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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 8, No. 46, May 24, 2010
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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CI Strategies:
Garbage In, Garbage Out
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management
For all
its strutting about as an emerging Great Power India
is increasingly perceived as a "flailing state"
–floundering, uncoordinated, elephantine, inept. If
any further evidence was needed, it has been amply provided
in the past weeks since the Chintalnar
massacre of April 6, 2010. The boastful
incoherence of the Centre’s anti-Maoist ‘strategies’
has been entirely dispersed, subsiding, instead, into
what one Opposition leader described as a posture of
‘injured martyrdom’.
Unsurprisingly,
pure cacophony has followed once again after the most
recent major Maoist
outrage, the killing of 44 persons – 16 Security Forces
(SF) personnel and 28 civilians – at Chingavaram in
the Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh, on May 17, 2010.
Carrion feeders in the ruling United Progressive Alliance
(UPA) now circle around the increasingly hapless Union
Home Minister, P. Chidambaram, even as the Opposition
brings out its knives. That none of the nation’s luminaries
has a single constructive idea to offer, beyond the
vacuous slogans – ‘developmental solution’ and ‘political
solution’, ‘two-pronged’ and ‘multi-pronged’ approaches
– while others scream for the deployment of the Army
and the Air Force, can only consolidate the reputation
for articulate incompetence that the best and the brightest
in India’s Parliament, Government and ‘civil society’
have rightly acquired.
While
the media and the political establishment bring a hysterical
focus on the Maoists and the state’s sorry ‘strategies’
only in the wake of the most dramatic incidents, the
reality of Maoist violence has been altogether relentless.
468 persons have already been killed in Maoist violence
this year (ICM data till May 23, 2010), including 167
SF personnel and 193 civilians. The year has already
witnessed 22 major incidents (each accounting for three
or more fatalities). Seven of these have recorded fatalities
in the double digits:
May 17
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The
CPI-Maoist cadres killed 44 persons (16 SF personnel
and 28 civilians) when they blew up a bus by triggering
an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) on a black-top
road at Chingavaram near Sukma in Dantewada District
of Chhattisgarh. Four civilians and two Special
Police Officers (SPOs) were also injured. There
were around 32 civilians and 18 SPOs in the bus.
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May 8
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The
combined forces of Orissa Police’s Special Operations
Group, Andhra Pradesh’s Greyhounds and the Border
Security Force (BSF) killed at least 10 cadres
of the CPI-Maoist in the Gumandi forest near Podapadar
village under Narayanpatna Police Station area
in Koraput District.
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April 6
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75 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) personnel
and one State Policeman were killed in an attack
by the CPI-Maoist in Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh.
The incident took place near Chintalnad -Tarmetla
village in the District when a CRPF patrol party
was returning from a road opening duty in the
Naxalite-infested Mukrana forest between 6 to
7 am. The team had been camping in interiors of
Tarmetla forest for the last three days as part
of a combing operation.
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April
4
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Eleven
personnel of the anti-Maoist Special Operation
Group (SOG) were killed and eight others were
seriously injured when cadres of the CPI-Maoist
triggered a landmine blast targeting a mini bus
carrying the SOG personnel at Tanginiguda on the
Govindpalli ghat road in Koraput District of Orissa.
Sources said a brief exchange of fire took place
between the SOG personnel and the Maoists near
the blast site. Reports said there were 19 persons
in the vehicle. The SOG personnel were on a mission
to sanitise the Maoist-prone Govindpalli ghat
road so that Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF)
personnel camping at Govindpalli in Malkangiri
District could move from there to Koraput.
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February 17
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At
least 12 villagers, including three women and
one child, were killed when nearly 150 heavily-armed
cadres of the CPI-Maoist attacked Phulwariya village
in Jamui District of Bihar. Four of a family was
charred to death while others were shot dead.
Those killed were Kora tribals and the attack
was in retaliation of the alleged killing of eight
Maoists by the Koras on January 31 at the instigation
of one Lakhan Kora, suspected by the Maoists of
being a Police informer. The Maoists triggered
explosions and also set 30 houses ablaze. The
whereabouts of Lakhan are not known. While the
Police say he survived the attack, this could
not be confirmed from local sources.
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February 15
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At
least 24 SF personnel, mostly belonging to the
Eastern Frontier Rifles were killed and several
others injured when a large group of CPI-Maoist
cadres attacked a SF camp at Silda in West Midnapore,
West Bengal. The Maoists triggered several blasts
before opening fire on the SF personnel. Before
leaving, the Maoists looted firearms and set the
camp ablaze. One civilian died of splinter injury
the next day taking the death toll in the incident
to 25.
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January 19
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13
CPI-Maoist cadres and one Salwa Judum (anti-Maoist
vigilante group) activist were killed in a firing
between Maoists and the Police in the dense Pareshgadh
forest area, near Andhra Pradesh border, of Bijapur
District in Chhattisgarh.
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This
follows on at least 998 fatalities in 2009 (392 civilians,
312 SF personnel and 294 Maoists), and including at
least 88 major incidents.
It is
evidently a complete waste of time to go over the contours
of a strategic response to the Maoist challenge in India.
This has been written about ad nauseam, in SAIR
and a wide range of other publications. The counter-insurgency
and counter-terrorism (CI-CT) successes of Punjab, Tripura
and Andhra Pradesh are all the models anyone could conceivably
need – if the intellectual honesty, competence and due
diligence to study these could, in fact, be tapped within
the security policy establishment. It obviously cannot
be. It is, consequently, far more productive to document
elements of the utter imbecility of the discourse on
the subject.
After
the Chintalnar incident Home Minister Chidambaram had
observed in Parliament, "If this tragedy is not a wake-up
call, then nothing can wake-up this country and this
Parliament." Just days later, he was challenged by his
own senior party leadership, through Digvijay Singh,
for his "intellectual arrogance", for treating
the Naxalite problem as a "purely law and order
issue" and for "failing to take into consideration
the issues that affect the tribals". Reflecting
a high measure of paternalistic contempt for a leadership
that has remained committed to its cause, in some cases,
for over half a century, Digvijay Singh went to describe
the Maoists as "misguided ideologues". Having
presided over one of India’s most backward and benighted
States, Madhya Pradesh, as Chief Minister for two complete
tenures, Digvijay Singh advocates ‘development’ as a
panacea to neutralize the Maoists. His colleague, Mani
Shankar Aiyar, declares him "one lakh per cent
right" in his criticism of Chidambaram.
Among
those brave souls who are setting out to ‘develop’ the
dark recesses of Abujhmadh, or of the Bastar Division,
the very heart of the Maoist insurgency, or those who
have proclaimed their intention to ‘clear, hold and
develop’ these areas, there is none who can explain
why the six Districts of Chhattisgarh which are categorized
"marginally affected" and the four, categorized
"not affected" by Maoist activities remain
backward and destitute. If the Chhattisgarh State Government,
or the mighty Indian
State, can, in fact, develop, or
‘seize, hold and develop’, the unconnected, uncharted
jungles of the Bastar Division, what prevents them from
bringing prosperity, justice and good governance to
the territories well within their control?
It is
significant, here, that Prime Minister Manmohan Singh
first drew attention to the enormity of the threat of
Left Wing Extremism as far back as in November 2004,
and has since repeatedly warned that this is now the
single greatest threat to the country’s security. Yet,
nearly six years later, there is no coherence in national
threat assessment and no consensus on response. Indeed,
in all these years, the Prime Minister has not even
been able to secure a consensus on this issue within
his Cabinet – though, fortunately, the embarrassing
public contradictions by his own Home Minister have
become a thing of the past since Shivraj Patil’s departure.
India
and her Parliament are not asleep. They are simply confused
and deluded. The strategic and tactical discourse has
been carried out, overwhelmingly, at a wishful plane,
entirely divorced from the realities of the ground.
The most powerful arguments advanced are not for consistent
and effective response, but in favour of inaction, vacillation
and perpetual deferral.
One leading
intellectual, for instance, proposes the thesis of the
‘bell curve of insurgencies’, and insists that "There
is no reason why the Maoist insurgency will not follow
that same pattern." In other words, it is ‘natural’
that violence will escalate to a point, but then it
will, equally naturally, and irrespective of state responses,
wither away. The strategic lesson, apparently, is that,
whatever we may choose – and the spectrum of choice
includes doing nothing – the outcome will remain quite
the same. Moreover, since it is not the children of
the elites who are dying in the rising trajectory of
the ‘bell curve’, one may assume that the mounting loss
of life imposes no significant moral obligation on the
state and its leadership. [Such sanguinity of perspective
was notably absent in media commentary in the aftermath
of the Mumbai attacks (26/11), when the wealthy died
at the Taj and Oberoi-Trident].
What
is missed in all this passionate promotion of paralysis
is that, from the localized insurgencies of the past,
India has now come to a stage where nearly half the
country is afflicted, in different measure, by chronic
conflict variables. 223 Districts, according to the
Home Minister’s 2009 estimate, are affected, in various
degrees, by Maoist activities; another 20 Districts
by the Pakistan-backed proxy war in Jammu & Kashmir;
and some 67 Districts by the multiple insurgencies that
trouble India’s Northeast. That adds up to 310 Districts
out of a total of 636. In addition, terrorist attacks
have targeted urban centres across the length and breadth
of the country. Though individual movements may rise
and fall, evidently, there is no ‘bell curve’ here –
rather, a steadily rising trajectory of disorders.
Another
widely articulated sentiment is the contention that
rising Maoist violence and mass killings are ‘acts of
desperation’. Attempts have been made to reinforce this
position by a number of media plants suggesting that
the Maoists are on the verge of a split because of ‘ideological
differences’ and wrangles over jurisdiction and the
sharing of booty. The unsettling reality is, the dramatic
Maoist attacks witnessed over the past months are far
from the ‘acts of desperation’ the more vacuous among
our political leaders would have us believe. These are
manifestations of the strategic confidence and tactical
capability of the rebels, on the one hand, and of strategic
and operational infirmity of the state’s Forces, on
the other. As the Maoists expand and consolidate areas
of activity and influence, these attacks will become
more frequent and lethal, pushing the already over-extended
capacities of the security establishment towards a breaking
point.
In the
wake of the Chintalnar incident, the Home Minister informed
India’s Parliament – and through it, the nation – that
he was "not afraid of the Maoists". [For different
reasons, neither, frankly, am I; Chidambaram is extraordinarily
well protected; I doubt if the Maoists will waste a
bullet on me.] But ask the CPMF companies flung about
randomly into the dense jungles of the Maoist heartlands;
ask the ill-equipped, ill-trained Policemen, huddled
in unprotected Police Stations and Posts, wondering,
each moment of each day, whether it is their turn to
be overrun; ask the tiny contingents that are sent out
for ‘area domination’ into territories they know little
or nothing of, and whose ends they cannot imagine, leave
alone dominate; and the answer you will uniformly get
is, yes, we are afraid; very afraid.
And that
is what matters. The Policeman, today, is marked out
by his uniform, not as a symbol of the state’s authority,
or as an agent of its power, but a hapless and preferred
target of Maoist violence. When he is killed, this is
not because a necessary ‘cost of war’ is to be rendered;
it is, more often than not, a life simply thrown away
to strategic and tactical stupidity. There is, as has
repeatedly been noted, no calculus of victory here;
only empty posturing and irresponsible individual ambition.
Who are
these people who call themselves the state’s strategists?
Who holds them to account? How are the same cycles of
operational failure repeated again and again without
correctives? How can the same vacuous, failed, rhetoric
exhaust the policy discourse for endless years and decades?
The core
of India’s problems is simple dishonesty, falsification,
dereliction. How can there be a consensus on assessments
and strategies when the first response to stress is
a fudging of facts? Take, for example, data on Maoist-related
fatalities. According to Institute for Conflict Management
data, based on open source monitoring, there had been
at least 998 Maoist-related fatalities in 2009. Past
records have shown that ICM figures on fatalities are
consistently lower than eventually disclosed official
data – and this is to be expected; open source coverage
is not as comprehensive, and most frequently misses
out a number of secondary fatalities (the injured who
die, often days after recorded incidents, in hospital).
The MHA’s January 2010 ‘monthly report card’ noted 1,125
Maoist related fatalities in 2009; and this would be
consistent with expectations. Surprisingly, however,
MHA’s Annual Report 2009-10 inexplicably brings this
figure down to 908!
Again,
speaking at the All India Conference of Directors and
Inspectors General of Police at Delhi on September 16,
2009, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh indicated that the
Police-population ratio for the country was 145 per
100,000. This is a figure that has been rattling around
since a report of the Bureau of Police Research &
Development (BPR&D: Data on Police Organisations
in India) was published in June 2006, and is selectively
projected whenever the Government wants to demonstrate
its ‘achievements’. The far more reliable annual compendium,
Crime in India, published by the National Crime
Records Bureau is given the go-by. NCRB’s latest report,
Crime in India – 2008, however, records that
the Police-population ratio for the whole country stands
at just 128 per 100,000, marginally up from 125 per
100,000 in 2007. The MHA may, of course, have even more
recent data, but it is improbable, given the numbers
of recruitments known, that a single year could have
pushed the ratio up from 128 to 145. Significantly,
BPR&D data for 2007 claims a Police-population ratio
of 153 per 100,000.
How can
two departments of the same MHA fail to reconcile their
data on so fundamental an index? Who is feeding falsehoods
and fabricated figures to the highest offices of the
land? How can a country not even get its basic statistics
right?
Another
aspect of the current crisis is the Centre’s own postures.
In this, Chidambaram has, for the past year, simply
been setting himself up for a fall, projecting the MHA
as the core respondent to the challenge of Naxalism,
and providing an alibi to the State’s to abdicate responsibility.
Inevitably, as disaster strikes – again and again –
the MHA now finds itself isolated and blamed for every
failure, and sets about complaining about an ‘incomplete
mandate’. The reality is, it is the States that will
have to take up their constitutional responsibility
for law and order management, and not the MHA that is
to be conferred a ‘wider mandate’. It was State Governments,
within the existing constitutional, administrative and
policing provisions, in Punjab, Tripura and Andhra Pradesh,
who defeated raging insurgencies. There is no reason,
other than the failure of will and intellect, why this
cannot be done in current theatres of Maoist depredation.
The Centre’s role is to support the efforts of the States,
and must so remain.
Then
again, the MHA has apparently gone cross-eyed with frustration.
Confronted with the shambles of their ‘clear, hold and
develop’ and ‘area domination’ strategies, and their
‘massive coordinated operations’ across the worst Maoist
afflicted States, the mandarins at North Block appear
to be "looking left, shooting right". As ‘civil
rights activists’ invent the oxymoron "Gandhians
with guns" to describe the Maoists, and with Maoist
depredations escalating, the Home Minister declared
that civil rights groups were "getting in the way
of the state’s efforts to contain the rebels."
His Ministry, noting that "Some Maoist leaders
have been directly contacting certain NGOs/intellectuals
to propagate their ideology," warned that supporters
of the ‘Maoist ideology’ could face up to 10 years in
prison.
There
is, of course, a very real problem here. The Maoists
set up front organizations deliberately intended to
exploit the interstices of democratic freedoms and rights
to undermine the State, and also exploit a range of
‘useful idiots’ – and there are many eager innocents
available – to propagate their cause. Where there is
clear evidence of criminal collusion or of incitement
to offence, the state must, of course, launch strong,
evidence-based prosecutions – not the embarrassing legal
travesties that have marked some actions against ‘sympathisers’
in the past. If, however, mere advocacy is now to be
punished, consistent application of this policy may
well require the Home Minister to send at least some
of his own Cabinet and Party colleagues to jail. There
is, moreover, something farcical here, as if the state,
unable to beat the opposing team in the field, decides
to vent its ire against their cheerleaders – hardly
the most sagacious course of action in any contest.
The Prime
Minister, on May 24, 2010, once again reiterated his
Government’s determination "to squarely tackle
the threat of terrorism and ideological extremism",
and claimed that he had "on earlier occasions outlined
our approach to tackling Naxalism." There is, however,
simply too much garbage in the policy discourse today
for any coherent CI policy or strategy to be shaped
or implemented. In such an environment, escalating operations
and thoughtless deployments will only result in augmenting
fatalities, particularly among the SFs. The mere claim
to an "approach to tackling Naxalism" can
no longer pass muster. If effective CI policies and
strategies are to be designed within the currently degraded
system of institutions and capacities at the Centre
and in the States, India’s leaders will have to discover
a far greater clarity of assessment, purpose and intent
than is currently evident.
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Weekly
Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
May 17-23,
2010
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
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Total
|
Bangladesh
|
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
INDIA
|
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
5
|
Jammu and
Kashmir
|
1
|
3
|
5
|
9
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
|
Bihar
|
7
|
0
|
0
|
7
|
Chhattisgarh
|
28
|
16
|
1
|
45
|
Jharkhand
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
West Bengal
|
7
|
5
|
0
|
12
|
Total
(INDIA)
|
44
|
24
|
12
|
80
|
NEPAL
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
Balochistan
|
5
|
0
|
0
|
5
|
FATA
|
4
|
5
|
229
|
238
|
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
|
13
|
3
|
10
|
26
|
Sindh
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total
(PAKISTAN)
|
23
|
8
|
239
|
270
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Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
44
persons including 16 SPOs killed by
Maoists in Chhattisgarh:
The
Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)
cadres killed 44 persons, including
28 civilians and 16 Special Police
Officers (SPOs), when they blew up
a bus by triggering an Improvised
Explosive Device (IED) on a black-top
road at Chingavaram near Sukma in
the Dantewada District of Chhattisgarh
on May 17. Four civilians and two
SPOs were also injured. There were
around 32 civilians and 18 SPOs in
the bus.
Times
of India,
May 18, 2010.
Pro-Maoist
groups under close watch of MHA:
There
are at least 57 front organisations
of the Communist Party of India-Maoist
(CPI-Maoist) and they are under constant
vigil of intelligence agencies. A
circular by the Union Ministry of
Home Affairs (MHA) alerts heads of
para-military forces and Police in
Maoist-affected States that the CPI-Maoist
has 57 "front bodies" of peasants,
labourers, women, students, tribals
and trade unions who have helped the
them raise the level of their tactical
warfare, including winning court battles
and getting their arrested leaders
released.
Indo-Asian
News Service,
May 18, 2010.
Need
to revisit anti-Naxal strategy, says
Union Home Minister P. Chidambaram:
Union
Home Minister P. Chidambaram on May
17 said that there was a need to revisit
the anti-Naxal (Left wing Extremism)
strategy in the light of the fact
that four States want use of air power
against the LWE.
PTI
News, May
18, 2010.
Maoists
reject fresh offer for talks by Union
Home Minister P. Chidambaram: South
Bastar regional committee secretary
of the Communist Party of India-Maoist
(CPI-Maoist) Ravula Srinivas alias
Ramanna on May 18 rejected the fresh
offer for talks by Union Home Minister
P. Chidambaram. Earlier in the day,
the Home Minister said that India
is willing to begin peace talks with
Maoists, but only if the insurgents
halt all attacks for 72 hours. The
Government would then convene talks
with the insurgents, he added.
The
Hindu, May
19, 2010.
Militants
slip into Jammu and Kashmir through
LoC, say intelligence sources: Intelligence
inputs suggest that some top Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT) militants, including top militant
Furqan, have sneaked into Kashmir
Valley infiltrating the Line of Control
(LoC). Sources in the State Home Department
have said the inputs of wireless intercepts
suggested that Furqan, whose actual
name was not known, had infiltrated
into the Valley to muster support
among the local population and to
streamline the operations of the terror
outfit. Besides Furqan, five other
top LeT militants were also among
them, the sources said.
PTI
News, May
20, 2010.
Mining
industry funding Naxal movement, says
Maharashtra Home Minister R. R. Patil:
Maharashtra
State Home Minister R. R. Patil on
May 20 claimed that the Naxal (Left
Wing Extremist) movement is being
funded by a section of the cash-rich
mining industry. Talking to the media
in Mumbai the Minister suggested that
the Directorate of Revenue Intelligence
(DRI) should find out details like
the source of funding of these companies
doing work in Naxal-hit areas.
Times
of India,
May 21, 2010.
Maoists
threaten to blow Rail Bhawan in Delhi:
The
Railway Headquarter in New Delhi has
received a letter on May 19 purportedly
written by the Communist Party of
India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) threatening
to blow up Rail Bhawan along with
some other vital railway establishments
in Delhi like Baroda House..
PTI
News, May
21, 2010.
10,000
new towers to strengthen communication
in militancy and Naxalism-affected
States: The
Union Ministry for Information Technology
(IT) and Communications has decided
to install 10,000 new mobile phone
towers to strengthen the Bharat Sanchar
Nigam Limited’s (BSNL) communication
system in the country, including Jammu
and Kashmir, mainly in the areas affected
by militancy and Naxalism (Left Wing
Extremism). The new towers would strengthen
Security Forces network and will prepare
them better to take on the threat
of militants and Naxalites.
Daily
Excelsior,
May 22, 2010.
PAKISTAN
229
militants and five SFs among 238 persons
killed during the week in FATA: At
least 71 Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan, TTP) militants, including
four ‘commanders’, were killed when
Pakistan Air Force (PAF) jet fighters
bombed targets in upper parts of Orakzai
Agency in Federally Administrated
Tribal Areas (FATA) during Operation
Khwakh Ba De Sham (I will see
you) on May 23.
The
Security Forces (SFs) backed by fighter
jets killed at least 34 Taliban (TTP)
militants in the on going Operation
Khwakh Ba De Sham in various
parts of Orakzai Agency on May 21.
In addition, a US drone attack on
a militant compound killed six Taliban
(TTP) militants in Miranshah, the
capital of North Waziristan Agency.
At
least 24 Taliban (TTP) militants were
killed and 29 others injured when
PAF fighter jets bombed different
parts of Orakzai Agency on May 20
in the on going Operation Khwakh
Ba De Sham.
At
least 60 Taliban (TTP) militants and
four soldiers were killed in a clash
between the Taliban (TTP) and SFs
during Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham
in Dabori area of Orakzai Agency on
May 19. Also, the jet fighters bombed
Taliban (TTP) militant hideouts in
Dabori area, killing five Taliban
(TTP) militants and injuring several
others.
Six
Taliban (TTP) militants were killed
and 10 others injured in a clash with
SFs during Operation Khwakh Ba
De Sham in Kol area of Dabori
tehsil (revenue unit) in Orakzai
Agency on May 18.
At
least 26 Taliban (TTP) and a soldier
were killed in a clash between SFs
and the Taliban (TTP) militants during
Operation Khwakh Ba De Sham
in Orakzai Agency on May 17.
Six
Taliban (TTP) militants were killed
and seven others injured in a clash
with SFs in Shoti area of Upper Orakzai.
Dawn;
Daily
Times; The
News, May
17-23, 2010.
13
civilians and 10 militants among 26
persons killed during the week in
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: At
least three Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan, TTP) militants were killed
and others injured during a clash
with Security Forces (SFs) in Gangro
and Gambat areas of Maidan tehsil
(revenue unit) of the Lower Dir District
on May 23.
Three
Taliban (TTP) militants, identified
as Alam Sher, Khan Wali and Muhammad
Ameen, were killed during a clash
with the SFs in the Matta tehsil
of Swat District on May 21.
Four
suspected TTP militants were killed
and seven houses destroyed during
an encounter with the SFs in Amakhel
village of Tank District on May 19.
A
remote-controlled bomb targeting a
Police patrol killed 13 persons, including
Kullachi Deputy Superintendent of
Police Muhammad Iqbal, his gunman
and driver, in Kachi Paind Khel area
of Dera Ismail Khan on May 18. The
TTP claimed responsibility for the
attack. Dawn;
Daily
Times; The
News, May
17-23, 2010.
Pakistani
Army Major arrested for links to New
York bomb plot, indicates report:
A Pakistani Army Major has been arrested
in connection with the May 1 failed
bomb plot in New York’s Times Square.
Daily
Times, May
19, 2010.
Agencies
warn of TTP plans to attack Parliament
House: Intelligence
agencies, on May 18, warned that the
Tehreek-e-Taliban (TTP) militants
have recruited a suicide bomber to
attack the Parliament House or any
other important building. According
to the report, the TTP has prepared
a 24 or 25-year-old bomber named Amer
Aaqa Hadifa, belonging to Jhang in
Punjab for the purpose. Meanwhile,
militant outfits have formed two separate
groups to target senior law enforcement
officials and Shia leaders in Punjab.
Daily
Times, May
19, 2010.
Taliban
trying to overthrow Government in
Islamabad, says US Defence Secretary
Robert Gates: The Taliban (Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan, TTP) is not only trying
to overthrow the Government in Islamabad,
but is also launching attack against
other countries, including the United
States, said the Defence Secretary
Robert Gates.
Times
of India,
May 21, 2010.
LeT
trained Times Square bomber Faisal
Shahzad in PoK, indicate reports:
The
Canada’s weekly current affairs magazine,
Maclean, quoting an unnamed
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) ‘commander’
on May 19 claimed that Faisal Shahzad,
the confessed bomb plotter of Pakistani
origin, had received terror training
in one of the ‘jihad’ (Holy
War) camps of the LeT in Pakistan
occupied Kashmir (PoK). The LeT commander,
however, denied any direct involvement
of his outfit with New York bombing
plot.
Macleans,
May 19, 2010.
Taliban
and Afghanistan Government hold talks
in Maldives: The
representatives of the Taliban and
the Afghanistan Government held talks
in the Maldives, officials said on
May 20. Maldives Government spokesman
Mohamed Zuhair said 15 representatives
of the Afghan Government and seven
Taliban militants met and would meet
again over the weekend. However, a
spokesman for Afghanistan president
Hamid Karzai, Waheed Omar said the
Government did not send any official
representatives. "We do not have any
representation and we do not think
it will be very helpful for the peace
process in Afghanistan," Waheed Omar
said..
Daily
Times, May
21, 2010.
SRI LANKA
LTTE
holds Transnational Government of
Tamil Eelam sessions in US: The
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE) leader Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran
on May 17 disclosed in a press statement
that the Transnational Government
of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) is holding its
inaugural sessions in the city of
Philadelphia in the United States
for three days. Rudrakumaran reportedly
announced the meeting in an e-mail
statement that had been circulated
to e-mail addresses of several Sri
Lankan newspapers..
Colombo
Page, May
18, 2010.
LTTE
sympathisers trying to revive Tamil
separatist movement, says Defence
Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse: Defence
Secretary Gotabhaya Rajapakse on May
20 said that the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) sympathisers
outside the country were trying to
revive the Tamil separatist movement.
Gotabhaya also said that although
the LTTE had not carried out any attacks
since the outfit's leadership was
wiped out in May 2009, the pro-LTTE
lobby abroad was still active. "The
motive of these international groups
remains the same as that of the LTTE,"
he said in a statement marking the
first anniversary of LTTE’s defeat.
Special
Broadcasting Service,
May 21, 2010.
The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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