Brief on

ISLAMIST EXTREMISM & TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA

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January 2004

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Pakistan – The Core Issue

1. The core issue of instability and violence in South Asia is the character, activities and persistence of the militarized Islamist-fundamentalist state in Pakistan, and no cure for this canker can be arrived at through any strategy of negotiations, support and financial aid to the military regime, or by a ‘calibrated’ transition to ‘democracy’.

2. **Footprints of Terror:** The ‘footprint’ of every major act of international Islamist terrorism invariably passes through Pakistan, right from 9/11 – where virtually all the participants had trained, resided or met in, coordinated with, or received funding from or through Pakistan – to major acts of terrorism across South Asia and South East Asia, as well as major networks of terror that have been discovered in Europe.

3. **The State as Suicide Bomber:** Pakistan has harvested an enormous price for its supposed ‘cooperation’ with the US, and in this it has combined deception and blackmail – including nuclear blackmail – to secure a continuous stream of concessions. Its conduct is little different from that of North Korea, which has in the past chosen the pathway of nuclear escalation to secure incremental aid from Western donors. A pattern of sustained nuclear blackmail has consistently been at the heart of Pakistan’s case for concessions, aid and a heightened threshold of international tolerance for its sponsorship and support to Islamist terrorism. To understand how this works, it is useful to conceive of Pakistan as a state acting as a suicide bomber, arguing that, if it does not receive the extraordinary dispensations and indulgences that it seeks, it will, in effect ‘implode’, and in the process do extraordinary harm to others. Part of the threat of this ‘implosion’ is also the specter of the transfer of its nuclear arsenal and capabilities to more intransigent and irrational elements of the Islamist far right in Pakistan, who would not be amenable to the logic that its present rulers – whose interests in terrorism are strategic, and consequently, subject to considerations of strategic advantage – are willing to heed. This is the bluff that the Musharraf dictatorship has confronted the world with, and it has allowed the General to dismiss an elected government; to rig elections; to continue supporting the operation of terrorist groups from, and the existence of their infrastructure on, Pakistani soil; and despite all this, to secure massive financial and political rewards, instead of the natural penalties that should have attached to such criminality of conduct.
3.1 As is the case with North Korea, Pakistan’s possession of nuclear weapons pushes the world’s ‘threshold of tolerance’ much higher than would be the case in dealing with a non-nuclear entity. It is not possible to deal with a nuclearized Pakistan on the same terms as a non-nuclear Afghanistan or Iraq. Pakistan is aware of its power, and has not hesitated to use it to extract maximal concessions. Even though it does not have capabilities of directly threatening US interests, it can use patterns of ‘lateral deterrence’, threatening to use its arsenal against other states friendly to the US.

3.2 It is crucial to note in this context that, if the Islamist terrorist groups gain access to nuclear devices, Pakistan will almost certainly be the source. In October 2002, after the US had discovered clinching evidence of contacts between bin Laden and two prominent Pakistani nuclear scientists, Pakistan had been forced to arrest these scientists – Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid. According to American sources, a third Pakistani nuclear scientist had tried to negotiate the sale of an atomic weapon design to Libya. Eventually, however, Pakistan simply decided not to press criminal charges against any of these scientists. At least another six Pakistani scientists connected with the country’s nuclear programme were in contact with Al Qaeda and bin Laden.

3.3 Pakistan has projected the electoral victory of the fundamentalist and pro-Taliban, pro-Al Qaeda Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) in the November elections as ‘proof’ that the military is the only ‘bulwark’ against the country passing into the hands of the extremists. The fact, however, is that the elections were widely rigged, and this was a fact acknowledged by the European Union observers, as well as by some of the MMA’s constituents themselves. The MMA victory was, in fact, substantially engineered by the Musharraf regime, as are the various anti-US ‘mass demonstrations’ around the country.

3.4 Nevertheless, whenever there has been sufficient international – and particularly US – pressure on Pakistan to act against this lobby, Pakistan has reluctantly cooperated, with no significant demonstrations of ‘public anger’ from the extremist lobby. In the process, the Musharraf regime, after taking some initial and token action against various Islamist extremist groups in the country – including the Jaish-e-Mohammed, the Lashkar-e-Toiba, and the Harkat-ul-
Mujahideen, all of which are on the US list of international terrorist organisations now allows each of these to function with complete freedom, albeit under changed names, though under the same leadership.

4. **The ‘Other Face’ of Pakistan’s ‘Moderate’ Dictatorship:** Pakistan has made a big case out of the fact that some of the top line leadership of the Al Qaeda has been arrested in the country with the ‘cooperation’ of the Pakistani security forces and intelligence. The fact, however, is that each such arrest only took place after the FBI and US investigators had effectively gathered evidence to force Pakistani cooperation, and little of this evidence has come from the Pakistani agencies. Indeed, Pakistani agencies have consistently sought to deny the presence of Al Qaeda elements in their country, and to mislead US investigators to the extent possible. This deception has been at the very highest level, and Musharraf himself, for instance, initially insisted that he was ‘certain’ that bin Laden was dead. When the bin Laden tapes began to surface – and most of these, again, leave behind a trail that comes from Pakistan – he insisted that, though bin Laden may be alive, he was certainly not in Pakistan. He has also repeatedly stated that there are no Al Qaeda elements in Pakistan. Pakistan’s cooperation in the various arrests that have been made is, without any measure of doubt, coerced.

4.1 It is notable that the arrests of several senior Al Qaeda operatives, including Khalid Sheikh Mohammad and Yasir al Jaziri were not from localities in the madrassa (seminary) dominated poorer quarters, but from some of the best quarters of Karachi and Islamabad – localities, moreover, dominated by military officers and government servants. A serving major was also implicated in colluding to provide shelter to Khalid Sheikh Mohammad. The fact is, significant factions of the Pakistani Army and the Inter Services Intelligence – with the backing of various Pakistani terrorist groups that they were instrumental in creating and sustaining – have been actively facilitating the relocation of the Al Qaeda from Afghanistan to Pakistan. While incontrovertible evidence of Musharraf’s personal complicity is not available, or, indeed, possible, the collusion of substantial segments of serving Army and intelligence officers is visible.

4.2 The idea that the Pakistan problem can be ‘solved’ by liberal ‘developmental’ financing by the international community is a myth. Each dollar of ‘development aid’ or ‘financial relief’ to Pakistan releases a dollar of domestic resources for further militarization, radicalization and extremist religious mobilization. The problem lies at the very
foundation of the Pakistani state and the ‘two nation theory’ that led to its creation: the theory that people of different religious communities cannot coexist. This has become the central pillar of the edifice of the military-feudal-fundamentalist combine that has ruled Pakistan for the last 56 years. The problem of religious extremism and terrorism in Pakistan can only be resolved through the ‘deconstruction’ of this Pakistani state, and by dis-empowering this combination of forces through a fundamental ‘regime change’ that goes well beyond a change of leadership, and comprehends a change of ideology and systems of governance. Pakistan will have to be disarmed, denuclearised and democratised if it is to be saved from the extremist forces that currently threaten to consume it.

5. **Kashmir – An Ideological Conflict:** Pakistan has consistently projected Kashmir as the ‘core issue’ of conflict in South Asia. The fact, however, is that the conflict in South Asia cannot be resolved within Kashmir, through any of the projected solutions of communal bifurcation or partition along religious lines. Such ‘partition’ would, in fact, validate Pakistan’s underlying ideology of religious ‘ghettoisation’, and would be only one stage in the process that can consistently end only with the ‘liberation’ of all of India’s 150 million Muslim’s from the ‘oppression’ of the unbelievers. Indeed, within the pan-Islamist ideology, such a possible outcome would only be a prelude to the wider jehad to bring the entire world of ‘unbelievers’ within the fold of Islam. The fact is, the confrontation between India and Pakistan is not about territory – in Kashmir or elsewhere. It is an irreducible ideological confrontation between a pluralist secular democracy, on the one hand, and a religious fundamentalist, intolerant and exclusionary ideology, on the other, that denies not only rights, but also basic humanity, to those who do not submit to its belief system. The Cold War hostility between the US and the Soviet Union provides an analogy to this pattern of ideological confrontation: once the ideology that sustained the Soviet Union was abandoned, the animus between the two peoples dissolved; while the ideology controlled the centers of Russian power, there was no possibility of settlement between the two countries. So, indeed, is it between India and Pakistan.

5.1 Any ceding of territories in Kashmir to Pakistan, or the creation of a separate Muslim majority state or quasi-state entity would create a vast and uninterrupted area of potential instability and Islamist extremist mobilization extending from West Asia
through Central Asia and across Afghanistan and Pakistan into Kashmir. A very substantial proportion of this region, especially extending through the Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas, the Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir, and much of any such territories that may be separated from the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir, comprise harsh, inhospitable and poorly policed terrain, which would provide an ideal safe haven for Islamist extremists and terrorists.

5.2 India has long been fighting the world’s battle against Islamist extremist expansionism, and remains a bulwark against this movement in Jammu & Kashmir.

6. **Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) & the Northern Areas:** Populations in the areas illegally occupied by Pakistan have never been granted civil, political or human rights by Pakistan, and remain economically backward and severely deprived even by Pakistani standards. The Northern Areas, particularly, have been separated from the rest of PoK and are not even given limited protection under the Pakistani Constitution. The Shia population who constitute a majority in the Northern Areas has been subjected to repeated and genocidal campaigns of repression – at least one of which was led by General (then Brigadier) Pervez Musharraf himself.

7. **Democracy:** The effort to orchestrate a transition to democracy through a controlled military regime is fundamentally flawed, and has, in fact, immensely weakened democratic and secular forces in Pakistan, even as it has further entrenched the military-jehadi-feudal combine of revanchist forces in the country.
Pakistan: The Footprints of Terror  

2003

**July 4:** Security agencies raid a village in the coastal area of Ghorabari in the Thatta district and arrest six persons, including the head of a *Madrassa* (seminary) and a woman, on suspicion of their links with the Al Qaeda. A wireless set, sensitive maps of the coastal area and sea routes, a rifle and two life jackets were recovered from the incident site.

**June 27:** Eight persons, accused of planning terrorist acts in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir, are arrested during a series of raids around the US Federal Capital of Washington, the US Justice Department said in a statement. Three other persons, reportedly living in Saudi Arabia, were also named in a 42-count Justice Department indictment. Initial appearances are to commence in the US Federal Court in Alexandria, Virginia, before Judge Rawles Jones, said US Attorney Paul McNulty. The accused have been indicted on conspiracy, firearms and other charges for alleged roles in a conspiracy to train and participate in Jehad in Kashmir in support of the proscribed Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT). They have also been accused of conspiring to prepare for and engage in Jehad in Chechnya, the Philippines and other countries. The group reportedly obtained AK-47 rifles and practiced small-unit military tactics in Virginia using paintball weapons and items to simulate actual combat in preparation for Jehad, said the Justice Department.

The indictment said that some of the defendants traveled to Pakistan and trained with the LeT, listed by the US among terrorist organisations. The suspects were arrested in the States of Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania, an unnamed Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) official said adding they were named as Randall Todd Royer; Yemeni national Ibrahim Ahmad al-Hamdi; Masood Ahmad Khan; naturalized US citizen Yong Ki Kwon; Pakistani national Muhammad Aatiq; Hammad Abdur-Raheem; Donald Thomas Surratt; and Caliph Basha Ibn Abdur Raheem. Three others - Khwaja Mahmood Hasan, a Pakistani-born US citizen; Sabri Benkhala; and Seifullah Chapman - are believed to be in Saudi Arabia.

**June 17:** Security agencies arrest an Arab national along with three Afghans suspected of having links with the Al Qaeda from Peshawar. Official sources were quoted as saying in reports that Adil al-Jazeeri, an Algerian national, was arrested from Peshawar's Hayatabad
locality along with three others. “He is a big catch. He is known among the Arabs for his close links with al-Qaeda,” said an unnamed official. Adil al-Jazeeri is reportedly on the US list of wanted Arab nationals believed to be close associates of bin Laden.

**June 5:** Michael Evanoff, Regional Security Officer of the US Embassy in Islamabad told the *Christian Science Monitor* that, “This [Pakistan] is now the epicentre of terrorism. It really is. This is the only country I know in the world that has so many groups that are against the US or Western ideals. Last year alone, these groups pulled off seven strikes against the US community here, including a March church bombing in Islamabad that killed five - among them an American woman from the embassy and her daughter - and a June truck bomb at the Karachi consulate that killed 14 Pakistanis.”

**June 1:** *Daily Times* reports that Pakistan’s security agencies are hunting for an Afghan national Hamdullah, popularly known as Mufti Inaam, who was the head of the intelligence agency under the erstwhile Taliban regime and has close contacts with bin Laden. Mufti Inaam reportedly distanced himself from the government shortly after the 9/11 attacks and consequent to the US military campaign in Afghanistan, he crossed the border and hid in the northwestern region of Pakistan. He is suspected to have remained underground in Peshawar for quite some time and also helped many of his friends and colleagues in Afghanistan enter Pakistan through safe routes before the fall of Kandahar. He is also believed to have assisted many Arab families migrate to Pakistan and arranged their safe settlements in various parts of the country. In Pakistan, Mufti Inaam remained in contact with certain terrorist groups and Al Qaeda operatives for many months.

**May 27:** Security agencies arrest a suspected Afghan Al Qaeda operative during a raid in the northwestern tribal territory bordering Afghanistan. The suspect, identified as Abdullah, was apprehended in a pre-dawn raid in Shahkas village near the border town of Jamrud, 25 km west of Peshawar, an unnamed official was quoted as saying in a media report.

**May 15:** Three suspected Al Qaeda operatives, including an Arab, are arrested in Karachi. The foreign national, identified as Iffan-ul-Hassham, was detained during an overnight raid at a hideout on the outskirts of Karachi during which a laptop computer and a satellite phone were seized. Two more men, both Pakistanis, were later detained based on information provided by Hassham.
May 11: Police in Peshawar unearth a passport-selling racket that was supplying stolen Pakistani passports to Al Qaeda suspects. An unspecified number of arrests were made on May 11 in Peshawar, said Inamullah Khan Gandapur, an Assistant Director with the Federal Investigations Agency, which polices immigration. "We had seen information that these people were involved in providing Pakistani passports to al-Qaeda suspects," Gandapur said. Police seized 100 blank Pakistani passports, which were earlier stolen from a government office in Swat.

May 8: Taliban sources in Pakistan and Afghan intelligence sources indicate that the Taliban currently has a recognizable hierarchy of leaders - some operating from Afghanistan and some from the Pashtun tribal areas of Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP). In Pakistan, Taliban commanders are reportedly working in alliance with like-minded leaders of Islamist extremist parties who now control two provinces along the Afghan-Pakistan border. In the NWFP, Qari Akhtar is the chief operations commander; in the Tor Ghar mountains near the Afghan border town of Spin Boldak, Mullah Mohammad Ibrahim is the Taliban's top leader. Shahzada Zulfikar, a Quetta-based political analyst, says that Taliban commanders continue to receive support from Pakistan's intelligence agencies, as they did more openly during the Taliban government. "The Taliban were and are still friends of Pakistan," says Zulfikar. "Pakistan ditched the Taliban due to American pressure, for a while, but now there are fears that their relationship might be restored due to the increasing presence of Indians in Afghanistan."

Taliban activists in Pakistan and Afghanistan claim that they are receiving direct assistance from Pakistan's Islamist parties, including Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamiat-Ulema-e-Islam. "We are at home as we were before (President) Musharraf hatched a conspiracy against us at the behest of the Americans," says Mir Jan, a Taliban fighter in Quetta. "But our brothers [the mullahs] are in power, so it means we are in power."

May 9: Security agencies in Karachi arrest two suspected members of the Taliban militia, including a close associate of the ousted regime's former Ambassador to Pakistan, during a raid. The authorities also seized a satellite phone, a sub-machinegun and an unspecified amount of foreign currency from their possession.
May 3: Police in Karachi arrest two Egyptian Al Qaeda suspects from Surjani Town and seized three AK-47 assault rifles, two TT pistols, two satellite phones, some transmitters and refined explosives from their possession. The two suspects, Abdul Khaliq Muhammad and Abi Abdullah, were reportedly planning to attack the US marines at Shahbaz airbase in Jacobabad, Miran Shah Airport and other sensitive installations in Gwadar.

May 2: Pakistani authorities handed over three Arab Al Qaeda suspects, including prime suspect in the October 2000-USS Cole bombing, Waleed Muhammad Bin Attash alias Khalid Al-Attash, to the US officials. Although the government did not officially confirm the extradition, an unnamed official was quoted as saying that "the foreigners including Al-Attash are not in our custody. They were handed over to the Americans." Bin Attash is a nephew of front ranking Al Qaeda terrorist Khalid Sheikh Muhammad, who was arrested on March 1, 2003, from Rawalpindi. Official sources claimed that Al-Attash and other suspects were not wanted by Pakistan in any criminal case and they were handed over to the US owing to the fact that the suspects were reportedly involved in terrorist acts aimed at the US establishments.

May 1: President Pervez Musharraf said in Islamabad that there were indications that Osama bin Laden was alive, and may be hiding in the tribal territory on the Pakistani-Afghan border. In an interview to a private television channel he said, "some indications are there that he is not dead but where is he? Nothing can be said about that... If they are in a small group, two, four, eight or 10 people, then they can hide in this side, our side of the tribal area, or hide on the Afghan side. I cannot say with surety."

April 30: Eleven Al Qaeda suspects, including three Arabs, were arrested from different parts of Karachi. Police also seized a large cache of arms, ammunition and explosives from their possession. An unnamed official was quoted as saying that the arrested men were reportedly planning to attack the US Consulate, American establishments and government installations. An Interior Ministry statement issued from Islamabad said "six suspects have been arrested which include Waleed Muhammad Bin Attash alias Khalid Al-Attash, a Yemeni national, who is suspected to be involved in the US Ship Cole incident." According to the statement, some 200 detonators, one wrist watch timer switch, five touch switches, capacitors of various types, 20 diodes, 46 transmitters, 20 variable controls, Kalashnikovs,
hand grenades, pistols, ammunition and a truck load of sulphur, gunpowder and urea bags were recovered.

**April 23:** Afghanistan has begun submitting lists of wanted "war criminals and terrorists" to Pakistan in an effort to stamp out Taliban and Al Qaeda cadres lurking along the neighbours’ mountainous border, said Afghan President Hamid Karzai in Islamabad. "We are going to come up with a more specific list of names who will be considered criminals of war against the Afghan people. There are people who are definitely terrorists." He named Akhtar Mohammad Usmani, a deputy of Taliban leader Mullah Omar, Mullah Dadullah, the Taliban’s intelligence chief, Mullah Biradar, the militia’s internal security chief and Hafiz Mujeeb, a lower-ranking commander. Many Afghan officials, suspicious of Pakistan for its previous nurturing and support of the Taliban regime, have accused it of allowing sanctuary for fugitive extremists in its remote tribal border regions.

**April 18:** Ugandan military intelligence chief Colonel Nobel Mayombo was quoted as saying in the *Daily Times* that “All along even before the US-led war in Iraq, we had intelligence reports that Ugandan terrorist groups were sending their recruits to centres in Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan and Afghanistan.”

**April 16:** According to a media report, pamphlets urging Afghan refugees to wage Jehad against US forces and their "hireling" government in Afghanistan have been circulated at camps in northwest Pakistan. Entitled "Declaration by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan" (IEA) the leaflets, written in Pushto, were distributed this week at refugee camps in the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) bordering Afghanistan. The erstwhile Taliban regime had ruled Afghanistan under the rubric of IEA, headed by Mullah Mohammad Omar. "Ulema, tribal leaders and Mujahideen of IEA call upon you to wage jihad against the hireling government in your motherland. It is your duty to rise...and direct your swords against the infidels and their puppets," said the leaflets.

**April 8:** Pakistani security agencies arrested a medical practitioner and his son for suspected links to the Al Qaeda network. M Khan Mahmood Ahmed Kathia and his son were reportedly arrested from Banni Qasim area, in Harrapa.
April 7: According to a media report, two Pakistani Al Qaeda suspects were arrested from a village near Sahiwal in Multan. The Interior Ministry, however, claimed it was unaware of the arrests.

April 3: Pakistani security agencies, in association with US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents, arrested two suspected Al Qaeda operatives in Peshawar. Information Minister Sheikh Rashid said the arrested "have been identified as Abdullah and Abdul Karim." Officials in Peshawar were quoted as saying that both came from Middle Eastern countries. They are also allegedly linked to the killing of Sher Nawaz Khan, an officer of the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, in March 2003 at Wana, 180 miles south of Peshawar.

March 28: A Pakistani woman, who was on the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) list for suspected links to the Al Qaeda, was arrested from the Gulshan-e-Iqbal area in Karachi. According to a media report, Dr Aafia Siddiqui was allegedly working with the 'Chemical Wire Group' of the Al Qaeda. Recently, the FBI had placed the photograph of Aafia Siddiqui at its website stating "Although the FBI has no information indicating this individual is connected to specific terrorist activities, the FBI would like to locate and question this individual." As reported earlier, Aafia having a doctorate degree in neurological sciences from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, was living in Boston along with her spouse and three children. She is alleged to have provided logistical support to a Saudi Al Qaeda operative Adnan G El Shukrijumah.

March 27: The Supreme Court of Pakistan held that the country lacks a law declaring Al Qaeda a terrorist organization and, consequently, no one could be detained simply for having links with the organization. The Supreme Court made the observation in a judgment on the Federal Government’s appeal against an earlier Lahore High Court order of releasing three Al Qaeda suspects. "Our security laws and anti-terrorism enactments are silent to the affect that Al Qaeda is a terrorist organization, having its network at global level and that it is a furious threat to national/international peace, security and tranquility," said the apex court.

March 18: Two suspected Al Qaeda operatives of Arab origin are arrested from the campus of Peshawar’s main university.
March 17: Six suspected Al Qaeda operatives are arrested in Lahore. Among those arrested were Yasir al Jaziri’s brother-in-law, a Qatari national and at least three Afghans.

March 15: Pakistani authorities arrested a leading Al Qaeda terrorist, Moroccan national Yasir al-Jaziri, in Lahore.

- The arrest was based on information given by Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the suspected mastermind of 9/11 attacks, who was arrested from Rawalpindi on March 1.
- "He (al-Jaziri) is less important than Khalid Sheikh Mohammed but he is quite an important person," Secretary of the Interior Ministry Tasneem Noorani was quoted as saying.
- Al-Jaziri is suspected to be involved in Al Qaeda's business operations and an unnamed official is quoted as describing him as an US-educated "computer whiz".
- He had also played a significant role in disseminating audio and videotapes of Osama bin Laden to the media.

March 9: An Iraqi and two Afghan nationals were arrested in Hyderabad, Sindh province, for suspected Al Qaeda links.

- They are also suspected to be involved in the murder of an official of the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, in Wana, South Waziristan, on March 4.

March 1: Three Al Qaeda terrorists, including the suspected mastermind behind 9/11, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, were arrested in Rawalpindi on March 1.

- Kuwaiti-born Khalid, who is on the most wanted list of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) of the US, is regarded as a key Al Qaeda lieutenant and organizer of the September 11 attacks in the US.
- The US government had announced a $25 million reward for information leading to his capture.
- He is a relative of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef, now serving a life sentence for involvement in the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing. On March 2, Khalid was handed over to the US authorities.
February 17: Ali Imron, a key suspect in the Bali bombings, reportedly confessed that he spent 18 months at a Madrassa in Peshawar before entering Afghanistan to conduct “jihad.”

February 13: An Egyptian national was arrested from the Wahadat colony in Quetta on charges of having links with the Al Qaeda network.

January 17: Two Tajik and two Arab operatives of the Al Qaeda are arrested in Karachi.

January 12: A ‘military commander’ of Afghanistan’s former Prime Minister and warlord Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, was arrested from his residence in the Baghgai village, approximately 15km away from Wana in Peshawar, for suspected links with the Al Qaeda.

January 8: Abu Omar, hailing from Morocco, and Abu Hamza, belonging to Yemen, were arrested after an encounter in the Gulshan-i-Maymar area of Karachi.

- Omar was trying to establish a Pakistan Sector of the Al Qaeda and was in constant contact with Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, suspected mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks.

January 4: Jack Thomas, a 29-year-old Australian convert to Islam, was arrested in Karachi for suspected links to the Al Qaeda.

- He was reportedly in contact with Al Qaeda operatives who had managed to sneak into Karachi.

- Information gleaned from Thomas led to the arrest of two men of Arab origin from a house in Karachi on January 9, five days after Thomas was arrested. The two men, identified as an Iraqi and Jordanian-Palestinian, were captured from a hose on Karachi’s outskirts. A third Al Qaeda suspect escaped, leaving behind an Algerian passport.
2002

December 21: According to Major Stephen Clutter, a US military spokesperson at the Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan, suspected Al Qaeda terrorists who killed a US soldier on December 21 near the village of Shkin, about 60 km south of Gardez, Afghanistan, had fled across the eastern border into Pakistan.

December 18: Ahmed Javed Khawaja, a medical practitioner, is arrested along with four of his relatives for harbouring Al Qaeda terrorists at his residence in Lahore.

- According to an Interior Ministry statement in the Lahore court (submitted in January 2003) the terrorists harboured by the family were Abu Yasir Al Jaziri, identified as an Algerian or Moroccan, Assadullah and Sheikh Said Al-Misri, both listed as Egyptians and Abu Faraj, listed as North African.
- Al Jaziri was "responsible for the business of al-Qaeda," Al-Misri was a financial chief of the network, and Faraj was the head of Al Qaeda's North Africa network, according to the statement. Faraj was also a deputy of Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, suspected mastermind of the 9/11 attacks.
- Ahmed Khawaja also reportedly confessed that he provided medical treatment to a wife of Osama bin Laden and also to the wife of another key Al Qaeda leader, Abu Zubaida.
- The FBI discovered Khawaja’s links with the Al Qaeda by tracing the Internet channels allegedly being used by him.
- He has been charged with providing treatment and financial support to Al Qaeda operatives and is alleged to have visited Kabul after 9/11. According to media reports, Khawaja had often visited Afghanistan during the war against the former Soviet Union and had collected funds for war victims at that time.

December 4: Pakistani security agencies arrested two Al Qaeda suspects in South Waziristan Agency, and have reportedly handed them over to American intelligence agencies for interrogation. They have been arrested for alleged involvement in an attack on a US military camp in southern Paktika province of Afghanistan.
**November 29:** Canadian government, acting on sustained pressure from the parliamentary Opposition, designated the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM) as terrorist groups.

**November 26:** French Police claim arrest of several Pakistani nationals during a raid in Paris. They are suspected associates of shoe-bomber Richard Reid. They were reportedly arrested at a Pakistani cultural center as well as at a restaurant and a mosque. Meanwhile, during a parallel raid at the Reunion Island, a French department located in the Indian Ocean, a former Imam (priest) of the Ali Mosque, also a Pakistani national, was also arrested and is scheduled to undergo questioning by French police.

**November 18:** Benevolence International Foundation (BIF), an international Non-governmental Organisation (NGO), with offices in Islamabad and Peshawar was officially declared as a terrorist group by the US authorities. The Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) USA said, on November 18, BIF has been officially listed as a "Specially Designated Global Terrorist."

**November 10:** The French police indicated that order was given in Karachi for the April 11, 2002-suicide attack on a synagogue in Djerba, in Tunisia. The attack resulted in the death of 21 persons, including two French and 14 German tourists.

- French anti-terrorist police who have been investigating the attack said they have ascertained that the satellite telephone used by the suicide terrorist, Nizar Naouar, who drove an explosives-laden truck into the synagogue, was acquired in Paris by Walid Naouar, Nizar's brother, who is being interrogated by police in Lyons.
- Police have claimed that the last telephonic call by Nizar before undertaking the attack was to a number in Karachi that has been identified as that of Khaled Sheikh Mohammad, a Kuwaiti and one of the new ‘operational heads’ of the Al Qaeda.

**November 8:** The US State Department added nine more groups suspected of terrorist links to a visa blacklist that will keep their members or affiliates out of the country. Among the newly named entities is the Pakistan-based Ummah Tamir-e-Nau (UTN), an organisation whose chief Dr. Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood, former Director General of the Pakistan
Atomic Energy Commission, was arrested on October 23, 2001, in Islamabad along with his associate Abdul Majeed (arrested in Lahore) for their alleged links to the Al Qaeda.

November 6: Three Pakistani men have been arrested in California for attempting to supply US-made Stinger missiles to the Al Qaeda terrorist network, US Attorney General John Ashcroft said on November 6. Ashcroft said the three were trafficking 600 kilos of heroin and five tonnes of hashish to purchase the shoulder-fired anti-aircraft missiles. “Three individuals have been indicted for conspiring to trade heroin for anti-aircraft missiles which they said they intended to sell to Al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan,” said Ashcroft.

October 30: A report indicated that of the six new Al Qaeda leaders, who the United States believes are currently in active command of the group, one is said to be residing in Pakistan and two in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region. The three terrorists are Saif al-Adel alias Makkawi, an Egyptian, Abdullah Ahmed Abdullah alias Abu Mohammed al Masri, Al Qaeda’s ‘financial officer’ and Tawfiq bin Atash alias Khallad, Al Qaeda’s ‘senior operational planner’. While the first two are believed to be in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region, the last is reportedly in Pakistan.

October 18: Islamabad police and FBI agents arrested Iranian lecturer Habibullah Zaiee of International Islamic University for his alleged links with the Al Qaeda. A media report indicated that Zaiee was suspected of involvement in co-ordinating the attacks on US installations in the country in the recent past.

October 15: Four Afghan refugees were arrested in a joint raid conducted by local police and US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) agents at the Jalozai Refugee Camp, Peshawar, on the suspicion that they had links with the Al Qaeda. The Jalozai Refugee Camp is run by the Ittehad-e-Islami Afghanistan, a group consisting of erstwhile Afghan fighters who fought against the erstwhile Soviet Union in the 1980s.

October 8: Two Afghans are arrested from the Shamshato refugee camp on the charge of providing shelter to some Al Qaeda suspects.

September 22: Police arrested five Al Qaeda suspects in Peshawar and Mianwali. Of them, an Al Qaeda member and two others were arrested by a joint-team of Crime Investigation
Department (CID) and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) sleuths from Peshawar's Jehangirabad area, while two others were arrested from Mianwali. Official sources in Peshawar said, of the three-arrested, one is a Tunisian, one belongs to the Nooristan province of Afghanistan while the third is a Pakistani.

September 12: Italian police working with US naval intelligence said they had arrested 15 Pakistanis, suspected to be members of the Al Qaeda terrorist network. They were reportedly taken into custody in August 2002 after arriving in the southern Sicilian port town of Gela on a merchant cargo ship from Morocco. They have been charged with conspiracy to commit terrorist acts. “We are certain that these people are part of a terrorist organization, and we are almost certain that that organization is Al Qaeda,” said Santi Giuffre, chief of police for the Sicilian province of Caltanissetta. He also said police had seized telephone numbers, including several in Spain and France, which linked these men to the Al Qaeda. Notes and documents referring to the Al Qaeda were reportedly found on-board their Romanian-registered vessel, which set sail from Casablanca in mid-July and was scheduled to visit Tunisia, Malta and the Libyan capital of Tripoli. All men were carrying an open, return air ticket from Karachi to Casablanca, he added.

September 11: Ramzi Binalshibh, Al Qaeda terrorist and a 9/11 prime suspect was detained in Karachi. Two suspected Al Qaeda terrorists were killed and five others, including Binalshibh, were arrested after a three-hour encounter at Defence Housing Authority in Karachi. The encounter ensued when security forces raided an apartment C-63 of a complex on 15th Street, Phase II Extension. Binalshibh, a Yemeni, was arrested with assistance from the FBI.

- Binalshibh, wanted in Germany for his alleged role in planning and carrying out the 9/11 attacks, is one of the front-ranking Al Qaeda terrorists to be taken into custody over the past year.
- In an interview to the Al Jazeera, he had reportedly claimed that he was an active planner of the 9/11 attacks. US officials have indicated that Binalshibh, also known as Ramzi bin al-Shaibah, was refused visa to enter the US at least four times before 9/11. He reportedly wanted to join the 19 hijackers involved in the multiple terrorist attacks.
He was also reportedly one of the roommates of Mohamed Atta—the suspected leader of the 9/11 hijackers—in Hamburg, Germany.

- He had played a key role in the transmission of funds to the terrorists undergoing flying training in the USA.

**August 30:** According to a report in Dawn, a Pakistani daily, one of the most-wanted men in Uzbekistan is in hiding near the Pakistan border but cannot be extradited despite a treaty between the two countries.

- Quoting Uzbekistan President Islam Karimov, Uzbek Embassy officials in Washington said that Tohir Yoldashev, political and ideological leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), was hiding near the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, but from time to time he lived in Pakistan as well.
- In year 2000, the Uzbek Supreme Court had, in absentia, sentenced Yoldashev to death.
- Terrorist group IMU is a coalition of Islamist terrorists from Uzbekistan and other Central Asian countries who are opposed to Karimov's regime.

**August 18:** Police in Peshawar arrested five Somalis near the Afghanistan border for suspected links with the Al Qaeda.

**August 17:** The then Interior Minister Moinuddin Haider said that “58 prisoners of Pakistani origin are at present registered to be at the Guantanamo Base in Cuba.” They were arrested in the wake of a crack-down by United States in the post-9/11 operations targeting persons linked with the Al Qaeda.

**August 2:** US authorities placed six Pakistanis on the list of suspected terrorists, businesses and organisations that are suspected of supporting terrorism. The US Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) has issued a new list of specially designated nationals and other persons, whose property is blocked worldwide, in order to assist the public in complying with various sanctions and programmes undertaken by the US government.

- One of them, Zia Ahmad, was linked to the multiple terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001 in the USA.
• The six Pakistanis mentioned in the list are: Zia Ahmad, a resident of Peshawar; Saiyid Abd Al-Man'am alias Agha Haji Abdul Manan; Nasir Ali Khan; Abdul Majid Chaudhry; Haji Ibrahim Khan Afridi and Mohammad Aziz.

• Furthermore, assets of the Pakistan-Libya Holding Company, Karachi, have been blocked as per the new list, while two new organisations have been listed as suspects in Pakistan, namely Revival of Islamic Society Heritage on the African continent, Pakistan office and Maktaba Al-Khidmat Al-Kifah, Peshawar.

• Other organisations and Pakistani nationals on the OFAC list include Lashkar-e-Toiba, Afghan Support Committee, Ahyaul Turas, Jamiat Ayat-ur-Rhas Al Islamia, Jamiat Ihyā ul Turath Al Islamia, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Ladehyanoy, Mufti Mohammed Rashid, Ummah Tamir-e-Nau, Rabita Trust and Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood.

July 27: A FBI team along with Pakistan Rangers raided a house in Luqman Mohallah in Khairpur and arrested four foreigners, suspected to be linked with the Al Qaeda.

July 18: Security agencies in Peshawar arrested 12 foreigners, suspecting them of having connections with the Al Qaeda.

• Out of those arrested five were Somalians, two Sudanese and one Afghan national, while the nationality of four could not be ascertained.

• They were arrested from the localities of University Town and Hayatabad Township in Peshawar.


• Omar Sheikh, a front ranking terrorist of the proscribed Jaish-e-Mohammed was prime the accused in the Pearl case.

• The court found Omar Sheikh guilty of committing offences under sections 7-A of the Anti-Terrorism Act, 365-A (kidnapping for ransom), 302 (murder) and section 120-A of the Pakistan Penal Code (conspiracy), after a trial inside the central prison.

• The judge sentenced the three co-accused to life imprisonment and a fine of Rs 500,000 each. The court also ordered that all the four accused to jointly pay an
amount of Rs 2 million, which would be paid to Pearl's widow Mariane Pearl and their recently born son.

- The court held that Omar Sheikh was responsible for creating a sense of fear nationally and internationally and ruled that he had hatched a conspiracy and was the principal offender.
- The verdict said, Daniel Pearl being a captive of the accused stood proved and the non-fulfillment of their demands has presumably resulted in the murder of Pearl at the hands of the accused.

**July 12:** Pakistani authorities in Karachi arrested an alleged financial adviser of Osama bin Laden and two other terrorists believed to be from the Al Qaeda.

- Three Al Qaeda cadres, including Sheikh Ahmed Saleem, who was reportedly acting as a financial adviser of bin Laden in Pakistan, were arrested during an overnight raid on a suburban apartment in Karachi.
- Saleem, a Sudanese, reportedly escaped from Afghanistan to Pakistan after the US-led military campaign began in October 2001, said official sources.

**July 7:** Eleven Al Qaeda suspects were arrested from the Clifton area and Shah Noorani area of Baluchistan.

- Security forces recovered 57 weapons from their possession, including rocket launchers, light machine guns, Kalashnikovs, satellite telephone instruments, letters of Osama Bin Laden and Taliban chief Mullah Mohammed Omar.
- The arrested suspects include an Egyptian and an Afghan national, as also five cadres of the outlawed Sipah-e-Mohammed Pakistan.

**July 3:** Four Al Qaeda terrorists and two security force personnel were killed and two police personnel injured in an encounter near Jarma bridge in Kohat.

- The four Al Qaeda cadres of Chechen origin were coming from the tribal area of Miranshah, headquarters of North Waziristan Agency, near the Afghan border.
- According to official sources, the Al Qaeda cadres were probably on a terrorist mission in Kohat or Peshawar.
- SF personnel recovered four Kalashnikovs, one machine-gun, two pistols, 15 hand-grenades and a rocket launcher from the encounter site.
June 30: Pakistani authorities arrested a suspected Arab Al Qaeda terrorist in the tribal territory bordering Afghanistan.

June 26: Ten Pakistan security force personnel and two Chechen Al Qaeda cadres were killed in an encounter in South Waziristan Agency.

- SF personnel had raided Azam Warsak, a remote tribal area bordering Afghanistan, and arrested Al Qaeda terrorists hiding there. The operation followed reports that Al Qaeda terrorists had taken shelter in the house of Abdul Khaliq Sarkikhel Wazir, a resident of Kaza Paunga.
- The raid was reportedly based on tip-offs from US intelligence agents that 40 to 50 Al Qaeda fugitives from the March 2002-Operation Anaconda offensive in eastern Afghanistan were hiding in two buildings.

June 23: Two Arabic-speaking men, two Afghan nationals and a Pakistani were arrested in a raid on the Afghan Support Committee (ASC)—a non-governmental organisation in Pabbi, Peshawar.

- The ASC is a Kuwait-based group reportedly set up by Osama bin Laden.
- Senior ASC employee Hussein Halil of Jordan is still in custody after being arrested in Pabbi for suspected Al Qaeda links in the last week of May 2002.
- The US government had frozen the ASC’s assets in January 2002 for alleged links with the Al Qaeda.

June 12: The French police claimed that they have arrested five persons, including two Pakistani nationals, in a raid in two suburbs of Paris for suspected links to the Al Qaeda.

- They are also reportedly linked to Markaz-Dawa-al-Irshad, parent organisation of the Lashkar-e-Toiba, and other terrorist groups operating in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.
- All the five are being accused of having provided logistical support to Richard Reid, the British "shoe-bomber".
- Reid, on December 22, 2001, unsuccessfully attempted to blow up a bomb contained in his shoe inside an American Airlines flight to Miami that he had boarded at Roissy-Charles de Gaulle Airport outside Paris.
• The two Pakistanis were arrested from a discrete residence they maintained in a back alley in the suburb of Evry, located south of Paris. The other three persons were arrested from Mantes-la- Jolie, an urban neighbourhood west of Paris, which in the past has reportedly been an important centre of Islamist fundamentalists.

**June 17:** Judicial authorities in France decided to place under detention a Pakistani national, Ghulam-Mustafa Rama, for allegedly having provided logistical support to Richard Reid, the British national who is known as the ‘shoe-bomber’, for having attempted to set off an explosive concealed in his shoe during a flight on December 22, 2001 to Miami.

- Rama, who is also the founder of the French branch of Markaz Dawa al-Irshad, was arrested by French police on June 12 at his home in Evry.
- On the same day, another unidentified Pakistani national and three Franco-Algerians were arrested.
- Police sources indicated that they are investigating the possibility of Rama playing an important role in providing recruits for terrorist operations in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir.

**June 11:** According to *New York Times*, Pakistan has arrested several US citizens linked to the Al Qaeda near the Afghanistan border, including a suspected associate of suspected ‘dirty bomb’ builder Jose Padilla.

- Padilla alias Abdullah al Muhajir was arrested on May 8 at Chicago’s O'Hare Airport after US officials said he had reportedly held extensive meetings with top-Al Qaeda terrorist Abu Zubaydah about possibly detonating a conventional weapon to spew radiological material in the United States.

**March 4:** At least two of the seven persons killed by Macedonian police in a weekend clash were Pakistani nationals who fought in Afghanistan, said Interior Minister Ljube Boskovski.

- On March 2, Macedonian police shot dead in an ambush seven persons who were thought to be part of an international terror network targeting US, British and German interests in the Balkan country.
- "We have hints that say the two came from Pakistan and fought in Afghanistan… After their participation in Afghanistan, they were transferred to the Balkans, to countries neighbouring (Macedonia)", said Boskovski.
March 3: Director of the CIA, George J. Tenet, reportedly briefed President Bush on the accumulation of fresh evidence regarding Al Qaeda's nuclear ambition. Tenet reportedly told Bush that Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme was more deeply compromised than either government has acknowledged publicly.

- Pakistan arrested two former nuclear scientists, Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmood and Abdul Majid, on October 23, 2001, and interrogated them about contacts with bin Laden and his lieutenants.
- Pakistani officials maintain that the scientists did not pass important secrets to Al Qaeda, but they have not disclosed that Mahmood failed multiple polygraph examinations about his activities.
- Although Pakistani authorities concluded that the scientists violated a secrecy oath during trips into Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, the government decided they would not have been able to give away information necessary to build a bomb.
- Pakistani official sources were quoted as saying that Mahmood and Majid had confessed that the ISI had sanctioned their charity activities and meetings with the Taliban supremo Mohammed Omar.
- The CIA has given a list of six more nuclear scientists to the Pakistani government whom it wants to probe on suspicion of having links with the Al Qaeda or Ummah Tamir-e-Nau (Reconstruction of the Muslim Ummah) of Dr Sultan Bashiruddin Mahmud.
- The issue was also discussed between President Pervez Musharraf and CIA Director John Tenet during the latter's visit to Pakistan in December 2001.
- Two of the six scientists, Dr Suleiman Asad and Dr Muhammad Ali Mukhtar, are directly related to the country's nuclear programme, and have been working in the Kahuta Research Laboratories for the last few years.

November 13, 2001: Spanish authorities arrest ten persons suspected of having links to the international network of bin Laden. Interior Minister Mariano Rajoy was quoted as saying that the arrested were considered to be "the leading members of the Spanish infrastructure of the mujahideen movement...which forms part of the network of Osama bin Laden." Europa Press cited police officials as saying the detainees were responsible for the group's
international relations and had held meetings in Pakistan, Yemen, the Philippines, Qatar and Afghanistan as well as in Europe.

**September 29, 2001:** Uganda's Joint Anti-Terrorism Taskforce arrest seven Pakistanis and a Zambian at Entebbe. The suspects – thought to be both drug traffickers and members of bin Laden's terror network – were en route from Rwanda to Europe, *The Post*, a daily in Lusaka, Zambia, reported on October 2. Circumstantial evidence pointed out that drug traffickers based in Afghanistan and Pakistan have established hubs in the predominately Muslim coastal city of Mombasa, Kenya, and in the two islands comprising Zanzibar, Tanzania, where hundreds of Pakistani nationals and their East African counterparts are arrested for drug smuggling each year, according to the United Nations and government agencies.

**September 16, 2001:** A government source in the Chinese territory of Macau said that police had arrested seven Pakistani nationals after finding documents apparently containing instructions to attack US targets there and in Hong Kong if there were a strike on Afghanistan.

Macau government sources said that the men were arrested after US authorities provided names to security forces in Macau and Hong Kong of people to watch for following 9/11.

**September 2001:** Israeli security officials arrested 23 persons belonging to various Islamist groups. Officials said that a Gaza resident who was the cell leader was sent by Hamas to Pakistan in 1998 to study terror techniques with bin Laden's network.

**December 2000:** Khalil al-Deek, a Jordanian, allegedly a front ranking terrorist of the Muslim Brotherhood is arrested in Peshawar, near the Afghan border with Pakistan, and extradited to Jordan.

**In September 2000,** three Pakistani men were arrested in southern Philippines on suspicion they had been smuggling weapons to the Abu Sayyaf terrorist outfit. Quoting official sources, the *Herald* said, “since the Abu Sayyaf has been getting millions of dollars in ransom payments during the past five months they have gone on a weapons buying spree and we know that a lot of the weapons have come from Pakistan."
In year 2000, Israel arrested a Hamas cadre named Nabil Aukel who was trained in Pakistan and then moved to Afghanistan and Kashmir to put that training into practice.

December 1999: Some members of a terrorist cell are arrested in Jordan. The terror network was composed mostly of Jordanians of Palestinian origin, as well as an Iraqi, an Algerian and Palestinians with American passports. The detainees admitted during interrogation that they had been trained in Afghanistan in a training camp financed by bin Laden, and were assisted by contact members of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The group planned to carry out mass attacks against Jewish and American tourists and Christian pilgrims at the Radison hotel in Amman, at Mount Nevo, at the checkpoints on the Israeli-Jordanian borders, and at the place where Jesus was baptized. The central activists responsible for the logistics and religious authorization for the attacks were three Palestinians who operated from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and the UK.

June 1999: Eight persons of Pakistani origin are arrested in Yemen. Although they claimed that they had come for a holiday, security sources indicated that these men aged 17 to 33, were Islamist terrorists on a mission to kill fellow Britons. They were reportedly trained and armed in the mountains of Abyan by an obscure terrorist group called the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA), which wants Yemen to become an Islamic state.


Jamal Ahmed Fadl, 38, a one-time grocery store clerk from Sudan, and L'Houssaine Kherchtou, 37, a former catering student born in Morocco testifying before a 12-member federal jury in New York, investigating the 1998 embassy bombings, admitted to the existence of Al Qaeda's training at camps in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sudan in firearms, explosives, computers, electronics, passport forgery and surveillance.

December 23, 1998: Seven men, including three Britons of Pakistani origin, are arrested in Yemen. The Yemeni government claimed they were carrying plans to blow up a church, a hotel and the British consulate.
In July 1997, two Palestinians and a Pakistani were arrested on a tip-off to New York City police and were found to have suicide bombs and a note indicating they intend a terrorist attack in the city's subways. Lafi Khalil, the Pakistani, entered the country on a tourist visa and stayed on illegally.

In 1995, Abdul Hakim Murad, a Pakistani citizen, was arrested in Philippines following an abortive bomb explosion. Consequent to interrogation, Murad told the story of "Bojinka" – "loud bang" – the code name bin Laden operatives had given to an audacious plan to bomb 11 U.S. airliners simultaneously and fly an air plane into the CIA headquarters in Langley, Va. – all after attempting to assassinate Pope John Paul II. Investigators also found a stack of passports – Norwegian, Afghan, Saudi, Pakistani – from the apartment from which he was arrested. Codenamed "BOJINKA," the plot involved using a timing device made from an altered Databank watch. Flight schedules and a decrypted letter found on the computer indicated that five participants were to simultaneously plant devices on flights to the United States.

After the bombings, four of the participants were to return to Karachi, Pakistan. The fifth was to return to Doha, Qatar.

Jamaat-ul-Fuqra (JuF), a terrorist outfit operating in Pakistan and North America, was formed by a Pakistani cleric, Sheikh Mubarak Ali Gilani, in the early 1980s. In the 1980s, they carried out various terrorist activities, including murders and fire-bombings, across the United States. Although Gilani, the chief of Fuqra resides in Pakistan, most of his group’s cells are located in North America. JuF is allegedly linked through court documents to ‘Muslims of Americas’, a tax-exempt group established in the United States in 1980 by Gilani, who was taken into Pakistani custody in connection with the abduction of murdered US journalist Daniel Pearl. Although dormant in terms of real activity, it has an active link with terrorist groups in Pakistan and provides both moral and material assistance to these groups.

SOUTH EAST ASIA

- The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) dispatched a first group of trainees to Pakistan in 1980.
• Most traveled with travel documents acquired after receiving false employment with a Middle East firm.

• The MILF has ex-filtrated its cadres out of the Philippines and into Pakistani and Afghan training camps.

• The MILF chairman Salamat Hashmi spent considerable time in Pakistan and knew many of the leaders of the Arab brigades of the Mujahideen.

The origins of Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) can be traced to Afghanistan. In the early-1980’s approximately 200 Moro fundamentalists arrived in Peshawar to serve with the Mujahideen.

• One of them, Ustadz Abdurajak Janjalani emerged as their leader. It is in Peshawar that Janjalani befriended bin Laden.

• He also developed a close association with Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Centre bombing.

• Laden was looking to expand his global network and Janjalani was looking for money to strengthen his movement and Yousef was looking for a new mission. Everything came together in Peshawar in 1991.

• Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, he began making frequent trips between his home in Basilan and the Peshawar-Afghan border region recruiting supporters.

Ramzi Yousef moved to Manila in September 1994 to begin planning a second round of attacks on American targets.

• While in Philippines, he established a compartmentalised cell of approximately 20 persons.

• Key cell members included Wali Khan Amin Shah, a close associate of Yousef. Amin Shah was born on the Pakistani-Afghan border. He previously worked for the Saudi-based Islamic International Relief Organisation (IIRO) in Peshawar. He is reported to have been the over-all charge of the financial logistics of the cell.

• On December 15, 1994, he was issued a three-month visa for Malaysia from the Malaysian embassy in Pakistan, indicating that he may have intended to seek a safe haven in Malaysia after the Pope’s assassination.
Another of the important members of the Yousef cell was Abdul Hakim Ali Hasmid Murad, a Pakistani national.

He had first come to the Philippines between November 1990 and February 1991. Ramzi Yousef trained him in Lahore in August 1994 in bomb making. Murad was also a trained commercial pilot.

Munir Ibrahim, another cell member hailing from Saudi Arabia had met Wali Khan Amin Shah in 1992 in Karachi.

Amein Mohammed was another Pakistani national part of the Yousef cell and had established a firm in Malaysia, Konsojaya SDN, BHD. Yousef and Wali Khan Amin Shah established a shell company, the Bermuda Trading Company, as a cover to purchase chemicals.

On December 10, 1994, a Philippines Airlines 747-200 flight 434, carrying 273 passengers and 20 crew, en route from Cebu to Tokyo was forced to make an emergency landing after a bomb went off in the cabin, killing a Japanese businessman.

Later, Yousef called and claimed responsibility for the bombing in the name of the ASG. This bombing, though claimed to be the work of the ASG, was a dry run to test Yousef’s plan to bomb 11 US jet-liners in “48 hours of terror”.

Fathur Rohman al-Ghozi aka abu Saad, an Indonesian national arrested on January 15, 2002, is linked to the Al Qaeda network.

Al-Ghozi had been living in Philippines since 1996-97, where he came after studying in a madrassa on the Pakistan-Afghan border. Reports indicate that he was supposed to liaise with the MILF.

As of December 2001, there were an estimated 200 undocumented Filipinos in Afghanistan and 600 ‘Islamic scholars’ of Filipino origin in Pakistan. Of those in Pakistan, some 200 are ‘missing’ according to the Philippine Embassy at Islamabad.

According to Malaysian academic Farish Noor, who studies the growth of Islamicism in Malaysia, “I’ve visited a school in Peshawar that was officially listed as having
three Malaysian students. In one class there were 50.” He is estimated that some 300 students return annually after such ‘education’ in Pakistan.

- Parti Islam SeMalaysia, (PAS) suffered a serious blow when 10 cadres of the Kampulan Mujahideen (seven of whom were also PAS members) were detained on August 4, 2001 for attempting to violently overthrow the Malaysian regime and establish an Islamic state. Most of the members arrested had spent time in Pakistan.

- Riduan Isamuddin alias Hambali, a long time Al Qaeda operative and accused in Bali bombings, was a close associate of Ramzi Yousef and Wali Khan Amin Shah. He is known to have sent large number of young radicals to Pakistan and Afghanistan.

- In October 2001, two foreigners arrived in Singapore to assist in the planning of a series of attacks on US, British, Australian and Israeli diplomatic, military and commercial interests. One of them was a Pakistani named Muhammad Aslam Yar Ali Khan alias Sammy. He abruptly left Singapore for Pakistan on October 4, 2001, and has remained at large there (unconfirmed).

- The Maktab al Khidmat Lilmujajidin al Arab (MAK), founded by Abdullah Yousuf Azzam, Palestinian Hamas leader, connects to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan.
  - Installed in Peshawar, placed under the direct protection of the ISI, the MAK was basically supported, financed and controlled through Saudi Arabia.

Indonesian media has reported that a Pakistani citizen identified as Havis Muhammad Saad Iqbal was deported to Egypt at that government’s request on January 11, 2002, in connection with suspected terrorist activities.

  - Iqbal is suspected of involvement in the ‘shoe bomb’ attempt by Richard Reid on the American Airlines jet en route from Paris to Miami, and other terrorist activities in Egypt, Indonesian daily Suara Pembaruan quoted Mahmud Hendropriyono, chief of the National Intelligence Agency, as saying.

Pakistani support has been extended to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) – a number of MILF leaders and members have lived in Pakistan and claim to have offices there.
• Abdul Sahrin, the ‘intelligence chief’ of Moro national Liberation Front (MNLF) was sent to various training camps in Pakistan.

• The National Islamic Command Council (NICC), a breakaway MNLF group headed by Melham Alam, is reported to have received financial support from Pakistan.

• When Ramzi Yousef was arrested in Pakistan, the FBI said they uncovered his plan to assassinate the then Philippine President Fidel Ramos in retaliation for the arrest of Abdul Hakim Murad and Wali Khan Amin Shah in Manila.

Official sources in Philippines have said that the ASG was receiving funds from among others the League of Pakistani Islamic Propagation.

Three foreigners tagged as members of an international extremist group were arrested in the Philippines in November 2001.

• Two Palestinians with Iraqi and Lebanese passports respectively and a Jordanian were reportedly responsible for the recruitment of southern Philippines-based rebels for terrorist training in Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq.
The Northern Areas of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

The Northern Areas in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK) have been split into five districts: Gilgit, Baltistan, Diamir, Ghizer and Ghanche. A population of 1.5 million inhabits a vast area of 72,495 square kilometers. Sparsely populated as the area is, the ethnic groups are varied – Baltees, Vashkuns, Mughals, Kashmiris, Pathans, Ladakhis and Turks, speaking a multiplicity of languages, including Balti, Shina, Brushaski, Khawer, Wakhi, Turki, Tibeti, Pushto and Urdu.

The sect-wise breakdown of population in the Northern Areas is:

- Gilgit – 60% Shia, 40% Sunni;
- Hunza – 100% Ismaili;
- Nagar – 100% Shia;
- Punal – 100% Ismaili;
- Yasin – 100% Ismaili;
- Ishkoman – 100% Ismaili;
- Gupis – 100% Ismaili;
- Chilas – 100% Sunni;
- Darel/Tangir – 100% Sunni;
- Astor – 90% Sunni, 10% Shia;
- Baltistan – 98% Shia, 2% Sunni.

The Northern Areas are the only region in Pakistan whose status is not specified in the Constitution. While Kashmir is mentioned as a disputed territory, the Northern Areas find no mention in the relevant schedule, nor do they have an autonomous or constitutional status of their own. The people of the Northern Areas are, consequently, not citizens of Pakistan within the meaning of the Constitution and do not enjoy any fundamental, legal, political or civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution. The region is also out of bounds to foreigners and journalists, except for occasional tightly controlled guided tours selectively organised by the Army or the intelligence agencies. The Northern Areas have thus been under virtual Martial Law for over five decades. Under the existing Frontier Crime Regulations (FCR), framed during the colonial era, every resident of the region has to report regularly to local intelligence personnel and all movements from one village to another have to be reported to the authorities.
In the aftermath of partition, these areas were declared to be part of the disputed territory of Jammu & Kashmir State so that whenever a plebiscite was held, their votes would go in favour of Pakistan. In 1963, Pakistan unilaterally ceded a sizeable chunk of Gilgit and Baltistan to China, which has long had territorial claims in the area. Under the so-called Sino-Pakistan 'boundary agreement' of 1963, Pakistan illegally ceded 5,180 sq km of Territory to China in Aksaichin in order to facilitate China to build the Karakorum Highway providing overland link between Beijing and Karachi. This highway passes through Kashmir territory and has been constructed illegally without the permission of India. This includes a portion of Hunza territory of the erstwhile Gilgit Agency of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Over the years, especially after the Shimla Agreement in 1972, successive Pakistani Governments have sought to amalgamate these areas into Pakistan by declaring them "federally administered territories". The ‘Azad Kashmir’ (PoK) Governments, on the other hand, have been arguing ever since 1950 that Gilgit and Baltistan were a part of Kashmir and should thus be incorporated into ‘Azad Kashmir’.

On being petitioned on the status of the Northern Areas, the ‘Azad Kashmir’ High Court passed a verdict in March 1993 criticizing the unrepresentative and arbitrary administrative system and denial of fundamental rights in the Northern Areas. It directed the ‘Azad Kashmir’ Government to immediately assume administrative charge of the region and asked the Government of Pakistan to assist the ‘Azad Kashmir’ government in this task. The Pakistan Government appealed in the Supreme Court, which, in a judgment passed on September 14, 1994, stated that "the Northern Areas are part of Jammu & Kashmir state but are not part of “Azad Kashmir” as defined in the “Azad Kashmir” Interim Constitution Act, 1974".

Until 1994, the people of the Northern Areas had no elected assembly, or even a municipal council, and no representation in the Federal National Assembly. In October 1994, the Federal Government allowed the political parties of Pakistan, but not of ‘Azad Kashmir’, to extend their activities to the Northern Areas.

The first party-based elections to a 26-member council called the Northern Areas Executive Council, were held in October 1994, and it was announced on March 31, 1995, that its members would have the same status, emoluments and privileges as the members of the
North West Frontier Province Legislative Assembly. But the council had no legislative authority, only advisory powers. The real power continued to be vested in the Ministry of Kashmir and Northern Areas Affairs headed by a Joint Secretary to the Government of Pakistan based in Islamabad, which exercised supreme control in all matters. Pakistanis man the civil, police and security services. There is no right of appeal against the judgments of the judicial commissioner.

Following a verdict of the Supreme Court of Pakistan in March 1999 recommending the extension of legislative, financial and administrative powers as well as an independent judiciary with writ jurisdiction, the first Northern Areas Legislative Council was elected in 2000. Under the new legal framework order, it was granted powers to legislate on local matters and impose local taxes. But the superstructure of the Northern Areas administration was left unchanged so that Pakistan's Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs continues to be its chief executive.

When the rest of Pakistan voted for a new civilian government in October 2002 elections, the Northern Areas remained outside the political process.

The Pakistani administration has also been involved in efforts to alter the demographic profile of the region, reducing the indigenous people to a minority. In the Gilgit and Skardu areas, large tracts of land have been allotted to non-locals, violating the United Nations Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP) resolutions and the J & K State Subject Rule. Other outsiders have purchased substantial stretches of land since they are, by and large, economically better off than the locals. As of January 2001, the old population ratio of 1:4 (non-locals to locals) in these areas had been transformed to 3:4. The rapid induction of Punjabi and Pakhtoon outsiders has created a sense of acute insecurity among the locals. The region is also deprived in terms of education and infrastructure, and there is only a negligible presence of daily newspapers, radio or TV stations.

**NORTHERN AREAS STRUCTURE OF GOVERNANCE**

The Northern Areas have the status of a Federally Administered Area. The chief executive authority for the region is vested in the Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Northern Areas, States and Frontier Regions. Assisting him is a Deputy Chief Executive who is appointed by
the Chief Executive from amongst the members of the Northern Areas Legislative Council, who shall be elected by majority vote by the members of the Council. The Deputy Chief Executive enjoys the status of a Minister of State. Advisors, who are appointed by the Chief Executive, in consultation with the Deputy Chief Executive, from amongst the members of the Northern Areas Legislative Council, assist the Deputy Chief Executive. The Advisors are entitled to the status of a Provincial Minister.

**DEPARTMENTS**

The principal civil servant in the Northern Areas is the Chief Secretary, and Secretaries head the departments. "Government" is defined by the Northern Areas Rules of Business, 1994, as meaning the Chief Executive, the Deputy Chief Executive and the Chief Secretary, Northern Areas.

**Northern Areas Legislative Council**

The Northern Areas Legislative Council is headed by the Federal Minister for Kashmir Affairs, Northern Areas, States and Frontier Regions and it meets only when the Minister convenes it.

**Judiciary**

Each district has a court of District and Sessions Judge. There are ten civil judges also exercising the powers of judicial magistrates. There is a Chief Court, comprising of one Chairman and two members, which acts the court of appeal from the decisions of the District and Sessions Judge. The Northern Areas Council Legal Framework Order, 1994, provides for the Court of appeals as the apex court of the Northern Areas, and provides for its establishment as soon as possible. *Such a Court of Appeals has so far not been set up*, and the decision of the Chief Court is, consequently, final. The Northern Areas have thus remained deprived of a High Court and of the facility of writ petitions against arbitrary state action. The people of the region cannot, moreover, appeal to the Supreme Court of Pakistan.
SECTARIAN VIOLENCE

Since 1988, the Northern Areas has witnessed sectarian violence that has claimed a number of lives. Unlike the rest of Pakistan, the Northern Areas have a Shia majority. The Pakistani establishment has long supported an anti-Shia programme in this region. A local insurrection broke out in Gilgit in May 1988 and in order to suppress the rebellion, the Special Services Group of the Pakistani Army based in Khapalu was dispatched. Pervez Musharraf, then a young Brigadier, was in charge of the operations, in which Musharraf used Sunni tribal irregulars to execute a brutal pogrom against the locals. Truckloads of Sunni tribals were sent in from the Afghan border to the region, and they indulged in anti-Shia brutalities unprecedented in Pakistan’s history. After eight days of ceaseless violence, the Army ‘stepped in’ to restore peace. Later on, the Shia population was further alarmed when large numbers of Sunnis were brought in from Punjab and the NWFP to settle down in Gilgit, radically altering the demographic profile of the area.

The anti-Shia pogrom resurfaced in 1993, when sectarian riots started again in Gilgit, leading to the death of 20 Shias. The ill-fated Kargil intrusions of 1999 into the Indian State of Jammu & Kashmir added to the discontent in the region. 73 per cent of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI) of the Pakistan Army, which was primarily used for these incursions and suffered the maximum casualties, is drawn from the Shia sect hailing primarily from the Northern Areas. The Shia soldiers were pushed into the suicidal mission, and later reportedly disowned by their own Army.

Year 2003 saw trouble brewing in the Northern Areas over the Islamic textbooks that the Pakistan Ministry of Education has issued as part of the curriculum for the schools in the region. According to Shia community leaders, the textbooks promote Sunni thought and values and are an attempt to promote sectarian hatred between the two sects. Almost everyday, hundreds of primary and secondary school students boycott classes and stage protest rallies in Gilgit.

DEVELOPMENT

The Northern Areas remain one of the most neglected and poorest parts of Pakistan. In 1981, the female literacy rate in the region was just three percent and the male literacy rate was 14.7
percent (well below the then national average of 26 percent). In the 1995 national achievement surveys, children and teachers in the Northern Areas scored the lowest in the country, and it was the only region in which girls scored lower than boys, reflecting serious gender equity issues. There is no industry to speak of except a few brick kilns. According to an article on the World Bank website, “Over 90 percent of the region’s 800,000 people live in small villages scattered along valleys carved by glacial streams and rivers. Subsistence agriculture is the norm and access to basic social services is often limited or unavailable. Roads are few, with one highway as virtually the only link to the rest of Pakistan.”

The Pakistani Government has reportedly set up only 12 high schools and two regional colleges in the Northern Areas, with no post graduate facilities. Very few locals are able to secure government jobs, and when they do, they are paid 25 per cent less than non-native entrants from Pakistan's Punjab province. There are no local dailies, or local radio or television stations. According to the most recently available data, there is just one doctor for 6,000 people. Piped water supply is virtually non-existent. And two thirds of the population must do without electricity in an area where winters are extremely harsh.
“May Allah destroy America and Britain... May Allah help the Mujahedeen in Iraq, Kashmir, Palestine, Chechnya and around the world.”

“The holiest soil on earth is that of Pakistan and we cannot tolerate the unholy presence of Nancy Powell on our holy land. Her presence keeps us away from Allah's blessings. Pakistan should cleanse itself from her unholy existence... Allah has told us to make atom bombs. America is telling us not to. Who should we listen to O Muslims, Allah or America? Kashmir will not be solved by talks, not by American arbitration, not by its division but only by jihad, jihad, jihad!... The Hindus were terrorists yesterday, they are terrorists today and they will remain terrorists tomorrow. We are right in seeking revenge from these spawns of evil.”

“I have come here because this is my duty to tell you that Muslims should not rest in peace until we have destroyed America and India.”

“We pray that Iraqis would continue to resist American tyranny and terror and we believe victory will come to them in the long run... History would record the sacrifice of Iraqi people in defence of their sovereignty and independence threatened by US imperialism... The attack was motivated by US designs to grab oil resources of the Iraqi people and enslave them.”

“We have the nuclear capability that can destroy Madras (India), surely the same missile can do the same to Tel Aviv. Washington cannot stop Muslim suicidal attacks. Taliban are still alive and along with "friends" they will continue the holy jihad against the U.S. America will
destroy Iraq and later on repeat the same act of war against Pakistan, Iran, Syria and Saudi Arabia.”


Many Western Scholars have pointed their accusing fingers at some of the … verses in the Qur’an to be able to contend that world of Islam is in a state of perpetual struggle against the non-Muslims. As to them it is sufficient answer to make, if one were to point out, that the defiance of God’s authority by one who is His slave exposes that slave to the risk of being held guilty of treason and such a one, in the perspective of Islamic law, is indeed to be treated as a sort of that cancerous growth on that organism of humanity, which has been created “Kanafsin Wahidatin” that is, like one, single, indivisible self. It thus becomes necessary to remove the cancerous malformation even if it be by surgical means (if it would not respond to other treatment), in order to save the rest of Humanity… The idea of Ummah of Mohammad, the Prophet of Islam, is incapable of being realised within the framework of territorial states much less made an enduring basis of viewing the world as having been polarised between the world of Islam and the world of war. Islam, in my understanding, does not subscribe to the concept of the territorial state…


“Terror struck into the hearts of the enemies is not only a means, it is the end in itself. Once a condition of terror into the opponent’s heart is obtained, hardly anything is left to be achieved. It is the point where the means and the end meet and merge. Terror is not a means of imposing decision upon the enemy (*sic*); it is the decision we wish to impose upon him.”


America wants to destroy all Muslim countries one after another, so let us go and fight in the way of Allah.

- Maulana Rahmatullah, Tanzeem-i-Ulma, Peshawar, April 3, 2003

If the U.S. attacks Iraq, the MMA alliance and all their supporters will attack Washington and Tel Aviv.

- Sami ul-Haq, MMA leader, Islamabad, March 2003
There are thousands ready to go for Jihad but they are waiting for the request from the Taliban.

- Maulana Mohammad Alam, Leader of Tehreek Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi, Peshawar, November 8, 2001

We will provide logistic support to the Taliban and will also provide information about Americans if the present regime did not stop supporting the US troops stationed in Pakistan.

- Hafiz Hussain Ahmed, Deputy Secretary-General, Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam (Fazlur faction), Hyderabad, October 30, 2001

The Taliban are a symbol of Islam. This will be a long war against the infidel forces. They want to eliminate Muslims.

- Maulana Samiul Haq, Chief of his own faction of Jamaat-Ulema-e-Islam, Karachi, October 26, 2001

The United States has waged a crusade against the Muslims and, unfortunately, Pakistan's rulers are supporting her to carry out the genocide of Afghans in the name of curbing so-called terrorism… Musharraf is playing the role of an informer of the US and Islam declares the death penalty for such people.

- Sheikh Aqeelur Rehman, District President, Jamaat-e-Islami, Muzaffarabad, October 26, 2001

American repression and imperialism is a challenge for the entire Muslim world… [linking Osama with attacks in the US is part of a plan to pave wave for the US’] sinister plans to strike against Afghanistan.


The real war has just started… After Palestine and Afghanistan, now Iraq will also give birth to holy warriors. Who will free me from the clutches of Jews?


Muslim blood is being extracted to serve Jews' interest.

“This is a matter of happiness for us that we are going to announce the holy war against Bush and his cronies from NWFP where the members of religious alliance are in power… It's enough and an eye opener for the Muslim Ummah to retaliate immediately as God's enemies (Americans and Britons) have imposed the worst kind of brutalities on the innocent Muslims… The MMA government must take steps for sending the faithful to Iraq to fight alongside their Iraqi brothers… Jihad is the lone weapon with Muslims to safeguard their rights and honour while such US attacks and cruelties on the Muslim would open more doors of the holy war.”


"We do not consider ourselves separate from Taliban or Afghanistan. Our history, our religion and blood and culture are the same. The Taliban government is our ideal government and we want a similar one in Pakistan because it has peace, equality and justice. We consider the war against Osama and Taliban a war against us, Pakistanis and Pakistan."

- Maulana Azam Tariq, Member of National Assembly from Jhang constituency and chief of Sunni group Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan, January 2003.

The US can declare us terrorists, but even then, we will continue waging war in India… The military government's biggest mistake is that it is not wising up its own people on the crucial juncture in the freedom movement in Kashmir… Pakistan must complete its nuclear programme and strengthen its defence missile system to apply pressure on India besides taking its own people into confidence… We must not toe the US line in Afghanistan as it would be our greatest support in case of war with India. Support from China and the Islamic world should also be sought in this regard.


Bush wants the world to embrace Christianity. Muslims are being oppressed in Kashmir, Palestine, Bosnia, Chechnya and India. Muslim women are being raped in these countries. Jihad, under such a situation becomes obligatory… Jamaat will not confront with the army, but continue to wage jihad in the world. War with the infidels will not end through negotiations but through fighting. There is no possibility of compromise with the infidels.

Looking ahead, darkly
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/mazdak/20030104.htm

The reality of power in Pakistan is that the army has controlled the destiny of the nation for most of its existence, and is likely to continue doing so in the foreseeable future. The invisible 'agencies' have huge, unaudited budgets and manipulate and malign politicians and control sections of the press. Incidentally, all this is a matter of public record: names of politicians and journalists who have received cash handouts from the exchequer have been published many times without any action being taken against those making the payments and those receiving them.

Under these circumstances, how can democracy possibly function? And if it can't, what difference does it make who occupies the prime minister's house in Islamabad?

One major problem with the army's role is that as an institution, it is convinced that its interest is identical to the national interest which it has defined without any semblance of a public debate. This leads to the conclusion that to justify our bloated defence budget, Pakistan needs an enemy. In our case, this means India. The logical inference to be drawn from this line of reasoning is that the Kashmir issue will never be resolved.”
Musharraf’s promises to banish extremism still unfulfilled

*Daily Times*, January 18, 2003


Despite promises by President General Pervez Musharraf to stamp out extremist Islam and terrorism, Jihad Inc is doing roaring business in the country. In the past few weeks, Maulana Masood Azhar, the leader of Jaish-e-Muhammad, and Hafiz Muhammad Saeed, the leader of Lashkar-e-Taiba, both organisations banned in Pakistan, were freed from detention on the orders of the Lahore High Court. A report in *The Economist* said the government seemed unable to convince the court that the two were a threat to public order.

… Meanwhile, at Friday prayers at mosques throughout Pakistan, the virtues of jihad are preached. Muslims are urged to resist all infidels, especially those supporting “America’s crusade against Islam in Palestine, Kashmir, Chechnya and Afghanistan”. Possible waverers get sinister warnings. The mullah at a Lahore mosque during Ramadan last November actually screamed that “all those Muslims who do not pray five times a day should be killed”… The outlawed organisations of Mr Azhar and Mr Saeed have simply changed their names. They seem to have plenty of money; they are setting up new offices, enlisting fresh recruits to their cause and training them in not-so-secret camps across the country. In fairly literate Pakistan (43%) there is plenty for a zealot to read. There are at least 40 jihadi publications in the vernacular, Urdu, including six weeklies, four fortnightlies and 30 monthly magazines.

Spreading despondency: who's to blame?

Ayaz Amir, *Dawn*, December 27, 2002

http://www.dawn.com/weekly/avaz/20021227.htm

… In the run-up to the elections Gen Musharraf and his team of oligarchs turned their attention to the country's Constitution. Sorely abused over the years, this document went perhaps through its most trying experience then. Musharraf had already declared himself president for five more years following the referendum. But that was not considered enough. The Constitution was further amended to give him more powers, thus reducing the prime minister to the position of a parliamentary figurehead.

In the pre-election phase every rule in the book was bent (or broken) to give the advantage to the Q League. In defense of this motley assembly of fair-weather birds, it has been said that if
it had official patronage why did it not win an outright majority. The answer is simple. Bereft of official patronage, it would have faced the prospect of political extinction… After the polls came the comic opera of government formation at the centre and in the provinces. The nation watched these games through jaded eyes. Why jaded? Because starting from the Q League and the referendum down to the October elections, the Pakistani public was exposed to so much that it lost the capacity of amazement. Nothing could surprise it any more.

**Pakistan first: what does it mean?**
Ayaz Amir, *Dawn*, December 20, 2002
http://www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/20021220.htm

When dictators or rulers – the same thing in our case – turn lazy or find themselves short of answers, they come up with the magical phrase, 'Pakistan first'. After intoning it they feel they have resolved any moral or intellectual dilemmas they may be facing… Pakistan first’ also should mean taking a hard look at the role of the army in our national life. Should it be the army first or Pakistan first? Seeing the way the national security establishment has spread its wings, and the way the military continually expands the area of its privileges, it sometimes gets confusing to know what the true aim of national security is? To strengthen the nation's defences or keep the bishops of national security in clover?

The civilian government, alas, has nothing to do with this debate. Democracy and civilianization are still orphans in Pakistan. The adult decisions remain in army hands. So, ultimately, it is the army which has to define what 'Pakistan first' should mean - an empty catchphrase or a spur to some fresh thinking?”

**March of the clerics (and other stories)**
Ayaz Amir, *Dawn*, October 18, 2002
www.dawn.com/weekly/ayaz/20021018.htm

The United States and General Pervez Musharraf, the best of friends, have done what on their own the people of Pakistan could never have. They have ensured the strong showing of the religious right – the six-party alliance, the Muttahida Majlis-i-Amal (MMA) – in the recent elections… This is not how it was supposed to happen. Remember that by cracking down on religious extremism and inveighing against the evils of madressah education General Musharraf was supposed to be taking Pakistan into the 'global mainstream', whatever this meant. He was supposed to be making Pakistan safe for a 'liberal' future. And smack in the
centre of these beguiling notions comes the march of the MMA. Where did our calculators go wrong?

Lest anyone think the religious factor is a passing phenomenon in Pakistani politics, it is here to stay. The greyness of the military regime and the intellectual bankruptcy of the 'liberal' parties will ensure this. This is another one the nation owes General Musharraf. The very thing he was supposed to destroy has come to haunt and perhaps mock him at his own table… Inter-Services and Military Intelligence, which together constitute the real election commission of Pakistan, deserve to be applauded for this outcome….

The Fantasies of Pakistani liberalism

How strange then that today they (the Islamist fundamentalists) should be demonised as the source of all our problems. Who held whom hostage? It was not the madrassas which forced any government to support the Taliban. This was a decision taken by the national security establishment in pursuit of ‘strategic depth’ and similar notions which have characterised our Afghan policy. The madrassas had it not in their power to hold the nation hostage. It was the army and the intelligence services which brooked no assault on the ‘obscurantist elements’ because they were seen as serving the ‘national interest’ – a bogey in whose name every last lunacy can be justified.

Pakistan’s rigged elections must be rejected
Benazir Bhutto, *Socialist Affairs Online*
www.socialistinternational.org/9SocAffairs/1-V50/bhutto-e.html

Islamabad’s generals ruthlessly use the intelligence agencies to factionalise mainstream political parties. Their goal to undermine traditional political parties plays into the hands of religious extremists. They are free to campaign. Their leaders are released from prisons by compliant courts too afraid to free political prisoners belonging to democratic parties… The October elections orchestrated in Pakistan were a mockery of justice. Five different laws were promulgated by edict to prevent the leadership of the Pakistan People’s Party from freely participating. However, Mullah Omar’s tutor was allowed to participate. Today he is a member of the Pakistani Parliament. General Musharaf promised new faces for Pakistan’s future. The new face can be found in Mullah Omar’s tutor as well as the large number of persons elected under the banner of the religious parties. A significant number of these are
battle hardened veterans of the Afghan Jihad… As the Musharaf régime tampered with the
election result, it deliberately gave the religious parties the power they now enjoy.

… But Islamabad’s generals are betting on a different course. They are betting that the world
is distracted by the violence in the Middle East and the weapons inspections in Baghdad.
They are betting that the world community will sideline the cause of democracy in Pakistan.
Maybe they are right. But if Islamabad’s nuclear armed military dictatorship is allowed to
exploit the war on international terror to legitimise its domestic dictatorship, the threat from
terrorists can only increase.

Democracy in Pakistan Means Political Defeat to the Army
Zaheeruddin Dar, South Asia Tribune
www.satibude.com/archives/dec16_22_02/opinion.zaheeruddin.htm
There seems to be scant realization of the fact that Pakistan has done almost everything to
entrench itself in a military-authoritarian order. Now it is almost, if not decidedly, impossible
to have a democracy in this country… Of all countries attempting at democratization of their
institutions and polity, Pakistan is the unlikeliest candidate. This county is proving more
willing than any other to stay the present course of further militarization of its institutions
than any other in the world. Its military has s entrenched itself in the political fort that now
the society has to pay the highest ever cost for taking a turn toward democracy. Now Pakistan
is like a patient that does not need prescription, but forced medication.

… Those who think that it is only the military that has a disorder in political approach toward
democratization, are wrong, as they fail to take account of the fact that socially, Pakistan is a
case of hate-democracy. The civilian population has been indoctrinated enough to hate
democratic prescriptions… Living in pre-feudal and tribal social structures and a pre-
industrial formation, generating only small and medium local finances for manufacture and
distribution, more than 80 percent of Pakistanis are yet to taste any kind of democratic order.

The Evil Face of the Controlled Democracy in Pakistan
www.satibude.com/archives/feb03_09_03/P1_darkface.htm
Democracy is coming back to Pakistan, but of what kind is demonstrated by the ugly
manipulation of the process by the military regime. All elections being held now are
“properly” managed and systems have been placed in the right spots to ensure that no more
surprise results upset the applecart. “Proper” arrangements have also been made to gather support for the pro-Musharraf house of cards… Freedom of expression and views does not come free of cost, even in a “democratic” Pakistan run by General Pervez Musharraf.

Musharraf is Pushing Pakistan into Talibanization, Theocracy
General Musharraf is hyping to heaven the threat of “Talibanization” of Pakistan that he has craftily imagined to peddle fear at home and abroad, and shift the spotlight from his dictatorship to his invention: Talibanization. He is hop-scotching the country from Lahore to Kohat to Islamabad to explain the terror of this phantom menace. In Lahore, he spoke to the lawyers on the dangers of Talibanization. In Kohat, his audience was made up of both Pakistanis and international diplomats. In Islamabad, he limited his comments to the press. His relatively more significant address was made in Lahore to a tamed audience of lawyers… He offered them a stark choice: “Do you want a theocratic Pakistan or an Islamic Pakistan?” …When Gen. Musharraf asks his audiences to choose between a theocratic Pakistan and an Islamic Pakistan, he means to ask them to choose his dictatorship over his opposition. Theocracy and Talibanization are his code words for his democratic opposition led by liberal-left Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), center-right Pakistan Muslim League (PML), and a six-party religious alliance in Muttehidda Majlis-e-Aml.

Since October, 1999 when he seized power, he has been trafficking sleaze against the country’s two top leaders, who pose the main challenge to his dictatorship – Ms Bhutto and Mr Sharif. So much so that his three and a half year in power has been a running commercial against the two. Through their character assassination, he hoped to erase their names from the collective memory of the Pakistani nation, and implant his own, instead. He has miserably failed at the first, but exceedingly succeeded at the second. Today, his name, which has become a handy stand-in for all that is wrong with Pakistan, is deeply etched on the memory of every Pakistani… All those who care about democracy in Pakistan know that Gen. Musharraf is pushing Pakistan into Talibanization and theocracy by standing in the way of liberal-left and center-right parties of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League (PML). The longer he stays in power, the likelier will become the Talibanization of Pakistan.
Editorial, The Friday Times, Najam Sethi, October 11, 2002
I have long argued that politics, like nature, abhors a vacuum, and that by trying to sideline the mainstream, moderate parties, Gen. Musharraf would inevitably pave the way for the immoderate religious parties. This lesson should have been learnt by now but it wasn't. When the establishment got rid of Benazir Bhutto in 1990, it made way for Nawaz Sharif. When it got rid of Sharif in 1993, it made way for Bhutto. When it got rid of Bhutto in 1996, it made way for Sharif. But when Musharraf got rid of Sharif in 1999 and started to hound Bhutto as well, he made way for the MMA [Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal, a coalition of six Islamist political parties]…. But there is a more cynical view that may gain currency. Maybe this is just what the establishment wanted. Two critical provinces bordering Afghanistan with the anti-American MMA [in power] so that the establishment can drive a hard bargain with Washington. And coalition governments in the other two provinces in which pro-establishment minorities or majorities can keep “democracy” in check.

Pakistan – Musharraf’s Morass
www.feer.com/articles/2003/0306_19/p012region.html
The Pakistan military has long given strategic and covert support to the country's Islamic fundamentalists, but that policy appears to be backfiring as the religious radicals mount a challenge to central power. This, coupled with President Pervez Musharraf's failure to win parliamentary support for the military's continuing political dominance, has led to fears that he may be on the verge of dissolving democratic legislatures and reimposing military rule nearly four years after overthrowing an elected government in a bloodless coup. "The present army leadership has developed utter contempt for civilians and democracy," says a retired general who used to be close to Musharraf. "It's a very dangerous situation for Pakistan and the region."

… the crisis is almost entirely of the military's making, as it refuses to share real power with civilians, insists on being the only decision-maker and covertly arms the fundamentalists to fight its proxy wars in Kashmir and, allegedly, Afghanistan. "The army has wilfully distorted the political system and denied space to secular parties and civil society while favouring the fundamentalists," says Samina Ahmed, regional director of the International Crisis Group (ICG), a Brussels-based think-tank. For decades Pakistani generals and politicians raised the spectre of Islamic fundamentalism to elicit Western support for their regimes. That, allegedly,
is why the military helped the MMA win power in North West Frontier Province. In fact, the country's rulers cultivated the militants as a vital foreign-policy tool, especially in dealings with India--the Islamic warriors waged the war to reunify Kashmir that Pakistan's army could not do itself.
India – Backgrounder on Conflicts

India has lost approximately 71,000 lives to terrorism and extremism over the last decade in the major irregular and sub-conventional wars that afflict the country. This is certainly cause for alarm, and creates an image of widespread breakdown of law and order – and this is an accurate picture of at least some parts of the country. Across most of its geographical expanse, however, India has remained by and large free of the modern-day scourge of terrorism, as of insurgency and other patterns of extremist political violence (see map).

A study of data relating to civilian fatalities as a result of social and political violence in the country over the period September 1, 1999 – August 31, 2001, (Graph 1) indicated that nearly 36 per cent of all such fatalities occurred in parts of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) alone as a result of the separatist proxy war in that State. Over 33 per cent were accounted for by a range of insurgencies and terrorist movements in India’s Northeast – and these were overwhelmingly concentrated in a small number of districts in four of the seven States in this region. A little less than 21 per cent of civilian fatalities resulted from Left Wing Extremist (referred to as Naxalism in India) and retaliatory violence in some areas of the States of Andhra Pradesh, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Orissa, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Bihar. Barely 10 per cent of the total civilian fatalities were spread across the rest of the country, and only a small fraction of these were concentrated in the economically vibrant metropolii. While some micro-variations would occur from year to year, the broad trends in violence in the country remain consistent in pattern with the findings of this study.

Separatism constitutes a primary demand of the movement in J&K, and of many of the groups active in India’s Northeast (though many Northeast groups do not have clearly defined separatist goals). There has been a proliferation of militant groups in recent times, with as many as 36 identified in J&K, and over 108 in India’s Northeast (see http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/index.html). Many of these are, however, insignificant gangs and some are now dormant.

J&K is currently the most significant internal security challenge faced by the country (Graph 2), and four Islamist fundamentalist groups – all of them head-quartered in Pakistan – constitute the gravest threat in the State: Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) [recently renamed Jamaat-ud-Dawaa], Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) [recently renamed Khuddamul Islam], Hizb-ul-
Mujahideen (HM), and Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM). All these seek integration of J&K with Pakistan, and they have entirely replaced groups, such as the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), that sought Kashmiri Independence and who dominated the earlier phase of the militancy. A study of trends in terrorist fatalities suggests that at least a third of all terrorists killed are of foreign origin.

The LeT is the terrorist arm of the Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), with its headquarters at Muridke in Pakistan. Its entry into J&K was first recorded in 1993 but it was after 1997 that it rose in the priorities of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Indian government officials maintain that the ISI has been extending covert support to the LeT to carry out subversive activities globally after the US launched its war on terror against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. The directive to Lashkar is to concentrate their activities globally rather than in only a few countries, including India. On July 27, 2003, eight alleged Lashkar cadres, accused of planning terrorist acts in Jammu and Kashmir, were arrested during a series of raids around the Federal Capital of Washington. Three other persons, reportedly living in Saudi Arabia, were also named in a 42-count Justice Department indictment.

The LeT has a specialised ‘suicide’ cadre, the *fidayeen*, who undertake high-risk missions against security forces and heavily guarded strategic targets. The first of these attacks targeted a residential complex of the Border Security Force (BSF) in Bandipore near Srinagar on July 13, 1999, towards the end of the ‘Kargil War’. The most spectacular of these missions was the attack on May 14, 2002, when three *fidayeen* of the Al Mansooran, a front outfit of the Lashkar, launched an attack on the Kaluchak cantonment in Jammu. 36 persons, a majority of them family members of SF personnel and other civilians, were killed, while 48 others were injured. Between November 1999 and December 2002, the Lashkar has carried out an estimated 50 *fidayeen* attacks. LeT operations are characterised by a level of brutality that surpasses that of other terrorist groups in the State. Cases include the cold blooded murder of 26 people in Wandhama on the intervening night of January 25-26, 1998; the June 19, 1998, massacre of 25 members of a wedding party in Doda, Jammu; and, during President Clinton’s visit to South Asia, the Chattisinghpura massacre of 35 Sikhs on March 20, 2000.

The JeM was set up in Pakistan in February 2000, by Maulana Masood Azhar. Azhar is closely connected with the Binori Seminary, the largest Deobandi *madrassa* in Pakistan, and was released on December 31, 1999, from an Indian prison in a hostage swap after the hijacking of the Indian Airlines Flight IC 814 to Kandahar, Afghanistan. The rise of the JeM
has been rapid. The first of its more dramatic strikes occurred on April 23, 2000, when a youth rammed a car laden with explosives at the gates of the local army headquarters at Badami Bagh in Srinagar. The *Jaish* has also claimed credit for the rifle grenade attack on the J&K Secretariat building in Srinagar on June 28, 2001; and the attack on the State Legislative Assembly complex at Srinagar on October 1, 2001, using a car bomb – 38 people, including four *fidayeen* were killed in the latter. The JeM was also responsible for the attack on India’s Parliament in New Delhi on December 13, 2001, in which nine security force personnel and a Parliament staff were killed. All the five terrorists involved in the attack were also killed by the security forces and were identified as Pakistani nationals. The JeM and the LeT are both closely connected with Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda, and are members of his *International Islamic Front for Jehad against Jews and Crusaders* (IIF).

The HM is numerically the largest group in J&K, accounting for up to 60 per cent of the total terrorist cadres in the State, though Indian intelligence considers it to be responsible for only about 10 to 20 per cent of current terrorist strikes. The HM was founded in 1989 as the militant wing of the *Jamaat-e-Islami* on the prodding of the ISI, as an Islamic counter to the relatively indigenous and purportedly secular JKLF. The group is headed by Syed Salahuddin, and is headquartered in Pakistan. The HM was responsible for setting fire to the Muslim shrine of Charar-e-Sharief in 1995 and collaborated with the LeT in the Chattisinghpora massacre. It has also killed several moderate Kashmiri Muslims. The HM has, however, on occasion indicated a willingness to accept a negotiated solution to the Kashmir problem, and had declared a short-lived unilateral ‘ceasefire’ in J&K in July 2000. It has increasingly been marginalized in the terrorism profile of the State. Also, for quite some time, there has been serious infighting within the group. On March 2003, former HM ‘chief commander’, Abdul Majeed Dar, was killed in the Noor Bagh area of Sopore Township in north Kashmir. Dar’s killing was the culmination of a three-year battle for supremacy being waged by his followers against the faction led by Syed Salahuddin, the HM ‘supreme commander’ and chief of the 14-member United Jehad Council (UJC), a conglomerate of Pakistan-based terrorist organisations. Earlier, Dar was ‘suspended’ by the Salahuddin faction and replaced by Saiful Islam as the Hizb ‘chief commander of operations’ in Kashmir, on May 4, 2002. Within hours of Dar’s murder, clashes broke out at HM camps in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) between the slain leader’s followers and the faction led by Salahuddin. On July 10, 2003, Pakistani media reports indicated that the HM had split, with the faction owing
allegiance to Abdul Majeed Dar joining the Hizb-e-Islami, after efforts for reunification by the front-ranking Kashmiri leadership and the Jamaat-e-Islami failed.

Among the proliferation of terrorist organisations in India’s troubled Northeast, two stand out in significance: the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) that seeks the secession of Assam, and the National Socialist Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah) [NSCN-IM] that has taken over the leadership of the longest insurgency in the region, seeking Naga independence. While violence by both these groups has seen a recent decline, their influence in the region is overwhelming. They run widespread networks of extortion, smuggling and other criminal activities, and also control substantial 'overground' business operations. The NSCN-IM has been engaged in negotiations with the Union Government under a cease-fire agreement that has been in place since August 1997. The latest round of peace talks between the Union Government and the NSCN-IM was held during January 2003 with the group’s leaders, Thuingaleng Muivah and Isak Chisi Swu, at New Delhi. ULFA has consistently rejected possibilities of a negotiated settlement. ULFA and the NSCN-IM have, moreover, continued to extend their spheres of influence in the Northeast region through low-grade violence as well as by training and arming a large number of other terrorist and proxy groups, and are supported by the ISI in their activities. No terrorist organisation in the Northeast has, however, sought to extend its sphere of operations outside the region till now.

In contrast, the Islamist groups operating with Pakistani support in Kashmir do have a clear pan-Islamist agenda, and are known to have created a network of terrorist cells in a number of other States in India. While an occasional and dramatic strike has been engineered in various cities, including notably, Delhi, Bombay, Gandhinagar, Coimbatore and Hyderabad, over the past decade, they are yet to secure any noticeable and persistent impact on normal life in any of these areas.

LeT, JeM, HM, and ULFA are among the 32 organisations banned under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) enacted on March 28, 2002. However, the immediate consequences of the Act and these bans have been negligible.
Graph 1
Civilian Fatalities

September 1, 1999 - August 31, 2000

- Social Conflicts: 8.73%
- Others: 1.18%
- LWE: 20.72%
- NE: 34.02%
- J&K: 35.35%

September 1, 2000 - August 31, 2001

- Social Conflicts: 9%
- Others: 1%
- LWE: 20%
- NE: 33%
- J&K: 37%
Graph 2
Total Fatalities in Major Conflicts

NOTE: Figures of years 2002 and 2003 are provisional, compiled from news reports.
K. P. S. GILL: ISLAMIST EXTREMISM & TERRORISM IN SOUTH ASIA

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MAJOR CONFLICTS AND TERRORIST GROUPS
OPERATING IN INDIA

STATE: JAMMU & KASHMIR
Lashkar-e-Toiba (Army of the Pure)
Jaish-e-Mohammed (Army of the Prophet)
Hizb-ul-Mujahiddeen (Party of Holy Warriors)
Harkat-ul-Mujahiddeen (Movement of Holy Warriors)
Al Badr (The Full Moon)
Harkat-ul-Jehad Islami (Movement of the Islamic Jehad)

NORTHEAST INDIA

STATE: ASSAM
ULFA: United Liberation Front of Asom
NDFB: National Democratic Front of Boroland
UPDF: United Peoples Democratic Front
BLT: Bodo Liberation Tigers

STATE: NAGALAND
NSCN-IM: National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Isak-Muivah
NSCM-K: National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Khaplang

STATE: MANIPUR
UNLF: United National Liberation Front
PLA: People’s Liberation Army
PREPAK: People’s Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak
NSCN-IM: National Socialist Council of Nagalim – Isak-Muivah

STATE: TRIPURA
NLFT: National Liberation Front of Tripura
ATTF: All Tripura Tiger Force

STATE: MEGHALAYA
HNLC: Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council
ANVC: Achik National Volunteer Council

LEFT WING EXTREMISM

STATE: BIHAR
People’s War Group [Communist Party of India, Marxist-Lennist (People’s War)]
Maoist Communist Centre
Ranvir Sena (Anti-Left Wing caste army of landlords)

STATE: JHARKHAND
People’s War Group [Communist Party of India, Marxist-Lennist (People’s War)]
Maoist Communist Centre
STATE: ORISSA
People’s War Group [Communist Party of India, Marxist-Lennist (People’s War)]
STATE: CHATTISGARH
People’s War Group [Communist Party of India, Marxist-Leninist (People’s War)]
Maoist Communist Centre

ANDHRA PRADESH
People’s War Group (PWG)
Communist Party of India – Marxist Leninist (Janasakhti) [Janasakhti: People’s Power]
## Major Islamist Terrorist Attacks in India by Pakistan-Based Groups in the Post-9/11 Period

[Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal / Institute for Conflict Management]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Terrorist Group</th>
<th>Arms used</th>
<th>Headquarters of Terrorist Group Responsible</th>
<th>Support / Linkages of Terrorist Group</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 17, 2001</td>
<td>SF personnel sleeping in the basement of a building attacked by two <em>fidayeen</em> (suicide terrorist).</td>
<td>Handwara, Kupwara district, J&amp;K</td>
<td>9 0 1 11</td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td>Muridke</td>
<td>ISI, Al Qaeda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1, 2001</td>
<td>Attack on State Legislative Assembly Complex.</td>
<td>Srinagar, J&amp;K</td>
<td>8 24 4 70</td>
<td>JeM</td>
<td>Explosives, guns</td>
<td>Central office – Islamabad Command HQ-Muzaffarabad, Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK).</td>
<td>ISI, Al Qaeda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 18, 2001</td>
<td>Failed assassination attempt on Public Works Minister Ali Mohammad Sagar.</td>
<td>Baramulla district J&amp;K</td>
<td></td>
<td>HM</td>
<td>Rifle grenades</td>
<td>Muzaffarabad, PoK.</td>
<td>ISI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 22, 2001</td>
<td><em>Fidayeen</em> attack on Indian Air Force base.</td>
<td>Awantipore, Pulwama district, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0 2 4 2</td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>Muridke</td>
<td>ISI, Al Qaeda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Organization</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>November 30, 2001</td>
<td>Massacre</td>
<td>Galyot village, Udhampur, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>conclusive identification</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 2, 2001</td>
<td>Attack on a marriage party.</td>
<td>Trinagal village, Udhampur J&amp;K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>conclusive identification</td>
<td>Guns</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 8, 2001</td>
<td>Suicide attack on SF convoy.</td>
<td>Azad Gunj, Baramulla, J&amp;K</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>Muridke</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 13, 2001</td>
<td>Five terrorists attack India’s Parliament while it is in session.</td>
<td>Delhi</td>
<td>9</td>
<td></td>
<td>JeM</td>
<td>RDX/Grenades/AK rifles</td>
<td>Central office – Islamabad Command HQ-Muzaffarabad, Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK).</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 31, 2001</td>
<td>Massacre</td>
<td>Mangnar Top, Poonch, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>conclusive identification</td>
<td>No</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 20, 2002</td>
<td>Massacre</td>
<td>Behra, Poonch, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Muridke</td>
<td>ISI, Al Qaeda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 22, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on the American Center.</td>
<td>Kolkata, West Bengal</td>
<td>4</td>
<td></td>
<td>AK rifles</td>
<td>Pakistan, Bangladesh. ARCF terminated.</td>
<td>ISI, Al Qaeda</td>
<td>ISI, Al Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 16, 2002</td>
<td>Massacre</td>
<td>Nirala, Rajouri district, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td></td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>AK Rifles</td>
<td>Muridke</td>
<td>ISI, Al Qaeda</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Casualty</td>
<td>Actual</td>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Attacker</td>
<td>Paraclet</td>
<td>Method</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>March 29, 2002</td>
<td>Suicide attack on Border Security Force camp</td>
<td>Kalakote, J&amp;K</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Grenades/Rifles</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 30, 2002</td>
<td>Suicide attack at Raghunath Temple</td>
<td>Jammu, J&amp;K</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>20 C</td>
<td>Grenade, guns</td>
<td>Muridke</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 8, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on a village</td>
<td>Dandli Dansal, Udhampur district, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Grenades/Rifles</td>
<td>Muzaffarabad</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 19, 2002</td>
<td>Fidayeen attack</td>
<td>Two SF camps at Chasana, Udhampur, J&amp;K</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7 SF</td>
<td>No conclusiv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 21, 2002</td>
<td>APHC leader Abdul Gani Lone assassinated</td>
<td>Eidgah grounds, Srinagar, J&amp;K</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>No conclusiv</td>
<td>Pistols/Hand Grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 27, 2002</td>
<td>Massacre of a family</td>
<td>Foothills of Pirpanjal mountain range, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>No conclusiv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 13, 2002</td>
<td>Massacre</td>
<td>Kasim Nagar, Jammu, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33C</td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>AK rifles/Grenades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 6, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on Amarnath pilgrims</td>
<td>Pahalgam, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>32 C</td>
<td>No conclusiv</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>Attacker(s)</td>
<td>First Responder</td>
<td>Suspected</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 23, 2002</td>
<td>Two massacres</td>
<td>Thanamandi and Manjakote, Rajouri district, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0 10 0 0</td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Muridke</td>
<td>ISI, Al Qaeda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 6, 2002</td>
<td>Independent candidate in the Assembly elections killed</td>
<td>Handwara, Kupwara district, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0 4 0 2</td>
<td>JuM</td>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>ISI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 11, 2002</td>
<td>Minister and candidate in the Assembly polls Mushtaq Ahmad Lone assassinated at a elections rally</td>
<td>Tikipora, Kupwara, J&amp;K</td>
<td>3 1 0 5</td>
<td>Al-Aarifeen/LeT</td>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>Muridke</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 12, 2002</td>
<td>Defence Minister George Fernandes’s convoy attacked</td>
<td>Kupwara district, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0 0 0 3</td>
<td>Al-Madeena Regiment</td>
<td>Rifles</td>
<td>Pakistan occupied Kashmir</td>
<td>ISI</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 24, 2002</td>
<td>Two terrorists attack the Akshardham temple of the Swaminarayan sect after storming it.</td>
<td>Gandhinagar, Gujarat.</td>
<td>1 32 2 74</td>
<td>Tehreek-e-Qisas/LeT</td>
<td>Grenades/ AK rifles</td>
<td>Unknown / Muridke</td>
<td>ISI / Al Qaeda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 11, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on SFs</td>
<td>Jammu-Srinagar national Highway, J&amp;K</td>
<td>8 0 0 6 SF</td>
<td>No conclusive identification</td>
<td>IED</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 22, 2002</td>
<td>Suicide attack on CRPF camp</td>
<td>Srinagar, J&amp;K</td>
<td>6 0 2 9</td>
<td>Lashkar-e-Toiba</td>
<td>AK-56 rifles/ Grenades</td>
<td>Muridke</td>
<td>ISI / Al Qaeda</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Attacker(S)</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Attacker(S)</td>
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<tr>
<td>November 23, 2002</td>
<td>Explosion</td>
<td>Srinagar-Jammu national highway, at Lower Munda, south Kashmir, J&amp;K</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>HM, HuJI, JuM</td>
<td>IED</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 24, 2002</td>
<td>Raghunath Temple</td>
<td>Jammu, J&amp;K</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Grenades, guns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 20, 2002</td>
<td>Member of the Legislative Assembly Abdul Aziz Mir assassinated.</td>
<td>Near Pampore town, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>Save Kashmir Movement/ HM</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 31, 2003</td>
<td>Editor of a local news agency, News and Feature Alliance (NAFA), killed.</td>
<td>Press Enclave, Srinagar, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>HM</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 13, 2003</td>
<td>Bomb explosion onboard local train.</td>
<td>Mulund, Mumbai, Maharashtra</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>JeM/ Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI)</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 14, 2003</td>
<td>Lone fidayeen after failing to attack a muharram procession is believed to have panicked and opened fire when confronted by the SF personnel.</td>
<td>Poonch Town, J&amp;K</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Rifle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Incident Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>Weapons Used</td>
<td>Affiliations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>March 16, 2003</td>
<td>In a joint operation, at least 50 terrorists attack a remote police post.</td>
<td>Ind village, Udhampur district, J&amp;K</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>HM, JuM, TuM, HuJI</td>
<td>AK Rifles/Grenades, Muzaffarabad/Pakistan occupied Kashmir</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>March 23, 2002</td>
<td>Approximately 25 heavily armed terrorists dressed in police uniform attack Nadimarg village, 75km away from Srinagar, and disarm policemen guarding the village. Later, they fired indiscriminately.</td>
<td>Nadimarg village, Pulwama district, J&amp;K</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>AK rifles, Muridke, ISI, Al Qaeda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 25, 2003</td>
<td>Two unidentified terrorists carry out a suicide attack on the Sector-11 headquarters of the Border Security Force (BSF).</td>
<td>Madar in the Bandipore area of Baramulla district, J&amp;K</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>No conclusive identification</td>
<td>AK rifles</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 26, 2003</td>
<td>A group of fidayeen (suicide terrorists) attacks the local station of All India Radio.</td>
<td>Srinagar, J&amp;K</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Al-Madeena Regiment</td>
<td>Explosive-laden car, grenades, automatic rifles, Pakistan occupied Kashmir, ISI</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 28, 2003</td>
<td>Two fidayeen (suicide squad) terrorists attack an army installation at the Dogra Regiment camp.</td>
<td>Sunjwan on the outskirts of Jammu city.</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Grenades, automatic rifles, Muridke, ISI, Al Qaeda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 21, 2003</td>
<td>Attack on pilgrims</td>
<td>Banganga, On way to Vaishnodevi</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>No conclusive identification</td>
<td>Grenades</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 22, 2003</td>
<td>Suicide attack on Army camp</td>
<td>Village Bangti in Akhnoor</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>LeT</td>
<td>Grenades, automatic rifles, Muridke, ISI, Al Qaeda</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Description</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Pathway</td>
<td>Target</td>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Location</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 28, 2003</td>
<td>Bomb explosion in bus</td>
<td>Ghatkopar, Mumbai</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>SIMI</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Aligarh</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 6, 2003</td>
<td>Terrorists blow up a car laden with explosives when a small Army convoy passed by the spot.</td>
<td>Parimpora, outskirts of the capital city of Srinagar</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>HM</td>
<td>Explosives</td>
<td>Muzaffarabad/Pakistan occupied Kashmir</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January 2, 2004</td>
<td>Suicide attack on railway station</td>
<td>Jammu</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>No conclusive identification</td>
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</table>

SF: Security Forces  
C: Civilian  
T: Terrorists  
IED: Improvised Explosive Device  
CRPF: Central Reserve Police Force
BRIEF PROFILE OF GROUPS RESPONSIBLE

Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT): Formed in 1990 in the Kunar province of Afghanistan, the LeT is the military wing of the Markaz-ud-Dawa-wal-Irshad (MDI), an Islamist fundamentalist organisation of the Ahle-Hadith sect in Pakistan. Headquartered in Muridke near Lahore, Pakistan, LeT is headed by Prof. Hafiz Muhammad Saeed. It is proscribed in India under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (October 25, 2001), Pakistan (January 12, 2002), and in UK (January 2002). The US Secretary of State Colin Powell in a notification on December 26, 2001, designated the outfit as a foreign terrorist organisation. The LeT is actively linked to the Pakistani Inter Services Intelligence Agency (ISI) and the Al Qaeda and Taliban militia.

Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM): The outfit was launched on January 31, 2000, by Maulana Masood Azhar in Karachi, Pakistan, after he was released from an Indian jail during the terrorists for hostage swap of December 31, 1999, following the hijacking of the Indian Airlines Flight 814. JeM is closely linked, through the Binoria Madrassa (seminary) in Karachi and the ISI, with the former Taliban regime and its protégé, Osama bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda. It was banned by the Indian government on October 25, 2001. The US Secretary of State Colin Powell in a notification on December 26, 2001, designated the JeM as a foreign terrorist organisation. The JeM was among five terrorist outfits proscribed on January 12, 2002, by President Pervez Musharraf during a televised address to the nation. It is also proscribed in Britain under the U.K. Anti-Terrorism Act, 2000.

Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM): The HM was founded in 1989 as the militant wing of the Jamaat-e-Islami, an Islamist fundamentalist organisation of Jammu and Kashmir. Among the terrorist groups active in J&K, the HM is the largest with a cadre base drawn from indigenous and foreign sources. Headquartered in Muzaffarabad, Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK), the group is currently headed by Syed Salahuddin. It is linked to the Pakistani ISI and to several other terrorist groups based in that country.

Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF): The ARCF is a marginal group that was raised sometime in the third week of December 2001, probably in an area populated by illegal migrants from Bangladesh near Habibpur, along the Indo-Bangladesh border in the Malda district of West Bengal. The ARCF, representing the growing nexus between organised crime and Islamist terrorism, is one of the two outfits (along with HuJI) that claimed responsibility
for the terrorist attack on the American Centre in Kolkata on January 22, 2002. It is a subsidiary group linked to the HuJI which has a strong base in Bangladesh, and very close links with Pakistan’s ISI. The ARCF was controlled by Aftab Ansari alias Aftab Ahmed alias Farhan Malik, from Dubai till his arrest on January 23, 2002, by the UAE authorities and subsequent deportation to India on February 9, 2002. Aftab Ansari played a key role in the July 25, 2001 abduction of Kolkata-based businessman Partha Pratim Roy Barman, who was subsequently released on July 30, 2001 after reportedly paying a ransom amount of Rs 3.75 crore in Dubai through the Hawala network. Reportedly, it is out of this money, JeM terrorist Omar Sheikh wired $100,000 to Mohammed Atta, leader of the hijackers in the 9/11 multiple terrorist attacks.

All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC): Formed on July 31, 1993, the APHC is a 26-party secessionist conglomerate engineered by Pakistan's ISI to provide a political face for the various terrorist formations in J&K. Headquartered in Srinagar, Abdul Gani Bhat is the current chairman of the alliance. The APHC is a major conduit for funds to the various terrorist groups in J&K. A predominant proportion of the APHC’s funding can either directly or indirectly be traced to the ISI. Individual constituents of the APHC also independently secure funds through sister organisations in Pakistan and Pakistan occupied Kashmir, such as the Jamaat-e-Islami, Muslim Conference, Jamiat Ahle Hadis, People's League, etc. The individual constituents also get funds through expatriate Kashmiri organizations like Ayub Thokar's World Kashmir Freedom Movement, Nazir Qureshi's World Assembly of Muslim Youth in Saudi Arabia, etc.

Jamiat-ul-Mujahideen (JuM): It was formed in the year 1990 as a breakaway faction of the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen consequent to a personality clash between Master Ahsan Dar, the then HM chief, and another leading HM cadre, Hilal Ahmed Mir. Based in Pakistan with active links to the ISI and other terrorist formations there, the JuM is currently headed by Engineer Mohammed Salah. It is banned in India under the provisions of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002.

Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen (TuM): It was formed in June 1990 by Yunus Khan, a confidante of Mohammed Abdullah Tairi, President of the J&K Jamaat-e-Ahle-hadis (JAEH) with the sole purpose of protecting the Asidih community, a small faction of Sunni Muslims. Based in Pakistan, Maulana Fazlur Rahman, chief of the Jamaat-e-Ulema-e-Islam is also a patron of the TuM. The group is linked to the ISI and is also known to have carried out many terrorist
attacks jointly with the Lashkar-e-Toiba. It is also linked to many Islamist groups in Bangladesh.

Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami (HuJI): Two Pakistan-based Deoband religious bodies, the Jamaat-ul-Ulema-e-Islami (JUI) and the Tabligh-i-Jamaat (TJ), set up the HuJI in 1980, at the outset of the Afghan war. It receives support from the ISI for its activities in India and elsewhere. ISI support has also been extended to the HuJI’s Bangladesh unit and for this unit’s activities with its Indian extremist and terrorist affiliates. Besides, the HuJI’s Bangladesh unit was set up with assistance from Osama bin Laden. It is banned in India under the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002. A splinter group of the HuJI, namely Harkat-ul-Mujahideen is designated as a foreign terrorist organisation in the US.

Al Madeena Regiment (AMR): Is a front group of the Al-Umar Mujahideen, which is headquartered in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. In Srinagar, Al-Umar Mujahideen and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen cadres have been enrolled in the AMR. It claimed responsibility for the June 23, 2002, attack in Srinagar when Omar Abdullah took over as President of the then ruling National Conference. It is also suspected to be involved in May 21, 2002, assassination of All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leader Abdul Gani Lone in Srinagar. Jammu and Kashmir police on July 6, 2002, arrested 12 AMR terrorists from Srinagar in connection with the Lone killing. AMR also claimed responsibility for the June 27, 2002, attack on the Pahalgam-Chandanwari road—part of the Amarnath yatra route—in which three security force personnel were killed.

Tehreek-e-Qisas: Came into prominence with the September 24, 2002, attack on the Akshardham temple in Gandhinagar, Gujarat, in which 32 persons were killed. The group’s identity was revealed by a letter found on the body of one of the terrorists killed by security forces. The letter, written in Urdu, claimed that the attack was in retaliation to the killings that followed the Godhra carnage.

Save Kashmir Movement (SKM): Is a front group of the Al-Umar Mujahideen, which is headquartered in Pakistan occupied Kashmir. SKM, which surfaced in the year 2002, has claimed responsibility for several attacks on security forces and political killings. It claimed responsibility for the December 20, 2002, assassination of the ruling People’s Democratic Party legislator Abdul Aziz Mir in Pampore. On March 23, 2003, it was one of the two
groups which claimed the killing of Abdul Majeed Dar, former Hizb-ul-Mujahideen ‘chief commander of operations, at Sopore.

Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI): The SIMI, proscribed under the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA), is an Islamist fundamentalist organization, which advocates the ‘liberation of India’ by converting it to an Islamic land. The SIMI, an organisation of young fanatical students has declared Jehad against India, the aim of which is to establish Dar-ul-Islam (land of Islam) by either forcefully converting everyone to Islam or by violence. Headquartered at Aligarh in the Northern Indian State of Uttar Pradesh, the SIMI has close links with the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen and Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence. Certain SIMI leaders are reported to have/had close links with terrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e-Toiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed. SIMI secures generous financial assistance from the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), Riyadh, and also maintains close links with the International Islamic Federation of Students' Organizations (IIFSO), Kuwait. The Chicago-based Consultative Committee of Indian Muslims has also been found to support SIMI morally and financially. It also has links with the Jamaat-e-Islam (JeI) units in Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal. The outfit is currently regarded as having a national presence with strong bases in the States of Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, Gujarat, Kerala, Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh and Assam.
# Major Terrorist Attacks in India’s North East by Groups supported by ISI, DGFI in the Post– 9/11 Period

[Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal / Institute for Conflict Management]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Incident</th>
<th>Place</th>
<th>Fatalities</th>
<th>Injured</th>
<th>Terrorist Group</th>
<th>Arms used</th>
<th>Headquarters of Terrorist Group Responsible</th>
<th>Support / Linkages of Terrorist Group</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>September 25, 2001</td>
<td>North East Express, a Delhi-Guwahati superfast train is attacked</td>
<td>Baghmari, Bongaigaon district</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
<td>NDFB</td>
<td>Explosive Device</td>
<td>Southern Bhutan</td>
<td>ULFA, DGFI, ISI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 19, 2001</td>
<td>Attack on police station</td>
<td>Labdanguri Barpeta district</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>NDFB</td>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>Southern Bhutan</td>
<td>ULFA, DGFI, ISI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 27, 2001</td>
<td>Attack on police party</td>
<td>Hazrathat, Dhubri district</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>ULFA</td>
<td>Small Arms</td>
<td>Samdrup Jongkhar, Southern Bhutan</td>
<td>NDFB, ISI, DGFI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 3, 2001</td>
<td>Attack on election duty security personnel</td>
<td>Lamelangso, Karbi Anglong district</td>
<td>8</td>
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<td>UPDS</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
<td>Karbi Anglong, Assam</td>
<td>DGFI, ISI</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 15, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on migrant settlers</td>
<td>Dailongjhar, Bongaigon district</td>
<td>13</td>
<td></td>
<td>NDFB</td>
<td>AK rifles</td>
<td>Southern Bhutan</td>
<td>ULFA, DGFI, ISI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Type of Attack</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Mortality</td>
<td>Injuries</td>
<td>ARMS Used</td>
<td>Group</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Agency</td>
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<td>June 24, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on Eight Oil and Natural Gas Commission (ONGC) employees, a Government of India enterprise</td>
<td>Daldali, in Karbi Anglong district</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>DHD</td>
<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
<td>Cachar district, Assam</td>
<td>ISI, DGFI</td>
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<tr>
<td>July 14, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on tribals</td>
<td>West Maligaon forest village relief camps, Kokrajhar district</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>NDFB</td>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>Southern Bhutan</td>
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<td>July 18, 2002</td>
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<td>Diyungmuk, NorthCachar Hills district</td>
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<td>DHD</td>
<td>Small arms</td>
<td>Cachar district, Assam</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 27, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on migrant settlers</td>
<td>Datgiri village Kokrajhar</td>
<td>22</td>
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<td>AK rifles</td>
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<td>March 16, 2003</td>
<td>Attack on a passenger bus</td>
<td>Goalpara district</td>
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<td>55</td>
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<td>Improvised Explosive Device</td>
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<td>Attack on Kuki tribes</td>
<td>Ganjam, Karbi Anglong</td>
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<td>Attack on migrants</td>
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<td>Samdrup Jongkhar, Southern Bhutan</td>
<td>ISI, DGFI</td>
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<td>November 29, 2003</td>
<td>Attack on tribals</td>
<td>Balipathar, Karbi Anglong</td>
<td>7</td>
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<td>KRA</td>
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<td>Mortality</td>
<td>Combatants</td>
<td>Weapons and Explosives</td>
<td>Intelligence Agencies</td>
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<td>January 13, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on market place</td>
<td>Singicherra Bazar, West Tripura district</td>
<td>16</td>
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<td>Small arms</td>
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<td>February 5, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on tribals</td>
<td>Paschim Nalicherra, Dhalai district</td>
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<td>Small arms</td>
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<td>July 26, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on Oil and Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) field staff and SFs escorting them</td>
<td>Debendra Sardarpara West Tripura district</td>
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<td>NLFT</td>
<td>Small arms, explosives</td>
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<td>August 20, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on paramilitary forces</td>
<td>Hirapur, West Tripura district</td>
<td>20</td>
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<td>AK rifles</td>
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<td>October 9, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on security forces</td>
<td>Raishabari, Dhalai district</td>
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<td>AK rifles</td>
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<td>October 26, 2002</td>
<td>Attack on civilian target</td>
<td>Battila, West Tripura district</td>
<td>8 9</td>
<td>ATTF</td>
<td></td>
<td>Satcherrri, Habiganj district, Bangladesh</td>
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<td>January 26, 2003</td>
<td>Political gathering</td>
<td>Mandai village, West Tripura district</td>
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<td>NLFT</td>
<td>AK rifles</td>
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<td>February 26, 2003</td>
<td>SF personnel on poll duty</td>
<td>Snatarampara, West Tripura district</td>
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<td>March 29, 2003</td>
<td>SF personnel Sindukumarpara, Dhalai district</td>
<td>5 2 NLFT Sajak, Khagrachari district, Bangladesh</td>
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<td>April 8, 2003</td>
<td>Private gathering Jagabandhpura, Dhalai district</td>
<td>5 8 NLFT AK rifles Sajak, Khagrachari district, Bangladesh</td>
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<tr>
<td>May 6, 2003</td>
<td>Non-tribal settlement Kalitilla, Satcharri village, West Tripura district</td>
<td>21 ATTF AK rifles Satcherri, Habiganj district, Bangladesh</td>
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<td>May 7, 2003</td>
<td>Market area Mohorchora, West Tripura district</td>
<td>10 NLFT AK rifles Sajak, Khagrachari district, Bangladesh</td>
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<td>July 16, 2003</td>
<td>Attack on civilians Kachucherra, Dhalai district</td>
<td>10 NLFT Small arms Sajak, Khagrachari district, Bangladesh</td>
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<td>August 14, 2003</td>
<td>Attack on non-tribal settlement Totabari and baralunga villagers, West Tripura</td>
<td>30 ATTF AK rifles Satcherri, Habiganj district, Bangladesh</td>
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<td>MANPUR</td>
<td>April 9, 2002 Local Market Pangei Bazaar, Imphal East district</td>
<td>4 2 34 PLA Remote controlled device Manipur-Bangladesh Border ISI</td>
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<td>May 27, 2002</td>
<td>Security forces Tongsong Sangsad village on the Imphal-Ukhrul Road</td>
<td>11 No conclusive identification</td>
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<td>November 20, 2002</td>
<td>Security forces Jivan Nagar, Bishnupur district</td>
<td>7 UNLF Grenade, AK rifles Manipur-Bangladesh border NSCN-K, ISI, DGFI</td>
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<td>Date</td>
<td>Event Type</td>
<td>Location</td>
<td>Casualties</td>
<td>Agency</td>
<td>Weapon</td>
<td>Identification</td>
<td>Investigating Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>February 10, 2003</td>
<td>Security forces</td>
<td>Leingangtabi along Imphal-Moreh road</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>KYKL</td>
<td>Grenade, AK rifles</td>
<td>No conclusive identification</td>
<td>ISI, DGFI</td>
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<tr>
<td>August 14, 2003</td>
<td>Bomb explosion</td>
<td>Lelong Bridge, Imphal West</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>Remote controlled device</td>
<td>Manipur-Bangladesh border</td>
<td>ISI</td>
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</table>
ATTF: A tribal terrorist outfit in Tripura, the outfit was formed in 1990 with a purported objective of creating an ‘independent Tripura’ and expulsion of immigrants from the region. It operates from its Bangladesh-based headquarters at Satcherri in Habiganj district. Tripura shares a 856 km international border with Bangladesh and the ATTF camps are located just across the border from where the terrorists indulge in violence against the civilians population, security forces and looting, abduction and extortion and go back to their camps. The outfit largely operates with the help of DGFI and ISI and the latter helps them in arms procurement and training. In many incidents, the Bangladeshi miscreants also openly participate in violence with the terrorists, as the incident of May 6, 2003, indicated when the former helped ATTF in killing 21 civilians in the West Tripura district. The outfit is also alleged to be getting political patronage from the Communist Party of India-Marxist and in turn allegedly acts in favour of the party during elections. Ranjit Debbarma currently leads the outfit and its present strength is estimated to be 500. A faction led by Lalit Debbarma had surrendered with approximately 1500 cadres in 1993 when the outfit was known as All Tripura Tribal Force. The outfit has linkages with the ULFA operating in Assam. ATTF indulges in internecine clashes with NLFT. The outfit has not shown any interest in negotiations.

NLFT: A tribal terrorist outfit in Tripura, the NLFT was formed in 1989 under the leadership of Dhananjoy Reang and subsequently the leaders have formed their own splinter groups. Dhananjoy Reang himself was expelled from the outfit and formed his own Tripura Resurrection Army (TRA), and subsequently surrendered in 1997. Following differences
again among the leaders in 2000, Joshua Debbarma formed the Borok National Council of Tripura (BNCT). In 2001 again the Nayanbasi Jamatiya and Biswamohan Debbarma formed separate groups of their own. The divisions have taken place on tribal and religious considerations. It is the last two that are most dreaded ones and are responsible along with the ATTF for most of the violence perpetrated in Tripura. While the NLFT-Debbarma has the strength of 700, the NLFT-Jamatiya has approximately 125 cadres. Like ATTF, the outfit also has a purported objective of creating an ‘independent Tripura’ and expulsion of immigrants from the region. It operates from its Bangladesh-based headquarters at Sajak, a camp in the Khagrachari district. Tripura shares 856 km international border with Bangladesh and the NLFT’s camps are also located just across the border from where the terrorists indulge in violence against the civilians population, security forces and looting, abduction, extortion and rape and go back to their camps. The outfit largely operates with the help of DGFI and ISI and the latter help them in arms procurement and training. In many incidents the Bangladeshi miscreants also openly participate in violence with the terrorists, as the incident of May 7 indicated when the former helped NLFT terrorists in killing 10 civilians in West Tripura district. The outfit is also alleged to be getting political patronage from the Congress and latter’s allies and in turn allegedly acts in favour of the party during the elections. The outfit has not shown any interest in negotiations.

ULFA: The outfit was formed on April 7, 1979, with a purported objective to liberate Assam from the ‘colonial occupation’ of India and to create ‘Swadhin (independent) Asom’. In the beginning, the ULFA tried to exploit the emotional outrage of the masses against Bangladeshi infiltration banking on the anti-immigration plank. However, it is now established beyond doubt that the outfit is not only dependent on active Bangladeshi support for its survival, but also more or less works as a client of the Pakistani ISI. The outfit survived two Army operations–Operation Bajrang and Operation Rhino in 1990 and 1991 respectively and then shifted camps to Bhutan and also in Bangladesh in 1990 from the Lakhipathar forest area in Assam’s Tinsukia district. Myanmar extended help to the Indian security forces in 1995 for conducting Operation Golden Bird. However, shelter on foreign soil and help from the DGFI and ISI has kept the outfit alive. The outfit is headquartered at Samdrup Jongkhar region in southern Bhutan. However, the outfit’s ‘commander-in-chief’ (head of the military wing) Paresh Baruah is based in Bangladesh and is also reported to have invested billions of rupees there extorted from the general public and government officials in Assam. He has reportedly been provided high level security by the Bangladesh security forces. The outfit’s ‘chairman’
and ‘deputy commander’ Arabinda Rajkhowa and Raju Baruah respectively are based in Bhutan. There also exists serious differences among the top leaders of the outfit primarily over the distribution of extortion amounts. Attack on security forces, installations of vital public importance and innocent civilians are the ‘operative strategy’ of the group. Its cadre strength is estimated to be 2,000. The outfit remains unresponsive to the negotiations call by the government.

NDFB: Formed in 1988, an outfit of the Bodo tribe in Assam, it was originally established as the Bodo Security Force (BdSF) under the leadership of Ranjan Daimary, who continues to be its ‘president’. Its purported objective is securing a ‘sovereign Bodoland’ in the areas north of the river Brahmaputra. The outfit’s current estimated cadre strength is estimated to be 3500 and most of who are based in camps inside Bhutan and Myanmar. Its ‘vice president’ Dhiren Boro was arrested in Gangtok, Sikkim’s capital, on January 1, 2003. Its ‘general secretary’, B Swmkhwr alias Govinda Basumatary was arrested earlier, on November 25, 2002. The outfit is active in the areas north and north-west of the river Brahmaputra–Bongaigaon, Kokrajhar, Darrang, Barpeta, Dhubri, Nalbari and Sonitpur districts. It also uses the Manas National Park as a sanctuary. Taking advantage of the fact that the forests in the park extend across the border into Bhutan, the NDFB cadres use the Manas Park as a corridor to slip in and out of Bhutan, where in the southern part it maintains its headquarter. Besides ISI and DGFI, the Chin National Liberation Army (CNLA), a militant outfit of Myanmar, has been supplying arms and ammunition to the NDFB. The outfit has not shown any sign of interest in negotiations.

DHD: A terrorist outfit of the Dimasa tribe in Assam, it is an offshoot of the erstwhile Dimasa National Security Force (DNSF) which had surrendered en masse in 1995, except for its self-styled Commander-in-Chief Jewel Garlossa, who now heads the DHD. The outfit is currently observing a ‘cease-fire’ with the Government, commencing January 1, 2003. The cease-fire period comes to an end on June 30 and official sources have indicated that it likely to be extended. Purported objective of the outfit is to create a separate State of ‘Dimaraji’ for the Dimasa (‘sons of the great river’) tribe, comprising Dimasa dominated areas of the North Cachar Hills and Karbi Anglong districts of Assam and parts of Dimapur district in Nagaland. The outfit was given liberal ‘aid’ by the ISI and NSCN-IM in its earlier activities, which included targeting immigrant labourers and security forces. Despite a cease-fire being
in operation, the outfit is alleged to be involved in the current inter-tribal conflict in the districts of Cachar and North Cachar Hills.

**UPDS:** A terrorist outfit of the Karbi tribe in Assam, the UPDS was formed in March 1999 with the merger of two terrorist outfits—the Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) and the Karbi People’s Front (KPF). A faction of the outfit under Horensing Bey has been observing 'cease hostilities' with the Union government since May 23, 2002. However, another faction that is led by H E Kathar continues to indulge in terrorist activities. The purported objective of UPDS is purging the area of non-Karbi settlers, including immigrant labourers from the Indian States of Bihar and Bengal and also Nepalis. The outfit's main area of operations is in the Karbi Anglong district, with a relatively minor presence in the North Cachar Hills district. In procuring arms and ammunition through Bhutan and Bangladesh, the outfit is said to have secured liberal assistance from the ISI and DGFI.

**HPC-D:** A terrorist outfit of the Hmar tribe active in parts of Manipur, Mizoram and Assam, it is an offshoot of the Hmar People’s Convention (HPC), which came into existence in 1986. Disappointed with the contents of the Mizo Peace Accord of 1986, which did not offer ‘Greater Mizoram’ integrating all areas inhabited by Hmars in Mizoram, Assam and Manipur under a single administrative unit, it took to arms and indulged in abduction, extortion and killings. The ISI and Bangladesh liberally assisted the outfit. Consequent to nine rounds of peace talks, a Memorandum of Settlement (MoS) was signed at the Mizoram capital Aizawl on July 27, 1994, for establishing the ‘Sinlung Development Council’ and subsequently, 308 HPC militants surrendered along with their arms. However, dissatisfied with the implementation process, a section of the cadres parted ways with the over ground HPC and formed the HPC-D in 1995. The purported objective of the outfit over the years has changed from an autonomous district covering the north and northeast Mizoram to an independent Hmar State (Hmar ram) consisting of the Hmar inhabited areas of Mizoram, Manipur and Assam. The outfit is active primarily in Mizoram; the Hmar inhabited areas of Churachandpur district in Manipur, and the Cachar and North Cachar Hills districts of Assam. The outfit collects ‘protection fees’ from the timber mafia in the Cachar district of Assam. Substantial funds are also reportedly generated in foreign countries, notably in the United States, by protagonists of the struggle in the name of protecting Hmar Christians. HPC-D, since its formation has aligned with several groups active in the northeastern region, including the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN), which allegedly provided it
with arms and training, Manipur-based outfit, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and with certain Islamist terrorist outfits in Assam, among others. All of these outfits are believed of getting desired assistance from the ISI.

**UNLF:** A terrorist outfit of the Meitei tribe in Manipur, the outfit was formed under the leadership of Areambam Samrendra Singh on November 24, 1964, to achieve ‘independence’ and ‘a socialist society’. A pan-Manipuri Youth League was formed in December 1968, which functioned as an overground body for the UNLF. Later, differences within the outfit surfaced over the issue of strategies to be adopted. While Samrendra Singh sought to spread ideological consciousness before launching an armed struggle, the more radical leader, Oinam Sudhir Kumar, established a Revolutionary Government of Manipur (RGM). Samarendra Singh was killed by unidentified terrorists in Imphal on June 10, 2001. Rajkumar Meghen alias Sana Yaima is the current UNLF ‘Chairman’. The outfit operates in the Jiribam valley and Cachar district of Assam. UNLF leaders had established a ‘political relationship’ with the authority of the then East Pakistan, and also underwent military training there in 1969. They are also reportedly have supported the Pakistani army during the 1971 Bangladesh liberation war. Later, the group also developed a relationship with China even while continuing its relations with Pakistan. The group is believed to be maintaining its old linkages with the ISI and the DGFI.

**KYKL:** Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) meaning "the Organisation to save the revolutionary movement in Manipur" is a Meitei terrorist group in Manipur, and was formed in January 1994 following a merger of the Oken faction of the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the Meiraba faction of People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and the Ibo Pishak faction of the Kangleipak Communist Party (KCP). In 1996, the outfit split into—the KYKL (O), led by Namoijam Oken and KYKL (T) led by Achou Toijamba. However, after five years of inter-group rivalry, the Oken and Toijamba factions decided to reunite sometime in mid-February 2002. Reports have indicated that the move was prompted by the purported objective of unity among various terrorist outfits in the region. The purported objective of the KYKL is to ‘rebuild’ the Manipuri society by clearing it of all ‘vices’ like immoral activities, drug trade and corruption, thus, actively interfering in the functioning of the state through violence against the civilians. Towards the end of 2001, the outfit launched ‘Operation New Kangleipak’ (ONK), an ‘anti-corruption’ campaign to ‘clean up’ the educational system in Manipur during which it shot at and injured the students and
invigilators whom it accused of indulging in educational malpractices. Following reunification in 2002, the outfit has formed an ad hoc ‘central executive committee’, with Achou Toijamba as ‘chairman’ and Keisham Yaima as the ‘general secretary’. It has also formed a ‘military commission’ known as Meeyamgi Yawol Lanmee (MYL), which is jointly headed by Namoijam Oken and Toijam Ibochou. Keirungba Khuman is the ‘deputy finance secretary’ in whose name extortion notes to the general public are reportedly issued. The outfit primarily operates in the four valley districts of Imphal East, Bishenpur, Thoubal and Imphal West. KYKL funds its activities primarily through extortion that it collects jointly with the Nagaland-based National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM). The outfit’s linkages bring it in the close proximity with the ISI and Bangladesh.

PLA: A terrorist outfit of the Meitei tribe in Manipur, it was established under the leadership of N. Bisheswar Singh on September 25, 1978 with a purported objective to organise a revolutionary front covering the entire Northeast and unite all ethnic groups, including the Meiteis, Nagas and Kukis, to ‘liberate Manipur’. PLA, though a Meiti outfit, claims itself to be a trans-tribal organisation seeking to lead the non-Meiteis as well. In 1989, the PLA formed a political body called the Revolutionary People’s Front (RPF). RPF runs a government-in-exile in Bangladesh where the PLA has set up a number of bases in the Sylhet district. Irengbam Chaoren is the ‘President’ of the RPF. Two camps in Myanmar and five camps in Bangladesh are currently known to exist, where about 1,000 recruits have received terrorist training. Camps in Bangladesh bring the outfit close to the ISI and DGFI, which allegedly support its activities.
The Kashmiri Pandits
An Ethnic Cleansing the World Forgot

Since late 1989, the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) has been in the grip of a vicious movement of Islamist extremist terrorism. As many as 36,289 [till December 30, 2003, Source: www.satp.org] lives have been lost in this conflict over nearly 14 years of a sub-conventional war that has inflicted enormous suffering on the people of the State, and transformed this confrontation between South Asia’s traditional rivals into a potential nuclear flashpoint.

Among the worst victims of this conflict are the Kashmiri Pandits, descendents of Hindu priests and among the original inhabitants of the Kashmir Valley, with a recorded history of over 5,000 years. Over the millennia, this community has been integral not only to the cultural and intellectual life of the people of this region, but the bulwark of its administration and economic development as well. The Pandits have now become the targets and victims of one of the most successful, though little-known, campaigns of ethnic cleansing in the world. Pogroms of a far lesser magnitude in other parts of the world have attracted international attention, censure and action in support of the victim communities, but this is an insidious campaign that has passed virtually unnoticed, and on which the world remains silent. Among the complex reasons for this neglect is, perhaps, the nature of this community itself: where other campaigns of ethnic cleansing have invariably provoked at least some retaliatory violence, the deep tradition and culture of non-violence among the Kashmiri Pandits has made them accept their suffering in silence, with not a single act of retaliatory violence on record.

January 19, 2003, marked thirteen years since what is generally recognized as the beginning of this process of ethnic cleansing as a result of which the Kashmiri Pandits were hounded out of the Kashmir Valley. On this day in 1990, a Kashmiri Pandit nurse working at the Soura Medical College Hospital in Srinagar was raped and later killed by Pakistan-backed terrorists. The incident was preceded by massacres of Pandit families in the Telwani and Sangrama villages of Budgam district and other places in the Kashmir Valley. While the Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF) claimed a 'secular' agenda of liberation from Indian rule, the terrorist intent was clearly to drive non-Muslim 'infidels' out of the State and establish Nizam-e-Mustafa (literally, the Order of the Prophet; government according to the Shariah). Accounts
of Pandits from this traumatic period reveal that it was not unusual to see posters and announcements – including many articles and declarations in local newspapers – telling them to leave the Valley. Pandit properties were either destroyed or taken over by terrorists or by local Muslims, and there was a continuous succession of brutal killings, a trend that continues even today.

Ethnic cleansing was evidently a systematic component of the terrorists’ strategic agenda in J&K, and estimates suggest that, just between February and March 1990, 140,000 to 160,000 Pandits had fled the Kashmir Valley to Jammu, Delhi, or other parts of the country. Simultaneously, there were a number of high-profile killings of senior Hindu officials, intellectuals and prominent personalities. Eventually, an estimated 400,000 Pandits – over 95 per cent of their original population in the Valley – became part of the neglected statistic of ‘internal refugees’ who were pushed out of their homes as a result of this campaign of terror. Not only did the Indian state fail to protect them in their homes, successive governments have provided little more than minimal humanitarian relief, and this exiled community seldom features in the discourse on the ‘Kashmir issue’ and its resolution.

A majority of the Pandit refugees live in squalid camps with spiralling health and economic problems. Approximately 2,17,000 Pandits still live in abysmal conditions in Jammu with families of five to six people often huddled into a small room. Social workers and psychologists working among them testify that living as refugees in such conditions has taken a severe toll on their physical and mental health. Confronted with the spectre of cultural extinction, the incidence of problems such as insomnia, depression and hypertension have increased and birth rates have declined significantly. A 1997 study based on inquiries at various migrant camps in Jammu and Delhi revealed that there had been only 16 births compared to 49 deaths in about 300 families between 1990 and 1995, a period during which terrorist violence in J&K was at a peak. The deaths were mostly of people in the age group of 20 to 45. Causes for the low birth rates were primarily identified as premature menopause in women, hypo-function of the reproductive system and lack of adequate accommodation and privacy. Doctors treating various Kashmiri Pandit patients assert that they had aged physically and mentally by 10 to 15 years beyond their natural age, and that there was a risk that the Pandits could face extinction if current trends persist. On the conditions at the camps, one report stated that, at the Muthi camp on the outskirts of Jammu where a large number of the Pandits stayed after migration from the Valley, a single room was being shared by three
generations. In certain cases at other places, six families lived in a hall separated by partitions of blankets or bed sheets.

Worse, the dangers of this ethnic cleansing are also making inroads into the Muslim dominated areas along the Line of Control and the international border in the Jammu region as well, with Islamist terrorists specifically targeting Hindus in these areas. There is now a steady flow of migration of Hindus from the rural and remote areas of the Jammu region towards Jammu city, and these trends accelerate after each major terrorist outrage.

The Pandits have rejected rehabilitation proposals that envision provision of jobs if the displaced people returned to the Valley, indicating that they were not willing to become ‘cannon-fodder’ for politicians who cannot guarantee their security. The Pandits insist that they will return to the Valley only when they – and not these ‘others’ – are able to determine that the situation is conducive to their safety. “We cannot go back in the conditions prevailing in Kashmir. We will go back on our own terms,” Kashmiri Samiti president Sunil Shakdher said in August 2002 in response to the then Farooq Abdullah regime’s proposed rehabilitation agenda. At the minimum level, these terms would include security to life and property and, at a broader level, a consensual rehabilitation scheme.

The Pandits appear fully justified in their reluctance to fall for the succession of ‘rehabilitation schemes’ that are periodically announced. Any proposal to return the Pandits to the Valley in the past has usually been followed by targeted terrorist attacks. Whenever any attempt to facilitate their return to the Valley has been initiated, a major incident of terrorist violence against them has occurred. The massacre of 26 Pandits at Wandhama, a hamlet in the Ganderbal area of the Valley on the intervening night of January 25-26, 1998; the earlier killing of eight others at Sangrampora in Budgam district on March 22, 1997; the massacre of 26 Hindus at Prankote in Udhampur District on April 21, 1998; and the killing of 24 Kashmir Pandits at the Nadimarg Village, District Pulwama, on March 23, 2003; these are the worst of the many examples of the terrorists’ tactic to block any proposal for the return of migrants to the Valley. These massacres and a continuous succession of targeted individual killings have ensured the failure of every proposal to resolve the problem of the exiled Pandits. It was, again, this pervasive insecurity that led to the collapse of the proposal to create 13 clusters of residential houses in ‘secure zones’ in different parts of Anantnag for the return and rehabilitation of Kashmiri Pandit migrants from outside the Valley in April 2001.
The current Chief Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, addressing his maiden press conference at Srinagar on November 3, 2002, said that the rehabilitation of migrant Pandits was one of his government’s ‘top priorities’. The Pandits, however, regard the Sayeed regime’s ‘healing touch’ policy with great scepticism. The regime’s decision to release a number of terrorists and secessionists on bail and the proposal to hold talks “without any pre-conditions” with a mélange of groups actively pursuing the agenda of violence has led a section of the Pandit community to believe that the State government, “is turning a blind eye to our plight…”

For a majority of the displaced Kashmiris, the recent State Legislative Assembly elections held little meaning. Panun Kashmir (‘Our Kashmir’ – a leading organisation of the displaced Kashmiri Pandits), during the run-up to the State Legislative Assembly elections in year 2002, had dismissed the exercise as ‘meaningless’. They said the Election Commission’s decision to make arrangements for Hindu migrants to vote from outside J&K would institutionalise their migrant status. “The move to allow migrant Hindu Pandits to vote at their respective refugee camps only reinforces the mindset that there are no chances for them to return to their homes, ever,” said Shakdher.

A section of the Pandits have demanded a geo-political re-organisation of the State and the carving of a separate homeland for them. While such an extreme suggestion may arise out of the increasing desperation of a people whose plight has been ignored for nearly a decade and a half, the idea itself is fraught with the imminent danger of playing into the hands of religious extremists who seek a division of the State along religious lines.

Their relatively small numbers, coupled with a tradition of non-violent protest, has made the Pandits largely irrelevant in the political discourse – both within the country and internationally – on Kashmir. It should be clear, however, that the many ‘peace processes’ and ‘political solutions’ that are initiated in J&K from time to time have little meaning until these include some steps to correct the grave injustices done to this unfortunate community.
Bangladesh – A Lengthening Shadow of Terror

Bangladeshi soil is increasingly being used for terrorist and for subversive activities by religious extremists, pan-Islamist terrorist groups, and insurgents operating in India’s Northeast, substantially through the active collusion of Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) and Bangladesh’s Directorate General of Field Intelligence (DGFI).

There were grave concerns about the possibility of Islamist extremists in the country acquiring radioactive materials and the technical know-how to build a ‘dirty bomb’, when on May 30, 2003, Bangladeshi police arrested four suspected members of a Islamist group, Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen, at a house in the northern village of Puiya. Officers also seized a football-size package with markings indicating it contained a crude form of uranium manufactured in Kazakhstan. Subsequent tests at the Bangladesh Atomic Energy Commission in Dhaka confirmed that the 225-gram ball was uranium oxide—enough to make a weapon capable of dispersing radiation across a wide area if strapped to conventional explosives.

Reportage during the first quarter of 2003 indicates the existence of Al Qaeda operatives in Bangladesh, coordinating their activities with local Islamist groups, validating perceptions that the country is emerging as a major safe haven for Islamist terrorist formations.

The broad trends during the year 2002 remained largely unchanged in the first quarter of 2003. Pakistan’s external intelligence agency, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), further tightened its hold over Bangladesh by harnessing past linkages with Islamist fundamentalists and certain sections of the military and political establishment. Internally, various Islamist groups remained active and enlarged their subversive agenda.

Since the elections of October 2001, and the installation of a new regime headed by Begum Khaleda Zia of the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) and backed by the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), communal tension and Islamist extremist mobilization has risen dramatically. The JeI, which has two Ministers in the new government, and 17 members in Parliament, allegedly receives support from the ISI, including funding and arms flows, as well as technical and training support.
A number of transnational Islamist terrorist groups, including the Al Qaeda, have established a presence in Bangladesh in alliance with various militant fundamentalist organizations there. Prominent among these is the Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami, Bangladesh (HuJI-BD), which was established with direct aid from Osama bin Laden in 1992. The HuJI-BD has very close links with the ISI, and received financial assistance from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan (under the Taliban) through Muslim Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Bangladesh, including the Adarsa Kutir, Al Faruk Islamic Foundation and Hataddin.

Various terrorist groups operating in India’s Northeast continue to find safe haven and operating bases on Bangladesh territory. Groups like the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) have been emboldened by the new BNP Government in Bangladesh, which in its previous term was seen as supportive of insurgent formations acting against India. Many leaders of Bangladesh’s ruling party have direct business linkages, including partnerships in corporations and financial operations that are run by, or co-owned with, leaders of such terrorist organisations. During its previous regime between 1991 and 1996, the BNP provided these groups with liberal facilities, including training camps, bank accounts, facilitation for arms purchases, and freedom of operation from Bangladeshi soil. As a result these terrorist groups, on the run in India’s Northeast under persistent pressure from Army operations, found a much-needed breathing space to regroup and re-launch their offensive against India.

Although the Government has reacted fiercely to suggestions that Bangladesh has become a new theatre of the activities of Islamist fundamentalist groups, including the Al Qaeda, reports suggest otherwise:

- Shortly after the fall of Kandahar in late 2001, several hundred Taliban and Al Qaeda fighters escaped by ship from Karachi in Pakistan to Chittagong. They were then trucked down – allegedly by the DGFI – to hidden camps in the Ukhia area, south of Cox’s Bazaar.

- Asian security services indicated that militants from the Jemaah Islamiah – which is connected to the Al Qaeda and seeks to set up a gigantic Islamic state encompassing Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and southern Philippines – were also hiding out in these camps, which were set up in the early 1990s to train rebels from the Muslim Rohingya minority in Myanmar's Rakhine State. The Jemaah Islamiah militants in
hiding in southeastern Bangladesh are believed to be mostly citizens of Malaysia and Singapore.

- On May 10-11, 2002, representatives of nine Islamist fundamentalist groups, including the HuJI, reportedly met at a camp near Ukhia town and formed the Bangladesh Islamic Manch (Platform). A transnational organization, it includes a group representing the Rohingyas, a Muslim minority in Myanmar, and the Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam, a small group operating in India’s northeast. By June 2002, Bangladeshi veterans of the anti-Soviet war in Afghanistan in the 1980s were reportedly training members of the new alliance in at least two camps in southern Bangladesh.

Evidently, the new right-wing regime, which came to power after the general elections of October 2001, has created a more favourable atmosphere for the operation of various extremist forces in the country. While the fundamentalist Jamaat-e-Islami – which is the major alliance partner of the ruling BNP – may not be directly responsible for subversive or terrorist activities, its inclusion in the coalition government has meant that other radical groups feel they now enjoy protection from the authorities and can act with impunity. The HuJI, for example, is reported to have 15,000 members of whom 2,000 are described as ‘hard core’.

Islamist extremists in Bangladesh have for long maintained operational linkages with a number of foreign Islamist groups. Investigations into the January 22, 2002, terrorist attack on the American Centre in Kolkata, capital of the Indian State of West Bengal, brought these linkages to the fore.

- The Asif Reza Commando Force (ARCF), which claimed responsibility for the attack, is essentially a criminal group allied to the Harkat-ul-Jehadi-e-Islami, Bangladesh (HuJI-BD), which has very close links with the ISI.

- The arrest of Aftab Ansari alias Farhan Malik, prime accused in the American Centre attack, led to further disclosures regarding the international linkages between the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) and the HuJI based in Pakistan and Bangladesh.

- Aftab Ansari played a key role in the July 25, 2001 abduction of Kolkata-based businessman Partha Pratim Roy Barman, who was subsequently released on July
30, 2001 after reportedly paying a ransom amount of Rupees 37.5 million in Dubai through the Hawala network.

- It was out of this money that Omar Sheikh – convicted by a Pakistan court in the Daniel Pearl murder case – is said to have wired $100,000 to Mohammed Atta, the alleged ringleader of the hijackers in the 9/11 multiple terrorist attacks.