South Asia Assessment 2002

Most of the internal security crises that plague South Asian states are both cross-border and inter-related. For example, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal, persistent ethnic problem in Sri Lanka, increasing use of Bangladeshi territory by Islamist extremists, the proliferation of small arms and the menace of drug trafficking and narco-terrorism, each of these has significant transnational dimensions. Bhutan, Bangladesh and Nepal also continue to grapple with the problem of having to deal with terrorist and extremist organisations, as well as subversive elements, based on their soil, and which operate against India.

Internal security problems in South Asia and their ramifications for regional security have been influenced by a host of international and internal factors. The destabilisation of Cold War equations and the haphazard emergence of a variety of conflicting international ‘strategic interests’ in the region, the acquisition of nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan, and a paradigm shift in the nature of international conflict, have all exacerbated regional tensions. The existence of nuclear weapons has diminished the probabilities of large-scale conventional wars. Consequently, a range of ‘non-standard’, ‘irregular’ ‘low-intensity’ or ‘sub-conventional’ wars has now become the most prevalent manifestation of inter-state confrontations. Terrorism is at the very heart of this new paradigm of international conflict. For its sponsors and perpetrators, it is a low-cost option with a high cost-benefit ratio. This strategy preys on domestic discontent, and involvement in other countries’ internal conflicts is emerging as a preferred strategy for nation-states, and as the most serious threat to regional security.

Since the September 11 terrorist attacks in the US, the focus of the international community has shifted to this region and Afghanistan. The scale and complexity of the September 11 attacks, and the location of the forces that engineered this outrage, made it necessary for the US to engage Pakistan as an ally in its campaign against international terrorism. Despite Pakistan’s emergence as ‘a frontline state’ in the US’ efforts to capture Osama bin Laden and eradicate his Al Qaeda network, the Pakistani state, through its external intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), continues with its policy of aiding terrorist outfits active in J&K and other parts of India.

India, while supporting the US-led international coalition against terrorism and the military strikes against the Taliban, Osama bin Laden and his Al Qaeda network, emphatically qualified that the war against terrorism should not be restricted to these target groups alone. The Indian position is that any effective strategy to counter the threat posed by the Islamist terrorist networks needs to take into account the range and complexity of its international linkages, and Pakistan’s inextricable relationship with, and role in creating and nurturing, these forces.

Islamist extremism has been used by Pakistan, as an instrument of state policy, since the 1980s, to further the country’s foreign policy goals vis-à-vis Afghanistan and India, and its quest for ‘strategic depth’. The Pakistani state and the Taliban have been co-sponsors of a terrorist network that essentially relies on madrassas (seminaries) and terrorist training camps located in Pakistan and (previously) in Afghanistan. There are an estimated over one million students studying in more than 10, 000 madrassas (some private estimates place their number between 40,000 and 50,000), with militant Islam as their core syllabus.

The military government, under US pressure, has made tentative efforts to register and regulate the activities of the madrassas, but was forced to reverse its stand almost immediately in the face of strong resistance.

Over the past decade, terrorists trained in Pakistan and Afghanistan had reached out across international borders, principally into the Balkans, Central Asia, China, South Asia and South East Asia, though also in some measure into Europe, Canada and the USA. The result was a tremendous expansion of the sphere of terrorism.

Any effective campaign against international terrorism, consequently, needs to recognise the relationship between Pakistan and the international Islamist terrorist network. Attempts to ignore this issue in order to facilitate Pakistan in its apparent role as a ‘frontline state’ would prove to be counterproductive in the long run.

There is, at present, little evidence to suggest that Pakistan has abandoned, or even diluted, its strategy of using Islamist extremism as an instrument of state policy. The Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir remains the prime target of this strategy, and of the activities of Pakistan-based Islamist terrorist groups.

The leadership of the terrorist movement in J&K passed from the hands of local militants into the hands of groups created by and based in Pakistan, as far back as in 1993, when the most powerful terrorist group indigenous to the State, the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), chose to give up arms and seek a ‘political solution’ to its grievances.

Currently, the most active terrorist groups in J&K are all headquartered in Pakistan. They include the Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen (HuM), linked to the Jamaat-e-Islami (JEI) in Pakistan; the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), the armed wing of the Markaz-ad-Da’awa-wal-Irshad; the Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami (HuJI) and the Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen (HM, formerly the Harkat-ul-Ansar), linked to the Jamaat-e-Ulema (JUI), Pakistan, the Pakistan Tablighi Jamaat and to the Hizb-e-Islami of Afghanistan; al Badr; and the Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), created in the year 2000. There are another score of minor and dormant groupings, also located in Pakistan. The umbrella Muttahida Jehad Council coordinates the activities of 14 of these, including the HuM, the HM and a number of minor terrorist factions claiming adherence to the Deobandi sect. Significantly, the proportion of foreign mercenaries and mujahideen involved in the militancy in the State has been steadily rising from a mere six per cent in 1992 to an estimated 55 per cent today. A majority of these are from Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK).

Unsurprisingly, the year 2001 had witnessed increasing involvement of Pakistan-based terrorist organizations and of the ISI in terrorist activities not only in J&K but in other parts of the country as well. There is coherent evidence of a strategy of encirclement through greater coordination and networking among different terrorist outfits operating in the subcontinent. Ethnic insurgencies in at least four States in India’s Northeast – Assam, Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura – persist at levels of low intensity wars, and Left Wing extremism, particularly in Andhra Pradesh, and in combination with caste wars in Bihar, are also growing concerns. Ample supplies of sophisticated weapons and enabling technologies – primarily sourced from Pakistan – have increased fatalities in local confrontations to disturbing levels, and there is a pattern of proliferation that is destabilizing all areas contiguous to existing conflicts.

In Sri Lanka, prospects for peace are apparently at their brightest turn. The Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) are set to meet in September 2002 for direct talks. Earlier, both sides declared a month-long cease-fire, which was subsequently extended and, on February 23, 2002, the LTTE and the government signed the Norwegian-brokered ‘Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the Permanent Cessation of Hostilities’. During 2001, the peace process failed to take off largely because both the government and the LTTE perceived, at different points in time during the year, the other side to be on a weak footing, when each had called for a resumption of talks to resolve the ethnic conflict.

A significant shift during the year 2001 in the LTTE’s position on a separate country (Eelam) occurred with its chief, V. Prabhakaran, declaring in his Annual Heroes Day message that his organization was neither for separatism nor terrorism. He also indicated that the LTTE would agree to a political solution within an integrated Sri Lanka, but would be forced to opt for secession if the conflict was not solved through peaceful means.

The 9/11 terrorist attacks strengthened the then Sri Lankan government’s campaign during the year 2001 for a global ban on the LTTE. Some countries among the international community had imposed restrictions on the LTTE after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US. Even while attesting support to the peace process, the US has unambiguously stated that the LTTE would continue to remain on the US State Department’s list of foreign terrorist organizations. There is substantial speculation that the LTTE has entered into the current phase of peace process for purely tactical reasons, and under increasing international pressure.

Though Bangladesh remained largely peaceful and free from terrorist violence in the year 2001, increasing use of its territory for terrorist and for subversive activities by religious extremists, pan-Islamist terrorist outfits, and insurgents operating in India’s Northeast, remain the most serious threat not only to the internal security of the country but also to the regional security environment. Moreover, rising discontentment in the Chittagong Hills Tracts (CHT), where the Accord of 1997 promised lasting peace and stability, has once again become a matter of concern.

Since the elections of October 2001, and the installation of a new regime headed by Begum Khalida Zia of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and backed by the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), communal tension and Islamist extremist mobilization has also risen dramatically. The Jamaat, which has two Ministers in the new government, and 16 members in Parliament, has also allegedly received support from the ISI, including funding and arms flows, as well as technical and training support.

A number of transnational Islamist terrorist groups, including the Al Qaeda, have established a presence in Bangladesh in alliance with various militant fundamentalist organizations there. Prominent among these is the Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami, Bangladesh (HuJI-BD), which was established with direct aid from Osama bin Laden in 1992. The HuJI-BD has very close links with the ISI, and has reportedly received financial assistance from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan (under the Taliban) through Muslim Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Bangladesh, including the Adarsa Kutir, Al Faruk Islamic Foundation and Hataddin. Operational linkages also exist with a number of foreign Islamist organizations and militants.

Various terrorist groups operating in India’s Northeast continue to find safe haven and operating bases on Bangladesh territory. Recent reports indicate that such groups, operating from Bangladesh, have started regrouping and shifting several of their camps from Bhutan to border areas in Bangladesh. Outfits like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) have been emboldened by the new BNP government in Bangladesh, which in its previous term was seen as supportive of these groups. Many leaders of Bangladesh’s ruling party are reported to have direct business linkages, including partnerships in corporations and financial operations that are run by or co-owned with leaders of such terrorist organisations. During its previous regime between 1991 and 1996, the BNP is reported to have provided these groups with unhindered facilities, such as training camps, bank accounts, arms purchases, and so on. As a result these terrorist groups, on the run in India’s Northeast under persistent pressure from Army operations, found a much-needed breathing space to regroup and re-launch their offensive against the Indian state

As in August 2002, the Maoist insurgency and counter-insurgency operations are in a state of lull. Earlier, in end-November 2001, the Maoist insurgency in Nepal has escalated to unprecedented levels. Jettisoning a four month-old cease-fire that they had announced on July 23, 2001, the Maoist insurgents launched co-ordinated country-wide strikes on the night on November 23, 2001, including their firs attack on an Army post in the history of the movement. The insurgents also declared the formation of a ‘Central People’s Government’, implying that they had constituted a national-level parallel government. At that stage, the insurgents were also running a state within a state in their strongholds, including Rolpa, Rukum, Jajarkot and Salyan districts. It was in these districts that the insurgency began in 1996. The Maoist insurgents maintain links with various left-wing extremist––Naxalite––groups active in various parts of India – though these have remained at an ideological rather than at an operational level till this point.

On the political front, Nepal is headed for mid-term elections, due on November 13. The Prime Minister, Sher Bahadur Deuba, recommended the dissolution of Parliament as a split in the ruling Nepali Congress was impending and because he did not have the numbers to secure the extension of the state of Emergency that was declared soon after the insurgents re-launched what they call ‘people’s war’.

Another problem is the increasing use of Nepales territory by the ISI and underworld operatives as a base for activities in India. Islamist extremism has also been on a rise, and is, presently, primarily directed against India. However, its linkages with organised criminal operations and the destabilisation of pockets of Muslim concentrations in the Terai region bordering India, and a rapid proliferation of madrassas in this area, are a cause of increasing concern for Kathmandu. Nepal is, consequently, emerging as an important ‘staging post’ for Pakistan’s strategy of erosion and encirclement against India, and is increasingly the preferred route for terrorist movements to various areas of low-intensity conflict in J&K and the Northeast.

Bhutan remained largely free from terrorist violence in the year 2002. However, the activities of Ngolops (armed Nepalese dissidents) and terrorist groups operating in India’s Northeast who have established their camps on Bhutanese soil, continue to arouse serious apprehensions regarding the security of this Himalayan Kingdom.

In a significant victory for the Royal Government vis-à-vis terrorists active in India’s North East, the ULFA had agreed in June 2001 to shut down four of the nine camps they have been operating in that country, and to relocate their cadres to some other destination, by December 31, 2001. Available reports indicates that ULFA has shifted three main camps from the Kalikhola and Samdrup Jhonkhar areas of Bhutan to the Arunachal Pradesh border. Other reports have pointed out that under heavy pressure from the Bhutanese authorities, ULFA cadres are reportedly attempting to set up camps and bases inside Garo Hills of India’s Meghalaya State. Conflicting intelligence, however, suggests that the closure of three camps has merely meant a shifting of the cadres to the remaining camps. The Royal Government of Bhutan has been applying pressure on various North east terrorist outfits like the ULFA, the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation (KLO) to remove their camps from Bhutanese territory. However, as these terrorist groups continue to operate from bases inside Bhutan, thus rescinding on their earlier promises, Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes said in Nagoan, Assam, on June 24, 2002, proposals were under active consideration to launch joint-operations with Bhutanese troops to flush the terrorists out of Bhutan.

Another extremely disturbing aspect of the Indian sub-continent is that two of the three largest drug growing areas of the world are located on its periphery; as the region becomes an increasingly important transit route for the international drug trade, it is progressively drawn into the destabilizing dynamics of organized crime and narco-terrorism, with hitherto unforeseen implications for peace and security far beyond the region. With opium production in Afghanistan surging once again, after a temporary, though drastic, slump, in year 2001, the movement of drugs, and the linkages of the narcotics trade with terrorist groups and operations, could cause significant disturbances in the region. There are, however, several countervailing factors currently in operation as well, including the US presence in Pakistan (traditionally the fulcrum of distribution and narco-terrorist operations), and the easier access to Europe through Central Asia and other routes North of Afghanistan.

In south Asia, the most potent threat to security emanates from the complex interplay of domestic, regional and international factors. These factors are superimposed, in this region, on societies deeply fragmented by their obsession with caste and community; and with linguistic, regional and cultural differences. These are societies, moreover, which are enormously unequal and inequitable. Given the mixed administrative and political record of successive regimes in the various constituent countries, it is unsurprising that the manifestations of discontent in explicit conflict and violence have seen a continuous escalation over the last half-century.

The stability of South Asia, and the success and failure of initiatives for the resolution of existing conflicts will, in the 21st Century, depend on the exploration of new ideas, ideologies and strategies that provide concrete and effective alternatives to violence as a means to political ends; and these alternatives will have to appeal, equally, to the establishment and to the alienated groupings that currently believe that violence is the only method to secure some relief within the prevailing system.