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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 9, No. 21, November 29, 2010
 
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Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Squandering
the Peace
Shrideep Biswas
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
More
than a year after the decisive defeat of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
the opportunities to deliver a peace dividend to all
citizens, and of striking a dramatic new course to secure
an equitable future for all communities have largely
been lost to a polarized politics and the pursuit of
personal political agendas. Nevertheless, the peace
has held, and at least some of the more urgent aspects
of post-war reconstruction and rehabilitation have been
addressed with a modicum of efficiency.
Significantly,
on May 15, 2010, President Mahinda Rajapakse appointed
an eight member 'Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission’,
headed by former Attorney General Chitta Ranjan de Silva,
examine the events of the period between February 2002
and May 2009. The specific mandate of the Commission
covers the facts and circumstances that led to the failure
of the Cease-Fire Agreement (CFA) operationalized on
February 21, 2002, and the sequence of events that followed
thereafter, up to the end of the war on May 19, 2009;
whether any person, group or institution directly or
indirectly bear responsibility in this regard; the lessons
that can be derived from these events and their attendant
conditions, in order to ensure that there can be no
recurrence; the methodology by which restitution to
any person affected by those events, or their dependents
or heirs could be affected; and the institutional, administrative
and legislative measures that need to be taken in order
to prevent any recurrence in the future and to promote
further national unity and reconciliation among all
communities. The Commission would make recommendations
on these various aspects.
Meanwhile,
residual issues of resettlement of Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs) and the rehabilitation of LTTE cadres
still haunt the Government. By November 6, 2009, the
Government had already re-settled 119,687 IDPs in their
own villages, leaving
exactly 143,534 IDPs to be resettled. By October 25,
2010, according to the Ministry of Resettlement, the
total number of IDPs remaining to be resettled had dropped
to 18,799 with the 17,641 people still in the Vavuniya
relief villages and another 1,158 IDPs remaining in
Jaffna. According to security sources, the remaining
IDPs are to be resettled before the end of 2010, once
the ongoing mine clearing process is completed. The
Government has stressed that it would complete the re-settlement
process on or before January 1, 2010. The Army has deployed
1,050 personnel expedite de-mining process, while over
2,000 de-miners from various non-governmental organizations
(NGOs) were also involved in the process. The Sri Lanka
Army (SLA) reported, on November 28, 2010, that it has
managed to clear over 300,000 mines in the Northern
and Eastern Provinces in the country. Military Spokesman
Major General Ubhaya Medawala told local media that
the Army Field Engineers had so far cleared over 306,000
mines in a land area of 1,863 square kilometres in the
North and East.
While
the resettlement of IDPs is expected to be completed
within a reasonable margin of time around the proposed
deadline, the rehabilitation of former LTTE cadres may
prove somewhat more awkward. At the end of the war,
over 11,000 LTTE cadres had surrendered, and the Government
had promised that they would be rehabilitated ‘soon’.
Less than half of these have, however, been rehabilitated
at this juncture. On October 22, 2010, D.E.W. Gunasekara,
Rehabilitation and Prison Reforms Minister, stated that
the Government had rehabilitated and released some 4,460
former LTTE cadres, including 304 females. The Government
continued to screen refugees in military-run camps for
LTTE militants, as it has remained apprehensive about
the potential threat from diehard remnants of the LTTE.
Significantly,
despite its decimation on the Sri Lankan soil, several
foreign
cells of the LTTE remain active
and are striving desperately to form a ‘transnational
Government’ for the Sri Lanka Tamils. Three broad groups
are now assumed to be controlling the remaining pro-LTTE
international factions: a US group said to be headed
by V. Rudrakumaran; a UK group, controlled by Aruththanthai
Emmanuel of the World Tamil Forum (WTF); and a Norway
group under Perinpanayagam Sivaparan alias Nediyavan.
In the
meanwhile, the incumbent President Mahinda Rajapakse
was elected as the sixth Executive President of the
country by a massive majority of over 1.8 million votes
in the January 26 elections.
Rajapakse polled a total of 6,015,934 votes, as against
his closest rival Sarath Fonseka of the New Democratic
Front (NDF), who polled 4,173,185 votes. Subsequently,
on April 9, 2010, the ruling United Peoples' Freedom
Alliance (UPFA) won a huge majority of nearly two-thirds
in the 14th General
Elections.
The presidential
elections, however, gave rise to a vicious rivalry between
Rajapakse and Fonseka, with the latter, instead of basking
in the deserved glory of his victory over the LTTE,
finding himself in jail after the Sri Lankan Military
Police arrested him from his office on February 8, 2010,
on charges of committing ‘military offences’. Fonseka
was accused of plotting to assassinate the President
and overthrow the Government in a coup. On August 13,
a Court Martial, probing charges that the General dabbled
in politics while in uniform, found him guilty and recommended
a ‘dishonourable discharge from rank.’ On September
17, another Court Martial held Fonseka, guilty on all
four counts in a case related to procurement of arms
in violation of the tender procedures and recommended
that he be jailed for three years. President Rajapaksa
approved the prison sentence given by the second court
martial against Fonseka. Fonseka also lost his seat
in Parliament in accordance with an ordinance which
states that if a member is jailed, he loses his seat
immediately. These actions amounted to nothing less
than a political witch-hunt, initiated by the President
after Fonseka decided to challenge him electorally.
Conspicuously,
after the military victory of May 2009, Rajapakse had
asserted that he could look for a ‘final solution’ on
the Tamil issue only after he had secured a new mandate
as the President, and a 2/3rd majority in
Parliament, which would enable amendments to the Constitution,
which would be vital to implement any significant proposal.
While the Presidential election fulfilled his first
condition, his party’s share in Parliament, combined
with the support of the coalition of Sri Lanka’s Tamil
parties, the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), provides
him the required 2/3rd majority as well.
The final report of the All Party Representatives Committee
(APRC), constituted by President Rajapakse on July 11,
2006, under the Chairmanship of Professor Tissa Vitharana
to formulate a draft proposal for Constitutional reform,
also provides the necessary direction for reform. The
APRC report, submitted on July 19, 2010, includes the
following salient recommendations:
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A
Unitary structure for the Republic with power shared
between the centre and the Provinces. Adoption of
a Parliamentary form of Government at the Centre.
-
Granting
of foremost place to the Buddhist religion.
-
To
accord the status of national language to both Sinhala
and Tamil, while reserving the use of English for
official purposes.
-
Recognition
of supremacy of the Constitution and its protection
by a Constitutional Court.
-
Securing
in-built mechanisms to check secessionist tendencies.
-
A
mixed electoral system, combining features of the
first-past-the-post and proportional representation
systems.
-
A
three-tiered distribution of power (Central, Provincial
and Local Governments).
-
Creation
of a Senate.
-
Creation
of two community councils (One for Indian Tamils
and the other for Sri Lankan Muslims)
-
Creation
of a Higher Appointment Council for State Services
and the Judiciary.
-
Retaining
the substances of articles 82 (5) and 83, which
concern amendments to the Constitution. 82 (5) requires
any amendment of the Constitution to be passed by
two-thirds of all members (including those not present);
while Article 83 provides for approval of certain
bills by a Referendum.
The TNA
has repeatedly expressed its desire to hold discussions
on power sharing with the re-elected President Rajapakse,
declaring that it is not opposed to supporting an ‘acceptable
proposal’ for a ‘lasting solution’ to the ethnic issue.
Apart from the TNA, the Tamil Parties Forum (TPPF) consisting
of 10 anti-LTTE Tamil parties (all of them of moderate
political persuasion and most of them members or supporters
of the Rajapakse administration) have been forwarding
a set of moderate demands, such as improved resettlement
and compensation for war victims, inter alia.
Regrettably,
the Rajapakse Government has so far refrained from displaying
any enthusiasm for these overtures, much to the dismay
of the TNA and TPPF. On November 26, 2010, however,
a 16-member delegation of the TPPF was able to secure
an appointment with the President to discuss aspects
of post-conflict reconciliation.
Rajapakse’s
principal preoccupation in the post-conflict phase,
regrettably, has been the consolidation of his own power,
and the silencing of any voices of opposition in the
country. Unsurprisingly, on September 8, 2010, Parliament
approved the 18th
Amendment to the Constitution, giving
more powers to the President. According to the Amendment,
a President, if elected, can serve any number of terms;
previously a President could serve a maximum of two
six-year terms. The Amendment, further, gives absolute
control and power to the President over appointments
to some of the most important posts in the country,
including several key Commissions and posts such as
the Chief Justice, the Attorney General, the Inspector
General of Police, among others. Meanwhile, the 17th
Amendment to the Constitution, which empowered the Election
Commission to prevent the use of state resources by
candidates or parties during elections, has been repealed.
These Amendments are being interpreted by political
analysts as a move leading to further consolidation
of dynastic rule, and the undermining of democracy in
the Island nation. Shortly thereafter, on November 13,
the ruling United Peoples’ Freedom Alliance (UPFA) Government
appointed a four-member Committee headed by former Prime
Minister Rathnasiri Wickremenayake to formulate the
policy decisions for the next (19th) Amendment
to the Constitution. According to reports, the 19th
Amendment, like the 18th, is expected to
consist of two principal components: the first would
do away with the present proportional representation
(PR) system and replace it with a hybrid of PR and first-past-the-post
systems; the second part would introduce changes to
the 13th
Amendment, and thus to the
provincial council system
There
is also evidence of a continued trend to militarization,
despite the decimation of the threat from the LTTE.
Beginning the first stage of Budget 2011, Prime Minister
D.M. Jayaratne thus presented the Appropriation Bill
in Parliament on October 19, 2010, with highest allocation
to the Defence Ministry, at SLR 215,220 million. In
comparison, SLR 75,250 million has been allocated to
the Economic Development Ministry.
Sri Lanka
continues, moreover, to be haunted by the specter of
war crimes allegations during the final stages of the
conflict with the LTTE, and a sustained international
campaign has been directed against President Rajapakse
and the Sri Lankan Security Forces (SLSFs). On January
7, 2010, a United Nations Human Rights expert claimed
that an execution video depicting alleged execution
of Tamil prisoners by Sri Lankan soldiers was authentic,
and called for an inquiry into possible war crimes during
the final stages of the conflict. On December 13, 2009,
former Army Commander, General Sarath Fonseka, had accused
the Defense Secretary Gothabhya Rajapakse of giving
orders to Major General Shavendra Silva, then-commander
of the 58th Division of the Army operating
in the Northern Province, to kill all the LTTE cadres
wanting to surrender with ‘white flags’. However, on
November 15, 2010, testifying on the controversial 'white
flag' case, General Silva told a court that military
Forces did not shoot at anybody who wanted to surrender.
However, the Doha (Qatar) based international news channel
Al Jazeera, on November 10, 2010, telecast a
report on alleged war crimes committed on Tamil civilians
by the Sri Lankan SFs, renewing international concerns
and pressure. The Rajapakse Government has, however,
out rightly rejected the report, accusing the news channel
of attempting to tarnish the image of country's Army,
but has also rejected all calls for a probe by any international
agency into war crimes allegations and has refused to
allow a United Nations panel of experts entry into Sri
Lanka,
Sri Lanka
continues to operate under a State of Emergency [Parliament
approved the extension of the Emergency by another month
on November 9, 2010] nearly a year and a half after
the end of the conflict, and with no significant incidents
of terrorism or manifest threat to security on its soil.
While the Government’s achievements in rehabilitation
of IDPs, and even of surrendered LTTE cadre, have been
significant, political grievances continue to rankle,
and are, indeed, being compounded by a partisan approach
that seeks, overwhelmingly, nothing more than the consolidation
of the President’s power and support base. Despite a
clear mandate, the President has not brought the country
any closer to the fulfillment of his earlier promise,
and a lasting resolution of the ethnic issue. The President
can, of course, afford to ride roughshod over the political
opposition on the weight of his victories against the
LTTE and in the elections, without fear of violent reaction
in the foreseeable future. Nevertheless, his manifest
reluctance to engage directly with all parties, and
to evolve a political of accommodation and conciliation,
augurs poorly for Sri Lanka’s political future.
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Another Year
Wasted
Anshuman Behera
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
Nepal’s
unending troubles have pushed yet another year into the
void, with a political deadlock blocking out all possibilities
of progress in both Government formation and the critical
drafting of a Constitution. A tiny glimmer of light, however,
can be extracted from the fact that, despite the continuous
and often abrasive political confrontations, the country
has remained relatively free of major acts of violence.
Total militancy-related
fatalities, according South Asia Terrorism Portal
(SATP data), have continued their declining trend, with
35 deaths recorded in 2010 (all data till November 28,
2010), as against 50 through 2009, and 480 in the last
phase of the Maoist ‘people’s war’ in 2006, before a peace
deal was hammered out with the Seven Party Alliance (SPA)
after the collapse of the monarchy. Civilian fatalities
have seen a dramatic fall, from 35 in 2009 to 12 in 2010,
while militant deaths have risen from 14 to 22.
Nepal
Fatalities: 2009-10*
|
Years
|
Civilians
|
SFs
|
Militants/
Terrorists
|
Total
|
|
2010*
|
12
|
1
|
22
|
35
|
|
2009
|
35
|
1
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14
|
50
|
|
2008
|
55
|
1
|
25
|
81
|
|
2007
|
59
|
0
|
40
|
99
|
|
2006
|
61
|
181
|
238
|
480
|
Source:
SATP
*Data till November 28
Significantly,
of the 12 civilians killed, the Unified Communist Party
of Nepal – Maoist (UCPN-M)
was responsible for just two deaths. The remaining 10
were killed by Madhesh-based extremist formations, principally
the Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha – Jwala Singh faction
(JTMM-J).
Of the 22 militants killed, as many as 14 were from the
UCPN-M, another two from its youth wing, the Young Communist
League, five from JTMM-J, and one ‘unidentified’. Significantly,
in a departure from previous years, most of the extremist
killings have been in factional or party rivalries. 10
UCPN-M cadres were killed by Madhesh-based terrorist groups
such as JTMM-J and Sayunkta Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha
(SJTMM), and another four by unidentified assailants.
The Maoists,
who spearheaded the violent political turmoil in the country
for a decade (1996-2006), are evidently no longer actively
engaging in armed violence, and the consequent vacuum
has created spaces for fringe Madheshi groups to consolidate
their power through localized campaigns of intimidation
and murder.
The Maoist
role in the country’s unrelenting political logjam, however,
remains central. On November 19, 2010, the Maoists obstructed
the passage of the Annual Budget by the caretaker Government
led by the Communist Party of Nepal – United Marxist Leninist
(CPN-UML), unleashing pandemonium in Parliament and attacking
Finance Minister Surendra Pandey. In doing this, the Maoists
– the country’s main Opposition party – backtracked on
their pact with the ruling parties to allow the new Budget
to be passed. The three principal parties of Nepal – UCPN-M,
CPN-UML and the Nepali Congress (NC) – had, on November
15, decided to form a three-member taskforce comprising
former Finance Ministers Bharat Mohan Adhikari, Ram Sharan
Mahat and UCPN-M Vice Chairman (VC) Baburam Bhattarai
to carry out consultation among parties to present the
Budget in Parliament on a consensual basis. After the
meeting, Bhattarai had said, "We are close to striking
a package deal." On November 17, the three reached
an agreement to allow the Budget to pass through Parliament.
The obstruction
of the Budget was, however, no more than the deepening
of an enduring crisis most starkly reflected in the failure
to elect a Prime Minister (PM) in more than five months
since caretaker PM Madhav Kumar Nepal resigned on July
1, 2010, and with 17 rounds of elections. The attempt
to elect the PM was initiated on July 21, with three candidates:
Pushpa Kamal Dahal alias Prachanda, the Chairman
of the UCPN-M; Jhala Nath Khanal of the CPN-UML; and Rama
Chandra Poudel of the NC. While, Jhala Nath Khanal withdrew
his candidature after the first round, Prachanda remained
a candidate till the seventh round (held on September
7, 2010). Since then, the lone surviving candidate for
the post has failed to secure the magic number of 301
in the 601-member Parliament. There is little possibility
of a resolution here, unless there is a significant inter-party
consensus, given the distribution of seats in the Constituent
Assembly: the UCPN-M accounts for 220 seats; NC, 110;
CPN-UML, 103; and the Madheshi parties, a combined strength
of 82. Maoist support is essential to Government formation
by any other party; while the Maoists can secure power
only with the support of either the NC or the CPN-UML.
Neither of these outcomes has crystallized despite months
of hectic politicking.
Another
conflict that has proven irreducible is the confrontation
between the Maoists, on the one hand, and all the other
parties massed on the other, over the integration of the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with the Nepal Army (NA).
The integration question has been one of the principal
causes of the political polarization in the country for
over four years, and this has been deepened further by
the participation of the PLA in the ongoing Sixth Plenum
of the UCPN-M, held in the Gorkha District, which commenced
on November 21, 2010. The participation of the PLA in
the Plenum has been criticized, not only by political
opponents of the Maoists, but by the United Nations Mission
in Nepal (UNMIN) as well. On November 24, 2010, Upendra
Yadav, Chairman of the Madheshi Janadhikar Forum (MJF),
accused the UCPN-M of breaching the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement (CPA)
by involving their former combatants in the party's Plenum,
and demanded that the Army Integration Special Committee
(AISC) should take the matter seriously, as the former
Maoist combatants are now under its purview. Similarly,
Karin Landgren, the Chief of UNMIN, stated, "PLA
presence in the plenum is contrary to the spirit of Agreement
on the Monitoring of the Management of Arms and Armies
and the Comprehensive Peace Agreement." The understanding
between the SPA and the Maoists on the modalities and
regulation of PLA combatants, and their verification,
has been the subject of three different agreements in
2006. Even after four years, however, a stalemate on the
question of integration persists.
There
is further and increasing contention on the role and tenure
of UNMIN. Originally, UNMIN’s tenure was intended to end
on January 23, 2008, but has since been extended seven
times, the last of these on September 15, 2010, with a
four month extension, ending January 15, 2010. It is unlikely
that the PLA’s integration will be completed (or even
see any substantive progress) within this period, and
UNMIN’s credibility can only be further diluted with the
passage of time and its evident ineffectiveness.
Adding
to the overdose of instability is the increasing internal
division within the UCPN-M, which
has come to a head during the Sixth Plenum. On November
22, Maoist leaders, such as Baburam Bhattarai, Mohan Baidhya
and Pushpa Kamal Dahal aka Prachanda tabled different
reports regarding the party’s future strategy and line
of struggle, with Vice-chairmen (VC) Bhattarai and Baidhya
presenting two separate documents contradicting party
chairman Prachanda. Bhattarai reiterated the idea of a
‘competitive republic’, which was adopted by the Party
at its Fourth Plenum at Chubang, Rukum District, in 2005.
Baidhya wanted the party to adopt the idea of a ‘people’s
republic’, as was discussed in the Kharipati (Bhaktapur
District) meet of the Party on February 17, 2010 and demanded
that that Maoist revolutionaries should have no option
to revolt against the party if it plunged into ‘rightist
revisionism’. On the contrary, Prachanda simultaneously
stressed preparations for a new revolt, while staying
firm on peace and the Constitution.
The two
most contentious issues within the UCPN-M are: to decide
who the principal enemy is, and what would be the future
ideological line of the party. On the principal enemy,
Prachanda and Baidhya have similar views. They claim that
foreign intervention, particularly by India, is the principal
factor for the present political impasse, and such intervention
is, consequently, the principal enemy. Prachanda and Baidhya
insist that the Party should wage an ‘ideological war’
against India to preserve national Independence. Bhattarai,
on the other hand, on November 22, articulated a ‘softer’
line, calling for an ‘agitation’ and not a ‘war’ against
‘foreign forces’ – a semantic distinction that has been
given much significance within the party’s polemics, and
has been denounced in certain quarter as ‘pro-India’.
On the future ideological line of the Party, there are
three divergent views. Baidhya advocates a hard-line revolutionary
perspective, declaring, on November 23, 2010, "I
have a clear view that democratic republic and democratic
constitution cannot address the genuine issues of the
people. We should establish a people’s federal democratic
republic…" Bhattarai, on the same day, advocated
a continued commitment to the present peace process, insisting,
"We should remain on the peace and constitution processes
till the last minute to save the republic, secularism
and federalism". Prachanda’s stand on the future
ideological line opportunistically blends these two approaches,
preparing for revolution, but staying on in the present
peace process.
Ideological
niceties apart, however, the real struggle in the Party
is between Bhattarai and Prachanda over leadership. Prachanda
is increasingly threatened by Bhattarai’s growing popularity;
Bhattarai accuses Prachanda of working in the Party as
an autocrat. Baidhya, on the other hand, has accused both
Prachanda and Bhattarai of deviating from Communist ideology.
Earlier
divisions in the UCPN-M gave birth to the militant MJF,
JTMM-J, Janatantrik Terai Mukti Morcha –Jai Kishan Goit
(JTMM-G) and the Matrika Yadav-led Communist Party of
Nepal – Maoist. Further divisions in the UCPN could result
in the creation of other radical formations in the country,
violently struggling to secure some prominence in the
political landscape.
The Madhesh
based parties further complicate a difficult situation.
In the struggle to elect a PM, with none of the major
political formations capable of chalking up the required
support on its own, and no two of them willing to sit
together to form a Government, relatively minor Madhesh-based
parties have begun to wield disproportionate clout in
Kathmandu. The demands of the Unified Democratic Madheshi
Forum (UDMF), a combination of the four principal Madheshi
parties – MJF, Madheshi Janadhikar Forum-Loktantrik (MJF-L),
Terai Madhesh Loktantrik Party (TMLP) and Sadbhawana Party
(SP) – remain unacceptable to each of the national political
formations. The alliance – with 82 members in Parliament
– crucially, seeks complete regional autonomy and a single
Madheshi Provincial State (ek Madhesh ek Pradesh),
and an unambiguous ‘right to self-determination’, in addition
to specific commitments on the peace process and on the
drafting of the Constitution, as well as the implementation
of past agreements, such as the bulk integration of Madheshi
people in security institutions, as the price of its support
to any Prime Ministerial candidate. While the Madheshi
parties appear to have become much more central to any
resolution of the protracted crisis in Kathmandu, it is
far from the case that they offer any easy solution. There
is, moreover, little internal coherence even within the
Madheshi groupings. There are, for instance, serious divergences
of opinion on the question of autonomy, with the Upendra
Yadav-led MJF demanding complete autonomy and right to
self-determination, while armed groups such as the JTMM-G
have raised the stakes to a claim of sovereignty. Reports
indicate that there are at least 30 underground militant
groups operating in the 20 Districts of the Madhesh
region.
The multiple
political disputes in Kathmandu have crystallized into
a deadlock on the drafting of the Constitution.
The first meeting of the Constituent Assembly (CA) was
held on May 28, 2008, and 11 ‘thematic committees’ were
allocated responsibilities to work on different components
of the proposed Constitution by the SPA and the UCPN-M.
A dead line of May 28, 2010, was imposed for the completion
of the drafting process. However, with each of the political
formations amplifying their disagreements on even the
smallest possible issues, the deadline has long gone,
and the process itself has lost impetus within the daily
political deadlocks in Kathmandu. Repeated Maoist announcements
regarding the intention to start a ‘new revolution’, and
acquisition of capacities for violence by various other
political formations, have only added to apprehensions
that the political impasse may spiral incrementally into
open chaos.
|
Weekly
Fatalities: Major Conflicts in South Asia
November 22-28,
2010
|
|
Civilians
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorists/Insurgents
|
Total
|
|
BANGLADESH
|
|
|
Left-wing Extremism
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
|
INDIA
|
|
|
Jammu &
Kashmir
|
0
|
0
|
7
|
7
|
|
Left-wing Extremism
|
|
|
Andhra Pradesh
|
3
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
|
Bihar
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
|
Chhattisgarh
|
1
|
2
|
20
|
23
|
|
Maharashtra
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
|
Odisha
|
6
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
|
West Bengal
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
|
Total (INDIA)
|
15
|
2
|
28
|
45
|
|
PAKISTAN
|
|
|
Balochistan
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
|
FATA
|
2
|
4
|
33
|
39
|
|
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
|
4
|
1
|
13
|
18
|
|
Sindh
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
|
Total (PAKISTAN)
|
7
|
5
|
47
|
59
|
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
INDIA 20
Maoists killed in Chhattisgarh: At least 20 Communist
Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist) cadres were killed
in a fierce encounter with the Central Reserve Police
Force (CRPF, 111th Battalion) and State Police
personnel near Aasrampura village of Jagargunda area
in Dantewada District on November 23. A CRPF press release
said, "More than 150 Naxals opened fire on a CRPF
party, which was conducting the area-domination operation.
In the ensuing encounter, around 20 Maoists were killed.
The bodies of nine Naxals and arms and ammunitions have
been recovered. No casualty has been reported from the
CRPF’s side. The appearance and combat fatigues of the
dead Maoists showed that they were well trained."
Indian
Express, November 24, 2010.
Central
intelligence agencies warn of terrorist attack in Mumbai:
Intelligence inputs sent to Mumbai Police by Central
Agencies have hinted at Islamist militant outfits Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT), Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HM) and Indian Mujahideen
(IM) joining forces to carry out a terror attack on
a five-star hotel in Mumbai, similar to the November
26, 2008 attack. Security agencies said a seven-member
gang comprising operatives from the three outfits has
apparently been dispatched to the city. Times
of India, November 21, 2010.
US
court summons ISI chief and LeT leaders: A United
States (US) court issued summons to senior officials
of Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, Inter-Services
Intelligence(ISI), including its Chief Major General
Ahmed Shuja Pasha, along with alleged masterminds of
the terrorist attacks in Mumbai on November 26, 2008
(also known as 26/11) and Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) leaders
Hafiz Mohammad Saeed and Zakiur Rahman Lakhvi in response
to a lawsuit filed by relatives of two American victims
accusing them of providing material support for the
26/11 attacks. The 26-page lawsuit was filed before
a New York Court on November 19 against the ISI and
LeT by the relatives Rabbi Gavriel Noah Holtzberg and
his wife Rivka, who were both shot dead by militants
at the Chhabad House in Mumbai. PTI
News, November 25, 2010.
"Visible
and invisible links" links among J&K militants, Naxals
and Left-leaning academicians, says Jammu and Kashmir
Chief Minister Omar Abdullah: The Jammu and Kashmir
(J&K) Chief Minister Omar Abdullah on November 19
said there were "visible and invisible links" among
the militants in his State, the Communist Party of India-Maoist
(CPI-Maoist), Left-leaning academicians and supporters.
"We have no experience with Maoist insurgency even though
of late we find efforts being made to build bridges
between the Maoists and Naxalites of the rest of India
with militants of Kashmir and also some Left-thinking
academicians and students in Jammu region as well,"
Abdullah said. DNA
India, November 20, 2010.
Police
has concrete evidence about links between militants
and separatists, says Kashmir IGP Shiv Murari Sahai:
Inspector General of Police (IGP, Kashmir) Shiv
Murari Sahai on November 26 said that Police has concrete
evidence about links between militants and separatists
in triggering and planning the recent unrest in Kashmir
valley. "There is a concrete evidence that the recent
agitation was planned," Sahai said, adding, Police have
found evidence that Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militants
planned the unrest and were in league with the separatist
politicians. Daily
Excelsior, November 27, 2010.
Training
camps of LeT and other outfits still active in Pakistan
and PoK, reveals arrested Pakistani LeT militant :
An arrested Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) militant on November
26 rejected Pakistan’s claim that it has dismantled
the terror infrastructure on its soil after the November
26, 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks (also known as 26/11).
"The training camps of LeT and other outfits were still
active in Pakistan and its occupied Kashmir, despite
a crackdown launched by the authorities there," Mohammad
Saleem Rehmani alias Abu Saad, a resident of
Nawab Sahib area of Sindh in Pakistan, told reporters
after being presented before the media.
Daily
Excelsior, November 27, 2010.
CCEA
approves Action Plan for 60 Naxal-hit Districts:
The Cabinet Committee on Economic Affairs (CCEA) on
November 26 approved the commencement of an Integrated
Action Plan (IAP) in 60 selected Districts affected
by Naxal [Left Wing Extremism] violence with the aim
of giving a fillip to development schemes in tribal
and backward regions. The IAP would be an additional
central assistance scheme on a 100 per cent grant basis.
It is aimed at quick resolution of problems concerning
healthcare, drinking water, education and roads. In
2010-11 alone, each of the 60 Districts will be given
a block grant of INR 250 million, with the total coming
to a INR 15, 000 million. In 2011-12, the grant will
go up to INR 300 million each.
The Hindu, November 27, 2010.
PAKISTAN
33
militants and four SFs among 39 persons killed during
the week in FATA: Four militants were killed
when a US drone attack targeted a vehicle in at Pir
Keley village, 10 kilometres east of Miranshah, the
headquarter of North Waziristan Agency, in Federally
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) on November 26.
Security
Forces (SFs) on November 25 killed eight militants
in the upper areas of Orakzai Agency.
At
least 14 militants were killed and six others were
injured in shelling by gunship helicopters in Kot
Killay and Khadizai areas of Orakzai Agency on November
23.
At
least five militants were killed and several others
were injured in a US drone attack at Mir Ali tehsil
(revenue unit) in North Waziristan Agency on November
22. Daily
Times; Dawn;
The
News, November
23-29, 2010.
US
adds Pakistan charity organisation to terror list:
The United States (US) on November 24 added Pakistan’s
Falah-e-Insaniyat Foundation (FeF), a charity associated
with Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), to its official list of
blacklisted terror outfits. The US State Department
said the FeF had been dubbed an "alias"
of LeT, which is already on the State Department’s
list of "designated foreign terrorist organisations".
Daily
Times, November 25, 2010.
Top
leadership of al Qaeda is in Af-Pak border area, says
Special US Representative to Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke:
Special United States (US) Representative to
Afghanistan and Pakistan Richard Holbrooke on November
23 said that the top leadership of al Qaeda terrorist
network is in the Af-Pak border region. "Al Qaeda
is in many places, but its leadership is in the border
areas between Afghanistan and Pakistan," said Holbrooke.
Indian
Express, November 24,
2010.
No
external hand involved in terrorism, says Interior
Minister Rehman Malik: Federal Interior Minister
Rehman Malik on November 21 ruled out the involvement
of external hand in terrorism in the country, saying
the locals were supporting terrorism, especially the
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) in Karachi. "No external
hand is involved in terrorism in Pakistan," Malik
told reporters, adding that Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan
(TTP), al Qaeda and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) were all
coordinating with each other and were trying to de-stabilise
Pakistan. Rehman Malik later said that most militants
belonged to the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) and Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan (SSP). Daily
Times, November 22-28, 2010.
Taliban
"true followers of Islamic ideology" and US is "biggest
terrorist", says Federal Minister for Tourism Maulana
Attaur Rehman: The Taliban are "the true followers
of Islamic ideology", said Federal Minister for Tourism
Maulana Attaur Rehman who also believes that "America
is the biggest terrorist of the world". According
to Maulana Attaur Rehman, "Ulema and Taliban are the
true followers of Islamic ideology and America is
the biggest terrorist of the world, which is creating
hatred against them." "It is a misconception that
Ulema and Taliban are against co-existence of people
with different religions. In fact it is America which
is against the interfaith harmony to maintain its
hegemony on the world," said Rehman.
Dawn, November 23,
2010.
Explosives
for attacks come from Afghanistan, says Interior Minister
Rehman Malik: Interior Minister Rehman Malik said
on November 25 that most of the explosives used in
bomb attacks in the country were smuggled from Afghanistan
but insisted that the cross-border movement of militants
was being limiting. Malik blamed Afghan militiamen
for destroying biometric systems that made it impossible
to identify the tens of thousands of people who cross
the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan daily.
"We really do not know how many terrorists, how
many drug barons, how many criminals are crossing
every day," said Malik. Daily
Times, November 26, 2010.
10
million reward for spying against TTP: The Government
on November 27 announced a reward of PNR 10 million
to anyone providing information about the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP). "The Government will make arrangements
to settle the informers and their families anywhere
in the country, even abroad, if they fear that the
Taliban might hurt them," Interior Minister Rehman
Malik said. Daily
Times, November 28, 2010.
SRI LANKA
President
Mahinda Rajapakse confirms of having a political solution
to the Tamil question: Sri Lankan President Mahinda
Rajapakse confirmed that he had a political solution
to the Tamil question in mind and that discussions
with political parties and the people would go ahead.
"[On devolution] we must know the minds of the
people… What we want is reconfirmation of what they
want… The solution that I have in mind might not be
good enough for them; they might not accept it. Not
only the political parties, the people must accept
it… We want to appoint a committee, from both sides,
and discuss all these," Rajapakse said.
The
Hindu, November 22, 2010.
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The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
related economic, political, and social issues, in the South
Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
for Conflict Management
and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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