Security Forces Commander, Jaffna peninsula, Major General Sarath Fonseka, outlined a plan to enable the resettlement of civilians (internally displaced persons) in High Security Zones (HSZs) in Jaffna peninsula. He tabled these proposals in a letter sent to the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), on December 20, 2002. Primarily, he had called for disarming the LTTE to enable such re-settlement, and for maintaining a ‘balance of forces’ between the LTTE and government forces.
Presented below is the complete text of the proposals.
PREAMBLE
NEED FOR SECURITY
FACTORS AFFECTING RESETTLEMENT
DE-ESCALATION PROPOSALS IN RELATION TO RESETTLEMENT IN HSZs
IMPLEMENTATION PLAN
* Above 'd' and 'e' would facilitate handing over of houses occupied by the Security Forces on a continuing basis, as and when alternative accommodation is constructed.
Date: 20 December 2002
GSC FONSEKA RWP RSP rcds psc Major General Commander Security Forces (Jaffna)
Copies: Secretary of Defence Comd of the Army Comd of the Navy Comd of the Air Force
1
Resettling of displaced persons to be carried out only for those families lived in the area before 1991 in Palaly HSZ and before 1995 in Nagarkovil, Muhamalai Thanankilappu, Ariyalai and beach road Jaffna.
Resettlement of Armed groups aid sympathizers in close proximity to camps.
Possible only in selected areas.
Restriction on visitors into resettled areas is required.
2
Enforcing deterrent Police action against violence.
Provoke people against SF to discharge violence.
Restriction on unlawful assemblies
Explore legality of imposing restrictions over areas outside HSZ and within HSZ.
3
SLMM mandate to be enhanced to check suspected safe houses of armed groups org [organisations] in cleared areas and create a system to monitor availability/distribution of arms ammo [ammunition] found in uncleared areas too.
Availability of LTTE military hardware including missiles in the cleared areas and uncleared areas.
SLMM/neutral observers to guarantee the removal of the threat before resettlement.
4
Conducting of counter insurgency operations
Develop military capability in HSZ
No resettlement.
Nil
5
Declaration of permanently abandoning of suicide missions and remove of such personnels with assistance of Police/SLMM intentions are identified.
Suicide cadres threat on SF movements and VIPs/VVIPs.
Will differ resettlement
Detrimental effect on confidence buildings
6
SLMM to prevent terrorist taking control over selected areas and ensure safe passage of SF. Conduct sporadic checks of safe houses and offices by SLMM to monitor above.
Hinder the mobility of SF confined to a restricted area by armed groups activities.
Resettlement to commence if the threat is eliminated.
SLMM mandate to be enhanced
7
Take all measures to prevent armed groups achieving the capability mentioned in identified threat. SLMM to continue spot checks on SF request for arms and ammo. Withdraw of LTTE weapons in forward lines and dumping them in rear/storage south of Kilinochchi under SLMM supervision.
Create situation within cleared areas. Tie down available troops in the belly thus depriving assistance to FDLs.
No resettlement unless the preventive measures are successful.
8
Police to be geared to take actions against hostile elements.
Hostile behaviour of people IDPs not yet resettled.
Expedite the resettlement process/ relocate where resettlement not possible.
Requirement of housing projects.
9
Ensure present security systems are effectively practiced and SLMM to keep checks on fishermen and sea tigers going to sea from uncleared areas.
Fishermen resettled in coastal areas sympathetic to armed groups movements.
Resettlement must not hinder the defence potential.
More applicable to defences facing Lagoons.
10
SLMM to remove such facilities available with LTTE. Also decommissioning of indirect weapon systems to be arranged.
Capability of passing accurate information to bring down accurate indirect fire by the people resettled.
Restrict the area of resettlement as there should not be radio communication from close proximity of HSZs.
Amend SLMM mandate.
Authority to search houses and personnel on suspicion. Also to continue regular checks on entry/ exit points. LTTE will not be allowed to do politics in HSZ.
Military cadres with forge identities will enter HSZs.
Only the people provide their legitimate ownership before 1991/95. LTTE members will not be allowed to resettled.
People resettled will not be allowed to go into prohibited areas.
Ability to attack VPs, VIPs possible
Only in selected areas.
Depriving communication facilities and decommissioning of indirect weapons to be done under SLMM supervision.
Accurate indirect fire could be brought down.
-DO-
Relocation of IDPs in crown land elsewhere where required.
Declare prohibited areas and legitimate search and arrest within HSZ and also decommissioning of missiles to be done.
Threat on security of air crafts and ships from within HSZ.
Access to be denied to prohibited areas for civilians.
Ability to identify voids of defences.
LTTE stop recruiting, total disarming of cadres and hand over weapons to SLMM
Reduce overall operational efficiency by reducing log [logistic] elements in HSZs. Thereby causing reduction of troops in the peninsula.
Resettlement to start after implementation
Avoid resettling of civilians in places from where Air port/ Harbour can be threatened and conduct regular checks and searchers and necessary to find hidden weapons etc. declaration of non-execution of underwater / seaborne suicide mission is also needed.
There will be a threat on harbour/air port when civilians resettle close to those locations.
Impose time restrictions on Entry/Exit points. Movement restrictions to be imposed during night. No entry/exit for fishing in HSZs. Resettlement on the coastal belt only in selected areas.
Make necessary arrangements to acquire land to enhance security/ development of harbour /airport
Retain buffer zones as much as possible for the defences specially in HSZs.
Armed groups mixed up with civilians may launch attacks where SF will not have sufficient reaction time.
No go areas to be declared separate. Entry/Exit points for different blocks of resettlement and also road networks should be worked out for selected resettlement areas. Such terrorist intentions will totally terminate resettlement.
Additional defence measures to be arranged.
Ground of tactical importance should be held by SF and any indication of such threat will be considered very seriously and preventive, deterrent action be taken immediately.
Options open to prepare fortifications in Ground of Tactical importance or selected areas. Eg: Vasavilan, Kadduvan, Thelippala and Keerimalai.
No resettlement in such areas
Maintain military strong points in Grounds of Tactical importance
Ownership of houses of displaced personnel who left before 1991/95 will be seriously considered when resettling.
Resettlement of sympathizes with forged identities to assist terrorist in offensive ops [operations] against SF.
Only in selected areas
Psy [psychological] ops and civil affairs operations to take special care of these families
11
Maintain and increase intelligence/survailance and early warning facilities and conduct regular searches of suspicious elements to enhance security of command, fire control and logistic elements
Possible attacks in VHSZs to paralise comd and control system support and log elements thereby prevent efficient conduct and supporting of def ops on FDLs.
Strict security checks on the civilians including house searches as required
12
Reduction of LTTE cadres in areas opposite cleared areas. Weapons withdrawn to be kept under SLMM custody.
SF is forced to contract or vacate certain part of HSZs thereby weakening/reducing the present military superiority in JFN [Jaffna] hence the power projection of LTTE beyond that of SF.
Resettlement will continue parallel to disarming
SLMM mandate to be enhanced and numbers to be increased.
13
To retain necessary amount of depth for the defences at any cost.
If resettled in HSZs as forced the defences to contract, SF will be forced to sacrifice depth of defences.
Resettle in the areas excluding areas which provide the depth.
Can be considered once threat has been reduced/ decommission-ing of weapons had taken place.
14
LTTE to deescalate by disarming and to retain a balance of power parallel to reduction of SF positions.
If the conflict escalates unable to go back to the original positions to regain initiative after civilians have been resettled.
If the threat is eliminated resettlement is possible
15
Reduce LTTE offensive capability by disarming and decommissioning of indirect weapons.
Due to the presence of civilians secrecy of SF defences will be sacrificed thus making defences vulnerable to armed group attacks.
Resettlement programme to be parallel to elimination of threat
Source: Tamil Guardian, London, December 25, 2002