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Indian
Media
December 18, 2001 |
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December 10, 2001 |
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December 7, 2001 |
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December 6, 2001 |
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December 3, 2001 |
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November 28, 2001 |
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November 26, 2001 |
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November 12, 2001 |
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November 10, 2001 |
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November 9, 2001 |
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November 8, 2001 |
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November 6, 2001 |
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November 5, 2001 |
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November 3, 2001 |
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November 1, 2001 |
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October 31, 2001 |
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October 30, 2001 |
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October 29, 2001 |
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October 27, 2001 |
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October 26, 2001 |
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October 25, 2001 |
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October 24, 2001 |
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October 23, 2001 |
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October 22, 2001 |
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October 20, 2001 |
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October 19, 2001 |
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October 18, 2001 |
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October 17, 2001 |
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October 16, 2001 |
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October 15, 2001 |
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October 13, 2001 |
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October 12, 2001 |
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October 11, 2001 |
- Editorial, The Hindu, Chenai
- Editorial, Indian Express,
New Delhi
- Editorial, Indian Express,
New Delhi
- Editorial, Hindustan Times,
New Delhi
- Editorial, Hindustan Times,
New Delhi
- Editorial, Hindustan times
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October 10, 2001 |
- Editorial, The Hindu, Chennai
- Editorial, Hindustan Times,
New Delhi
- Editorial, Hindustan Times,
New Delhi
- Editorial, Indian Express,
New Delhi
- Editorial, Indian Express, New Delhi
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October 9 , 2001 |
- Editorial, The Hindu, Chennai
- Editorial, Hindustan Times, New Delhi
- Editorial, Hindustan Times, New Delhi
- Editorial, Hindustan Times, New Delhi
- Editorial, Indian Express,
New Delhi
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October 1 , 2001 |
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September 29, 2001 |
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September 28, 2001 |
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September 27, 2001 |
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September 26, 2001 |
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September 25, 2001 |
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September 18, 2001 |
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September 17, 2001 |
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September 14, 2001 |
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September 13, 2001 |
- Editorial, Daily Excelsior,
Jammu
- Editorial, The Hindu, Chennai
- Editorial, Pioneer, New Delhi
- Editorial, Indian Express, New
Delhi
- Editorial, Hindustan Times,
New Delhi
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September 12, 2001 |
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Afghanistan
is yet to be a holiday destination and is unlikely to be one for some
time to come. But the gaiety with which Id was celebrated in Kabul on
Monday shows how repressed Afghans were under the soul-sapping regime
of the Taliban.
The paradox could not be
keener. The self-styled ‘upholders of true Islam’ would be puzzled to
find how Afghans have thronged to the mosques after they have been sent
packing. But there is really no surprise in this. Cracking the whip
has never been the best way of convincing people about a cause or belief.
Apart from the spontaneous
act of flocking to mosques, the people of Kabul are also tasting the
sweet joys of expressing themselves after years of repression. For eight
long years, Afghans were barred from singing, dancing, flying kites
— a traditional pastime — watching television or even listening to music.
Cinemas and beauty parlours were outlawed as were other forms of sport
and entertainment. In this atmosphere of ultra-puritanism, enjoying
was a sin. As a result, the neurotic Taliban have managed via negativa
to make Afghans celebrate Id — and life itself — with a vengeance.
The most blatant act of
rejecting the Taliban past has been displayed by the women of Afghanistan.
Not only were their lives constricted by barbaric ‘laws’, but they were
also treated as sub-humans existing only as a sort of necessary evil.
In the past, Afghan women have played a prime role in the modernisation
of the country.
The flight of the Taliban,
therefore, signals not only the resurrection of spontaneous emotions
in Afghanistan but of the country itself. While women have not rejected
the burqa outright (and why should they, considering it is a part of
Afghan culture predating the Taliban), they symbolically renounced the
symbol of Taliban oppression by observing Id without wearing one. Despite
the severe hardships facing Afghans, this year’s Id will be remembered
as the one in which a battered people started to celebrate life once
again.
-- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, December 18, 2001
For
the Taliban, history has come full circle. If Kandahar was their launching
pad, it has now proved their graveyard. In the winter of 1994, a mysterious
group that was to put the mark of Cain on the world, conquered Kandahar
in southern Afghanistan, from where it pushed northwards. In time it
captured the country’s capital. Kabul’s fall to these forces in September
1996 signalled the arrival of Afghanistan’s new conquerors — or, rather,
new tyrants. Within two years, they had 90 per cent of the country within
their grip. Today, they have been officially declared as a dead force,
with Hamid Karzai, the new chief of the interim administration in Afghanistan,
pronouncing that ‘‘the Taliban rule is finished — as of today, it is
no longer a part of Afghanistan.’’ Osama bin Laden may not be within
view as yet, and the future of Omar Mullah is shrouded in mystery. But
clearly, the Taliban have vanished from centre stage.
How did the seemingly unorganised
talib, or Islamic student, come to assume the importance he did, sometimes
without even firing a shot?
How did a group of young
madrassa students — some of them mere teenagers who never knew what
it was like to live in peace-time conditions, streaming across from
refugee camps in Pakistan — come to exercise total sway over a country
notoriously difficult to rule? These will remain some of the great questions
of contemporary Afghan history. Clearly, for a war-ravaged nation, the
Taliban, with their promise of peace, almost appeared at one stage to
be liberators, a force that could finally tame the warlords that had
carved up the country into innumerable fiefdoms after the retreat of
the Russians and perpetrated innumerable atrocities upon the people.
The fact that they were largely derived from Pashtun ethnic stock, and
seemed to represent Pashtun nationalism, helped galvanise strong public
support for them in the southern half of the country. They also held
out the hope of performing the task of cleansing society, with their
messianic brand of Islam, combined with the strict Pashtun tribal code.
Above all, they proved extremely adept at facilitating deals and buying
loyalty through the simple expedient of bribing key commanders.
It wasn’t long, however,
before the ugly contours of the new political dispensation came into
view. The murder of one-time president, Najibullah, and the brutal mutilation
of his body in 1996 — symbolised the brutality and peremptory punishment
that were soon to become the hallmarks of the new order. Public submission
was extracted through fear created through a combination of public executions
and extraordinarily oppressive codes of conduct for women. Their exit
from the scene, therefore, of this band of desperadoes can only be cause
for the greatest relief — and delight. But the delight will necessarily
be tinged with concern over the future of a nation, that was once described
by poet Mohammed Iqbal as the heart of Asia but which is really in many
ways the orphan of the world. The Taliban brand of tyranny has passed
on, but that is still no guarantee that others of the same ilk will
not emerge from the wasted stretches of Afghanistan at some future date.
-- Editorial, Indian
Express, New Delhi, December 10, 2001
For
all the rhetoric that went into fabricating the Taliban’s larger-than-life
image, the collapse of their regime in Afghanistan has come about sooner
than most people had expected.
The fall of Kandahar on
Friday, which had been held out as the last bastion, has put paid to
all those quixotic claims. The Taliban’s earlier declaration of resolve
to fight to the last man has proved hollow. As the US bombing campaign
persisted day after day, they seem to have realised that their game
was up, and sued for surrender. At least in that one act, they seem
to have demonstrated better sense than this conglomeration of rag-tag
medieval fighters is usually thought capable of. With the capture of
Mullah Mohammed Omar and Osama bin Laden, which is expected to happen
in the next few days, the essential targets of the military campaign
may be assumed to have been achieved.
What then remain are the
problems of peace which may be far more complex and harder to tackle
than delivering bombing sorties. The humanitarian needs of a population
that has been bombed back to pre-Stone Age conditions remain enormous.
As the country directly hit by Al-Qaeda’s acts of terror, it was the
US that was in charge of the military mission. But as the guns begin
to fall silent, it is the international community that should now have
a larger role to play in restoration of normalcy in Afghanistan. Whether
it is the task of bringing to justice those found guilty of involvement
in acts of terrorism or delivering the humanitarian help, the UN should
have a larger role to play than it has during the bombing campaign.
Such an approach would
also involve being mindful of the sensitivities of the position of the
new leadership in Kabul which is keen to restore the image of its government
as a sovereign entity. Any attempt to ‘backseat drive’ these leaders
is likely to come unstuck, as has often happened in the past. It is
an indication of such sensitivities that Younous Qanooni, the new interior
minister, flew to New Delhi for talks here following the Bonn meeting.
Apart from signalling recognition of the goodwill and support the new
regime enjoys in New Delhi, it indicated a desire to enlarge the interim
government’s regional support network. The new leadership is aware that
Kabul’s exclusive dependence on any one country has not worked to its
advantage in the past, and its desire to enlarge its circle of friends
could only help in its stability in the future.
-- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, December 10, 2001
THE
`NEGOTIATED SURRENDER' by the Taliban at Kandahar and the fallout of
unanswered questions seem to illustrate America's acute dilemma in the
present phase of its ongoing war on terrorism in Afghanistan. The leadership
of the obscurantist Taliban and its brutal ally, Osama bin Laden's Al-Qaeda
network, still remain the elusive targets of the U.S. in the context
of its declaratory ``principles'' of this anti-terror war. In choosing
a horde of tactical allies and friends who might be able to pursue the
leaders of the Taliban-Osama axis, the U.S. has encouraged even adversarial
Afghan groups on the basis of their compatible professions of an anti-Taliban
agenda. Since the very beginning of this war two months ago, the only
factor uniting these antagonistic Afghan groups with the U.S. was their
litany of grudges against the Taliban. The U.S. President, Mr. George
W. Bush, has sought to rule the sky during this period and let his Afghan
proxies hound the Taliban on the ground. The limited presence of America's
land-based Special Forces is said to have more to do with the ``hunting''
of Osama and the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar. It is within this tactical
space of such war aims that the U.S.' proxy, the Northern Alliance,
gradually wrested control of almost all strategic areas, including Mazar-e-Sharif
and the capital of Kabul, from the Taliban. And now, the Taliban's original
springboard, the Kandahar city, has ``fallen'' into the hands of a loose
coterie of Pushtun tribal groups. Unlike the Northern Alliance, which
is primarily dominated by Afghanistan's ethnic minorities, these Pushtun
groups hail from the country's majority population that was the mainspring
of the Taliban too.
In some ways, the farcical
aspects of the Taliban's ``negotiated surrender'' to an amorphous front
of Pushtun tribal groups can be linked to the eagerness of both sides
to avoid a bloodbath involving some political adversaries of the same
ethnic stock. Surely, there is nothing at all wrong with a largely bloodless
``surrender'' by the Taliban at Kandahar. However, the international
community is simply aghast at the amateurish manner in which the Taliban
leader, Mullah Omar, has been allowed to remain at large instead of
giving himself up in line with the terms of a ``negotiated surrender''.
This may exemplify America's troubles with its own proxies. However,
Washington's promise of a sustainable `campaign' in the future against
globalised terror will call for political candour as also strategic
credibility of a very high order that was not witnessed during the ``fall''
of Kandahar at this time.
Surely, the Bush administration
does not seek to downplay the dangers and difficulties ahead as it tries
to capture Osama and Mullah Omar. The larger concerns of the global
community, inclusive of the U.S., go beyond tactical necessities. Already,
genuine doubts have arisen regarding the viability of the power-sharing
agreement that the U.N. brokered only a few days ago for a post-Taliban
dispensation in Afghanistan in the short run. This has much to do with
the political ambitions of the various Afghan groups that signed the
relevant accord. More disturbing is the trend of some U.S.-friendly
Pushtun groups allowing a sizable number of the Taliban radicals to
flee from Kandahar with their weapons. A tiny fraction of such fugitives
has been engaged by the small contingent of the U.S. Special Forces
on the ground. The overriding imperative is that the U.S. should ensure
that the lapses of its proxies do not result in a future shock for the
other countries including India on the hit-list of the Taliban-Osama
axis. The essentially apolitical ``principles'' of the present war -
a universal anti-terror agenda and the need to avoid humanitarian tragedies
- cannot be lost sight of for any reason.
-- Editorial, The
Hindu, Chennai, December 10, 2001
THE UNITED
NATIONS seems to have drawn a rough but promising road map that might
help steer Afghanistan, a failed state, towards a civilised political
future. There can be no doubt whatsoever that Afghanistan must be liberated
from the clutches of the notorious Taliban and its cohort, Osama bin
Laden, the suspected czar of international terrorism. Their agenda of
grisly political terror as also social obscurantism has already ravaged
the country that straddles an important region in the geopolitical neighbourhood
of India. With the Taliban now clearly on the retreat in the face of
nearly two months of a massive military offensive by the United States,
Afghanistan is generally regarded to have become increasingly inhospitable
to Osama too. In one sense, a critical matter of concern to the international
community is that the actual fate or present whereabouts of Osama as
also the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, are still far from clear. Yet,
the overall international mood in regard to Afghanistan is to count
out the Taliban-Osama axis as a durable factor of instability within
that country itself. It is in this context that the U.N. has found it
possible to take an optimistic view of the lingering uncertainties.
A subtle, unstated, distinction appears to have been drawn by the U.N.
between the possible future of Afghanistan as a Taliban-free society
with a democratic polity, in one scenario, and a larger international
order without the scourge of political terror, on a separate plane.
This alone can explain the current efforts by the U.N. to place Afghanistan
on a slow track towards an orderly polity even before the Taliban-Osama
axis has been conspicuously decimated in line with the stated objectives
of the U.S.
If the U.S. as also its
allies and friends can exercise due care to ensure that the residual
battle against the Taliban-Osama axis does not ruin Afghanistan's march
towards a civilised polity, the U.N.'s current efforts may be seen to
be truly meaningful. The Northern Alliance, the anti-Taliban force with
some basic Afghan characteristics, is now in control of much of the
country including the capital, Kabul. As America's present-day proxy
on the ground in Afghanistan, the Northern Alliance has not only gained
from the U.S.' air strikes against the Taliban but also contributed
to the American war plans in some measure. This aspect accounts for
the Alliance-weighted power-sharing formula worked out by the U.N. for
the Afghan transition towards democracy over an estimated period of
about two-and-a-half years from now.
The rough blueprint, approved
by the Afghan delegations that have held intensive discussions under
U.N. guidance for over a week in Germany, provides for an interim `Prime
Minister' with a Cabinet. In about six months, a loya jirga or a traditional
national convention will be called, perhaps under the moral authority
of the former Afghan monarch (`King' Zahir Shah), to establish a new
dispensation. The `government' so formed is expected to put the country
through the paces of a transition to a democratic order which will be
ushered in through polls to be held on the principle of political pluralism.
While the interim `Prime Minister' will be from the majority Pashtun
community, the Northern Alliance will get the pivotal portfolios of
defence as also foreign policy and internal affairs in the run-up to
the loya jirga. On paper, the division of power for this proposed `interim'
period reflects the ground realities. Yet, the success of the U.N.-engineered
plan will depend on a number of imponderables including the likely equation
between the Northern Alliance and the planned international security
force, which (if it takes off) may have more to do with turning Afghanistan
into a terror-free zone rather than a democratic society.
-- Editorial, The
Hindu, Chennai, December 7, 2001
The western
coalition, looking for a way to launch the new government in Afghanistan,
had invested so much in the Bonn meeting of the non-Taliban Afghan groups
that it simply could not afford to let it fail. So even though it took
some arm- twisting to make the four main formations participating in
the Bonn conclave to fall in line, everybody was relieved when they
finally put their signatures on the final agreement on Wednesday.
That should pave the way
for the installation of an interim administration mandated to rule in
Kabul for a six-month period when a Loya Jirga, or an assembly of the
tribal leaders, will be summoned as part of a process to enlarge the
representative character of the interim government. According to this
time-table, national elections will be held in about two years so that
a stable and fully representative government is finally put in place.
As of now, the agreement
seems to have managed a balance of interests among the participating
groups. While the position of the majority Pashtuns has been acknowledged
in choosing the 44-year old Hamid Karzai as prime minister of the interim
government, it is the Northern Alliance — since rechristened as United
Front — that has emerged as the most influential group. The Alliance
has bagged 17 of the 23 ministerial positions, besides three of the
five posts of vice-chairmen. With a total of eleven Pashtuns in the
29-member government — which will have former King Zahir Shah as its
nominal head — the numbers nearly match their percentage of population
in the country. However, what remains in question is the representative
character of those selected. Only two of those chosen are apparently
able to speak Pashtu, while most of the others have been living outside
Afghanistan and have had little contact with the ground situation.
While these imbalances
are expected to be set right when the elections are held, what happens
in the interim period shall have a vital bearing on the working of the
proposed time-table. One critical factor is the time it takes to terminate
the fighting. The Taliban, of course, would try to keep hitting in order
to increase the vulnerability of the new government. And if it goes
awry, the presence of even a multi-national peace keeping force may
not be of much help. Likewise, it may not be too difficult to mollify
the outgoing President, Burhanuddin Rabbani. But managing the northern
warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, who too has been side-lined in this dispensation,
could be somewhat difficult — especially in a country where past hurts
or humiliations are not easily forgiven or forgotten.
-- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, December 7, 2001
Well
wishers of the Afghan people will definitely be enthused by the broad
agreement reached at the Bonn talks, which paves the way for a representative
government in Kabul. The talks held at the initiative of UN special
envoy to Afghanistan, Lakhdar Brahimi, has prepared a timetable which,
if followed, will eventually result in a democratically elected government
in that war-torn nation. If things go as planned, a new interim authority
will be in place in Kabul around December 22. Pashtun leader, Hamid
Karzai, assisted by five deputies and 23 other ministers, the names
of whom are yet to be announced, will head the authority. This means
the current regime led by Burhannudin Rabbani will be supplanted. Karzai
will hold fort for six months, after which a loya jirga, or grand traditional
assembly of elders, will be called to frame a constitution for the country
and form an interim government. A larger loya jirga will ratify the
constitution under which democratic elections will be held. The agreement
also mentions the deployment of a multinational peacekeeping force to
‘‘assist in the maintenance of security for Kabul and its surrounding
areas’’. Women will get a fair representation.
There is no doubt the agreement
is quite comprehensive. However, its success will depend on whether
the various Afghan factions will stand by the agreement. Some difficulties
in the implementation of the agreement can be foreseen. First, questions
will be raised about the representative character of the four Afghan
delegations that took part in the Bonn talks. Sceptics will say that
Afghan society is ethnically so divided that vast sections of it went
unrepresented at Bonn. Rabbani would find it difficult to reconcile
himself to the loss of power, although he has in the past expressed
his willingness to abdicate in favour of a consensus leader. The reference
the agreement makes to the glorious role he and his Mujahideen had played
in the struggle ‘‘against terrorism and oppression’’ may not be sufficient
to keep him content. Already, Rabbani and his allies had begun hinting
that the participants in the Bonn talks were allowing the West to take
over the country, by introducing foreign troops, disarming the Mujahideen
and organising war crimes trials. This could be his future line of attack.
The Northern Alliance may
appear united in the fight against the Taliban but it is divided not
only on ethnic lines but also on the proximity of their leaders to the
West, Pakistan, Iran and the former Soviet Union. Sorting out these
differences is central to the success of the agreement. In this context,
the decision to include in the loya jirgas representatives of Afghan
refugees living in Iran, Pakistan and elsewhere, as also members of
the Afghan diaspora, makes sense. While the idea of confining the UN-led
multinational force to Kabul and its surrounding areas is to let the
US-led forces have complete freedom in their operations against the
Taliban and the Al-Qaeda, disarming the various militia operating there
could indeed be messy. After all, the Afghan’s passion for the gun is
well known. But if law and order are to prevail in the country, the
wielders of guns will have to be disarmed.
-- Editorial, Indian
Express, New Delhi, December 6, 2001
It wasn’t
so long ago that the souk was seething. The American bombardment in
Afghanistan to incapacitate the Taliban appeared to horrify Muslim opinion
everywhere.
Quite simply, the reason
was that ordinary folk did not quite comprehend the monstrous scale
on which the Taliban system worked, abetted by tainted funds supplied
through ‘benefactors’ like Pakistan. Nor was it adequately understood
that long before the twin towers went down in New York, the real victims
of the terror networks for years were ordinary Muslims in predominantly
Islamic societies, such as West Asia and Pakistan. In Afghanistan, the
worst hit were women and children.
Nevertheless, so pervasive
had become the malign influence of the networked propaganda machine
of the mediaevalists that it was easy to whip up the frenzied idea that
the world was ganging up against Islam and Muslim Afghanistan. The Muslim
poor became particularly susceptible to this influence. The whipping
up was being done by the Al-Qaeda’s global networks, masquerading as
religious or welfare bodies dedicated to education, healthcare or waqf
matters. Since the Northern Alliance fighters — Muslim to a man — pushed
the Taliban back and went rushing into Kabul to a hugging welcome by
its residents, the lies have suddenly exploded. The ‘street’ has gone
quiet in Islamic lands. Peshawar and Quetta are no longer being rocked
by revolt. The supposedly intrepid ‘jehadis’ are running away from the
battle which is being won every passing day by Muslims sworn to wipe
out the Taliban and reconstruct life anew in Afghanistan.
In these circumstances,
it is hardly a surprise that our own loose cannon, the Shahi Imam of
Delhi’s Jama Masjid, has fallen silent. He had made it his business
to inflame passions, boost pro-terrorist sentiment and denigrate public
figures like Shabana Azmi in the hope of cashing in on carefully manufactured
popular paranoia among the poorer Muslims. But all said and done, the
historical retreat of the spurious jehadi sentiment must await the day
when democrats speak up across the Muslim world.
-- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, December 3, 2001
AMERICA'S
MILITARY `CAMPAIGN' against international terror seems to have acquired
the proportions of a war without rules on the rugged terrain of Afghanistan.
In a political sense, the battle lines themselves are overshadowed by
controversies. In a clear escalation, the U.S. has begun to deploy hundreds
of ground troops on the outskirts of Kandahar - presumptively, the fall-
back bastion of the suspected terror twins, the Taliban and Osama bin
Laden's Al-Qaeda organisation. The mandate of the U.S. Marines has been
variously outlined. However, the central theme pertains to their training
for dexterous operations that might require high skills for non-conventional
manoeuvres as also the more orthodox combat duties. The message being
conveyed by Washington is that the U.S. will now try every trick in
the book and beyond it to carry forward what may turn out to be the
ultimate push in the hunt for Osama bin Laden and his chief Taliban
host, Mullah Omar. In America's apparent reckoning, the two are thought
to have made the Kandahar region their final sanctuary in the war which
the U.S. launched on October 7 with a massive show of cruise missile
attacks and aerial bombardment against the Taliban's military and other
infrastructure facilities. Despite the incremental military steps that
the U.S. has taken since then, the latest battle lines evoke a poignant
dilemma. There is no doubt that the U.S., on one side, and the Taliban
as also Osama's Al-Qaeda, on the other side, regard each other as the
sworn enemy. What complicates their standoff, though, is the obvious
plight of the ordinary Afghans. It is this aspect that blurs the `moral'
dividing line that certainly exists between the U.S. and Britain as
the allies-in-combat, in one formation, and the Taliban- Osama axis.
From the beginning of this
war, the U.S. has not been found wanting in its articulation of concerns
about the well-being of innocent Afghan civilians. However, there is
little encouraging evidence to show that either the United Nations or
the U.S. itself has been able to ameliorate the obvious hardships of
the ordinary Afghans in a meaningful manner. If this is inevitable in
a war without precedent against terrorism, the sheer disorder that seems
to define the amateurish conduct of the `campaign' itself raises many
disconcerting questions. The motley anti- Taliban group, known as the
Northern Alliance, is America's acknowledged proxy or ally (depending
on one's perspective). Yet, shockingly messy is the manner in which
the Northern Alliance has sought to quell a major riot by the Taliban's
non-Afghan comrades after they were taken prisoner during the battles
for Kunduz and Mazar-e-Sharif. This demonstrates a failure by the U.S.
to ensure that the recognised norms of war are adhered to by those acting
under its auspices.
On a higher plane of war
aims, the U.S. has not so far produced the fine judicial-grade evidence
that the larger international community would like to see regarding
Osama's proven complicity in the terrorist crimes against humanity that
occurred on American soil on September 11. However, this does not negate
the other reality that Osama himself may have in some ways taken credit
for the tragic events on that day. Discernible beyond these niceties
are two disturbing aspects of the `war' on terror. First, the U.S. President,
Mr. George W. Bush, has yet to outline clearly a blueprint of political-diplomatic
goals that determine his disproportionate use of force in Afghanistan
at this time. Second, he seems to be in a hurry to enlarge the definition
of terrorism, solely from a U.S. perspective, without leaving the task
to a forum like the United Nations.
-- Editorial, The
Hindu, Chennai, November 28, 2001
The
end game in Afghanistan could well have begun. The landing of US marines
in Kandahar means the Americans are willing to take a huge risk. They
have so far confined themselves to making the passage smoother for the
Northern Alliance by bombing and destroying vital installations of the
Taliban and the Al-Qaeda. The fall of one city after another to the
Northern Alliance shows the US strategy as having met with success.
It is now only a matter of time before Kandahar, from where the Taliban
strongman Mullah Omar had been controlling Afghan affairs, also falls
to the Northern Alliance. So what has prompted this sudden deployment
of ground forces which could result in American casualties? It could
be because the US does not want the impression to persist that it is
afraid of a ground war. Also, Kandahar is in the southern part of the
country where the Northern Alliance does not enjoy any groundswell of
support or natural advantages. In other words, the Northern Alliance
cannot be depended upon to conduct the war in the south with the finesse
they displayed in the north. But whatever be the reasons, the Taliban
have got an opportunity for a direct combat with the US forces.
This, then, will be the
most decisive battle of all. The deployment of the marines could also
be a measure of US confidence, not only about their invincibility but
their abilities in locating Osama bin Laden. If the Taliban’s claim
that they had been withdrawing for strategic reasons is true, the Americans
could indeed be in for a rude shock. In any case, it is too optimistic
to believe the Taliban would surrender in Kandahar without a fight because
Kandahar represents all that the Taliban stand for. The fight they put
up at Kunduz, even after they surrendered to the Northern Alliance,
could be a pointer to the shape of things to come. Of course, this is
not to discount the possibility that the so-called ‘revolt’ by the Taliban
was stage-managed by the Northern Alliance to finish them off. Reports
suggest that there are no Taliban survivors after the horrendous ‘clashes’
in Kunduz. Given the UN reluctance to ensure the safety and welfare
of the surrendering forces under the relevant international conventions,
the fate of those defending Mullah Omar and bin Laden cannot be any
different.
All these killings and
counter-killings would have made some sense if they finally led to the
establishment of a government acceptable to all the various ethnic sections
of Afghan society and which is able to ensure law and order in the country.
President Burhanuddin Rabbani’s conciliatory stance towards other ethnic
groups is a welcome trend as, indeed, Pakistan’s readiness to do business
with the powers that be in Kabul. It is against this backdrop that the
UN-sponsored conference on Afghanistan is taking place in Bonn. The
success of the conference where India has the observer status depends
on the willingness of the Northern Alliance to give a fair representation
to the Pashtuns, who are Afghanistan’s single largest ethnic group and
without whom there cannot be a representative and enduring government.
However, the Taliban have by their conduct forfeited their right to
have a say in the decision-making process of Afghanistan.
-- Editorial, Indian
Express, New Delhi, November 28, 2001
THE TALIBAN'S ROUT in
Kabul, the Afghan capital, has not settled the fundamental issues of
concern to the global community as regards the ongoing U.S.-led military
`campaign' against international terrorism. A critical reality during
the relative lull over the week-end was that the cruelly regressive
Taliban's `commanders' held out at Kandahar and virtually sued for their
face-saving surrender at Kunduz, both strategic towns in Afghanistan.
Elusive, as a result, is the terror-axis that links the Taliban and
Osama bin Laden, the suspected evil genius behind the heinous carnage
that shook America and the entire civilised world on September 11. Outwardly,
the Taliban's high command is now reported to have claimed that it has
severed links with Osama's Al-Qaeda network. On a different but relevant
plane, Pakistan has finally stripped the Taliban of its last fig leaf
of diplomatic recognition. Originally, the U.S. did appear to have persuaded
Pakistan to become a tactical ally for the present phase of the anti-terror
`campaign' that was launched on October 7. Moreover, Washington found
nothing really amiss until very recently about Islamabad's autonomous
decision to keep the diplomatic door open to the Taliban, originally
Pakistan's political protege. In this regard, the latest official `spin'
in Washington is that Pakistan's diplomatic channels of communication
with the Taliban were indeed of some avail as long as the fanatical
Afghan group held a few Western citizens captive before finally releasing
them very recently. Whether or not Islamabad has actually been guided
by this aspect or by the political implications of the Taliban's latest
flight from Kabul, Pakistan's decision at this time to snap ties with
the radicalised Afghan group can be of strategic importance to the ongoing
American `campaign' inside Afghanistan itself.
At one level, the Taliban
must have read the signal that its isolation on the international stage
cannot be more decisive. It, therefore, remains to be seen whether this
fact alone can persuade or pressure the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar,
to let his ideological alter-ego and partner, Osama bin Laden, face
the U.S. and the international community on his own without any `moral'
or material backing from the Talibanised Afghans. On a totally different
plane, the Taliban's final estrangement with Official Pakistan seems
to account for the credible but unconfirmed reports that the Taliban
fighters are willing to strike a deal with the ascendant Northern Alliance
and save their own lives and to do so by leaving their ``foreigner comrades''
in the field, many Pakistanis as also Arabs and Chechens, to their own
devices and fate. The U.S.-backed Northern Alliance is a motley coalition
of anti-Taliban forces with quintessential Afghan moorings.
It is in this context that
Pakistan's President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, appears to be running out
of options for saving the Pakistanis inside Afghanistan, given especially
the reports from Washington that the U.S. has not authorised any air-lift
of such people of concern to Islamabad. It is doubtful, however, whether
Gen. Musharraf, who in September took the courageous `moral' and strategic
decision to back the U.S. in the face of opposition inside Pakistan,
will now allow this issue to impede the international efforts to break
the Taliban-Osama axis and to pursue the two separately. Given the international
stakes, the Northern Alliance, which now controls Kabul and has agreed
to participate in a U.N.- sponsored conference on the political future
of Afghanistan, should also act responsibly. In monitoring these developments,
New Delhi should not spoil its copybook by resorting to any unseemly
jockeying for a strategic `presence' in Afghanistan.
-- Editorial, The
Hindu, Chennai, November 26, 2001
Ever
since Pakistan’s somersault from being a friend of the Taliban to —
not an enemy — just a close acquaintance, Islamabad has managed the
transition with some finesse.
Except for the suspicion
that a recent fire in the army headquarters was not due to a short-circuit,
as was claimed, but the burning of documents relating to the army’s
and the ISI’s links with the Taliban, Pakistan has covered its tracks
fairly well. This hasn’t been a mean feat considering the long years
of partnership between the two, which preceded the formal takeover of
Afghanistan by the Taliban in 1996. True, there has been a few embarrassing
moments, as when an ISI delegation was suspected of having advised Mullah
Omar to carry the good fight against the Americans instead of asking
him to surrender, as it was meant to do. The questioning of Pakistani
nuclear scientists by the Americans is another matter which must be
a cause of concern in Islamabad, for no one knows what may finally emerge
from their depositions.
However, nothing can be
as disconcerting for Pakistan as the uncertain fate of its trapped nationals
who had gone to Afghanistan to fight for the Taliban. It isn’t only
the deep distress which will be generally felt in Pakistan if they are
mercilessly gunned down in accordance with the Afghan tradition which
must be unnerving for Islamabad. What must be no less unsettling is
the revelations they might make if caught. Although a majority of them
may have gone there on their own, the chances of official involvement
cannot be ruled out in the context of the earlier close ties between
Pakistan and the Taliban. It is possible that the Pakistani helicopters
have already ferried out the regular army personnel who had been trapped
in Kunduz. But the capture of the others, who number in hundreds, is
bound to cast further doubts on the Pakistani disclaimers about being
involved in terrorism in Kashmir and elsewhere.
Not surprisingly, Islamabad
has been insisting on a safe passage for its nationals, with the promise
that they will be arrested on entering Pakistan. But it is not a request
which the rest of the world can accept. The Pakistanis, and also the
Arabs, Chechens, British Muslims and others, hadn’t gone to Afghanistan
on a tourist visa. They were — and are — terrorists who waged a jehad
on behalf of the Taliban and Osama bin Laden and will continue to do
so if given a reprieve. So, the only course open for them is to lay
down their arms and surrender to the besieging forces which, in the
case of Kunduz, happen to be the Northern Alliance.
--- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, November 26, 2001
ON THE
DAY the Northern Alliance, a friend of India and present ally of the
U.S., scored a breakthrough victory in Mazar-i-Sharif in northern Afghanistan
- the first on the ground on behalf of the global alliance - Indian
diplomacy secured a triumph of sorts in Washington. The formulation
in the joint statement issued at the end of Mr. Vajpayee's talks with
Mr. George Bush, describing both countries as ``targets of terrorism''
and clubbing the September 11 terror attacks in New York and Washington
and the October 1 assault on the Assembly building in Srinagar, is acknowledgement
by Washington, in however roundabout a manner, that it accepted in theory
the need to root out this menace everywhere. New Delhi's ceaseless campaign
to bring the focus on the Pakistan-sponsored terrorism it has been battling
for more than a decade had begun paying dividends. In remarks at a joint
press conference earlier, Mr. George Bush had half-met India's concerns
over the sponsorship of terrorism from across the border. Calling it
the ``evil'' of the politics of terrorism and murder, Mr. Bush had declared
that there was but one universal law of anti-terror, implying that it
will be applicable to all forms of such activity but giving no clue
if and when it will be applied to specific other cases. It did not matter
that this was vague enough to mean all things to all allies and friends.
It also did not matter immediately that while Mr. Vajpayee may be talking
of targets in his neighbourhood, his host may have his sights on old
enemies further west in the Gulf region.
There were some other gains,
too, on the bilateral front, more promises and few clear losses from
the Prime Minister's mission to Washington as part of a three-nation
voyage. It was clear that while India was eager not to compound Washington's
worries by highlighting its specific concerns - Mr. Bush openly hailed
the ``understanding'' shown by Mr. Vajpayee - the U.S was anxious to
ensure that New Delhi was not alienated and understood American compulsions.
As the two countries took one more step at the summit level to turn
the estranged democracies into engaged democracies, the state of health
of post-Sept. 11 bilateral relations was on public view on the precincts
of the White House: there was the single-mindedness of purpose and steely
determination of the U.S on one side of the podium and on the other
the genuine worry and concern of India that it may have to fend for
itself in tackling cross-border terrorism sponsored by its western neighbour
after the Afghan crisis eases and world attention shifts away. Mr. Bush
apparently brought no pressure to bear on Mr. Vajpayee to return to
the dialogue process with Pakistan.
If Mr. Vajpayee's visit
to the White House was itself the message at these extraordinarily sensitive
times in the U.S, he did win friends by declaring that India will not
overload the agenda of the global coalition, thereby unambiguously addressing
a major U.S concern and promising to continue the policy of restraint
that came under severe strain on Oct. 1 in the wake of the terrorist
attack in Srinagar. The Prime Minister effectively projected India's
basic argument that a frontline partner of the U.S-led coalition cannot
be allowed to sponsor terrorism. In the end, there was but one message,
and one objective. Washington let it be known to India, which was among
the first to offer to join the fight against terrorism, that the global
alliance's guns will for now be fully and solely trained on ``enemy
number one'' Osama bin Laden, his network and the rag tag army of the
Taliban. It brooked no diversions or distractions.
-- Editorial, Hindu, Chennai,
November 12, 2001
BUILDING
A VIABLE alternative political arrangement for Afghanistan is proving
to be as frustrating and elusive a goal as defeating the Taliban and
its benefactor, Osama bin Laden. A full month after the U.S.-led alliance
against terror launched its bombing campaign against the Taliban, efforts
to work out a power-sharing arrangement have been stymied by internal
contradictions, factional rivalries, clashing interests and the power
games of the neighbouring countries. In fact, all the factors that have
been behind the trauma and tragedy of Afghanistan in the past half a
century are in play. The apparent early gains that Washington and its
allies in Europe claimed in bringing out Zahir Shah, the ousted former
King, and helping forge an alliance between him and his old enemies,
the Northern Alliance, have been short-lived. In the last few weeks,
the U.S.- led alliance has suffered a series of political setbacks.
One charismatic Pashtun leader whom the U.S. seemed to prop up as a
possible coalition leader in a post-Taliban setup has paid with his
life and another has had to be plucked to safety from the battle ground
even as Zahir Shah waits impatiently in his exile in Rome. Meanwhile,
the Northern Alliance, the present favourite by default of the U.S.
and Russia and composed of non-Pashtun factions, inches its way forward,
looking to Washington to pave the way to the seat of power in Kabul
through the most intensive bombing that the world has seen in several
decades.
There are no signs yet
that the hold of the radical Islamic group has been loosened over much
of Afghanistan. But the urgency of evolving an alternative coalition
cannot be overemphasised since a power vacuum in the event of the Taliban
collapsing in the face of the bombing onslaught can push the country
back into civil war. During his interactions in Washington, the Prime
Minister, Mr. A. B. Vajpayee, has renewed New Delhi's suggestion that
a group of interested countries be formed immediately for Afghanistan's
political reconciliation and economic reconstruction. Considering that
Afghan society has remained rooted to ethnic, tribal and religious ties
that provide links in different directions, it has been impossible to
reconcile the interests of the countries around, besides the long-term
objectives of the U.S. and its allies. Washington supports the Rome
process with the focus on the former King, himself a Pashtun, while
Iran and Pakistan oppose Zahir Shah for their own reasons. Pakistan,
with whose support the Taliban captured power five years ago, opposes
the Northern Alliance, and its appeal for including ``moderate'' Taliban
elements has proved a non-starter with most doubting if moderates could
have survived in the outfit. In this tangled web of interests, hope
rests on the Six Plus Two group - composed of the six nations bordering
Afghanistan, including Iran and Pakistan, plus the U.S. and Russia -
and on the experience and expertise it has gathered in the two decades
it has striven in vain to bring normality to Afghanistan.
The Six Plus Two group
plus the United Nations. As the international community continues the
search for an acceptable leader from the Pashtuns who form the majority
in Afghanistan, the U.N. has also been active on the sidelines and in
the shadows, rushing humanitarian relief and coordinating. With winter
fast approaching, caring for the population is the immediate task, daunting
beyond words. In the longer term, salvaging a country ravaged by two
decades of wars can be an equally immense effort. Unlike in the past,
however, Afghanistan this time will not be left to fend for itself.
The U.S. and the European Union have the blueprint prepared of a massive
plan of reconstruction. It is an area in which India can provide assistance
without inviting the wrath of rivals in the neighbourhood.
-- Editorial, Hindu,
Chennai, November 10, 2001
Once
again a Pakistani dictator in civvies is being feted in the western
capitals. Not only is he being promised all the goodies that he may
want, he is also being described as ‘courageous’ for his participation
in the US-led campaign against terrorism.
The adjective is important.
None of Pervez Musharraf’s predecessors was honoured in such glowing
terms. But one man’s courage can be another’s cowardice. The reason
why President Musharraf is being so praised is that he has turned his
back on a former ally, the Taliban. If it has taken courage to do so,
it is not only because one of Osama bin Laden’s anthrax packages may
carry his name, but also because his has been a complete reversal of
policy of which there are few parallels in international diplomacy.
But can a man who has made
such an about-turn be trusted? It is this point which India has to ponder
while deciding to talk to him again. So far as India is concerned, there
have been two recent betrayals by the same person — one in Kargil and
the other in Agra where he tried to hijack the agenda by focusing solely
on Kashmir. He is still trying to do so by equating Kashmir with Palestine
and blandly denying Pakistan’s role in cross-border terrorism. But even
if such ploys are regarded as part and parcel of diplomatic manoeuvres,
the point about the trustworthiness of General Musharraf remains. It
has to be remembered that even after his ‘courageous’ about-face, he
still tried to help the Taliban by pleading for a short war and then
favouring the inclusion of ‘moderate’ elements from the Taliban in the
next government in Kabul.
Having failed on both counts,
General Musharraf is now calling for a halt in the bombing during Ramzan.
Probably he knows that he will not succeed in this case either. But
if he is still playing these cards, it is evidently to pacify the fundamentalists
in Pakistan (and elsewhere in the Muslim world) who have been angered
by his ‘cowardice’ in deserting the Taliban. It is no secret that, despite
the recent purges, there are elements in the Pakistani army and the
ISI who support the murderous outfits of Osama bin Laden and Mullah
Omar. And why shouldn’t they? After all, till the morning of September
11, their leader — General Musharraf — thought that the Pakistani policy
towards the Taliban was a ‘correct’ one, as he told the BBC. Given this
background, the difference between General Musharraf and other military
dictators like Ayub Khan, Yahya Khan and Zia-ul-Haq is that he may not
enjoy the full support of the army and the ISI. While dealing with him,
therefore, it is this factor which India has to keep in mind.
-- Editorial, Hindustan Times, New
Delhi, November 10, 2001
AS THE
PRIME Minister concluded the Moscow leg of a marathon mission abroad
and headed for Washington, it was clear that a treaty partner of Cold
War vintage was in the process of readjusting and retuning its own world
vision. As befitting a long-standing, time-tested relationship, there
were, doubtless, points of convergence of ideas and interests between
India and Russia on key areas of mutual concern. But there were also
differing perceptions and different nuances as the Prime Minister and
the Russian President discovered at their summit talks. The Moscow declaration
and the separate joint statement that Mr. Vajpayee and Mr. Vladimir
Putin initialled after the talks underlined the post-September 11 geopolitical
reality that in this era of flux no bilateral relations will remain
the same. One other reality stood out in the documents: the large shadow
of the United States as the two countries strive to develop their own
independent equations with the sole superpower. Eager to stress the
areas of commonality of purpose - as with the clear emphasis on the
primacy of the United Nations in the fight against global terrorism
- both were equally anxious not to cause offence to Washington. A new
ethos in Indo-Russian relations is emerging, qualitatively different
from the one seen after Mr. Putin's breakthrough visit to India late
last year.
Bilateralism, for a while,
apparently took the backseat at the summit. Mr. Putin appeared disinclined
to oblige his Indian guest on the issue of Kashmir, impliedly suggesting
that New Delhi give up its obduracy and return to the negotiating table
with Pakistan. Moscow would welcome the resumption of the direct dialogue,
the Russian President said at his press conference, in effect endorsing
Gen. Pervez Musharraf's suggestion for a meeting in New York and rejecting
the hardline stand of the Indian Government. The absence of a reference
to the Indian conditions for a resumption of the talks did suggest that
Moscow concurs with the line that the U.S. and the European Union have
been taking on the India-Pakistan dispute. Moscow was perhaps the only
capital on his present itinerary where Mr. Vajpayee would have hoped
to receive an endorsement of his policy vis-a-vis Pakistan. He can now
expect to come under even greater pressure from Washington and London
to respond positively to Gen. Musharraf's invitation for talks.
With their shared experiences,
India and Russia could speak with a common voice on terrorism, calling
for the completion of negotiations under U.N. auspices on a draft convention
that will provide a legal basis to combat the global menace. Itself
a sponsor of an anti- terrorism draft, India apparently readily endorsed
the Russian proposal that the fight should be launched by legally established
mechanisms under the world body, respecting the Kremlin's fears of American
unilateral action stemming from the experiences in the former Yugoslavia
where a Moscow-friendly regime was targeted by the Western alliance
without U.N. sanction. Mr. Vajpayee would also have understood Mr. Putin's
anger at the ``double standards'' of the international community. The
West and its media had strongly indicted the Putin regime for the manner
in which it was tackling externally-sponsored terrorism in the province
of Chechnya. Seen from Moscow and Delhi, the contrast with the response
following the attacks of September 11 would have been striking and sharp.
However, as with the call for ``a new cooperative security order'',
where again Moscow's perceptions have changed dramatically, both countries
carefully avoided stridency. That is the hallmark of post-September
11 diplomacy.
-- Editorial, Hindu,
Chennai, November 9, 2001
AT THE
END of another high profile visit to New Delhi by an American official,
there is greater bilateral optimism. India will be more than satisfied
with the Defence Secretary, Mr. Donald Rumsfeld's reiteration of the
assurance that the U.S.-led campaign against terror will not be confined
to Osama bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network. It will be pleased also
with Mr. Rumsfeld's endorsement, perhaps for the first time by a senior
U.S. official, of a role for New Delhi in shaping post-Taliban Afghanistan.
His remarks after talks with the Defence Minister, Mr. George Fernandes,
that the U.S. will pursue terrorist networks wherever it finds them
were clear cut. The atmosphere in official New Delhi was apparently
much more congenial than during the visit of the Secretary of State,
Gen. Colin Powell, with both sides in the interregnum taking steps for
better understanding of each other's objectives and concerns in the
aftermath of the September 11 terror attacks. The positive signals from
Washington and the measures it has initiated in the last few days, including
the effective banning of two Pakistan-based terrorist groups operating
in Jammu and Kashmir, have apparently cleared the diplomatic air of
distrust. New Delhi's concerns over terrorism and its overseas sponsorship
are, it is clear, finally being addressed by the U.S.
India will welcome the
promise of increased military cooperation held out by Mr. Rumsfeld,
raising visions of a strategic partnership for the common good in the
future. Invited to the U.S. by his counterpart, Mr. Fernandes was thus
justified in expressing satisfaction over the outcome of his interaction
with Mr. Rumsfeld. The two countries have an opportunity to discuss
the specifics of military cooperation when the Defence Policy Group
meets next month. Released from the shackles of proliferation-related
sanctions, a steadily expanding strategic relationship received a jolt
on September 11. As the two countries are set to resume their interrupted
strategic dialogue, it is clear that the shape of the long-term relationship
must await the outcome of the current campaign against terrorism. For,
in the jigsaw of global diplomacy in the aftermath of the terror attacks
in New York and Washington, bilateral relations across the world remain
in limbo as strategic visions remain blurred beyond recognition.
Of immediate relevance
to India and its geostrategic interests is the declaration by Mr. Rumsfeld
that New Delhi will not be denied its rightful say in the building of
a post-Taliban political structure in Afghanistan. With its centuries-old
cultural and other ties, India can offer help in a big way for implementing
the massive rehabilitation and reconstruction plan that the U.S. has
reportedly drawn up in conjunction with the European Union. The plan
is said to cover all facets of life, including areas in which India
has expertise to offer: education, health care and infrastructure. India
found itself on the losing side in the war against the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan but played a quiet role in the following decade. Its
support for the secular Rabbani Government in Kabul pitted it against
the Taliban and Pakistan. It worked closely with the U.N. in trying
to arrive at a power- sharing arrangement among the mujahideen factions
in the wake of the civil war that followed the withdrawal of Soviet
troops. Its vital stakes demand that it work actively in concert with
Iran, Russia and the Central Asian republics, with which Delhi has maintained
close relations, for the formation of a liberal, democratic, representative
coalition to return Afghanistan to modern civilisation.
-- Editorial, Hindu,
Chennai, November 8, 2001
PAKISTAN
President Pervez Musharraf couldn’t be leaving Islamabad to keep his
date with other world leaders at the UN General Assembly session in
New York at a worse possible time. There is palpable tension all around.
At the country’s borders with Afghanistan, angry Kalashnikov-wielding
men of all ages and sizes have been amassing for days on end waiting
to cross over and join forces with the Taliban in their battle against
the US and in clear defiance of Pakistan’s official stance on that war.
They have, so far, resisted the attempts of Interior Minister Moinuddin
Haider to rein them in. The house arrest of Jamaat-e-Islami leader,
Qazi Hussain Ahmad, and the clamping of sedition charges against him,
is the other major domestic crisis that has been brewing. Ahmad, incidentally,
was scheduled to address a massive anti-America rally in Rawalpindi
on Friday. His arrest has now led to calls for a nation-wide strike
on that day.
These very factors when
viewed against Pakistan’s history of coups have provoked some western
commentators to term the Pakistan general a very courageous man for
choosing to sally forth into the world with such insouciance in such
stormy times. All the more so because he has personally experienced
the uncertainties of international travel in times of political crisis.
In October 1999, Nawaz Sharif had dismissed him as army chief even as
he was flying home from Sri Lanka. But Musharraf’s spin doctors have
been quick with their replies — the concerns of state cannot come to
a standstill simply because of a few small protests in Pakistan, they
argue. A reasonable enough reply if indeed the description of the protests
as ‘‘few’’ and ‘‘small’’ is an accurate one. From all evidence it is
not.
In such circumstances,
General Musharraf’s trip to New York via Paris and London is an act
of both faith and courage. The reason why he risks it at this juncture
is because it also provides him with the best opportunity possible to
strut the international stage as USA’s most important ally in its war
against terrorism. The US President, George W. Bush, sensitive to this
concern, is planning to host a special dinner for the general in New
York on Saturday. The fact that Musharraf’s minister of finance is accompanying
him in this excursion means that he also hopes to be properly compensated
for his support. There is an additional imperative at work here. The
general would like to neutralise, as much as he possibly can, India’s
concerns over Pakistan-sponsored terrorist attacks. He certainly would
not like to leave such an important stage clear for Vajpayee to dominate
over. Poor Pervez Musharraf, so many factors to contend with, so many
equations to work out, so many imponderables to weigh. As he packs his
bags for New York, all we can do is to extend some good housewifely
advice to him: remember to lock up your house carefully before you leave.
-- Editorial, Indian
Express, New Delhi, November 8, 2001
Much
of what George W. Bush said on Tuesday will meet with approval from
his partners in the war against terror. There is little doubt that the
Taliban and Al-Qaeda pose the same kind of threat to mankind as Nazi
Germany and the Stalinist version of communism once did.
But more than what the
American president has said, it is the timing of his declamation which
is intriguing. Just when US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld has felt
confident enough to claim that the "bombing is improving"
and that "we have people on the ground who are... directing the
bombing", the rather alarming picture of the end of civilisation
painted by Mr Bush may seem rather odd. True, no one expects a quick
end of the war. As British Home Secretary Jack Straw has pointed out,
even the death of Osama bin Laden may not bring an end to terrorism.
But there must be more than such an appraisal of the conflict to explain
Mr Bush’s observations.
His hints about the acquisition
of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons by the terrorists are important
in this respect. But however frightening the context, it is strange
for the American president to virtually hold out a threat by saying
that nations may be "held accountable for inactivity". Although
he had earlier used the phrase made famous by John Foster Dulles, US
Secretary of State during the Cold War, that that those who were not
with the US were "against us", his displeasure over such a
stand has now been made more explicit. Such an attitude may seem strange
considering that, for the first time, the US has more nations supporting
its war than at any time since the end of World War II.
Throughout the Cold War,
for instance, the entire non-aligned bloc was against the US, in the
Dullesian sense of the term. The war in Vietnam fuelled enough opposition
even at home for the US to finally withdraw. Washington’s policy of
intervention in Latin America had few supporters even among its western
allies. Much of the continuing dislike of the UN among the American
right-wingers is born of the fact that the US was never sure of winning
a vote in the General Assembly, where its opponents far outnumbered
its supporters. In contrast, there is virtual blanket support for the
US action against terrorism, even if the war itself has its critics
among the committed pacifists. For Mr Bush, therefore, to call upon
the coalition partners to "do more than just express sympathy"
suggests a hardening of the American attitude since the war began. If
this indicates doubts about its progress, it is a disturbing sign.
Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, November 8, 2001
Is the
United States finally heaving over towards the extreme Right? The September
11 terrorist attacks and the subsequent anthrax scare have got Americans
wondering whether liberal reactions to violent actions are as effective
as sinking toothless gums into a piece of tough meat.
"In this autumn of
anger", liberals like Newsweek columnist Jonathan Alter are nervously
rethinking their ideological positions and are even considering — at
least on the level of a debate — the use of torture against terrorist
suspects. He talks about torture as "something to jumpstart the
stalled investigation of the greatest crime in American history".
Coming from a liberal, one can almost hear the heart-wrenching effort
made to come up with that line.
A few days ago, former
National Security Advisor Sandy Berger spoke in a similar fashion about
how the American Constitution was an impediment in the way of delivering
swift justice to terrorists. He even went on to suggest that they could
be tried in countries where the legal system was ‘quicker’, throwing
up the strange image of a captured Osama bin Laden being flown from
Washington to Saudi Arabia for a quick hanging from the nearest lamppost.
Closer home, an American court banned a schoolgirl from wearing an anti-war
T-shirt. With the Constitution out of the way, the penalty could have
been more severe.
So what does that make
of the professed moral superiority of liberalism over fundamentalism?
If the US does take the ‘get-them-by-hook-or-by-crook’ approach — which
many remind us it has done in the past anyway — where does the difference
between, say, the Taliban and the US lie? ‘Justice’ was delivered quickly
to anti-Taliban Pashtun leader Abdul Haq by Mullah Omar’s regime when
he was hanged before he could cause any harm to the establishment in
Kabul. Will Washington too change the rules a bit, before the threat
of more attacks on America turns real? It’s a thought, and a terrible
one too.
-- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, November 8, 2001
IN A
FLASH, the world's approach to terrorism changed on September 11. Objects
considered ubiquitous till the other day are now seen as potential killers,
with the ability to conjure up private and public panic. From aircraft
to mailbags, the changed ingredients of the terrorists' arsenal do not
augur well for the world. It is one thing to aspire for a change from
the status quo - several individuals and groups have done so with success
in the past - it is another to deploy terror to reach such an end. The
world has seen its share of armed insurrection, it has also seen rival
armies resorting to tactics that could go down as the use of biological
weapons - Hannibal is credited to have used it in 184 B.C. During the
several wars that man has fought against man, contaminating enemy supply
lines for instance, has been part of the tactics, and not many states
at war have resisted such temptations. The present threats of biological
warfare, however, mark a distinct difference from the past. The possible
use of such weapons by terrorist groups aimed at innocent non-combatants
calls for a complete new look at countering the menace of terrorism.
The ease with which biological agents can be concealed and the extent
of damage that can be caused by even small amounts make the new form
of terrorism more difficult to combat.
If cruel ingenuity killed
thousands of innocents in the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on
Terror Tuesday, it takes a real life Prof. Moriarty to sustain the tempo
of terror through the threat of the use of biological weapons. Across
the globe, mail has now become objects of scare. Of the several possible
faceless suspects behind this new-age terrorism, the global spread of
anthrax-laced mail points to the possibilities of either a networked
organisation or groups working in tandem. However, as it will be ``a
capital mistake to theorise before one has data'', it is important that
Governments take urgent and concerted steps to track down the perpetrators
of this new form of terror. The lack of any credible evidence on who
has been behind the innumerable mail - both hoaxes and real ones - points
to the ease with which those behind such acts can evade the long arm
of the law, thereby making such forms of terror an easy option for outlawed
groups. Clearly, the perils of proceeding against unknown enemies are
too huge to be ignored, especially given the increasing possibility
of their being dangerously armed.
The subcontinent's share
of anthrax mail - including those sent to a State Minister in India,
a newspaper office in Pakistan and diplomatic missions in Sri Lanka
- is a serious pointer to the vulnerability of the region. Given the
wide spread of terrorist organisations in South Asia, these are to be
taken as an early wake-up call. Responses from the Governments to this
new threat have concentrated largely on stemming the spread of panic.
The use of technology to scan mail as well as the periodic advisories
that have been issued by Governments are indications that the seriousness
of the threat has engaged the attention of states. Yet, there are areas
that remain to be addressed, including testing facilities, the availability
of vaccines, and the ability to respond to a mass emergency. While these
and other initiatives are required to be taken by Governments, at the
larger level it is imperative that the multilateral mechanism in place
to check the production of biological weapons is effectively activated
and complete compliance ensured.
-- Editorial, Hindu,
Chennai, November 6, 2001
The twins
who shape US policy on its war against terrorism have both made their
whistle-stop tours of South Asia and said their piece in Islamabad and
New Delhi while treading the tightrope linking the two capitals. If
the visit of US Secretary of State Colin Powell two weeks ago was in
the nature of a thanksgiving one to the two South Asian neighbours who
expressed unqualified support for the US-led coalition’s war against
terrorism, US Secretary of Defence Donald Rumsfeld’s more recent exertions
were all about ensuring the continuation of that support at a time when
US B-52s are unleashing their awesome fire power on Afghanistan with
increasing casualties on the ground. Both officials have had to pick
their way through the minefield of India-Pakistan relations and both
have taken recourse to the strategy of promising immediate rewards to
Pakistan while assuring India goodies in times hereafter.
Two developments have occurred
during the period separating the two visits. One, the coalition against
terror that had once seemed fairly solid has now been buffeted by several
contrary forces, not least of them the rising tide of popular anger
in Islamic nations like Indonesia and Pakistan against what is perceived
as a ruthless bombardment of a helpless and hapless people. Even in
countries that have been traditionally close to the US, like the UK,
awkward questions are being asked about the utility of such an approach.
The other development is the sharp escalation of tension between India
and Pakistan, accompanied by an acrid verbal exchange between the heads
of the two states and troop build-up and exchange of fire along the
border. Washington seems too busy trying to manage the first to pay
more than cursory attention to the second — that at least was the message
Runsfeld conveyed. As he put it, ‘‘What we are doing in Afghanistan
is that we are engaged in an exercise of self-defence. This is the only
way to deal with the problem and that is to take the battle to them.’’
In other words, this is all about their war, not our concerns — so let
us not fool ourselves about this.
Chafe as India may against
USA’s inability to be responsive to multi-layered realities in its foreign
policy formulations, the mood in Washington clearly is to concentrate
on Afghanistan and ensure some military breakthrough before the height
of winter is upon it. This is what is making Rumsfeld supremely resistant
to Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf’s plea that America suspend its
bombing operations through the month of Ramzan in deference to Islamic
sentiments. But what the US defence secretary does not seem to recognise
is that the Pakistan government, under pressure from public opinion
over its continued support of the US bombing, is upping the ante on
Kashmir in what is clearly a diversionary ploy. Therefore, this policy
of turning a blind eye to the Kashmir cauldron, as the US prefers to
do at the moment, may not be an entirely wise approach to adopt. All
the more so since the US engagement in Afghanistan, from all evidence,
promises to be a long and complicated one, no matter what spin Runsfeld
chooses to impart to it.
Editorial, Indian
Express, New Delhi, November 6, 2001
To market
a product successfully, one must first brand it. While perceptions may
suggest otherwise, selling ‘an Islamic cause’ to millions of Muslims
hasn’t been much of a success. Reportedly, several hundred youngsters
from Britain are leaving their country to fight alongside the Taliban
against the US and Britain.
Add to that the thousands
of Pakistanis who are ready to wage war against their own countrymen,
and one may get a picture of a pan-Islamic mobilisation. But if one
looks closer, one may find this ‘clash of civilisations’ model withering
away.
The present ‘rush’ of foreign
jehadis may seem an inverted version of the Spanish Civil War, where
non-Spaniards joined by a common ideology pitched in to fight against
the ‘evil’ of fascism. But consider this. The conflict that has troubled
West Asia for decades has not a whiff of Islamicism about it. The Palestinian
cause is against imperialism, and the very fact that none of the extremist
outfits in the West Bank is waging a ‘religious war’ against Israel
shows that Samuel P. Huntington’s famous theory may be hanging on a
very loose string. Nor has any of the jehadis considered it worthwhile
fighting for the Palestinians.
The ‘Islamic rantings’
of Ayatollah Khomeini were more about mobilising a force against a hegemonic
superpower — which had earlier set up a puppet king in Tehran — rather
than against ‘infidels’. Saddam Hussain, yesterday’s Osama bin Laden,
is anything but a mullah in fatigues. The Iraqi despot has always been
keen on nationalism, not any pan-Islamic brotherhood. Libyan dictator
Muammar Gaddafi’s ‘ideology’ can be traced to the Marxism-tinged theories
of First World-Third World disparity. Even Palestine’s Islamic Jehad
and Lebanon’s Hezbollah — both only nominally Islamic — are ‘secular’
forces that see the enemy as a usurper of land and power rather than
as ‘Jewish evil’. Bin Laden’s success has been to question the fact
that ‘an Islamic cause’ and ‘anti-imperialism’ are two different entities.
His failure has been that no one of consequence — especially in West
Asia — has fallen for his specious brand-building exercise.
-- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, November 6, 2001
INDIA'S
LONG, LONELY battle against fundamentalist terrorism on its soil may
be about to be joined, even if indirectly and remotely, by the global
coalition as the U.S expands its campaign to include terrorism in its
multifarious forms. The American State Department's action in designating
the Pakistan-based militant outfits Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammad
as terrorist organisations - and in effect banning them - will be welcomed
in India as the first positive signal that New Delhi's concerns are
being recognised and acknowledged. The action, followed up within hours
by Britain, coincides with the Bush administration's significant decision
to broaden its campaign and expand the terror list to include groups
beyond those with links to Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda network.
The U.S can now seize the assets of these groups and impose other stringent
financial sanctions, already imposed against Osama and his group to
choke the flow of money. Included in the list are outfits as far apart
as the Hamas and the Hizbolla in the Middle East, ETA, the Basque separatist
group in Spain, and three Colombian groups operating in the civil war
torn South American nation.
The decision to widen the
campaign, not totally unexpected or non-controversial, follows criticism
that Washington has two standards when it comes to targeting terrorism.
The initial moves by Washington after the September 11 attacks did create
the impression that its sights were too narrowly focussed on Osama bin
Laden and his cadre, to the exclusion of terrorist groups operating
elsewhere. New Delhi, which responded by unilaterally offering all assistance
to the U.S., found itself on the sidelines as Washington put together
a global coalition and placed Pakistan on the frontline. India made
no secret of its dismay that Pakistan should form part of the anti-terror
coalition despite its record of encouraging cross-border terrorism in
Kashmir. Within three weeks of that catastrophic strike against the
U.S, Pakistan-based militants launched a murderous attack on the Jammu
and Kashmir Legislature in Srinagar in which innocent people were killed.
The massacre, for which the Jaish-e-Mohammad claimed responsibility,
shocked the world and evoked words of sympathy, but India's appeal that
the global focus include the groups operating in Kashmir from bases
in Pakistan went unheeded. The U.S, which said it was placing the JeM
under ``close'' watch, and its allies and friends had their own priorities.
The American decision to
broaden the anti-terror campaign, encompassing the action concerning
the LeT and the JeM, may end this abnormal situation. The State Department's
decision will have a dampening effect on the two terrorist groupings
based in Pakistan. Besides having their assets impounded, anyone suspected
of providing aid or financial services to them can be targeted. Both
groups have their patrons in Pakistan who have openly raised funds and
solicited donations for them. With their designation as terrorist groups
by the State Department, the Pakistan Government will come under enormous
pressure to crack down on their fund- raising activities, effectively
neutralising them. Other groups have rechristened and reincarnated themselves,
apparently with official backing. But with the U.S-led coalition significantly
stepping up its campaign, this ploy may prove less effective in the
future. For its part, New Delhi, which has welcomed the U.S. action,
must continue to keep its vigil, in the realisation that fighting cross-border
terrorism is primarily its own battle, which it has to carry on with
restraint, without distracting talk of untenable ideas like hot pursuit.
And quite apart from terrorism the political issue with Pakistan and
the aspirations of the people in Kashmir need also to be addressed.
-- Editorial, Hindu,
Chennai, November 5, 2001
NOW that
bioterror has visited our doorstep, with anthrax spores detected in
Pakistan and a mysterious letter still being analysed in Mumbai, what
lies ahead? Is the subcontinent now to be witness to the paranoid drill?
A run on antibiotics. A sudden desire to make a fashion statement with
gas masks. An equally fervent urge to sport latex gloves. A dash by
government officials to the archives for copies of long forgotten conventions
on biological and chemical weapons. For all the soothing words from
experts — that bioterrorism is more a psychological threat than a real
one, that terrorists carting vials of pathogens are unlikely to cause
death and destruction on a large scale — the fear is very real. And
it is a fear that must be addressed simultaneously at three levels:
the personal, the administrative and the futuristic.
Medical personnel are right
when they emphasise that the biggest challenge posed by bioterror attacks
like the current anthrax mailing list is maintaining a sense of proportion
and context. They are right when they caution that while biological
weapons have never been (till now, at least) effective weapons of attack
in a war, awareness and alertness are the most effective antidotes to
the possibility of any unnatural introduction of pathogens. People going
about their daily lives can best defend themselves by being on the lookout
for suspicious substances (in the current anthrax wave letters bearing
white powder, but the possibilities unfortunately are endless) and by
resolutely shirking hysteria. For instance, shopping sprees for antibiotics
and the impulse to consume doses without a doctor’s recommendation can
be dangerous. The biggest fear in tackling outbreaks — naturally occurring
ones as well as those caused by bioterrorists — is the spectre of antibiotic
resistance. For the authorities, it is important to remember that a
bioterror attack must essentially be managed like any other epidemic.
It demands quick response, the capacity to cordon off infected areas
and provide medical treatment for victims as soon as possible. It also
calls for speedy dissemination of information, for immediate intervention
to stockpile medicine and plot out responses to different scenarios.
Dealing with bioterror involves reassuring the public as much as treating
victims and sanitising endangered sites.
The most worrying aspect
of the anthrax letters is the implication that evil-doers, for want
of a better term, have served notice that all the worst case scenarios
envisioned over the years could fast become reality. Planners and policy
makers must undertake a crash analysis of what a technologically adept
terrorist could do and what must be done to prepare for such eventualities.
It may amount to a chilling mix of sci-fi and thriller narratives, but
the future’s already here. We have to deal with it.
-- Editorial, Indian
Express, New Delhi, November 5, 2001
THIS
IS NO time for brinkmanship in the subcontinent. With the U.S.-led campaign
entering a very decisive phase, there is, instead, a desperate, urgent
need for India and Pakistan to tone down their rhetoric and continue
the policy of restraint that has generally characterised their stances
since the September 11 terrorist strikes. The ominous prognostications
coming from the Vienna-based U.N. watchdog, the International Atomic
Energy Agency, cast a special responsibility on the two nuclearised
neighbours not to say or do anything that can exacerbate tensions and
heighten the dangers of a conflagration. It is in this context that
one must express grave apprehensions over the war of words that has
erupted between the two countries. The open charges and counter-charges
in the past few days of troop movement along the border and the sorry
spectacle of the United Nations military observer in Kashmir making
totally unacceptable remarks and then apologising for them have tended
to surcharge the atmosphere. Pakistan has said that these are routine
military exercises which take place around this time every year. If
India has reason to doubt the statement, it has ways of seeking clarifications
and delivering diplomatic protests even as it takes counter measures.
Both countries have also set in place confidence-building tools, including
the hotline between the Directors-General of Military Operations, which
should be utilised to clarify the position and defuse tensions. There
is nothing to gain by going public and provoking panic. Islamabad needs
to realise too that appeasing domestic constituencies cannot come at
the cost of the national, and international, good.
In these extraordinarily
troubled times, when the maximum of restraint and caution should be
exercised particularly in sensitive border areas such as the Chicken
Neck in the Jammu region, the public posturing of the type being witnessed
helps neither side. There is the real danger on the contrary of the
situation spinning out of control. It is the felt concern that one misstep
by either country has the potential to spark a conflagration, with catastrophic
consequences for the region and the world, that has seen the avalanche
of VVIP visits to India and Pakistan since the U.S. launched its campaign
against Afghanistan. The leaders of the U.S., England, Germany and now
France have all but one message to both countries: restraint.
Behind the message is the
widespread concern over the nuclearisation of the subcontinent, a concern
which has been immeasurably deepened by the daring September 11 attacks
in New York and Washington. The terror campaign has introduced a new
element of potential disaster: nuclear material falling into the hands
of terrorists. This heightened concern, verging on panic in some capitals,
is reflected in the stark warning from the IAEA. The agency's Egyptian-born
director, Muhammad el-Baradei, has spoken of how the international community
is not just dealing with the possibility of Governments (running those
``rogue'' states) diverting nuclear material into clandestine weapons
programmes. The world has now been exposed to the potential of terrorists
targeting nuclear facilities or using radioactive sources to incite
panic, contaminate property and even cause death among civilian populations.
The disturbed conditions in Pakistan and the presence and power of the
fundamentalist terrorist groups there are a particular source of concern
to the international community. The Pakistani Foreign Minister, Mr.
Abdul Sattar, has declared that his country's nuclear arsenal is in
safe, foolproof custody. This is reassuring but the world will continue
to watch warily to see if nations have the resources to prevent the
explosive match of the terrorist and the nuclear bomb.
-- Editorial, Hindu,
Chennai, November 3, 2001
IT is
not easy being a national leader these days if air travel leaves you
queasy. America’s first war of the 21st century is in progress, no matter
how patchy it may be. A grand sounding ‘‘global coalition against terror’’
has to be examined afresh every day for fraying edges and developing
schisms. Information technology may offer prime ministers and presidents
aids to confer in real time, but there’s nothing like a hearty handshake
to conclude negotiations — those itsy-bitsy quid pro quos Washington
is doling out these days. So these days special aircraft are on permanent
standby to ferry officials between war rooms around the globe. The red
carpet too is never really rolled and stored away; there is just not
enough time between the departure of a visiting minister and the arrival
of another.
Counting down the ministers
who have dashed to New Delhi in past weeks would tax even the most fluent
linguist. And the frequent fliers’ club is ever expanding, with Prime
Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee taking off on Sunday for Russia, Britain
and the US. You would think peripatetic premiers and foreign secretaries
would soon run out of destinations beyond the war zone. Small worry.
Just look how purposeful an air these dashes from the tarmac to the
corridors of powers and back again to urgently whirring aircraft — with
a tiny detour for quickfire press briefings — lend them. There’s nothing
like the distant rumble of fighter jets (alright, that’s on TV, but
so what?) to make a democratically elected leader feel truly statesmanlike.
But even as Tony Blair awaits the trophy for notching up the maximum
frequent flier points, it would be apt to ask: is the so-called global
coalition any stronger for all this hectic journeying? As Vajpayee’s
entourage wends its way through power capitals, would it be fair to
expect that Indian concerns will now be factored into battleplans in
this ‘‘war against terror’’?
As the American airstrikes
against Afghanistan drag on, as the Ramadan month approaches (with its
emotive appeal to rally opinion in Muslim countries against the military
campaign), the mission is getting blurrier. It will become increasingly
more difficult to manage dissent if Washington cannot define its objective.
To smash the Al-Qaeda network, to decimate the Taliban, to stop at nothing
short of an ethnically representative regime in Kabul, to secure for
the Palestinians their homeland, to target every terrorist organisation
possible... the tendency by media managers in Washington to hop among
these could only loosen coalitional bonds. As for India, surely the
top priority for Vajpayee would be to elicit from Western leaders a
clarification on the definition of the ‘‘global terrorism’’ they are
fighting. Is it terrorism that is killing thousands of innocent people
around the globe, or is it terrorism that has the global reach to inflict
destruction in sites like the Twin Towers? On forging clarity on these
queries will the success of international diplomacy be judged, not on
the number of hours spent airborne.
-- Editorial, Indian
Express, New Delhi, November 3, 2001
To the
rest of the world, an increase in tension along the India-Pakistan border
may seem inevitable at such an uncertain time. Since the two countries
are known to be the worst of enemies, their relations are hardly expected
to remain unaffected by the turmoil in Afghanistan.
But even if a deterioration
in their ties is expected, the international community will not be amused
by even a minor flare-up. There is every reason, therefore, for New
Delhi to ensure that the situation does not worsen to a marked extent.
In fact, every effort must be made to behave as sensibly and maturely
as possible.
In this respect, India
made the right move when it said that it did not want to take advantage
of Pakistan’s present difficulties. The reassurance was needed because
Islamabad evidently expected India to fish in troubled waters. Hence
the advice given by Pervez Musharraf to India to "lay off"
even when there was nothing to suggest that New Delhi had any aggressive
intention. Since then, however, not everyone in India has behaved responsibly,
with broad hints being given about taking out the terrorist training
camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. Suggestions of this nature have
also been denied, but it is clear that domestic political compulsions,
including the UP elections, have played a part in alternately warning
Pakistan and making conciliatory gestures.
Where Pakistan is concerned,
it may make use of the bogey of a threat from India to divert attention
from its own domestic problems. This may be a reason for its troops
build-up in the border region. Any government in trouble prefers a little
tension with a neighbour and there is no doubt that Pakistan’s present
woes are many. For one thing, General Musharraf is reaping a whirlwind
from the jehadi enterprise which he had merrily encouraged to harass
India. And, for another, the American misgivings about the continuing
support for the Taliban provided by his administration, with or without
his knowledge, must be a source of immense concern for him.
At a deeply unsettling
time like this, Pakistan would probably like nothing better than to
raise the fear of India’s designs, which has been a standard ploy for
all Pakistani leaders. There is every reason, therefore, for India to
reiterate its earlier reassuring message to Pakistan. Since the US is
fighting at least half of India’s war against terrorism, and Pakistan
is in greater trouble than it has ever been in its life, India has little
to complain about at the moment. All it needs is a state of calm along
the border.
-- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, November 3, 2001
The British
media have called it a ‘bad Blair day’. Considering that Prime Minister
Tony Blair has for all purposes been the most successful face of America’s
‘war against international terrorism’, Thursday’s ‘failure’ in Syria
appears to have taken some of the sheen off the western world’s most
dependable grin.
Mr Blair’s visit to Damascus
was supposed to shore up more support for the American cause from a
quarter that counts the most: the Islamic world. Instead of the expected
camaraderie to fight a ‘common cause’, the unexpected happened: the
British premier had to endure Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s open
criticism of Washington’s campaign in Afghanistan, calling Israel a
terrorist State and dubbing Palestinian extremists as ‘freedom fighters’.
Quite plainly, the visit was a disaster.
To add to his woes, Mr
Blair’s attempt to make Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon sit down
and talk with Palestine Authority Chairman Yasser Arafat ended in little
more than exchanging pleasantries. Mr Sharon refused to give a pledge
on the time-frame within which Israel is likely to pull out troops from
the West Bank. Mr Blair had no alternative but to patiently listen that
there would be no movement towards the negotiating table until the Palestinians
ended their violence against Israel. In other words, the West Asia peace
process remains buried in the ditch.
Despite Mr Blair’s photogenic
diplomacy receiving loud applause in London and Washington in the last
few weeks, he has finally found himself staring at a different sort
of picture. That the Arab world is not in sync with Anglo-American expectations
of a new world order is beginning to become more apparent as the war
in Afghanistan drags on. In each of this week’s visits to Arab States
— Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia — Mr Blair was told that the western
perception of the Israel-Palestine conflict was overtly biased against
the Palestinian cause. This, after Mr Blair’s (and Mr Bush’s) statement
that a Palestinian State was a necessity. Perhaps, the British prime
minister will now see that winning over friends means more than just
firm handshakes and lecturing about a battle against ‘evil’. It also
means listening to unpleasant facts.
-- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, November 3, 2001
Just
in case anyone has forgotten how life was for millions of Afghans before
the US started its military campaign on October 7, here’s a quick recap.
Women brutally denied any rights whatsoever, people murdered under the
pretext of some skewed religious logic or the other, millions left to
starve because of a complete lack of infrastructure and human sentiment,
4.5 million refugees on the run prior to September 11.
In other words, a barbaric
regime ruled a people with an iron fist and a warped mind. Allegations
of the Taliban ready to use civilians as ‘human shields’ may seem far-fetched
to many — especially since the allegations have been made by the US.
But those who have no qualms throwing acid on women’s faces, burying
people alive or stoning them to death seem unlikely to have sleepless
nights over using their own people as cannon fodder and propaganda.
One positive fallout of
September 11 has been that the plight of Afghans under a brutal regime
suddenly took on flesh and blood. News of horrors being committed in
the name of a religion in a far-away land bothered very few people outside
Taliban-country. When the Bamiyan Buddhas were blown up and non-Muslims
targeted by clerics, there was some concern. But, once again, matters
out of sight were left largely out of mind.
Even with an ongoing war
further affecting life itself and anti-American rhetoric growing in
non-US quarters, most Afghans have not forgotten their plight under
the Taliban. "In the time of the Taliban’s medievalist domination,
no Afghan and no sensitive Muslim will be deceived by the ‘nationalistic’
gestures of the Taliban who invite the Afghan people and even the whole
Muslim world for ‘jehad’ against America. Any person, group or government
that supports the Taliban, no matter under what pretext, is the enemy
of the Afghan people," states the Revolutionary Association of
the Women of Afghanistan. Let no one be in doubt that the Taliban is
the primary terror for the Afghan people. Worries about bombs and the
takeover by Northern Alliance troops (former mujahideen whose atrocities
paved the way for the Taliban five years ago) are comparatively — and
only by comparison — milder.
Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, November 1, 2001
IT’S
difficult to recall those days not so long ago when the scariest doomsday
scenarios debated by the American media centred around things like the
Y2K bug and shark attacks. September 11 was not just the day the country
discovered the world, it was also the day it began counting down the
different kinds of danger lurking — some real, others in the mindspace.
The day it — as well as the rest of the world — began identifying fears
to address. Urban vulnerability. Bioterrorism. And now the possibility
of nuclear terrorism. For all the fact checkers the New Yorker compulsively
employs, it is difficult to gauge the accuracy of Seymour Hersh’s story
on the Washington’s contingency plans in case Pakistan’s President Pervez
Musharraf is deposed and its nuclear facilities commandeered by Talibanised
security forces.
Amidst the flurry of economic
packages that have been showered upon Islamabad, has Washington already
extracted some sort of control over Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal? Or is
it really, as Hersh would have us believe, still busy training Israeli
commandos (wonder how that is being digested on the Arab street) to
take away Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in case renegades try to seize
them? Or is this all fantasy, are the Americans not even preparing for
such an eventuality? Hard to say. But what is certain is that there’s
an edginess — as much here in India as anywhere else, if not more —
about instability in Pakistan. Nuclear facilities apart, possible coups
apart, other facets of this instability are already in evidence. Nuclear
scientists, suspected of harbouring sympathies for the Taliban, are
being arrested. Religious tensions are already extracting litreages
of blood every day. Cleavages along ethnic lines are being scrutinised
as the American strikes in Afghanistan carry on. And members of the
Musharraf government are publicly speculating the domestic reaction
if Operation Enduring Freedom carries on, without a pause, during the
Ramadan month. The mounting numbers of wannabe warriors for the Taliban
lining up at the border are being updated with a horrifying urgency.
It is easy then to drift
towards worst-case scenarios, to plot contingency plans in case Pakistan
gets ‘‘Talibanised’’. What is not easy, however, is to weave into all
of this talk of splitting the Taliban and wooing away a ‘‘moderate’’
faction. Indeed, an impression is already gaining currency that the
US is pacing its war effort in Afghanistan till some of Mullah Omar’s
men can be tempted away with offers of a place in any post-war dispensation.
But the possibility of further Talibanisation of Pakistan is directly
linked to the very survival of the Taliban in Afghanistan. For every
day that the American alliance dithers and postpones decisive strikes
on the Taliban, instead mistargeting its ammunition at innocent civilians,
provides more nutrition to the ‘‘Talibanised’’ sections in Pakistan
— in its army, in the ISI, or in Islamist groups.
-- Editorial, Indian
Express, New Delhi, October 31, 2001
Inevitably,
as the war in Afghanistan has tended to confound earlier expectations,
there is speculation about the future course.
One of the conjectures
relates to the duration of the conflict, with the admission that it
is going to be different from what the world has experienced so far.
It was only to be expected, therefore, that the question which is at
the back of everyone’s mind, that of nuclear weapons, would also feature
in the discussions.
The most unsettling in
this respect is the report about the US-Israeli plan to prevent the
Pakistani nuclear arsenal from falling into the hands of terrorists.
This grim possibility had been a nightmare scenario even earlier. Now,
the apprehensions are bound to be greater since the terrorists have
already demonstrated their determination to pursue their insane jehadi
objective.
The world had faced such
a threat only once before, when Mao Zedong argued that enough Chinese
would survive a nuclear confrontation with the US to usher in a communist
revolution. However, if that was mere bluster, the menace presented
by Osama bin Laden and the Taliban is not. For the first time, the world
is dealing with fanatics whose thinking is beyond the comprehension
of normal human beings.
The safety of the Pakistani
arsenal, therefore, is of concern to the entire international community.
Apart from the Taliban, the known fact of the Talibanisation of sections
of the Pakistani establishment is a matter of deep disquiet. The US
is trying its best to keep Pervez Musharraf in good humour by doling
out dollars. But what of the fanatics in the ISI, whose links with the
Al-Qaeda in the training of the jehadis operating in Kashmir have now
come to light? Is it fully under General Musharraf’s control?
The American reiteration
of their strategic thinking which does not rule out the use of nuclear
weapons, as underlined by US Defence Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, may
also be of relevance if the war drags on indefinitely. Of the last three
major wars, the US lost one, in Vietnam, and was only half a winner,
against Iraq. It also had to withdraw in a hurry from Somalia.
Its stakes, therefore,
are very high in Afghanistan, especially because it is seemingly facing
an implacable enemy which has succeeded in taking the war to the American
continent unlike any of its other adversaries. The stakes are high for
India also because the American success in the war against terrorism
is bound to lessen the menace faced by India. But it is the unforeseen
complications caused by a prolongation of the conflict which is a cause
for deep unease.
-- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, October 31, 2001
The
horrendous massacre of Christians by terrorists in Pakistan has again
shown how Islamabad’s coddling of the Taliban has blown up in its face.
The Pakistani establishment,
and especially its present leader, Pervez Musharraf, must have known
how acting as the friend, philosopher and guide of the Taliban would
foment religious extremism in Pakistan as well. But it was a risk which
they took in the hope that the damage which Pakistani civil society
might suffer would be compensated by the wresting of Kashmir from India.
There is little doubt that General Musharraf was a major proponent of
this cynical line, of which the invasion of Kargil was an integral part.
It was only a few months ago that there was a belated recognition by
the Musharraf regime about the danger posed by the extremists to Pakistan
itself, leading to a simultaneous ban on a Sunni and a Shia outfit.
But as Sunday’s outrage
has shown, it is easy to light a fire but extremely difficult to put
it out. It isn’t only the massacre of Christians which has shown how
rabid militancy is flourishing in Pakistan, but also the eagerness of
several thousand armed men to cross over to Afghanistan to fight on
behalf of the Taliban. It is in this highly disturbing context that
General Musharraf’s call for picking up the threads of the Agra dialogue
has to be seen. Although India has made it clear more than once that
it does not want to take advantage of Pakistan’s present troubles, it
also has to keep in mind the fact that these troubles are Pakistan’s
own creation. Not only that, they had been fomented with the express
purpose of conducting a jehad against India, a ‘war’ which has now been
endorsed by Mullah Omar.
What is more, even after
being burnt by the fiery zeal of the jehadis, there is no sign of Pakistan
resiling from its provocative line on Kashmir. It still refuses to acknowledge
its role in cross-border terrorism and refers to a settlement of the
Kashmir problem in accordance with the wishes of the Kashmiris. One
might have thought that greater attention might be paid to ascertaining
the views of the Pakistanis about the man who usurped power two years
ago and has led their country to the present sorry pass. Evidently,
by offering to resume the dialogue, Pakistan is trying to retrieve what
it can from the wreckage of its Taliban (and Kashmir) policy. After
all, Islamabad knows that the jehadis today have reached a stage of
insanity where they are as capable of turning against it as against
India. New Delhi, therefore, has to be extremely careful about how it
wants to deal with the villain of Kargil.
-- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, October 30, 2001
Despite
the George Bush rhetoric that the US is slowly but surely dismantling
Taliban defences, their installations and their command-and-control
structures, signs on the ground are unfortunately far less sanguine.
It would be an exercise in self-deception to regard the brutal execution
of Afghan opposition commander, Abdul Haq, as just another death in
a barbaric war. From all evidence, Haq — as a credible Pashtun leader
— was to play a central role in putting together a post-Taliban political
order, one with a fair Pashtun representation. In fact, the mission
that marked his end was in pursuit of precisely such a goal.
His execution means that
the Taliban, even after 20-odd days of unremitting pounding by the US
with the help of the most sophisticated arms and ammunition in the world,
are not about to give up the ghost. More important, it indicates that
their information network and political control over much of Afghanistan
remain intact. The brutal manner in which Haq was done to death within
hours of his capture indicates that the Mullah Omar regime wished to
make an example of him and send out the message that anybody who does
business with the US is a dead man as far as it is concerned. This,
incidentally, is the Taliban’s second significant strike: last month
a suicide bomber had got Ahmad Shah Masood, a lynchpin of the Northern
Alliance. There are two possible reasons for the Taliban being able
to stave off imminent collapse, apart of course from the pathetic state
of the forces opposed to it within the country. The first is through
the sheer brutality of its methods. It is a dispensation that survives
on an intricate network of fear and exemplary punishment. The second
is the potent appeal it makes to country and culture. Note the words
Mullah Omar used in exhorting his compatriots to rally to the Taliban
cause: ‘‘We must defend our land. Remember our fathers and grandfathers
who fell defending this religion and this land.’’
So where does this leave
the strategy of the global alliance against terror? That three weeks
of aerial attacks have only led to big rubble being reduced to small
rubble is cause for concern. Already, there are signs of the US administration
getting more realistic about its objectives. Last week, US Defence Secretary
Donald Rumsfeld indicated that the US may never be able to get hold
of Osama bin Laden. There was also that candid admission by a US rear
admiral a few days ago. He had expressed surprise over the doggedness
with which the Taliban were hanging on to power. These are useful reality
checks and will hopefully moderate the blind ‘‘bomb ’em back to the
stone age’’ rhetoric of many Washington hawks. With the holy month of
Ramzan just a few days away and winter imminent, the Pentagon will have
to tread a minefield. It doesn’t have many options before it but the
few it has will have to be pursued with sense and sensitivity.
-- Editorial, Indian
Express, New Delhi, October 29, 2001
It can
be said without much exaggeration that the finest ambassador that the
American state department has had during the ongoing military campaign
against international terrorism has been British Prime Minister Tony
Blair.
Following close on his
heel is the American media. The near blackout on stories about civilian
casualties in Afghanistan and on any close analysis about the causes
— as opposed to the effects — of why the US is disliked tell a tale
in which an artificial link can be discerned between journalism and
‘patriotism’. For those who have followed the news through the lens
of the American media since September 11, anything critical of US policies
is a no-no, as is the trend to go out of one’s way to present facts
in an ‘edited’ form.
Being charged of bias is
an occupational hazard for any media organisation anywhere in the world.
But what can one make of the fact that two columnists in the US were
sacked for questioning the actions of President Bush? Or that of encouraging
prime-time news programmes which try their hands at deconstructing the
word ‘evil-doers’? The muzzle on the mouth of US television networks
like CNN, NBC, CBS and Fox may have been self-imposed after a ‘request’
by National Security Advisor Condoleezza Rice. But a muzzle is a muzzle
is a muzzle and it hinders one from pursuing the truth. And the media
in the world’s most powerful democracy are treating truth as if it were
a hot potato.
The president of the Inter-American
Press Association, Danilo Arbilla, warned earlier this month that the
US media’s "credibility was at stake" and that their duty
was to "seek the most information possible, even that which could
be considered dangerous". Apart from the American print media’s
hush over anything that may ‘counter the cause’ — itself a flawed argument
— TV channels are kidding themselves if they think that no one will
notice discrepancies. Flashes in the distance may have satisfied an
audience during the Gulf war, but thanks to the dissemination of technology,
CNN no longer has the monopoly over state-of-the-art media equipment
as it had during the Nineties. As is evident in the way the BBC is covering
the war, it is possible to be objective during war-time. The moment
news becomes propaganda, it simply becomes a veiled parody of an Uncle
Sam poster calling all Americans to join the armed forces.
-- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, October 27, 2001
As several Muslim academics,
clerics, women activists and ordinary men and women publicly denounce
the Jama Masjid Shahi Imam Syed Ahmed Bukhari’s vulgar personal vituperation
against Shabana Azmi on a recent television programme, they reiterate
another point as well: that the Shahi Imam does not speak for the community.
It is one of the tragedies of the post-WTC world that this point is not
more obvious than it seems to be, and that average men and women of the
Muslim community in India should feel cornered into providing proof of
their distance from those like the Shahi Imam. It is really unfortunate
it should have become necessary for them to do so to puncture the smug
stereotype of the ‘Islamic response’ to Black Tuesday.
Another war has been afoot
since September 11 and not just in Afghanistan. This is the clash, across
borders, not of civilisations, but of manufactured images. In this fight,
the shriller, more virulent contrivance occupies centre stage. And so,
Islam comes to be equated with fundamenta- lism/terrorism. It is necessary,
in this moment, to stand up and point out that ‘Islamic fundamentalism’
is not a natural coupling and that it does not represent more than a
mere fragment of the truth, either about Islam or about fundamentalism.
But it is important to do more than just that. Care must be taken that
one stereotype is not fought by resorting to another. The ‘Muslim extremist’
will not be vanquished by the ‘Muslim moderate’. The only way in which
justice can be done within a complex reality is by recognising, yes,
its complexity. Public spaces within the media and outside need to be
opened out to accommodate and broadcast many more voices from the community
than they usually do. There is no one voice, extreme or moderate, that
can tell everyone else about what it is that is actually happening deep
in the recesses of the ‘Muslim mind’. Truth is, as both grapple with
daily concerns about education, health, employment et al, the Muslim
in Srinagar may react completely differently from the Muslim in Mumbai
on any particular issue, and that both reactions can vary from one issue
to another.
There will be resistance,
of course, to abandoning the stereotypes and the anointed spokespersons
for the community. Typecasting is so convenient and it serves so many
interests, especially in a multi-ethnic, multi-religious state like
ours. It suits the media to hold up one view as representative of the
entire community because it obviates the effort involved in going out
and searching for more. It has also suited the state and the government
at various points of time to negotiate with one face of a community
— the Shahi Imam has been given a far more serious hearing by the political
leadership of the majority community rather than by members of his own.
Most of all, it suits the lunatic fringes of both the Hindus and the
Muslims to be seen as imaging their respective communities and to sharpen
their claws against each other’s edges. Yes, it will be difficult, but
there is no alternative to a more nuanced understanding of a multifaceted
reality.
-- Editorial, Indian
Express, New Delhi, October 26, 2001
Some
of the initial assumptions about the war in Afghanistan are being proved
wrong. There does not seem much immediate hope of the Americans attaining
their objective of ‘smoking’ out the Taliban and hunting them down,
as outlined by President George W. Bush at the start of the campaign.
In contrast, the US has
now admitted that the Taliban has turned out to be much tougher than
what was believed. The desire for a quick end of the conflict was expressed
with even greater earnestness by Pakistan, so much so that the US had
to deny that it reflected Washington’s view. Pakistan, of course, had
its own reason, for the longer the war continues, the more destabilising
it may prove to be for Pervez Musharraf.
Already, the deaths in
Afghanistan of Pakistani militants belonging to one of its terrorist
outfits have exposed, yet again, the links between Islamabad and Mullah
Omar’s regime. The arrest of a Pakistani nuclear scientist has also
underlined the danger of these holocaust weapons falling into the hands
of fundamentalists — the ultimate in scary scenarios. Such dangerous
fallouts could only have been avoided by an early end of the war either
as the result of a clear-cut military defeat of the Taliban or defection
from its ranks. But the present indications are not hopeful. Arguably,
a massive ground offensive by the Americans may have made an impact.
But the US is evidently unwilling to undertake such a mission because,
first, it does not want to get bogged down as the Russians did and,
secondly, it suspects that such steps will put an even greater strain
on the Muslim partners of the coalition.
It isn’t only that there
are no signs as yet about who is winning or losing the war, there is
confusion, too, about the post-Taliban dispensation. The only certainties
about it is the place of the former king, Zahir Shah, at the helm and
the stationing of troops from Muslim countries to maintain order under
UN auspices. But there is no certitude about who will run the show on
the ground. Neither the unwholesome record of the Northern Alliance
nor the identification of ‘moderate’ elements in the Taliban recommend
themselves as possible solutions to the problem. For the present, however,
even considering a post-Taliban scene may appear absurd in view of the
uncertainty of how the war will progress in the coming days and weeks.
Indeed, the next most troublesome phase will be the effect of the bombing
during Ramzan on the Muslim countries. In India, concern about the conditions
in Pakistan becoming more unsettled is bound to be widely felt as the
war continues into the winter.
-- Editorial, Hindustan
Times, New Delhi, October 26, 2001
THE
SPIRALLING RHETORIC on the India-Pakistan front shows how intense are
the hard feelings that the Governments on both sides seem inclined to
let fly at each other like some uncontrollable sparks. Admittedly, the
two countries are very wary of each other's real intentions in a tremendously
complex regional context. The growing bilateral tensions are, in a sense,
traceable to last month's strategic decision by Gen. Pervez Musharraf,
Pakistan's President and Chief Executive, to cooperate with the United
States in its war, now under way, against Afghanistan. Relevant to this
is the emotional upheaval, which is being felt differently by the people
of India and Pakistan, on account of the uncontested belief that Afghanistan's
Taliban regime, presently under fire from the U.S., had in the first
place owed its genetical links to Islamabad itself. The extent of Pakistan's
benign or reformatory influence over Osama bin Laden, the Taliban's
patron-guest and America's prime target now, is of secondary importance
to New Delhi and Islamabad in this context. An overall regional ambience
so perceived seems to have spurred the Prime Minister, Mr. Atal Behari
Vajpayee, in his latest poser to Pakistan. The burden of his tactical
taunt is that Pakistan, which is ``waging a war'' against its own Taliban,
can hardly be trustworthy as a dialogue partner.
In a chronological sequence,
Mr. Vajpayee's doubts over Pakistan's credentials as a credible interlocutor
have only followed Gen. Musharraf's intemperate warnings. Gen. Musharraf
asserted only a day earlier that Islamabad would ``teach India a lesson''
if it were to opt for any military ``mischief'' on the bilateral front
at this particularly fragile moment in their relationship. The surmise
in Gen. Musharraf's official camp at this stage seems to be that India
has no business to quarrel with Pakistan if it has been able to join
the U.S.-led ``international coalition against terrorism''. The subtle
point at issue is that Washington is willing to accept Islamabad as
a key player in this unpredictable venture despite New Delhi's line
against Pakistan's encouragement of cross-border terrorism within India.
In New Delhi's perspective, Pakistan's geostrategic location rather
than its `moral' stature should explain the current convergence of interests
concerning Washington's ``anti-terror'' war and Islamabad's new foreign
policy orientation. New Delhi, provoked by Gen. Musharraf's latest remarks,
is now squandering the sign of restraint which it signalled only a few
days ago when it clarified that it had no intention for the present
to embark on ``hot pursuit'' of the Kashmir-related terrorists inside
the territory controlled by Pakistan.
Mr. Vajpayee clearly wants
to put Pakistan in the dock on the international stage by pointing out
the perceived inconsistencies in Gen. Musharraf's foreign policy. The
Prime Minister has asked Pakistan to choose either peace or animosity
in relation to India without mincing words or quibbling about policy.
Mr. Vajpayee may naturally be eager to let the global community know
India's point of view. However, his parallel move to slam the door on
the idea of re-engaging Pakistan seems to presage a new and dangerous
drift on the bilateral scene. So, both he and Gen. Musharraf must face
the true test of statesmanship by reining in the rhetoric so that it
does not become a blighted substitute for a genuine and sustainable
dialogue. Pakistan's latest `demarche' to India in regard to some statements
by its Home and Defence Ministers, Mr. L. K. Advani and Mr. George Fernandes
respectively, is illustrative of how far Islamabad has gone down the
path of confrontation in a context that has more to do with America's
strategic compulsions. While New Delhi is right in wanting to avoid
a ``sterile'' debate with Islamabad over each other's rhetoric, it will
be unwise to give up the search for a possible re-engagement between
the two.
-- Editorial, Hindu,
Chennai, October 25, 2001
General
Pervez Musharraf should not be left untutored in front of a microphone,
if his recent comments on PTV are anything to go by. What he had to
say on Monday was not just crude, it was downright offensive. Phrases
like ‘‘We are not wearing chudiyan (bangles)’’ do not behove presidents
of nations — whether they are ‘‘chota-mota’’ or not — and General Musharraf
woussld do well to realise that. Perhaps it is the new arrogance that
his close partnership with the US in the ‘‘war against terror’’ has
engendered which prompts him to choose his words so rashly. Whatever
the reason, it does little for his image or that of his country. Finding
himself driven into a corner by a hostile response from within his country
to his support of the air strikes on Afghanistan, the General clearly
finds it expedient to turn on the anti-India rhetoric.
But if General Musharraf
is given to talking loosely on Pakistan-India relations, Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee has a habit of delivering ad hoc pronouncements
every now and then. Ironically, his statements to the press on Monday
at Lucknow, ruling out a fresh dialogue with Pakistan, contradicted
his observations of late August — also made in Lucknow — confirming
that he was going to meet General Musharraf in New York. It is true,
of course, that a great deal has changed in the intervening two months.
They witnessed not just the September 11 strikes in New York and Washington
but a dastardly attack on the J&K Assembly building in Srinagar,
which even Musharraf was forced to condemn publicly. While events such
as these would certainly add complexity to the India-Pakistan dialogue
process, the question really is whether they should be allowed to torpedo
it or even put it on the back burner. Vajpayee, when he expressed himself
against resuming the dialogue process this time, justified the revised
stand by pointing to Monday’s Fidayeen attack on the Avantipur Indian
Airforce base, near Srinagar. But the fact remains that such attacks
are not new and not wholly unexpected either. While we should take every
precaution to foil such predatory strikes and ensure security in J&K,
they should not in themselves be allowed to define foreign policy formulations
and targets.
In other words, India must
continue to talk to Pakistan while holding on to the big stick to fight
any aggression it may face from that country. Foreign policy by its
very nature follows a much larger cycle of evolution than those that
describe skirmishes and attacks on the ground. Such policy formulation,
therefore, would be destabilised greatly if it were to respond to the
acts of terror that J&K has, alas, been witnessing on an almost
daily basis. It takes a self-confident nation with clearly defined priorities
to pursue the larger objective of working towards achieving sustainable
peace on the subcontinent. Both India and Pakistan then have little
to gain by trotting out the same tired old statements and shibboleths
which have only led them to go around in never ending circles like blinded
bulls yoked together by violence.
-- Editorial, Indian
Express, New Delhi, October 24, 2001
FOR
THE U.S., the ringing chorus by the forum for Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) against terrorism in ``all forms and manifestations''
is music indeed. In a different sense though, the United States must
reckon with the APEC's collective failure to openly voice solidarity
with Washington as regards its ongoing ``counter- terror'' strikes against
Osama bin Laden and the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Also relevant
to any discussion of the actual diplomatic gains by the U.S. at the
latest APEC summit in Shanghai is the forum's formulation that the United
Nations should ``play a major role'' in combating terrorism comprehensively.
Arguably, these are the outward signs of the APEC's hesitation even
if it does not connote an absolute refusal to endorse America's present
military action. On balance, however, there seems to be something that
the U.S. can usefully cite from the subtle sub-text of the forum's overall
suggestion about a major role for the global organisation. The U.S.-friendly
view from the Asia-Pacific rim is that ``the importance of all relevant
U.N. resolutions'' be taken into account in the battle against international
terror. Indeed, the legal and moral springboard for America's current
military expedition was the resolution that the U.N. Security Council
recently adopted to outline a robust policy of facing the terrorist
challenges in the wake of last month's outrage against humanity. If
seen in this nuanced framework, Washington's claim about ``universal
support'' for its anti-terror sentiments is not really illusory as might
be indicated by the APEC's eloquent silence on the incremental American
military involvement in Afghanistan.
The APEC's diffused perspective
on America's efforts to lead an international anti-terror coalition
is not of the same salience to Washington as the view of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organisation (NATO) is. As an acknowledged military alliance,
the U.S.-centric NATO has by and large expressed its collective willingness
to throw its weight behind Washington in its anti- terror ``campaign''.
Now, the APEC, a quintessential regional grouping that was explicitly
formed to address the global economic challenges on a sustainable basis,
seems to have played a proactive role in addressing the U.S.' concerns
about the financial sponsorship of international terrorism. In this
manner, the APEC entity, whose centre of gravity extends beyond the
U.S. economy, may have raised the stakes of the international community
in its battle against terrorism on the financial front in particular.
The Asia-Pacific rim is dotted with the world's two premier economies,
those of the U.S. and Japan, besides several emerging and interactive
ones. So, the APEC can make a positive difference to the ``campaign''
against international terror by translating some of its latest intentions
into a reality. Spelt out in this category are some critical APEC objectives
- blocking the international transfers of terror- spinning financial
assets, strengthening energy security, ensuring the safety of the global
transportation networks among other aims.
No less important to the
global anti-terror ambience are the bilateral meetings that the U.S.
President, Mr. George W. Bush, held with his Chinese and Russian counterparts,
Mr. Jiang Zemin and Mr. Vladimir Putin respectively, on the sidelines
of the APEC summit. Mr. Jiang advocated a role for the U.N. in this
``campaign'', while Mr. Putin downplayed Mr. Bush's apprehensions that
the international terrorists might manage to lay their hands on intercontinental
ballistic missiles and activate them. Yet, among all the APEC leaders,
it was Mr. Putin who came closest to Mr. Bush in articulating the terrorist
threats. With Mr. Bush advocating a missile defence system by showing
the terrorist challenge as a new strategic compulsion, Mr. Putin agreed
to look at futurist ways of defending global stability only after evaluating
the long-term viability of the existing frameworks. A serious Russo-American
strategic dialogue seems to be beginning in this new context.
-- Editorial, Hindu,
Chennai, October 23, 2001
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