resulting in just 12 injuries to civilians; and further down to 103 incidents, though the resultant civilian deaths stood at  seven, and another 33 were injured. In 2013, after the amnesty to 1,811 stone pelters from the 2010 campaign, the number of incidents of SF firing witnessed a quantum jump, to 318, with five civilian deaths and 49 injured. Though no incident of firing was recorded by NCRB through 2014, 304 incidents of lathi-charge (there was no data on lathi-charges in earlier years) in which one civilian was killed and another 138 were injured. Clearly, most of these police actions were presumably taken against protestors who were engaging in stone-pelting and other manifestations of street violence.

Unfortunate political decisions and a proclivity to resort to polarizing identity politics on the part of most significant political formations active in the State have undermined the hard won gains by the SFs in the face of Islamabad’s continuous efforts to reverse the trend of declining terrorism. Terrorism-related fatalities in the first six month and 10 days of 2016 stand at 120, but include just five civilians; 30 SF personnel and 85 terrorists have also died. In 2015, there were 78 fatalities during the corresponding period, including 12 civilians, 22 SF personnel and 44 terrorists. The SFs have succeeded in creating a safer environment for civilians, even as they have paid a higher price themselves, while, at the same time, securing a better kill-ratio against the terrorists.  

The politics of opportunism is keeping J&K on a boil well after terrorism has lost strength and the base it had. The cycles of disruption will continue to recur periodically unless the remaining distance to normalization is covered by political initiatives. SF’s can contain or end violence; they cannot create peace; that is the task of political sagacity, of which there is a visible and endemic deficit, both in the state and in the nation at large.

INDIA

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Assam: KPLT: Changing Colours
Nijeesh N.
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management

On June 29, 2016, the Army claimed that, in a series of joint operations with the Assam Police over the preceding days, 11 militants of the recently-floated militant outfit, Helem Tiger Force (HTF), were arrested from Umrongso in Dima Hasao District and Larkercha village in West Karbi Anglong District along the Assam-Meghalaya border. HTF reportedly has close links with the Karbi People's Liberation Tiger (KPLT). During the operation, the Security Forces (SFs) recovered two 9mm pistols, three 7.65 pistols, three rifles, one hand grenade and 40 rounds of live ammunition. After the arrest, the Army sources said that the unearthing and apprehension of a majority of cadres of this outfit which has links with KPLT and United People's Liberation Army (UPLA), has been a major setback to the nexus between the outfits, which have been involved in kidnapping, extortion and ‘tax-collection’. The kingpin of this new outfit is still at large and efforts are on to reach out to him.

On June 11, 2016, a KPLT militant identified as Deven Tisso (22) was killed in the Kolonga Bazar area near Baithalangso in West Karbi Anglong District in an encounter with the Police. According to sources, during the heavy gun fight between the militant group and SFs, Tisso was killed on the spot and others of the group managed to flee. SFs recovered a 7.66mm pistol and four live cartridges from the area.

On April 1, 2016, two top KPLT militants identified as 'finance secretary' Sojong Tisso and 'general secretary' Mukrang Bey were killed and one of their accomplices was arrested in an encounter with a joint team of Police and the Army at Borpung Terang village in the Kalyani Reserve Forest in Karbi Anglong District, ahead of the April 4 voting (first phase of Assam Assembly Poll 2016) in the area. The Police recovered one HK-36 rifle, two magazines live ammunition, a .22 pistol with live ammunition, a .303 pistol with eight bullets, and two INSAS rifles.

Earlier in the month of April 2016 KPLT, which was opposing the Assembly Election, had issued threats to media persons after journalists at a meeting in Diphu Press Club unanimously decided not to publish the extremist outfit’s Press Releases calling for bandhs (strikes) opposing the voting in the District on April 4, 2016.

The KPLT was formed on January 8, 2011, by the Anti-talks faction of Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF-AT) with the objective of carving an Autonomous Karbi State out of Assam. The KLNLF-ATF was a breakaway faction of the Karbi Longri National Liberation Front (KLNLF), which had laid down arms on February 11, 2010. The KLNLF, a breakaway faction of the United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), was formed on May 16, 2004, after a split in the group, when UPDS signed a cease-fire agreement with the Union Government on May 23, 2002. KPLT remains a major agent of violence in the Karbi Anglong region, and also has a base in the Dima Hasao District of Assam and some parts of Arunachal Pradesh.

While most of the local militant groups have come under ceasefire agreements in the recent past, the KPLT continues to pose a threat to security in the region. Further, UPLA, formed in February 2013 mostly by the former members of the UPDS, the Karbi National Liberation Army (KNLA), the Naga Rengma Hills Protection Force (NRHPF), United People’s Liberation Front (UPLF) and the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA), are also currently active in the area.

The Karbi Anglong region was divided into two administrative Districts in 2015 (East Karbi Anglong and West Karbi Anglong), with a combined area of 10,434 square kilometers. It is situated in the central part of the Assam State and is administered by a 30-member Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC) – a unique autonomous council constituted to empower the Karbi tribe and safeguard their political, cultural and linguistic identity – under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. Karbis aka Mikir are the major Hill tribal community in the region, constituting around 45 percent of the population. The region borders the Golaghat, Morigaon, Nagaon and Dima Hasao Districts of Assam, as well as the States of Meghalaya and Nagaland.

Militancy in Karbi Anglong started in the 1980s, and peaked in 2005, when 108 fatalities were recorded. There was a sharp decline in 2010, with 10 fatalities, following a Suspension of Operation (SoO) with the principle Karbi outfits – KLNLF (2010) and UPDS (2002). A gradual rise in violence has, however, been recorded over the past years. According to partial data compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP), in 2011, KPLT was involved in 15 of 17 recorded fatalities; in 2012, KPLT was linked to 14 of 17 fatalities; in 2013, KPLT was involved in 17 of 23 fatalities; in 2014, KPLT was involved in 17 of 31 fatalities; in 2015, KPLT was involved in 10 of 12 fatalities; and in 2016, KPLT has already been involved in three of five reported fatalities in the Karbi Anglong region (till July 8, 2016). Much of the violence since 2011 has been attributed to the formation of KPLT.

Since the formation of the group in January 2011, according to the SATP database, KPLT-related violence has resulted in 76 fatalities (18 civilians, 4 SF personnel and 54 KPLT cadres) [data till July 8, 2016]. Interestingly, the outfit has not inflicted any civilian fatalities since December 10, 2014, though it has lost several cadre since.

Indeed, relentless operations by SFs have succeeded in controlling KPLT violence, especially after the I.K. Songbijit faction of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB-IKS) militants massacred over 69 Adivasis (tribals) on December 23, 2014. After the massacre, SFs launched several operations in different parts of the State, including ‘Operation Wipe Out’ to flush out militants, particularly KPLT cadres, from the Karbi Anglong District in central Assam. During the operation, SFs arrested several key militant leaders, including the group’s ‘chairman’, ‘commander-in-chief’, ‘deputy chief’, ’finance secretary’, ‘auditor’ and ‘area commanders’, in separate incidents. In mid-February 2015, the Indian Army claimed that the entire top leadership of KPLT had been arrested. An Army release stated, “The operation has decimated the organisation and almost completely wiped out the dreaded KPLT from West Karbi Anglong District of Assam facilitating return of peace in the poorly developed region." However, Superintendent of Police (SP) (Karbi Anglong), Mugdha Jyoti Dev Mahanta, on February 1, 2015, observed, “But the KPLT now has been split into five groups - KPLT (Buche group), KPLT (Pratap), KPLT (Donri), KPLT (Symbon) and KPLT (Sojong). Some of these groups have six-seven members."

In one recent incident, SFs arrested 'commander-in-chief' of the KPLT, identified as Arbho Terang, from Balipathar Sencho Bey village under Bokajan Police Station in Karbi Anglong District on May 15, 2016. He had been involved in many extortion cases in different areas of Karbi Anglong. According to SATP, five militants of KPLT have been arrested in 2016, thus far; 58 were arrested in 2015; 41 in 2014; 12 in 2013; 37 in 2012 and 17 in 2011.

KPLT has also been involved in other violent incidents, particularly extortion and abduction, which have contributed to a public outcry against the outfit. Continuing SF operations have combined with resistance from villagers, making it increasingly difficult for militants to operate in Karbi Anglong. KPLT and other militant formations principally rely on extortion and abduction to sustain their activities. On April 26, 2016, locals of the remote Metargaon village in East Karbi Anglong District caught and beat up a link man of a militant outfit who was trying to extort money from the villagers, and handed him over to Police. Several similar cases have been reported earlier, in which villagers confronted the militants and refused to succumb to extortion demands.

Confirming these incidents, an Army source stated, on May 7, 2016, "Locals are fed up with gun-culture here (Karbi Anglong). Relentless operations by Security Forces have decimated rebel outfits like Karbi People's Liberation Tigers. Because of Army operations, money is drying up for militants and they are now targeting remote villages for extortion". Ordinary people, who already suffer from acute poverty and unemployment, are fed up with militant atrocities.

SFs have succeeded in suppressing militant formations in Karbi Anglong, including KPLT, in the past, but splinters have emerged to resume disruption and extortion in the region. The surfacing of HTF and its links with KPLT are indications of the fact that militancy is far from over, albeit it is in the character of old wine in a new bottle. SF successes need consolidation through governance initiatives to address the challenge of the extreme backwardness of, and the lack of infrastructure in, the region.

Civilians

Security Force Personnel

Terrorists/Insurgents

Total

BANGLADESH

Islamist Terrorism

INDIA

Arunachal Pradesh

Jammu and Kashmir

Manipur

Left-Wing Extremism

Chhattisgarh

Jharkhand

Odisha

Total (INDIA)

PAKISTAN

Balochistan

Sindh

Total (PAKISTAN)