SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 9, No. 49, June 13, 2011
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
Revolt within a Rebellion
Guest Writer: Wasbir Hussain
Director, Centre for Development & Peace Studies, Guwahati;
Member, National Security Advisory Board
has broken out among Naga rebels twenty-three years after
a bloody internecine struggle left scores dead and an
insurgency divided. Another split is now threatening to
impact on the protracted Naga peace process.
7, 2011, a meeting of the Khaplang faction of the National
Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K)
‘expelled’ its 'chairman', S.S. Khaplang, on charges of
behaving in a ‘unilateral and dictatorial manner.’ This
essentially means that the NSCN-K has split with those
who have expelled Khaplang choosing ‘General’ Khole Konyak,
until now the group’s ‘commander-in-chief’, as their new
chairman. The outfit will drop Khaplang from its name,
and is shortly expected to announce a new name. Khaplang
is expected to continue to head a faction under the original
name, NSCN-K, as he still has a considerable following
and can command his cadres from his base in Myanmar.
power struggle has troubled the NSCN-K for some time now,
and Khaplang’s ouster is a culmination of growing difficulties
within the group. On March 17, 2011, Chipu Menon aka
‘Brigadier’ Khungwang, head of the NSCN-K’s operations
in Arunachal Pradesh, was killed near Mon in Nagaland
after allegedly being ‘summoned’ by some senior leaders
of the outfit for ‘urgent discussions’. Media reports
indicate that some NSCN-K leaders had claimed Menon was
awarded ‘capital punishment’ for allegedly killing five
senior citizen from Bordoria and Kaimai villages under
the Tirap District on the pretext that they were working
for the rival Isak-Muivah faction of the NSCN (NSCN-IM)
in 1999. Menon was also accused by some of his colleagues
of setting up a new rebel group, the Arunachal Naga Liberation
Force, in Tirap and Changlang in 2010, and extorting money
from local businessmen in the name of this new outfit.
Menon’s killing demonstrated that the power struggle within
the NSCN-K had become acute.
now has four factions — the Isak-Muivah faction, the NSCN-K
splinter headed by Khole Konyak, the NSCN-K headed by
Khaplang, and NSCN-Unification. The NSCN came into being
in 1980, after a split from the Naga National Council
(NNC). Led by Thuingaleng Muivah, Isak Chishi Swu and
S. S. Khaplang, the NSCN parted ways because it opposed
the NNC’s signing of the Shillong Accord in 1975 and its
acceptance of the Indian Constitution. In 1988, the NSCN
itself split over purported ‘ideological differences’
in a violent parting of ways. Early that year, Muivah
apparently received news that the Indian Government was
ready for talks within the framework of the country’s
Constitution. Although the offer was rejected, there were
widespread rumours that Swu and Muivah had ‘sold out’
and planned to oust Khaplang, seize arms from the Konyak
cadres and surrender in India. Amidst a ‘National Assembly’
session of the group that was called to resolve the controversy
these reports had generated, Khaplang’s fighters, backed
by a section of Burmese troops, attacked Muivah’s group
in a pre-emptive strike at dawn on April 30, 1988. Some
140 of Muivah’s cadres, primarily Tangkhuls, were killed.
This incident resulted in the split of the NSCN, as Isak
(Swu) and Muivah formed the NSCN-IM, while Khaplang gave
his own name to his faction, the NSCN-K.
the NSCN-IM and the Government of India signed a ceasefire
agreement and entered into a peace process to resolve
what the outfit calls the ‘Indo-Naga conflict.’ Today,
fourteen years later, and more than seventy rounds of
talks across the world between the NSCN-IM and the Government
of India, a ‘solution’ remains elusive. The NSCN-K followed
suit, entering into a truce with New Delhi on April 30,
2001, but has not begun formal talks yet.
split, though bloodless, came about on November 23, 2007.
Several NSCN-IM cadres, led by its one-time ‘home minister’
Azheto Chopey, broke away from the group and formed the
NSCN-Unification. On January 21, 2008, the NSCN-IM ‘dismissed’
27 of its cadres, who had defected along with Chopey from
‘national service’ with effect from January 22, 2008,
for ‘deliberately defying’ a directive of the ‘yaruiwo’
(prime minister) Isak Chishi Swu, to return from the “reactionary
camp” and report to the Council Headquarters. Since January
2008, the NSCN-U has been involved in bitter clashes with
the NSCN-IM, culminating in the death of 14 of its cadres
near Dimapur, Nagaland’s commercial hub, on May 16, 2008.
Since 2009, however, the NSCN-U has been maintaining a
have always been asked as to which of the principal NSCN
factions (NSCN-IM or NSCN-K) was the ‘true representative’
of the Naga people; or whether New Delhi or the Nagas
themselves believed there could be lasting peace with
a possible accord being reached with either one of the
Naga rebel factions. That the answer was always in the
negative is indicated by continuing efforts by Naga civil
society groups, particularly Church leaders and the Naga
Hoho (the apex tribal council), in trying to unite the
two rebel factions. The logic for this, as yet unsuccessful,
unity effort is simple — only an accord by the Government
of India jointly with the two NSCN factions has the potential
of bringing lasting peace. It is impossible to see New
Delhi signing two separate deals with two Naga rebel factions
fighting over more or less the same issues. With the split
in the NSCN-K, the job of Naga civil society and the Government
would appear to have been made somewhat more difficult.
however, another side to the story. Reports trickling
out of the anti-Khaplang camp suggest that Khaplang was
first impeached by the outfit’s ‘Tatar Hoho’ or ‘parliament’
and then expelled, not just for behaving in an ‘autocratic’
manner, but for obstructing the process of unification
among the Naga insurgent factions. The accusations against
him included the charge that he had unilaterally ‘dismissed’
‘General’ Khole Konyak, the outfit’s ‘commander-in-chief’,
who was also the undeclared vice-chairman of the group,
and appointed a new vice-chairman; that he had ordered
his leaders not to attend the Naga reconciliation meeting
organized by the Forum for Naga Reconciliation on September
18, 2010; and that he has been in exile for too long,
operating from his base in Myanmar, and had consequently
lost sight of things on the ground.
of Khaplang actually ordering his men to keep away from
the Naga reconciliation efforts are true, there is a possibility
that his ouster could actually hasten the process of unification
of the NSCN-IM and the faction headed by Khole Konyak.
There is possible speculation, moreover, that Khaplang’s
ouster may have come about because the Hemi Naga from
Western Myanmar was not fitting into New Delhi’s scheme
of things with regard to a peace deal; and that Khole
Konyak and others have inched closer to sorting out differences
with the Government. Khaplang, in this scenario, would
appear as a spoiler, because his affiliations are with
Nagas from Myanmar, allowing him to strike a far more
ouster is certainly going to disrupt, or at least weaken,
the Myanmar connection of several frontline rebel groups
from the Northeast, such as the Paresh Baruah faction
of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA)
and Manipur’s United National Liberation Front (UNLF),
which have found safe haven in that country under the
wings of the NSCN-K. These rebel formations, operating
out of Myanmar, were also provided logistic support by
NSCN-K cadres in Nagaland, parts of Assam, and Arunachal
Pradesh –states that either share direct borders with
Myanmar or that are close to these borders (Assam). This
certainly gave Government agencies reason to undermine
of course, just teasers; the reality may be nothing more
than the usual power struggle within insurgent formations.
ouster in a bloodless coup became possible because he
has been away from the Naga heartland (Nagaland) for far
too long, and had lost touch with the Naga people, mainly
in Nagaland and Manipur. Under the new circumstances,
the two factions – Khaplang and Khole Konyak – may both
weaken substantially; or Khaplang may be progressively
sidelined, leaving behind a stronger Khole Konyak formation.
In either case, New Delhi may find itself in a better
position to dictate terms to the rebels. If, on the other
hand, the NSCN-IM and Konyak factions move towards unity
in the days ahead, New Delhi would have to listen to a
broader Naga voice.
10, 2011, Khaplang had retaliated with the counter-expulsion
of several breakaway leaders, including ‘general secretary’
Kitovi Zhimomi (one of those who is in charge of the Konyak
faction after Khaplang’s expulsion) and erstwhile ‘home
minister’ Azheto Chophy, besides six other functionaries.
Khaplang’s silence on ‘General’ Khole Konyak, the new
‘chairman’ named by the group, is, however, significant.
Khaplang has sought to add a new dimension to murky NSCN
politics by saying that members whom he has now expelled
are actually members of NSCN-Unification, and not his
group, the NSCN-K. Khaplang has also formally declared
that his group would not be part of the Naga reconciliation
of Naga insurgent politics remain complicated, and the
road to Naga peace is full of traps and pitfalls. A single,
united, Naga voice is still nowhere to be heard.
Currency of Terror
Research Assistant, Institute for Conflict Management
estimates indicate that Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN)
worth over USD 2.2 billion were in circulation in India
by 2010, pumped in over the years by Pakistan’s Inter
Services Intelligence (ISI) in a strategy intended simultaneously
to destabilize the Indian economy, even as it released
substantial funds for Islamist terrorism on Indian soil.
In 2005, the seizure of FICN in India amounted over INR
70 million; this rose to INR 100 million in 2007; and
INR 258.9 million in 2008, INR 229.8 million in 2009.
During 2010, 1,850 cases of the circulation of significant
quantities of FICN were detected and fake notes to the
tune of INR 258.27 million were seized, and 1,265 persons
were arrested. A bulk of cases detected indicates a strategy
of widespread dissemination of relatively small quantities
through a multiplicity of agencies, including terrorist
formations. Some cases detected in 2011 help illustrate
2011: Three cadres of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM),
including one ‘communications expert’, was arrested near
the Khan Market area of New Delhi for allegedly running
a FICN racket. Police claimed to have recovered counterfeit
notes with a face value of INR 1 million from them.
2011: A scrap dealer, identified as Zubair Alam, was arrested
in New Delhi, along with FICN worth INR 110,000.
2011: Police arrested five persons and seized FICN worth
INR 954,000 from their possession near Arif Ke village
under Mallanwala Police Station in Punjab. Customs officials
also recovered FICN worth 200,000 from a goods train,
which runs between India and Pakistan for trade activities
at the Attari Railway Station located close to Pakistan.
seized by the Police from various operations exhibit a
very high degree of sophistication. The fake notes have
different serial numbers, indicating that they have not
been printed from a scanned image of a genuine note by
using coloured scanners and printers, but have been printed
on a large scale at a security press with advanced technologies
and specialized paper, inks and other materials.
the problem is now so widespread that the Reserve Bank
of India (RBI) regularly brings out circulars on how to
indentify counterfeit currency notes, as well as notifications
of fake series in circulation.
currency has long been recognized as a source of funding
for terrorism in India. Specifically, investigations into
at least three cases — the Hyderabad bombings of August
2007; the attack on the Indian Institute of Science in
Bangalore in December 2005; and the 26/11 terror attacks
on Mumbai — have demonstrated such a link. In the first
case, in the immediate aftermath of the explosions, the
Police had arrested a four-member gang including a Dubai
national. The police recovered fake currency of INR 23.6
million. The Police Commissioner disclosed that FICN in
the denominations of INR 500 and INR 1,000 had been brought
in from Pakistan via Dubai. Intelligence sources found
that INR 3 million of the INR 5 million spent on the attack
on the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore in December
2005 was obtained through the fake currency racket. In
the Mumbai 26/11 attacks, a significant part of the money
to fund the preliminary operations was obtained through
fake currency rackets and hawala (illegal money
transfer) channels. In May 2011, in its second charge
sheet in the 26/11 case, the US Government named a serving
ISI officer, Major Iqbal, as a key conspirator charged
with providing funds to Pakistani-American Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT) operative David Coleman Headley. Major Iqbal, posted
in Lahore during 2007 and 2008, was handling Headley on
behalf of the ISI. He provided USD 25,000 and fake Indian
currency notes to Headley, to meet the latter’s expenses
during surveillance operations in India preceding the
terrorist outfits have also been provided FICN funding
from Pakistan. In one such case, the Maharashtra Anti
Terrorism Squad (ATS) told a Special Court in January
2009 that it was probing the links between the Indian
Mujahideen (IM) and fake currency rackets in the country.
The ATS submitted before the Special Court at Shivajinagar
that Riyaz Bhatkal, Iqbal Bhatkal and Ahmed Yasin, founders
and top operatives of the IM, had provided counterfeit
notes to Maulana Hussain Shabbir Gangavali (29), who was
arrested on December 30, 2008, at a Janwadi Masjid in
Pune with FICN worth INR 25,000.
been noted elsewhere,
for… all Pakistan-backed Islamist terrorist groupings
- are provided via tacit state support, including
the transfer of large quantities of fake Indian
currency that Indian Intelligence sources contend,
on the basis of interrogations of arrested terrorists
and couriers, is printed at Pakistani Security Presses
at the Mlair Cantonment in Karachi, and at Lahore,
Quetta and Peshawar, and which Pakistan uses to
finance its jihad against India. Significant
in this regard is the Indian government's August
2009 announcement that it intends to take up the
issue of the importation of currency standard ink
and paper by Pakistan from the UK, Sweden and Switzerland,
with various international agencies, including Interpol.
In addition to very substantial seizures of fake
Indian currency notes (FICN) from Pakistan-linked
couriers, there have been instances of such currency
also being recovered from Pakistan Embassy staff.
India's Ministry of Home Affairs has reportedly
found that "the ISI has managed to get access to
the configuration, specifications and other secret
codes of the genuine Indian currency notes from
six European companies that supply Indian currency
papers fitted with security features, and another
company in Switzerland that supplies the security
ink used in printing these currency notes in India."
Bureau of Investigation (CBI) report to the Finance Ministry
has reiterated the claim that Pakistan Government Printing
Presses in Quetta, Karachi, Lahore and Peshawar, were
churning out large quantities of FICN. Reports indicate
that the paper for the fake notes is sourced from London.
Indian investigators also believe that the Pakistani Government
imports currency-standard printing paper far in excess
of official needs. The extra quantum is handed over to
the ISI for FICN production.
2010, reports suggested that India had decided to raise
the charge of printing and circulating FICNs against Pakistan
at various international fora. According to Government
sources, armed with concrete evidence against Pakistan,
India would first approach the Financial Action Task Force
(An inter-Governmental body whose purpose is the development
and promotion of national and international policies to
combat money laundering and terror financing). The matter
would subsequently be raised with the World Bank, IMF
and Interpol as well.
FICN problem received international attention when the
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 2011,
of the US State Department confirmed that India faced
an increasing inflow of counterfeit currency, produced
primarily in Pakistan, and that terrorist and criminal
networks used this money to finance their activities in
the country. “India faces an increasing inflow of high-quality
counterfeit currency, which is produced primarily in Pakistan
but smuggled to India through multiple international routes,"
the Report noted. Further, criminal networks exchange
counterfeit currency for genuine notes, which not only
facilitates money laundering, but also represents a threat
to the Indian economy.
pushes large chunks of FICN into India directly from Pakistan,
as well as through Nepal, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Malaysia
and Thailand. Pakistan International Airlines (PIA) has
been used to transport counterfeit currency to conduits
in Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The modus operandi
was revealed by two Nepali counterfeit currency traffickers
who were arrested by the Thailand Police in October 2007.
During interrogation, the accused disclosed that they
were working for a prominent Nepali businessman. Nepal
has long been used for this ‘trade’, so much so that the
possession of any high denomination Indian currency note
(INR 500 and INR 1000) is prohibited in the country. Significantly,
in one of the earliest cases confirming official complicity,
a Pakistani diplomat, Asim Saboor, Assistant Secretary
at the Pakistani Mission in Kathmandu, was caught by the
Nepali Police in the act of conducting a transaction with
FICNs, and was found distributing counterfeit Indian banknotes
on January 3, 2000. He was summarily expelled from Nepal.
Pradesh (UP)-Bihar border with Nepal is the most prominent
route for the inflow of fake currency from Nepal into
India. After the neutralization of an FICN racket in UP
in 2010, interrogations revealed that the gang employed
a set of six women couriers from Champaran in Bihar and
another set of four hailing from Nepal. The FICN travelled
to Uttar Pradesh from Nepal along two routes: from Nepal
to UP via Bihar, and directly to UP, particularly through
the Siddhartnagar and Maharajganj routes. The gang used
private vehicles to cross the Nepal border, while the
rest of the movement was done principally on public transport.
To minimise suspicion, women couriers, particularly those
with young children, were preferred within India, and
were paid two per cent of the total face value of the
FICN. A male shadow was used to trail the couriers to
ensure that they were not trapped by the Police. FICN
of INR 1,000 denomination was bought in Nepal at the rate
of INR 500 to INR 600, while the INR 500 denomination
note was bought for INR 300 to INR 400 each.
and Punjab borders are the other corridors through which
Pakistani agents push fake currency into India. Following
a Police raid on an ISI cell in Delhi in 2011, the arrested
operatives revealed that the Thar Express, running between
Munnabao in Pakistan and Jodhpur in Rajasthan, was being
used to smuggle FICN into India. Fake currency to the
extent of INR 3.3 million was seized from them. They also
confirmed that the Indian currency was printed in Pakistan
and illegally pushed into India through Nepal, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Malaysia and Thailand.
also flown in from Dubai, with the crime syndicate, D-Company,
headed by Dawood Ibrahim, playing a prominent role. The
D-Company has been identified as a criminal-terrorist
syndicate by the US Congress, and is on the Interpol’s
wanted list for organized crime, counterfeiting, and terrorist
activities. D-Company operations in Dubai are run by two
key lieutenants — Aftab Bhakti and Babu Gaithan. The money
is transported to India through regular flights, with
ordinary passengers. Indian workers from Dubai are specifically
targeted, and are paid the value of a return ticket that
enables them to travel home, in exchange for carrying
a consignment. From Dubai, the fake currency consignments
reach two major transit points — Mumbai and Hyderabad.
The fake currency is offered to crime networks throughout
India at a 1:2 ratio of original currency to counterfeit
consignments are also delivered to Tamil Nadu (from Sri
Lanka) and Gujarat (from Pakistan).
networks are also used for distribution. In Rajasthan,
for instance, fake currency operations are closely linked
to satta (gambling) and opium smuggling. In one
case, Asghar Ali, arrested at Ahmadabad in Gujarat in
2009, confessed to operating as a contact point for those
who sought to get into the FICN business, and facilitated
their contacts with agents who would arrange for the delivery
of FICNs against hawala payments, from Dubai and
Pakistan. He confessed to linkages with Pakistani intelligence
agencies as well.
the challenge of this new security threat in a coordinated
manner, India’s Ministry of Home Affairs, in March 2011,
asked States to step up their drives against FICNs. States
were asked to share a copy of the forensic report on the
seized and recovered FICNs with the Intelligence Bureau
(IB) and the RBI. The States were also asked to set up
a committee headed by the Directors General of Police,
with General Managers/Deputy General Managers of the RBI,
officers of the intelligence branch of the State Police,
and the Criminal Investigating Department of the State
Police, as members. A Home ministry official, on condition
of anonymity, disclosed, “States have been asked to designate
a Police Station at each District Police Headquarters
as the nodal Police Station wherein the offences relating
to FICNs recovered by banks can be reported. The banks
will also correspondingly designate a nodal officer in
each of the districts in their respective banks. These
officers will be vested with the responsibility of reporting
the seizures of the FICNs.”
have been asked to evolve an efficient system of registration
of cases, crucial to enable both proper investigation
and a comprehensive database for a meaningful action to
get to the sources of the proliferation of FICNs. The
National Investigation Agency (NIA) has also been empowered
to probe and prosecute cases relating to FICN related
offences under various provisions of the Indian Penal
Code. The Centre has nominated the CBI as the Nodal Agency
to monitor investigation of fake currency note cases.
The RBI has also strengthened the mechanism for detection
of counterfeit notes by the banks.
these various measures and a progressive recognition of
the problem by international agencies and foreign powers,
FICN inflows into India remain uninterrupted. With Pakistan’s
unrelenting commitment to the anti-India ‘jihad’,
India is yet to find an effective foil to neutralize this
tool of economic terrorism, even as it struggles to cope
with Pakistan’s terrorist proxies operating on its soil.
Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts in
June 6-12, 2011
data compiled from English language media sources.
Minister wants to keep Islam as state religion:
Sheikh Hasina wants to keep Islam the State religion,
thus preserving the illegal changes to the Constitution,
made in 2007 by the provisional Government. In a
statement on June 8, the Prime Minister responded
to those calls for the restoration of the original
secular constitution, as established by the Supreme
Court in July 2010. Spero
News, June 9, 2011.
High Court judges on IM/SIMI hit list: Two
of the three judges of the Allahabad High Court
who gave the September 2010 verdict on the Ram Janmabhoomi-Babri
Masjid title suit are on the hit list of Indian
Mujahideen (IM) and Students' Islamic Movement of
India (SIMI). From the photographs and literature
seized from ten alleged IM and SIMI cadres, who
were arrested by the ATS last week, a plot to eliminate
the judges and the publisher of a Delhi-based comic
magazine for printing drawings of Prophet Mohammed
came to light. Times
of India, June 10, 2011.
Hussein Rana held not guilty for Mumbai attacks
by US court: On June 9, Pakistani-Canadian Tahawwur
Hussain Rana was acquitted by a US court on charges
of abetting Mumbai terror attacks (November 26,
2008, also known as 26/11) but was convicted for
providing material support to the Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT) and helping a terror plot in Denmark. The
12-member jury announced the verdict at the end
of two days of deliberations against Rana, a co-accused
in the Mumbai attack with his friend, the Pakistani-American
national, David Coleman Headley. No sentencing date
was set. PTI,
June 10, 2011.
had vetoed imposition of sanction against LeT and
JeM militants, reveals a confidential cable:
From a confidential cable dated August 21, 2009
sent by the American Embassy in Beijing to Washington,
it has come to light that Chinese authorities had
place a technical hold on an Indian request to impose
sanctions on high-ranking Pakistan-based operatives
of the Laskhar-e-Toiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM). According to the cable, the Indian request
to list three militants, namely, Abdul Rahman Makki
(brother of LeT/Jud leader Hafiz Saeed and the number
two man in the LeT hierarchy), Azam Cheema (LeT
intelligence chief and a key advisor of its senior
leader Zaki-ur-Rahman Lakhvi) and Mohammad Masood
Azhar Alvi (the founder of the JeM) under the United
Nations Security Council Resolution 1267 was vetoed
by China on the grounds of lack of sufficient information
to merit such action. According to the U.S. State
Department, China's hold on listing the three terrorists
was done at the behest of Pakistan. The
Hindu, June 7, 2011.
militants still active in Jammu and Kashmir, states
General of Police (DGP) Kuldeep Khoda said on June
7 that there are an estimated 250 to 300 militants
active in the State. According to Police estimates,
in central Kashmir which comprises the Districts
of Srinagar, Budgam and Ganderbal, there is presence
of 15 militants. Daily
Excelsior, June 8, 2011.
chairman S. S. Khaplang impeached and expelled:
National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Khaplang
(NSCN-K), S. S. Khaplang, was impeached and expelled
for his alleged dictatorial leadership on June 7.
Khaplang was expelled during a meeting of militant
leaders loyal to 'general secretary' N. Kitovi Zhimomi
at the Khehoi designated camp near Dimapur, thereby
creating two factions of the outfit - one led by
Khaplang and the other by Zhimomi and Khole. Khole,
'commander-in-chief' of the group, was elected its
acting chairman. Telegraph,
June 10, 2011.
Government approves use of Russian MI17 choppers
for Maoist-hit areas: Union
Government on June 6 approved the use of MI17 Russian
choppers for Communist Party of India-Maoist (CPI-Maoist)-hit
areas in Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh,
Orissa, West Bengal, Jharkhand, Bihar, Madhya Pradesh
and Uttar Pradesh. The choppers will be made available
to the State Governments within three months. Daily
Bhaskar, June 7, 2011.
would be in place in 18 months, says Union Home
Minister P. Chidambaram: Union
Home Minister P. Chidambaram said that the National
Intelligence Grid (NATGRID), which had been given
an 'in principle' clearance by the Cabinet, would
be in place in 18 months, and would be able to prevent
26/11-type terror attacks. Headline
Today, June 11, 2011.
protection systems to be upgraded to counter terror
from seas: India
is going in for "a major upgrade'' of its harbour
protection systems (HPSs) at the naval bases in
Mumbai (in Maharashtra), Visakhapatnam (in Andhra
Pradesh), Karwar (in Karnataka), Kochi (in Kerala)
and Port Blair (in the Andaman and Nicobar islands),
along with the ongoing security audit of ports,
airfields, naval facilities, offshore installations
and the like. Top Defence Ministry sources said
that the plan is to "upgrade existing HPSs'' and
"plug gaps'' to ensure that any nefarious activity
by regular or irregular enemy forces are detected
early and neutralized swiftly. Times
of India, June 8, 2011.
road planned through Maoist-affected areas:The
road transport ministry is finalising a proposal
to develop 1,100 kilometres of road corridor along
the Andhra Pradesh border linking it with Maharashtra,
Orissa and Chhattisgarh. The latest plan to expand
the road network tops up a 2009 project worth INR
73 billion to build 5,477 km of two-lane roads in
the 33 Left Wing Extremist (LWE) hit Districts across
eight States. Hindustan
Times, June 10, 2011.
approves AISC recommendation to appoint 120 officials
for secretariat: The Government on June 10
decided to allow the secretariat of the Army Integration
Special Committee (AISC) to appoint 120 officials
to speed up its works. Among the 120 officials,
72 are section officers and 48 computer officers.
the AISC on June 7, made public another schedule
for the integration and rehabilitation of the Peoples'
Liberation Army (PLA) combatants, aiming to conclude
the regrouping of the combatants by August 27.
Nepal News, June 8-11, 2011.
sub-committee sets August 18 deadline to complete
first draft of new constitution: The sub-committee
formed by the Constitutional Committee to narrow
down disputes in the new constitution has set a
deadline of August 18 to resolve the outstanding
disputes and prepare the first draft of the new
constitution. In a meeting in the morning of June
9 (today), the sub-committee decided complete the
first draft latest by August 18, ten days before
the Constituent Assembly (CA) term expires.
Nepal News, June 9, 2011.
69 militants and 11 SFs among 80 persons killed
during the week in FATA: Five militants were
killed and nine others injured when jet fighters
pounded their hideouts in different areas of Baizai
tehsil (revenue unit) along Afghanistan border in
Mohmand Agency of Federally Administered Tribal
Areas (FATA) on June 11.
least 150 militants armed with rockets attacked
a security checkpost in North Waziristan Agency
(NWA) on June 9, killing eight soldiers. 12 militants
were also killed in retaliatory firing by Security
missile strikes hit a militant training facility
and a suspected vehicle in NWA on June 8, killing
militants and two SF personnel were killed when
militants laid an ambush on the patrol party with
automatic weapons and rocket propelled grenades
in the Shaheedan Dhand area of Kurram Agency on
militants and one trooper, Nahid Gul, were killed
when militants from Afghanistan attacked a check
post in Patala area of lower Kurram Agency near
the Pakistan Afghanistan border on June 7.
militants were killed in three US drone strikes
in South Waziristan Agency on June 6.
June 7-13, 2011.
civilians among 44 persons killed during the week
in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa: At least 39 persons were
killed in twin bomb blasts in the Khyber Super Market
in Peshawar, the provincial capital of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa
late on June 11.
June 7-13, 2011.
provides weapons to terrorists in Jammu and Kashmir,
26/11 key accuse Tahawwur Rana tells FBI: Pointing
at the Inter Services Intelligence's (ISI's) direct
involvement in providing arms to militants in Jammu
and Kashmir, Tahawwur Rana, the Pakistani-Canadian
accused in the 26/11, has told FBI that ISI gives
weapons to terrorists when they are about to enter
the Indian territory. He told FBI investigators
that Pakistani-American David Coleman Headley had
told him ISI provided weapons to "freedom fighters"
in Jammu and Kashmir. Indian
Express , June 8, 2011.
intelligence to Pakistan compromised, says Washington
Post report: The US intelligence officials
have twice handed Islamabad tips about insurgent
bomb-making factories, only to find them abandoned
before Pakistani troops arrived, Washington Post
reported on June 11. The vacated factories have
led US officials to question whether the information
had been mistakenly leaked in recent weeks or whether
the insurgents had been directly warned by Inter-Services
Intelligence (ISI), according to the report. Dawn,
June 11, 2011.
rejects US call for action against Intelligence
officers and LeT leaders: Pakistan on June 7
rejected calls by the United States (US) to prosecute
Intelligence officers and top Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT)
commanders indicted by a Federal Court for their
role in the November 2008 Mumbai attack (also known
as 26/11). Earlier, in meetings conducted in May
2011 with the US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton
Pakistani officials said that action against the
LeT could spark off a war within Pakistan. The
Hindu, June 8, 2011.
Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani's adviser terms jails
as extremist breeding ground: Mustafa Nawaz
Khokhar, an adviser to the Prime Minister, after
his visit to a jail in Haripur District of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa province on June 8 came up with the
observation that jails have become breeding grounds
for extremists because outfits like the Tehreek-e-Taliban
Pakistan (TTP) and the Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)
have taken their "ideological campaign" to prisoners.
June 9, 2011.
Qaeda remains biggest global threat, says Interpol:
Al Qaeda and outfits linked to it remain the world's
biggest Security threat despite the killing of Osama
bin Laden, the head of Interpol said on June 7.
The Interpol claimed that airlines and other forms
of public transport are most at risk, with terrorists
using fraudulent passports to travel undetected.
News, June 8, 2011.
risks losing control of nuclear arsenal to terrorists,
claim reports: According to a new report published
by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute
(SIPRI) on June 7, Pakistan is in danger of "losing
control of part of its nuclear arsenal" to terrorists.
of India, June 8, 2011.
reduce number of its military personnel in Pakistan:
The United States (US) reduced the number of its
military personnel in Pakistan following the request
of Pakistani Government, a US Defence official said
on June 10. A senior Pakistani military official
said on June 8 that Pakistan Army had sent home
90 US military personnel. Daily
Times, June 11, 2011.
confirmation" of Ilyas Kashmiri's death, says US
State Department spokesman Mark Toner: US State
Department spokesman Mark Toner told reporters in
Washington on June 7 that he had "no confirmation"
of Harkat-ul-Jihad al-Islami's (HuJI) death.
Interior Minister Rehman Malik on June 6 confirmed
the death of al Qaeda leader Ilyas Kashmiriin US
drone strike on June 3.
Express, June 7-8, 2011.
plans to release final report before Nov 15:
The Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission
(LLRC) on June 10 said that plans are underway to
release its final report before November 15, 2011.
The Commission stressed that its final report will
be completely based on the observations made by
the Commissioners through gathering oral and written
evidence from the public and field visits.
Page, June 11, 2011.
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
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terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on
counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on
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