Inertial
Advantage
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute
for Conflict Management
Despite
enveloping uncertainty, unremitting misgovernance and
widespread public perceptions of insecurity, the reality
of India’s multiple terrorist and insurgent movements
is that most of them are weakening. For the ninth year
in a row, total
fatalities due to terrorist and
insurgent conflicts in the country continued their decline,
registering a total of 1,902 deaths in 2010, as against
2,232 in 2009, and a peak of 5,839 in 2001 (all data
from the South Asia Terrorism Portal database).
Fatalities in 2011 currently total 117 (till February
13).
The worst
and steadily worsening of conflicts in India is, without
dispute, the Maoist insurgency, principally spearheaded
by the Communist Party of India – Maoist (CPI-Maoist),
but including at least another 20 minor Left Wing Extremist
(LWE, also called Naxalite) factions. Naxalite-related
fatalities, at 1,180 in 2010, now significantly outstrip
the combined total of all other terrorist and insurgent
movements in the country.
Total
fatalities resulting from the Pakistan-backed Islamist
terrorist campaigns in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K)
remained at 375 in 2010, the same number as the preceding
year, though this figure excludes the 111 persons killed
(overwhelmingly in Police firing) in the terrorist and
separatist-backed street
violence which peaked through June
– October 2010.
Total
fatalities in India’s Northeast fell dramatically to
322 in 2010, from 853 in 2009, and 1,051 in 2008. Manipur
and Assam saw the most significant improvements in this
long-troubled region, with fatalities dropping from
416 and 391, respectively, in 2009, to 138 and 158 in
2010.
Very
significantly, Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorist attacks
across the country, outside J&K, registered a low,
albeit marginally rising, incidence, after their peak
in 2008. There were 25 fatalities in Islamist terrorist
attacks across the country, with the worst incident
recording 17 killed and at least 60 injured in the explosion
at the German Bakery in Pune on February 13, 2010. 2009
had recorded no major incident (involving three or more
fatalities), and a total of eight deaths in such attacks.
378 persons were killed in 2008 in Islamist terrorist
attacks outside J&K, with the Pakistan-backed 26/11
Mumbai attack alone recording 166 fatalities.
India’s
security and intelligence apparatus also took cognizance
of an emerging threat of ‘Hindutva
terrorism’, confirming or investigating
the role of right wing extremist Hindu groups in a number
of terrorist incidents dating back to 2006-07. While
no incident of suspected Hindutva terror was recorded
in 2008, 2009 or 2010, there 12 extremists were arrested
on charges of involvement in earlier incidents, particularly
the Malegaon (September 8, 2006) Hyderabad Mecca Masjid
(May 18, 2007) and Ajmer (October 11, 2007) blasts,
even as linkages to the Samjhauta Express attack (February
19, 2006) were exposed.
310 of
the country’s 636 Districts are currently afflicted
by varying intensities of chronic activity, including
subversion, by insurgent and terrorist groupings. 223
Districts across 20 States register Maoist activity;
another 20 Districts in J&K are affected by Pakistan-backed
Islamist separatist terrorism; and 67 Districts in six
States in the Northeast are affected by numerous ethnicity
based terrorist and insurgent movements.
The broadly
positive trends – with the exception of Maoist violence
– do not, however, provide an accurate index to the
quality of the state’s responses over the intervening
period. Indeed, in all spheres, it is a range of complex
extraneous factors that has led to dramatic improvements,
where these have been registered.
The sheer
incoherence of the state’s response to the crisis of
militant-backed street violence in J&K is a case
in point. In a heavily securitized State, with a 20-year
insurgency, 17 years of high-intensity violence (more
than 1,000 fatalities per year, between 1990 and 2006),
and with ample warnings in terms of recurrent incidents
of stone pelting over the preceding years, including
the major flare-up over the Amarnath Land allocation
issue in 2008, both State and Central agencies were
caught completely off guard and utterly unprepared in
terms of Force deployment and capability, when street
violence surged towards the end of June 2010. Sheer
public exhaustion, the onset of winter, and a measure
of disillusionment with the movement’s leadership led
to the dissipation of this violence, but there is little
evidence to suggest that the state is now better-equipped
to respond to the next, and highly likely, cycle of
escalation. The street movement is, in fact, a calibrated
strategy on the part of the Pakistani handlers of the
separatist movement in J&K to compensate for the
declining terrorist violence in the State. This, in
turn, is the consequence, not of any fundamental change
of objective or intention on the part of the sponsoring
agencies – the Pakistan Army and its intelligence wing,
the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI)
– but of the increasing international pressure on Pakistan
to wind down its export of terrorism, Pakistan’s own
increasing preoccupation with internal terrorism and
with its more pressing strategic imperatives of disruption
in Afghanistan, and the progressive erosion of the loyalty
of a number of state sponsored terrorist groupings that
have progressively transferred their allegiance to the
Islamist extremist combine led by the al Qaeda. There
has, of course, been some improvement in the responses
of the Army, para-military and State Police security
grid across J&K as well, and significant gains from
the construction of the border fence along the Line
of Control (LoC) and international border in the State.
It remains to be seen, however, whether these will be
sufficient proof against another cycle of unconstrained
terrorism that would inevitably follow a premature withdrawal
of the Western powers from Afghanistan, were this to
occur.
In the
meanwhile, the Union Government has initiated what appears
to be a somewhat directionless process to secure negotiations
with the more recalcitrant separatist elements within
J&K through the appointment of a group of three
interlocutors in October 2010. The interlocutors have,
however, failed to meet any prominent separatist leader
in the intervening months. India’s Foreign Secretary
Nirupma Rao has also announced the intention of resuming
talks – which had been suspended after the Mumbai attacks
in November 2008, with Pakistan, "on all issues".
The initiative holds out little hope of influencing
the trajectory of violence in the region, even as Pakistan
manifestly continues to support a number of India-directed
Islamist and other terrorist formations on its soil,
and demonstrates no evidence of seeking to abandon terrorism
as an instrument of state policy to secure its perceived
strategic objectives in the neighbourhood.
Sheer
exhaustion and the loss of safe havens abroad have been
the principal causes of the progressive collapse of
enduring insurgent and terrorist movements in India’s
Northeast, though operational successes have, again,
been an integral element in processes of gradual attrition.
The gains in Assam were substantially the consequence
of a windfall resulting from a change in policy in Bangladesh
after the Sheikh Hasina regime assumed power in January
2009, ending the state support and assured safe havens
that had earlier been provided to insurgent groups operating
in India’s Northeast, and handing over several leaders
and cadres of various insurgent groups to Indian authorities.
It is, nevertheless, the case that some insurgent groups
retain significant residual capacities, even as others
– ominously including the Maoists – are just waiting
to fill the emerging
vacuum. There is also some evidence
that China is now extending support to the surviving
groupings in the region, prominently including the Paresh
Baruah faction of the United Liberation Front of Asom
(ULFA).
The decline
in violence in Manipur, and the reverses that have been
inflicted on various militant groups, have also opened
up avenues for a more enduring stability in what had
emerged as the State afflicted by the region’s most
virulent insurgencies. Unfortunately, the political
space in Manipur continues to be occupied by an incompetent
kleptocracy. In the absence of greater political probity
and administrative maturity, the gains of the recent
past may yet again be frittered away, as were the opportunities
of declining strife in 2002-2003. Unless the gains of
2010 are consolidated and translated into political
initiatives providing economic and administrative relief
to the people of Manipur, the contracting spaces for
violence may once again begin
to expand.
There
has been a gradual consolidation of peace in most of
the other States of the Northeast, though Meghalaya
saw a transient spike in fatalities. The Union and State
Governments initiated negotiations and signed truce
agreements with a number of insurgent groups and factions
in the region in 2010, even as earlier agreements, such
as the protracted Ceasefire Agreement signed with the
National Socialist Council of Nagalim (NSCN) in 1976,
continued to hold out, despite misgivings and missteps.
The Northeast insurgent groups currently engaged in
talks with the Government include the Isak-Muivah (IM)
and Khaplang factions of the NSCN; the pro-talks faction
of the ULFA; the pro-talks faction of the National Democratic
Front of Bodoland (NDFB);
the Nunisa faction of the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD);
Black Widow (BW),
United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS);
Achik National Volunteer Council (ANVC);
Karbi Longri North Cachar Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF);
Kuki National Organization (KNO) and United Peoples
Front (UPF). On August 25, 2010, Union Home Minister
Chidambaram stated, "We have appointed two Interlocutors:
RS Pandey to talk to the NSCN (IM) and PC Haldar to
talk to NDFB (PT), DHD (Nunisa), DHD (J), KLNLF, UPDS
and ANVC, besides ULFA."
Significantly,
an eight-member ULFA delegation led by ‘chairman’ Arabinda
Rajkhowa held its first round of talks with Union Home
Minister P. Chidambaram at North Block in New Delhi
on February 10, 2011. Chidambaram is reported to have
conveyed to ULFA that the Government of India was willing
to amend the Constitution, if the need arose, to solve
any problems in Assam.
There
have been renewed Governmental efforts to bring almost
all militant outfits in the Northeast to the negotiating
table. Nevertheless, several contentious issues concerning
post conflict repatriation, resettlement and, most importantly,
demilitarisation of ex-combatants remained unresolved
in the ‘normalised’ pockets of the region, complicating
the contours of ongoing and emerging peace processes.
It is
in the theatres of escalating Maoist violence that the
most visible indices of state incoherence, indeed, incompetence,
have been notable. As noted, 223 Districts across 20
States register some Maoist activity, though not more
than 67 of these are categorized as ‘highly affected’,
with high levels of insurgent organization and persistent
violent activity. Divergent assessments of the intensity
of Maoist activities have been provided by official
sources from time to time. Home Minister Chidambaram,
on September 15, 2009, claimed that Maoist violence
"has been consistently witnessed in about 400 Police
Station areas of around 90 Districts in 13 States".
There are well over 14,000 Police Stations in India,
and this assessment suggests that the problem is, at
worst, marginal. On March 12, 2010, with, no evidence
of any change in the situation on the ground, the Home
Minister went on to state that 34 Districts were "virtually
controlled" by the Maoists. In late 2009, the Centre
launched what were repeatedly described a "massive
and coordinated operations" by Central Paramilitary
Force in combination with State Police Forces, across
the five worst affected States - Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand,
Maharashtra, West Bengal and Odisha. There was great
initial optimism, but the bluster quickly faded into
hysterical demands for Army deployment and the use of
the Air Force for offensive operations, after a succession
of bloody Maoist ambuscades predictably left hundreds
of Security Force personnel dead in the early days of
the ill-planned and undermanned Union Home Ministry-backed
misadventure.
Fortunately, the MHA’s calls for Army and Air Force
deployment were quickly shot down. Unfortunately, however,
the great enthusiasm of early 2010 quickly faded into
a defensive sulk, and, despite claims to the contrary,
operations against the Maoists have been substantially
scaled down in desperate measures to save face and minimize
SF casualties. On September 16, 2010, Union Home Secretary
G.K. Pillai, nevertheless, saw fit to boast that the
SFs, had "regained control" over more than
10,000 square kilometres from the Maoists. It is not
clear when the Maoists had ‘liberated’ these areas,
nor where the Indian flag has once again been unfurled.
What is evident on the facts, however, is that the Maoists
have not been pushed out of any of the areas where they
had established their disruptive dominance prior to
the launch of the Centre’s "massive and coordinated
operations", and there is reason to believe that
they have substantially expanded their areas of subversion.
Significantly,
West Bengal, with Assembly Elections due this year,
has emerged as the State worst affected by Maoist violence,
as the rebels have chosen to fish in the troubled waters
of a murky face-off between the ruling Communist Party
of India – Marxist (CPI-M) and its challenger, the Trinamool
Congress. West
Bengal saw as many as 425 fatalities
in 2010, up from 158 in 2009, as against Chhattisgarh,
with 327 in 2010, and 345 in 2009.
While
a detailed assessment of these is not possible here,
huge sanctions for Force and technology augmentation,
and for financial allocations for the Internal Security
and Intelligence apparatus, have been approved over
the past two years, but there is very limited impact
on the ground, as implementation drags on at the majestically
elephantine pace of the Indian bureaucracy. Questionable
claims have, of course, been advanced by various departments
regarding capacity improvement. The MHA, for instance,
claims that the Police-population ratio for the country
has been raised from 128 per 100,000 at the end of year
2008, to a present 161. In fact, the latter figure has
been calculated on population estimates of the 2001
Census, and does not account for the roughly 20 per
cent increase in population since. If this increase
is factored in, the actual numbers will revert roughly
to the original 128. These ratios, moreover, are often
calculated in terms of sanctioned posts, and not actual
Force available. As of January 1, 2009, there were 530,580
vacancies in the State Police Forces. 116,903 personnel
were recruited after this, till November 30, 2010. It
is not clear what proportion of these simply replaces
personnel lost to superannuation, disability, death,
pre-mature retirement and other factors. Central Force
allocation to the States remains meager, particularly
in the Maoist-afflicted areas. Just 62 battalions of
CPMFs, yielding a mere 24,800 personnel on the ground
(400 personnel per battalion), are currently allocated
to the six worst affected States, which account for
an area of 829439 square kilometers and a population
of over 446 million.
The leadership
gap in the Police also remains crippling. Of 4,013 authorised
posts, as on January 1, 2010, in the Indian Police Service
(IPS), just 3,383 were in position, leaving a deficit
of 16.7 per cent. It is widely acknowledged that authorized
strength is a fraction of what is actually needed. The
annual intake into the IPS was to be enhanced to 150,
from the present 130, from 2009, but the proposal has
been blocked by technical objections from the Union
Public Services Commission.
The capacity
augmentation measures that have been initiated will,
of course, begin to have an impact in time. No significant
gains in any theatre of insurgency or terrorism have,
however, been registered over the past years as a result
of a strategic or policy re-orientation. India continues
to benefit through the sheer inertial advantage of its
size and diversity, as a range of movements succumb
to exhaustion. This can, however, provide only very
qualified satisfaction, as the wider environment shows
signs of continuous deterioration, and as capacities
for governance
and particularly for security and justice administration,
fail to keep pace with the growth of population and
with the increasing discontents unleashed by uneven
processes of modernization and rapid transformation
of the economy, within a political ethos and culture
permeated by corruption, nepotism and stifling stratification.