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FAULTLINES - THE SERIES

FAULTLINES focuses on various sources and aspects of existing and emerging conflict across the world, with a particular focus on the Indian subcontinent. Terrorism and low-intensity wars, communal, caste and other sectarian strife, political violence, organised crime, policing, the criminal justice system and human rights constitute the central focus of the Journal.

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In a fractious and rapidly transforming world order, consensus is breaking down at every level, and across nearly all issues. States themselves are internalising falsehoods in the age of fake news, manipulated communications and information overload. The most fundamental values, long held to be ‘self-evident’, are disintegrating, even as a resurgence of noxious ideologies afflicts the entire globe. As uncertainties multiply, fear rules, and people are driven into ancient attitudes of tribalism and hate. The ‘end of history’, itself a manufactured falsehood, has been no more than a new and bloody beginning of another phase of human frailty and failure, fuelled manifold by a technological blitz that much of humankind can, even now, hardly comprehend. Our greatest idols have had feet of clay.

It is not clear whether information and analysis can create clarity within the Tsunami of disinformation flooding across the world, but the effort to seek the hard ground of truth in the deluge of fabrication and deceit cannot be abandoned, and must, indeed, intensify.

When the political cultures of falsehood mingle in with conflict, the outcomes are the more unpredictable and lethal. Powerful tools have been harnessed by those who seek to create and sustain conflict, and the advocacy of peace, of democracy and of a rational politics has failed to keep pace with the wreckers. In this feverish environment, the challenge of separating ‘truth’ from ‘hype’, as one of the papers in this volume expresses it, is extraordinary.
This, as the paper on nuclear energy in India illustrates, is also the case where such a separation should be possible simply on grounds of verifiable evidence. But in areas such as nuclear energy and the entire array of issues relating to the environment, the discourse has been muddied by sentiment, even as the scientists’ hubris has precluded effective engagement in the public and popular discourse. Worse, as the near-fantastical debate on climate change ignited by Donald Trump and his adherents demonstrates, science itself is being everywhere brought into question, challenged by faith systems that admit neither to proof nor falsification.

Then again, is the enduring corruption of language, the selective and perverse use of terms such as ‘terrorism’, ‘peace process’, ‘conflict resolution’, ‘justice’, ‘equality’, ‘democracy’, among others, which mask complex motives and are opportunistically harnessed by polar opposites in the political and global spectrum.

Each of the papers in this volume explores themes that tread ambiguous and contested ground. Each challenges the established narrative between conflicting perspectives, attempting to bring some clarity to issues that have long been intentionally obscured. Each, finally, is intended to take the discussion forward, seeking further engagement and disputation, in the only process available to humankind, to move from darkness into the light.

Ajai Sahni
October 28, 2018
Many nations view nuclear power as the most viable source of energy when the world has no other easy option; but the key issue that they confront is ‘social opposition’, more so after the 2011 Fukushima nuclear disaster. Yet, in very few countries have anti-nuclear movements succeeded. The decisions by Germany, Switzerland, Vietnam, etc., to roll back their nuclear programmes are argued as dramatic exceptions; and it is believed that anti-nuclear sentiment is not likely to remain forever in Japan either. However, there have been some cases in Australia and the United States, where near-complete reactors have been halted by popular opposition. Will India join this list?

With the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement and Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) waiver, India’s nuclear power program has been unshackled from the multilateral technology-denial regimes. Consequently, India has embarked on an ambitious nuclear energy expansion programme. Meanwhile, India is also facing a modicum of resistance to the construction of new
nuclear power plants. Owing to vehement public opposition, nuclear projects have been halted, shifted or cancelled in places like Haripur (West Bengal), Bhoothathankettu and Peringome (Kerala), and in Mithivirdi (Gujarat). This is likely to escalate in future, as more reactors are in the pipeline. Will India’s nuclear energy programme be shackled from within? Even though there is no pan-Indian anti-nuclear movement in the country today, the social resistance seems to be getting consolidated and institutionalised. How will this culminate? The various manifestations of social opposition to, and changing dynamics in social acceptance of, nuclear energy in India are matters of serious introspection.

**Science-Technology-Society Triad**

“Science, technology and society constitute a dynamically interactive triad” influencing each other in significant ways.¹ The body of scientific knowledge that a society assimilates determines its technological prowess; and technological innovations, in turn, generate new social contexts. In other words, if science and technology is misunderstood and neglected, social development will be missed; and if social control is absent, science and technology will be misused, and civilization will be at stake.

As the three are not passive partners, the question is whether society always responds wisely to the scientific march, and whether the evolution of technology always complements the sustainability of society? Diametrically opposite but convincing narratives are advanced involving nuclear energy, given the history of serious nuclear accidents along with the

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many societal benefits that have accrued. Nuclear science and technology today seems to be standing at a societal crossroads, waiting to be marked as ‘awful’ or ‘awesome’.

Every technological endeavour involves benefits along with certain risks; but society responds positive if the expected benefits outweigh the involved risks. Then “how much risk is society willing to accept to realize the promise of emerging technologies”?2 In India, “from the Chipko movement to the Narmada movement to Koodankulam protest, same type of voices are heard demanding protection of livelihood, environment, and democracy.”3 Specifically, the sporadic pockets of skepticism over nuclear energy in India seem symptomatic of the predicament involving social acceptance vs. promise of technology. It is believed that lack of information, or a ‘misinformation overdrive’, leads to public fear of nuclear technology. Further, nuclear technology comparatively elicits an extraordinary level of concern because of the scale of potential hazards it poses. The nature of nuclear technology itself is complex, with emission of invisible radiation and possibility of catastrophic accidents, to that extent, the media always presents the worst case scenario. Consequently, the public’s concept of risk is heavily influenced by the imagined consequences of catastrophic accidents, and is built on values, attitudes and sets of attributes which are different from those of the policy-makers and nuclear experts.4

Therefore, it is assumed that, with greater public education and social understanding of nuclear technology, public support for, and greater social acceptance of, nuclear projects can be achieved. Of late, governments the world over have resorted to aggressive public engagement, media management, along with lucrative packages for rehabilitation of affected people. Still, anti-nuclear movements or sentiments are pervasive in many parts of the world.

Though, a pan-Indian anti-nuclear movement is invisible today, to many, the Khasi Student Union (KSU) opposition to uranium mining in Meghalaya; the Paschim Banga Khet Majoor Samity (PBKMS) protests in Haripur (West Bengal); the Jharkhand Organization Against Radiation (JOAR) concerns in Jadugoda (Jharkhand); and the People’s Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMANE) in Koodankulam (Tamil Nadu) reflect “the classic David-Goliath fight between the ordinary citizens of India and the powerful Indian government”. As an outgrowth, the sporadic anti-nuclear movements have started to align with the socio-political fault lines. They seem to have began as a ‘secular movement’ intended to raise awareness about the hazards of nuclear plants, but subsequently a religious institution has been drawn into the movement, prompting other religious group to suspect and project the agitation as a conspiracy. Even though no ‘green politics’ is visible in the country and no Indian political party has aligned itself with the anti-nuclear movement, ‘vote bank’ politics has conveniently found its way into the anti-nuclear movements.

6 Moolakkattu, p. 422.
THE GENESIS AND NOMENCLATURE

Organized anti-nuclear (energy) sentiment in India is a fairly new phenomenon, though some argue that such sentiments and consequent activities “were not hitherto totally unknown in the southernmost tip of India.” Its genesis can be traced back to mid 1980s, when a non-government organization ‘Janandolan – People for Peace’ decided to launch an action programme against the Kaiga Nuclear Power Plant (KNPP), laying the foundation of the protest mobilization in Uttara Kannada.

A coalition of groups, the Citizens Against Nuclear Energy (CANE) opposing the KNPP project, was formed in Bangalore, comprising of Gandhi Bhavan, Karnataka Sarvodaya Mandal, Prabriti, Disarmament Centre and Appiko, among others. It initiated public awareness campaigns and lobbied against nuclear power. The villagers strongly expressed their concerns on rehabilitation to officials. Dr. Raja Ramanna visited and assured the villagers that they would receive adequate compensation, rehabilitation, and jobs for all. On 29 March 1985, more than 1,000 villagers of Kaiga and nearby areas held a meeting at Bare in Yellapur taluk and demanded that the government take care of their rehabilitation.

During 1987-89, the Group for a Peaceful Indian Ocean (GPIO) started a campaign against the superpower rivalry in Indian Ocean along with opposition to the Koodankulam

9 Ibid, p. 234.
Nuclear Power Project. Since 1988, when the deal was signed with the then Soviet Union, the plans to create a site for reactors, later evolving into a deal for building a total of six, has faced intermittent opposition. Since its inception, “local groups, including the National Alliance of People’s Movements (NAPM), the National Fish workers Forum (NFF), the Tamil Nadu Fish Workers Union (TNFU), the Social Action Movement (SAM), the Palmyrah Worker’s Development Society (PWDS), the Peace Association for Social Action (PASA), Group for a Peaceful Indian Ocean (GPIO), and others voiced their worries over the health and safety of the surrounding population, in regards to both a potential disaster as well as the general impact of nuclear waste entering the ecosystem.”

Meanwhile, nuclear disasters like Three Mile Island (March 1979) and Chernobyl (April 1986) brought the issue of risks involved in nuclear energy to the forefront of global discourse. Ever since, a section of the media and some civil society groups draw a parallel to India’s programme. The idea that ‘nuclear activity anywhere is a threat to humanity everywhere’ became all pervasive.

During the late 1980s, a massive anti-nuclear movement surfaced involving Koodankulam nuclear power project in Tamil Nadu. The Koodankulam project was conceived in the whirlwind of rising anti-nuclear sentiments globally, and persisting domestic resentment over project-induced displacement and rehabilitation concerns. A month after the Inter-Governmental Agreement signed on November 20, 1988 by Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Soviet

11 Uday Kumar, p. 116.
President Mikhail Gorbachev for the construction of two nuclear plants in Koodankulam, local groups lead by Rev. Y. David’s ‘Samathuva Samudaya Iyakkam’ (Social Equality Movement) staged a massive protest rally at Tirunelveli. Owing to the uproar from public and disintegration of Soviet Union in the meantime, the implementation of the project was halted for nearly a decade, only to be resumed in 1997 when Prime Minister Deve Gowda and Boris Yeltsin signed a supplementary deal. Initially the National Alliance of People’s Movement (NAPM) organized meetings and discussions; subsequently small-scale mobilization were continued under the Anumin Nilaya Ethirpu Iyakkam (Nuclear Power Project Opposition Movement) created in November 1999. After the final agreement signed in November 2001, the PMANE lead by S.P. Udaykumar was launched to spearhead the protest. Subsequently with discussions in 2008 for additional four reactors at the Koodankulam site, Fukushima nuclear disaster in 2011, the ongoing protests in Koodankulam became intense and protracted.

Unlike previous protests, the Koodankulam episode and consequent government response mark various unique developments. First, the protest has so far been the most protracted anti-nuclear movement in the country, involving the participation of around 60 to 70,000 people; more importantly, it has been sustained as a Gandhian non-violent movement of resistance. Secondly, the movement seems to be the most organized and institutionalized till now, probably heralding an era of ‘green politics’, though nascent, in India today. Third, ‘religion’ seems to have become entangled with the anti-nuclear movement, which started with a secular character, but later found to be centered round the mobilization by the

13 Ibid.
Catholic Church in the locality. Undoubtedly, a majority of the local population comprising farmers, fishermen and the protest leaders, happen to be Catholics. Interestingly, the Muslim population constituting a significant section of civil society in this southern state remained aloof from the issue. Fourth, conspiracy theories are floated around alleging the role of external players – the global anti-nuclear lobby, unhappy foreign industrial contenders and vested interest groups – in fuelling the protest movement to sabotage the India-Russia deal by pumping in money to the protesters. Fifth, the consequent highhandedness of the government and local police resulted in the killing of a some protesters, mass arrests and court cases against more than 56,000 protesters, and slapping of ‘sedition’ and ‘waging war against the state’ charges against them. Lastly, post-Koodankulam, a strong network has been established among various splintering protest groups in different areas, with probable cross mobilization. For example, protesters from one plant area visit the older plant area to know the plight of the people there. The villagers in the Mithvirdi area (Gujarat) have expressed solidarity and are reportedly willing to help in the fight against the nuclear plant project in Kovada (Andhra Pradesh) too. It would not be difficult to speculate now on the emergence of a pan-Indian anti-nuclear movement soon, as more projects are in the pipeline and there is increasing resentment in every location.

None of the other nuclear related projects in India are free of local resentments as well. In 2006, the West Bengal Agricultural Workers Union, known as PBKMS, mobilized 6,000 villagers to create a bamboo barricade to prevent scientists, engineers, and police from entering a village in

Haripur to perform soil tests for the Nuclear Power Corporation of India Limited (NPCIL). The Uranium mining project in the West Khasi Hills in Meghalaya has faced stiff opposition from certain local communities who project their tribal identity vis-à-vis the rest of India. The project also “exposes fault lines within Meghalaya, pitting landowners who want uranium mining for jobs and economic growth, against villagers who refuse to relinquish commonly-owned land, to which they have cultural, economic, and emotional attachments.”

In Jadugoda, the opposition is “not pitched in terms of identity politics, but as a shared experience of suffering related to health and occupational hazards.” The Jharkhand Organization Against Radiation (JOAR) in Jadugoda, established in 1979, stepped up its campaign in 1996 when the Uranium Corporation of India Ltd. (UCIL) initiated land acquisition, displacing 30 homes to build the third tailing dam. Through Public Interest Litigation (PIL), Right to Information (RTI), and court cases, protesters have resorted to the legal route to prove their stand on health hazards, with little success. Interestingly, none of the allegations regarding the adverse impact of nuclear projects on health and environment have been proved with sufficient evidence in court.

Not long ago, the National Green Tribunal (NGT) announced the shifting of the Mithivirdi (Gujarat) Nuclear Power Plant project, where Westinghouse is willing to install six AP-1000 reactors, to Kavvada (Andhra Pradesh), due to ‘delay

16 Ibid, p.77.
17 “Jharkhandi Organization Against Radiation (JOAR)”, http://jadugoda.jharkhand.org.in/.
in land acquisition’ as a result of strong public opposition.\textsuperscript{18} Even, the public resentment around Koodankulam is viewed by the nuclear establishment as “merely a PR (public relations) disaster (rather) than scientific.”\textsuperscript{19} Undoubtedly public resentment against nuclear projects in India, though sporadic and limited to pockets, is unlikely to subside in the foreseeable future, as more such projects are in the pipeline. No instance of wholehearted support for, and satisfactory settlement of public grievances involving, nuclear energy projects, is available.

**Nuclear Linear Progression**

In retrospect, India’s nuclear journey in terms of public perception and acceptance has had a linear progression which can be divided into three phases. First, the 	extit{trust-based optimism phase} (1947 to the 1970s) marks popular trust in the stalwart nuclear scientists Homi Bhabha and the political leader Jawaharlal Nehru, during which nuclear projects were viewed as symbols of modernity and prestige.\textsuperscript{20} The quest for nuclear energy in India, in a way, was a kind of conviction that nuclear energy was going to be a magical energy source that would solve India’s socio-economic problems. So the commitment goes back to the 1940s, to Bhabha and Nehru, who wanted India to be among the leaders in industry, science and technology. In 1944, Homi Bhabha declared, “When nuclear energy has been successfully applied for power production, in, say, a couple of

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{18} Maulik Pathak, “Gujarat’s nuclear power plant project to be shifted to Andhra Pradesh: NGT”, 	extit{Livemint}, June 1, 2017, https://www.livemint.com/Politics/gis6xh208EC0qW7ujVm2MO/Gujarats-nuclear-power-plant-project-to-be-shifted-to-Andhr.html.
\end{itemize}
decades from now, India will not have to look abroad for its experts but will find them ready at home”.

As a result, a country-wide network of laboratories and scientific organisations was established as the base to groom batches of technocrats and basic researchers. Programmes were initiated for uranium mining and processing, fuel making, heavy water production, reactor building, fuel processing and waste management. The 1950s and 1960s are considered as the infrastructure-building phase followed by a reorientation in the late 1960s and 1970s, toward protecting the legal, technical and knowledge environment for indigenisation. There was a political consensus among all factions on utilising atomic energy for the socio-economic uplift of Indian society. Both nuclear research and nuclear scientists gained greater autonomy. It was only in the late 1970s that the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC) and the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) faced critical reviews of their activities and achievements.

This led to the doubt-based pessimism phase, spanning around two decades (1980s to 2000), which was marked by public protests (Kaiga in 1987-88), criticism for not meeting energy production targets, and nuclear accidents in different parts of the world. During this period, public opposition to the Kaiga project was mainly against the site selection process, highlighting the environmental impact and disaster proneness of the site. The protest continued for several months, including

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a district-wide *bandh* on February 2, 1989. There were differences in terms of political parties’ mobilisation of the public on the nuclear plant at Kaiga. While the Congress Party and Janata Dal approved of the project, the CPI/CPI-M (Communist Party of India/Communist Party of India Marxist) took an inconsistent stand; only the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) passed a resolution against it. A public debate was demanded and Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi agreed in Parliament that a debate was necessary, but it did not materialise till November 1988.

During this period, nuclear accidents abroad, like Three Mile Island (1979, US), Chernobyl, (1986, USSR), and some incidents in India such as the Narora fire (1993), Kakrapar flooding (1994), Kaiga containment dome collapse (1994), generated enormous criticism and concern about the safety of nuclear plants. At the time of the Three Mile Island accident, Tarapur Atomic Power Station (TAPS)-1&2 and Rawatbhata Atomic Power Station (RAPS)-1 were in operation, and another five 220 MW Pressurised Heavy Water Reactor (PHWR) units were under various stages of construction. Prime Minister Morarji Desai ordered a safety audit of all Indian nuclear reactors. Similarly, after the Chernobyl accident (1986) Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi asked DAE to assess the safety of India’s nuclear installations.

Amidst all these, two important developments took place during this phase: 1) the former USSR came forward to set up the Koodankulam reactor despite the global nuclear denial regime; 2) though unrelated to the nuclear energy plans, India conducted a second series of nuclear tests at Pokhran in May

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1998 and the public mood was marked by jubilation across the country, though the political and strategic debate revolved around *who would get the credit* and what strategic advantage would accrue to India *vis-a-vis* Pakistan. Overall, though, fallacies in belief and loopholes in the nuclear establishment coloured the nuclear energy debate. Perceptibly “this phase marked the maturity of the Indian nuclear power programme” as potential safety gaps were exposed and addressed.²⁴

The third phase, starting from 2001, can be termed as the *post-material-support-oppose* phase where “post-material” factors, to a greater extent, went to shape public acceptance of nuclear energy projects. The post-material issues related to “quality of life” such as climate change, environmental pollution, energy security, displacement, rehabilitation and the issue of safety-security of nuclear installations that are linked to support for, or opposition to, the nuclear policy. During the last over one and a half decades, a number of PIL and RTI applications on these issues have been lodged by concerned citizens. Civil society consciousness in India has visibly increased. It indicates that rising industrial and societal prosperity in India will gradually liberate the public from the stress of basic acquisitive or materialistic needs, and people will increasingly emphasise quality of life and sustainability. This can be marked from the patterns of public responses to a series of issues, such as maintaining order in the nation, rising prices, corruption, black money, protecting freedom of speech, etc. Within this framework, one can judge public support for, or opposition to, nuclear projects. This phase will continue till the time the majority of the public either start supporting or vehemently opposing the nuclear energy projects.

Sitakanta Mishra

The intention is not to paint a gloomy picture of Indian public perception of, and attitude towards, domestic nuclear energy projects. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) “Nuclear Technology Review 2009” assessed that the public acceptance index (PAI) of nuclear energy in India grew from around 60 percent in 2005 to around 90 percent during 2008, and ranked the highest in the world. The aftermath of the Fukushima nuclear disaster, however, saw protest movements at Koodankulam and Jaitapur giving rise to the impression that anti-nuclear sentiments are now on the rise in India. Each time a problem related to nuclear technology arises anywhere, a section of the media and civil society groups draw parallels to India’s programme. Many tend to forget that nuclear risks, to a great extent are location-, and technology-specific. The public panic, based on the idea that ‘nuclear activity anywhere is a threat to humanity everywhere’ seems to be overemphasised, and, in the process, the specificities and achievements of nuclear projects are overlooked.

India today, with its existing 22 nuclear reactors with 6780 MWe capacity, and four reactors at various stages of implementation will add another 2800 MWe capacity. “Nuclear power generation capacity in the country is expected to reach nearly 15,000 MW by 2024 as the government has expedited the process of setting up new plants.” In the long-run, India aims to meet half of its total electricity demand from nuclear sources through indigenous and international collaborations. India has signed a dozen civil nuclear cooperation agreements with various countries and industrial houses for reactors and

fuel supply. Many of these activities are unlikely to be free of controversies.

MANUFACTURED OR NATURAL OPPOSITION

Is domestic opposition to nuclear energy programme in India spontaneous or manufactured? To fathom the nature of opposition, one must scrutinize the basis of opposition and the concerns. Often the anti-nuclear coterie cites the risks involved in ionizing radiation, adverse impact on the ecosystem, effects on livelihood of the local populace, displacement and ill-managed rehabilitation processes. This is diametrically opposite to the views propagated by the scientific community. However, concerns involving project-induced displacement and consequent miseries are genuine, and the government should be held responsible. But there prevails enormous confusion and misperceptions regarding radiation. The increasing gap between the public and the scientific community, the callous attitude of the nuclear establishment and government in clarifying certain information, and the propagandist attitude of certain vested interests and disgruntled people have contributed to such confusions.

No major nuclear accident is known to have happened in India; yet many draw baseless parallel between India’s programme and accidents happened elsewhere; it is interesting to know that the general background radiation in Kerala is more than the background radiation level in some nuclear facilities. The alleged connection between cancer incidence and nuclear plants has never been scientifically proven. Scientists argue that the marine ecosystem does not get affected or hinder the livelihood of fishermen. Pockets of domestic resistance seem to be based more on the fear of displacement and imagined risk apprehensions related to nuclear disaster incidents elsewhere.
Is then India’s nuclear energy programme experiencing the “burden of perception”?27

Many also question the sanctity and integrity of India’s nuclear regulatory mechanism. For the last few years, the propagated view has been the India’s nuclear regulatory body – Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) – suffers from “regulatory capture”.28 It is alleged that the AERB – the controlling agency – is not independent of the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) – the nuclear promoting agency. Even the proposed Nuclear Safety Regulatory Authority (NSRA) (which has now lapsed) was criticised as “a nuclear regulator without teeth”.29 Moreover, as alleged by former Chairman of AERB A. Gopalakrishnan long ago, there were “130 safety issues in Indian nuclear facilities of which 95 were of top priority”30. After reviewing the reports, he was

…appalled at the clearly dangerous lack of safety in the various hazardous nuclear installations at that time due to unattended safety problems accumulated over the previous 15 or so years, while the DAE continued

28 India’s nuclear regulatory agency – AERB – has been alleged to have fewer powers and less independence. Though AERB proclaims itself as “independent”, its functional and administrative linkages with DAE and AEC are not strictly separated. For example, the safety review report of the AERB is submitted to the AEC in which the Managing Director of NPCIL and Chairman of DAE are members (whose work the AERB is mandated to oversee) and not the Chairman of AERB. Also the AERB depends mostly on the DAE and BARC staff and their research facilities.
to operate these installations at extremely high risk to the public”.

But AERB claims that India’s nuclear establishment learnt lessons from all these accidents and discovered many weak areas in its review process, and the whole range of remedial measures to the loopholes identified was promptly carried out. These claims and counter-claims, however, give an impression that all is not well in the Indian nuclear industry.

Generally two explanations can be put forth to understand the nuances in social perception leading to acceptance or rejection of any technology by society. The ‘technology-based explanation’ asserts that the degree of available knowledge on any specific technology determines the degree of acceptance of the same. While safer technologies are desired, the degree of social acceptance accorded to a politically charged technology, like nuclear energy, is more likely to be governed by factors exclusive of its public safety performance. On the other hand, the ‘trust-based explanation’ asserts that the degree of social acceptance of a technology ultimately depends more on the degree of public trust on the organizations and individuals managing the technology. Only establishing scientific confidence does not by itself address public concerns fully. Like it or not, the nuclear energy debate is not technology vs. technology in India. Homi Bhabha and Jawaharlal Nehru were the early cheerleaders of the nuclear programme and their charisma smoothened the path for the unopposed development of a country-wide nuclear infrastructure.


Even though India has the best of brains, we do not see any charismatic personality with popular appeal cheerleading for nuclear projects in India today. Undoubtedly, former President APJ Abdul Kalam had mass appeal and advocated nuclear energy and supported the Koodankulam project, but he was generally regarded as the ‘missile man’ by Indian people. This does not mean that India is lacking visionary political or scientific leadership. Rather, there seems to be a disjointed growth of science, society and technology, sometimes creating hurdles in each others’ way.

Public concern and enquiry on any aspect of the nuclear project are legitimate; after all it is public money that is spent on these projects. Even the nuclear establishment agrees that the Koodankulam protest is “more a PR disaster than scientific”. Lately, the Government of India and other nuclear agencies have embarked on a mission to allay public fears. DAE, AERB, and NPCIL have all addressed the safety and security issues through various public outreach programs to address public concerns.

Will there be a linear progression from public education to public understanding, further to public support for, and ultimately a greater social acceptance of nuclear projects? Perceptibly, Indian public awareness of national nuclear program has increased and issues related to nuclear energy are vigorously flashed in the media over the last two decades. The debate over energy security and implications of the Indo-US civil nuclear agreement has probably made its way to every literate Indian. But a segment of the Indian public still opposes new nuclear projects in the name of safety-security fears and adverse socio-economic impact, along with ecological imbalance. Any clarification or information furnished by government agencies on all these issues is not trusted.
NATURE OF OPPOSITION AND DEGREE OF SUCCESS

Generally the themes and the nature of the opposition movements in India viewed through the prism of “neo-Gandhism”\textsuperscript{33} which prescribes the assumption of personal and social responsibility in the commitment to individual and collective amelioration through the process of self-realization and community-making.\textsuperscript{34} “It’s not a coincidence,” says P.K. Sundaram, that India’s anti-nuclear activism found its cradle in Gandhian institutions.”\textsuperscript{35} Particularly the Anumukti group is engaged consistently in opposing nuclear energy and weapons, and mobilizing public opinion since 1980s under the leadership of Narayan Desai, a veteran Gandhian.\textsuperscript{36}

If so, why has the anti-nuclear movement not been successful, compared to other neo-Gandhian opposition initiatives like the anti-corruption movement by Anna Hazare? The anti-nuclear groups argue that their movement is at a nascent stage and it would take time to mature. According to Udaykumar, rural and agricultural India is in deep and continuing distress, with rising unemployment, falling gross food grains output, loss of purchasing power, miseries among farmers, etc.; they

\textsuperscript{34} According to Makarand R Paranjape, “neo-Gandhianism is…not merely a creed or an ideology; it is not merely a set of beliefs or practices; it is the assumption of personal and social responsibility; it is the commitment to individual and collective amelioration; it is process of self-realization and community-making.”, http://www.makarand.com/acad/Neo-GandhianPraxisAPersonalReport.htm.
are “in the midst of struggle for survival”; therefore, “cries for human security, better health, environmental safety, and sustainable development”, in other words, the ‘post-material consciousness’, “are quite weak. So it is no wonder why anti-nuclear or peace movements are not pervasive or powerful in contemporary India.” As India marches ahead economically, the civil society consciousness of its citizen’s would increase, leading to their increasing demand for safe and secure living conditions.

Taking serious note of the Fukushima disaster, India undertook a comprehensive review of the safety-security arrangement in place in its nuclear plants and adopted necessary corrective measures. More importantly, the post-Fukushima skepticism and anti-nuclear protests at home and elsewhere did not deter India from signing nuclear energy agreements with various countries and industrial houses. More reactors are planned and India is not likely to rollback its nuclear expansion programme. But the State Governments will play an influential role in nuclear energy decision-making in future, as law and order is a State domain and the protesters first confrontation is with the State Government. The equation between the State and Union Government would largely determine the degree of acceptance, or rejection, of new projects.

On the other hand, whatever may be their degree of success, the concerns raised by the anti-nuclear movement are now centre-stage in India’s national discourse. How the anti-nuclear discourse will unfold in the decades ahead, and if present pockets of resistance will acquire a pan-Indian character, is a matter of conjecture; but the anti-nuclear phenomenon, which is in its infancy, is not likely subside anytime soon.

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Surprisingly, the anti-nuclear sentiments and the plight of the affected people has not attracted much political patronage. As highlighted earlier, there is no ‘green politics’ in India yet and no national political party has subscribed to the anti-nuclear ideology. Surprising unanimity has always been found across the political spectrum in India on nuclear technology matters. Opposition movement leaders have made frequent forays into the political domain either by joining political parties and/or contesting elections, but without substantial gains.

In 1988, over the Kaiga issue, Shivram Karanth, the leader of the anti-nuclear protest, contested the Parliamentary election but was defeated. The Aam Admi Party (AAP) initially attempted to stand by Koodankulam protesters. In March 2014, former AAP leader Prashant Bhushan held a meeting with the People’s Movement Against Nuclear Energy (PMANE) leader Udaykumar in Idinthakarai and reportedly declared that the party has “always opposed nuclear energy and also the Koodankulam Nuclear Power Project…” Subsequently, Udaykumar “had decided to join the AAP after its high command agreed to fulfill his conditions such as taking people’s opinion on establishing nuclear reactors and decentralisation of power.”

nuclear policy of the nation.”\textsuperscript{40} Besides, AAP no national party has ever adopted the anti-nuclear movement or subscribed to the anti-nuclear ideology.

The other method attempted was the formation of a political party with an anti-nuclear ideology and alliances with like-minded regional parties, with the hope of taking their voices to legislatures, and to reach out to wider audiences. Udaykumar, after several futile political forays, launched his new political party ‘Pachai Tamizhagam’ (Green Tamil Nadu) with a “manifesto dedicated to fighting against nuclear energy… (and) not contest to win but to make people aware” of the nuclear risks.\textsuperscript{41} Further, PMANE and other environment organizations, in cooperation with the Left Front (CPI, CPM), and other lesser-known regional parties such as the Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katch (Liberation Panther Party), Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Renaissance Dravida Progressive Federation), Indian Union Muslim League, Social Democratic Party of India, Tamizhaga Vaazhvurimai Katchi (Tamil Nadu Right to Livelihood Party), have been found working for some time as a united front during State elections in Tamil Nadu. During the local elections, the Government has tended not to annoy protesters, but in the post-election phase they have been dealt with in a highhanded manner.

A PROGNOSIS

A technological controversy, such as the debate over nuclear energy, is a dynamic social process that cannot readily


be predicted or managed due to the involvement of a variety of actors, factors and settings, each exerting complex influences over the other.\textsuperscript{42} It is, however, a fact that citizens are now playing a more visible role in nuclear policy making. The question, then, is how is the public to be led to the “right” decision?\textsuperscript{43} The key is to impartially identify what is right, and how and who should convince the public. It is easy for anti-nuclear activists to rouse public opinion to a fever pitch by playing on the mysteries of the atom and invisible radiation. In defence, there is no magical cure. Without prejudice, society needs to weigh the benefits of nuclear technology accrued during the past decades in relation to the losses or risks experienced. Broadly, owing to overemphasis on the risks involved, the achievements and benefits of nuclear technology in many sectors, including energy, have tended to be drowned out.

Undeniably, nuclear technology has the potential to address all our energy needs if it is harnessed safely. Past nuclear disaster-related and project-induced, sufferings have demonized nuclear technology. Probably the sophistication and maturity of the technology needs to be enhanced to a greater height to eradicate all probable risks attached to it. There is, consequently, need to introspect the technology has failed us or have we failed the technology?

As far as India’s nuclear energy trajectory is concerned, there can be no looking back. In the long-term, however, the

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fate of India’s programme will be determined on the basis of: how early and how much affordable electricity is harnessed without any major nuclear accident. Any delay in project completion and any safety-related incident would intensify the presently sporadic anti-nuclear sentiment, giving it a pan-Indian character.

Crucially, sporadic public opposition in various areas should not be clubbed into a single category of motivation, as diverse plans throng with competing motivations and values. Citizens’ concerns about nuclear energy projects cannot be addressed solely by a ‘nuclear energy policy’. Along with efficient project execution and mature technology application, a concerted effort must be made to prepare a pool of ‘nuclear cheerleaders’ (they need not be technocrats) who can be integral to a nation-wide Nuclear Knowledge Management (NKM) framework, to effectively address the prevailing misconceptions on, and individual concerns regarding, nuclear energy projects, while propagating its utility and necessity for India.
India & China

Contrasting Approaches to Terrorism

Sriparna Pathak*

The scourge of terrorism has emerged as an international problem, severely impacting global politics. Long gone are the days when security could be viewed in traditional state-centric terms. Global networks of terror, operating through media encompassing communication tools which were intended to further the forces of globalisation, are the ugly reality of the 21st century. Asia, as a region has not been left untouched. According to the Global Terrorism Index, 2017, India ranks 8th on the list of countries most affected by terrorism, while Pakistan ranks 5th. The countries listed have scores assigned to them with 10 indicating greatly affected by terrorism while 0 indicates not affected by terrorism. Pakistan scored 8.4, while India stood at 7.534.¹

Terrorism is not a challenge faced by India or Pakistan alone. It is, in fact, one of the most significant challenges that

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states in the international system face. China, which has clearly emerged as an integral part of the international system owing to its diplomatic and economic manoeuvres, has its own share of woes emanating from sub-nationalist movements among minority groups, which at times have sought the forceful overthrow of the state, despite massive clamp downs.

An early example was the 1990 uprising in Baren, where 200 Uyghur militants armed with ‘advanced weaponry’, according to Chinese sources, attacked Chinese paramilitary forces. According to reports, Afghan trained Islamists set up loudspeakers in the township, urging the local Uyghur population to rise up against Chinese oppression and to establish an independent Uyghur state. The uprising was crushed by Chinese government forces.\(^2\) There are two contesting views here regarding the nature of the Baren incidents. The first is that of the Chinese authorities, who perceive the incident as an uprising and assert that it was initiated by 200 Uyghur militants, armed with ‘advanced weaponry’, who attacked Chinese paramilitary forces. It is also held by authorities that Afghani militia forces were involved and Islamists set up loudspeakers urging the local Uyghur populace to rise up against oppression and to work towards the establishment of an independent Uyghur Islamic state, all the while praising jihad.\(^3\)

The Uyghur position is that Zeydin Yusup, the leader of the East Turkistan Islamic Party (ETIP) led an unarmed protest


with around 200 men. They marched up to the local government office and demanded an end to the mass immigration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang. Alternatively, some sources assert that the protests were the result of forced abortions imposed on Uyghur women by the Chinese government. Others argue that the protests were the result of local Uyghurs not being allowed to build a mosque. Despite the variance in the attributed cause, the incident was brutally crushed.

Chinese authorities believe that, since 1990, there have been “six stages of terrorism” in Xinjiang and also that, over this period, the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP)’s capabilities – its tactics, target selection, geographic reach, and international connections – have evolved and grown, as has the danger it poses in the country. Gohel, however, claims that the 2013 Tiananmen Square attack served as the initiation of the “seventh stage” of Uyghur-linked terrorism.6

**Table 1: Seven Stages of Terrorism in China**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 1</td>
<td>Creating an Atmosphere of Terror – On April 5, 1990, violent protests erupted in Baren, a township in Aktu County.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 2</td>
<td>Explosive Attacks – February 28, 1991, an explosion at a bus station in Kuqa County, Aksu Prefecture, killing one person.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stage</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stage 3</td>
<td>Assassinations – August 24, 1993, two men stabbed and injured Abliz Damolla, an executive committee member of the CPPCC Yecheng County Committee in the Kashi Prefecture and imam of the Great Mosque.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 4</td>
<td>Attacks on Police and Government Institutions – August 27, 1996.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 5</td>
<td>Organising Disturbances and Riots – From February 5 to 8, 1997, rioters calling for a caliphate attacked people and destroyed stores and burned and damaged cars and buses in Yining, Ili Kazakh Prefecture. Seven people were killed, more than 200 were injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 6</td>
<td>Poison Attacks – From January 30 to February 18, 1998, Uighur terrorists conducted 23 poisoning cases in Kashgar resulting in one fatality, and four others suffering ill-effects.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stage 7</td>
<td>A man drove a jeep packed with explosives and carrying his wife and mother into a crowd in Tiananmen Square on October 28, 2013. This resulted in the death of two civilians along with the driver, and two other passengers. Following the attack, Abdullah Mansour, the leader of the Pakistan-based and Uighur-led TIP released a propaganda video praising the plotters and warned of future attacks.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Clearly, China has been at the receiving end of what it terms as terrorism for a relatively long time span; which means it has an understanding of how non state actors challenge a state’s security.  

However, as seen in the case of India’s attempts to list Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) ‘chief’ Maulana Masood Azhar as a designated terrorist by the United Nations (UN), China has repeatedly blocked such moves, with the latest incident in November, 2017, when China obstructed a bid by the US,

7 Ibid.
France and the UK to list Azhar as a global terrorist by the UN.\textsuperscript{8}

This clearly demonstrates a divergence in the understanding of the issue of terrorism vis-à-vis the two countries. A better understanding of what the convergences and divergences in India’s and China’s approaches to terrorism are, could possibly facilitate better cooperation. The problem of extremism in Xinjiang is China’s primary concern, while the Indian perspective focuses on Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), the Maoist insurgency and the multiple insurgencies of the Northeast.

Among the first divergences between the Indian and Chinese approach to terrorism is with respect to Pakistan. On June 28, 2017 a day after India and the US asked Pakistan to rein in cross border terror, China put up a defence of Pakistan, stating that Islamabad has been at the frontlines of the fight against terrorism.\textsuperscript{9} Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang told reporters in Beijing, “China thinks that the international cooperation against terrorism should be enhanced and stepped up. The international community should give full recognition and affirmation to Pakistan’s efforts in this regard.”\textsuperscript{10} In contrast to the Chinese sheltering of state sponsored terrorism from Pakistan was the US approach. Ahead of the Prime Minister Narendra Modi – President Donald Trump meeting in 2017,

\textsuperscript{8} Elizabeth Roche, “China again blocks bid in UN to list Masood Azhar as a global terrorist”, \textit{Live Mint}, November 2, 2017, https://www.livemint.com/Politics/ABEmOW05luaAgJJaVcrfql/China-says-no-consensus-over-listing-Masood-Azhar-as-global.html.


the US State Department declared Syed Salahuddin, ‘chief’ of the Kashmiri terrorist group Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM), as a “global terrorist”.

While it may seem that China is unsympathetic to the cross-border terrorism that India faces because it has not borne the brunt of a comparable terror, the fact is that cross border terrorism has also been a source of concern for China. On 30 August 2016, the Chinese Embassy on the outskirts of the Kyrgyz capital of Bishkek was attacked by a suicide bomber who drove a Mitsubishi Delica van packed with explosives into its security gates. The attack injured two Kyrgyz security guards and three Embassy staff. Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Prime Minister Jenish Razakov confirmed that the attack was the handiwork of terrorists. Various Chinese observers asserted that the attack was the work of Uyghur extremists. Li Wei, an anti-terrorism expert at the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, claimed that the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) most likely carried out the attack. Through 2017, however, the Chinese state media reported that the number of violent attacks by “terrorist cells” in China has dropped due to increased security measures; but also cited experts claiming that the level of attempted violence remains high. China says it faces a serious threat from violent extremism, particularly in its western region of Xinjiang, where hundreds of people have been killed in recent years in unrest mostly between Muslim ethnic Uyghurs and majority Han Chinese. However, there


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is no official record of the number of casualties, and a wide divergence in other estimates. For example, according to state media, the explosions and their aftermath in Xinjiang in 2014 resulted in 50 people dead and 50 injured. On the other hand, according to Radio Free Asia, a dozen people were killed and 100 were injured in the bomb blasts. The report also stated that the injured included 12 police officers. Such discrepancies in data are a constant over the years with regard to incidents in Xinjiang.

According to officials, there is a campaign by separatists in Xinjiang, who want to set up an independent state called East Turkestan. However, rights groups doubt the existence of a coherent militant group in the region and argue that Uyghur anger at repressive Chinese policies is more to blame for the unrest. Several Uyghurs are, however, believed to have joined hands with Indonesian terrorist groups linked to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). In 2016, Reuters reported that Saud Usman Nasution, the head of Jakarta’s National Counter Terrorism Agency, stated that Indonesia was cooperating with China to investigate an ethnic Uyghur suspected of plotting a suicide bombing. Uran Botobekov, a Kyrgyz diplomat,

asserted that the position of the Turkestan Islamic Party (TIP) against the Chinese authorities has become even more radical. If previously the party’s strategic objective was to conduct a terrorist struggle against China’s power structures and to separate Xinjiang from Beijing, today it has adopted a more global objective. TIP fighters call on the world’s Muslims to join the jihad against Western countries in internet videos. Perhaps most worryingly for China, TIP believes that Muslims may fight locally, using various means, instead of going to Syria and Iraq to conduct a “holy war” against the “infidel” Western regimes. In March 2017, ISIS released a half-hour video in which they pledged to “shed blood like rivers” in attacks against Chinese targets. This was the first direct threat that ISIS levelled against China.

While there may be disputes over the quantum and nature of terrorist activity in or against China, it is clear that China does face a terrorist threat, as does India. Nevertheless, Indian responses to terrorism in China have been very different from what China has done with reference to terrorist activities in India. An example was the diplomatic row between India and China in 2016, over the grant of an Indian visa to Dolkun Isa – the leader of the World Uyghur Conference. When Isa was granted the permit to visit India, China protested that he was a “terrorist” on the Interpol’s Red Corner list, and it was the obligation of all countries to “bring him to justice”. India

17 Ibid.
immediately cancelled Isa’s visa. Isa claimed that no reason was given to him by Indian authorities for the cancellation of his visa.\textsuperscript{20}

There is thus a great divergence in the approaches adopted by the two countries to address concerns of terrorism within each other’s territories. In this context, it is pertinent to look at the measures the two have adopted within their territories to address the challenge of terrorism.

The Chinese Approach

The major terror threats experienced by China, in the official narrative, originate from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the northwest of the country. Since roughly three decades, the region has been rocked by social unrest involving the indigenous populations. Xinjiang principal population is Uyghur, and is increasingly matched by Han Chinese – the ethnic majority of the People’s Republic of China (PRC); Tajiks, Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Mongols, and Hui constitute lesser minorities. Among the local groups opposing Beijing’s authority some more radical factions have emerged.

Xinjiang today is one of the five minority autonomous regions of China, occupying one-sixth of China’s landmass, bordering eight countries, and is the location of an ethno-nationalist conflict of the Uyghurs who constitute 45.84 per cent of the region’s population.\textsuperscript{21}


Xinjiang presents a complicated minority issue for its links with the wider issues of Islamic identity in Central and West Asia. This Islamic factor, along with ethnic consciousness, has been fused together to produce an ethno-religious conflict. The situation has been further exacerbated in the post-9/11 phase, where the war against international terrorism has impacted the region, and effectively allowed the Chinese government to blur the distinction between separatism and terrorism. Xinjiang represents a case of contest between an ethnic minority and majority Han Chinese nationalism, a contest that is perceived by Beijing as a distinct security threat to the Chinese state.

The current terrorist threat is caused by scattered local unconnected groups rather than a single well organised network with a clear chain of command. There are several sporadic groups resorting to violence in Xinjiang. The violent outbreaks in Xinjiang occur intermittently, and the groups that claim responsibility frequently splinter, merge and collapse. Some of these terrorist groups, which operated or are operating in Xinjiang, were listed in China’s official statement on East Turkestan terrorists, published in January 2002. The list includes several groups allegedly responsible for violence, including the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), the East Turkistan Liberation Organisation (ETLO), the Islamic Reformist Party ‘Shock Brigade’, the East Turkestan Islamic Party, the East Turkestan Opposition Party, the East Turkestan Islamic Party of Allah, the Uyghur Liberation Organization, the Islamic Holy Warriors and the East Turkestan International Committee. Yet the approach of the Chinese government has been to constantly blame ETIM alone as being behind most terrorist attacks and uprisings.

ETIM, however, seems to have been replaced by the Turkistan Islamic Party TIP, or partly absorbed into the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). In fact, in 2008, TIP claimed twin terror attacks in Shanghai and Kunming as well as the attack at the Urumqi Railway Station in April 2014. The vast majority of the attacks, though, remain unclaimed by any organisation, suggesting that the terrorist threat lacks a unified chain of command and that various acts of terrorism are carried out by separate groups, which may have similar goals but generally do not function as a cohesive unit or organisation.

The geographical expanse of Chinese terrorism is visible outside Chinese borders in Central Asia and in the Hindu Kush region as well. Historically, militant Uyghurs fought alongside the Taliban in Afghanistan and Pakistan. After September 11, 2001, the Chinese government charged that Uyghur groups had links with the Taliban in Afghanistan. Earlier, in 1998, local authorities announced that they had smashed twenty “terrorist bases” in southern Xinjiang. Among those arrested were some men allegedly coming back from Afghanistan and Pakistan.23

In May, 2014 the IMU urged all Taliban groups to target Chinese interests in the region, especially embassies, companies, and Chinese nationals.24 The separatists hide mainly in the troubled North Waziristan region, where they are treated by the Pakistani Taliban hosts as guests of honour, according to Pakistani intelligence sources.25

After the terrorist attacks in Beijing and Kunming, surveillance and troop deployments have increased both inside and outside Xinjiang. In May 2014, Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region Party Secretary, Zhang Chunxian called for a “people’s war on terror” (反恐维稳的人民战争) (Fankong weiwen de renmín zhanzheng). Shortly after, the then Minister of Public Security, Guo Shengkun announced a so-called “strike hard” campaign (严打) (yanda) to crack down on “terrorist elements.” Xi Jinping declared that in order to stabilise Xinjiang, the state’s surveillance nets needed to “spread from the earth to the sky”.26

Official English language newspaper, China Daily stated that violent attacks involving or orchestrated by terrorist cells dropped in 2016, citing data from the Law Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. However, no figures were provided. Nevertheless, Li Wei, an anti-terrorism expert at the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, told the China Daily, “People should realize that more attacks have been foiled at the planning stage. We haven’t seen a significant drop in the number of attempted attacks”.27

As reported in March, 2017, in its effort to combat separatist Uyghur groups, China is apparently seeking to establish military bases in the part of Pakistan that borders Xinjiang.28 China has pressed Islamabad to crack down on Pakistan-based Uyghur terrorist groups. It was due to pressure

from Beijing that Pakistan banned ETIM, IMU and the Islamic Jihad Union (IJU); extradited ETIM leaders to China and carried out military operations to dismantle ETIM’s bases in Pakistan. In fact, the operation launched by Pakistan’s military in North Waziristan in June 2014, which reportedly focused on ETIM and IMU, was at Beijing’s behest.

**THREE EVILS**

The Three Evils or *Sangu Shili* (三股势力) refers to the forces of separatism, extremism and terrorism. In June 2017, Chinese President Xi Jinping stated that the fight against the three evil forces – “terrorism, separatism and extremism” is a long and arduous task. President Xi made the speech at the latest Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit in Astana. The concept of the three evils is closely linked to China’s western provinces, which are resource rich regions, and building a harmonious socialist society as was envisaged at the fourth plenary session of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China in 2004, and that requires a stable Western boundary. The three evil forces are projected as the biggest obstacles hindering the construction of a harmonious society in the western border areas.

What the phrase actually means is a push for cooperation and to rally China’s western neighbours against nascent

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independence movements such as those in Xinjiang and Tibet. In 2006, a *China Daily* report on exercises between the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) members was to demonstrate the determination and capabilities of the SCO member countries to combat the Three Evil Forces.31 Additionally, the then Chinese Minister of Public Security Zhou Yongkang reminded the Pakistani government of its commitment to fight these evils.32 Stila Nicholas Puerava notes that China’s identification of the three evil forces, splittism (separatism), terrorism and extremism, are code-words for Xinjiang’s troubles.33 Meng Li, on the other hand, blames Tibet entirely for the three evils, which, he asserts, are the problems causing socio-political instability in Tibet, where separatist forces led by the Dalai Lama resort to fanaticism and religious extremism, using violent and terrorist activities to achieve their political ends.34 Broadly, secessionism in either Tibet or in Xinjiang – both of which are resource rich Western provinces – easily fit the Chinese description of the three evils.

In other words, while China has been trying to internally address the three evils, it also has been seeking international cooperation from neighbouring countries. In fact SCO, which came into existence as the Shanghai Five, began with meetings

on improving frontier security. Following the resolution of all boundary disputes between Beijing and the post Soviet Republics, by the turn of the new century SCO’s focus shifted to combating ‘the three evils’ in Eurasia.35

**Chinese Government Policies towards Uyghurs**

Xinjiang was incorporated into the People’s Republic of China in 1949, which is known as the “peaceful liberation of Xinjiang” (新疆和平解放) (Xinjiang heping jiefang). In 1949, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) marched into the Hexi corridor in Gansu Province and proceeded towards Xinjiang. At that time, Xinjiang was ruled by a coalition government which was comprised of the Chinese nationalists (Kuomintang) and representatives from the former Second East Turkistan Republic.36

Graham Adams notes that, since the “peaceful liberation of Xinjiang”, the PLA has endeavoured to present itself as a benevolent protector of ethnic minorities. Local propaganda in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region features members of the military, linked arm-in-arm with colourfully dressed minorities, all of whom are unified as one family, one nation. However, beneath the official veneer of ethnic solidarity, local Central Asian ethnic groups tend to remain extremely distrustful of the military and Public Security Bureau.37


What has also been a constant is the encouragement by the Chinese Government to the Han population to settle in Xinjiang. The resettlement policy, together with huge investments in infrastructure, was, of course, to the detriment of the Uyghurs, who represent today barely 45 per cent of the population in the province compared to over 80 per cent in 1941.

The repression of Muslims in Xinjiang takes myriad forms. 2017 alone, for example, Muslim names for babies were banned in the Province. The authorities banned the names with religious connotations such as Saddam or Medina, on the pretext that they could “exaggerate religious fervour”. Children with banned names will not be able to obtain a “hukou,” or household registration, essential for accessing public school and other social services. On April 1, 2017, the authorities in Xinjiang imposed new rules that prohibit the wearing of what they call “abnormal” beards or veils in public spaces. Punishments have also been imposed for refusing to watch state TV or radio programs. Brutal stories of detention, torture and Uyghur women forced to endure late-term abortions to comply with the now lifted one child policy, from which Uyghurs were supposedly exempted, are galore. Oral and written testimonies speak of the Han Chinese who flood the cities of Xinjiang and are rarely respectful of Uyghur’s beliefs and customs, and who also exclude Uyghur’s from well-paid jobs.

39 Ildikó Bellér-Hann, Community Matters in Xinjiang, 1880-1949: Towards a Historical Anthropology of the Uyghur. BRILL, 2008, p. 64.
Authorities in Xinjiang’s major cities of Urumqi, Hotan, Kashi and Aksu, have also held a series of “anti-terrorism pledge meetings” at which huge numbers of paramilitary police are mobilised in public squares. In a ceremonial show of force these rallies publicly commit themselves to “maintain stability”. In May 2017, more than 10,000 soldiers took part in one such rally in Xinjiang’s capital Urumqi.\textsuperscript{42}

After the ‘incident’ in 2009, in which Police crackdown resulted in killing of 100 people and which led to ethnic riots in Urumqi, Xinjiang has become the main focus for repression by Chinese authorities. Yiming Li notes that annual security spending in the region has doubled since then, if not more. In August 2016, Chen Quanguo replaced Zhang Chunxian as the top leader of Xinjiang. Chen was previously in Tibet, where he was responsible for “stability maintenance”, and had a reputation for being a hardliner. In Xinjiang, he is replicating his Tibet ‘model’, and the array of repressive measures such as banning Muslim names, a ban on fasting, etc., stand out as examples. The most appalling step has been the imprisonment of Uyghurs in concentration camps. In August 2018, Gay McDougall, a member of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, stated that there have been reports that Beijing had turned the Uyghur autonomous region into something of a massive internment camp.\textsuperscript{43}

**Terrorism in India**

Terrorism in India ranges from ethno-nationalist terrorism to left wing terrorism to religious terrorism and narco-terrorism.


A report released by the U.S. State Department in July 2016 noted that more than half the terror attacks in the country in that year took place in four states – Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), Chhattisgarh, Manipur and Jharkhand. As compared to China, where the so called terrorist threat emanates only from the Western regions, terrorism in India plagues more than one region, with a wider geographical spread. Further, the underlying causes of violence are vastly different in India’s case. While demands for separate states and/or identity based movements are seen in India as well, economic deprivation, land ownership rights and multiple lines of ethnic differences separate the Indian case from that of China.

Indian Government’s Approach to Terrorism

Since independence in 1947, India has been embroiled in a number of low intensity conflicts. As far as a standard approach to rooting out terrorism is concerned, India lacks once. In fact, according to Major General Sheru Thapliyal of the Center for Land Warfare Studies, “India lacks a coherent strategic response to terrorism; and most of our responses are kneejerk.” However, the lack of a standard response is often due to the fact that the causes and nature of terror-related activities in various parts of India are different. The approach that has been used by security agencies, consequently, differs across the geographical expanse of the country. It is necessary, therefore, to adopt a case by case approach to understand India’s counter insurgency responses in its various geographical landscapes.

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INDIAN POLICIES IN JAMMU AND KASHMIR

The State of J&K was granted autonomous status by Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. Gopalswami Ayyangar, Minister in the first Union Cabinet of independent India, who was the principal drafter of Article 370, stated that, for a variety of reasons, Kashmir, unlike the other princely states was not ripe for integration into the Indian state. India had been at war with Pakistan over J&K, and there had been a ceasefire. Yet, the conditions were still unusual and abnormal and part of the State’s territory was still in the hands of “rebels and enemies”.\(^{45}\) As stated by Amitabh Mattoo observes that there was hope that J&K would one day integrate like other States of the Union; which is why there is the use of the term “temporary provisions” in the title of Article 370. This, however, could happen only when there was real peace and only when the people of the State acquiesced to such an arrangement.\(^{46}\)

The State of J&K is the only State in India to have a separate Constitution as well as a State flag of its own. However, the flag cannot be hoisted alone and has to be hoisted at all times along with the Union flag of India. The Directive Principles of State Policy and the Fundamental Duties of the Indian Constitution are not applicable to J&K. Additionally, the right to property which has been reduced to a legal right from being a fundamental right in the rest of India, is still a fundamental right in J&K.


The terrorist threat or the Kashmiri insurgency is largely a conflict between various Kashmiri separatist formations, on the one hand, and the Government of India, on the other. Over recent years, while the number of civilians losing their lives as a result of terrorism has remained more or less of a constant, the number of terrorists killed as well as security forces killed has increased, as seen in Graph 1.


![Graph 1](http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/jandk/data_sheets/annual_casualties.htm)

*Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal*  

While some of the separatist groups support accession to Pakistan, others seek complete independence. The conflict in the State has strong Islamist elements, and many of the ultras identify with Jihadist movements and are supported by foreign Jihadist groups. Democratic development was miniscule in Kashmir, largely up to the late 1970s, and by 1988 many of the democratic reforms provided by the Indian government had been reversed. As a result, non-violent channels for expressing

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discontent were limited catalyzing a dramatic increase in support for insurgents who advocated violent secession from India.\textsuperscript{48} In July 1988, the Kashmir insurgency began with a series of strikes and attacks on the Indian government. In the 1990s, this escalated into the most important internal security issue in India, and currently remains so.\textsuperscript{49}

An estimated INR 250 to 300 million is disbursed to terrorist and secessionist groups in J&K each month, from Pakistan.\textsuperscript{50} Except for a small percentage of funds that is raised through collections and donations made in the Kashmir Valley, virtually the entire funding for militancy comes from other countries, including Pakistan, and various international Islamic organisations.\textsuperscript{51} The major contributor remains Pakistan through its external intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). Also, Pakistan diverts funds to Kashmiri separatists through various ‘charitable organisations’. For instance, according to a July, 2018, report, the National Investigation Agency (NIA) estimates that Pakistan-based terror groups finance terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir by generating millions in donations through their charity organisations. Falah-e-Insaniat Foundation (FIF), a charity run by terror outfits Jamaat-ud-Dawa (JuD) and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT); and Al Rehmat Trust, backed by terrorists group

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{51} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), have been supporting terrorists and funding terrorism in Kashmir.\(^{52}\)

The problem does not end with a mere identification of support and funding from Pakistan. Beyond Pakistan, there is tacit support from China, which keeps reiterating that it wants the dispute between India and Pakistan to be settled amicably, but, continues to extend unqualified support to Pakistan, to the extent that Beijing even backs and is actively funding the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) which runs through Kashmiri territory occupied by Pakistan. Professor Srikanth Kondapalli notes, CPEC’s array of infrastructure projects across Pakistan is expected to boost not only Pakistan’s economy, but also stiffen its spine against foreign detractors. With the corridors passage through Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), China is telling the Pakistani establishment – read, its Army and ISI – that it has its back and will implicitly support to the latter’s policy of continuous exfiltration of terrorism across the Line of Control and International Border, into India.\(^{53}\)

Additionally, as has been briefly mentioned previously, in March 2016, China was the only member in the 15 nation United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to put a hold on India’s application to list Pakistani terror group JeM ‘chief’ and Pathankot terror attack mastermind Masood Azhar as a designated terrorist by the UN. Azhar’s listing on the 1267 sanctions list would subject him to an assets freeze and travel ban. China had in February, 2016 blocked the US move to designate Azhar as a global terrorist. The deadline for China


to take action on its technical hold was till August 2, 2016. After the deadline of August 2 passed, China again extended by three months its technical hold on the US, France and UK-backed proposal to list Masood Azhar as a designated terrorist by the UN. In October, 2016 again, China blocked the move to list Azhar in the designated list of terrorists. In 2017, for the fourth time, China blocked India’s bid to list Azhar at the 1267 committee. In September 2018, Chinese Foreign Minister, Wang Yi defended Beijing’s repeated blockade of India’s bids at the United Nations to list Azhar as a global terrorist, arguing that the issue lacks ‘consensus’ among the members of the UN Security Council and the concerned parties – India and Pakistan.

The Indian government approach to the insurgency in J&K is to seek dialogue with key stakeholders in the Valley, instead of an outright repression of Kashmiri aspirations. What needs to be pointed out in the context of Kashmir is the presence of the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). The law was first implemented on July 5, 1990, when the entire law and order machinery collapsed in the Valley and normal law was found inadequate to tackle rising armed militancy. The then State Government declared the Kashmir Valley as a disturbed area under Section 3 of AFSPA. Later, on August 10, 2001,
the J&K government extended the disturbed area provision to the Jammu province as well. There have been several complaints of human rights violations by the armed forces in the Valley. However, the violations are not government policy, as is the case of Xinjiang where discriminatory laws dictate personal matters, such as those of religion and personal faith.

**NAXAL AFFECTED AREAS IN INDIA AND COUNTER-INSURGENCY**

The Left Wing Extremism (LWE) Division of the Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) observes,

A number of Left Wing Extremist outfits have been operating in certain remote and poorly connected pockets of the country for a few decades now. The CPI (Maoist) Party, is the major Left Wing Extremist outfit responsible for majority of incidents of violence and killing of civilians and security forces and has been included in the Schedule of Terrorist Organisations along with all its formations and front organisations under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967. The CPI (Maoist) philosophy of armed insurgency to overthrow the Government is unacceptable under the Indian Constitution and the founding principles of the Indian State. The Government has given a call to the Left Wing Extremists to abjure violence and come for talks. This plea has been rejected by them, since they believe in violence as the means to capture State power.

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The MHA’s Annual Report, 2017, noted that there had been a decline in Left Wing related incidents. In 2016, the number of LWE related incidents and deaths was 1,048 and 278, respectively; the comparable numbers in 2015 were 1,089 and 230, respectively.\(^5\) Graph 2 reflects the trends in LWE-linked fatalities.

**GRAPH 2: FATALITIES IN LEFT WING EXTREMISM: 2005-18**

![Graph showing trends in Left Wing Extremism](source: South Asia Terrorism Portal\(^6\))

Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Bihar, Odisha and Maharashtra are presently considered the worst affected states. Andhra Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh and Telangana are the other affected states.\(^6\)

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The Government of India’s approach has emphasised security, development, ensuring entitlements and rights of local communities, improving governance and public perception management. High level deliberations and interactions with the State Governments concerned has been a constant. The various forces that are executing not just counter insurgency operations, but also efforts to restore the stability of the affected areas, include the Central Armed Police Forces, India Reserve Battalions, State Police Forces, State Special Forces and the Central Reserve Police Force’s Commando Battalion for Resolute Action. A number of Counter Insurgency and Anti Terrorism schools have been set up to improve the response capabilities of the States. The underlying philosophy of the Government has been to enhance the capacity of the State Governments to tackle the Maoist menace in a concerted manner.

With respect to the Forces, there have been several complaints and grievances of citizens in affected areas. Some of these cases have been taken up by State or National Human Rights Commissions; while grievances have been addressed, others remain.

**Northeast India and Counter-insurgency**

A quick look at available statistics reveals that in the year 2016, there were 160 terror related casualties in Northeast India. This sees a reduction from 2015, the number of which stood at 273. Graph 3 shows casualties related to terrorism in the region.
There are over a hundred groups which use terrorism as a tool and have operated in the Northeastern region at various times since India’s independence. Almost all the groups are either seeking (or sought) independence or autonomy. Shared international boundaries and the geographical terrain actually make counter-insurgency difficult in the region. Out of the four countries that the region shares boundaries with, three are known to have been sanctuaries for terrorist groups. Myanmar, Bangladesh and Bhutan share over 4,500 miles of border territory with India, with varying levels of security. Almost all of the Indian terror groups operating in the Northeast have had camps that provided or provide sanctuary, training, and external support. Many borders lack absolute and clear demarcation and are culturally porous, with similar ethnic groups on both sides of the existing boundaries, making cross border absorption and assimilation even easier. In the past,

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India has had either joint patrolling or operations with the help of its international counterparts or intelligence sharing to address this form of terrorism. For examples, Myanmar and India established border agreements to address drug trafficking. In 1995, the two sides also launched Operation Golden Bird, which tracked down and neutralized a rebel column that picked up a large consignment of weapons at the Wyakaung Beach on the Myanmar- Bangladesh coast, south of Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. The consignment was moving through the jungles of Mizoram. In January 2006, India and Myanmar conducted some joint military operations inside Myanmar to flush out militants from National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Khaplang (NSCN-K) group. This was supposedly done in exchange of transfer of some military equipment to the Myanmar Army by India, following high-level visits by the Indian President, Defence Minister and Air Force chief to Myanmar. With Bhutan, in 2015 India announced an agreement to increase the Bhutanese military presence on the border. In December 2003, “Operation All Clear” was conducted inside Bhutan to eliminate Northeastern militant groups based in South Bhutan, and about 30 militant camps belonging to the United Liberation Frontiers of Assam (ULFA), National Democratic Frontier of Bodoland and Kamtapur Liberation Organsiation (KLO) were targeted. The then Indian Army Chief, General N.C. Vij, had announced that 650 militants had been “neutralised” — either killed or

captured — during the operations.\textsuperscript{65}

With Bangladesh, various forms of border cooperation have helped in delivering a substantial blow to the ULFA. The process commenced in 2009, after the Sheikh Hasina-led Awami League Government came to power, and the first few years witnessed the most significant gains with the expulsion of all major terrorist groups from Bangladeshi soil. The report of ULFA ‘chairman’ Rajiv Rajkonwar \textit{alias} Arabindo Rajkhowa’s arrest in Bangladesh on November 30, 2009, and his handover to India signaled the beginning of significant cooperation between India and Bangladesh with regard to terrorism. In 2010, Bangladesh arrested ULFA leader Ranju Chowdhury from its northern District of Mymensingh.\textsuperscript{66} Further, in 2015, in a move that was seen as a major boost to security cooperation, authorities in Dhaka handed Anup Chetia, a top ULFA leader, over to India, 18 years after his arrest in Dhaka.\textsuperscript{67} Besides these developments, the defense services of the two countries have also been participating in joint counter-terrorism exercises. Sampriti, the joint exercise operation between the Indian and the Bangladeshi armies has completed seven rounds,\textsuperscript{68} the last of which was held at the Counter-Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School in Vairengte, in Mizoram (India) in 2017.

\begin{footnotes}
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\end{footnotes}
In 2017 the two countries resolved to step up anti terror cooperation, as PM Narendra Modi termed the spread of radicalism as a grave threat not just to the two countries, but to the entire region. Previously, in 2016, India and Bangladesh agreed to enhance anti terrorism cooperation, during the India-Bangladesh Home Ministers’ Dialogue. During the Dialogue, the bilateral extradition treaty was also amended to facilitate prompt exchange of wanted terrorists and other criminals.69

In the case of China, such cooperation is rare. In November 2015, the two countries issued a joint statement on internal security, marking out new areas for cooperation in meeting counter-terrorism challenges, exchanging information on terror groups and streamlining channels of communication on security-related issues. The brief statement – issued by India’s Ministry of Home Affairs and the Ministry of Public Security of China – laid out the contours of cooperation under the broad theme of “combating international terrorism”70.

Since Xi Jinping took office in 2013, he has often publicly spoken of ways to bring about a safer world. At the SCO summit in Astana in 2017, he stated “destabilising factors and uncertainties are on the rise”. China is willing to work together with all parties to “build a common home of security, stability, development and prosperity”71.

Xi urged all countries to build a world of common security for all, observing,

A country cannot have security while others are in turmoil, because threats facing other countries may haunt it also. When neighbours are in trouble, instead of tightening your own fences, you should extend a helping hand to them.72

Yet, as stated by India’s former Foreign Secretary, Dr. S. Jaishankar at the first ever India-China Think Tanks’ Forum in New Delhi in 2016, there is no effective cooperation mechanism between India and China to deal with the issue of terrorism.73 The example of blocking India’s attempts at the UN to list Masood Azhar in the 1267 Committee is worthy of mention again in this context. In contrast to what Xi Jinping stated at the UN regarding extending a helping hand instead of tightening one’s own fences, when a neighbour is in trouble, China has actually been not just tightening its own fence, but sitting on the fence and urging trouble makers to further trouble an already troubled neighbour. Beyond utter disregard for as burning an issue as terrorism at the level of the UN, China has tacitly aided terrorism backed by Pakistan as also in India’s Northeast, while stonewalling complaints from the Indian side.

**Chinese Support to Terrorism in Northeast India**

In the month of June 2017, two discrete events took place in India, which have a common linkage to terrorism in terms of ammunition and training. One was the Police and the Special Forces – 10 (SF-10) encounters with the Garo

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National Liberation Army (GNLA) in West Khasi Hills, which left two cadres dead, and where a Chinese rifle and one Single Barrel Muzzle Loading (SBML) gun were recovered.\textsuperscript{74} The second was the neutralization of an illegal gun manufacturing unit in Langol Games Village in Manipur. It was reported that, along with the guns, 97 demand letters of the “Terrorist Revolutionary Army”, and a few more intriguing articles were recovered from the unit.\textsuperscript{75} Earlier, in 2015, days after a terrorist attack in Manipur in which 18 Indian soldiers were killed, Indian intelligence agencies stated that they suspected a Chinese angle. News reports citing a senior government official claimed that NSCN-Khaplang abrogated its ceasefire pact with the Centre following instructions from China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA).\textsuperscript{76} In response, Chinese officials refuted these allegations, declaring such charges “absurd” and such a linkage “impossible”.\textsuperscript{77} It is already common knowledge that the leader of the group, S.S. Khaplang, when he was alive, and Paresh Baruah of ULFA, often shuttled between Taga in Myanmar and Ruili in China – and were in regular touch with Chinese officials. \textit{The Hindustan Times} reported in 2015 that

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{77} “After Myanmar strike, China denies PLA links with Manipur attackers”, \textit{The Indian Express}, June 10, 2015, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-others/china-denies-pla-links-with-manipur-attackers/.
\end{itemize}
Chinese intelligence played “an active role” in assisting nine northeast Indian insurgent groups to form a united front.\(^\text{78}\) The illicit flow of Chinese arms to India was confirmed by the then Home Secretary G.K. Pillai in 2010.\(^\text{79}\)

Bertil Lintner, in his book *China’s India War*, rightly notes that Chinese influence on India’s Northeast is immense, that China has not ceased support to the rebels in the Northeast, and that these groups buy weapons on what is euphemistically called the black market in China.\(^\text{80}\)

**THE CONVERGENCES AND THE DIVERGENCES**

In 1901, following the assassination of the then US President William McKinley by an anarchist terrorist, Theodore Roosevelt stated that anarchy is a crime against the entire human race, and that such a crime should be made an offence against the law of nations, like piracy and the slave trade; as anarchy was a “far blacker infamy than either”.\(^\text{81}\) Post 9/11, a period of history has begun where states in the international system have been challenged in unorthodox ways. Such challenges come from within and from outside, and are backed by a host of parties with global linkages. Each state in the system has been trying to meet these challenges and has had varied levels


\(^{80}\) Bertil Lintner, *China’s India War: Collision Course on the Roof of the World*, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2018, p.27.

of success as well as failure; India and China are clearly no exception to this phase of history. Even though the challenge more or less remains the same for states, the measures adopted have varied widely. While there are some similarities in the approaches that have been adopted to deal with non-traditional security threat, several dissimilarities persist.

As far similarities are concerned, both India and China have understood that surveillance in areas prone to terrorist challenges is a must. In 2015, Xi Jinping declared that in order to stabilise Xinjiang, the state’s surveillance net needed to “spread from the earth to the sky”. In India, in December 2016, it was reported that surveillance cameras were to be reinstalled across the Kashmir Valley, starting with 46 locations in Srinagar – although the intensity of surveillance conceptualized is a mere shadow of the Chinese project. There is also similarity in the Indian and Chinese responses to terrorism with regard to mobilisation of security forces. In 2014, it was reported that 3,000 former members of the PLA were shipped into communities in Xinjiang in an attempt to maintain stability following a wave of riots and terror attacks. Also, in 2016, it was reported that 10,000 soldiers of the PLA’s Xinjiang Military Command participated in a military drill. In the Indian case, the much-detested AFSPA already exists in both J&K, and several Northeastern states. Additionally, the Central Paramilitary Forces are frequently called in to address the Maoist insurgency. In both, India, as well as China, insurgents and terrorists get material and arms support from


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across international boundaries, besides having access to safe havens across international borders.

The divergences in attitudes and approaches to terrorism between India and China are far greater in comparison to the convergences. To start with, the perception on Pakistan as a sponsor of terrorism is vastly different in India and China. Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Lu Kang told reporters in Beijing, “China thinks that the international cooperation against terrorism should be enhanced and stepped up. The international community should give full recognition and affirmation to Pakistan’s efforts in this regard”. The second divergence lies in listing JEM chief Masood Azhar at the 1267 Committee. India, of course, sees Pakistan as a principal source of terrorism in the country and across the region.

Major differences also exist in the policies adopted in Xinjiang versus those adopted by India. While ‘striking hard’ as a policy has been advocated and adopted in Xinjiang, along with a curtailment of forms of religious expression including beards, clothing or cultural manifestations, in India there is the existence of Article 370 in J&K, which allows for a separate Constitution for the State, an expression of the hope that someday the people of the State will themselves seek full integration with the Indian state, on par with other States of the Union. Similarly, in Northeast India, political space has been created to accommodate ethnic diversity by the creation of new States or, for example in Assam, the creation of various territorial councils such as the the Bodoland Territorial Council.

In the Chinese case, there are no official statistics available on the number of casualties or number of terrorist attacks. In

84 “China defends Pakistan, says Islamabad was at frontlines of fight against terrorism”, The Indian Express, June 28, 2017, https://indianexpress.com/article/pakistan/china-defends-pakistan-says-islamabad-was-at-frontlines-of-fight-against-terrorism-modi-trump-joint-statement-4726032/.
fact, there is absolute lack of even secondary data on the issue for China. In the Indian case, detailed data is available from the MHA, as well as from various State police forces.

In China, the effort to combat terrorism also includes plans of establishment of military bases in Pakistan. In June 2017, it was reported by the Pentagon, “China most likely will seek to establish additional military bases in countries with which it has a longstanding friendly relationship and similar strategic interests, such as Pakistan.”\(^85\) In 2016, China began building its first overseas base in the African nation of Djibouti, which is already home to Camp Lemonnier, a U.S. installation, responsible for counter terrorism operations in the Persian Gulf and east and north Africa.\(^86\) India does not have bases in other countries; neither does it have plans of setting up military bases on the grounds of fighting terrorism.

While in Xinjiang, the state engages in demographic engineering through the active resettlement of Han Chinese, in India the status of local populations is protected. In J&K, for example, Article 35A, though hotly debated, restricts the right to property to local ‘residents’ alone, and outsiders to the State cannot own any property in the State. Further, religious freedoms is a fundamental right in India, while invasive limitations are imposed on religious practices in China.

While there are several allegations of human rights violations by security forces in sensitive areas such as J&K,


the Maoist belt, and Northeast India, these occur as individual aberrations and correctives in the form of constitutional bodies such as the National and State Human Rights Commissions, as well as an activist Court system, have long been in existence. In Xinjiang or Tibet there is no appeal to any independent authority for any excesses committed by the State, and a wide range of abuses are integral to state policy.

The geographical spread of extremism is restricted to the Western provinces in China. In India’s case, the spread of terrorism or extremism is across the length and breadth of the country. The underlying causes of extremism in India are greater than China’s, as reasons comprehend economic deprivation, religious and ethnic fissures, contested land ownership, and a range of other grievances. In India, the government has had several dialogues with separatists and extremist groups, be it in J&K, in Northeast India or with the Left Wing Extremists. In Xinjiang, such a dialogue is yet to take place.

In China’s position on terrorism there are divergences between its official statements and its actual actions. The exemplifying case in this context is that of blocking India’s bid at the 1267 committee to list Azhar as an international terrorist. India has not engaged in such double speak. Further, in its attempts to eradicate extremism and terrorism, China has undertaken a more concerted approach at the level of SCO. In India’s case such cooperation on terrorism, despite several attempts, has not been possible, largely because of Pakistan’s double standards on terrorism. Cooperation on the issue of terrorism is extremely difficult for India and China which have different approaches and stances towards international terrorism. Nevertheless, more dialogue on the issue to find out possible future areas of cooperation would be welcome.
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Indo-US Counter-terrorism Cooperation Foundations, Dimensions and Limitations

Sumit Kumar*

Over the last two decades India and the US have succeeded in strengthening their strategic partnership, with counter-terrorism having emerged as a major pillar of the bilateral relation.¹ This is evident from the fact that ever since the establishment of the Joint Working Group on Counter-terrorism in 2000; the two sides have consistently taken a slew of measures to expand counter-terrorism cooperation. During the George W. Bush Administration the two sides signed the Cyber Security Initiative and also accelerated annual joint military exercises, with a focus on understanding and sharing ways of tackling terrorism-related issues, the coming of the Barack Obama Administration to power witnessed the establishment of the India-US Strategic Dialogue, the Counter-terrorism Cooperation Initiative and others. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and US President Donald

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Trump have also expressed their resolve to expand bilateral cooperation in this area. At the same time, while India and the US have shared concerns about fighting Al Qaeda, the Taliban and other terrorist organisations in the South Asia Region, the rise of the Islamic State (IS, formerly Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, ISIS) across the globe further necessitated collective and strong efforts by countries, including India and the US, in the sphere of counter-terrorism.

It is, however, equally true that, despite a shared interest in fighting terrorism, the two sides continue to face some important structural and other constraints in deepening their counter-terrorism cooperation. For instance, while India views Pakistan as the main breeding ground for terrorism, asking the US to declare it as a ‘terrorist state’, the US believes that any war against terrorism would be meaningless without Pakistan’s active involvement. Of course, in recent times, the US has blocked some financial assistance to Pakistan on the grounds of Islamabad’s failure to strongly tackle terrorist activities emanating from its soil. The fact remains that Washington has taken a hard approach towards Pakistan not because of New Delhi’s concerns on the continued use of terrorism against India, but because there has been increasing realization in the US administration that Pakistan is not doing enough to dismantle the Taliban and other terrorist organisations which pose security threats in Afghanistan. The US’s demand for India’s compliance with its policies with regard to many countries and issues has also continued to strain the relationship. The nature and direction of counter-terrorism cooperation between the two sides, as well as the outcomes of counter-terrorism

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engagement between the two countries are of particular interest in this context.

**Foundation of India-US Counterterrorism Cooperation: An Overview**

Terrorism emerged as one of the major security threats in the 21st century, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US.\(^3\) This has, in turn, helped develop a consensus among world leaders on the urgent need for initiating collective efforts to effectively deal with the menace. Consequently, most countries supported the US in its war on terrorism in Afghanistan to dismantle the Al Qaeda and other terrorist formations.

The war on terrorism naturally brought South Asia into the limelight, with the presence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and in the Pakistani areas adjacent to Afghanistan.\(^4\) At the same time, the emergence of fundamentalists in Pakistan and their collaboration with terrorists, as well as the role of the Pakistani state in encouraging terrorism, further compounded the security challenges in South Asia in particular, and in other parts of the world, in general.\(^5\) Undoubtedly, the situation

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that emerged after the 9/11 terrorist attacks also provided the impetus for India and the US to foster and strengthen their bilateral cooperation on counter-terrorism.

The genesis of counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries can, in fact, be traced back to the 1980s, when the Reagan administration readily agreed to help India to fight the Khalistan movement in the Indian state of Punjab. This in turn paved the way for the US to provide training to Indian intelligence officers in subjects such as anti-hijacking and hostage negotiation techniques.

When India started facing terrorist activates in the state of Jammu and Kashmir in 1989, the US considered the problem a domestic issue and refused to acknowledge the role of Pakistan in spreading terrorism in the State. The coming of the Bill Clinton Administration to power in 1991 further complicated India’s efforts to fight terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir, as top US officials including President Clinton emphasized India’s alleged human rights violations in the State. Addressing the UN General Assembly in September 1993, President Clinton described the unrest in Kashmir as an ethnic conflict, speaking of “Bloody ethnic, religious and civil wars from Angola to the

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Caucasus to Kashmir.” statements from top officials of the US Administration including President Clinton encouraged Pakistan and boosted terrorist organisations working in Kashmir, resulting in an unprecedented rise in terrorist activities in and around Kashmir.10

However, the then Indian Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s visit to Washington DC in 1994 indicated the beginning of a new phase in the relationship, as the US Administration implicitly acknowledged that the Pakistani government was supporting terrorism in Kashmir.11 President Clinton also signed a new law in 1996 banning fund-raising in America by named terrorist organisations12 and India and the US signed an Extradition Treaty in August 1997.13 The hopes raised by these initiatives, however, were soon dashed to the ground following the 1998 nuclear tests conducted by India.14

Surprisingly, the nuclear tests provided a golden opportunity for both the countries to forge a new relationship for various reasons and within a few months, both New Delhi

10 Ibid.
14 C. Raja Mohan, Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy, Viking, New Delhi, 2003.
and Washington DC began drawing up a closer relationship. Negotiations between India’s then External Affairs Minister, Jaswant Singh, and the then US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Strobe Talbott, earned the appellation “quiet diplomacy”. In December 1999 when terrorists belonging to the Pakistan-based Harkat-ul-Mujahideen hijacked the Indian Airlines’ Flight 814 soon after it took off from Kathmandu, the capital of Nepal, and forced the pilots to land in Kandahar, Afghanistan, the Clinton Administration extended full support to India and publically acknowledged Pakistan’s ties with the hijackers. While the quiet diplomacy between Singh and Talbott played a pivotal role in bringing the relationship back on track, US support to India on the issue of terrorism, among other factors, became a major stepping stone towards breaking new grounds in the bilateral ties.\footnote{Chidanand Rajghatta, “US Finally Wakes up to India’s Terror,” \textit{Indian Express}, January 1, 2000.}

On the heels of these positive developments, when President Clinton visited India in March 2000, he and the then Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee signed a “Vision Statement”. One important aspect of this statement was the agreement that terrorism was a serious security threat to their respective countries and it was therefore necessary for India and the US to come together to fight this menace. The statement reaffirmed:

In the new century, India and the United States will be partners in peace, with a common interest in a complimentary responsibility for ensuring regional and international security. We will engage in regular consultations on, and work together and with others for strategic stability in Asia and beyond. We will bolster joint efforts to counter terrorism and meet
Indo-US Counter-terrorism Cooperation

other challenges to regional peace. We will strengthen the international security system, including in the United Nations and support the United Nations in its peacekeeping efforts, we acknowledge that tensions in South Asia can only be resolved by the nations of South Asia.¹⁶

Truly, while Clinton’s visit marked a new beginning in the relationship, the two sides’ decision to set up a Joint Working Group in April 2000 to coordinate their activities against international terrorism was the first major step towards institutionalising counter-terrorism cooperation between the two countries.

TRANSFORMING COUNTER-TERRORISM: INDIA-US TIES SINCE THE 9/11 ATTACKS

While the coming of the Georg W. Bush Administration to power further witnessed an upward movement in bilateral ties between the US and India, the 9/11 terrorist attacks brought both the countries even closer, especially in view of India’s immediate offer of its full backing to counter terrorism operations by the US in South Asia. Along with the shared aim of fighting terrorism, other factors soon accelerated process of transforming the relationship from ‘estranged democracies’ to ‘strategic partnership’; these factors included: President Bush’s strong desire to help India emerged as a potential balancer against China; the strong presence of the Indian community in the US; and economic security, among others. A new initiative post-9/11 was to expand the scope of the India-US Defence Policy Group (DPG) to cover military-to-military

cooperation in counterterrorism. The DPG decided to supply certain American sensors for onsite monitoring of India’s land borders. In 2004 the two sides entered into the Next Step in Strategic Partnership. In a major boost to security and defence ties New Delhi and Washington DC adopted a New Framework for the US-India Defence relationship in 2005, in which defeating terrorism was one of the major elements of the agreement. While the signing of the Civil Nuclear Agreement between the two countries in 2008 elevated the relationship to an all-time high, the Mumbai terrorist attack in November the same year catalyzed a further intensification in their bilateral engagement.

When President Barrack Obama assumed office in 2009, there were expectations in both the countries that Obama would further consolidate ties. However, his administration’s initial foreign policy decisions, including the formation of G-2 (the US and China), Obama’s unilateral decision to withdraw US troops from Afghanistan without consulting India, and other steps, raised serious concerns about the future direction of the transforming India-US engagement. However, before the ties could deteriorate further, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh became the first state guest of the Obama Administration in 2009. Singh declared, “We seek to broaden and deepen our

20 Nalini Kant Jha and Sumit Kumar, “China under the Obama Administration,” in Anupurna Nautiyal and Chintamani Mahapatra, ed., India-China Relations in the Contemporary Era Opportunities, Obstacles and Outlooks, Gyan Publication, New Delhi, 2014, pp. 211-228.
strategic partnership, and to work with the United States to meet these challenges of a fast-changing world in this 21st century.” President Obama characterised India as a “rising and responsible global power,” emphasizing that the ties between the two countries would be “one of the defining partnerships of the 21st century”. At the same time, the two sides agreed to strengthen cooperation in counter-terrorism, with President Obama asking Pakistan to deal effectively with extremist organisations operating from its soil, to prevent Mumbai-type attacks. Consequently, the two counties established the Strategic Dialogue in five areas, including counter-terrorism. More to the point, while expressing concerns about the increasing terrorist activities in the South Asia region, the 2010 White House National Security Strategy identified Afghanistan and Pakistan as the “epicenter of the violent extremism practiced by Al Qaeda.”

The killing of Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad in 2011 further exposed Pakistan’s dubious stand on fighting terrorism and reaffirmed India’s position that Pakistan was using terrorism as its state policy. This development forced the US Administration to seriously rethink its Pakistan policy and, in turn, led the Obama Administration to suspend USD 800 million in military transfers, including USD 300 million to reimburse Pakistan for expenses incurred in fighting terrorism. On the

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other hand, India and the US focused on expanding counter-terrorism ties with the Homeland Security Dialogue of 2011 and also signed the India-US Counter Terrorism Initiative. After this, a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed in 2011, to promote increased cooperation and exchange of information on cyber security.

In the ensuing years, however, the relationship between India and the US came under a cloud for a number of reasons: the revelation of several scams in India and the failure of the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) government to take effective steps to fix the existing policy parlaying; the Manmohan Singh Government’s decision to reject Boeing and Lockheed Martin’s bids in its lucrative Medium Multi Role Combat Aircraft competition, among other factors, further negatively impacted ties. Worse, in an unprecedented and unprofessional move, the US authorizers conducted the strip search of Indian Consulate General Devyani Khobragade in New York in December 2013, causing a high-voltage diplomatic crisis.

**INDIA-US TIES UNDER THE MODI GOVERNMENT**

The coming of the new BJP-led government after the 2014 Parliamentary Elections raised concerns about the future direction of India-US relations, given the fact that the US administration had, in the past, refused Narendra Modi


a US visa on account of his alleged role in the 2002 Gujarat riots. Surprisingly, however, soon after coming to power in May 2014, Prime Minister Modi decided to redirect his government’s efforts to sustain and deepen ties with the US. President Obama warmly reciprocated. Modi visited the US in 2014 and, with President Obama, signed a vision statement titled, “Chalein Saath Saath: Forward Together We Go.” President Obama paid a return visit to India in 2015, becoming the first serving US President to visit India twice.

These high-level political visits infused a new momentum in bilateral ties and the relationship was elevated to the height of the India-US Strategic and Commercial Dialogue. The issue of terrorism emerged as a major concern during discussions between Modi and Obama. Sharing each other’s views on this issue, they reaffirmed deep concern over the continued threat posed by terrorism, especially in the light of the rise and spread of IS, and underlined the need for continued comprehensive global efforts to combat and defeat terrorism. The leaders stressed the need for joint and concerted efforts, including the dismantling of safe havens for terrorist and criminal networks, to disrupt all financial and tactical support for networks such as Al Qaeda, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Jaish-e-Mohammad, the D-Company, and the Haqqanis. They also

reiterated their call for Pakistan to bring the perpetrators of the November 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai to justice; pledged to enhance criminal law enforcement, security, and military information exchanges; and strengthen cooperation on extradition and mutual legal assistance. Through operational cooperation with the help of their law enforcement agencies, they aimed to prevent the spread of counterfeit currency; inhibit the use of cyberspace by terrorists, criminals, and those who use the internet for unlawful purposes; and to facilitate investigation of criminal and terrorist activities. The leaders also committed to identify modalities to exchange terrorist watch lists. President Obama pledged to help India counter the threat of improvised explosive devices with information and technology. The leaders agreed to pursue supply of US-made mine-resistant ambush-protected vehicles to India.\(^{30}\)

Subsequently, the two leaders’ strong desire to deepen counterterrorism engagement led to the transformation of their relationship into “a defining counterterrorism partnership for the 21st century” in September 2015.\(^{31}\) The following year, the annual Yudh Abhyas military exercise was conducted with a focus on counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations in mountainous regions. In December 2016, Washington DC designated New Delhi, a ‘Major Defense Partner’, a status unique to India,\(^{32}\) which was seen as an immense boost to counter-terrorism cooperation. The new designation institutionalises the progress made to facilitate defense trade

\(^{30}\) Ibid.


and technology sharing with India to a level at par with that of the United States’ closest allies and partners, and ensures enduring cooperation into the future.\(^{33}\)

Amid the strengthening ties between New Delhi and Washington, India faced the Pathankot and Uri terrorist attacks in January and September 2017 respectively. The investigation into the attacks again brought to the fore Pakistan’s continued use of terrorism as state policy against India. Congressman Ted Poe, Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Terrorism, along with Congressman Dana Rohrabacher, introduced HR 6069, the Pakistan State Sponsor of Terrorism Designation Act in the House of Representatives. At the same time, the Indian-American community in the United States launched a White House petition to designate Pakistan a state sponsor of terrorism.\(^{34}\) However, the Obama Administration did not issue any strong statements on the terrorist attacks in India, let alone support the move to declare Pakistan a terrorist state. Of course, one reason behind Obama’s failure to take tough steps against Pakistan at this time might have been guided by the fact that only a few months were left before his administration completed its term.

Be it as it may, there is no denying the fact that at the time of Obama demitting his office, the relationship between India and the US was robust. At the same time, Donald Trump’s election as the next American President further emboldened India and the Indian foreign policy establishment. One reason for this was the fact that, during his election campaign, Trump had praised India and Indian origin-people in the US. A large number of Indian-Origin people also voted for Trump in the presidential election. Though it was symbolic, President Trump’s call to

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\(^{33}\) Ibid.

Prime Minister Modi within five days of taking office, further underscored his desire to enhance engagement with India. During the telephonic conversation, Trump described India as a “true friend” of the US.\(^{35}\)

While the meeting between Modi and Trump in June 2017 resulted in the signing of a joint statement entitled “Prosperity through Partnership,” the issue of terrorism received significant importance during discussions. Trump’s focus on eradicating the menace of Islamist terrorism was seen as an encouraging sign for India, given the fact that Islamist terrorism is a major threat to India. Trump’s commitment to fight terrorism was also an indication of the fact that his administration would continue to keep US Forces in Afghanistan and would also enhance the pressure on Pakistan to rein in terrorist organisations operating from its soil.

US National Security Advisor, General Michael Flynn’s description of Islamism as a ‘vicious cancer’ confirmed the fact that he would not treat Pakistan differently from other extremist Muslim countries.\(^{36}\) With regard to Pakistan, the Trump Administration also made it clear that Islamabad had to confront terrorism in its all forms.\(^{37}\) Realizing that Pakistan was reluctant to cooperate in counter-terrorism operations, the US decided to withhold disbursement of USD 255 million

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to Islamabad. While announcing his South Asia Policy in August 2017, President Trump became, perhaps, the first top US leader to declare openly, “Pakistan often gives safe haven to agents of chaos, violence, and terror.” In his first tweet of 2018, President Trump said, “The United States has foolishly given Pakistan more than 33 billion dollars in aid over the last 15 years, and they have given us nothing but lies & deceit, thinking of our leaders as fools.” Consequently, the US State Department announced a freeze on most military aid to Pakistan, amounting up to USD 1.3 billion.\(^{38}\)

On the issue of promoting peace, security, stability and development in Afghanistan, Trump’s South Asia Policy included the deployment of more US troops in Afghanistan, without fixing a timeline their return. Trump observed,

…from now on victory will have a clear definition: attacking our enemies, obliterating ISIS, crushing Al Qaeda, preventing the Taliban from taking over Afghanistan, and stopping mass terrorist attacks against America before they emerge.

Trump’s South Asia Policy authorized US commanders in the region to take action against terrorists both in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Equally important is the fact that the new US administration did not consider Pakistan its non-NATO ally any longer and that Trump’s preference of India over Pakistan would contribute to stability in Afghanistan. Certainly, given former President George W. Bush’s lukewarm approach to India on the Afghanistan issue and Obama’s flip-flop approach, Trump’s new strategy was a welcome development for India. It was not only a candid acceptance of India as a regional

and global power, but also envisaged an increase in India’s strategic outreach in Afghanistan.

The Trump Administration has approved the sale of 22 Guardian MQ-9B unmanned aircrafts to India, which will enhance India’s maritime surveillance capability.\(^{39}\) During the inaugural meeting of the 2+2 Dialogue, the two sides announced their intent to increase information-sharing efforts on known or suspected terrorists and to implement UN Security Council Resolution 2396 on returning foreign terrorist fighters. They committed to enhancing their ongoing cooperation in multilateral fora such as the UN and FATF.\(^ {40}\)

**DIMENSIONS AND OUTCOMES**

The sustained political engagement between the two countries, along with other domestic, regional and global factors, has indeed marked a defining movement between India and the US on counter-terrorism cooperation. Today, while there is sharp change in the American position on Pakistan’s role in abetting terrorism; on the other hand, India and the US hold military exercises, share confidential intelligence inputs, and organize regular meetings of their high ranking officials on converging areas of common interest, including counter-terrorism.

Certainly, the Joint Working Group (JWG) agreement signed in 2000 was a major linchpin of counter-terrorism cooperation between the two sides. The focus of this group is to hold regular

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meetings of counterterrorism and legal experts of the two countries. Under its aegis, both countries have expanded their cooperation on information sharing and the assessments of the terrorist situation in South Asia and elsewhere, upgraded anti-terrorism training programs for Indian law enforcement officials, and launched joint military cooperation on counterterrorism. The JWG has also facilitated dialogue on terrorist financing, transportation security, border management and internal security, and has initiated measures to identify and attack organisations and individuals that pose a threat to India and the US.

Another important development is that the knowledge of counter-terrorism cooperation between the two sides has increasingly become public, unlike in the past. This does not, of course, mean that the policy of secrecy has been completely abandoned. Identities of sources of information are protected, as is other sensitive information. The JWG has also helped both the countries to recognize the fact that the campaign against terrorism must be intense and multi-dimensional. This is apparent in the emphasis on the reality that any substantive gain against terrorism would depend heavily on the commitment of individual countries and on international cooperation. Officials of the two countries engaged in the counter-terrorism activities review the training and capability building programmes conducted by the US. India has welcomed the US move to

expand bilateral engagement in the counter-terrorism sphere by covering preventive, protective and consequence management capabilities in both conventional and WMD terrorism.  

As far back as in October, 2001, India and the US had signed a bilateral treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters. The treaty has helped the two countries in securing uncomplicated law enforcement assistance from each other and has improved the ability to investigate and prosecute a plethora of crimes, including terrorism-related offences, drug-trafficking and money laundering. The two countries have also cemented a Maritime Cooperation Framework to enhance security on the seas. Significant aspects of the Maritime Cooperation Framework are the protection of international maritime trade and infrastructure and the reduction of the possibility of shipping containers being used to transport weapon of mass distraction.

In 2017, an MoU on bilateral ‘Counter-terrorism Designations Dialogue’ was signed between the two sides. The joint statement said, “The US and Indian delegations exchanged information on procedures for pursuing designations against terrorist groups and individuals through domestic and international mechanisms” and consequently, in August 2018, the US declared the Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) a terrorist organization and Abdul Rehman al-Dakhil and two terror financiers, Hameed ul Hassan and Abdul Jabbar, as Specially Designated Global Terrorists (SDGT).

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44 Ibid.
Cyber-terrorism has also emerged as a major cause of concern for both the countries. In India’s case, despite the Indian Government’s claim that “not one attempt has been successful” with respect to the Ghost Net attacks, and that the “government’s computer network system, maintained by the National Informatics Centre, is highly efficient,” the fact remains that India is certainly not prepared to tackle any direct or covert attack on its information infrastructure.\(^{47}\) It has also been estimated that cyber crime could cost the world including India and the US, USD 600 billion, a year.\(^{48}\) Wikileaks revelations have further underscored the need for India and the US to strengthen their cooperation in this area.

The first major effort towards fostering ties in fighting cyber-terrorism was in 2002, when the two sides established the Indo-US Cyber Security Forum. The signing of the Counterterrorism Cooperation Initiative (CCI) in 2010; an MoU to promote increased cooperation and exchange of information on cyber security in 2011; the formation of the US-India Cyber Policy Dialogue in 2013; the creation of a Homeland Security working group under the bilateral High Technology Cooperation Group (HTCG) in 2014, with the aim of facilitating joint access to counterterrorism-related technology; have cumulatively provided platforms for discussions among representatives from the Governments and industries of both the countries.\(^{49}\) They also aim to promote closer cooperation and the timely


exchange of information between the organizations of their respective governments responsible for cyber security. There is an increased and effective cooperation on counterterrorism, information-sharing, and capacity-building. The CCI included several projects for enhancing joint counterterrorism capabilities through the sharing of advanced techniques, best practices, and investigative skills. It also promotes bilateral cooperation on law enforcement and cybercrime by creating a mechanism for cooperation, including setting up appropriate sub-groups and affirming common objectives in fighting international cyber crime. These include the application of international law to state behavior in cyberspace, the affirmation of norms of responsible state behavior, and the development of practical confidence-building measures. It commits both countries to promoting international law, public-private partnerships, and appropriate norms of state cyber conduct, promotion of cooperation between forensic science laboratories, establishment of procedures to provide mutual investigative assistance, enhancing capabilities to act against money laundering, counterfeit currency and financing of terrorism, exchanging best practices on mass transit and rail security; increasing exchanges between Coast Guards and Navy on maritime security; exchanging experience and expertise on port and border security; enhancing liaison and training between specialist Counter Terrorism Units including National Security Guard with their US counter parts.  

While the Indian Computer Response Team (CERT-IN) has been working with the US National Cyber Security  

Indo-US Counter-terrorism Cooperation

Division since 2011, India and the US signed a Frame Work for Cyber Relations in 2016, the first such document that the US has signed with any country. This mechanism is intended to foster cooperation between the Computer Response Team of the US and its counterpart in India, with the aim of identifying, coordinating, sharing and implementing cyber security protocols and initiatives. It will also provide for sharing information on a real time or near real time basis about malicious cyber security threats, attacks and activities, and establishing appropriate mechanisms to improve sharing of information.

The US Department of Defence runs a Counter-Terrorism Fellowship Programme (CTFP) designed to educate Indian military officers as part of the US global war on terrorism. Only those Indian military personnel that are assigned to or participate in counter-terrorism units can avail of the benefits of this programme. This programme also supports mobile training teams sent to India from the US to train their counterparts on various issues related to counter-terrorism activities. As part of the CTFP, the US Coast Guard in April 2005 conducted Port Security training in Mumbai for 25 Indian Navy personnel. In September 2005, a Surgical Trauma Response Techniques Mobile Training Team (MTT) program was conducted in New Delhi for about 35 Indian military doctors, and in the same month a Cyber Terrorism MTT program was held in New Delhi for 40 Indian officials and military personnel.

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53 Ibid.
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has scaled up cooperation with Indian security agencies, providing inputs and training on how to deal with issues like drug trafficking, cyber-crime and others. It was in this context that the FBI started courses on subjects such as Surveillance and Detection for Indian police officers. India also signed the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 2005, on July 24, 2006, at the UN Headquarters in New York. This Convention was the first anti-terrorism convention adopted following the 9/11 attacks.

In a significant move, the Indian Government allowed the FBI to join the Indian team in investigating the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, underscoring the enhanced level of accessibility between the two sides. Also, the FBI Quantico laboratory has hosted many senior Indian forensics experts and the agency shared best practices with Indian law enforcement officials. The US Department of State’s Anti-Terrorism Assistance (ATA) Country Assistance Plan for India focuses on critical incident response, post-incident investigation, human rights and similar issues. In July, 2018, India and the US signed a key pact for exchange of intelligence on terror on a real time basis that include biographic information of known and suspected terrorists. This pact in turn has led India to formally enter into the US Homeland Security Presidential Directive-6 (HSPD-6), which will enable it to access ‘unclassified biographic information of known and suspected terrorists’ maintained by the US on a reciprocal basis. The HSPD-6 is a model text agreement for exchange of terrorist screening information between Terrorist Screening Centre (TSC) of the US and an Indian agency.54

LIMITATIONS

India and the US have covered a long distance as far as cementing their counter-terrorism engagement is concerned. This cannot blind us towards the factors that limit the further expansion of ties. One such constraint has been the divergent perceptions of both the countries regarding the nature of terrorism and how it is to be contained. India views Pakistan as the main source of terrorist activates taking place in the country. In turn, India strongly believed that any attempt towards addressing the issue of terrorism in South Asia would be meaningless unless actions is taken to pressurize Pakistan into withdrawing support to various terrorist organizations. This is the reason that, time and again, the Indian Government has appealed to the US to initiate the process for declaring Pakistan a ‘terrorist state’.

Although, the Trump Administration has taken a tough stand against Pakistan for its failure to take action against terrorists operating from its soil, India has no reason to believe that Trump’s actions have been taken to address India’s concerns. In fact, the reason behind the US’s punitive initiatives against Islamabad are mainly two-fold: first, Pakistan’s support to Al Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan, which pose security threats to the US, second, the deepening ties between Pakistan and China. Furthermore, like his predecessors, Trump has not taken any steps to ensure that Pakistan brings the culprits of the 2008 Mumbai attack to justice.  

While India recognizes the fact that the US has realized the possible danger which the LeT constitutes to peace and

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security in South Asia, what continues to haunt New Delhi is Washington’s failure to treat LeT the way they treat Al Qaeda. India also doubts US sincerity in extending its fullest cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism on account of Washington’s flip-flop on the extradition to India of David Headily, who was involved in the 26/11 Mumbai attacks.56 Pessimism in the Indian establishment about the American desire for genuine counter-terrorism cooperation runs high, particularly following the killing of Osama bin Laden, in Abbottabad in a covert US military operation. Indian officials feel that the US does not share information on those aspects of Al Qaeda activities which have potential ties to terrorists in Kashmir.57

India and the US also differ in dealing with this menace at the international level. Following the 9/11 attacks, the US conferred upon itself the moral obligation to attack any country where terrorists were engaged in anti-American activities, and also expects all the countries, especially those with whom it has security cooperation agreements, to join it in this endeavour. However, though India has extended full support to the idea that the international community must come together to fight against terrorism, it has reservations over America’s unilateral decision to launch attacks in foreign countries in the name of dismantling terrorist outfits. This is evident from the fact that India refused to join the US in its war against Iraq in 2003. India has also not supported US missile attacks in Syria in

2017. In turn, sections of experts and bureaucrats in the US doubt India’s sincerity in siding with the US on these critical issues.

India has also refused to toe the US line in dealing with Iran and the Middle East. India has a historical legacy of cordial relations with countries like Iran, Iraq and the Persian Gulf nations. These countries are also India’s main source of petroleum products, and New Delhi would not jeopardize its relations in the Middle-East by siding with the US, particularly where the latter’s actions are arbitrary and unilateral. Further, as India is home to the third largest Muslim population in the world,\(^58\) there are also concerns in the Indian security and political establishments that adhering to the US line in the Middle East may push India Muslims towards radicalism.

Another reason which has hampered India-US counter terrorism cooperation, according to the US Administration, is the lack of institutional mechanisms in India to deal effectively with terrorist activities. The US has a plethora of laws dealing with counter terrorism, including the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996; the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA), USA-Patriot Act of 2001;\(^59\) the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA);\(^60\) among others. At the same time, the US has also developed a counter terrorism decision making structure,


\(^{60}\) Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008” or the “FISA Amendments Act of 2008,” One Hundred Tenth Congress of the United States of America, H. R. 6304.
which consists of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), a National Coordinator for Counter-Terrorism within the National Security Council (NSC), the Department of Health and Human Services, Department of Transportation, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security, Divisions of the Department of Justice, the FBI’S National Security Branch and the Treasury’s Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (TFI). The formation of these intuitional mechanisms has led the US to closely monitor terrorist activates by integrating intelligence and operations personnel working in this field, and coordinating international cooperation against terrorists.

In comparison, India does not have either sufficient laws, or a proper counter terrorism structure. For instance, some of the laws related to counter terrorism have already ceased to exist such as the Terrorist and Disruptive Activates (Prevention) Act (TADA) and the Prevention of Terrorism Activates Act (POTA). Laws like the Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act of 1995 and Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act of 1967, which was amended in 2008, are available in India to deal with terrorist activities, but are widely perceived to be inadequate to deal with the challenge.

India also has structural problems in effectively dealing with terrorism. For instance, as law and order comes under the jurisdiction of individual States, any attempt by the Union Government to establish a national counter-terrorism agency is opposed at the provincial level. The argument is that any such movement by the Union Government would damage the essence of the Indian federal structure. In consequence, there is no effective national-level body in India with which the US government can engage and coordinate. India’s poorly structured counterterrorism establishment and its hesitation
in sharing information through its intelligence agencies, with other countries, is also viewed as an obstacle to more cooperation between India and the US.\textsuperscript{61} India’s fight against terrorism has suffered from outdated laws and legal provisions and structures of governance.\textsuperscript{62}

While each wing of the US Armed Forces has its own elite unit specifically formed for responding to terrorist acts, such as the Green Berets, Army Rangers, Navy SEALS and others. In the Indian context, there is a significant overlap in India’s anti-terrorist operations. Forces are deployed not so much according to their suitability for a particular topography or the nature of operations called for but more according to their availability.\textsuperscript{63} For instance, there are intelligence agencies like the Intelligence Bureau, Military Intelligence, Research and Analysis Wing and others; but, they have not in the past been able to perform well or coordinate properly with each other in preventing or responding to terrorist activities. This is evident from the fact that after every major terrorist attack, it has been found that there was confusion in intelligence sharing and response among different agencies.\textsuperscript{64}

\textbf{Conclusion}

Increasing terrorist activities in the region, cyber security threats, maritime terrorism and other similar security challenges should provide India and the US all the more reasons to intensively boost counter-terrorism cooperation. In

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\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
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particular, as Al Qaeda and the Taliban threaten the interests of both the countries, New Delhi and Washington DC need to realize that they need each other’s support to fight this menace, and that Afghanistan is a common cause of concern. The US has invested astronomical amounts in military and stabilization operations, and India has also committed significant resources to projects for the development of infrastructure and institutions of governance, and it is a priority for both the countries to ensure that Afghanistan does not, again, fall under the sway of extremist and terrorist forces. Protecting sea lanes from terrorist attack has also become a vital aspect of India-US concern and potential counter-terrorism cooperation. India plays a significant role in the Indian Ocean Region, and America benefited in the past from cooperation with New Delhi in protecting US supply ships from threats of terrorism and piracy as they moved through the Straits of Malacca.\textsuperscript{65}

Though, both the countries have differing perceptions about Pakistan’s role in terrorist activities against India, New Delhi realizes that a US role is crucial in controlling Pakistan, and that close engagement with Washington, to put pressure on Pakistan, is imperative.

The information and communications technology (ICT) revolution has transformed the nature of terrorism, and it has become increasingly difficult for any country to protect its people from deadly attacks. India and the US also need to consolidate cooperation against cyber-terrorism.

No efforts towards deepening counter-terrorism cooperation can succeed in the absence of mutual trust and efforts to address

\textsuperscript{65} Walter K. Andersen, Testimony before House Committee on Foreign Affairs: Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia United States House of Representatives on India and the United States: A Different Kind of Relationship, June 25, 2008.
each other’s concerns. What remains to be seen is how the gaps and divergences that have hobbled cooperation in the past can be covered, to establish a more effective architecture of Indo-US cooperation against the rising threat of terror.
SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW

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Conflict Resolution in Assam
A Critical Inquiry

N. M. Singh* and Indrajit Sharma**

In view of the changing dynamics of conflicts in northeast India, a critical analysis of India’s conflict resolution strategies in Assam gains urgency. The resolution of the conflict is not actually taking place. Rather, it is the transient management of conflict that continues, but results in the generation of new issues and challenges. Although the sustained deployment of security forces in the State has achieved a promising outcome in controlling the level of violence, insurgent groups continue to exist, suggesting that the insurgencies in the State have not been entirely neutralised. Moreover, the existing negotiation process is exclusive rather than inclusive in nature, creating new demands and issues from groups other than those that are accommodated, and who become more eager to protect their own ethnic identity and local culture against groups that succeed in securing their ethnic demands. Given its strategic interests and aspiration to bring development to Assam, the Government of India will need to encourage wider participation

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in the conflict resolution process, instead of following the path of political exclusiveness by outbidding majoritarian or dominant groups over other minority communities.

In contemporary South Asia, India’s north-eastern State of Assam represents a conflict-prone volatile region. Starting from the late 1950s, Assam has witnessed armed conflicts ranging from insurgency for sovereignty to insurgency for statehood and autonomy, and including occasional violence over immigration and inter-ethnic conflicts over the issue of land and identity politics. These conflicts have brought Assam to several crossroads, and to both domestic and global attention. In the face of the difficult internal security situation in Assam, the Government of India (GoI) has adopted certain strategies to address extremism and insurgencies. Besides, the sustained violent activities of militant groups and their factional splits in Assam have led strategic communities to question the Government’s approach. In this context, it is necessary to examine the nature of conflicts and conflict resolution processes in Assam.

The purpose here is not to describe or trace the historical evolution of the insurgencies and armed conflicts in Assam, but to highlight the nature of conflict and analyse the present security situation. As a result, the primary focus is on the prominent insurgencies in the State.

**Conflicts in Assam**

Conflicts in Assam revolve around three major issues—land, (ethnic) identity and immigration. Many scholars trace the ‘root causes’ of conflicts in Assam back to the colonial period. They argue that it was British colonial policies, such as introducing Bengali as the State language in 1837, and the Inner Line regulations in 1873 (introduced in the Hill Areas of undivided
Conflict Resolution in Assam

Assam) which sowed the seeds of many of the conflicts today. Sanjib Baruah\(^1\) observes that it was such colonial policies which encouraged large-scale immigration from Bengal, and the way in which the boundaries of Assam were drawn up created a perception of fear among natives, eventually transforming into the anti-foreigners movement in Assam in the post-Independence era. Hiren Gohain\(^2\) alleged that it was the same colonial decision which awakened community consciousness in Assam, and later, further generated perceptions of insecurity and the fear that they would be eventually marginalized in their own homeland.

Baruah\(^3\) and N.K. Das\(^4\) have also discussed the history of tension between Assamese sub-nationalism and pan-Indianism since the early days. Nonetheless, numerous scholars consider unabated immigration from the then-East Pakistan (present Bangladesh) and the inability of the Indian State to accommodate identity aspirations as the major driving factor behind the emergence of the insurgency orchestrated by the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) in the State.\(^5\) However, ULFA gradually weakened in terms of its organizational structure and loss of public support, which it enjoyed till the early 1990s. The outfit has often allegedly been found to be involved in various anti-social activities.

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Moreover, it has split into two factions: pro-talks and anti-talks. The anti-talks faction, ULFA-I (United Liberation Front of Asom– Independent) continues its operational activities and there are cyclical surges in violence in the State from time to time, indicating that the insurgency in Assam has not yet ended.

Unlike ULFA, the origin of Bodo grievances and the subsequent insurgency can be traced back to the resentment among the Bodos with growing ethnic Assamese nativism. Many consider the signing of the ill-fated Assam Accord one of the major causal factors behind the rise of the Bodo insurgency. For instance, the clause 6 of the Accord defines specific provisions for protecting the cultural identity of the ‘Assamese people’. The Bodos disapproved the provision, ‘as they feared the clause might give legitimacy to the imposition of Assamese language and culture’. With growing differences among its leaders, the Bodo insurgency split into two groups: the National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB) and Bodo Liberation Tigers Force (BLTF). However, both the factions demanded a separate homeland for the Bodo communities. In 2003, the Bodo insurgency led by the BLTF ended with its disbandment following protracted negotiations with GoI, which led to the formation of an Autonomous District Council–

7 The Assam Accord was signed on 15th August 1985 between the Union Home Secretary, the Assam Chief Secretary and the representatives of the Assam Movement i.e. the All Assam Students’ Union (AASU) and All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP). The core theme of Assam Accord was the issue of illegal immigration aimed at preservation of Assamese identity and deportation of ‘foreigners’ – meaning illegal immigrants from Bangladesh.
8 M. Amarjeet Singh, Conflicts in Assam, National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, 2010, p.3.
the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC). This arrangement was unsuccessful as the NDFB continued to engage in violent activities.

Later in 2005, the NDFB also reached a ceasefire agreement with GoI, but it split into pro-talks and anti-talks groups. The anti-talk faction of NDFB led by IK Songbijit, NDFB (IKS), was responsible for the killing of more than 80 Adivasis (indigenous communities) in Assam in the year 2014. In a recent development, IK Songbijit has separated from NDFB and formed another insurgent group – the People’s Democratic Council of Karbi-Longri (PDCK) to fight for the cause of the Karbi communities in Karbi Anglong, the largest Hill District of Assam. The formation of PDCK took place in Myanmar and the group currently has an estimated more than 60 cadres. It is patronized by National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN) faction previously led by the (Late) S.S. Khaplang (NSCN-K, which defected from NSCN in 1988, and is primarily settled in the Taga region of the Sagaing Division of Myanmar) and the Paresh Baruah led ULFA-I. NDFB is now led by B. Saoraigwra and is designated as NDFB (S).

The subsequent burgeoning of multiple insurgent groups in the State (by the communities such as Karbis, Dimasas, Koch-Rajbangshis, Rabha-Hasong, Tiwas, and Missing) has been associated with the prevailing culture of movements

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based on ethnic assertion and identity politics.\textsuperscript{11} The growing perceptions of exploitation of Assam’s natural resources by the Centre, increasing unemployment, alleged human rights’ violations by the Security Forces, and corruption and nepotism in Government offices are identified as the other causal factors of conflict.\textsuperscript{12} Besides these, there are several other elements that sustain the insurgencies in the State. One predominant element is the easy availability of arms and narcotics in the border-states, with its geographical proximity to the notorious ‘Golden Triangle’ in Southeast Asia and Cox’s Bazar in Bangladesh. Arms and drugs are smuggled into the Northeast region of India through unguarded borders.\textsuperscript{13} The long porous border further provides a safe passage into neighbouring countries, where insurgent groups find safe havens. Hence, the intricate nexus between insurgency and arms smuggling, along with the lack of development in the region altogether have, have supported thriving insurgencies in the State for years.\textsuperscript{14}


\textsuperscript{14} Author interview with Professor N. G. Mahanta, Department of Political Science, Gauhati University, during field visit in Assam in the year 2017.
CURRENT CONUNDRUMS

In due course of their armed struggle, many of the insurgencies in Assam have died down and some of them are engaged in peace talks with GoI. Moreover, conflict-related fatalities are also declining in comparison to previous years. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS)’s Armed Conflict Survey 2018, ‘Assam witnessed one of its most peaceful years since the onset of insurgency with an estimated 33 fatalities’.¹⁵ The lowering level of violence in the State can be attributed to cooperation with some of the neighbouring countries, i.e. Bangladesh and Bhutan. At present, several militant groups have signed Suspension of Operations (SoO)¹⁶ agreements with the government, including ULFA (Pro-Talk), and NDFB (Pro-Talk). Other militant groups – Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), United People’s Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), Dilip Nunisa faction of Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) and Jewel Garlosa faction of DHD (DHDJ) – have signed Memorandum of Settlement (MoS)¹⁷ agreements with GoI.¹⁸

However, the momentum in the peace process is slow and frustration is high among the outfits. According to the IISS’s Armed Conflict Survey¹⁹, ‘the year 2017 marked a slow year for peace talks with the major armed factions: NDFB (Pro Talk), NDFB – Ranjan Daimary and ULFA (Pro Talk)’. The insurgency problem in the State is comparatively down but not

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¹⁶ A formal agreement between two or more parties in which there will not be carrying out of any operations against each other.

¹⁷ A formal agreement leading to dissolution of the organisation.


completely out. In 2013, the State Government disclosed that six new militant groups had emerged in the State, five of which came from the two autonomous Hill Districts of Karbi Anglong and Dima Hasao, whilst the sixth was a Bengali community-based movement in the Bodo Territorial Council area.\(^\text{20}\) Today, there are still several insurgent organizations active in Assam, based on ethnic identity, religion, community and political ideology. For instance, according to the Annual Report of Ministry of Home Affairs 2017-18, the active insurgent organisations in Assam include the anti-talks factions of NDFB-S; ULFA-I; Kamtapur Liberation Organization (KLO); Karbi Peoples’ Liberation Tigers (KPLT) and Karbi Longri NC Hills Liberation Front (KLNLF). This makes Assam one of the most conflict-prone states in India.

In addition, there is also growing potential for civil unrest, besides the problem of insurgency. For instance, the growing perceptions of insecurity among the educated Bodo youth, who fear that they will become a minority in their own home State has generated another ethnic fault line in Assam, particularly between the former and non-Bodo ethnic groups. Sometimes, people sharing the religious-linguistic profile with so-called ‘foreigners’ are harassed and unreasonably forced to prove their Indian citizenship.\(^\text{21}\) This was one of the main factors behind a violent ethnic clash between Bodos and Bengali speaking Muslims in Kokrajhar District in 2008, 2012 and 2014. Moreover, the recent process of updating the National Register of Citizens (NRC) created a feeling of insecurity


and alienation among between those seeking the prevention of illegal immigration, on the one hand, and the State’s indigenous Muslim population, on the other. The unresolved political question of illegal immigration is an enormous source of potential civil unrest in Assam, and is likely to have major spill-over effects in the whole Northeast region.

Table 1: Prominent Currently Active Insurgent Organisations in Assam

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Insurgent Organization</th>
<th>Active/Inactive</th>
<th>Areas of Operation (District Wise)</th>
<th>Organisational Base</th>
<th>Status of Peace Process</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NDFB – (S)</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Baksa, Chirang, Udalguri, Kokrajhar, Sonitpur, Darrang</td>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>Anti-Talk Faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULFA-I</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Tinsukia, Goalpara, Sibsagar, Jorhat, Dibrugarh, Sonitpur, Dhubri, Charaideo</td>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>Anti-Talk Faction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KLO</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Dhubri, Goalpara</td>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>Not Involved in Peace Process</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KPLT</td>
<td>Active</td>
<td>KarbiAnglong, Dima Hasao</td>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>Not Involved in Peace Process</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Status</th>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Conflict Category</th>
<th>Action</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>UPDS (United People’s Democratic Solidarity)</td>
<td>In Active</td>
<td>KarbiAnglong, Dima Hasao</td>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>Under Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) with GOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DHD</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>Cachar, Dima Hasao, Karbi Anglong and Nagaon</td>
<td>Ethnic Identity</td>
<td>Under Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) with GOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ULFA (Pro talks)</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>At one point of time ULFA operated in almost entire Assam with prominent districts such as Jorhat, Lakhimpur, Tinsukia, Sonitpur etc.</td>
<td>Political Ideology</td>
<td>Under Suspension of Operations (SoO) with GOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDFB (Pro talks)</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>Baksa, Chirang, Udalguri, Kokrajhar</td>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>Under Suspension of Operations (SoO) with GOI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDFB (RD)</td>
<td>Inactive</td>
<td>Baksa, Chirang, Udalguri, Kokrajhar</td>
<td>Ethnic identity</td>
<td>Under Suspension of Operations (SoO) with GOI</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**FRAMEWORK OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION**

Conflict resolution is a method and process in which deep-rooted sources of conflict are addressed and transformed.23

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This implies that behaviour between the conflicting parties is no longer hostile and the structure of the conflict has been changed. Conflict resolution is a comprehensive term which presumes that conflicts are never wholly zero-sum and, consequently, there is the possibility of an integrative outcome whereby all parties gain much of what they need or want. Generally speaking, it is an approach that focuses on preventing, decreasing, stopping, or transforming violent conflict, often using peaceful and non-violent methods. In reality, conflict resolution is something which is pursued by the advocates of peace by resorting to certain means towards establishing a lasting solution in society, acceptable to all the communities.

Approaches to conflict resolution can be observed from two contending perspectives – conservative and liberal. The conservative approach to conflict resolution advocates the use of hard power, such as the use of force. On the other hand, the liberal approach considers the use of (hard) power as a subsidiary element of a conflict resolution policy, and as such advocates the use of soft power, including economic development, dialogue and negotiations, as well as bringing about structural changes. In the latter perspective, conflicts are dealt with in a better way when the root causes are addressed;

27 Kanti Bajpai, op. cit., p. 27
this approach, consequently, seeks instrumental change in factors such as political, economic, and geopolitical structures in a conflict zone. This approach is related to the human needs model of conflict resolution, which regards conflict as a socio-political phenomena derived from the suppression of basic human needs and underdevelopment, and thus seeks to address these root causes. Such arguments are best reflected in the works of Johan Galtung, Edward Azar and Burton. The conflict discourse in their work reflects a shift from monodimensional to multidimensional approaches in dealing with conflict, and incorporates economic and political reforms, as well as human rights, development, and democratization into the strategies to address conflict.

**India’s Conflict Resolution Approach**

India embraces both the conservative and liberal perspectives of the conflict resolution process. In its conservative approach, India practices the use of force which is derived largely from military doctrine, especially relating to counterinsurgency. In the 1960s and 1970s, “India extensively used this approach to curb the Naga and Mizo insurgency movements as a part of its

counterinsurgency strategy.’”  

The ‘use of force’ has been one of the core elements behind India’s counterinsurgency doctrine, in which the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 1958, has played a vital role. The Act’s antecedents date back to the British colonial era. Since 1990, however, the Armed Forces’ and paramilitary’s counterinsurgency doctrine has been broadened. The Western doctrine of counterinsurgency, based on the concept of winning ‘hearts and minds’, has become a major part of Indian military doctrine. In addition, the conservative approach has also adopted the limited use of force, as the extensive use of force sometimes escalates the sense of insecurity within society, particularly in areas where the Forces are deployed.

The liberal perspective of conflict resolution has also been incorporated, and this has led to increasing importance being attached to negotiation with insurgents, as well as the social and economic development of conflict zones. The political approach uses various mechanisms such as conferment of Statehood, the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, and the signing of ‘Accords’ or ‘Agreements’ as part of a move for the peaceful resolution of conflicts. The GoI has now adopted a ‘multi-pronged’ strategy comprehending (i) Security Forces and Police action; (ii) granting local autonomy through mechanisms such as conferment of Statehood or Autonomous District Councils under the Sixth Schedule and through ‘tribe specific accords’; (iii) negotiations with insurgent outfits; and (iv) developmental activities, including special economic packages.

32 Rajesh Rajagopalan, op. cit.
33 Special Provisions for Administration of Tribal Areas.
34 Second ARC 7th Report, op. cit, p.149.
India’s conflict resolution strategy in Assam can be analysed in broad conceptual parameters of counterinsurgency strategies such as the use of force, surrender-cum-rehabilitation schemes, developmental approach, political dialogue and negotiations (including peace talks).

**Use of Force**

The use of force has been a special and most prominent element in India’s militaristic approach to conflict resolution. The main objective of this initiative is to stabilize law and order in the disturbed areas and maintain the territorial integrity of the country. Since the 1950s, it has been one of the principal means of confronting insurgencies in Assam, till the late 1990s. The Government implements this approach through the Police, Army and Paramilitary Forces. The Paramilitary Forces comprise the Assam Rifles (AR), the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF), the Border Security Force (BSF), and the National Security Guard (NSG).

The use of force covers a conventional military approach, though it is slightly different in the Indian case, as compared to many other countries. In India, the dominant idea is that the fight is against fellow Indians, and this has tended to inhibit the use of heavy artillery or air power (except in the classic case of the Mizo insurgency in the 1970s where air power was used). The principle is simply that, when force is required to combat any insurgent activity, it is to be used in moderation. Although “the Indian Army did not have a formally laid down doctrine for its counterinsurgency campaign until the decade of the 2000s,” it is possible to observe its evolution over the
years, as Rajagopalan\(^{35}\) has indicated. Banerjee\(^{36}\) argues that formal Indian Army Doctrine (IAD) was spelled out in 2004 and its subsequent flow in the form of the Doctrine for Sub-Conventional Operations (DSCO) in 2006 provides a basis for understanding counterinsurgency doctrine in the Indian Army. Goswami has observed that, in the case of the Indian Army’s response to conflicts such as the Naga conflict, the Mizo armed insurgency or the ULFA in Assam, the dominant idea has been the proportionate use of force.\(^{37}\)

**Surrender cum Rehabilitation Schemes**

To bring insurgents into the mainstream, the surrender cum rehabilitation scheme was first introduced in Assam for the first time in 1992 by GoI. It was the brainchild of then Chief Minister of Assam, Hiteshwar Saikia’s Government. The scheme was known as the ‘100 per cent Special Margin Money Scheme’. The policy was justified on the grounds that it would mitigate the then existing level of unemployment. Although it did not achieve its intended objectives, the scheme was reviewed in 1998 by Chief Minister Prafulla Kumar Mohanta’s Government. The objective behind the scheme was to wean away the misguided youth and hardcore militants who had strayed into the fold of insurgent organizations, and found themselves unable to escape that net. The scheme sought


to ensure that surrendered cadres could lead a normal life. From this period onwards, such schemes, with progressively generous provisions, have become a significant part of the multi-pronged conflict resolution strategy in Assam.

Surrendered militants were hosted in various rehabilitation camps. As a part of the scheme, a monthly stipend of INR 2000 per month for a period of 12 months was given and there were also revised incentives for the weapons surrendered by the insurgent. This continued for a period of one year. In addition, the Government of Assam, in consultation with the Centre, adopted several vocational training programs for surrendered militants. Following this scheme, after the signing of the Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) with the Government in the year 2003, BLTF disbanded its organization and 2,711 militants surrendered to the Government. The scheme was reviewed in April 2005, under which an immediate grant of INR 150,000 was to be kept in the name of the surrendered insurgent as a fixed deposit for a period of three years. And the duration for the monthly stipend of INR 2,000 was also increased from 12 months to 36 months. It was further revised and amended in 2009, in which the amount of the stipend was hiked to INR 3,500 per month, but for a period of one year. In case, more support was required, the State Government could consult the Union Ministry of Home Affairs to increase the tenure beyond one year. In April 2018, the scheme was revised again in order to make it more effective. Under the new guidelines, the amount

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of the stipend was hiked to INR 6,000 per month, for a period of three years. And the one-time grant was increased to INR 400,000, with a waiting period of three years. In addition, the monetary incentive for weapons/ammunition surrendered by the insurgents was also revised from to INR 100,000. This financial grant is given after proper scrutiny, only to those surrendered militants certified for their good conduct and confirmed not to be indulging in any unlawful activities. In 2010, the Government of Assam made an announcement that it would recruit some of the surrendered militants into Assam Police battalions, based on their eligibility and physical fitness. According to Assam Tribune reports, in the period between 1998 and 2010, more than 10,000 militants surrendered. However, in the period between 2011 and 2017, the number of surrendered militants declined drastically (Table 2).

**TABLE 2: NUMBER OF THE SURRENDERED MILITANTS FROM 2011 TO 2017 IN ASSAM**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Number of Extremists/Militants Surrendered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

42 “Annual Reports 2011 to 2017”, op. cit.
Considering that insurgencies and issues relating to ethnicity often have socio-economic roots and thrive in less developed areas, GoI adopted a new approach in its conflict resolution process, starting from the mid-1990s. This approach was based on the assumption that providing development packages or pouring money into economically backward regions would minimize existing social insecurities and vulnerabilities. In this context, commenting on the insurgency problem in Northeast region, Jairam Ramesh argued that “give them (people) development (i.e. building of schools, bridges, IITs and other infrastructure including refineries) and they will forget about problems of identity, problems of assertion, problems associated with creating a nation out of essentially tribal communities.”

In Assam, such efforts could be observed for the first time during the 8th Five Year Plan in 1996, when the then Prime Minister, H.D. Deve Gowda, announced a special package for the entire northeast region. Succeeding Governments continued this policy of economic package for the region. Such measures were directed at alleviating economic backwardness and improving living conditions of the population in particular and the Northeast region in general. In fact, development has been considered by many as the ultimate panacea to all sorts of internal conflicts in Assam. This aspect is reflected in various

44 Ibid.
Conflict Resolution in Assam

policy initiatives, which have been taken for the development of the region, and detailed Government studies and reports.\textsuperscript{45} The framing of the Look East Policy\textsuperscript{46} gave further impetus to the process and the development paradigm started to take precedence in the State. Apart from the Government, development efforts have also been taken up by the Security Forces, including the State Police, in the form of civic action programs as a part of their counterinsurgency measures.\textsuperscript{47} For instance, Assam Rifles has started adopting schools in remote areas, opening free medical camps and providing free medicines for the local population from time to time.

Currently, Assam has been at the forefront of India’s development paradigm due to its strategic location.\textsuperscript{48} It also has tremendous potential to meet various policy objectives of India’s vision towards the East.

\textbf{Political Dialogues and Negotiation for Reconciliation}

With the changing narratives as well as dynamics of conflicts, the unidirectional militaristic approach has been often found not to be successful in containing conflict in the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{45} For details, see the High Level Commission Report on “Transforming the North-East”, also known as the “Shukla Commission Report” framed in the year 1997. See also, “L.C. Jain Committee Report”, Planning Commission, Government of India, 1990.
\item \textsuperscript{46} In its pursuit for economic growth and development, the GoI devised the policy in 1991 to establish economic relations with the neighbouring countries in the East. In 2015, LEP was renamed as Act East Policy with an objective of establishing pragmatic relations with the neighbours in terms of economy, culture and development for the Northeastern states.
\end{itemize}
contemporary world. The Union Ministry of Home Affairs document on *Innovative Methods in Fighting Insurgency in North-East India,*\textsuperscript{49} mentions that the State’s response has shifted from merely arming State Forces, to adopting a strategy of using agreements and negotiations, alongside improved counterinsurgency measures. It is with these innovative methods that the State aims to restore normalcy in the Northeast region. With counterinsurgency operations and the use of force failing to end movements of violence in the State, GoI initiated processes of negotiations to secure political settlements with various insurgent outfits operating in the Northeast, as a strategic option. In the contemporary scenario, the Indian State aims to bring the conflicting parties to the table for peace talks, to achieve a political solution towards a lasting and durable outcome.

The characteristics of the negotiation processes adopted in Assam can be classified as follows:

1. *Accord based negotiation:* The primary objective of the negotiation strategy for the state has been in the form of an accord or a peace agreement that reduces the level of violence.

2. *Bilateral negotiation:* The State engages to bring the insurgent outfits onto the negotiating table in a one-on-one policy.

3. *Selective negotiation with prominent insurgents:* First the State identifies the prominent insurgent groups and then selectively invites them for negotiations. For instance, in the entire Northeast, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland – Isak Muivah(NSCN-IM) is considered as the mother of all insurgencies (in terms

Conflict Resolution in Assam

of funds, total strength of the cadre, organisational structure and functioning, weaponry, power, etc.). A similar assessment holds for ULFA within Assam. It is believed that once the principal insurgent groupings are brought to the negotiating table, others will automatically follow.

4. *No involvement of third parties:* GoI does not involve any third party or mediator to resolve its internal conflicts. Reverend Michael Scott’s peace mission to Nagaland in the 1960s was the first and last time India even considered seriously involving a third party (an international intervention) to settle an internal problem.\(^{50}\)

Another traditional mechanism that GoI often deployed is the granting of statehood and autonomy under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. For instance, in 1963, 1972 and 1987 the State of Assam was subjected to territorial reorganization after the massive armed uprising in the Hill Districts of Assam. In fact, the Sixth Schedule, a model of decentralized governance within an autonomous framework, has also sometimes led to the formation of a separate State, e.g., Nagaland, Meghalaya, etc. However, it has often been seen that bringing a particular community or tribal area under the Sixth Schedule isolates the target population from other tribes inhabiting those areas. Worse, this kind of development inspires every other ethnic group to assert their sub-ethnic identity and to demand similar treatment, undermining social harmony within the society.

**ASSESSING THE APPROACHES: ISSUES AND CHALLENGES**

Conflict resolution strategies in Assam have been designed to control deteriorating security situations, often suggesting

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that the State is engaged only in managing conflicts rather than seeking their resolution, and a lasting peace in society. In a conflict management framework, conflicts are controlled in such a way that the level of violence does not escalate, or conflict is considered as no more a major problem. There are a number of factors that need to be better understood to secure a greater clarity on this issue:

**Counter-productive AFSPA**

It is observed that the militaristic approach operates under the legal cover of AFSPA. In Assam, the presence of AFSPA has often attracted criticism, with allegations of disproportionate use of force and human rights violations during counterinsurgency operations. This has given a platform to insurgents to legitimize their armed movements. For instance, Goswami\(^51\) cites the case of the Kakopathar incident that took place on February 5, 2006, in Tinsukia District, in which a civilian was picked up by the Army on suspicion of linkages to ULFA, and was found dead after a few days in Army custody. Subsequently, on February 10, 2006, people from nearly 100 villages protested the incident sparking wider mass unrest. ULFA reaped significant benefits from the situation. It is to be noted that ULFA once enjoyed an estimated 10 percent of popular support among the Assamese masses.\(^52\) According to Lawrence, this is more than adequate, as insurgencies require only two per cent of popular support to endure.\(^53\) Further, AFSPA has not been able to contain the insurgency; rather, it continues to exist in Assam where the conflict has taken a dynamic shape.

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The objective behind the militaristic approach has always been to contain insurgencies. However, over the past two decades, pursuing this objective has created thorny challenges to the mainstream stakeholders. Conflict in Assam has become dynamic and complex in nature with the growing assertion of sub-regional identities among many ethnic groups, along with newly emerged anti-talks factions, with new leaders, that have been engaged in armed violence. These factions (anti-talks) have the ability to recruit new members, as well as to carry out occasional ambushes and attacks on the Security Forces. This suggests that the militaristic campaign has been successful neither in containing nor eliminating the insurgencies in terms of a particular geographic location. Rather, it has resulted in producing offshoots of multiple insurgencies.

Recent reports highlight the fact that Assam-based insurgent organizations such as ULFA-I, NDFB-S and KLO, along with the Myanmar-based NSCN-K, have jointly formed a conglomerate of militant groups across India’s Northeast – the United National Liberation Front of Western South East Asia (UNLFWSEA). This development underlines the potential for a resurgence of insurgent activities in the State. It is estimated that “different ethnic armed groups (EAGs) continue with efforts to engage in disruptive activities and had formed this united platform. They are also engaged in developing a nexus with transnational jihadi groups and Maoists, increasing the threat potential in Assam.”

This, in fact, indicates that the existing issues still require urgent policy review.

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EXCLUSIVENESS AND PROCRASTINATION IN RECONCILIATION PROCESSES: NEGOTIATION

The strategy behind the use of the militaristic approach in India’s conflict resolution is to contain and weaken the insurgents and to compel the outfits to come to the table for negotiations. However, the whole discourse on negotiations has its own discrepancies. Policies relying on the use of force have been rather counter-productive. Negotiation has been employed at the forefront of strategy in addressing insurgencies in Assam. However, government efforts for reconciliation through negotiation and peace talks look very exclusive, and lack an inclusive nature. In general, the negotiation process is selective, choosing only the dominant groups, in the belief that this will help resolve the principal issue as well as problems with other subordinate groups. However, in Assam, a diverse State in every sense, with growing and complex problems of ethnicity, selecting one dominant group over another does not result in anticipated policy outcomes. Although the Government has, very recently, started inviting the smaller groups for peace talks, the progress in this direction has been slow.

Besides, the State engages to bring the outfits onto the negotiating table by its one-on-one policy. In one sense, this is justified, as competing demands would be difficult to accommodate in a single process. The demands of ULFA-I and NDFB-S, for instance, include the contentious issue of sovereignty, whereas KLO seeks a separate ‘Kamtapur’ State, to be carved out of six Districts in north Bengal and four districts of Bongaigaon, Dhubri, Goalpara and Kokrajhar in Assam. The demands of the three insurgent formations are fundamentally irreconcilable, confronting the State’s mediators with complex dilemmas. Nonetheless, it is seen that there are various factions
that have agreed to ceasefires, Suspension of Operations and Memoranda of Settlement Agreements.

Given the changing dynamics of conflicts in the region, the question of procrastination in the State’s approach to negotiations also acquires some urgency. Today, a fair number of ethnic insurgencies in Assam remain unresolved, years, even decades after the initial Agreements have been signed. The nature of peace processes has been very tardy. The Centre’s strategy to bring the rebel groups to the table for negotiations has been successful only to the extent that it has given the State symbolic victories, even as problems continue to fester. The multiplicity of insurgent outfits in the form of splinter groups puts a question mark over the very technique of reconciliation for conflict resolution. Thus, many issues remain unresolved and there is a tendency for the negotiations themselves to generate new demands and issues from outsider groups eager to protect their own ethnic identity and local culture.

**Accords and Agreements**

It is seen that the primary goal for conflict resolution strategies has been to produce an agreement that reduces the level of violence. However, many of the accords have not been inclusive in nature, which is an essential element to meet the ends of a peace process. For instance, after the Bodo Accord was signed, other ethnic communities such as the Rabhas, Tiwas and Mishings raised further demands in the State. In 1995, the Government accordingly established Autonomous Councils for the Rabhas, Tiwas and Mishings. These accords were, however, seen as pre-emptive measures by the Government.  

55 An interesting fact in this context is

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argued by Rajagopalan\textsuperscript{56} that “one of the great fears generated by demands for autonomy is that they snowball; a State cannot grant greater autonomy to one segment of its citizenry without coming under pressure to do so with others”.

Besides, various Accords, Agreements, and Ceasefires failed to provide a better result in terms of achieving the anticipated objective in the form of ending violence. Many groups have been involved in peace parleys amid various uncertainties and mutual distrust. In the case of direct negotiations between the State and the rebel outfits, there has always existed a kind of negative environment. While the divisions within the outfits were believed to be a positive outcome, new factions and new leaders framed new political objectives, tactics and strategies, creating new challenges for peace. Occasional attacks, bombings and the emergence of new splinter groups still constitute a threat to the State’s quest for the resolution of the conflict.

**GRANTING OF AUTONOMY ON ETHNIC LINES**

In Assam, there are three Autonomous District Councils (ADCs): the Karbi Anglong Autonomous Council (KAAC), the Dima Hasao District Autonomous Council (DHDAC) and the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC). These autonomous councils have been constituted under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution, and on the basis of ethnic identity, to protect and develop particular communities. It is argued by many scholars that the territorial councils or autonomous councils based on ethnic lines create further tensions, given the complex mosaic of populations in Assam. Territorial councils on the grounds of ethnicity are an unending process. Moreover, it is also

believed that any policy that seeks to protect the interests of ethnic communities *per se* will lead to a proliferation of such identities and would further divide society, as it projects ethnic identity is a powerful political platform.\(^57\) Such fragmentation has gradually become a challenge for the State in Assam.

**Generating Splinter Groups**

The peace process in Assam has faced various problems. The pattern of conflict in the State is extremely complex and it has often been hard to broker any lasting peace, given the militant political mood among many ethnic communities. Further, negotiating with the insurgents creates its own set of problems. Often, when the Government engages in peace talks with an insurgent outfit, it simultaneously provokes a splintering process, with anti-talks factions rejecting the process and persisting with violence. The newly-formed factions act as spoilers and attempt to derail on-going peace processes. A good example of this is NDFB–S, which has been challenging the State’s quest for a peaceful resolution. NDFB-S defected from its parent NDFB when the latter entered into a Ceasefire Agreement. NDFB-S has emerged as a strong outfit, engaging in periodic and wanton killings in the Bodo dominated areas in what some view as part of an ‘ethnic cleansing’ program. There is, thus, the constant apprehension that talks themselves may lead to the emergence of new militant movements that may hamper any long-term strategy of peaceful resolution.

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FAKE SURRENDER AND CORRUPTION IN REHABILITATION PROGRAMMES

The State Government’s strategy of awarding economic incentives to surrendered militants and of rehabilitating them, initially in designated camps, has been criticized on the grounds of endemic corruption. Various sources indicate that past records of those who wanted to surrender were not checked properly. Taking advantage of this situation, a number of ‘fake surrenders’ have occurred, leading to the misuse of the funds sanctioned for the scheme, often with the complicity of State authorities.\textsuperscript{58} Highly placed sources indicate that the number of those who have surrendered was much higher than the total number of militants. In many cases, the majority of the militants who laid down arms did not have any police case against them, and the Police and Security Forces had no record of their involvement in militant activities.\textsuperscript{59} There is similar news of ‘fake surrenders’ in the neighbouring Manipur State as well (and, indeed, in most insurgency afflicted States where similar schemes are on offer). The lack of employment and poverty is often the driving factor behind this growing problem. Unemployed youth imitating insurgent cadres are attracted by the State Government’s announcement of absorbing surrendered militants in State Police forces, and succeed in securing such employment because of the corruption that exists within the system.

Again, the stipends and fixed deposits provided are vastly inflated by bringing in fake surrendered militants, and disbursing these sums, with a substantial proportion flowing back to corrupt officials.


\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
Another paradox is that, although the scheme was successful as it brought a number of misguided youth and many senior cadres and leaders back into the mainstream, it failed to stop others from joining militancy. Thus, for example, fresh recruitment drives by ULFA-I in rural areas of eastern Assam, including districts of Tinsukia, Dibrugarh and Sivasagar, especially those hailing from remote areas bordering Arunachal Pradesh and Nagaland, were quite successful.60

Worse, many surrendered militants have also been found to be engaging in unlawful activities, such as extortion. Bhattacharjee has also argued that these schemes give birth to irregular counterinsurgency forces, such as the Surrendered United Liberation Front of Assam (SULFA).61 At one point in time, these were used to eliminate rebels, eventually leading to the infamous ‘secret killings’ from 1998 to 2001. Many inquiry commissions have been instituted into these events, including the K.N. Saikia Commission62 of 2005, but not a single person has been held responsible, so far. Moreover, the primary objective of surrender, which is the social and economic rehabilitation of the militants, also remains substantially unimplemented.

The Government’s efforts for the rehabilitation of families of victims’ of militants through the schemes such as the announcement of ex-gratia relief, has also been very difficult

62 An inquiry commission was set up in 2005 in Assam headed by Justice (Retired) K. N. Saikia on the ‘secret killings between 1998 and 2001’ done during the erstwhile AGP-led Government.
to monitor, and the monies have often not been released. Moreover, such schemes have been seen to fail when there is large-scale devastation due to ethnic clashes.⁶³ In Assam, most of the cases of ethnic clashes are reported in village areas, where people are mostly ignorant of such provisions. Talukdar observes that, in certain cases, “even if the money is deposited, the families may not be aware of how to utilize the money.”⁶⁴ Further, many of the victims from the most vulnerable sections of society often lack the courage to visit a government office to claim the ex-gratia payment.

CONCLUSION

GoI has sought to positively manage the conflicts in Assam, adopting varied approaches, including grant of autonomy, pursuing negotiations, political accords and ceasefire agreements, as well as a range of developmental and rehabilitation programmes. On the ground, however, the State’s engagement in managing conflicts remains reactive rather than preventive or proactive. Peace in the State is measured by the absence of violence and a decline in fatalities, even if insurgent outfits remain active. Moreover, each of the approaches adopted have had limitations, flaws and unintended consequences. In particular, they have catalysed the assertion of a multiplicity of sub-ethnic identities by communities originally outside the scope of militancy. New groups have been provoked to resort to political mobilisation and formation of ethnicity-based armed groups, creating new issues and challenges.

⁶⁴ Ibid.
Conflict Resolution in Assam

The end of an armed conflict does not occur just because of the surrender of arms by rebel groups, or fragments of such groups. In the absence of an inclusive political resolution of disputes, one that ensures a just outcome and a lasting peace, it is incorrect to speak of a resolution of the conflict. Political processes which accommodate divergent demands and aspirations of multiple parties and ethnic groups, encouraging democratic values and popular participation, are integral to the process of conflict resolution.

Part of the problem of many negotiated solutions in Assam is that they have generally been exclusive in nature, and have failed to involve civil society groupings as potential mediators. Elsewhere in the Northeast region of India, civil society representatives have been influential in ending armed conflicts. Involving such entities in the complex negotiations in Assam can help speed up the frequently slow and protracted peace process. GoI must go beyond exclusive bilateral processes that accommodate individual insurgent groups, to extend negotiations into a roundtable format, where the Government invites representatives of various civil society groups representing the complex fabric of community interests in the State. Proper coordination of efforts between the civil administration and the military forces, for the smooth conduct of the conflict resolution approaches, is also a necessity.

Peace in the Assam, indeed, across the Northeast, will not only bring much-needed development to the region, but will also strengthen India’s strategic interests in South and Southeast Asia. In the present and challenging environment, the border States of the Northeast can play an important role in India’s foreign policy. Many on-going projects, such as the Trans-Asian Highway, Kaladan Multi-Model Project, Tri-lateral Highway Project (India-Myanmar-Thailand), are in
critical interface with the border States of the Northeast. These patterns of development can enormously help counter-balance China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region. India’s conflict resolution approach in Assam and the Northeast needs urgently to be revamped, bringing a greater sensitivity to attitudes towards the region.

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I, Ajai Sahni, hereby declare that the particulars given above are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.

October 28, 2018  
(Sd) Ajai Sahni  
Signature of Publisher
The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), China’s vision to channelise its financial outreach as well as its strategic and political influence, has secured tremendous attention in the international community since its launch in 2013. Symbolic of the close relationship between Pakistan and China, the initiative will undeniably influence regional and geopolitical equations within the countries of South Asia and Eurasia.¹

The debates on strategic impact and tangible deliverables under CPEC are a dominant part of Pakistani media and academic discourse, with numerous events held to promote CPEC. There are also various arguments over the alignment of the economic corridor in Pakistan with regional differences, the sustainability of the projects, as well as the employment generation potential for local communities.

¹ This corridor connecting Arabian Sea /Indian Ocean with Western China provides trade and economic opportunities for many Central Asian and South Asian countries to compete for markets in Europe and Africa.
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From the Chinese perspective, the consolidation of political power after the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China under President Xi Jinping will only increase the prominence of flagship initiatives like CPEC as part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)\(^2\) in the 21\(^{st}\) century. CPEC is designed to promote the China-Pakistan strategic relationship in Asia, but will increase the list of differences between India and China. China’s role in South Asia and the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is a major Indian concern and CPEC further promotes an expanding Chinese dominance in the area, as well as military cooperation between China and other countries in the region.

Diplomatic negotiations for CPEC started in May 2013, after the handover of the Gwadar Port to China during the visit of Chinese Premier Li Keqiang to Pakistan. Both sides signed the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on the long term plan for CPEC. Chinese Premier Li Keqiang highlighted the focus on construction of connectivity projects, power generation and energy development under CPEC. A Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC) was set up under the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) of China and the Development Ministry of Pakistan to oversee CPEC.\(^3\)


In April 2015, both the countries signed 51 agreements and Memorandums of Understanding (MoUs) for cooperation in different fields as part of the USD 45 billion CPEC. Agreements worth USD 28 billion were for initiating ‘early harvest’ projects, while the remaining USD 17 billion are for later phases.\textsuperscript{4} In addition, China approved another USD 8.5 billion as added investment in Pakistan’s railways to upgrade tracks and signaling (USD 4.5 billion) and Liquified Natural Gas (LNG) terminal (USD 4 billion), increasing the project cost to USD 53.5 billion.\textsuperscript{5} In April 2017, China approved additional financing for establishment of industrial zones, raising the overall cost of CPEC to USD 62 billion.\textsuperscript{6} The entire investment for CPEC projects comes from China.\textsuperscript{7} However, estimates of the total value of CPEC vary according to the inclusion and exclusion of various projects. Some infrastructure projects were considered and later dropped as part of CPEC. These include five, mostly thermal power projects, with a combined capacity of 3470 MW: Muzaffargarh Coal Power Project (1,320 MW), Salt Range Mine Mouth Power Project (300 MW), Gaddani Power Park (1,320 MW), Sunnec Wind Farm (50 MW), and Chichoki Mallian Combined-cycle Power Plant (525 MW).


These were considered technically unfeasible and therefore, removed from CPEC projects in February 2017.\(^8\)

CPEC will be executed in three phases. In the first phase, 12 energy projects generating 5000 MegaWatt (MW) of electricity were to be completed over the 2017-18 period. The medium-term projects would be completed by 2025, while the long-term projects of CPEC would be completed by the year 2030.\(^9\) However, as reported on March 31, 2018, Pakistan’s Interior Minister, Ahsan Iqbal has already announced the revision of the deadline for the first phase to 2020, adding that USD 35 billion are to be invested in the power sector out of a total of USD 46 billion allocated for the CPEC projects in the first phase.\(^10\) China will finance the larger part of CPEC through soft loans, grants, commercial loans and and private equity investment. CPEC energy projects are funded with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) by Chinese firms and commercial loans at the rate of six to seven percent from Chinese banks. The transportation projects’ finance is provided by the Chinese Government and the state-owned Chinese banks mostly as concessional loans at 2 to 2.4 percent of interest rate.\(^11\)

The Long Term Plan (LTP)\(^12\) prepared by China Development Bank includes provisions for financial guarantees

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for credit enhancement support in the funding of infrastructure projects, increases in supporting capacity, and protection of the interests of creditors of CPEC. The measures suggested by China Development Bank will protect the investments of Chinese investors and promote their interests. The LTP states that China’s maximum annual direct investment in Pakistan is expected to be around USD 1 billion. Pakistan’s ceiling for preferential loans should be USD 1 billion, and for non-preferential loans no more than USD 1.5 billion per year. However, Pakistan received USD 4.4 billion in first ten months in the financial year (July 2017-April 2018) as bilateral and commercial loans from China.\textsuperscript{13}

Increasing the role of Chinese currency, Renminbi (RMB) in the economy of Pakistan is a major objective of CPEC.\textsuperscript{14} The LTP published on CPEC’s official website\textsuperscript{15} on December 18, 2017, jointly by Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform, Government of Pakistan and National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), People’s Republic of China, lacks complete information on the projects and does not include recommendations of the China Developmental Bank’s conditionalities related to the projects’ finances. The document provides no information on reaching of targets or goals under CPEC, working of the bidding system, terms of the project, employment policies, and the measures to preserve and protect heritage, ecology, wildlife and local livelihoods. Prior to CPEC, various developmental and economic investment


documents, including International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreements, were open for public viewing in Pakistan.\textsuperscript{16} The absence of comprehensive details of CPEC projects and their financing patterns creates ambiguity and even the projected value at USD 62 billion is uncertain.

**EXPECTATIONS AND PROSPECTS**

China’s global image has changed after four decades of rapid economic growth with massive infrastructure and industrial development in the fields of transportation, energy generation, irrigation and urbanisation. China’s economic growth led to millions of its population emerging from poverty. According to a January, 2018 report, 55.6 million people were brought out of poverty in China in just the three years between 2014 and 2016.\textsuperscript{17} China’s export-oriented growth model has increased prosperity and foreign exchange reserves, the latter by nearly four times in twelve years (2005-2017), as reflected in the People’s Bank of China data of the foreign exchange reserves from 2005 to 2017:

**TABLE 1- CHINA’S FOREIGN EXCHANGE RESERVES (2005-17)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Foreign Exchange Reserves of China (in Trillion USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>0.81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>1.06</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Chinese foreign exchange reserves increased almost five times from 800 billion USD to 3.84 trillion USD over 2005-2014. Chinese President Xi Jinping described the new economic growth period as the “new normal” in May 2014, with sustained medium to high growth rates, the development of BRI and promotion of innovation. China’s economic power with substantial foreign exchange reserves created conditions for launching of flagship programs such as the Silk Road.

Source: State Administration of Foreign Exchanges, Government of China

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Reserve (Trillion USD)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>1.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>1.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>2.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>2.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>3.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>3.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>3.82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>3.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>3.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>3.01</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>3.13</td>
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</tbody>
</table>


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Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road.\(^\text{20}\) The CPEC project was also announced around the same time, in May 2013.

The Chinese interest in the development of infrastructure projects in countries like Pakistan as part of CPEC is meant to provide economic opportunities for its own enterprises and skilled labor from China under the ‘new normal’ economic growth conditions.

Chinese President Xi Jinping highlighted the Gwadar Port, energy, infrastructure development and industrial cooperation as part of CPEC to promote pragmatic cooperation leading to the distribution of fruits to the people of Pakistan and other countries. The significance of strengthening mutual assistance and deepening strategic cooperation with frequent exchanges of high-level visits and meetings were highlighted by Jinping in his official message on CPEC.\(^\text{21}\) CPEC is considered as a solution to many issues, including the stagnant economy, terrorism, energy shortages and poor infrastructure in Pakistan. The requirement of foreign investment in Pakistan’s economy is to be addressed through CPEC with technological and economic assistance from China, resulting in a fiscal boom

\(^{20}\) Chinese President Xi Jinping announced Silk Road Economic Belt in September 2013, on a visit to Kazakhstan. While, 21st century Maritime Silk Road was announced by Xi Jinping during a visit to Indonesia in October 2013. The six corridors identified for Silk Road Economic Belt are New Eurasian Land Bridge; China-Mongolia-Russia; China-Central Asia- West Asia; the China- Indochina Peninsula Corridor; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Corridor. While, Maritime Silk Road specifies two routes – one to the ports in Mediterranean and another to the South Pacific.Veysel Tekdal, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: at the crossroads of challenges and ambitions”, Pacific Review, 2018, Volume 31, Issue 3, pp. 373-374.

and job opportunities for Pakistani citizens. The integration of China with South Asia, Central Asia and West Asia through Gwadar Port is not just an economic but significantly strategic initiative, intended to provide energy security for China and strategic security for Pakistan, purportedly resulting in ‘win-win cooperation’.

China’s assistance and participation in the development of Pakistan’s infrastructure has been a principal feature of their diplomatic relations of more than 50 years. Infrastructure projects like the Karakoram Highway and Gwadar Deep Sea Port; technological projects such as the Chashma Power Plants and massive mechanical and electrical complexes, display extensive ‘cooperation’ between both countries. The bilateral relations with neighboring countries are significant as the foundation for China’s global role.22

There is active cooperation on security issues between China and Pakistan as well. In 2014, the then Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Sun Weidong highlighted the sharing of “weal and woe” in security issues. China endorsed Pakistan’s position on the formulation and implementation of counter-terrorism strategy based on Pakistan’s perceived ‘national conditions’. China’s security cooperation and ‘joint fight’ against terrorist forces in Pakistan are ostensibly intended to promote regional peace and security.23


China has utilised the trilateral dialogue process with Pakistan and Afghanistan to promote its counter-terrorism and BRI agenda. The first trilateral dialogue involving foreign ministers of China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, was held on December 26, 2017, in Beijing. The three countries agreed to ‘fight terrorism of all kinds’ and promote connectivity under BRI, and called for the Afghan Taliban to join the peace process in Afghanistan on this trilateral platform.\footnote{Joint Press Release of the 1st China-Afghanistan-Pakistan Foreign Ministers’ Dialogue, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The People’s Republic of China, December 26, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1522147.shtml.} China had also conducted meetings with Taliban representatives on the security conditions in Afghanistan in 2016. Taliban official claimed of having ‘good terms’ with a few countries including China. A group of four states, Afghanistan, Pakistan, United States and China tried to restart the peace process in 2016.\footnote{Afghan Taliban delegation visits China to discuss unrest: sources, Reuters, July 30, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-taliban-china-idUSKCN10A09H.}

The bilateral trade between China and Pakistan hugely favours China with an augmenting trade surplus between 2005 and 2012 (Table.2). The trade surplus has almost tripled for China, even while Pakistani exports have increased nearly four times from 0.8 billion USD in 2005 to 3.14 billion USD in 2012. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s trade deficit increased to USD 12.7 billion in 2017.\footnote{“China agrees to accommodate Pakistan’s concerns on FTA”, Dawn, February 9, 2018, https://www.dawn.com/news/1388207.} China’s trade surplus with Pakistan has increased nearly five times from 2.6 billion USD in 2005 to 12.7 billion USD in 2017. These trade imbalances in favour of China will inevitably create multiple difficulties for Pakistan’s economy. Pakistan has imported goods worth USD 5.6 billion...
in January 2018.\textsuperscript{27} The country’s foreign exchange reserves stood at USD 10.3 billion in June 2018\textsuperscript{28} and further declined to USD 8.089 billion on October 12, 2018.\textsuperscript{29} However, Pakistan imported goods worth USD 4.4 billion in September, 2018.\textsuperscript{30} These foreign exchange reserves are not enough to cover two months of imports. The shortage of foreign exchange reserves will create a balance of payment crisis for Pakistan. The debt repayment of CPEC loans for Pakistan will be around USD 1.5-1.9 billion in 2019 and increasing to USD 3-3.5 billion in 2020.\textsuperscript{31} Debt repayments and the trade deficit could lead to a cyclical debt trap.\textsuperscript{32}

\textbf{Table. 2 China-Pakistan bilateral trade (2005-2012) (unit: Billion USD)}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total Trade</th>
<th>China’s Exports to Pakistan</th>
<th>China’s Imports from Pakistan</th>
<th>China’s trade surplus</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2005</td>
<td>4.26</td>
<td>3.43</td>
<td>.83</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


\textsuperscript{29} “Foreign Exchange: SBP’s reserves fall $219m, stand at $8.1b”, \textit{The Express Tribune}, October 18, 2018, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1828791/2-foreign-exchange-sbps-reserves-fall-219m-stand-8-1b/.


\textsuperscript{31} Hu Weijia, “China’s loans to Pakistan should drive economic development, lift debt payment ability”, \textit{Global Times}, May 27, 2018, http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1104333.shtml.

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Value 1</th>
<th>Value 2</th>
<th>Value 3</th>
<th>Value 4</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>5.25</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>3.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2007</td>
<td>6.54</td>
<td>5.43</td>
<td>1.11</td>
<td>4.32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>6.98</td>
<td>5.98</td>
<td>1.01</td>
<td>4.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>6.78</td>
<td>5.52</td>
<td>1.26</td>
<td>4.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>8.66</td>
<td>6.93</td>
<td>1.72</td>
<td>5.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>10.56</td>
<td>8.44</td>
<td>2.12</td>
<td>6.31</td>
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<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>12.41</td>
<td>9.27</td>
<td>3.14</td>
<td>6.13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: Website of the Chinese Embassy to Pakistan*  

Significantly, CPEC construction has resulted in many Chinese nationals working and living in Pakistan. A total of 5,824 Chinese nationals were working in the country in December 2012. By December 2017, their number had increased up to 30,000. CPEC construction has increased the employment opportunities for Chinese nationals, but the terrorist threat has the potential to directly impact on bilateral relations. In June 2017, Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain stated that the protection of Chinese working in Pakistan was a ‘top most priority’ for the Government and added that 15,000

military personnel had already been deployed to safeguard Chinese nationals working on energy and infrastructure projects in the country.37

The Joint Statement issued during the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) highlighted the friendly relations between both the two states. China acknowledged Pakistan’s consistent endorsement of issues related to China’s ‘core interests’.38 The Statement asserted that the nature of bilateral relations helped both the countries to understand and include their mutual concerns/threats in their policy planning and reiterated China’s firm commitment towards Pakistan’s efforts to uphold its independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity. China also appreciated the Pakistan’s ‘sacrifices’ in the fight against global terrorism.39 Under flagship initiatives such as CPEC, institutional mechanisms like working groups and joint coordination committees have been created and China’s state-owned enterprises and private investors have been encouraged to invest in Pakistan.40 Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Yao Jing claimed that 22 of the total 43 ‘early harvest projects’ worth around USD19 billion were under

38 Some Chinese scholars argue that China should assert and defend its core interests in a global order, which is not facilitating China’s rise as a global power. Jinghen Zhen, Yuefan Xiao and Shaun Breslin, “Securing China’s core interests: the state of the debate in China” International Affairs, Volume 91, Issue 2, p.246.
40 Ibid.
construction or completed, and that 70,000 jobs had been generated for Pakistan by April 2018.  

The visible benefits to China under the CPEC initiative include decrease of distance and efficient systems for supplies; rapid development of China’s backward Xinjiang and North-Western regions; alternate and short route to West Asian and African markets from China via Gwadar Port; Chinese interests in Pakistan’s energy sector and mineral resources and Gwadar Port development with modern infrastructure, among others. Gwadar provides easy access from China to the Arabian Sea and offers Chinese cargo direct access to the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), avoiding the Malacca Straits and reducing the 12,000 kilometers distance to just 3,000 kilometers. The initial pilot cargo was dispatched from Gwadar in November 2016 to Africa, Europe, and West Asia. Moreover, China can also launch naval expeditions from Gwadar in IOR and dominate the Persian Sea from Gwadar. In the present scenario, China has maintained a distance from regional and global religious conflicts and maintains friendly diplomatic relations with the majority of Islamic countries. China is not a primary victim or target of global religious terrorism and has not presented itself as a threat to any nation on the basis of religion.

During his visit to China in 2006, then Pakistan President General Pervez Musharraf initially proposed the development of two ‘corridors’, the ‘energy corridor’ and ‘trade corridor’, connecting China and Pakistan with railways and energy pipelines. Pakistan handed over the operations and the necessary infrastructure development of Gwadar Port to China in 2013. The construction of the Karakoram Highway (KKH) is a joint upgradation project connecting China with South Asia. Pakistan’s target is to become a high middle-income country with a per capita GDP of USD 4,200 by 2025 under its ‘CPEC Vision 2025’. The project envisages the potential to transform Pakistan into the hub of business and trade in Asia, even as it sees Xinjiang reaching out to markets in Europe and Asia.

The Long Term Plan (LTP) signed between China and Pakistan for the future development of CPEC during the 2017-2030 timeframe has identified Kashgar, Atushi, Tumshuq, Shule, Shufu, Akto, Tashkurgam Tajik, Gilgit, Peshawar, Peshawar, Dera Ismail Khan, Lahore, Multan, Quetta, Sukkur,...

48 “LTP is a Chinese government document finalized in December 2015 by the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the China Development Bank. The LTP in its original form is more than 250 pages long; a greatly abridged version of only 36 pages was released to the public in December 2017, simply to stave off growing criticism about a lack of transparency – secrecy, even – in CPEC-related matters”. Aasim Sajjar Akhtar, “The China–Pakistan Economic Corridor”, Monthly Review, June 1, 2018, https://monthlyreview.org/2018/06/01/the-china-pakistan-economic-corridor/.
Hyderabad, Karachi, and Gwadar as major CPEC in both countries. The connectivity between Lahore and Peshawar, Quetta and Sukkur, and Karachi and Gwadar are the ‘three axes’ in the projected future CPEC road map.49

The energy shortages in Pakistan are also to be addressed with the construction of multiple power generation plants. Around 17,000 MW of electricity worth around USD 34 billion, is to be generated by power projects under CPEC. Again, the development of optical cable networks linking the two countries is intended to improve communication networks. The Gwadar seaport offers a potential naval base for Pakistan,50 part of a joint security mechanism between the two countries. This security cooperation is intended to address the problems both of Pakistan and China’s Xinjiang region, especially as these have been conceptualized in the wake of the September 2001 attacks in the US. The project seeks to Sino-Pakistan naval collaboration, particularly in joint exercises and training against piracy on the Open Seas. Power dominance dynamics in the Indian Ocean compel Pakistan and China to draw close in a naval alliance, with Gwadar Port potentially being developed as a naval base in the future.51

Some of Pakistan’s objectives with regard to CPEC are to build infrastructure, to improve the transportation and industrial sectors, eradicate terrorism through economic progress, sustenance and expansion of the Gwadar Port project, and the

51 Ibid.
promotion of military cooperation with China.\textsuperscript{52} The Chinese capital as part of CPEC is expected increase Pakistan’s GDP by 15 percent.\textsuperscript{53}

**THREATS AND CONCERNS**

The menace of terrorism and activities of various Baloch insurgent formations are potential threats to CPEC in Pakistan. The stability of Afghanistan is also a critical factor in the implementation of China’s related flagship initiative on BRI and Xinjiang, and will have significant impact on China-Pakistan relations.\textsuperscript{54} The security of Chinese working in CPEC projects is another urgent concern. In June 2017, two Chinese citizens who were teaching Mandarin, were abducted by terrorists in Quetta, Balochistan, one of the main locations of CPEC component projects. Pakistan subsequently confirmed the killing of the abducted Chinese nationals, even as Islamic State (IS) terrorists claimed the incident. Following this gruesome act, in December 2017, the Chinese Embassy warned Chinese organisations and its nationals working in Pakistan to be alert for potential terror attacks. The alert called for Chinese nationals to stay vigilant, safeguard personal security, avoid crowded places, and reduce time spent outside in Pakistan.

The high costs of providing security to an expanding workforce of skilled Chinese employed in CPEC projects will further increase the maintenance costs. Nevertheless, in September 2014, the then Chinese Ambassador to India, Le

\begin{footnotesize}

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid.

\end{footnotesize}
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Yucheng, described Pakistan as a victim of terrorism, along with India and China. He highlighted effective coordination between China and Pakistan against the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and other terroristic forces and asserted that the causes of terrorism were complicated, and that it would take a long process to resolve them. China’s domestic concerns in the Xinjiang region, emerging from terroristic threats from ETIM, impact on China’s policy towards Pakistan and the development of CPEC. The construction of CPEC has the potential to promote economic growth in Xinjiang region of China and in Pakistan, creating employment opportunities for local communities and addressing the challenges of terrorism. According to a 2013 Joint Statement, both countries consider ETIM as a common threat and stand united in fighting against this group.55

There are many concerns that have been raised by civil society and minority groups in Pakistan on various aspects of CPEC. Baloch activists have articulated fears that the increasing number of migrants from other parts of Pakistan will result in a demographic transformation of the region with the implementation of CPEC, even as concerns have been expressed regarding the massive influx of Chinese workers.56 According to the report released in December 2016 by the Federation of Pakistan Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FPCCI) Chinese nationals in Balochistan exceed the Baloch

population by 2048, engineering a radical demographic transformation. The report estimates the inflow of more than 600,000 Chinese nationals per year into Pakistan under CPEC and related developments.\(^{57}\) Similarly, CPEC is looked upon as a threat to the economic, cultural, and geographic existence of Sindhi and Balochi populations, and is perceived as a Punjabi expansionist conspiracy to increase hegemony over the provinces of Sindh and Balochistan.\(^{58}\) CPEC is widely viewed as yet another state-sponsored effort to rob the Baloch people of their resources in the guise of “development”, causing local resentment.\(^{59}\) Protests against CPEC have been organised by various Baloch and Sindhi groups inside and outside Pakistan. There were joint protests organised by Sindhi and Baloch associations in front of the Chinese Embassy in London in January 2018.\(^{60}\) China also faces a threat from Uighur militants in the Xinjiang province, against CPEC construction.

Pakistan is committed to setting up a military division headed by a two-star general to ensure security of the projected trade routes, comprising Force Protection Battalions (FPBn). CPEC safety is already monitored by the National Counterterrorism Center at Pabbi in the Nowshera District of

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the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Province. Similarly, the Pakistan Navy has created a separate force consisting of Pakistan Marines for the security of the Gwadar Port and of Chinese personnel there, Task Force-88. The formation of the special maritime force had been necessitated by the operationalisation of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, which is likely to lead to a surge in maritime activity at Gwadar, considered to be the nodal point for CPEC and the sea lanes. This has, in turn, amplified the maritime vulnerabilities there. The task force is conceptualized as a force multiplier for overall CPEC security.

According to February 2018 reports, Pakistani officials, have welcomed the talks between Baloch rebels and Chinese envoys. An un-named official in Islamabad observed, “Ultimately, if there’s peace in Balochistan, that will benefit both of us.” The Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan, Yao Jing has also stated that militants in Balochistan were ‘no longer’ a threat to the economic corridor. One provincial tribal leader confirmed that many young men had been persuaded to lay down their weapons due to assurances of financial benefits: “Today, young men are not getting attracted to join the insurgents as they did some 10 years ago,” adding that “Many people see prosperity” as an outcome of the China-Pakistan corridor.

On it’s part, Pakistan is also trying to extend cooperation to the Chinese at official level, to ensure proper implementation of

CPEC. The then Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, along with four Chief Ministers, attended China’s Belt and Road Summit held on May 14-15, 2017. The attendance of all four provincial Chief Ministers was intended to display national unity on the issue. Significantly, many concerns raised by the provinces regarding regional disparities under the project were said to have been resolved after meetings with Chinese officials.64

Provincial differences have emerged on the selection and prioritisation of the Eastern route65 under CPEC. The Eastern route will cross only very few areas of Balochistan and Khyber Pukhtunkhwa (KP), and prioritised ostensibly in view of Pakistan’s security concerns.66

Pakistan’s security challenges, particularly emerging from various terrorist formations acting there, or operating in the neighbourhood with Pakistani state support, are a defining factor with regard to the country’s capabilities to attract foreign investment, the movement of capital and people, and to promote economic growth. Terrorist and insurgent violence also constitutes a direct obstacle to the efficient execution of infrastructure projects under CPEC. On May 14, 2017,

Kota Mallikarjuna Gupta

for instance, 10 Pakistani nationals were killed by Baloch Liberation Army cadres in Gwador in what is only one of the many attacks against workers.\(^67\) The South Asia Terrorism Portal (SATP) provides data on province/region wise data of terrorism-related fatalities in Pakistan between 2011 and 2017:

**Table. 3 – Region wise fatalities list of Pakistan**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Balochistan</th>
<th>Sindh</th>
<th>KP</th>
<th>FATA</th>
<th>Punjab</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>1211</td>
<td>1206</td>
<td>3034</td>
<td>137</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>1553</td>
<td>656</td>
<td>2901</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>1668</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>1716</td>
<td>81</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>653</td>
<td>1180</td>
<td>617</td>
<td>2863</td>
<td>180</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>635</td>
<td>718</td>
<td>268</td>
<td>1882</td>
<td>176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2016</td>
<td>633</td>
<td>271</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>243</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>158</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal*\(^68\)

SATP data demonstrates that fatalities in Balochistan, Sindh, KP and FATA are consistently and dramatically higher than in Punjab. The high incidence of terrorist-related violence on CPEC’s Western routes\(^69\) across these troubled provinces, is a major concern for multiple stakeholders in this project.

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China and Pakistan have agreed to a four-layered security plan to guard the 3,000 kilometer-long economic corridor. Significantly, 32,000 security personnel are already deployed to provide security to 14,321 Chinese workers in Pakistan. Pakistan has also raised a Special Security Division (SSD) with nine infantry divisions, estimated around 13,700 personnel, and six civilian armed forces, for the protection of the CPEC projects.

**THE PROGRESS OF CPEC PROJECTS**

The major energy projects under CPEC that have already been completed include one 1320 MW Coal Power plant each at Port Qasim, Karachi, and Sahiwal, Punjab. Another two 1320 MW Thermal power plants are planned in the Thar Block of Sindh, and at Hub in the Lasbela District of Balochistan. The 1000 MW Quaid-e-Azam Solar Park is planned in Bahawalpur, Punjab. The Kohala Hydel Project in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) projected capacity of 1100 MW and Suki Kinari Hydropower Station in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with capacity of 870 MW are major hydero electric projects.

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70 "This security plan will include a new security policy to provide security to nearly 210 small and medium projects of CPEC. Nearly 500 Chinese security personnel are part of the plan for increasing capacities of Pakistani security personnel guarding CPEC. According to this plan, Balochistan province will have more security personnel to safeguard CPEC projects and personnel", Zahid Gishkori, “Economic corridor: Pakistan, China agree on four-layer security”, *The Express Tribune*, November 1, 2015, https://tribune.com.pk/story/983033/economic-corridor-pakistan-china-agree-on-four-layer-security/.

71 The Special Security Division (SSD) will have 13, 700 personnel to secure CPEC projects and provide protection to Chinese workers. Retired army personnel will be hired for SSD to secure CPEC. “Special Security Division established to secure CPEC" , *The Express Tribune*, January 22, 2017, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1303428/special-security-division-established-secure-cpec/.
planned under CPEC. A total of six coal-fired power plants are to generate a capacity of 7920 MW.\textsuperscript{72}

Five energy projects out of total 21 listed on the official CPEC website have been completed and are operational. Four are under construction. Two major thermal power plants are operational and generating 2640 MW electricity. In both these projects, the primary energy input is coal. Energy generation from renewable sources like solar, wind or hydro constitutes a very small element under CPEC.

Thermal power plants located in Port Qasim (Sindh) and Sahiwal (Punjab) operate on imported coal. Having been constructed using dated Chinese technology, the power plants are raising significant environmental concerns and questions about their long-term sustainability and profitability. There are also multiple concerns over the pattern of finance provided by the Chinese for these coal-fired power plants. Pakistan has guaranteed up to a 34.49\textsuperscript{73} per cent annual profit on equity invested in the thermal projects and loans have been obtained at a six per cent rate of interest, which increases to 13 per cent with the inclusion of insurance costs. The assured return on equity for coal-fired power plants was between 27.2 to 34.49 percent,\textsuperscript{74} double the standard of 17 per cent rates at the upper end. The tariff for thermal power plants averaged Pakistani Rupees (PKR) 8.3 per unit in CPEC thermal power plants, though energy experts argue that the actual tariff was far higher than this projected average.\textsuperscript{75}

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
CPEC infrastructure projects include both road and rail networks. According to the official CPEC website, a total of five highway projects totalling 968 kilometers, with an estimated cost of USD 5,341 million, are planned. However, only two highway projects covering 512 kilometres, which include Karakoram Highway Phase II (Thakot- Havelian Section -120 kilometers) and Peshawar-Karachi Motarway (Multan-Sukkur Section- 392 kilometers) with a projected cost of USD 4,346 million, are currently under construction, and three railway projects with an estimated costs USD 8,172 million are planned, but are still at the documentation stage, with construction yet to commence.\textsuperscript{76} CPEC also envisions construction and upgradation of highways in Pakistan across various routes over thousands of kilometers. However, only the Multan-Sukkur section on CPEC’s Eastern route is yet under construction.

Future CPEC projects at Gawdar also include the construction of an expressway, international airport, the development of a free zone, friendship hospital, technical and vocational institute, development of Gwadar university, etc. The construction of the Gwadar East-Bay Expressway, with an estimated cost of USD 140.6 million, is currently underway.\textsuperscript{77} Significant projects related to Gwadar seaport still need administrative approval. However, the Lahore Orange Line Metro, part of CPEC, is scheduled to be completed within 2018. The trial run for the Lahore Metro was conducted in February 2018 for a distance of 12 kilometers.\textsuperscript{78} The feasibility studies for Special Economic Zones (SEZ’s) have been conducted

and shared by Pakistan with China. Land has been acquired for one SEZ project under CPEC.\textsuperscript{79} Some CPEC projects in Gwadar are in the construction stage, while some are still in documentation stage.

Significantly, the extension of deadlines to complete CPEC’s first phase and increasing variations in the cost of component project, highlight the bottlenecks and difficulties that are already hobbling the execution of various projects on schedule. According to Pakistan’s Interior Minister, the revised deadline for completion of the first phase of CPEC has been pushed to 2020,\textsuperscript{80} from the originally planned 2017.\textsuperscript{81} Further, on August 19, 2016, the decision of Lahore High Court to suspend the construction works on the USD 1.6 billion Orange Line Metro (OLMT) at 11 historical sites in Lahore city, which is a part of CPEC, was set aside by Supreme Court of Pakistan in December 2017. The initial deadline to complete this project was 25 December, 2017\textsuperscript{82} and the project is only now set to resume. Such difficulties resulted in extended deadlines and delays in the Lahore Metro project.

Pakistan’s Federal Cabinet members have also raised the issue of the absence of the agricultural sector as part of CPEC, which was admitted by the Interior Minister, Ahsan Iqbal in

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{79} CPEC Special Economic Zones, CPEC, http://cpec.gov.pk/special-economic-zones-projects.
\end{itemize}
April 2018. Similarly, Pakistan’s water crisis has not been addressed under CPEC, and there is no project in the first phase to ease Pakistan’s future water concerns. The monopoly enjoyed by Chinese companies and Pakistan Government curbs on participation of local Pakistani firms has increased CPEC costs and also militates against the basic rights of Pakistani companies. The tough financial terms imposed by China to finance the USD 14 billion Diamer-Basha Dam resulted in Pakistan’s decision to delink the project from CPEC. China has also delayed finance to three infrastructure projects – the 210 kilometer Dera Ismail Khan-Zhob Road; the 110 kilometer Khuzdar-Basima Road; and the 136 kilometer portion remaining of the Karakarom Highway (KKH) from Raikot to Thakot, after Pakistani media reported corruption issues in CPEC projects in December 2017. These projects will have new sets of guidelines for finance, after China has established a new institution – China Aid. The concessional loans financed by China will be transferred from it’s Ministry of Commerce to China Aid. The problem of corruption charges and institutional changes have created issues for many CPEC projects.

Significantly, Japan had offered to finance Pakistan at rates cheaper than China for infrastructure creation as part of CPEC. However, Pakistan was forced to reject Japan’s offer after facing Chinese resistance.\(^8^9\) 75 percent of Pakistan’s loans during 2013-2018 have been for budgetary support and increasing foreign exchange reserves. High debt levels are consuming over 30 percent of the Pakistan Government budget on account of debt servicing cost.\(^9^0\) Pakistan’s total debt stands at USD 91.8 billion and is expected to reach up to USD 144 billion in the next five years (2018-2023).\(^9^1\) Pakistan’s economy will have to face tough economic conditions going forward, to manage the balance of payments crisis and increasing debt levels.

**The Indian response**

The Indian Government has consistently opposed CPEC, particularly with regard to projects located in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), parts of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) that Pakistan has illegally controlled since 1947. CPEC disregards Indian concerns over sovereignty and territorial integrity, according to the Ministry of External Affairs.\(^9^2\) India has also urged China to engage in meaningful dialogue

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regarding the BRI. India was one of the few countries in South Asia to boycott the Belt and Road Summit hosted by China in May 2017. While India and China are founding members in infrastructure investment banks like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), India has strong reservations regarding CPEC, apart from its problems with BRI.

The Indian Government has emphasised connectivity within global norms of good governance, rule of law, openness, transparency and equality. Crucially, infrastructure projects should not create an unsustainable debt burden for local communities, neglect concerns of ecological and environmental preservation and conservation standards, transparency, transfer of knowledge, skill and of technologies to the target country, and has expressed strong concerns regarding neglect of these considerations with regard to the CPEC and BRI projects.

In an alternative thrust, India has sought to promote connectivity across the region through ‘Trilateral Highway’ and multi-modal linkages with Myanmar and Bangladesh, as well as through the development of the Chabahar Port in Iran, partly in response to the challenges created by CPEC. Making India’s position on CPEC clear to the international community, Defence Minister Nirmala Sitharaman noted at the VIIth Moscow Conference on International Security on April 2, 2018, that there was a need to work towards increasing areas of convergence, and to reduce differences in a multi-polar world.

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93 Ibid.
She emphasised that there was no scope for expansionism, one-sided approaches, or for beggar-thy-neighbour policies.\textsuperscript{96}

China has tried to negotiate with India on various issues relating to CPEC and BRI. On April 28, 2018, China’s Vice Foreign Minister Kong Xuanyou stated, “As for whether India accepts the expression Belt and Road (BRI includes CPEC), I think it is not important and China will not be too hard on it”.\textsuperscript{97}

Seetharaman’s statement on a multi-polar world can be linked to China’s infrastructure initiatives in various countries, which are facing opposition from determined sections of society. The opposition to China-led infrastructure projects has been articulated in countries like Sri Lanka and Malaysia, apart from Pakistan. In Sri Lankan, January 2017 saw popular protests at Hambantota against the pattern of Chinese investment, leading to a Chinese takeover of the Port.\textsuperscript{98} Similarly, in May 2018, Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad of Malaysia stated that that he would seek to renegotiate the ‘unequal treaties’ of the East Coast Railway Project in Malaysia with the Chinese.\textsuperscript{99}

In February 2018, India has secured access to the Duqm Port in Oman for military use and logistical support, as part of its strategy to counter Chinese influence and activities in the


region. This port is strategically located, in close proximity to the Chabahar port in Iran, overlooking the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean. Moreover, the first consignment of wheat assistance to Afghanistan from India via Chabahar Port was delivered in November 2017. India and Afghanistan also established an Air Freight Corridor from Delhi to Kabul, when the first flight transported cargo on June 18, 2017. As reported on June 16, 2017, Indian Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) Spokesperson Gopal Baglay had disclosed that the cargo service would use Pakistani airspace as a civil cargo plane and standard operating procedures, as stipulated, would be followed by flight operators.

**Tangibles and Strategic Concerns**

CPEC is expected to further increase strategic competition between India and China in both Central and West Asia, regions abundant in energy and mineral resources. China is developing alternate routes to transport energy resources and cargo through CPEC, while India is still searching for options to improve connectivity across Eurasia. Moreover, Chinese

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diplomacy to engage various terror groups like the Afghan Taliban and BLA is expected to amplify Chinese interference and influence in domestic issues within the region. China’s diplomatic engagement with terror organisations could have unpredictable results for both Pakistan and the region at large.

CPEC’s development in Pakistan also creates long-term strategic concerns, such as the transformation of Gwadar into a naval base for both China and Pakistan, against India. The military uses of CPEC projects and infrastructure in Pakistan will augment the threat to India. India may seek to design and plan infrastructure and connectivity projects, creating local employment and economic growth for other countries, such as Iran, Afghanistan and Myanmar. India’s counter to CPEC demands financial and technological capabilities to execute various infrastructure projects across IOR. The promotion of clean and green energy in Pakistan’s neighborhood, including Afghanistan, also has the potential to initiate new narratives on energy projects, in contrast to CPEC’s environmentally destructive approach.

The tangibles from CPEC’s massive infrastructure projects overwhelmingly favour China’s interests, promote Chinese companies and firms, increasing Chinese exports, capturing markets for Chinese goods, and forcing long term deals in Pakistan, all in favour of China. On its part, Pakistan is receiving capital for developing infrastructure as part of CPEC, but on terms that are likely force it into a crippling debt trap that will eventually result in the transfer of assets and a creeping erosion of sovereignty. China’s rising influence in Pakistan, moreover, will create challenges for India’s foreign policy.