REPORT NO.

205

PARLIAMENT OF INDIA
RAJYA SABHA
DEPARTMENT-RELATED PARLIAMENTARY STANDING COMMITTEE
ON HOME AFFAIRS

TWO HUNDRED FIFTH REPORT

ACTION TAKEN BY GOVERNMENT ON THE
RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS CONTAINED IN THE TWO
HUNDRED THIRD REPORT ON BORDER SECURITY: CAPACITY BUILDING
AND INSTITUTIONS

(PRESENTED TO RAJYA SABHA ON 8TH MARCH, 2018)
(LAIĐ ON THE TABLE OF LOK SABHA ON 8TH MARCH, 2018)

Rajya Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi
March, 2018/Phalguna, 1939 (Saka)
PARLIAMENT OF INDIA
RAJYA SABHA

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ON HOME AFFAIRS

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*to be appended at the printing stage*
COMMITTEE ON HOME AFFAIRS  
(re-constituted w.e.f. 1st September, 2017)

1. Shri P. Chidambaram - Chairman

RAJYA SABHA

2. Shri Pratap Keshari Deb
3. Shri K. Rahman Khan
4. Dr. V. Maitreyan
5. Shri Shamsheer Singh Manhas
6. Shri Derek O'Brien
7. Shri Neeraj Shekhar
8. Shri K. Bhabananda Singh
9. Shri Ram Chandra Prasad Singh
10. Shri R.K. Sinha

LOK SABHA

11. Dr. Sanjeev Balyan
12. Shri S. Selvakumarachinnayan
13. Shri Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury
14. Dr. Kakoli Ghosh Dastidar
15. Shri Ramen Deka
16. Shri Prataprao Ganpatrao Jadhav
17. Shri Mallikarjun Kharge
18. Shrimati Kirron Kher
19. Shri Ram Mohan Naidu Kinjarapu
20. Shri Kaushal Kishore
21. Shri Ashwini Kumar
22. Shri P. Nagarajan
23. Shri Baijayant "Jay" Panda
24. Shri Dilip Patel
25. Shri Lalubhai Babubhai Patel
26. Shri Natubhai Gomanbhai Patel
27. Shri Bheemrao B. Patil
28. Shri Mohammed Faizal PP
29. Shri Bishnu Pada Ray
30. Shri Prem Singh Chandumajra
31. Shri B. Sriramulu

SECRETARIAT

Shri P.P.K. Ramacharyulu, Additional Secretary
Shri Rohtas, Joint Secretary
Shri Vimal Kumar, Director
Dr. (Smt.) Subhashree Panigrahi, Additional Director
Shri Bhupendra Bhaskar, Additional Director
Shri Pritam Kumar, Under Secretary

(i)
INTRODUCTION

I, the Chairman of the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs, having been authorized by the Committee to submit the Report on its behalf, do hereby present this Two Hundred Fifth Report on Action Taken by Government on the Recommendations/Observations Contained in the Two Hundred Third Report on 'Border Security: Capacity Building and Institutions'.

2. The Two Hundred Third Report of the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs was presented to the Rajya Sabha and laid on the Table of the Lok Sabha on 11th April, 2017. After presentation of the Report, the copies thereof were sent to the Ministry of Home Affairs requesting them to furnish Action Taken Notes on the recommendations of the Committee contained in the Report. The Ministry furnished the Action Taken Notes on the said report to the Committee on 17th August, 2017.

3. The Committee has noted that the statement on the status of implementation of the recommendations contained in the said Report of the Committee has not been laid on the Table of Rajya Sabha/Lok Sabha in pursuant to the direction of Chairman, Rajya Sabha dated 24th September 2004.

4. The Committee considered the draft Two Hundred Fifth Report and adopted the same in its meeting held on 8th February, 2018.

5. The recommendations/observations of the Committee are printed in bold letters.

P. Chidambaram
Chairman

Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs

8th February, 2018
New Delhi
19 Magha, 1939 (Saka)
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<td>Border Management</td>
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<td>HHTI</td>
<td>Hand Held Thermal Imager</td>
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<td>High Level Enquiry Committee</td>
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<td>ICB</td>
<td>India-China Border</td>
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<td>ITBP</td>
<td>Indo-Tibetan Border Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>IIT</td>
<td>Indian Institute of Technology</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>IBB</td>
<td>India-Bangladesh Border</td>
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<td>IMB</td>
<td>India-Myanmar Borders</td>
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<tr>
<td>INB</td>
<td>India-Nepal Border</td>
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<td>IBhB</td>
<td>India-Bhutan Border</td>
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<td>IPB</td>
<td>India-Pakistan Border</td>
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<td>INSAS</td>
<td>Indian New Small Arms System</td>
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<td>ISRO</td>
<td>Indian Space Research Organization</td>
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<td>Joint Task Force on Intelligence</td>
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<td>Light Machine Gun</td>
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<td>Limited Tender Enquiry</td>
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<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NCSMCS</td>
<td>National Committee on Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security</td>
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<td>NATGRID</td>
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<td>Pradhan Mantri Gram Sadak Yojana</td>
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<td>QRTs</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Teams</td>
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<td>State Financial Corporation</td>
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<td>SMACs</td>
<td>Subsidiary Multi Agency Centres</td>
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<td>SSB</td>
<td>Sashastra Seema Bal</td>
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Report

The Action Taken Report of the Committee deals with the action taken by the Ministry of Home Affairs on the recommendations contained in the Two Hundred Third Report of the Committee on Border Security: Capacity Building and Institutions. The Two Hundred Third Report was presented to Rajya Sabha/laid on the Table of Lok Sabha, on 11th April, 2017.

2. Action Taken Notes as received from the Ministry of Home Affairs in respect of the recommendations contained in the Two Hundred Third Report have been categorized as follows:

Chapter I: The recommendations/observations, which have been accepted by the Government: Para Nos. 2.6.8, 2.7.3, 2.10.4, 2.10.6, 2.12.3, 2.17.9, 2.18.3, 2.18.4, 2.26.8, 2.28.6, 3.3.8, 3.3.9, 4.1.4, 4.3.5, 4.3.6 and 4.5.7 (of Two Hundred Third Report)
Total recommendations- 16

The Committee is pleased to note that the Ministry has accepted its recommendations as mentioned in Chapter-I of the Report.

Chapter II: The recommendations/observations which the Committee does not desire to pursue in view of the Government’s replies: Para Nos. 2.3.3, 2.4.7, 2.4.8, 2.6.9, 2.8.3, 2.9.2, 2.10.7, 2.16.4, 2.21.5, 2.21.6, 2.21.7, 2.22.3, 2.23.4, 2.23.6, 2.26.5, 2.26.7, 4.2.5, 4.5.6, 4.7.1 and 4.7.2 (ibid)
Total recommendations - 20

The Committee is convinced with the explanations furnished by the Ministry and, therefore, does not want to pursue the recommendations further.

Chapter III: The recommendations/observations in respect of which the Committee is not satisfied with the replies of the Ministry: Para Nos. 2.4.4, 2.5.2, 2.8.5, 2.8.7, 2.9.5, 2.17.5, 2.17.7, 2.19.2, 2.20.2, 2.25.2, 3.2.4, 3.2.5, 3.4.5, 3.4.6, 4.1.2, 4.4.2, 4.4.6, 4.4.7, 4.5.8 and 4.6.3 (ibid)
Total recommendations - 20

The Committee expresses its concern over the non-implementation of its recommendations contained in Chapter-III and desires that the Ministry should furnish convincing action taken steps in respect of those recommendations.

Chapter IV: The recommendations/observations in respect of which final replies of the Government have not been received: Para Nos. 2.6.6, 2.6.7, 2.9.4, 2.13.3, 2.14.3, 2.15.4, 2.17.11, 2.24.3, 2.27.4, 2.28.5 and 3.2.6 (ibid)
Total Recommendations - 11

In respect of 11 recommendations in Chapter-IV, the Ministry has either furnished interim reply or couched its response in vague terms. Therefore, the Committee desires that the Ministry should furnish pointed and detailed Action Taken Notes in respect of the recommendations categorized in Chapters III and IV in keeping with the spirit of the recommendation.

3. The details of the ATNs have been analyzed in the succeeding chapters.
CHAPTER-I

RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS WHICH HAVE BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT

1.1 CATTLE SMUGGLING ALONG IBB

Recommendation

1.1.1 The Committee also learnt about the involvement of the local people living near the border in cattle smuggling and feels that lack of any legal deterrence and ineffective law enforcement seem to have emboldened such persons. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the West Bengal State Government should be requested to take strict action against persons who are known or suspected to be involved in cattle smuggling.

(Para 2.6.8 of 203rd Report)

Action Taken

1.1.2 BSF field officers keep on raising these concerns with respective state police for taking strict actions on the FIRs lodged by BSF against cattle smugglers. Further, a Task Force under Director General of Police, West Bengal has been constituted to examine the existing system of border policing and to suggest the measures to strengthen the State system to identify the crime syndicate involved in Cross Border Crimes and to take action against such syndicates.

1.2 INDIA PAKISTAN BORDER

Border Outposts along IPB

Recommendation

1.2.1 The Committee is concerned about the delay in construction of Border Out Posts on India’s most sensitive border. The issues of public protests, land acquisition, clearances should have been anticipated at the proposal stage itself. The Committee takes exception to the delay as it hampers surveillance and domination of IPB and the target of 3.5 km of inter-BOP distance has not been achieved. Now that the Ministry has resolved the issue and significant progress has taken place for completion of construction of BoPs, the construction of the remaining BoPs should be completed at the earliest.

(Para 2.7.3 ibid)

Action Taken

1.2.2 The Status of Composite BOPs sanctioned along Indo-Pak Border is as under:-

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>State</th>
<th>Sanctioned</th>
<th>Completed</th>
<th>In Progress</th>
<th>Yet to Start</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jammu</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>05</td>
<td>-</td>
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<td>Punjab</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>01</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rajasthan</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarat</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>06</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.2.3 During the Steering Committee Meeting held under the Chairmanship of Secretary (BM), Chairman Steering Committee on 20 Jan 2017 timeline of March, 2018 has been fixed for completion of Composite BOPs.
1.3  INDIA- CHINA BORDER (ICB)
Border Infrastructure along ICB

Recommendation

1.3.1  The Committee takes note of the fact that the infrastructure on the Chinese side of the India-China border is far better than that on the Indian side and to, achieve comparable results, the Government has to intensify its efforts and fast-track the projects. The Committee recommends that the Ministry should strive to complete the construction of all the roads under Phase-I by March, 2019 as targeted and should also start the Phase-II construction at the earliest.

(Para 2.10.4 ibid)

Action Taken

1.3.2  Committee’s recommendation has been noted and all efforts will be made to complete the project by March, 2019. For construction under Phase-II, DPRs have been received and EFC Note has been initiated.

Recommendation

1.3.3  The Committee feels that the permanent integrated buildings at high altitude BoPs is the need of the hour to improve operational efficiency. Construction of the Lukung BOP may be completed at the earliest and an early decision may be taken for the other 11 BOPs which are under consideration.

(Para 2.10.6 ibid)

Action Taken

1.3.4  Committee’s recommendation has been noted and all efforts will be made to complete Lukung BOP by 25.01.2018. Proposal for 11 BOPs is being progressed for which SFC Note has been initiated.

1.4  INDIA- NEPAL BORDER (INB)

Border Infrastructure along INB

Recommendation

1.4.1  The Committee is constrained to note the inordinate delay in the construction and upgradation of 1377 km of strategic roads along the India-Nepal Border in the States of UP, Bihar and Uttarakhand due to pending land acquisition and forest clearances. The Committee notes that the Ministry has sought an extension of time up to March, 2019 for completion of these projects. The Ministry should have made serious efforts in resolving the issues. Though the construction should have been completed in 2016 as per the original plan, only very little has been completed so far. The Committee deprecates this delay and desires that at least by March, 2019 it should be completed.

(Para 2.12.3 ibid)

Action Taken

1.4.2  Committee’s recommendation has been noted and all efforts will be made to complete the project by March, 2019 in the encumbrance free stretches. In stretches with encumbrances (wildlife clearances, arbitration cases, dam height), all out efforts are being made to clear encumbrances.
1.5 GENERAL BORDER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Working Conditions of Border Guarding Forces (BGF) Personnel

Recommendation

1.5.1 The construction of Observation Posts and ambush-cum-patrol shelters along the India-Bangladesh and India-Pakistan Borders is a good proposal and is in the right direction to improve the working conditions of personnel and also to strengthen the surveillance on the border. The Committee recommends that the Ministry should take an early decision on this proposal during this financial year itself.

(Para 2.17.9 ibid)

Action Taken

1.5.2 The High Level Empowered Committee in its 32nd meeting has accorded approval for construction of 833 Nos OP cum Naka Machans and ACP Shelters amounting to Rs. 97.03 crore along India-Bangladesh and India-Pakistan Borders. Work is in progress in 126 Surveillance cum OP shelters and 277 ACP shelters.

1.6 DEPLOYMENT OF BGF BATTALIONS TO DUTIES OTHER THAN BORDER GUARDING

Recommendation

1.6.1 The Committee is concerned to observe that while 30 out of a total of 186 battalions were designated as Reserve Battalions, only 10 out of 30 were actually kept as Reserve and even they have been deployed in various locations for miscellaneous duties. The Committee feels that the raison d'être of having Reserve Battalions has been lost and this has become the root cause for overburdening of border guarding personnel leaving them with no time for sleep, rest, recuperation and training activities. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should urgently raise additional battalions in the respective forces for the purpose of handling LWE and Counter Insurgency operations and to ensure that battalions from BGFs are not diverted for the purpose. The Committee also recommends that the Government should raise the required number of Indian Reserve Battalions for the States to ensure their self-sufficiency in law and order, elections and other miscellaneous duties instead of making them dependent on the CAPFs.

(Para 2.18.3 ibid)

Action Taken

1.6.2 Additional raising and deployment of forces is done after assessing the prevailing security situation and the strength of existing forces, which is done on required basis, as per the demand of the situation. Since 2009, 112 additional battalions have been sanctioned to the CAPFs (CRPF-38, BSF-29, SSB-32 and ITBP-13). Out of these, 96 battalions have been raised; 12 under raising and 04 are to be raised in 2018-19.

Recommendation

1.6.3 The Committee feels that the number of Reserve Battalions at present is too low and it has to be augmented urgently. The Committee, therefore, recommends that all the proposals of BGFs to raise additional number of battalions should be considered on a priority basis and approval must be granted at the earliest. The Ministry should establish a strong institutional mechanism to ensure that
the Reserve battalions do not get deployed under any circumstances for any other duty except in times of extreme exigencies and should be kept for the purpose of training, rest and relief of existing troops. The Ministry should also ensure that any such deployment in times of exigencies should be temporary and must not become permanent at any cost.

Action Taken

1.6.4 As and when State Governments request MHA for additional CAPFs on short term basis for any emergent Law & Order/election duties, MHA provides training/reserve Coys of CAPFs available in the area, as no other source is available with MHA. After normalising the situation or completion of election-related duties, reserve Coys are reverted back to their locations.

1.7 COMPOSITE BOPs

Recommendation

1.7.1 The Committee also expresses its displeasure on the fact that the Ministry did not implement several recommendations of the Committee given in its 177th Report on Coastal Security Scheme. The Committee recommends that the Ministry should have a relook into the Committee’s 177th Report and make efforts to implement the recommendations given therein.

Action Taken

1.7.2 The status of implementation on the observations/conclusions and recommendations contained in the 177th Report of the Department-related Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs (DRPSC-HA) on the Coastal Security Scheme has been furnished for consideration of the DRPSC-HA. All the 58 recommendations made by the Committee have been accepted.

1.7.3 Based on the 177th Report, the DRPSC-HA has made 23 recommendations contained in the 187th Report, for which status of implementation was laid on both the Houses of the Parliament on 31st July, 2015.

1.8 COASTAL BORDER

Security of Islands

Recommendation

1.8.1 Coastal security is an important challenge the country is facing on the external front. Funds are being provided to the states for marine policing and coastal security but several states have failed to spend the funds fully while some projects under Coastal Security Scheme are facing delayed implementation. The States do not seem to be fully alive to the enormity of the challenge or to the huge responsibility that they have agreed to share regarding Coastal security. There should be regular meetings with State governments to sensitize them and join hand with the Central government in monitoring all coastal security related projects so that our security system could be strengthened.

(Para 2.28.6 ibid)
Action Taken

1.8.2 Ministry of Home Affairs has been implementing Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) in phases with a view to strengthening the infrastructure of the State Coastal Police for patrolling and surveillance of coastal areas, particularly in the shallow areas close to the coast.

1.8.3 The Phase-II of the CSS, with an outlay of Rs 1579.91 crore is under implementation at present wherein various assets and equipments have been provided to build their capability.

1.8.4 A mechanism of periodic meetings already exist to review the coastal security in totality where State Govts./UT Administrations are sensitized about coastal security. National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) against Threats from the Sea’ under the Chairmanship of Cabinet Secretary reviews the Coastal Security mechanism in its bi-annual meetings. Chief Secretaries of all Coastal States/UTs are its members. Steering Committee for review of coastal security under the Chairmanship of Secretary (BM), MHA reviews the implementation of the Coastal Security Scheme, in its bi-annual meetings, wherein the implementation of Coastal Security Scheme, Surveillance and patrolling mechanism in the coastal areas; and other issues relating to Coastal Security are reviewed. State Coastal Security Committees under chairmanship of Chief Secretaries/Administrators and District Coastal Security Committees under chairmanship of District Magistrates in all Coastal States/UTs have been constituted to monitor, manage and Steer the various issues of the Coastal Security at these levels.

1.8.5 Hon’ble Union Home Minister has reviewed the Coastal Security mechanism in the country with Home Ministers, Chief Secretaries, DGPs of the Coastal States/UTs, in Mumbai on 16.06.2016.

1.9 MULTI-AGENCY CENTRE (MAC)

Recommendation

1.9.1 The Committee takes note of the low contribution of State agencies in overall inputs received by the Multi Agency Centre. The Committee feels that this points towards certain weaknesses in the intelligence gathering capacity of the States. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should hold consultations with the States and find out the reasons for this low contribution. The Committee also recommends that an assessment be done of various State Intelligence agencies and Special Branches to ascertain their bottlenecks and efforts be made to resolve them.

(Para 3.3.8 ibid)

Action Taken

1.9.2 It has been IB’s endeavour to ensure that all agencies contribute intelligence inputs to MAC forum as mandated by MAC Order 2008. On several occasions, Joint Director/MAC wrote D.O. letters to all the Heads of MAC participating agencies requesting them to share information to the MAC-SMAC forum. Such D.O. letter was last sent on December 08, 2016 to all DGPs/CPs. In fact, the quantum of intelligence inputs contributed by the State Special Branches has increased from 11% in 2016 to 14% in March 2017 showing a gradual progress on this account. The matter may be discussed in the next consultation meeting under the aegis of JTFI to ascertain the bottlenecks and efforts required to resolve them.

Recommendation

1.9.3 The Committee takes note of the MAC/SMACs network and appreciates that this may have enabled seamless integration of intelligence collected by different agencies. The Committee
recommends that there should be a strong mechanism to perform extensive reliability and validity checks on intelligence that comes in from various Provider Agencies before its dissemination.

(Para 3.3.9 ibid)

**Action Taken**

1.9.4 MAC devised its own mechanism for grading of inputs received from various channels/agencies. Besides, it also conducts special meetings on LWE, NE meeting (Bangladesh/Myanmar), J&K Cross-Border Terrorism, Focus Groups meetings on important security related developments in addition to the MAC daily Nodal Officers meeting. In these meetings, the stakeholders make assessment about the reliability of the source of information and credibility of inputs received. Maximum numbers of intelligence related inputs were resolved through such meetings. Actionable intelligence is immediately shared with concerned enforcement agencies for action and follow-up.

**1.10 OTHER ISSUES**

**Acquisition of Border Land**

**Recommendation**

1.10.1 The Committee notes that State administrations are facing serious difficulties in acquiring land because of legal and other impediments and views that the same has caused delay in execution of border roads, fencing and flood lighting projects. Absence of such basic infrastructure has an adverse impact on our border security. Besides this, project cost of constructing border roads also increases manifold due to time and cost over-run. Therefore, the Committee strongly recommends that problematic road patches should be identified and ‘Alternate Dispute Resolution Mechanism’ should be immediately established for expediting disposal of all land acquisition related disputes.

(Para 4.1.4 ibid)

**Action Taken**

1.10.2 Department of Border Management is making all out effort to expedite land acquisition cases with State Govt. by allowing state to procure land under land purchase policy or acquiring land under urgency clause of New Land Acquisition Act. The recommendation of the Committee has been noted and states are being advised to establish ADRM for problematic patches to expedite land acquisition cases as land acquisition is state subject.

**1.11 DRUG TRAFFICKING IN BORDER STATES**

**Recommendation**

1.11.1 The Committee notes the rampant drug trafficking problem in border areas especially along the India-Pakistan border in Punjab and J&K, and feels that, despite huge amount of seizures of drugs, the Government has comprehensively failed to address this issue. The Committee recommends that the Ministry must make serious efforts to completely prevent the flow of drugs from across the border by adopting a zero tolerance approach in vulnerable areas.

(Para 4.3.5 ibid)
1.11.2 Over the years there has been decrease in the smuggling activities and the extent of interception has increased. The same is evident from the figures of smuggled items i.e drugs and infiltration seized during the last three years and current year (upto 30 April, 2017):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Seizure of drugs Qty (in)</th>
<th>Infiltration Cases</th>
<th>Apprehension</th>
<th>Killed</th>
<th>Foiled</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>434,934</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>409,213</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>352,737</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017 (upto 30 Apr)</td>
<td>93,116</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1.11.3 Following measures have been taken by BSF to contain the smuggling of drugs along Indo-Pak International Border:

(i) Vulnerability mapping of BOPs is being reviewed from time to time and being strengthened by deploying additional manpower, special surveillance equipments, vehicles etc.
(ii) Effective domination of the border by carrying out round the clock surveillance of the border viz, patrolling, laying nakas, establishing of observation posts all along the IB.
(iii) Erection of Border Fencing on the International Border.
(iv) Installation of Border Floodlights along the fence.
(v) Use of Water crafts/Boats and floating BOPs for domination of riverine area of IB.
(vi) Up-gradation of Intelligence (Int) network and coordination with sister agencies.
(vii) Conduct of special operations along the border and rear areas.
(viii) Anti-Tunneling exercise is being conducted on regular basis in vulnerable areas.
(ix) Use of technological solution/Force multipliers.

Recommendation

1.11.4 The Committee is anguished to know that cultivation beyond fencing was helping the drug couriers to transfer drugs from across the border to the hinterland. The Committee is given to understand that persons going beyond the fence find the packets that come from across the border in their fields and throw them across the fence on the Indian side which are collected by drug couriers during the night. The Committee recommends that the Ministry must instruct BSF to create anti-trafficking teams of 4-5 personnel in every Company who must scan the area beyond the fence every day in the morning before the farmers are allowed to pass through the gates and also scan the area on the Indian side of the fence during the evening after all the farmers have returned from the fields. These teams must also be tasked with the duty of surveillance of the area under the command of the respective companies during night with Hand-held thermal imagers from the BoPs and should be encouraged to launch operations in case of detection of any suspicious movement near the fence. The Committee also recommends that BSF personnel must be directed to frisk all the persons going beyond the fence for any purpose both while going and returning.

(Para 4.3.6 ibid)

Action Taken

1.11.5 BSF has directed its field formations to take action as per the recommendation of the Committee vide communication dated 03.05.2017.
1.11.6 Also, all persons going ahead of fencing through gates are properly frisked. Mahila Constables are employed to search/frisk ladies going ahead of the border fence.

1.12 INFILTRATION AND CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM

Recommendation

1.12.1 The Committee is also concerned that while there were intelligence inputs before the attacks, they were of a generic nature without any specific details regarding the date and exact location of the attacks. Intelligence agencies should analyse the inputs carefully and to the extent possible isolate the actionable inputs.

(Para 4.5.7 ibid)

Action Taken

1.12.2 All sensitive and operational inputs are being shared immediately on SMAC platform to strengthen and gear up security grid. In case of specific inputs efforts were made to develop the inputs in due course and value additions/feedbacks, if any are also being updated. In case of any additional inputs being received and further developed as actionable, besides sharing the same on SMAC, the same are also discussed on SMAC platform by calling emergency meeting with the concerned and alerts being sounded.

1.12.3 Intelligence agencies grade the available inputs, based on the credibility of the source of information which may vary from time to time. The analysis of these inputs is carried out at appropriate levels to segregate actionable inputs and shared with all concerned at the earliest keeping the time criticality in view. All intelligence inputs received in the Ministry are disseminated expeditiously. Concern of the committee has been noted for compliance.
CHAPTER-II

RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS ON WHICH THE COMMITTEE DOES NOT DESIRE TO PURSUE THE MATTER IN VIEW OF THE GOVERNMENT’S REPLY

2.1 BORDER OUTPOSTS ALONG IBB

Recommendation

2.1.1 The Committee, in the first instance, takes a serious note of the fact that the proposal of constructing 509 BOPs along IPB and IBB to reduce the inter-BOP distance to 3.5 Kilometres has been revised and reduced to 422 BOPs. Reducing inter-BOP distance is very crucial for the security of the country and to keep a tab on the activities going on at the border. But even the reduced target was not achieved and only 97 BOPs out of 326 BOPs have been completed by the end of 2016 along IBB. The Committee takes a serious view of the cost and time overrun due to delay in land acquisition. The government should have taken advance action to overcome all such difficulties for timely implementation of the project. Now that the Ministry has found a workable solution in the form of utilizing land available in the Right of Way of Fence and Road, the Committee strongly recommends that the project should be completed by the targeted date of July, 2018 and there should be no further time and cost overrun. The Committee notes that no reasons were furnished by the MHA why the number of BoPs was reduced from 509 to 422. In the circumstances, the Committee recommends that the original plan of constructing 509 BOPs to reduce the inter-BOP distance to 3.5 kilometres may be reconsidered in the interest of the security of the nation.

(Para 2.3.3 of 203rd Report)

Action Taken

2.1.2 The project for construction of 509 Composite BOPs was reduced to 422 Composite BOPs as the construction of remaining BOPs was not feasible either due to pending land acquisition or due to site conditions. However, it was decided that the construction activities of remaining BOPs will be taken up as per the availability of site. After revision in scope of project to 422 BOPs, site for 2 more BOPs was made available in West Bengal and accordingly, the 2 BOPs have been approved. Therefore, as and when the site of remaining BOPs will be made available, the balance Composite BOPs work will be taken up.

2.1.3 Further, along Indo-Bangladesh Border 125 BOPs have been completed and work is in progress in 188 BOPs. The Construction of 133 BOPs have been taken up in the Right of Way (RoW) of fence and roads. Along Indo-Pakistan Border 78 BOPs have been completed and work is in progress in 15 BOPs.

2.2 BORDER FENCING ALONG IBB

Recommendation

2.2.1 The Committee feels that the issue of shifting the villages or the fence is an intricate one and the Ministry must not adopt a one-size-fits-all approach on this issue. The Committee feels that the Ministry must try to shift the fence in as many areas as possible to prevent any inconvenience to the people. However, wherever the houses are located right on the International Boundary line, the Ministry will have to shift them to the hinterland and rehabilitate the affected households. The Committee recommends that the Ministry should carry out a review of all such areas within six
months and come up with specific solutions in all such cases. The Committee desires to be apprised about the progress in this regard.

(Para 2.4.7 ibid)

Action Taken

2.2.2 BSF has been tasked to survey the border areas to ascertain the feasibility of shifting of fence ahead of villages. However, shifting of fence ahead of villages also require concurrence of Border Guard Bangladesh (BGB).

2.2.3 In this process, MHA has approved shifting fence ahead of 07 villages in Assam in November, 2016.

2.2.4 In all such cases, since concurrence of BGB is required for erection of fencing (SRF) with in 150 yards of IB, the issue is being pursued with BGB at the various levels including DG Level talk between India and Bangladesh.(Source: BM-III, Page 456-460)

Recommendation

2.2.5 The Committee also notes that while rehabilitation and resettlement of displaced people does not come under the purview of BADP Guidelines, the BADP funds can be utilised to create social infrastructure. The Committee feels that the people residing on the border line will be willing to shift easily if they are provided with proper housing and other facilities. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should persuade the State Government to provide BADP funds for community housing projects, which fall within the definition of social infrastructure, in the hinterland and shift all the households living beyond the fencing into such buildings.

(Para 2.4.8 ibid)

Action Taken

2.2.6 As per records available in the Department of Border Management, 148 villages are situated between the Border Fencing and International Boundary on Indo-Bangladesh Border. This Ministry has no objection to the proposal for shifting of these villages to own side of the border fencing. The schemes/works under BADP are prepared by the State Government and concerned State Government may include work related to the basic infrastructure in the area as per BADP guidelines. However, community housing cannot be undertaken under BADP as the guidelines of BADP does not permit for the same.

2.3 CATTLE SMUGGLING ALONG IBB

Recommendation

2.3.1 The Committee agrees that mass movement of cattle occurs from all the states towards West Bengal and Assam and once they reach the border areas it becomes extremely difficult to stop their movement across the border. The Committee feels that Police forces of various States have failed to stop this mass movement of cattle to border states and West Bengal Police has failed to intercept or stop the movement of the cattle. The Committee feels that there is a wide and deeply entrenched nexus due to which this menace has proliferated and the Government needs to strike at the roots of this nexus if it has to completely curb this problem.

(Para 2.6.9 ibid)
Action Taken

2.3.2 In order to curb cattle smuggling along the IBB, MHA has submitted a report in the Hon'ble Supreme Court containing detailed suggestions on the matter. The matter is under consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

2.4 INDIA PAKISTAN BORDER
Border Fencing, Floodlighting and Roads Along IPB

Recommendation

2.4.1 *The Committee recommends that there should be regular maintenance of flood lights so that damage is minimal. In the flood prone areas, pre-emptive and protective steps should be taken to ensure that flood lights are not affected. The Committee hopes that the work of restoration of damaged flood lights, entrusted to CPWD, would have been completed as per target by March, 2017.*

(Para 2.8.3 ibid)

Action Taken

2.4.2 The maintenance of the floodlights along the Indo-Pakistan Border is entrusted to BSF (except Gujarat) for which appropriate funds are allocated every year. The maintenance of floodlight is regular feature. Further, maintenance of floodlight in Gujarat is under process and 85 km floodlight is handed over to BSF by CPWD.

2.5 BORDER ROADS ALONG IPB

Recommendation

2.5.1 *The Committee, during its study visit to border areas of Punjab, found extremely poor roads which can significantly slow down the movement of Forces and cause hardship to them during an emergency. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that approval to the project of construction of lateral and axial roads in Punjab may be granted without any further delay and construction work should begin at the earliest. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry must prioritise construction of lateral roads as they are essential for patrolling and surveillance purposes.*

(Para 2.9.2 ibid)

Action Taken

2.5.2 The proposal for construction of lateral and axial roads in Punjab has been taken on priority. The estimate for consultancy work and design of road, bridges, culverts etc for invitation of tender on EPC mode for construction of Lateral and Axial roads along Indo-Pak Border in Punjab amounting to Rs. 8.20 Crore has been approved in favour of CPWD by the 33rd HLEC in its meeting held on 15 Nov 2016. The consultancy work is likely to be completed in due course.

2.6 INDIA-CHINA BORDER (ICB)
Border Infrastructure along ICB

Recommendation

2.6.1 *The Committee also recommends that the proposal of construction of more helipads in forward locations may be approved without any delay. The Ministry of Home Affairs may also chalk*
out a plan to create a dedicated air wing of ITBP and procure a minimal fleet of helicopters and planes, as per the requirements of ITBP, for the purpose.  

(Para 2.10.7 ibid)

**Action Taken**

2.6.2 Ministry of Defence vide U.O. dated 31-1-2017 has provided operational clearance for construction/up-gradation of 48 helipads (construction of 11 new helipads and up-gradation of 37 existing helipads). As regards creation of air wing for ITBP, the recommendation of the Committee has been noted.

2.7 **VULNERABILITIES ON IMB**

**Recommendation**

2.7.1 The Committee takes a serious note of the fact that the gaps in the deployment are wide and are prone to be exploited by the insurgents to carry out sabotage activities against the country and its security forces. The Committee is also constrained to learn that the system of FMR along with porous and unfenced border is being exploited by the anti national elements for unhindered movement of insurgent groups across the border. The Committee also expresses its concern that the implementation of FMR is not uniform across the states along the IMB which is exploited by insurgents and anti-national elements. The exploitation of FMR is also facilitated by the thick jungles, heavy undergrowth, riverine and mountainous terrain in the region. The Committee takes note of the MOU being proposed by India to Myanmar for rationalising and regularising the FMR and recommends that steps may be taken for early signing of the MOU. The Committee also recommends that steps may be taken to ensure uniform implementation of the FMR by all the states bordering Myanmar to check its misuse.  

(Para 2.16.4 ibid)

**Action Taken**

2.7.2 In order to rationalize and regularize the facility of free movement under the exiting FMR and with the objective of confining this facility to genuine and bonafide residents of the border areas a draft MoU on movement of people across IMB is under consideration in MEA.

2.7.3 The implementation of FMR was deliberated in the meeting to review the Indo-Myanmar Border issues with Chief Ministers of Indo-Myanmar Border States, held under the Chairmanship of Hon HM on 12th June 2017 at Aizawl, Mizoram, wherein it was decided to set up a Committee under the Chairpersonship of Special Secretary (Internal Security), MHA.

2.7.4 The Committee will examine the present rules and regulations adopted by the border States on FMR and shall prepare common standard operating procedures and uniform guidelines on FMR for all the 4 IMB States of Nagaland, Manipur, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh so that inimical elements, criminals, contrabands etc, are filtered at the border without causing inconvenience to genuine people. The committee will also identify the border crossing points in border villages and the competent authorities who can issue border passes (or such documents), periods of stay, point of entry and exit for the people crossing the border. Constitution of the Committee is under process.
2.8 SERVICE CONDITIONS AND PAY RELATED ISSUES OF BGFs

Recommendation

2.8.1 The Committee is disappointed to note that the personnel of the CAPFs are unfairly treated as compared to their counterparts in the Armed Forces. The committee feels that this will have an adverse impact on the morale of the Forces who work tirelessly to secure the borders of our country. The Committee is aware that the Committee on the Allowances recommended by the 7th CPC is yet to give its report and recommends that the MHA must make another effort to enhance the hard area allowances of CAPFs and bring them at par with the Armed Forces. The Committee also feels that changes in the Modified Assured Career Progression (MACP) scheme is under the jurisdiction of the Ministry and recommends that the proposals of CAPFs for the same may be considered expeditiously and a suitable decision taken.

(Para 2.21.5 ibid)

Action Taken

2.8.2 The CAPFs personnel are entitled to Risk Allowances, such as Counter Insurgency (Operations) Allowance and Field Area Allowance, as admissible to Army, depending on their place of posting.

2.8.3 The 7th CPC has also recommended a common regime of Risk and Hardship allowance for Army and CAPFs, which will be governed by a newly introduced Risk and Hardship Matrix, depending upon on the severity of the risk and hardship involved in jobs/work environment.

2.8.4 The Risk Allowance has been revised from Rs. 60 per month to Rs. 135 per month w.e.f. 1.7.2017. The Hard Area Allowance has been rationalized by a factor of 0.8 w.e.f. 1.7.2017.

2.8.5 CAPFs had demanded that MACPs be increased to four times in a career along with reduction in eligibility period ranging from six to eight years. They also demanded that MACP be given in promotion hierarchy. The 7th CPC did not agree to the above demands.

Recommendation

2.8.6 The Committee also recommends that hard area allowance should be exclusively decided on the basis of geographical and climatic conditions of the area of deployment and should be uniform for personnel of all the forces, be it CAPFs or Army.

(Para 2.21.6 ibid)

Action Taken

2.8.7 The CAPFs personnel are entitled to Risk Allowances, such as Counter Insurgency (Operations) Allowance and Field Area Allowance, as admissible to Army, depending on their place of posting.

2.8.8 The 7th CPC has also recommended a common regime of Risk and Hardship allowance for Army and CAPFs, which will be governed by a newly introduced Risk and Hardship Matrix, depending upon the severity of the risk and hardship involved in jobs/work environment. The Hard Area Allowance has been rationalized by a factor of 0.8 w.e.f. 1.7.2017.
Recommendation

2.8.9 The Committee is however, considering a separate subject on CAPFs in which it will deal with service conditions, living conditions, pay & allowances and housing and will give a comprehensive report on the subject. The issues pertaining to BGFs will be dealt with extensively in that report.

(Para 2.21.7 ibid)

Action Taken

2.8.10 Noted.

2.9 MEDICAL FACILITIES FOR BGF PERSONNEL

Recommendation

2.9.1 The Committee feels that despite the medical facilities provided for Border guarding Forces personnel, the Jawans are not satisfied particularly at the forward locations. The Committee observed during the visit that while BSF personnel are availing of facilities under CGHS, most of the border districts are not covered under this Scheme rendering it completely futile. The Committee recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must urge the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare to cover all border districts, especially on hostile borders, under CGHS in view of the presence of a large number of BGF personnel on the border. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry must make efforts to construct composite hospitals in all Frontier Headquarters and Unit Hospitals in all the Sectors. The Committee desires that on the medical front, the Forces should not feel dissatisfied.

(Para 2.22.3 ibid)

Action Taken

2.9.2 Ministry of Health has been requested vide MHA’s letter dated 15.06.2017, to extend CGHS facilities to all border districts, especially on hostile borders in view of the presence of a large number of BGF personnel on the border.

2.9.3 In addition to the medical facilities available to Central Government employees, there are 39 composite hospitals, i.e. 32 nos. 50-bedded, 06 nos. 100-bedded and one 200-bedded, for providing specialty services to the CAPF personnel and their family members. The requirement of medical facilities is reviewed from time to time and based on such requests of CAPFs, additional hospitals are sanctioned.

2.10 BORDER AREA DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (BADP)

Recommendation

2.10.1 The Committee takes note of the Ministry’s submission and feels that the objective of Border Area Development Programme to saturate the border areas with all the essential infrastructure remains unfulfilled even after three decades of the inception of this programme. The Committee, during its study visits, found widespread illiteracy, backwardness and poverty along with severe lack of amenities in the border areas of West Bengal and Rajasthan. On the other hand, border areas in Punjab and J&K are suffering from poor infrastructure and lack of connectivity and transportation. The Committee feels that there is a need to strengthen the monitoring of the projects under BADP and conduct a review of performance of this programme to find out its lacunae. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should carry out an Impact Assessment of BADP to ascertain the
measures that can be undertaken to make this programme a success. The Committee, keeping in view the scope and mandate of BADP, recommends that the Ministry should enhance the allocations being made under the BADP.

(Para 2.23.4 ibid)

**Action Taken**

2.10.2 Over the years, the development of border areas has become a priority of the Central Government. As it is a gap filling scheme, the funds under BADP are limited and also the level of assistance under BADP. Due to State Governments’ perceived development of border areas as the responsibility and priority of the Central Government, very little effort have been made by State Govt. on their part to fund these areas through State Plan sources or to converge funds available under the CSS, resulted into a big gap between the pace of development in the border villages and the hinterland. The budgetary allocation under BADP for the current financial year (2017-18) is Rs.1100.00 crore, which is an increase of Rs.110.00 crore from previous year (2016-17) allocation of Rs.990.00 crore. Further, Assessment of BADP is being done regularly by Third Party Inspection Agency (TPIA) appointed by the respective State Governments.

**Recommendation**

2.10.3 The Committee notes the submission of Punjab Police and agrees that state police infrastructure needs to be improved to match the security requirements. Though it is primarily the responsibility of States to improve police infrastructure, the Committee recommends that the Ministry should take up the above suggestion in its next review of BADP guidelines and make efforts to incorporate it to the extent possible.

(Para 2.23.6 ibid)

**Action Taken**

2.10.4 BADP is a gap filling scheme and funds available in it are limited. Various activities for infrastructure development in border areas are already being taken up under the BADP. If, the provision for improvement of police infrastructure under BADP is included, the developmental activities under BADP will get lesser allocation of funds which may affect the pace of development in the border areas.

2.11 **COASTAL BORDER**

Coastal Security Scheme (CSS)

**Recommendation**

2.11.1 The Committee expresses its displeasure that the Ministry was unable to complete the implementation of phase II of the CSS as per the target and has sought extension for the same. The Ministry is unable to implement critical projects within the set timeframe and this is bound to have ramifications on the overall intended coastal security system. The Committee strongly recommends that the phase II of coastal security scheme should be extended in the first instance and completed at the earliest. The procurement of motor boats has suffered an inordinate delay and the Ministry should make sincere efforts to complete their procurement at the earliest.

(Para 2.26.5 ibid)

**Action Taken**

2.11.2 Ministry of Home Affairs has been implementing Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) in phases with a view to strengthening the infrastructure of the State Coastal Police for patrolling and surveillance of coastal areas, particularly in the shallow areas close to the coast.
2.11.3 The Phase-II of the CSS, with an outlay of Rs 1579.91 crore (Rs.1154.91 crore non-recurring and Rs.425 crore recurring), commenced w.e.f. 1st April, 2011 with a duration of five years. Under the Scheme, the Coastal States/UTs have been sanctioned with 131 Coastal Police Stations (CPSs), 60 jetties, 10 Marine Operation Centres (MOCs), 225 boats, 131 four wheelers and 242 motorcycles. The Scheme, scheduled to be completed within the 12th Five year Plan (2012-2017), has been granted extension for four years (i.e., from 01.04.2016 to 31.03.2020) by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) in its meeting held on 04.01.2017.

2.11.4 Under the Scheme, 110 CPSs have been operationalised, 86 CPSs have been constructed, 45 CPSs are under construction, 23 jetties have been constructed/operationalised, 4 MOCs have been operationalised, 127 Four Wheelers, 234 Two Wheelers have been procured. The balance work will be completed by the implementation period of Scheme, i.e., 31.03.2020. Both the physical and financial components of the scheme have already been approved by the CCS.

2.11.5 Procurement of the sanctioned 225 boats under the Phase-II of Coastal Security Scheme is being done centrally by MHA. The LTE was floated on 21.12.2016. The bid has been opened on 27.04.2017 and it is under the Technical Evaluation Stage.

Recommendation

2.11.6 The Committee, during its deliberations, was apprised about the serious infrastructural inadequacies of Indian Coast Guard and Coastal police forces. Lack of a clear coordination mechanism between Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard and coastal police that are guarding the three respective layers of our sea front is also another serious issue. The Committee recommends that there should be a clear command chain and defined SOPs with reference to coastal security and the DG, Coast Guard, who is designated as the head of the coastal command, must be empowered adequately and be given authority to command other sister agencies in matters of coastal security.

(Para 2.26.7 ibid)

Action Taken

2.11.7 A three tier Coastal security mechanism for the maritime zone of the country is provided by Marine Police, Indian Coast Guard and Indian Navy. Post 26/11 terrorist attack, the Coastal Security architecture was strengthened with Indian Navy being designated as the authority responsible for overall maritime security, which includes coastal security and offshore security. Director General Coast Guard was designated as the Commander, Coastal Command who will be responsible for overall coordination between Central and State agencies in all matters relating to coastal security. Indian Navy, Indian Coast Guard and the Coastal Police operate in synergy and co-ordination to effectively provide coastal security all along the coast of the country. MHA is implementing a comprehensive and integrated Coastal Security Scheme to strengthen security infrastructure and capabilities of Police of coastal States.

2.11.8 The Coastal Security mechanism is being reviewed at various levels viz., National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) against Threats from the Sea’ under the Chairmanship of Cabinet Secretary with Chief Secretaries of all Coastal States/UTs as its members, Steering Committee for review of coastal security under the Chairmanship of Secretary (BM), MHA, and Coastal Security Committees at All Coastal State/District levels under the Chairmanship of Chief Secretaries/ Administrators in the Coastal States/UTs, & District Magistrates at the districts level respectively.
2.12 FAKE INDIAN CURRENCY NOTES (FICN)

Recommendation

2.12.1 The Committee is aware of the reports of post demonetization seizure of high quality Fake Indian Currency Notes of the denomination of the new Rs. 500 and the new Rs. 2000 in Malda District area along the India-Bangladesh Border. The Committee is concerned to note such incidents that belie the tall claims made that FICN will be eliminated after demonetization. The Committee is also worried to note that no measures have been taken by the Ministry to replace the existing FICN detection machines, available with the Border Guarding Forces to detect the smuggled fake currency or to make it compatible for detecting new denomination notes. The Committee feels that the fake currency manufacturers and smugglers will exploit this situation and may be able to flood the country with new FICN before the Ministry is able to come up with a plan to foil these attempts. The Committee therefore, recommends that the Ministry should take urgent notice of this issue and formulate a strategy to disrupt smuggling of new FICNs into the country through the land and coastal borders. The Committee, in view of rising number of seizures of FICNs along the India-Bangladesh Border, also recommends that the Ministry should take up this issue with Bangladesh Government in the Home Secretary level talks and urge them to crack down on the printers and smugglers of FICNs situated in Bangladesh.

Action Taken

2.12.2 FICN has been an agenda item for HS level talks with Bangladesh. A MoU has been signed between India and Bangladesh to prevent smuggling of fake currency notes. Pursuant to signing of the MoU, Standard Operating Procedure (SoP) has been adopted and nodal points of contact have been established for exchange of information / intelligence. The recommendation of the Committee is noted.

2.13 NAGROTA TERROR ATTACK

Recommendation

2.13.1 The Committee, while noting the similarities in the various attacks on security forces’ establishments, feels that all such fidayeen attacks indicate that they carefully select a target based on vulnerability and do meticulous planning and preparation. The Committee also feels that attacks like the one on Nagrota could have been perpetrated only by those receiving information and active guidance from the military establishment across the border. The Committee, therefore, recommends that all the small and big campuses of the Armed Forces and CAPFs need to stay always on high alert and must make all efforts to ensure fool proof security of the perimeters of their own establishments. The Committee further recommends that measures like providing some degree of isolation of the military establishment from the other habitations, strengthening of perimeter security by cutting the trees around it, raising the height of the walls, adequate lighting during night and providing night vision devices to guards must be implemented urgently.

Action Taken

2.13.2 Government and the Defence Services take the attacks on Defence establishments very seriously. In the wake of the terrorist attack on Pathankot Airbase in January, 2016, Government had constituted a four member committee under the chairmanship of Lt. Gen Philip Campose, inter alia to examine the existing Standing Operating Procedure for security of all Armed Forces establishments; to suggest a model format for security audit of armed forces establishments; to recommend short and
long term measures including introduction of technological solutions and other reforms in the present system of security of armed forces establishments. The Committee submitted its report to MoD in May, 2016. The recommendations of the Committee include inter alia installation of technology based security infrastructure, positioning of well trained, armed and equipped ‘Quick Reaction Teams’ (QRTs) at high threat/ high priority military bases, conduct of periodic security audits etc.

2.13.3 Based on the recommendations of the Committee and after consultation with Service headquarters, broad Guidelines for Security of Defence Installations were issued to Services Headquarters.

2.13.4 In compliance of the above Guidelines, the Defence Services have taken a number of actions inter alia including risk categorization of Military Bases; formulation of detailed SOPs; strengthening of response mechanism by better weapons and vehicles; augmenting of security infrastructure; security of family quarters; Mutual Aid Schemes with other Services; periodic security audit of all military installations etc.

2.13.5 The following remedial steps have been taken by the Border Guarding Force (BSF) to stop such attacks:-

i. Security audit of all the campuses/ establishments/ BOPs/ FDLs/ Adm bases/ THQ have been carried out and all the required security measures for strengthening the security have been taken.

ii. SOPs regarding counter fidayeen attack are being reviewed from time to time.

iii. The QRTs have been detailed and are available at all HQrs/Establishments under Jammu & Kashmir Ftrs to tackle such situations.

iv. Rehearsal of QRT and mock drill to deal with any attack or eventuality is being carried out regularly.

v. ‘G’/Vig staff have been directed and geared up for collection of intelligence.

vi. Reinforcement and replenishment plans have been worked out at all levels.

vii. The communication system within the campuses is based on triple layer system with connectivity on line, radio sets and mobile phones.

2.14 GENERAL

Recommendation

2.14.1 Border security has become very fragile and, as gathered from the evidence before the Committee, there are several gaps which need to be plugged. The inadequacies have become starkly visible over a period of time. Some inadequacies have been addressed; some are being addressed, while others remain unaddressed. Though there are internal security challenges, in the view of the Committee, the external security challenges are very strong on the both the Eastern and Western borders. As already explained earlier in the report, some institutional mechanisms have been created to address the security challenges. But the Committee is dismayed over the ambiguous approach of the Government in strengthening the institutions and feels strongly that a comprehensive intelligence infrastructure is imperative to address the security challenges.

(Para 4.7.1 ibid)

Action Taken

2.14.2 The mechanism of MAC & SMAC is operational wherein all stake holders at border viz Border Guarding Forces, Local Police, Central/State agencies participate based on which action is
taken. Further, as outlined in Border Protection Grid concept, all agencies at border will be incorporated for regular coordination including intelligence information.

**Recommendation**

2.14.3 The Committee has dealt with all the issues relating to capacity building for secure borders and the institutions in some detail in the preceding paragraphs and has given recommendations on each one of them. The Committee hopes that the government would implement all the recommendations in right earnest so that the external security challenges are addressed properly and the borders and institutions are strengthened and secured.  

* (Para 4.7.2 ibid)

**Action Taken**

2.14.4 Noted for compliance.
CHAPTER-III

RECOMMENDATIONS/OBSERVATIONS IN RESPECT OF WHICH REPLIES OF THE GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT BEEN ACCEPTED BY THE COMMITTEE

3.1 BORDER FENCING ALONG IBB

Recommendation

3.1.1 The Committee notes with anguish the extremely slow pace of construction of fencing along IBB. The Ministry was able to complete only 21 km of fencing in 17 months since July, 2015. The Committee also notes that a long stretch of 423.34 km has remained unfenced due to non-feasibility of physical barrier and deployment of non-physical barriers is still in its testing phase and will require time before its implementation. The Committee feels that, at the current pace, the Ministry would not be able to seal the India-Bangladesh border by its target date i.e. March, 2019. The Committee recommends that the Ministry should find solutions to the problems that beset the fencing project and erect physical barriers at all feasible locations at the earliest. The Committee also recommends that in the areas that are hotspots for FICN and cattle smuggling, fencing projects should be prioritised and, if fencing in such areas is not feasible, then the Ministry must increase the deployment of forces and intensify round-the-clock surveillance till such areas are secured through implementation of non-physical barriers.

(Para 2.4.4 of 203rd Report)

Action Taken

3.1.2 BSF and MHA are making all out efforts to fence the IBB at the earliest by holding regular meeting with State Governments and construction agencies. Non-feasible border areas are to be covered with Technological solutions for which BSF has initiated a Pilot Project in Jammu. So far 3006.5 km of border is covered by Physical barrier and work is in progress in 120.82 km. To resolve the issue related to land acquisition/Public Protest, the Ministry is making all possible efforts including review at the Cabinet Secretary level.

3.1.3 Vulnerability mapping with respect to cross border crime is regularly being reviewed. The vulnerable areas are strengthened by deploying manpower, equipments, etc.

Further Recommendation

3.1.4 The Committee is not satisfied with the reply furnished by the Ministry. No action seems to have been taken by the Ministry on the recommendations of the Committee. Even the plan to deploy technological solutions is in the pilot stage of implementation. The Committee is of the view that the Ministry needs to accelerate the pace of construction of fencing along the India-Bangladesh Border and complete the pilot projects at the earliest and start deploying technical solutions in areas where physical barriers are not feasible.

3.1.5 The Committee is also not convinced with the efforts being made to resolve the issues of land acquisition and public protests that have hampered the construction of fencing in several areas. The Committee feels that merely reviewing these issues at the Cabinet Secretary level is not going to resolve the deadlocks. The Committee recommends that the Ministry needs to think out of the box to tackle such issues as they have remained unresolved for several years. All efforts must be taken to devise innovative solutions that may require minimal land acquisition.
3.2 BORDER FLOODLIGHTING ALONG IBB

Recommendation

3.2.1 The Committee notes that almost 528 km of border, where floodlighting is feasible and has been sanctioned, is yet to be floodlit. The Committee also noticed lack of floodlights along several stretches during its study visit to the India-Bangladesh Border. Lack of floodlights on the border allows the smugglers to perpetrate their devious activities during night. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry must fast-track the floodlighting project and complete it at the earliest. The Committee also recommends that, as a short-term measure, the Ministry must provide adequate long-range night-vision equipment to all the Border Outposts situated in areas that lack floodlights.

Action Taken

3.2.2 Out of 2894.61 Km floodlight sanctioned along IBB, 2490 Km floodlight has been completed and work is in progress in 193 km.

3.2.3 648 Hand Held Thermal Imagers (HHTIs) are available on IBB. Most of the HHTIs deployed in nonfloodlit areas and vulnerable gaps. (Source: BM-III, Page 383)

Further Recommendation

3.2.4 The Committee recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must accelerate the completion of floodlighting project in the remaining 193 km border areas along India-Bangladesh Border to ensure that illegal immigration, infiltration/smuggling are prevented without fail. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must ensure that the Hand Held Thermal Imagers (HHTIs) deployed in non-floodlight areas must be in working condition. The Committee further recommends that Government should make available to BSF the latest and adequate long-range night vision equipment for better border surveillance and management.

3.3 INDIA PAKISTAN BORDER

Border Fencing, Floodlighting and Roads along IPB

Recommendation

3.3.1 The Committee takes note of the recommendation of the High Level Committee to drop the balance work of construction of fence, roads and floodlights on India Pakistan border in Gujarat and look for an alternative cost effective way of surveillance. The Committee feels that significant amount of time has been wasted on this small stretch of border in Gujarat which suffers from persistent water logging. The Committee recommends that early efforts may be made to put in place a cost effective alternative mechanism for surveillance in this stretch. There should be no further delay in this regard. Advanced technological solutions may be considered for this purpose.

Action Taken

3.3.2 A Pilot Project for implementation of Comprehensive Integrated Border Management Solution (CIBMS) in two stretches of 5-6 Km each has been undertaken in Jammu Sector. Based on the price of sensors and system integration discovered after opening the financial bids for Jammu Pilot Project, BSF has prepared a proposal for deployment of technological solutions in Punjab and Gujarat which includes-
i. Radar  
ii. Electro-optic sensor  
iii. OFC based intrusion detection system  
iv. Under water sensors  
v. Gate management  
vi. Command & control centre

3.3.3 BSF is getting the proposals vetted by technical experts like professors of IITs.

Further Recommendation

3.3.4 The Committee notes that a Pilot Project for implementation of Comprehensive Integrated Border Management Solution (CIBMS) in two stretches of 5-6 km each has been undertaken in Jammu Sector and BSF has prepared a similar proposal for deployment of technological solution for Punjab and Gujarat Sector which is under vetting by technical experts like professors of IITs. The Committee strongly recommends that the proposal for deployment of technological solution in Punjab and Gujarat Sector must be vetted by technical experts within the specific time frame, so that the project gets approved and sanctioned in time for its fast-track implementation on the ground level.

Recommendation

3.3.5 The Committee finds that the fencing in the Thar Desert region of Rajasthan Border area has proved to be ineffective in serving its intended purpose due to the problem of shifting sand dunes. The Committee also notes that the MHA is examining the possibility of conducting a study through a premiere agency like IIT. The Committee is also aware that BSF is considering the option of dense plantation in Jaisalmer Border area to stabilize sand dunes. The Committee in this connection would like to draw the attention of the Ministry to a fence erected by the USA, on its border with Mexico having geographical terrain similar to Thar Desert, which can be repositioned mechanically to appropriate border line and in effect floats on top of the shifting sand dunes. The Committee recommends that the MHA should form a working group or a Committee comprising of technical experts to examine all the possible solutions to this problem. The Committee desires to be apprised of the progress in this regard.

(Para 2.8.7 ibid)

Action Taken

3.3.6 Complete border in Rajasthan State has been fenced except shifting Sand Dunes area of 1.60 Km where work is in progress (90% completed) and the work is likely to be completed by September, 2017.

Further Recommendation

3.3.7 The Committee is concerned about fencing in the Thar desert region of Rajasthan border areas where shifting sand dunes disturbs the regular maintenance of fence. In that regard, the Committee had recommended the Government to examine the viability of adopting the fence model in Mexico, having geographical terrains similar to Thar Desert. The Committee is not satisfied with the reply of the Ministry of Home Affairs and is unable to comprehend how the traditional fencing would be able to safeguard the border in the shifting sand dunes area. The Ministry has also failed to apprise the Committee about the decision taken on the option of dense plantation in Jaisalmer border areas to stabilize sand dunes. The Committee, therefore,
strongly recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must furnish detailed and focused reply to the Committee on its recommendation.

3.4 BORDER ROADS ALONG IPB

Recommendation

3.4.1 The Committee feels that Border Roads Organisation is very ill-equipped for the purpose of delivering border roads in a timely manner. The Committee recommends that the Ministry should make efforts to revive the idea of creating a joint venture through public-private partnership between the Government and a private company having wide experience and expertise in road projects.

(Para 2.9.5 ibid)

Action Taken

3.4.2 All projects are executed, as per OMs issued by Ministry of Finance under the General Financial Rules (GFR). The suggestion of the Committee has been noted.

Further Recommendation

3.4.3 The Committee takes strong exception to the reply of the Ministry and it seems that the Committee’s recommendation of creating a joint venture through public-private partnership between the Government and a private company having wide experience and expertise in road projects, has not ever been considered by the Ministry. The Committee reiterates its recommendation given in Para 2.9.5 of its 203rd Report. The Committee further recommends that the Ministry should conduct wider consultation and seek expert advice on the matter.

3.5 GENERAL BORDER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Working Conditions of Border Guarding Forces (BGF) Personnel

Recommendation

3.5.1 The Ministry's submission that a Jawan gets minimum of 6 hours uninterrupted sleep in every cycle of 24 hours is at variance with the facts observed and learnt by the Committee during its study visits. The Committee is anguished to observe that the flawed system leaves grossly insufficient time for Jawans to get decent rest and sleep. The Committee is concerned to note that due to shortage of manpower, jawans are forced to perform 16-18 hours of duty in a day. The BSF needs to revise its duty hours system so as to ensure atleast one gap of 8 to 10 hours between two consecutive shifts. Moreover, a patrolling shift of 6 hours is unduly long and without adequate rest a Jawan cannot be expected to remain alert throughout the shift. The Committee recommends that this system should be rationalized by creating six shifts of 4 hours each during a 24 hours cycle wherein a Jawan performs two shifts of 4 hours each in a day with a gap of 8 to 10 hours between these two shifts. It must be ensured that the Jawan gets 8 hours of sleep plus two hours to attend to his personal needs. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry should assess the amount of additional man power required to adopt this system and should have sufficient number of Reserve Battalions.

(Para 2.17.5 ibid)

Action Taken

3.5.2 Generally, the working hours in the Central Armed Police forces are 8 hourly shifts. This, however, varies sometimes in case of operational exigencies. Adequate provisions have been made to ensure that the CAPFs get adequate rest. Necessary leave/training reserve is built in the personnel get
adequate rest and relief. Measures have been taken to implement a transparent, rational and fair leave policy and to regulate duty hours to ensure adequate rest and relief.

Further Recommendation

3.5.3 The Committee is concerned about the arduous nature of duty and hardship faced by the jawans at their posts with inadequate rest and relief. The Ministry does not seem to be taking enough steps to reduce the hardship faced by the jawans who are performing duty in the severest conditions. In view of these facts the Committee had recommended rationalization of duty hours and creation of six shifts of 04 hours each during a 24 hours cycle. The Ministry has submitted that necessary leave/training reserve and leave rationing with transparency have been worked out without giving details of measures taken to ensure adequate rest and relief to the jawans.

3.5.4 The Committee therefore, reiterates the recommendation made vide para 2.17.5 of its 203rd report of the Committee to be implemented at the earliest so as to keep the jawans at sound state of mind while performing their duties. The Committee also desires to be apprised about the details of the measures already undertaken to implement a transparent, rationale and fair leave policy to regulate duty hours to ensure adequate rest and relief.

Recommendation

3.5.5 The Committee expresses its deep anguish over the neglect of basic necessities to the jawans by the commanding officers. The Committee feels that a Jawan must not be made to travel on foot for his daily commute if the duty location is far away from the BoP. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the BSF must procure sufficient number of bicycles and every Jawan must be provided with one for the purpose of commuting wherever cycling is possible. The Committee also recommends that in areas where there are no roads, like deserts and hilly areas, the Commanding officers must be directed to estimate the commute duration, consider them as part of the duty hours of jawans and accordingly revise their duty hours so as to minimize their fatigue and provide them adequate time for rest.

(Para 2.17.7 ibid)

Action Taken

3.5.6 At present, a total of 2808 bicycles are authorized to BSF for its 39 Bns deployed for border patrolling. BSF has intimated that keeping in view of deployment of Bns as on date, and the present operational scenario, authorization of bicycles is being reviewed and adequate bicycles will be provided accordingly, after due codal formalities.

Further Recommendation

3.5.7 The Committee reiterates for expeditious provisioning of basic amenities like bicycle to jawans for their daily commute where the duty location is far away from the BoP and would like to be apprised of the progress made towards provisioning of adequate number of bicycles to jawans.

3.6 PENDING PROCUREMENT OF WEAPONS AND ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

Recommendation

3.6.1 The Committee feels that adequacy of modern equipment for surveillance during day as well as night is a pre-requisite to detect any attempt of infiltration or illegal migration. The Committee,
therefore, recommends that the Ministry should immediately procure all essential surveillance equipment especially those required for surveillance during night, like Hand-held Thermal Imager and PNV Monocular, at the earliest and apprise the Committee of the progress in the matter.

(Para 2.19.2 ibid)

**Action Taken**

3.6.2 Modernization of CAPFs including acquisition of surveillance equipment is a continuous process. CAPFs procure these items as per their operational requirement and deployment pattern. Surveillance equipments procured/being procured by CAPFs to be used at night are HHTI, PNV Goggles, PNV (Monocular), PNV (Binocular), Global Positioning System (GPS), Laser Range Finder, Day Light Telescope for 5.56 mm INSAS Rifles, Day Light Telescope for 5.56 mm INSAS LMG and Night Vision Goggles.

**Further Recommendation**

3.6.3 The Committee understands that modernization of CAPFs including acquisition of surveillance equipments is a continuous process, but at the same time, the Committee reiterates its recommendation that the Ministry of Home Affairs must provide the required modern and latest surveillance equipments to CAPFs to detect round the clock any attempt of infiltration or illegal migration.

3.7 COMPOSITE BOPs

**Recommendation**

3.7.1 The Committee is anguished to observe the poor condition of the Border out Posts (BoPs). The Committee notices that only 422 out of 1901 BoPs on India-Bangladesh and India-Pakistan Borders are composite and others lack various basic elements. The Committee is constrained to observe that several BoPs do not have even the most essential facilities like provision for filtered drinking water or proper barracks. It is inhuman to make Jawans to live and sleep without a fan in the BoPs. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should intensify its efforts for converting all BoPs into composite ones and apprise the Committee, periodically, about the progress of this project. The Committee also recommends that all the proposals for provision of piped water in BoPs should be approved at the earliest and till then orders may be issued for procurement of water filter/RO systems for all BoPs and for proper maintenance of existing ones. The Ministry should take an immediate decision in this regard and inform the Committee about the decision taken.

(Para 2.20.2 ibid)

**Action Taken**

3.7.2 The non-composite BoPs will be brought at the level of Composite BoPs in a phased manner. Apart from on-going project of 422 Composite BoPs, a proposal for construction of deficient elements in 135 BoPs to bring them at par with Composite BoPs at a cost of Rs. 421.77 Cr is under consideration of the Ministry.

3.7.3 Further, a proposal for piped water supply to 181 BoPs has been approved by MHA at a cost of Rs. 99.91 crore.

3.7.4 As regards installation of filtration plant, it is informed that installation of RO plant is also the part of above scheme of BoPs.
Further Recommendation

3.7.5 The Committee recommends that the proposals for construction of deficient elements in 135 BoPs may be cleared by MHA so that the projects are implemented expeditiously to bring the non-composite BoPs at par with composite ones without time and cost overruns. The Committee further recommends that the Government should also take up the remaining 1344 BoPs (1901-422-135), out of a total of 1901 BoPs, on the India-Bangladesh and the India-Pakistan Border for converting them into composite BoPs at the earliest.

3.8 ILLEGAL SAND MINING IN PUNJAB BORDER AREAS

Recommendation

3.8.1 The Committee is anguished to note the illegal sand mining on the Punjab border and the allegations of connivance of the BSF and the Punjab Police in this crime. The Committee recommends that an investigation should be carried out by the Ministry jointly with the Punjab Government to expose the truth and the culprits. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry must also convey the views of the Committee to the State Government of Punjab and ask them to curb this menace.

Action Taken

3.8.2 BSF has not reported any matter related to illegal sand mining on Punjab Border. Also no case of connivance of the BSF and the Punjab Police personnel has been reported in MHA.

Further Recommendation

3.8.3 The Committee is constrained to express its displeasure over the evasive reply of the Ministry of Home Affairs on the allegation of connivance of the BSF and the Punjab Police in the illegal sand mining on the Punjab border. The Committee feels that the Ministry of Home Affairs should have constituted an investigation/inquiry team to ascertain the truth and instead of solely relying on the report to it by the BSF. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that the Ministry should conduct an independent investigation to find out the truth about connivance of BSF and the Punjab police. The Committee desires to be apprised of the action taken in this regard.

3.9 INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN SECURING BORDERS

National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID)

Recommendation

3.9.1 The Committee is dismayed to learn that even though allocation was made by Cabinet Committee on Security on 28th November, 2013 for creating infrastructure, the infrastructure is nowhere in place. Only civil construction is expected to be completed in Delhi by March, 2018. Though DPR was approved on 6th June, 2011 and the implementation approved on 28th November, 2013, the project is still at the nascent stage. There are several vacancies of technical consultants to be filled and no action has been taken in this regard. Most subject matter experts hired in the previous year have quit NATGRID and the vacancies have not yet been filled. It is difficult for the Committee to believe that NATGRID will become operational by September, 2018 when the civil construction is expected to be completed only by March, 2018. The Government has not taken prompt decisions and actions to ensure early operationalisation of NATGRID. This shows the ambiguity and
uncertainty prevailing in the government and its inability to take quick decisions. Even when it is claimed that NATGRID is expected to be operational by September, 2018, the fact is that there will only be certain amount of basic analytics and minimal data sharing by that date.

(Para 3.2.4 ibid)

**Action Taken**

3.9.2 As noted by the Committee, the civil construction in Delhi is to be completed by March, 2018. Further, NBCC is in process of selecting bidders for interior furnishing of Data Centres for which shortlisting of bidders through Expression of Interest (EOI) process has already been completed. The Security vetting of the shortlisted bidders are being conducted after which the techno-commercial bids will be invited by NBCC. The furnishing of Data Centres in Delhi is expected to be completed by July, 2018.

3.9.3 With regard to engagement of consultants, National Institute for Smart Government (NISG) had issued the advertisement for engagement of 21 consultants for NATGRID in September, 2016. Subsequently, the advertisement for the role of Chief of Technology was issued on 12.11.2016. After completion of screening of applications, interviews were started in December, 2016 and the consultants started joining NATGRID in February, 2017. Out of 22 consultants, 7 consultants have already joined and another 11 consultants have confirmed their date of joining. The process of finalization of remaining 4 consultants is on.

3.9.4 With regard to operationalization of NATGRID, it is submitted that after the on-boarding of Chief of Technology on 02.03.2017, necessary activities in this direction have been initiated. Efforts are being made to operationalize the Entity Extraction, Visualisation and Analytics (EVA) system by August, 2018.

**Further Recommendation**

3.9.5 The Committee feels that in order to operationalize NATGRID by September, 2018, the scheduled timeframe of civil construction in Delhi by March, 2018; interior furnishing of Data Centres by July 2018; on boarding of all 22 consultants; engagement of 19 additional consultants and operationalisation of Entity Extraction, Visualisation and Analytics (EVA) system by August 2018, must be met by all means. All the targets may be achieved within the set timeframe and no further delay should occur.

**Recommendation**

3.9.6 The Committee also reiterates its recommendation made in its 201st Report that the Ministry should clear the confusion looming large over the NATGRID’s future by completing the construction work of its main building at the earliest. The Committee also reiterates that the Ministry must republish the posts as widely as possible along with offering remuneration package commensurate to that being offered in the private sector to attract the most qualified professionals for this technology-driven project.

(Para 3.2.5 ibid)

**Action Taken**

3.9.7 In line with the timelines approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) on 14.12.2016, the Civil construction of the infrastructure buildings in Delhi is expected to be completed by March, 2018. Further, NBCC is in process of selecting bidders for interior furnishing of Data Centres for which shortlisting of bidders through Expression of Interest (EOI) process has already been completed. The Security vetting of the shortlisted bidders are being conducted after which the
techno-commercial bids will be invited by NBCC. The furnishing of Data Centres in Delhi is expected to be completed by July, 2018.

3.9.8 With regard to engagement of consultants, National Institute for Smart Government (NISG) had issued the advertisement for engagement of 21 consultants for NATGRID in September, 2016. Subsequently, the advertisement for the role of Chief of Technology was issued on 12.11.2016. Only after completion of screening of applications, the interviews commenced w.e.f December, 2016 and the consultants started joining NATGRID in February, 2017. Out of 22 consultants, 7 consultants have already joined and another 11 consultants have confirmed their date of joining. The process of finalization of remaining 4 consultants is on.

3.9.9 Further, NATGRID is initiating engagement of 19 additional consultants in phase as per requirement during the financial year 2017-18, for which approval of the competent authority has already been obtained.

Further Recommendation

3.9.10 The Committee reiterates its recommendation made in response to para 3.2.4 of 203rd Report with regard to engagement of consultants.

3.10 NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM CENTRE (NCTC)

Recommendation

3.10.1 The Committee observes that Article 355 of the Indian Constitution casts a duty upon the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance. This duty assumes more importance in the present scenario where terrorism, insurgency and Left Wing Extremism have affected almost every State of India. While there are agencies like NIA, IB, MAC and NSG and some in the pipeline like NATGRID that are cumulatively capable of addressing these menaces, there is no single unified authority to coordinate the operations of these agencies and ensure a quick response in times of crisis like the 26/11 attack. The Committee understands that several States have objected to NCTC and other agencies also might have their reservations. However, the larger issue of national security should be given paramount importance. Adequate consultations have been held between the central government and the states. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should immediately revive the idea of NCTC as a single, unified and premier counter-terrorism agency and re-issue the notification laying down the power, functions and duties of the NCTC.

(Para 3.4.5 ibid)

Action Taken

3.10.2 Operationalisation of NCTC has been kept in abeyance as some States raised concerns/objections regarding structure, functions and mandate of NCTC issued vide O.M. dated 03.02.2012. Despite series of meetings, including a meeting held under the Chairmanship of Union Home Secretary with the State Chief Secretaries, DGPs and the Home Secretaries on 12.03.2012, meeting held by the then Hon’ble Prime Minister with all the Chief Ministers/ Administrators/ Lt. Governors of State/ UTs on 05.05.2012 and discussing the issue during the conference of Chief Ministers held on 05.06.2013, no consensus could be achieved with regard to the structure, functions, mandate and ultimate utility of creating the NCTC. Recommendations of the Committee have been noted.
Further Recommendation

3.10.3 The Committee, relying on the justification for reviving the idea of National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) as given in para 3.4.5 of 203rd Report, finds it pertinent to recommend that the Government should revisit the whole issue of reviving the idea of NCTC and make concerted efforts for building a consensus amongst all stakeholders with regard to the structure, functions, mandate and utility of creating and operationalizing of NCTC as a single, unified and premier counter-terrorism agency. The MHA may undertake a lead role in the matter.

Recommendation

3.10.4 The Committee observes that the notification of NCTC which was issued in 2012 has neither been rescinded nor operationalised as yet. The Committee feels that the Ministry must not keep this notification in abeyance endlessly and recommends that a decision to re-issue the notification be taken immediately.

Action Taken

3.10.5 Operationalisation of NCTC has been kept in abeyance as some States raised concerns/objections regarding structure, functions and mandate of NCTC issued vide O.M. dated 03.02.2012. Despite series of meetings, including a meeting held under the Chairmanship of Union Home Secretary with the State Chief Secretaries, DGPs and the Home Secretaries on 12.03.2012, meeting held by the then Hon’ble Prime Minister with all the Chief Ministers/ Administrators/ Lt. Governors of State/ UTs on 05.05.2012 and discussing the issue during the conference of Chief Ministers held on 05.06.2013, no consensus could be achieved with regard to the structure, functions, mandate and ultimate utility of creating the NCTC. Recommendations of the Committee have been noted.

Further Recommendation

3.10.6 The Committee feels that Government should not keep the notification pertaining to structure, function, mandate of National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) issued vide OM dated 03.02.2012 in abeyance for an indefinite period. The Committee, therefore, reiterates its further recommendation made in response to ATN of para 3.4.5 of its 203rd Report keeping in view the national interest.

3.11 OTHER ISSUES

Acquisition of Border Land

Recommendation

3.11.1 The Committee is aware of the land issues and the demand for compensation for the acquired land in border areas. The Committee agrees with the Ministry’s assertion that acquisition of fertile and cultivable land lying ahead of fencing will be a loss to the farmers and the Nation. However, the Committee feels that, in certain areas, there may be compelling reasons for which the forces might need to use the land ahead of the fencing. In such circumstances, the Committee recommends that effort may be made to acquire and utilize the land on a lease basis and farmers may be given adequate compensation for the same.

(Para 4.1.2 ibid)
Action Taken

3.11.2 This Ministry, in January, 2015 has requested the State Government of Punjab to acquire 11 feet strip of land ahead of the fence for patrolling by BSF. Once the details are received from the State Government, this Ministry will provide funds for the purpose.

Further Recommendation

3.11.3 The Committee is of the view that the Ministry of Home Affairs should take suitable follow-up action in tandem with the State Government of Punjab and persuade the farmers of the region to sacrifice their fertile and cultivable land for acquisition by the government on lease in the 'national interest' in lieu of adequate compensation for the same. The Committee feels that the Union Government must persuade the State Government to initially declare an attractive rate of compensation to be given to the farmers of Punjab in lieu of land to allay the apprehensions of the farmers with regard to the compensation.

3.12 INFILTRATION AND CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM

Recommendation

3.12.1 The Committee takes note of the fact that more than a year has passed since the Pathankot attack occurred; however, the investigation of that attack has not been completed by NIA. Moreover, no analysis seems to have been done into the failure of the intelligence agencies to provide credible and actionable inputs regarding the attacks at Pathankot, Uri, Pampore, Baramulla and Nagrota. The Committee feels that these attacks have exposed the deficiencies of our intelligence agencies. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should instruct the NIA to complete the investigations of these attacks at the earliest so as to identify the loopholes in the intelligence setup in the border areas.

Action Taken

3.12.2 The case relating to terrorist attack at Indian Air Force Base at Pathankot on 02.01.2016 was transferred to NIA for investigation vide MHA’s Order No. 11011/02/2016-IS-IV dated 04.01.2016. The NIA registered the case and started investigation. After completing investigation of this case, the NIA filed charge sheet against the accused on 19.12.2016 in the Court of competent jurisdiction. As regards the cases relating to terror attack in the infantry Brigade Headquarters of Army at Uri on 18.09.2016 and terror attack in Army Camp of 30 Rashtriya Rifles in Langate, Handwara, Jammu & Kashmir on 06.10.2016, these cases have been transferred to NIA for investigation. The investigation of these cases is in progress.

Further Recommendation

3.12.3 The Committee is not happy with the progress of the investigation. National Investigation Agency (NIA) should complete the investigation in the remaining cases at the earliest without any delay.

Recommendation

3.12.4 The Committee feels that such a huge rise in the number of infiltrations justifies the apprehension that the Indian Army and the BSF may have failed to foil some of these attempts. The Committee recommends that the Government must carry out a thorough investigation into the sudden
spurt in the increase in the infiltration attempts along the LoC from across the border and find out the vulnerabilities along the LoC that are being apparently exploited by the infiltrators.

(Para 4.4.6 ibid)

**Action Taken**

3.12.5 Indian army has constructed a 668.66 km long Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System (AIOS) along the Line of Control (LoC) and International Border under the operational control of Army. Various equipments including Radars, Observation Systems, Infra Red Sensors and Thermal Imagers have been incorporated to detect and intercept infiltration by terrorists.

3.12.6 Post detection of successful infiltration, the reasons for the same are analysed and corrective action taken. Dynamic deployment of troops in concert with employment of active and passive measures is carried out.

3.12.7 The reasons for sudden spurt in increase in infiltration attempts from across the Line of Control may be attributed to:-

(i) Pakistan’s ability to regulate the inflow of terrorists into J&K.
(ii) To direct attention of the international fora from the internal security situation within Pakistan to J&K.
(iii) Help foment trouble and provide indigenous hue to the violence in J&K.
(iv) In view of the damage inflicted by the Indian security forces to the terrorists over the last five years, need to revive the strength of terrorists operating in J&K to keep their movement alive.

**Further Recommendation**

3.12.8 The Committee observes that despite the construction of 668.66 km. long Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System (AIOS) along the LoC and international border by Indian Army and the use of latest equipments to detect and intercept infiltration by terrorist, there has been spurt in the infiltration attempt along the LoC from across the border. That is a matter of concern to the Committee. The Committee is in agreement with the Ministry of Home Affairs that Pakistan makes attempts to divert the attention of international fora from the internal security situation within Pakistan to Jammu & Kashmir. The Committee feels that such attempts of Pakistan have to be countered by the Government of India through diplomatic channels. Moreover, Pakistan's efforts to regulate the inflow of terrorists into Jammu & Kashmir and to foment violence in the State need to be combated:checked to eliminate any possibility of terrorist attacks in Jammu & Kashmir.

**Recommendation**

3.12.9 The Committee also notes that there has been an increasing number of incidents of infiltration through tunnels from across the border. The Committee feels that in future this might become a major modus operandi of the infiltrators and the Government must take proactive measures to foil such attempts. The Committee recommends that the Ministry must explore technological solutions for tunnel detection in border areas and should, in this regard, seek the help of other countries which have successfully developed tunnel detection systems.

(Para 4.4.7 ibid)
**Action Taken**

3.12.10 Suggestion of the Committee has been noted.

**Further Recommendation**

3.12.11 The Committee is dissatisfied with the brief reply of the Ministry and takes an exception to the fact that no details of action taken have been furnished in the reply. The Committee, while reiterating its recommendation given in Para 4.4.7 of its 203rd Report, desires to be informed of the steps taken by the Ministry to proactively detect tunnels in the border areas.

3.13 **NAGROTA TERROR ATTACK**

**Recommendation**

3.13.1 The Committee is of the view that the best way of preventing such attacks is to foil all attempts at infiltration. Detecting and neutralizing the terrorists during an infiltration attempt will ensure minimum casualties of Indian security forces. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Government must intensify the surveillance and patrolling on both LoC and International Boundary to detect and foil any attempt at infiltration.

(Para 4.5.8 ibid)

**Action Taken**

3.13.2 Ministry of Home Affairs has taken up several measures to strengthen security on Indo-Pak Border. Major ones are:

i. Two additional Bns have been deployed for strengthening of security along Indo-Pakistan border in Jammu Sector.

ii. 11 Support Coys were deployed in Jammu Ftr from Eastern Theatre for further enhancing firing capability.

iii. 05 additional Bns have been deployed on International Border under Punjab Ftr.

3.13.3 The above measures has resulted in reduction of infiltration on the Indo-Pak International Border which is indicated in the table below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>J&amp;K</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjab</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>62</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

3.13.4 Indian army has constructed a 668.66 km long Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System (AIOS) along the Line of Control (LoC) and International Border under the operational control of Army. Various equipments including Radars, Observation Systems, Infra Red Sensors and Thermal Imagers have been incorporated to detect and intercept infiltration by terrorists.
3.13.5 Post detection of successful infiltration, the reasons for the same are analysed and corrective action taken. Dynamic deployment of troops in concert with employment of active and passive measures is carried out.

Further Recommendation

3.13.6 The Committee observes the action taken to foil attempts of infiltration from across the border and the resultant reduction in infiltration. However, the main concern of the Committee is with regards to those incidents where the terrorists successfully infiltrate into Indian territory and carry out terror attacks. The Committee also takes exception to the confusing statistics furnished by the Ministry that show that all cases of infiltration were foiled in the past 4 years. If such was the case, no terrorist attack would have happened in the last three years. The Committee strongly recommends that instead of furnishing unbelievable statistics, the Ministry should focus on further augmenting the capacity of Border Guarding Forces to make LoC and International Boundary a zero-tolerance area for terrorist infiltration. The Government may, accordingly, take appropriate measures to strengthen the security and surveillance mechanism on India-Pakistan Border.

3.14 CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS

Recommendation

3.14.1 The Committee is constrained to note that, after the 1971 war, the present is the most vulnerable period for the borders of the country. There have been a large number of ceasefire violations and several jawans and civilians have been killed. According to some reports, more than a hundred ceasefire violations took place within a span of two months in 2016 and the year 2016 can be considered as one of the most vulnerable periods. The Government should find a way to prevent the frequent and persistent violations of ceasefire including using diplomatic channels. Ultimately, the answer lies in diplomacy. During ceasefire, the worst sufferers are the people living in the border villages. The questions are where will they go and where will they earn their living. The country today appears to have internal refugees and internal migrants. The only way the country can restore the ceasefire is to go back to a situation where both India and Pakistan agreed to observe the ceasefire. For more than a decade, the ceasefire held good. But now, from both sides, the ceasefire appears to be virtually dead on the LoC. The Committee strongly recommends that the government should make every effort, including activating diplomatic channels, towards preventing ceasefire violations and restoring the situation of a genuine ceasefire.

Action Taken

3.14.2 BSF has evolved detailed plans to counter cross-border firing with Pakistan. The following actions are being taken by BSF on International Border regarding Cross-border firing:-

i. Conduct of flag meetings with counterpart to sort out the border issues. Besides, strong written protest notes are lodged by BSF.
ii. The point is raised during Bi-Annual DG level talk between BSF and Pakistan Rangers.
iii. An institutional mechanism has been established at border to expeditiously inform the villagers on occurrence of cross-border firing.
iv. BSF regularly interacts with Border population and educates them regarding precautions to be taken during cross-border firing.
v. Intelligence inputs received regarding cross border firing are shared with the local police, sister agencies and local population.

3.14.3 Due to above measures, there has been decline in cases of cross border firing across Indo-Pak International Border in Jammu region as shown below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year (upto 30.04.2017)</th>
<th>No of cross border firing incidents on IB</th>
<th>Casualties of BSF personnel during cross-border firing incidents</th>
<th>International Border</th>
<th>Line of Control</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Died</td>
<td>Injured</td>
<td>Died</td>
<td>Injured</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Further Recommendation

3.14.4 The Committee notes the detailed plans evolved by BSF and action being taken by BSF to counter cross-border firing with Pakistan. However, the Committee reiterates its recommendation made in para 4.6.3 of its 203rd Report to keep the diplomatic channel open for preventing any further ceasefire violations and restoring the situation of genuine ceasefire for security and safety of people living in the border villages allowing them to earn the means of their livelihood.
CHAPTER-IV
RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATION IN RESPECT OF WHICH FINAL REPLY OF THE GOVERNMENT HAVE NOT BEEN RECEIVED

4.1 CATTLE SMUGGLING ALONG IBB

Recommendation

4.1.1 The Committee is distressed to note that despite several measures taken by the BSF the problem of cattle smuggling persists along IBB. The Committee is particularly anguished to note that the West Bengal State Government has failed to implement its own order dated 01.09.2003 that outlaws existence of any cattle haats within 8 km of border area. The Committee recommends that the State Government of West Bengal should take steps to cancel the licenses of all cattle haats that are illegally functioning within 8 km of border area and hold the officials responsible for illegally issuing/renewing licenses to these haats. The Committee also recommends that mass movement and trading of cattle should be prohibited within 15 km of the border and steps may be initiated to move all cattle haats located within 15 km of the border to the hinterland.

(Para 2.6.6 of 203rd Report)

Action Taken

4.1.2 The Government of West Bengal was requested for shifting of Cattle haats beyond 8 km of the border.

4.1.3 In order to curb cattle smuggling along the IBB, MHA has submitted a report in the Hon'ble Supreme Court containing detailed suggestions on the matter. The matter is under consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

Further Recommendation

4.1.4 The Committee is not satisfied with the response of the Ministry. The recommendation of the Committee was clear that the licenses of all cattle haats illegally functioning within 8 Kms of border areas may be cancelled and the officials who have illegally issued/renewed such licenses may be held responsible for illegally issuing/renewing license to these haats. The Committee reiterates its recommendation and hopes that the Ministry would take action and furnish a detailed reply in the matter.

Recommendation

4.1.5 The Committee notes that the auction of seized cattle by Customs officials is misused by the cattle smugglers who keep buying the auctioned cattle again and again. The Committee, in this regard, recommends that auctioning of seized cattle must be banned in the states bordering IBB and Customs Department may be requested to arrange for transportation of the seized cattle to states other than the border states and hold auctions there. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry must pursue the Customs Department to raise the minimum bench mark price of the seized cattle to prevent their re-selling to the persons involved in smuggling of cattle and also make it mandatory for cattle auctioneers to submit their Pan Card and Aadhaar Card details while bidding.

(Para 2.6.7 ibid)
Action Taken

4.1.6 In order to curb cattle smuggling along the IBB, MHA has submitted a report in the Hon'ble Supreme Court containing detailed suggestions on the matter. The suggestion in the report include discontinue the practice of auctioning the seized cattle. The matter is under consideration of the Hon'ble Supreme Court.

4.1.7 Further, this issue has been taken up by BSF with the Chairman board of Excise & Customs, North Block New Delhi.

Further Recommendation

4.1.8 The Committee takes note of the reply of the Ministry that the issue has been taken up by BSF with the Chairman, Central Board of Excise & Customs. The Committee desires to be apprised of the measures taken by the CBEC on the recommendation of the Committee to raise the benchmark price of the seized cattle and prevent its re-selling to the persons involved in smuggling of cattle.

4.2 BORDER ROADS ALONG IPB

Recommendation

4.2.1 The Committee feels that the Ministry is not seriously taking up the issue of poor road connectivity in the Jammu sector and is leaving the matter to the discretion of the State Government. The Committee is also anguished to note the sluggish progress of the project to construct bunds, metalled roads and bunkers along the fence in the Jammu sector. The Committee feels that lack of adequate all-weather connectivity in border areas will keep the border in Jammu region vulnerable to external threats like infiltration. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry should fast-track the project to construct roads, bunds and bunkers along the fence and start the construction work at the earliest. The Committee also recommends that the State Government of J&K must be constantly exhorted to improve road connectivity in the Jammu sector by constructing good all-weather roads that will provide connectivity to all the BoPs.

Action Taken

4.2.2 The State Government of J&K was approached for undertaking the work of construction of axial roads linking the Border Out Posts (BOPs) in Jammu Sector under PMGSY. However, now the Jammu Bund project is being modified to include axial roads linking the BOPs in the project. CPWD has prepared cost estimates for the modified project which is in process for approval.

4.2.3 Further, J&K Division of MHA has approved a pilot project in November 2015 for construction of 60 bunkers in Jammu sector along the International border at cost of Rs. 3 crores for safety of civilians during cross-border firing. The State Government of J&K has already constructed 45 bunkers and work for construction of remaining bunkers is in advanced stage of completion. The State Government is being pursued to complete the project within this year (2017).
Further Recommendation

4.2.4 The Committee would like to know the status of CPWD's modified project on Jammu bund project, which include the construction of axial roads linking the BoPs and construction of remaining 15 bunkers which was scheduled to be completed by the end of year 2017. The Ministry of Home Affairs may apprise the Committee of the progress on these two issues/projects.

4.3 INDIA-BHUTAN BORDER (IBhB)
Border Infrastructure Along IBhB

Recommendation

4.3.1 The Committee takes a serious view of the fact that though the project of construction of 313 km of border roads along the India-Bhutan border has been approved, it is yet to take off due to pending land acquisition. The Committee is also concerned that transfer of forest land in such cases has become a major cause of delay. The Committee recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs should take up this issue with the Ministry of Environment and Forests at the highest level and frame a Standard Operating Procedure to be followed by both the Ministries in all such cases where transfer of forest land is required for border infrastructure projects.

(Para 2.13.3 ibid)

Action Taken

4.3.2 The alignment for the road along Indo-Bhutan border has been finalized in consultation with the Assam State Forest Authorities and SSB (BGF). The detailed project report is under preparation by Assam PWD. Necessary action for obtaining forest/wild life clearance (if required) will be initiated on receipt of complete DPR. However, the proposal for granting general relaxation up to 15 km from border in lieu of 5 km is under examination/consideration in the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change.

Further Recommendation

4.3.3 The Committee desires that detailed project report on construction of Border Roads along the India-Bhutan Border must be completed within the set timeframe by Assam PWD so that forest/wild life clearance is obtained without any further delay. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must pursue the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change to take an early decision on the proposal for granting relaxation up to 15 km from border instead of 5 km for implementing border infrastructure projects.

4.4 INDIA-MYANMAR BORDER (IMB)
Deployment of BGF along IMB

Recommendation

4.4.1 Since the Assam Rifles is not a dedicated BGF and the Ministry is exploring the possibility of deploying a dedicated BGF for guarding the India-Myanmar Border, the Committee recommends that the Ministry should take an early decision in this matter and put an end to the confusion.

(Para 2.14.3 ibid)
Action Taken

4.4.2 A proposal for streamlining and strengthening of border guarding arrangements on Indo-Myanmar is under consideration of the Government.

Further Recommendation

4.4.3 The Committee may be apprised of the decision taken in the matter.

4.5 BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE ALONG IMB

Recommendation

4.5.1 The Committee expresses its concern over the delay in the re-survey of the boundary line on IMB for construction of fencing. The Committee is aware that this border is one of the most porous borders and insurgent groups are quite active in the border area. The attack on the Armed Forces convoy in 2015 was a gruesome reminder that India needs to secure the IMB and eliminate cross-border insurgency in the region. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs should pursue the Ministry of External Affairs for completing the re-survey at the earliest so that the fencing work could begin. The Committee also recommends that the proposed comprehensive border infrastructure project for IMB should be approved without any delay. The procurement of modern weapons and equipment for border management should also be completed at the earliest. (Para 2.15.4 ibid)

Action Taken

4.5.2 Govt of India had initiated a work of fencing (apprx 10 Km) between BP No. 79-81 at Moreh in Manipur in the year 2010. The work was then stopped due to agitation by local population in the year 2013, followed by demand of State Govt for re-survey of border between BP No. 79-81. Since Boundary between 79 to 81 is demarcated resurvey is not possible. However, in order to remove difference of perception on ground, it has been decided to construct subsidiary pillars between BP No. 79 & 82. Subsidiary Pillars have been erected between BP No 79 & 81.

4.5.3 21st National Level Meeting (NLM) between India and Myanmar was held on 5-6 July 2017 in Myanmar wherein it has been decided that issue of construction of Subsidiary Pillars between BP 80 to 82 during 2017-18 field season would be discussed at the Heads of Survey Deptts meeting.

4.5.4 Further, proposal to streamline and strengthen border guarding arrangement of IMB is being progressed.

Further Recommendation

4.5.5 The Committee would like to be apprised of the progress made on the issue of construction of Subsidiary Pillars between border pillar no. 80 to 82 at Moreh in Manipur along India-Myanmar Border (IMB) as decided in the 21st National Level Meeting (NLM) between India and Myanmar on 5-6 July 2017. The Committee also takes note of the fact that the boundary between pillar nos. 79 to 81 is demarcated and resurvey is not required. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the fencing between border pillar nos. 79 to 81 may be commenced and completed at the earliest.
4.5.6 The Committee would also like to know about the current status of the proposal to streamline and strengthen border guarding arrangement of IMB.

4.6 GENERAL BORDER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Working Conditions of Border Guarding Forces (BGF) Personnel

Recommendation

4.6.1 The Committee is concerned by the insensitive approach of the Government towards the jawans posted in difficult and harsh conditions. The Committee strongly recommends that the Ministry must pursue this matter with the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) on a priority basis and ensure that subsidized call rates are made available on all the 135 DSPTs allotted to the BSF being used in remote areas. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry must bear the expenses of all calls made through these DSPTs or subsidise the calls made by jawans, out of its own funds, until the DoT takes a decision on this matter.

(Para 2.17.11 ibid)

Action Taken

4.6.2 MHA, vide letter dated 03.05.2016, had requested DoT to ensure that all the DSPTs sanctioned to the CAPFs are covered under the subsidized rate. As informed by DoT, vide their letter dated 27.05.2016, agreement for continuation of the existing facility of DSPTs to CAPFs at reduced rate of Re.1/- per minute has been extended, for a period of 5 years beyond 26.02.2016. However, CAPFs informed that DSPT calls on subsidized rate of Re.1/- per minute is being provided only on those DSPTs, which have not completed the period of 5 years with effect from the date of their installation and remaining DSPTs are charged @ Rs.5/- per minute.

4.6.3 MHA have no provision in MHA Grant to bear the expenses of these calls. In case DoT denies subsidized, the cost is to be borne by the CAPFs under their respective budget. DoT has been requested again vide MHA’s OM dated 09.06.2017 to grant extension of subsidized call rate of Re.1/- per minute to all the DSPTs installed by BSNL at Border Out Posts as well as in Left Wing Extremism affected areas.

Further Recommendation

4.6.4 The Committee has come across the news reports (The Indian Express dated 19th October, 2017) that call rates for all the Digital Satellite Phone Terminals (DSPTs) used by the armed forces and CAPFs have been recently subsidized from rate of Rs 5/- per minute to Re 1/- per minute. The Committee desires to be apprised about the latest position in the matter.

4.7 BORDER PROTECTION GRID (BPG)

Recommendation

4.7.1 The Committee notes the ambitious plan of the Government to move to the concept of putting in place technological barriers instead of the present practice of erection of physical barriers on all the borders. The Committee recommends that the technology solutions implemented as part of the proposed Border Protection Grid (BPG) in every border State should be mission critical and not merely on a best effort basis. The Ministry must also carry out extensive research on similar systems deployed internationally by countries like USA and Israel before finalising the major constituents of the BPG and technologies to be used. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry should come
out with a specific timeline for finalising the design of the proposed BPG and a time line for implementing the same.

(Para 2.24.3 ibid)

Action Taken

4.7.2 The BSF held extensive consultations with the firms to shortlist the technologies that can be deployed on the border. Further to test the technologies available globally, a pilot project for Comprehensive Integrated Border Management Solution (CIBMS) has been undertaken in two stretches along the Indo-Pakistan border in Jammu Sector.

4.7.3 Based on the price of sensors and system integration discovered after opening the financial bids for Jammu Pilot Project, BSF has prepared a proposal for deployment of technological solutions in Punjab and Gujarat. Same is being vetted by technical experts of IIT. The recommendation of the committee has been noted.

Further Recommendation

4.7.4 The Committee desires to be apprised of the details of the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management Solution project after the completion of the pilot project.

4.8 OTHER INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE COASTAL SECURITY

Recommendation

4.8.1 The Committee notes that boats, less than 20 meters length are not mandatorily required to have AIS (Automatic Identification System) and this is certainly a security threat to coastal areas. The Committee takes note of the Ministry’s submission that an appropriate technology for installation of tracking system for boats less than 20 meters has been identified. The Committee recommends that the Ministry should ensure timely installation of this system in all the boats at the earliest.

(Para 2.27.4 ibid)

Action Taken

4.8.2 The National Committee on Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS) against Threats from the Sea, in its 14th meeting held on 24.11.2016 was apprised that satellite-based technology is under trial with Indian Navy and Indian Space Research Organization (ISRO) is most suited for fitment of tracking devices on boats venturing into the sea. The Committee was also informed that the Proof of Concept (PoC) trials are currently being conducted by the Indian Navy and with the trials conducted thus far, the results appear to be satisfactory.

4.8.3 After detailed deliberations, 14th NCSMCS recommended that “to begin with ISRO could provide 500 transponders each to the sensitive coastal State of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu”. Accordingly, ISRO is in process of supplying 500 terminals each to Gujarat and Tamil Nadu and delivery will be completed by December, 2017. D.o AHD&F have been tasked to take appropriate action for deployment of these 1000 terminals.
Further Recommendation

4.8.4 The Committee desires to be apprised of the status of final delivery of the transponders to the States of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu and the number actually installed successfully on the boats venturing into the sea.

4.9 COASTAL BORDER
Security of Islands

Recommendation

4.9.1 The Committee takes note of the efforts of the Ministry in developing the Island Information System geo-portal and Holistic Development of Island Scheme for security and development of vulnerable islands. The Committee desires that the Ministry may enhance security of the remote islands and also develop them with the help of the geo-portal. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry should make efforts, in collaboration with the Ministries of Shipping and Defence, to find a solution to ensure round-the-year sea connectivity and patrolling of all the uninhabited and remote islands like Minicoy. 

(Para 2.28.5 ibid)

Action Taken

4.9.2 India has 1382 islands, which includes two major island territories—the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (836 islands) and the Lakshadweep group of Islands (32 islands). East & West Coasts of India are also associated with a large number of islands (514 Islands).

4.9.3 Indian Navy has the overall responsibility for maritime security which includes offshore and coastal security. However, implementation of measures for coastal security is a multi-stakeholder activity in which presence and patrolling is maintained in multiple layers, by the State Coastal Police, ICG and IN, in their respective zones of responsibility, as per prevalent capabilities and threat perceptions.

4.9.4 MHA has issued security guidelines for Islands in May, 2016, to all stake-holders including Coastal States/UTs, wherein the Costal Sates/UTs have been asked to ensure that no islands to be left unattended, and for this purpose, the Coastal states/UTs should notify the jurisdiction of the State Coastal Police Stations so as to ensure that the outlying islands are brought under the ambit of their surveillance. Coastal States/UTs have been asked to comply with same and send their action plans. Department of Border Management (DoBM), MHA is coordinating with IB, MHA and Coastal States/UTs for preparation of the detailed action plan for the security and safety of the Islands. Same will be integrated with action plans of security of Islands of respective Coastal States/UTs.

Further Recommendation

4.9.5 The Committee recommends that the Department of Border Management (DoBM), MHA in tandem with IB, other Departments of MHA, Coastal States/UTs should expedite the preparation of the detailed action plan for the security and safety of islands of the country. The Committee also recommends that till the time the detailed action plan is prepared, an interim arrangement should be made to ensure round-the-year sea connectivity to remote islands like Minicoy and frequent patrolling of all the uninhabited islands.
4.10  INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN SECURING BORDERS
National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID)

Recommendation

4.10.1 The Committee observes that the Ministry has not been able to utilise the funds allocated for NATGRID since its inception. The Committee expresses its displeasure at this perennial poor utilisation of budgetary allocations wherein not even one-half of the allocation was utilised in any single financial year from 2010-11 to 2015-16. The Committee is totally disillusioned with the pace of the implementation of the NATGRID project and the utilisation of funds. The Committee hopes that the Ministry will be able to expedite the implementation of this project and will also be able to achieve significant utilisation of funds during 2017-18.

(Para 3.2.6 ibid)

Action Taken

4.10.2 It is submitted that the utilization of funds by NATGRID has increased significantly in the Financial Year 2016-17 and Rs. 82.84 crore of funds were utilized which is 79.65% of the Budget Estimates, 2016-17 (Rs. 104 Crore) and around 95% of the final Revised Estimates, 2016-17 (Rs. 87.23 Crore). Further, one bill of Rs. 7.13 Crore for major works could not be paid for want of funds under that head.

4.10.3 NATGRID has allocated Rs.122.27 crore in BE 2017-18. Following actions are being taken for optimum utilization of funds in FY 2017-18:

i) Construction of NATGRID Infrastructure including Data Centres:-

   NBCC has reported completion of 100% civil construction at Bengaluru as on 31.12.2016. NBCC has also noted around 48% completion of civil construction at Andheria Mod, New Delhi as on 30.04.2017. NBCC is in the process of selecting bidders for interior furnishing of Data Centres for which shortlisting of bidders through Expression of Interest (EoI) process has already been completed by NBCC. The Security vetting of the shortlisted bidders is being conducted after which the techono-commercial bids will be invited by NBCC. The furnishing of Data Centre in Delhi is expected to be completed by July, 2018.

ii) On-boarding of Consultants:-

   In the first phase, NATGRID has already completed the selection process for 22 consultants through National Institute for Smart Government (NISG). Out of 22 consultants, 7 consultants have already joined and another 11 consultants have confirmed their date of joining.

iii) NATGRID IT Framework:-

   After the on boarding of Chief of Technology on 2nd March, 2017, the activities for implementation of IT Framework of NATGRID have been initiated. Further, a proposal seeking approval of CCS for extension of timelines for implementation of Horizon I and some elements of Horizon II is under submission. The Department of Expenditure, Ministry of Finance has conveyed their support for the proposal on 17.02.2017.
Further Recommendation

4.10.11 The Committee desires to be apprised of the latest status of the construction of data centres, on boarding of consultants, implementation and operationalisation of IT Framework of NATGRID.
RECOMMENDATION/OBSERVATIONS- AT A GLANCE

BORDER FENCING ALONG IBB

The Committee is not satisfied with the reply furnished by the Ministry. No action seems to have been taken by the Ministry on the recommendation of the Committee. Even the plan to deploy technological solutions is in the pilot stage of implementation. The Committee is of the view that the Ministry needs to accelerate the pace of construction of fencing along the India-Bangladesh Border and complete the pilot projects at the earliest and start deployment of technical solutions in areas where physical barriers are not feasible.

(Para 3.1.4)

The Committee is also not convinced with the efforts being made to resolve the issues of land acquisition and public protests that have hampered the construction of fencing in several areas. The Committee feels that merely reviewing these issues at the Cabinet Secretary level is not going to resolve the deadlocks. The Committee recommends that the Ministry needs to think out of the box to tackle such issues as they have remained unresolved for several years. All efforts must be taken to devise innovative solutions that may require minimal land acquisition.

(Para 3.1.5)

BORDER FLOODLIGHTING ALONG IBB

The Committee recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must accelerate the completion of floodlighting project in the remaining 193 km border areas along India-Bangladesh Border to ensure that illegal immigration, infiltration/smuggling are prevented without fail. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must ensure that the Hand Held Thermal Imagers (HHTIs) deployed in non-floodlight areas must be in working condition. The Committee further recommends that Government should make available to BSF the latest and adequate long-range night vision equipment for better border surveillance and management.

(Para 3.2.4)

INDIA PAKISTAN BORDER

Border Fencing, Floodlighting and Roads along IPB

The Committee notes that a Pilot Project for implementation of Comprehensive Integrated Border Management Solution (CIBMS) in two stretches of 5-6 km each has been undertaken in Jammu Sector and BSF has prepared a similar proposal for deployment of technological solution for Punjab and Gujarat Sector which is under vetting by technical experts like professors of IITs. The Committee strongly recommends that the proposal for deployment of technological solution in Punjab and Gujarat Sector must be vetted by technical experts within the specific time frame, so that the project gets approved and sanctioned in time for its fast-track implementation on the ground level.

(Para 3.3.4)

The Committee is concerned about fencing in the Thar desert region of Rajasthan border areas where shifting sand dunes disturbs the regular maintenance of fence. In that
regard, the Committee had recommended the Government to examine the viability of adopting
the fence model in Mexico, having geographical terrains similar to Thar Desert. The Committee
is not satisfied with the reply of the Ministry of Home Affairs and is unable to comprehend how
the traditional fencing would be able to safeguard the border in the shifting sand dunes area.
The Ministry has also failed to apprise the Committee about the decision taken on the option of
dense plantation in Jaisalmer border areas to stabilize sand dunes. The Committee, therefore,
strongly recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must furnish detailed and focused
reply to the Committee on its recommendation.

(Para 3.3.7)

BORDER ROADS ALONG IPB

The Committee takes strong exception to the reply of the Ministry and it seems that the
Committee’s recommendation of creating a joint venture through public-private partnership
between the Government and a private company having wide experience and expertise in road
projects, has not ever been considered by the Ministry. The Committee reiterates its
recommendation given in Para 2.9.5 of its 203rd Report. The Committee further recommends
that the Ministry should conduct wider consultation and seek expert advice on the matter.

(Para 3.4.3)

GENERAL BORDER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Working Conditions of Border Guarding Forces (BGF) Personnel

The Committee is concerned about the arduous nature of duty and hardship faced by
the jawans at their posts with inadequate rest and relief. The Ministry does not seem to be
taking enough steps to reduce the hardship faced by the jawans who are performing duty in the
severest conditions. In view of these facts the Committee had recommended rationalization of
duty hours and creation of six shifts of 04 hours each during a 24 hours cycle. The Ministry has
submitted that necessary leave/training reserve and leave rationing with transparency have
been worked out without giving details of measures taken to ensure adequate rest and relief to
the Jawans.

(Para 3.5.3)

The Committee therefore, reiterates the recommendation made vide para 2.17.5 of its
203rd report of the Committee to be implemented at the earliest so as to keep the jawans at
sound state of mind while performing their duties. The Committee also desires to be apprised
about the details of the measures already undertaken to implement a transparent, rationale and
fair leave policy to regulate duty hours to ensure adequate rest and relief.

(Para 3.5.4)

The Committee reiterates for expeditious provisioning of basic amenities like bicycle to
jawans for their daily commute where the duty location is far away from the BoP and would
like to be apprised of the progress made towards provisioning of adequate number of bicycles
to jawans.

(Para 3.5.7)
PENDING PROCUREMENT OF WEAPONS AND ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT

The Committee understands that modernization of CAPFs including acquisition of surveillance equipments is a continuous process, but at the same time, the Committee reiterates its recommendation that the Ministry of Home Affairs must provide the required modern and latest surveillance equipments to CAPFs to detect round the clock any attempt of infiltration or illegal migration.

(Para 3.6.3)

COMPOSITE BOPs

The Committee recommends that the proposals for construction of deficient elements in 135 BoPs may be cleared by MHA so that the projects are implemented expeditiously to bring the non-composite BoPs at par with composite ones without time and cost overruns. The Committee further recommends that the Government should also take up the remaining 1344 BoPs (1901-422-135), out of a total of 1901 BoPs, on the India-Bangladesh and the India-Pakistan Border for converting them into composite BoPs at the earliest.

(Para 3.7.5)

ILLEGAL SAND MINING IN PUNJAB BORDER AREAS

The Committee is constrained to express its displeasure over the evasive reply of the Ministry of Home Affairs on the allegation of connivance of the BSF and the Punjab Police in the illegal sand mining on the Punjab border. The Committee feels that the Ministry of Home Affairs should have constituted an investigation/inquiry team to ascertain the truth and instead of solely relying on the report to it by the BSF. The Committee, therefore, strongly recommends that the Ministry should conduct an independent investigation to find out the truth about connivance of BSF and the Punjab police. The Committee desires to be apprised of the action taken in this regard.

(Para 3.8.3)

INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN SECURING BORDERS

National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID)

The Committee feels that in order to operationalize NATGRID by September, 2018, the scheduled timeframe of civil construction in Delhi by March, 2018; interior furnishing of Data Centres by July 2018; on boarding of all 22 consultants; engagement of 19 additional consultants and operationalisation of Entity Extraction, Visualisation and Analytics (EVA) system by August 2018, must be met by all means. All the targets may be achieved within the set timeframe and no further delay should occur.

(Para 3.9.5)

The Committee reiterates its recommendation made in para 3.2.4 of 203rd Report with regard to engagement of consultants.

(Para 3.9.10)

NATIONAL COUNTER-TERRORISM CENTRE (NCTC)

The Committee, relying on the justification for reviving the idea of National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) as given in para 3.4.5 of 203rd Report, finds it pertinent to recommend that the Government should revisit the whole issue of reviving the idea of NCTC and make concerted efforts for building a consensus amongst all stakeholders with regard to the structure, functions, mandate and utility of creating and operationalization of NCTC as a
single, unified and premier counter-terrorism agency. The MHA may undertake a lead role in the matter.

(Para 3.10.3)

The Committee feels that Government should not keep the notification pertaining to structure, function, mandate of National Counter-Terrorism Centre (NCTC) issued vide OM dated 03.02.2012 in abeyance for an indefinite period. The Committee, therefore, reiterates its further recommendation made in response to ATN of para 3.4.5 of its 203rd Report keeping in view the national interest.

(Para 3.10.6)

OTHER ISSUES

Acquisition of Border Land

The Committee is of the view that the Ministry of Home Affairs should take suitable follow-up action in tandem with the State Government of Punjab and persuade the farmers of the region to sacrifice their fertile and cultivable land for acquisition by the government on lease in the 'national interest' in lieu of adequate compensation for the same. The Committee feels that the Union Government must persuade the State Government to initially declare an attractive rate of compensation to be given to the farmers of Punjab in lieu of land to allay the apprehensions of the farmers with regard to the compensation.

(Para 3.11.3)

INFILTRATION AND CROSS-BORDER TERRORISM

The Committee is not happy with the progress of the investigation. National Investigation Agency (NIA) should complete the investigation in the remaining cases at the earliest without any delay.

(Para 3.12.3)

The Committee observes that despite the construction of 668.66 km. long Anti-Infiltration Obstacle System (AIOS) along the LoC and international border by Indian Army and the use of latest equipments to detect and intercept infiltration by terrorist, there has been spurt in the infiltration attempt along the LoC from across the border. That is a matter of concern to the Committee. The Committee is in agreement with the Ministry of Home Affairs that Pakistan makes attempts to divert the attention of international fora from the internal security situation within Pakistan to Jammu & Kashmir. The Committee feels that such attempts of Pakistan have to be countered by the Government of India through diplomatic channels. Moreover, Pakistan's efforts to regulate the inflow of terrorists into Jammu & Kashmir and to foment violence in the State need to be combated/checked to eliminate any possibility of terrorist attacks in Jammu & Kashmir.

(Para 3.12.8)

The Committee is dissatisfied with the brief reply of the Ministry and takes an exception to the fact that no details of action taken have been furnished in the reply. The Committee, while reiterating its recommendation given in Para 4.4.7 of its 203rd Report, desires to be informed of the steps taken by the Ministry to proactively detect tunnels in the border areas.

(Para 3.12.11)
NAGROTA TERROR ATTACK

The Committee observes the action taken to foil attempts of infiltration from across the border and the resultant reduction in infiltration. However, the main concern of the Committee is with regards to those incidents where the terrorists successfully infiltrate into Indian territory and carry out terror attacks. The Committee also takes exception to the confusing statistics furnished by the Ministry that show that all cases of infiltration were foiled in the past 4 years. If such was the case, no terrorist attack would have happened in the last three years. The Committee strongly recommends that instead of furnishing unbelievable statistics, the Ministry should focus on further augmenting the capacity of Border Guarding Forces to make LoC and International Boundary a zero-tolerance area for terrorist infiltration. The Government may, accordingly, take appropriate measures to strengthen the security and surveillance mechanism on India-Pakistan Border.

(Para 3.13.6)

CEASEFIRE VIOLATIONS

The Committee notes the detailed plans evolved by BSF and action being taken by BSF to counter cross-border firing with Pakistan. However, the Committee reiterates its recommendation made in para 4.6.3 of its 203rd Report to keep the diplomatic channel open for preventing any further ceasefire violations and restoring the situation of genuine ceasefire for security and safety of people living in the border villages allowing them to earn the means of their livelihood.

(Para 3.14.4)

CATTLE SMUGGLING ALONG IBB

The Committee is not satisfied with the response of the Ministry. The recommendation of the Committee was clear that the licenses of all cattle haats illegally functioning within 8 Kms of border areas may be cancelled and the officials who have illegally issued/renewed such licenses may be held responsible for illegally issuing/renewing license to these haats. The Committee reiterates its recommendation and hopes that the Ministry would take action and furnish a detailed reply in the matter.

(Para 4.1.4)

The Committee takes note of the reply of the Ministry that the issue has been taken up by BSF with the Chairman, Central Board of Excise & Customs. The Committee desires to be apprised of the measures taken by the CBEC on the recommendation of the Committee to raise the benchmark price of the seized cattle and prevent its re-selling to the persons involved in smuggling of cattle.

(Para 4.1.8)

BORDER ROADS ALONG IPB

The Committee would like to know the status of CPWD's modified project on Jammu bund project, which include the construction of axial roads linking the BoPs and construction of remaining 15 bunkers which was scheduled to be completed by the end of year 2017. The Ministry of Home Affairs may apprise the Committee of the progress on these two issues/projects.

(Para 4.2.4)
INDIA- BHUTAN BORDER (IBhB)

Border Infrastructure Along IBhB

The Committee desires that detailed project report on construction of Border Roads along the India-Bhutan Border must be completed within the set timeframe by Assam PWD so that forest/wild life clearance is obtained without any further delay. The Committee also recommends that the Ministry of Home Affairs must pursue with the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change to take an early decision on the proposal for granting relaxation up to 15 km from border instead of 5 km for implementing border infrastructure projects.

INDIA- MYANMAR BORDER (IMB)

Deployment of BGF along IMB

The Committee may be apprised of the decision taken in the matter.

BORDER INFRASTRUCTURE ALONG IMB

The Committee would like to be apprised of the progress made on the issue of construction of Subsidiary Pillars between border pillar no. 80 to 82 at Moreh in Manipur along India-Myanmar Border (IMB) as decided in the 21st National Level Meeting (NLM) between India and Myanmar on 5-6 July 2017. The Committee also takes note of the fact that the boundary between pillar nos. 79 to 81 is demarcated and resurvey is not required. The Committee, therefore, recommends that the fencing between border pillar nos. 79 to 81 may be commenced and completed at the earliest.

The Committee would also like to know about the current status of the proposal to streamline and strengthen border guarding arrangement of IMB.

GENERAL BORDER MANAGEMENT ISSUES

Working Conditions of Border Guarding Forces (BGF) Personnel

The Committee has come across the news reports (The Indian Express dated 19th October, 2017) that call rates for all the Digital Satellite Phone Terminals (DSPTs) used by the armed forces and CAPFs have been recently subsidized from rate of Rs 5/- per minute to Re 1/- per minute. The Committee desires to be apprised about the latest position in the matter.

BORDER PROTECTION GRID (BPG)

The Committee desires to be apprised of the details of the Comprehensive Integrated Border Management Solution project after the completion of the pilot project.

OTHER INITIATIVES TO IMPROVE COASTAL SECURITY

The Committee desires to be apprised of the status of final delivery of the transponders to the States of Gujarat and Tamil Nadu and the number actually installed successfully on the boats venturing into the sea.
COASTAL BORDER

Security of Islands

The Committee recommends that the Department of Border Management (DoBM), MHA in tandem with IB, other departments of MHA, Coastal States/UTs should expedite the preparation of the detailed action plan for the security and safety of islands of the country. The Committee also recommends that till the time the detailed action plan is prepared, an interim arrangement should be made to ensure round-the-year sea connectivity to remote islands like Minicoy and frequent patrolling of all the uninhabited islands.

(Para 4.9.5)

INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED IN SECURING BORDERS

National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID)

The Committee desires to be apprised of the latest status of the construction of data centres, onboarding of consultants, implementation and operationalisation of IT Framework of NATGRID.

(Para 4.10.11)