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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 30, February 1, 2010
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Bitter
Peace
Ajit Kumar Singh
Research Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management
A polarizing
election, even as the wounds of the final ferocious
battle to crush the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE)
were fresh, has poisoned the tense peace in Sri Lanka.
In the bitterly contested Presidential Election the
United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) candidate, incumbent
President Mahinda Rajapakse was re-elected as the Sixth
Executive President of Sri Lanka by a massive majority
of over 1.8 million votes on January 26, 2010. He polled
a total of 6,015,934 (57.88 per cent), as against the
New Democratic Front (NDF) candidate, former Army Chief
and ex-Chief of Defense Staff, General (Retired) Sarath
Fonseka, who polled 4,173,185 (40.15) votes. President
Rajapakse led in 16 out of 22 electoral Districts, while
Fonseka led in six Districts. 10,495,451 (74.49 per
cent) out of a total of 14,088,500 registered voters
cast their ballot at 11,098 centers throughout the country.
Notably, the NDF is a conglomeration including the main
opposition United National Party, the Janatha Vimukthi
Peramuna (People's Liberation Front, the country’s major
Marxist party), and several other political formations
opposing the UPFA.
With
his re-election, the pressure is now on President Rajapakse,
who had promised a ‘political
solution’ to the Tamil issue after
he had renewed his mandate. He had, however, insisted
that all parties, and especially the pro-LTTE Tamil
National Alliance (TNA) representatives, would have
to participate in the discussions on the political solution.
Before the elections, he had declared, "I know
what to give and I know what not to give. The people
have given me the mandate, so I’m going to use it. But
I must get these people [the TNA representatives] to
agree to this. They must also know that they can’t get
what they want. No way for federalism in this country.
For reconciliation to happen, there must be a mix [of
ethnicities]."
The electoral
process and outcome give little grounds for optimism
about any easy reconciliation. The TNA, which had, after
the defeat of the LTTE, started talking about political
solutions within the framework of a united Sri Lanka,
changed its tenor and reinforced its divisive agenda
during the course of the electioneering. According to
Media and Information Minister Anura Priyadharshana
Yapa, the TNA did not withdraw its 2002 and 2004 Election
Manifestos which included, inter alia, recognition
of Tamils as a distinct nationality; establishing a
Tamil homeland; and the rights to self-determination.
On December 8, 2009, the TNA stressed that a political
solution based on federalism was foremost among their
conditions for supporting either of the two main candidates
[Rajapakse or Fonseka] at the Presidential Election.
The TNA
eventually supported Fonseka who, on January 4, 2010,
submitted a proposal titled "Immediate Relief Measures
for War Affected Persons", to Member of Parliament (MP)
R. Sampanthan, the leader of the TNA. The prominent
commitments made in the document included: amnesty to
all former LTTE militants who have no evidence against
them "within one month"; dismantling the controversial
High Security Zones (HSZs) "in keeping with the relocation
of the Security Forces"; termination of the state
of emergency; immediate dismantling of all paramilitary
cadres and armed groups; termination of the practice
of the Government seizing lands in the east, while at
the same time cancelling allocations deemed "not transparent"
or "corrupt". There was, however, no mention of any
political solution to address the grievances of the
Tamil minority in Sri Lanka.
Worse,
there seems to be complete disagreement among political
groupings on the essentials of the elusive political
solution to the ethnic problem that could carry the
gains of the military success against the LTTE to a
logical conclusion. Where Rajapakse has rejected any
de-merger of the North-East, for instance, Fonseka had
promised the de-merger of the region.
More
alarmingly, extreme animosities have tainted relations
within the political class. The most dramatic manifestation
of the acute antipathies that are wrecking the political
processes in the country is the character of allegations
and counter-allegations between the two presidential
candidates – till so recently united in their war with
the LTTE. During the election campaign, Fonseka had
alleged that the Government had killed surrendering
LTTE leaders in the last phase of the war (May 16-19,
2009), prompting the War Crimes Tribunal to call for
investigations against Sri Lankan leaders. As acrimony
on this issue mounted, Fonseka claimed that Rajapakse
was trying to have him killed to suppress his disclosures.
Post election developments underline how dangerous emerging
trends in Sri Lankan politics are becoming. On January
29, 2010, General Lakshman Hulugalle, the Director of
the Media Centre for National Security, ‘exposed’ an
alleged plot by General Fonseka, to assassinate President
Mahinda Rajapakse, his family members and the Government’s
top officials. Giving details, he claimed, "They
had hired 70 rooms in two prestigious hotels. They have
hired retired Army officers and Army deserters to assassinate
the President and his family members." He added,
further, that the conspiracy was to assassinate the
President while he was passing the Lake House roundabout
to go to Temple Trees, and to assassinate Defense Secretary
Gothabhya Rajapakse when he was passing the Lake House
roundabout to go to the Defense Ministry. "This
is the first time in history that such a move has been
made by a defeated candidate," Hulugalle stressed.
Meanwhile, the Government is reported to have withdrawn
the security cover provided to the ex-Army Chief, provoking
Fonseka’s assertion that "There are criminals who
do politics who can and will also try to kill me."
Election
violence made matters worse. People's Action for Free
and Fair Elections (PAFFREL), one of the two accredited
election monitoring groups, received reports of 224
violent incidents. The group reported that between December
17, 2009, and January 11, 2010, it received reports
of 50 assaults, 8 shootings and 11 incidents of threat
and intimidation. Meanwhile, another election monitoring
group, Campaign for Free and Fair Elections (CaFFE)
reported 259 election violations between August 15,
2009 and January 11, 2010, including 49 cases of assault
and 74 incidents of election law violations. The number
of poll-related deaths was reported to be four.
Crucially,
despite Rajapakse’s pledge of ethnic
reconciliation in the aftermath
of the LTTE defeat, the electoral rebuff from the Tamil
dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces may harden
his stance, even as it makes his task tougher.
Electoral
District
|
Total
percentage of polling
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Mahinda
Rajapakse
|
Sarath
Fonseka
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Batticaloa
|
64.83
|
26.27
|
68.93
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Digamadulla
District
|
73.54
|
47.92
|
49.94
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Jaffna
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25.66
|
24.75
|
63.84
|
Trincomalee
|
68.22
|
43.04
|
54.09
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Wanni
|
40.33
|
27.31
|
66.86
|
Source:
Sri Lanka Election Commission Website
Region
|
Total
percentage of polling
|
Mahinda
Rajapakse
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Sarath
Fonseka
|
Batticaloa
|
66.66
|
27.59
|
68.74
|
Jaffna
|
19.18
|
27.56
|
66.17
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Kilinochchi
|
7.23
|
15.18
|
75.11
|
Mannar
|
34.19
|
23.18
|
70.19
|
Mullaitivu
|
14.00
|
18.43
|
73.47
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Trincomalee
|
60.85
|
26.95
|
69.42
|
Vavuniya
|
43.83
|
28.53
|
66.02
|
Source:
Sri Lanka Election Commission Website
The distribution
of votes is a clear index of the fact that Rajapakse
had failed to reassure the Tamil people on the first
occasion when they were voting freely, without fear
of the LTTE. Though observers may argue that the voting
percentage was very low in the Northern Province and
not much can be read into the outcome. It is significant,
however, that, despite high percentages of voting and
a UPFA led Government in the Eastern Province the people
discarded the President in that region as well.
Despite
these reverses, however, there were some positive developments
during the course of the elections. Although the radical
Nediyavan faction of the remnants of the LTTE based
in Norway, and the more moderate faction led by V. Rudrakumaran
based in the United States, calling for a rejection
of electoral politics in Sri Lanka and its substitution
by a political and diplomatic offensive against the
Island Government, both at home and abroad, the TNA
participated in the elections. Putting things in perspective,
TNA MP for Trincomalee, K. Thurairatnasingham, stated,
on January 11, 2010: "Given the present position
of the Tamils in Sri Lanka, it is futile to fight for
independence. Likewise, forming a transnational government
of Tamils overseas is not going to help the Tamils in
the Island. We have to use the resources provided by
the existing Sri Lankan political system to get our
demands met." Notably, the TNA was a divided house
in its resolve to support Fonseka and, according to
reports, at least two of its MPs even supported Rajapakse,
while a third contested independently. The division
within TNA provides ample opportunity to the President
to reach out to certain sections of the TNA, which continues
to exercise a clear control over the masses of the North
and East.
Current
pronouncements, unfortunately, indicate that the Rajapakse
Government may adopt delaying tactics, and the argument
has now been put forward that any ‘solution’ would require
amendments to the Constitution, and such amendments
are possible only with 2/3rd majority in
Parliament. Though the General Elections are due by
April 22, 2010, there can be no guarantee that Rajapakse’s
coalition will secure 2/3rd seats in the
225-member Parliament.
In his
14-point programme titled, ‘A brighter future’, Rajapakse
had promised to work towards a political solution to
the ethnic problem. He had made commitments to establish
a Northern Provincial Council under the 13th
Amendment, and had said he was "thinking of setting
up a senate, as a second chamber, that would give the
provinces a greater say". It remains to be seen
whether the President, with his refreshed mandate, will
display the sagacity to deliver on his pledge.
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Weekly
Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
January
25-31, 2010
|
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist/Insurgent
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Jammu and Kashmir
|
0
|
2
|
1
|
3
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
Left-wing Extremism
|
|
Chhattisgarh
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Jharkhand
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Orissa
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
West Bengal
|
4
|
2
|
1
|
7
|
Total (INDIA)
|
6
|
4
|
7
|
17
|
NEPAL
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
7
|
1
|
0
|
8
|
FATA
|
18
|
5
|
101
|
124
|
NWFP
|
3
|
1
|
1
|
5
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
28
|
7
|
102
|
137
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Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
Lakhvi
is not the only mastermind in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks,
there are others, says Union Home Minster P. Chidambaram:
Reacting
to Pakistani investigators admission of Lashkar-e-Toiba’s
(LeT) role in the November 26, 2008 Mumbai terrorist
strikes (also known as 26/11), Union Home Minister
P. Chidambaram on January 28 said that LeT operations
commander Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi is only one of the
26/11 masterminds, adding that there are other masterminds
also. Chidambaram said, "Lakhvi is one of the masterminds.
There are others. We know their names and we think
Pakistan also knows their names. If they do not bring
others to trial then I would have to conclude reluctantly
and regrettably that they are still dragging their
feet."
Meanwhile,
Home Chidambaram refuted Pakistani Prime Minister
(PM) Yousaf Gilani's claim that there was insufficient
evidence on Jama’at-ud-Da’awa (JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed's
links to 26/11.
Times
of India, January 29, 2010.
NSCN-IM
in Nagaland joins hands with separatist groups of
Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab, indicates report: The
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM) joined hands with Hurriyat Conference of
Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and Dal Khalsa of Punjab,
to put pressure on the Union Government for an ‘early
solution to the impasse in Nagaland, Jammu and Kashmir
and Punjab’. Thuingaleng Muivah, ‘general secretary’
of the NSCN-IM, Syed Ali Shah Gilani, ‘chairman’ of
Hurriyat Conference, and Kanwarpal Singh of Dal Khalsa
in a joint statement appealed to the international
community highlighting the ‘fundamental conflicts
and contradictions’ in India. The report adds that
the joint message was ‘endorsed’ by leading organisations
based in the respective Diaspora communities.
Telegraph
India, January 28, 2010.
Talk
with Naxals only if they give up violence, says Union
Home Minister P. Chidambaram: The
Union Government on January 28 said the anti-Naxal
(Left-Wing Extremism) operations would stop only if
the Naxalites abjure violence and decides to come
to the negotiation table. "If they (Naxals) wish to
come for talks after abjuring violence, they are welcome.
If there is no response to the offer, the anti-Naxal
strategy, being formulated, will continue."
Times
of India, January 29, 2010.
Maoists
in Jharkhand for conditional talks: The
Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) accepted
the Jharkhand Government's offer to come to the negotiating
table on January 29. The Bihar-Jharkhand North Chhattisgarh
Special Area Committee of CPI-Maoist spokesperson
Gopal said, "Whether he (Jharkhand Chief Minster Shibu
Soren) will be able to resist the pressure of the
Central Government and his coalition partner BJP [Bharatiya
Janta Party] to continue war on his own people (Maoists)
is doubtful. If Soren's proposal is sincere, the Government
must make the atmosphere conducive for talks. If Government
wants to hold us on gun point and then negotiate,
there is no possibility of negotiations." Putting
forth an eight-point ‘wish list', the CPI-Maoist spokesman
said the list included immediate end to proposed war
on its own people and "de-para-militarisation" of
Jharkhand's rural parts. Gopal said all political
prisoners, including Central committee leaders — Sushil
Roy, Amitabh Bagchi, Mohit and women leader Shila
— must be released unconditionally. He also demanded
lifting the ban on the outfit and punishment for the
police and intelligence officers responsible for "fake
encounters".
Times
of India, January 30, 2010.
PAKISTAN
101
militants and 18 civilians among 124 persons killed
during the week in FATA: Fighter
jets bombed Taliban hideouts in the Swoi and Damadola
areas of Mamoond tehsil (revenue unit) in the
Bajaur Agency of Federally Administered Tribal Areas
on January 31, killing nine Taliban militants.
A
suicide bomber killed 16 persons, including 14 civilians
and two Police officers, and wounded 20 others at
a police check point in the Bajaur Agency on January
30. The attacker, on foot, struck a market area in
the region’s main town, Khar. In addition, suspected
US missiles killed nine alleged militants in the Mohammad
Khel area of North Waziristan Agency.
SFs
killed 24 Taliban militants in air strikes and clashes
in Bajaur Agency on January 29. In one incident, the
fighting erupted when militants attacked a check post
manned by the Frontier Corps and members of an anti-Taliban
militia in the Chinar town. Troops retaliated and
killed 14 militants. A paramilitary soldier was also
killed and three others were wounded in the clash.
Also, fighter jets bombarded a Taliban hideout in
the town of Sewai in the Mamoond tehsil killing
10 terrorists and injuring 15 others. Further, five
suspected militants were killed and four others sustained
injuries in a drone attack in Dattakhel area of North
Waziristan Agency.
SFs
killed nine militants and injured five others in a
clash in the Salarzai tehsil of Bajaur Agency
on January 28. Three SFs were injured in the clash.
Separately, four Taliban militants were killed in
Operation Rah-e-Nijat (Path to Salvation) in
South Waziristan Agency.
12
Taliban militants were killed and three others injured
in clashes between Salarzai laskhar (militia)
and militants in the Chinnar village of Bajaur Agency
on January 27. One trooper was also killed in the
attack.
Three
militants were killed and several others sustained
injuries when gunship helicopters fired at suspected
hideouts of insurgents in Mamond and Salarzai tehsils
in Bajaur Agency on January 26.
SFs
killed 15 militants in a gunfight in Kurram Agency
in FATA on January 25. Also, air strikes by the jet
fighters killed 10 terrorists and destroyed several
in the Khar area of Kurram Agency. The
Hindu;
Dawn;
Daily
Times; The
News, January 25-31, 2010.
2072
persons killed in 1,780 incidents of terrorism across
the country since April 2009, says Interior Minister
Rehman Malik: As
many as 2,072 persons have been killed in 1,780 incidents
of terrorism across the country since April 2009,
the National Assembly (NA) in Islamabad was informed
on January 25. Speaking during the question hour in
the NA, Interior Minister Rehman Malik said the people
killed included 565 individuals from various law enforcement
agencies. He added that 6,253 persons had been injured
in these attacks, including 1,590 Security Force personnel.
Times
of India, January 27, 2010.
Investigators
admit LeT ‘operations commander’ Lakhvi’s role in
26/11 Mumbai attacks: Pakistani
investigators on January 27 said that there is "sufficient
incriminating evidence against" the seven arrested
terrorists for their involvement in the November 26,
2008 Mumbai (India) terrorist attacks (also known
as 26/11). The Federal Investigation Agency (FIA)
report presented to an anti-terrorism court conducting
the trial of seven accused, including the Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT) ‘operations commander’ Zakiur Rehman Lakhvi,
states that there is "sufficient incriminating evidence
on record against those arrested for orchestrating
the Mumbai attacks." It also corroborated the statement
made by Ajmal Amir Kasab, the lone LeT terrorist arrested
by the Mumbai Police during the attacks in Mumbai.
The
report aired by Dawn News said there is enough
evidence to prosecute all the seven accused, who are
in custody. Among them is Hammad Amin Sadiq, who gave
out funds and safe houses for the terrorists. Lakhvi
has been named as the mastermind of the Mumbai terror
attack. Abu-al-Qama has been identified as the terrorists’
handler, who trained Kasab and the nine others who
attacked Mumbai. Zarar Shah has been named as the
Lashkar's facilitator and is also an expert in computer
networks. Report identifies Shahid Jamil Riaz as a
crew member of one of the boats used by Kasab and
gang to travel from Karachi to Indian waters. Jami
Ahamd has been identified as the man who partially
financed the Mumbai terror plot and Muhammad Younas
Anjum has been named as the chief financer of the
terrorist strikes. The 61-page report, which was compiled
by a team of experts led by FIA officials, was presented
to the anti-terror court in Rawalpindi in July 2009.
Meanwhile,
Prime Minister (PM) Yousaf Raza Gilani denied Indian
accusations that his Government was dragging its feet
on booking the prime accused of the 26/11 attacks,
saying the alleged chief architect Jama’at-ud-Da’awa
(JuD) chief Hafiz Saeed was very much on trial and
the court had to decide when to order his arrest.
But Gilani also reiterated that India was not giving
it enough information to act against Saeed.
Times
of India, January 29, 2010.
SRI LANKA
Mahinda
Rajapakse re-elected as the sixth Executive President:
Incumbent
President Mahinda Rajapakse was elected as the sixth
Executive President of the country by a massive majority
of over 1.8 million votes on January 26. He polled
a total of 6,015,934 votes as against his closest
rival former Army Chief and ex-Chief of Defence Staff
General (Retired) Sarath Fonseka of the New Democratic
Front (NDF) who polled 4,173,185 votes. Rajapakse
led in 17 out of 22 electoral Districts gaining 57.88
percent of the votes polled. Rajapakse led in 16 electoral
Districts, while Fonseka led in five Districts, mostly
in the North and East of the country.
Daily
News, January 28, 2010.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
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and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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