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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 38, March 29, 2010
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Troubled
Triad
Asutosha Acharya
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
In
the latest of a series of terrorist attacks targeting
Indians in Afghanistan, coordinated suicide attacks
were executed on February 26, 2010, at two hotels in
Kabul, the Afghan capital. Nine Indians were killed,
including two Majors of the Army. At least 10 others,
including five Indian Army officers, were injured in
the strike, which killed another eight, including locals
and nationals from other countries. The attackers, believed
to be three in number, struck at the guest houses, particularly
the Park Residence, rented by the Indian Embassy for
its staffers and those linked to India’s developmental
work in Afghanistan. Indian External Affairs Minister
S.M. Krishna noted that this was "the third attack
on Indian officials and interests in Afghanistan"
over the preceding 20 months.
A faction
of the Taliban was first to claim responsibility for
the attack, when the Haqqani group’s spokesman Zabihullah
Mujahid telephoned a reporter with the Associated
Press and confirmed that five suicide bombers took
part in the operation, and that foreigners were the
target.
Later
in the evening, a man introducing himself as Hussain
Burki called the BBC Urdu Service in London,
to claim that the suicide bombing in Kabul was a joint
operation of the Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM)
and the Afghan Taliban. "Three of our fidayeen
[suicide squad members] fighters, Mohammad Owais, Aftab
Ahmad and Daresh Khan, carried out the attack, along
with the Afghan Taliban and offered the supreme sacrifice
of their lives. This was revenge against the Indians
for the atrocities they are committing in Kashmir and
Afghanistan’.
A few
hours later, however, the ‘Afghan Taliban’ ruled out
the involvement of the JeM in the Kabul attack, claiming
that the assault had been executed by Taliban fidayeen
alone.
These
claims and counter-claims were, however, mere smokescreens,
intended to mislead investigators and keep the focus
away from the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI),
Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, which simply
does not want the Indian presence in its Afghan ‘backyard’,
and which has been the architect of the succession of
earlier attacks on Indian interests.
Initial
speculation, based on past trajectories, lent credibility
to the idea that the attack was engineered by the Haqqani
faction of the Taliban, at the behest of the ISI. Afghan
intelligence officials leading the investigations, however,
quickly found that the top leadership of both the Taliban
and al Qaeda were ignorant of the attack for more than
five hours after its initiation. Afghan investigators
found a trail that led directly to Pakistan and to the
ISI's currently preferred terrorist formation, the Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT).
Afghan security officials soon confirmed the responsibility
of the ISI-LeT combine. Saeed Ansari, a spokesman for
Afghanistan's intelligence service, on March 2, disclosed
that his agency had evidence that Pakistanis, specifically
LeT, were involved in the attacks. "We are very close
to the exact proof and evidence that the attack on the
Indian guest house ... is not the work of the Afghan
Taliban, but this attack was carried out by Lashkar-e-Toiba
network, who are dependent on the Pakistan military."
Ansari also noted that the February 26 Kabul attacks
bore similarities to two suicide bombings at the Indian
embassy in Kabul in 2008 and 2009, and the car bomb
attack in January at a residential hotel in one of the
safest neighbourhoods in the capital, Kabul. Ansari
further stated that the Taliban lacked the logistical
capabilities for the attack, since the gunmen appeared
to have detailed knowledge, including names, of Indian
guests at the hotels. "This kind of information,
where the Indians are, is not the ability of the Afghan
Taliban to know," Ansari insisted. He also claimed
that the Taliban "had no knowledge" of the Kabul attacks
at least five hours after they started. Investigators
also established that the attackers spoke Urdu, not
Pashto or Dari. Sources also indicated that the staff
at the targeted guesthouses generally comprised Pakistani
nationals who were recruited by the Kabul ISI station
to keep tabs on the Indian residents.
Crucially,
the style of the attack was very different from past
suicide attacks on the Indian establishment in Kabul.
Unlike previous suicide attacks on the Indian embassy,
the latest attack was the ‘trademark’ LeT-style assault,
using explosives to bring down defences and then launching
a small-arms raid, hunting for specific targets, particularly
Indian nationals, similar to the November 26, 2008,
Mumbai attacks. Confirming this, the Indian Ambassador
in Kabul, Jayant Prasad, noted, "It was a 26/11
type of attack. The attackers searched each and every
room and killed people." Further, sources revealed that
the terrorists searched a senior Indian Foreign Service
Officer’s room at Park Residence several times and even
lobbed in grenades, because they thought he could be
hiding inside. When they did not find him in the room,
the terrorists spoke to their handlers over their mobile
phones to notify his absence, a pattern significantly
similar to the LeT cadre’s modus operandi on
26/11.
Though
LeT’s global presence is now widely acknowledged, the
ISI had not previously used the group to target Indian
establishments outside Indian soil. In Afghanistan,
Indian targets had earlier been hit by ISI using its
preferred anti-India Afghan terrorist faction – the
Haqqani network. India, US and Afghanistan investigators
had recovered clinching evidence that the July 2008
and October 2009 Indian Embassy suicide bombings were
orchestrated by the Haqqani network, under real-time
operational control of the ISI. In an effort to create
a measure of ambiguity, the ISI chose to utilize the
LeT to target Indian interests in Afghanistan. The move
is also part of ISI's design to keep the pressure on
Indian projects and presence in the country, and also
skirt around the handicap of US pressure against the
Haqqani network’s operations on Afghan soil at a time
when Islamabad is eager to ‘repackage’ its proxies as
the ‘good Taliban’, for inclusion in the power structure
at Kabul.
Indian
projects and nationals in Afghanistan remain vulnerable
to the Pakistan-backed terrorist enterprise because
of its large presence in the reconstruction of the war-ravaged
country. India has a huge assistance programme for Afghanistan’s
reconstruction. Since 2002, after the defeat of the
Taliban regime, India has pledged over USD 1.3 billion
aid to Afghanistan, making India the fifth largest donor
nation, after the US, UK, Japan and Canada. In the 2010-11
Indian budget, a total of INR 2.9 billion has been allocated
for various aid programmes to Afghanistan. Indian engagement
in Afghanistan has focused on long-term economic stabilization,
institution-building and social welfare, as well as
a commitment to integrate Kabul into the South Asian
framework. With Indian involvement in developmental
works steadily increasing, some 4,000-5,000 Indian nationals
are currently working on several reconstruction projects
across Afghanistan. The Indian Embassy at Kabul notes:
"India has undertaken projects virtually in all parts
of Afghanistan, in a wide range of sectors, including
hydro-electricity, power transmission lines, road construction,
agriculture and industry, telecommunications, information
and broadcasting, education and health, which have been
identified by the Afghan Government as priority areas
for development." In January 2009, India handed over
the 218 kilometre Zaranj-Delaram highway, constructed
at a cost of USD 266 million, linking Kabul with Iran
and, more importantly, with the Iranian port of Chabahar,
to facilitate movement of goods and commodities across
an alternative route from the links through Pakistan,
which are periodically held at ransom by the Pakistan
establishment and their terrorist proxies. The construction
work on the Zaranj-Delaram highway was disrupted repeatedly
due to Pakistan's denial of all transit facilities from
India to Afghanistan through its territory. The project
was also opposed by the Pakistan-backed Taliban, who
relentlessly attempted to block work by attacking and
killing Indian nationals. Some of the more prominent
attacks directly targeting work on the Zaranj-Delaram
highway project included:
November
19, 2005: A 36-year old Border Roads Organisation (BRO)
employee, Ramankutty Maniyappan was abducted. His decapitated
body was found four days later, on a road between Zaranj,
capital of Nimroz, and the Ghor Ghori area.
January
3, 2008: In the first-ever suicide attack on Indians
in Afghanistan, two Indo-Tibetan Border Police (ITBP)
soldiers were killed and five injured at Razai village
in Nimroz.
April
12, 2008: Two personnel of the Indian Army’s BRO, M.P.
Singh and C. Govindaswamy, were killed and seven persons,
including five BRO personnel, sustained injuries, in
a suicide-bomb attack in Nimroz.
June
5, 2008: An Indo-Tibetan Boarder Police (ITBP) trooper
was killed and four others injured by the Taliban in
the south-west Province of Nimroz.
[Nimroz
lies along the 218 kilometre Zarang-Delaram Highway
Project].
Since
2002, Pakistan has continuously attempted to block India’s
capacity-building initiatives in Afghanistan. For instance,
blocking the movement over Pakistani territory of heavy
equipment meant for a 202-kilometre transmission line
in Afghanistan. India has, nevertheless, managed to
overcome such obstacles, engineering one of the largest
airlifts in the region, over four years, to bring electricity
to power-starved Kabul.
India’s
growing influence in Afghanistan has always been opposed
by Islamabad, in pursuit of Pakistan’s blatant ambitions
to establish a proxy regime at Kabul. Pakistan fears
that India’s ‘soft power’ among the Afghans will leave
Pakistan encircled by hostile neighbours. Pakistan has
historically sought a zero Indian presence across its
western borders, and has aggressively lobbied diplomatically
against any Indian role in Afghanistan, even as it intensifies
terrorist intimidation in physical attacks against Indian
targets. Significantly, at a meeting of the Indian National
Security Council (NSC) on February 12, the Research
and Analysis Wing (R&AW) chief reportedly told Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh that his agency had picked up
a conversation between ISI chief, Lt. Gen. Shuja Pasha,
and Afghanistan President Hamid Karzai, in which Pasha
asked for a scaled down Indian presence in Afghanistan,
including its cultural presence, in return for mediating
a truce between Karzai and the Taliban.
After
the ferocious February 26 attack, sources indicate that
the ISI is planning more attacks on the Indian presence
in Afghanistan. Intelligence inputs confirm that Indians
are under a constant threat from Pakistan-backed terrorist
groups. Regarding the February 26 incident, Indian Union
Home Minister P. Chidambaram stated, on March 2, "there
were intelligence alerts that Indian assets may be targeted,
following which adequate steps were taken... but Afghanistan
is a vulnerable area." Union Government sources indicated,
on March 12, that India has received ‘credible’ intelligence
inputs on a terrorist plot to abduct Indian diplomats.
Coming
against a backdrop of a growing threat perception from
ISI backed terrorist outfits, India has sent 40 Indo-Tibetan
Border Police (ITBP) personnel to step up the security
of its diplomatic corps in Afghanistan. Earlier, there
were 163 ITBP personnel, deployed at the Indian embassy
in Kabul and its consulates in Jalalabad, Kandahar,
Herat and Mazar-e-Sharif.
Despite
growing threats from Pakistan-backed terrorist outfits,
India has declared that it will continue its developmental
activities in Afghanistan without scaling down its presence,
even though it suspended operations of its medical mission
in Kabul, which were hit by injuries to most of its
members. National Security Adviser (NSA) Shivshankar
Menon nevertheless asserted that India would continue
to fulfil its developmental commitments towards the
Afghan people, although there may be some adjustments
in the way things were being done.
Threat
perceptions from Pakistan backed terrorism at India’s
many projects and establishments in Afghanistan have
always been high. It is evident that India will have
to invest much more in the security of its assets in
that country, though it would be physically impossible
to secure every place and every Indian life. India’s
overwhelming emphasis in Afghanistan has been on ‘soft
power’, and in the region, on minimal defensive capability,
relinquishing the entire initiative to a malignant Pakistani
intent. Since India has refused to evolve the necessary
offensive capacity, and to seize the initiative, it
will have to go on battling perceptions that it is running
scared.
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Gujarat:
Copybook Expansion
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management
Sachin Bansidhar Diwan
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
Six
years ago, the erstwhile People’s War Group’s (which later
merged to form the Communist Party of India – Maoist,
CPI-Maoist)
‘Urban Perspective’ document (‘Our Work in Urban Areas’)
promised to focus on, among others, the Ahmedabad-Pune
corridor, noting,
This
stretch of Western India is the main concentration
of high industrialisation and urbanisation in the
country. It includes four of the top ten cities
in the country – Mumbai, Ahmedabad, Pune and Surat
– besides two other cities over ten lakh – Vadodara
and Nashik. The industries cover almost all the
main industrial groups – engineering, chemicals,
textiles, automobiles, telecommunications, electronics,
etc. These cities and the adjoining districts attract
the largest amount of new investment in the whole
country. The working class is the most diverse,
having migrated from all parts of the country.
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Recognizing
that rural areas would "play a primary role"
in the "armed struggle" the Urban Perspective
stated, nevertheless,
Without
a strong urban revolutionary movement, the ongoing
people’s war faces difficulties; further, without
the participation of the urban masses it is impossible
to achieve countrywide victory.
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And
further,
The
ceaseless attacks of the imperialists and their
Indian agents are daily pushing the national bourgeoisie
into more conflict with the ruling classes. Thus
today the practical possibilities of unity from
below are growing. These possibilities are greater
in cities with a stronger national bourgeois presence
like the Delhi belt, the Coimbatore-Erode belt in
Tamil Nadu, Surat in Gujarat, etc. Local party organisations
should, where possible, utilise such opportunities,
while keeping in mind the above principles.
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Gujarat
would seem an unlikely location for a Maoist mobilisation,
on conventional reasoning. With just 4.4 per cent of the
country’s population, the State accounts for 17 per cent
of its GDP, 16 per cent of national exports, and 39 per
cent of the national industrial output. While the world
teetered on the brink of recession, and while the Indian
economy slowed down significantly, Gujarat grew at 12.99
per cent in 2009-2010, and has averaged 12 per cent over
the past decade. According to official calculations, just
16.75 per cent of the population is below the poverty
line, as against a national average of 27.5 per cent.
When the Tata’s Nano project at Singur in West Bengal
ran into trouble over land acquisition and displacement,
it shifted to Gujarat. This is the State most preferred
by industry, and, according to the Reserve Bank of India,
accounted for 26 per cent of total bank finance in the
country in 2006-07.
Surat
is a notable part of this success story: the State’s fastest
growing city accounts for 92 per cent of the world’s diamond
cutting and polishing industry. It has been called the
‘Manchester of the East’, accounting for 28 per cent of
India’s total synthetic fiber output, and 40 per cent
of the country’s man made fabric production.
None
of this, however, has deterred the Maoists from targeting
this flourishing State to realize their strategy of bringing
the ‘Ahmedabad-Pune corridor’ into their sphere of influence.
On
March 16, 2010 the Surat Police arrested a former freelance
journalist of Orissa, Niranjan Mahapatra, from Pandesara
in the Surat District for his alleged involvement in Maoist
movement in Surat city, as well as in different
tribal areas of South Gujarat. Sources indicate that he
had been working among the tribals in South Gujarat
since 1996, though had shifted base to Surat
for the past five years. Police investigations
revealed that he had sought to mobilize the dam evacuees
of Ukai, living in Tapi, Surat and Dang Districts. The
Police claimed to have recovered several incriminating
documents from his rented accommodation at Jagannath Nagar.
Subseqeuntly,
on March 19, 2010, N. K. Singh, a suspected cadre of the
Communist Party of India-Marxist-Leninist-Janshakti (CPI-ML-Janshakti)
was arrested from the Alang ship-breaking yard in the
Bhavnagar District of the Saurashtra region where he was
running a labour union. He hailed from Begusarai in Bihar.
The Police had extracted his mobile phone number from
Niranjan Mahapatra.
Prior
to these incidents, the Gujarat Police, on February 26,
2010, filed a comprehensive First Information Report (FIR)
against the CPI-Maoist in Surat, to investigate the organisation’s
activities and identify the persons involved in its spread
in the State. The complaint confirmed that the Maoists
were trying to extend their networks in the State, particularly
in the tribal regions of South Gujarat. An offence under
various provisions of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (UAPA) has been
registered. Explaining the circumstances of filing of
the FIR Inspector General of Police (Surat Range) A. K.
Singh stated on February 27, 2010,
We
have analysed the source materials and believe that
their activities in South Gujarat are in continuation
with their activities in the other Naxal [Left Wing
Extremism]-affected States of the country. This
is the first comprehensive FIR registered against
them that will give legal power to the Police to
investigate and find out the spread of CPI-Maoist
in South Gujarat. Earlier, only minor complaints
were filed against them. It is a banned organisation
and we need to track their every movement.
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Earlier,
on April 10, 2009, five CPI-Maoist cadres belonging to
the Narayanpur District of Chhattisgarh were arrested
by a joint team of the Chhattisgarh Police and Gujarat
Police from the Hazira industrial area of Surat. The Maoists
were identified as Arjun Ramlal Yadav, Surajlal Rupjiram
Gond, Jankuram alias Dholuram Virsing Gond, Chandu
alias Chanda Bavanji Gond and Sonmati Rasiya Gond.
According
to senior Police officials, the Maoists, including two
women, were acting as a sleeper cell and used Surat and
Hazira as a hiding place after carrying out attacks in
Chhattisgarh. They were working as labourers in a construction
company and living in the staff quarters near Singotar
Mata Temple. The operation was planned after Police from
the Dhantri District of Chhattisgarh received a tip-off
that the extremists were hiding in Surat. The Surat Deputy
Commissioner of Police, Subhash Trivedi, disclosed that
the group used to visit Chhattisgarh frequently: "They
used to return to Surat, either after carrying out attacks,
or when any member fell ill."
Many of
the details of the Maoist gameplan were revealed during
interrogation of Surya Devra Prabhakar, believed to be
in charge of the Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh Maoist operations,
who was arrested by the Maharashtra Anti Terrorism Squad
(ATS) from Mumbai (Maharashtra) on January 18, 2010. Prabhakar
was responsible for drafting policies to recruit ‘young
blood’ into the movement, and stayed in Surat between
2000 and 2006, before shifting to Mumbai. He, however,
continued to visit Surat frequently. He was active in
the tribal belt of South Gujarat and had established contacts
with power loom and diamond industry workers. The ATS
recovered INR One million from Prabhakar, believed to
be a portion of the INR 2.5 million collected by him from
Surat. The ATS also recovered a computer CPU, a pen drive,
a mobile phone and Maoist literatures. More importantly,
Prabhakar revealed that the plan to make the stretch from
Ahmedabad to Mumbai a ‘Red Corridor’ was brewed almost
10 years earlier, and Surat was chosen as the operational
Headquarters because of its huge migrant population from
Maoist affected States like Orissa, Maharashtra, Bihar
and Chhattisgarh. In addition, another two major cities
Vadodara (Gujarat) and Nashik (Maharashtra) – lie in the
targeted corridor, each with million-plus populations.
The entire targeted region boasts a diversified industrial
presence and is home to a wide varied range of the working
class populations, with a significant representation of
migrant workers from Maoist afflicted States.
Gujarat
is also being developed as a ‘breeding ground’ for Maoists
from other, more troubled, States. Gujarat Additional
Director General of Police (ADGP) Sudhir Sinha, on March
22, 2010, revealed that the Maoists were using Gujarat
to recruit potential cadres from the large migrant population,
especially in Surat, and collect funds for their movement:
"CPI-Maoist cadres are brainwashing potential migrant
recruits and are sending them back to the State of their
origin to work there," Sinha said.
For all
their efforts, the Maoist consolidation in Gujarat, and
in the targeted Ahmedabad-Pune corridor, is still in its
infancy. There has been no violence in the State. Crucially,
the Gujarat Administration and Police have far better
capacities for governance than most of the regions afflicted
by the Left Wing insurgency. The overall level of policing
is better in this region than in the States worst affected
by Maoist mobilisation. The Police-Population ratio [number
of Policemen per 1, 00,000 of Population] in Gujarat is
131, and in Maharashtra, 141, both higher than the national
average of 125 (though well below ratios internationally
regarded as adequate even for peacetime policing).
There is,
nevertheless, an evident residual potential for extremist
mobilisation, and this has been clearly demonstrated by
Hindu right wing mobilisation in the State, and by the
brutality of the Gujarat riots in 2002. There is a vast
pool of grievances which extremists, both of the Right
and of the Left, can harness. A sizeable population has
been displaced as a result of development projects such
as dams, highways, Special Economic Zones (SEZs), mining,
etc., across the targeted region. Significantly, there
is a large migrant worker population from Maoist affected
States like Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, West Bengal, Chhattisgarh
and Andhra Pradesh. The gulf between the ‘haves’ and ‘have-nots’
is considerable.
The Maoists
are clearly aware that existing and evolving developmental
friction and the inequities and inequalities of the emerging
order can translate excellent opportunities for mobilisation
in their favour. The Maoist intent is to "mobilize
the broadest possible sections", and such an objective
is not pursued only through mobilisation of armed cadres,
but would also "utilise all possible open and legal
opportunities for work", building "broad mass
organisations" to help the Party "have wide
contact with the masses, so that it can work under cover
for a long time and accumulate strength". At the
same time, a secret underground structure for violent
action is being developed, within a long-term ‘protracted
war’ framework. The Maoist network, consequently, comprises
both ‘secret’ and ‘open revolutionary mass organisations’.
A range of ‘legal and democratic’ fronts join hands with
a United Front that establishes linkages with ‘like-minded
organisations’ to take the movement forward.
The Maoist
strategy is insidious, deeply corrosive, and is rarely
confronted by the State in its initial, non-violent phases.
Indeed, the record in most badly affected States has been
one of denial even after significant Maoist violence has
been initiated. Nipping the budding Maoist mobilisation
will, of course, present the Gujarat Police with a range
of legal challenges within the Indian system. It is, nevertheless,
the most efficient and humane method to prevent the transition
to a more violent phase, which would then require even
greater use of Force to suppress. The State Police has
done well to initiate a vigorous response at the present,
incipient stage of the Maoist movement in Gujarat. India
can ill-afford another ‘Red Corridor’, this time, across
its flourishing Western belt.
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Weekly
Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
March 22-28,
2010
|
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist/Insurgent
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
2
|
0
|
1
|
3
|
Jammu
and Kashmir
|
0
|
0
|
13
|
13
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Meghalaya
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
|
Bihar
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Chhattisgarh
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Jharkhand
|
5
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
Maharshtra
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Orissa
|
1
|
4
|
0
|
5
|
West
Bengal
|
5
|
0
|
5
|
10
|
Total
(INDIA)
|
17
|
4
|
27
|
48
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
FATA
|
3
|
5
|
166
|
174
|
NWFP
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
Total
(PAKISTAN)
|
6
|
5
|
169
|
180
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
INDIA
90 Maoists
killed in Chhattisgarh till February 2010: Chhattisgarh
Home Minister Nankiram Kanwar on March 25 said in the State
Legislative Assembly that as many as 90 Maoists were killed
and 12 of their terror camps were destroyed till February 27
this year in the State's Bastar region under Operation Green
Hunt."
Economic Times, March 26, 2010.
219 Kashmiri
Pandits killed by militants since 1989, says Jammu and Kashmir
Revenue Minister Raman Bhalla:
The Jammu and Kashmir Government on March 23 said 219 Kashmiri
Pandits were killed by militants since 1989, while 24,202 Kashniri
Pandit families were among the total of 38,119 families that
migrated out of the Valley due to turmoil. Revenue Minister
Raman Bhalla told the Legislative Assembly that from 2004, no
killing of any person from the community [Kashmiri Pandits]
had taken place. He disclosed that 808 Pandit families, consisting
of 3,445 people, were still living in the Valley.
The
Hindu, March 24, 2010.
Intercepts
reveal LeT plan to target Indian interests in Afghanistan: Several
satellite phone conversations intercepted by Indian agencies
in the past few months indicate that Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) is
now deeply involved in attempts to drive India out of Afghanistan.
"Unlike earlier, apart from Pashto, many of these recent intercepts
have been in Urdu. These were taken up with US agencies and
they later authenticated them," said an official source, adding
that, through the intercepts, India has been able to confirm
at least five meetings since September 2009, in which plans
to attack Indians in Afghanistan were discussed. The location
of the satellite phone in most of these conversations was established
in areas adjoining the Kunar province along the Afghanistan-Pakistan
border. Kunar is the place where LeT was first formed in the
early 1990s. The intercepts also revealed that ISI officials
were in constant touch with not just LeT but also other groups,
to carry out attacks against Indians and Indian establishments
in Afghanistan.
Times of india, March 27, 2010.
400 militants
waiting to infiltrate in Jammu and Kashmir: About
400 militants were waiting to cross over to this (Indian) side
of the Line of Control (LoC) and nearly 300 militants were active
in the Kashmir Valley, said Brigadier Gurmeet Singh, Brigadier
General Staff, 15 Corps, on March 28. "According to the Intelligence
available with us, there are 42 training camps across the LoC
and 34 of these are active. There are 20 launch pads opposite
our Corps zone, where around 400 militants are waiting to infiltrate,"
he said. He added that the militants were using GPS and satellite
phones, as they do not trust local guides anymore.
Meanwhile,
Pakistan-based terror outfit Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) has issued
a warning in Kashmir, telling residents to stop helping defence
forces or face death. In its latest diktat, the LeT has put
up posters in the Doda District of Kashmir, warning locals that
all who either serve in the Para-military Forces or the Police
Force will be killed. It also waned that, in the coming days,
the group will target Special Police Officers.
Times of India, March 27, 2010.
Capacity of
terrorists to strike India is very high, says Union Home Minister
P. Chidambaram: The
Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram, on March 27, said
the capacity of terrorists operating from across the border,
to strike places in India was high, as they get support from
the (Pakistani) state. At the same time, he said, Indian security
forces have the capacity to give a "swift and decisive" response
to any terror attack targeted against the country. "The challenge
before security is that the source of the terror lies across
our border and they have the support of the state and therefore
their capacity to reach here and strike is very high," he said.
Chidambaram said that cities in India were as vulnerable to
terror as those in other parts of the world. "
Chidambaram
listed Maoist violence as one of the grave challenges facing
the country and assured the gathering that the Government would
free areas held by Naxals in the next three years. "Within two-three
years, we will be able to free these areas from Naxals," he
said.
Times of India, March 27, 2010.
LeT expanding
to other South Asian nations, said top US military official:
Pakistan-based
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), predominately a threat to India, is fast
expanding operations to other South Asian countries including
Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Maldives, said Admiral Robert
Willard, Commander of the US Pacific Command, in his testimony
before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 27. "Right
now our concern is the movement of Lashkar-e Toiba, the terrorist
group that emanates from Pakistan that was responsible for the
Mumbai attacks in India, and specifically their positioning
in Bangladesh and Nepal, the Maldives and Sri Lanka," Willard
said, in response to a question from Senator George Lemieux.
Times of India, March 27, 2010.
Headley names
more Pakistani Army officers in Karachi Project: The
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operative David Coleman Headley identified
five or six serving officers of the Pakistan Army among the
leaders of the Karachi Project, which seeks to organize attacks
on India through fugitive Indian jihadis being sheltered
in Karachi by the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)-LeT combine.
Sources said that, besides serving Majors Samir Ali and Iqbal
of Pakistan Army, Headley has told his Federal Bureau of Investigation
handlers about the role of one Colonel Shah and at least two
other officers of the Pakistan Army in the Karachi Project.
The role of two serving officers of the Pakistan Army, Majors
Samir Ali and Iqbal, in the Karachi Project, was reportedly
mentioned in the dossier that was submitted to visiting Pakistani
Foreign Secretary Salman Bashir in New Delhi on February 25.
Times of India, March 27, 2010.
PAKISTAN
166 militants
and five Security Force personnel among 174 persons killed during
the week in FATA: At
least 17 Taliban militants were killed in air strikes and clashes
with Security Forces (SFs) in Orakzai Agency of Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA) on March 28.
Air
strikes killed around 16 Taliban militants in the on going Operation
Khwakh Ba De Sham (I will see you) in the Orakzai Agency
of FATA on March 27. In addition, a US missile strike in North
Waziristan killed four militants in a suspected al Qaeda and
Taliban hideout.
At
least 31 Taliban militants and five soldiers, including a lieutenant
colonel, were killed in fighting and air strikes in the Orakzai
Agency on March 26.
At
least 66 Taliban militants were killed in air strikes in Taliban
strongholds of Ghaljo and Mamuzai areas of Orakzai Agency on
March 25.
The
SFs killed at least 21 Taliban militants in Ajani area of Lower
Orakzai Agency on March 24.
The
missiles fired from US drones killed at least six militants
in the suburbs of Miranshah in North Waziristan Agency on March
23.
The
SFs killed five Taliban militants in the Anjani area of Orakzai
Agency. The SFs targeted Taliban hideouts with heavy artillery,
killing at least five Taliban militants and injuring three others.
Dawn;
Daily
Times; The
News, March 22-29, 2010.
823 militants
killed during Operation Rah-e-Nijat, says Interior Minister
Rehman Malik: Pakistani-American
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) operative David Coleman Headley, accused
of plotting the November 26, 2008 (also known as 26/11) Mumbai
terrorist attacks and conspiring to target a Danish newspaper,
pleaded guilty before a US court in Chicago on March 18. Headley
told US District Judge Harry Leinenweber that he wanted to change
his plea to guilty, in an apparent bid to get a lighter sentence
than the maximum death penalty. Headley reportedly charged on
12 counts, admitted he was guilty of all of them.
Dawn,
March 27, 2010.
Pakistan continues
to support some terrorist outfits, says US official: Pakistan
continued to support some militant outfits that operate in Afghanistan,
a top US intelligence official said on March 24. "Islamabad
has demonstrated determination and persistence in combating
militants it perceives dangerous to Pakistan's interests, but
it also has provided some support to other Pakistan-based outfits
that operate in Afghanistan," said Mathew Burrows, Counsellor
and Director of the Analysis and Production Staff at the National
Intelligence Council.
Times of India, March 25, 2010.
Mullah Omar
names new deputies: Taliban
leader Mullah Mohammad Omar, on March 23 appointed two of his
top Taliban ‘commanders’ from the south to replace his former
‘deputy’ Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, who was arrested by Pakistani
forces in Karachi on February 18. Abu Zabihullah, a senior Taliban
operative, said that Abdul Qayyum Zakir, a former Guantánamo
Bay inmate, and Akhtar Mohammad Mansoor, replaced Baradar. Their
appointments, Zabihullah said, are meant, "to convey a
good message that, despite our leader’s arrest, the Taliban
is back to business-as-usual operations without a problem".
Daily Times, March 24, 2010.
SRI LANKA
TNA highlights
Sinhalese influx into North: Tamil
National Alliance (TNA) highlighted the "dangers"
arising from the post-war influx of Sinhalese into the predominantly
Tamil Jaffna peninsula and the Wanni by drawing attention to
the construction of permanent Sri Lankan Army camps in the region.
Parliamentarian Suresh Premachandran, who is contesting the
April 8 General Election from Jaffna District, said that the
construction of permanent camps meant the transformation of
the existing camps into family stations, which in turn would
mean a great increase in the population of the Sinhalese. This
fear stems from the fact that the Sri Lankan Army is almost
exclusively Sinhalese.
Express
Buzz, March 25, 2010.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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