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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 30, February 1, 2010

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal


ASSESSMENT


SRI LANKA
Click for PrintPrint

Bitter Peace
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management

A polarizing election, even as the wounds of the final ferocious battle to crush the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) were fresh, has poisoned the tense peace in Sri Lanka. In the bitterly contested Presidential Election the United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) candidate, incumbent President Mahinda Rajapakse was re-elected as the Sixth Executive President of Sri Lanka by a massive majority of over 1.8 million votes on January 26, 2010. He polled a total of 6,015,934 (57.88 per cent), as against the New Democratic Front (NDF) candidate, former Army Chief and ex-Chief of Defense Staff, General (Retired) Sarath Fonseka, who polled 4,173,185 (40.15) votes. President Rajapakse led in 16 out of 22 electoral Districts, while Fonseka led in six Districts. 10,495,451 (74.49 per cent) out of a total of 14,088,500 registered voters cast their ballot at 11,098 centers throughout the country. Notably, the NDF is a conglomeration including the main opposition United National Party, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (People's Liberation Front, the country’s major Marxist party), and several other political formations opposing the UPFA.

With his re-election, the pressure is now on President Rajapakse, who had promised a ‘political solution’ to the Tamil issue after he had renewed his mandate. He had, however, insisted that all parties, and especially the pro-LTTE Tamil National Alliance (TNA) representatives, would have to participate in the discussions on the political solution. Before the elections, he had declared, "I know what to give and I know what not to give. The people have given me the mandate, so I’m going to use it. But I must get these people [the TNA representatives] to agree to this. They must also know that they can’t get what they want. No way for federalism in this country. For reconciliation to happen, there must be a mix [of ethnicities]."

The electoral process and outcome give little grounds for optimism about any easy reconciliation. The TNA, which had, after the defeat of the LTTE, started talking about political solutions within the framework of a united Sri Lanka, changed its tenor and reinforced its divisive agenda during the course of the electioneering. According to Media and Information Minister Anura Priyadharshana Yapa, the TNA did not withdraw its 2002 and 2004 Election Manifestos which included, inter alia, recognition of Tamils as a distinct nationality; establishing a Tamil homeland; and the rights to self-determination. On December 8, 2009, the TNA stressed that a political solution based on federalism was foremost among their conditions for supporting either of the two main candidates [Rajapakse or Fonseka] at the Presidential Election.

The TNA eventually supported Fonseka who, on January 4, 2010, submitted a proposal titled "Immediate Relief Measures for War Affected Persons", to Member of Parliament (MP) R. Sampanthan, the leader of the TNA. The prominent commitments made in the document included: amnesty to all former LTTE militants who have no evidence against them "within one month"; dismantling the controversial High Security Zones (HSZs) "in keeping with the relocation of the Security Forces"; termination of the state of emergency; immediate dismantling of all paramilitary cadres and armed groups; termination of the practice of the Government seizing lands in the east, while at the same time cancelling allocations deemed "not transparent" or "corrupt". There was, however, no mention of any political solution to address the grievances of the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka.

Worse, there seems to be complete disagreement among political groupings on the essentials of the elusive political solution to the ethnic problem that could carry the gains of the military success against the LTTE to a logical conclusion. Where Rajapakse has rejected any de-merger of the North-East, for instance, Fonseka had promised the de-merger of the region.

More alarmingly, extreme animosities have tainted relations within the political class. The most dramatic manifestation of the acute antipathies that are wrecking the political processes in the country is the character of allegations and counter-allegations between the two presidential candidates – till so recently united in their war with the LTTE. During the election campaign, Fonseka had alleged that the Government had killed surrendering LTTE leaders in the last phase of the war (May 16-19, 2009), prompting the War Crimes Tribunal to call for investigations against Sri Lankan leaders. As acrimony on this issue mounted, Fonseka claimed that Rajapakse was trying to have him killed to suppress his disclosures. Post election developments underline how dangerous emerging trends in Sri Lankan politics are becoming. On January 29, 2010, General Lakshman Hulugalle, the Director of the Media Centre for National Security, ‘exposed’ an alleged plot by General Fonseka, to assassinate President Mahinda Rajapakse, his family members and the Government’s top officials. Giving details, he claimed, "They had hired 70 rooms in two prestigious hotels. They have hired retired Army officers and Army deserters to assassinate the President and his family members." He added, further, that the conspiracy was to assassinate the President while he was passing the Lake House roundabout to go to Temple Trees, and to assassinate Defense Secretary Gothabhya Rajapakse when he was passing the Lake House roundabout to go to the Defense Ministry. "This is the first time in history that such a move has been made by a defeated candidate," Hulugalle stressed. Meanwhile, the Government is reported to have withdrawn the security cover provided to the ex-Army Chief, provoking Fonseka’s assertion that "There are criminals who do politics who can and will also try to kill me."

Election violence made matters worse. People's Action for Free and Fair Elections (PAFFREL), one of the two accredited election monitoring groups, received reports of 224 violent incidents. The group reported that between December 17, 2009, and January 11, 2010, it received reports of 50 assaults, 8 shootings and 11 incidents of threat and intimidation. Meanwhile, another election monitoring group, Campaign for Free and Fair Elections (CaFFE) reported 259 election violations between August 15, 2009 and January 11, 2010, including 49 cases of assault and 74 incidents of election law violations. The number of poll-related deaths was reported to be four.

Crucially, despite Rajapakse’s pledge of ethnic reconciliation in the aftermath of the LTTE defeat, the electoral rebuff from the Tamil dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces may harden his stance, even as it makes his task tougher.

Electoral District
Total percentage of polling
Mahinda Rajapakse
Sarath Fonseka
Batticaloa
64.83
26.27
68.93
Digamadulla District
73.54
47.92
49.94
Jaffna
25.66
24.75
63.84
Trincomalee
68.22
43.04
54.09
Wanni
40.33
27.31
66.86
Source: Sri Lanka Election Commission Website

Region

Total percentage of polling
Mahinda Rajapakse
Sarath Fonseka

Batticaloa

66.66
27.59
68.74

Jaffna

19.18
27.56
66.17

Kilinochchi

7.23
15.18
75.11

Mannar

34.19
23.18
70.19

Mullaitivu

14.00
18.43
73.47

Trincomalee

60.85
26.95
69.42

Vavuniya

43.83
28.53
66.02
Source: Sri Lanka Election Commission Website

The distribution of votes is a clear index of the fact that Rajapakse had failed to reassure the Tamil people on the first occasion when they were voting freely, without fear of the LTTE. Though observers may argue that the voting percentage was very low in the Northern Province and not much can be read into the outcome. It is significant, however, that, despite high percentages of voting and a UPFA led Government in the Eastern Province the people discarded the President in that region as well.

Despite these reverses, however, there were some positive developments during the course of the elections. Although the radical Nediyavan faction of the remnants of the LTTE based in Norway, and the more moderate faction led by V. Rudrakumaran based in the United States, calling for a rejection of electoral politics in Sri Lanka and its substitution by a political and diplomatic offensive against the Island Government, both at home and abroad, the TNA participated in the elections. Putting things in perspective, TNA MP for Trincomalee, K. Thurairatnasingham, stated, on January 11, 2010: "Given the present position of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, it is futile to fight for independence. Likewise, forming a transnational government of Tamils overseas is not going to help the Tamils in the Island. We have to use the resources provided by the existing Sri Lankan political system to get our demands met." Notably, the TNA was a divided house in its resolve to support Fonseka and, according to reports, at least two of its MPs even supported Rajapakse, while a third contested independently. The division within TNA provides ample opportunity to the President to reach out to certain sections of the TNA, which continues to exercise a clear control over the masses of the North and East.

Current pronouncements, unfortunately, indicate that the Rajapakse Government may adopt delaying tactics, and the argument has now been put forward that any ‘solution’ would require amendments to the Constitution, and such amendments are possible only with 2/3rd majority in Parliament. Though the General Elections are due by April 22, 2010, there can be no guarantee that Rajapakse’s coalition will secure 2/3rd seats in the 225-member Parliament.

In his 14-point programme titled, ‘A brighter future’, Rajapakse had promised to work towards a political solution to the ethnic problem. He had made commitments to establish a Northern Provincial Council under the 13th Amendment, and had said he was "thinking of setting up a senate, as a second chamber, that would give the provinces a greater say". It remains to be seen whether the President, with his refreshed mandate, will display the sagacity to deliver on his pledge.


NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
January 25-31, 2010

 

Civilian

Security Force Personnel

Terrorist/Insurgent

Total

INDIA

 

Assam

0
0
1
1

Jammu and Kashmir

0
2
1
3

Manipur

0
0
3
3

Left-wing Extremism

 

Chhattisgarh

0
0
1
1

Jharkhand

1
0
0
1

Orissa

1
0
0
1

West Bengal

4
2
1
7

Total (INDIA)

6
4
7
17

NEPAL

1
0
0
1

PAKISTAN

 

Balochistan

7
1
0
8

FATA

18
5
101
124

NWFP

3
1
1
5

Total (PAKISTAN)

28
7
102
137
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.


INDIA

Lakhvi is not the only mastermind in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, there are others, says Union Home Minster P. Chidambaram: Reacting to Pakistani investigators admission of Lashkar-e-Toiba’s (LeT) role in the November 26, 2008 Mumbai terrorist strikes (also known as 26/11), Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram on January 28 said that LeT operations commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi is only one of the 26/11 masterminds, adding that there are other masterminds also. Chidambaram said, "Lakhvi is one of the masterminds. There are others. We know their names and we think Pakistan also knows their names. If they do not bring others to trial then I would have to conclude reluctantly and regrettably that they are still dragging their feet."

Meanwhile, Home Chidambaram refuted Pakistani Prime Minister (PM) Yousaf Gilani's claim that there was insufficient evidence on Jama’at-ud-Da’awa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed's links to 26/11. Times of India, January 29, 2010.

NSCN-IM in Nagaland joins hands with separatist groups of Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab, indicates report: The National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM) joined hands with Hurriyat Conference of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and Dal Khalsa of Punjab, to put pressure on the Union Government for an ‘early solution to the impasse in Nagaland, Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab’. Thuingaleng Muivah, ‘general secretary’ of the NSCN-IM, Syed Ali Shah Gilani, ‘chairman’ of Hurriyat Conference, and Kanwarpal Singh of Dal Khalsa in a joint statement appealed to the international community highlighting the ‘fundamental conflicts and contradictions’ in India. The report adds that the joint message was ‘endorsed’ by leading organisations based in the respective Diaspora communities. Telegraph India, January 28, 2010.

Talk with Naxals only if they give up violence, says Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram: The Union Government on January 28 said the anti-Naxal (Left-Wing Extremism) operations would stop only if the Naxalites abjure violence and decides to come to the negotiation table. "If they (Naxals) wish to come for talks after abjuring violence, they are welcome. If there is no response to the offer, the anti-Naxal strategy, being formulated, will continue." Times of India, January 29, 2010.

Maoists in Jharkhand for conditional talks: The Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) accepted the Jharkhand Government's offer to come to the negotiating table on January 29. The Bihar-Jharkhand North Chhattisgarh Special Area Committee of CPI-Maoist spokesperson Gopal said, "Whether he (Jharkhand Chief Minster Shibu Soren) will be able to resist the pressure of the Central Government and his coalition partner BJP [Bharatiya Janta Party] to continue war on his own people (Maoists) is doubtful. If Soren's proposal is sincere, the Government must make the atmosphere conducive for talks. If Government wants to hold us on gun point and then negotiate, there is no possibility of negotiations." Putting forth an eight-point ‘wish list', the CPI-Maoist spokesman said the list included immediate end to proposed war on its own people and "de-para-militarisation" of Jharkhand's rural parts. Gopal said all political prisoners, including Central committee leaders — Sushil Roy, Amitabh Bagchi, Mohit and women leader Shila — must be released unconditionally. He also demanded lifting the ban on the outfit and punishment for the police and intelligence officers responsible for "fake encounters". Times of India, January 30, 2010.


PAKISTAN

101 militants and 18 civilians among 124 persons killed during the week in FATA: Fighter jets bombed Taliban hideouts in the Swoi and Damadola areas of Mamoond tehsil (revenue unit) in the Bajaur Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas on January 31, killing nine Taliban militants.

A suicide bomber killed 16 persons, including 14 civilians and two Police officers, and wounded 20 others at a police check point in the Bajaur Agency on January 30. The attacker, on foot, struck a market area in the region’s main town, Khar. In addition, suspected US missiles killed nine alleged militants in the Mohammad Khel area of North Waziristan Agency.

SFs killed 24 Taliban militants in air strikes and clashes in Bajaur Agency on January 29. In one incident, the fighting erupted when militants attacked a check post manned by the Frontier Corps and members of an anti-Taliban militia in the Chinar town. Troops retaliated and killed 14 militants. A paramilitary soldier was also killed and three others were wounded in the clash. Also, fighter jets bombarded a Taliban hideout in the town of Sewai in the Mamoond tehsil killing 10 terrorists and injuring 15 others. Further, five suspected militants were killed and four others sustained injuries in a drone attack in Dattakhel area of North Waziristan Agency.

SFs killed nine militants and injured five others in a clash in the Salarzai tehsil of Bajaur Agency on January 28. Three SFs were injured in the clash. Separately, four Taliban militants were killed in Operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path to Salvation) in South Waziristan Agency.

12 Taliban militants were killed and three others injured in clashes between Salarzai laskhar (militia) and militants in the Chinnar village of Bajaur Agency on January 27. One trooper was also killed in the attack.

Three militants were killed and several others sustained injuries when gunship helicopters fired at suspected hideouts of insurgents in Mamond and Salarzai tehsils in Bajaur Agency on January 26.

SFs killed 15 militants in a gunfight in Kurram Agency in FATA on January 25. Also, air strikes by the jet fighters killed 10 terrorists and destroyed several in the Khar area of Kurram Agency. The Hindu; Dawn; Daily Times; The News, January 25-31, 2010.

2072 persons killed in 1,780 incidents of terrorism across the country since April 2009, says Interior Minister Rehman Malik: As many as 2,072 persons have been killed in 1,780 incidents of terrorism across the country since April 2009, the National Assembly (NA) in Islamabad was informed on January 25. Speaking during the question hour in the NA, Interior Minister Rehman Malik said the people killed included 565 individuals from various law enforcement agencies. He added that 6,253 persons had been injured in these attacks, including 1,590 Security Force personnel. Times of India, January 27, 2010.

Investigators admit LeT ‘operations commander’ Lakhvi’s role in 26/11 Mumbai attacks: Pakistani investigators on January 27 said that there is "sufficient incriminating evidence against" the seven arrested terrorists for their involvement in the November 26, 2008 Mumbai (India) terrorist attacks (also known as 26/11). The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA) report presented to an anti-terrorism court conducting the trial of seven accused, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) ‘operations commander’ Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi, states that there is "sufficient incriminating evidence on record against those arrested for orchestrating the Mumbai attacks." It also corroborated the statement made by Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone LeT terrorist arrested by the Mumbai Police during the attacks in Mumbai.

The report aired by Dawn News said there is enough evidence to prosecute all the seven accused, who are in custody. Among them is Hammad Amin Sadiq, who gave out funds and safe houses for the terrorists. Lakhvi has been named as the mastermind of the Mumbai terror attack. Abu-al-Qama has been identified as the terrorists’ handler, who trained Kasab and the nine others who attacked Mumbai. Zarar Shah has been named as the Lashkar's facilitator and is also an expert in computer networks. Report identifies Shahid Jamil Riaz as a crew member of one of the boats used by Kasab and gang to travel from Karachi to Indian waters. Jami Ahamd has been identified as the man who partially financed the Mumbai terror plot and Muhammad Younas Anjum has been named as the chief financer of the terrorist strikes. The 61-page report, which was compiled by a team of experts led by FIA officials, was presented to the anti-terror court in Rawalpindi in July 2009.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister (PM) Yousaf Raza Gilani denied Indian accusations that his Government was dragging its feet on booking the prime accused of the 26/11 attacks, saying the alleged chief architect Jama’at-ud-Da’awa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed was very much on trial and the court had to decide when to order his arrest. But Gilani also reiterated that India was not giving it enough information to act against Saeed. Times of India, January 29, 2010.


SRI LANKA

Mahinda Rajapakse re-elected as the sixth Executive President: Incumbent President Mahinda Rajapakse was elected as the sixth Executive President of the country by a massive majority of over 1.8 million votes on January 26. He polled a total of 6,015,934 votes as against his closest rival former Army Chief and ex-Chief of Defence Staff General (Retired) Sarath Fonseka of the New Democratic Front (NDF) who polled 4,173,185 votes. Rajapakse led in 17 out of 22 electoral Districts gaining 57.88 percent of the votes polled. Rajapakse led in 16 electoral Districts, while Fonseka led in five Districts, mostly in the North and East of the country. Daily News, January 28, 2010.


The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni


A Project of the
Institute For Conflict Management



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