South Asia Terrorism Portal
Fragile Transition Ajai Sahni Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management Saji Cherian Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
An apparent peace has come to Nepal, with fatalities dropping precipitously and the Government-Maoistpeace talks getting underway. Although, these developments should be a matter of relief, the conflict has far from ended and hopes of a tranquil future may be premature. Following the Jana Andolan(People’s Movement) against King Gyanendra’s ‘direct rule’, the pace of political developments in Nepal has been fast and furious.
May 17 will go down in the history of the Himalayan nation as a momentous day, as the House of Representatives (HoR) unanimously passed a proposal, tabled by Prime Minister Girija Prasad Koirala, depriving the King of privileges enjoyed by him and declaring the reinstated House ‘supreme’. The HoR resolution scrapped the provision of Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Royal Nepalese Army being held by the King, thereby depriving the King of his control over the Army. The proposal also dissolved the King’s advisory council, the Raj Parishad Standing Committee and deprived the monarch of any authority to enact the law concerning Royal succession, which will, in future, be the province of Parliament. The name of the Royal Nepalese Army was changed to Nepali Army, and “His Majesty’s Government” was replaced by the “Government of Nepal”.
The proclamation also made the income and assets of the King taxable, while declaring Nepal as a secular state. While the power of this revived Parliament – which was dissolved by the King in 2002, and whose term, in the normal course, would have expired in May 2004 – to pass a mere ‘resolution’ that altered fundamental provisions of the Constitution is uncertain, and the Constitutionality of these provisions debatable, there has been no immediate evidence of any resistance or reaction from a demoralized and discredited Palace. Supporters of the declaration, however, argue that the legitimacy of this Parliament now flows, not from the Constitution, but from the people’s movement.
That legitimacy, however, is neither unconditional, nor necessarily durable, and will come under increasing challenge if the conduct of the current dispensation is not seen as just and demonstrably productive. Regrettably, early days suggest that the ‘democratic’ dispensation now in power is possibly somewhat lacking in democratic sensibilities and respect for the rule of law, and may quickly exhaust the wave of presently overwhelming public goodwill.
This appears to be the suggestion of the early days of the restored Parliament and the Seven Parties Alliance (SPA) Government, among the first of whose actions was the order for the arrest and detention, for a period of 90 days, of five Ministers of the predecessor regime for their ‘role in suppressing anti-King protests’. That order has now been held as illegal by Nepal’s Supreme Court, which, on June 4, 2006, directed the Government to immediately release three ex-Ministers who had separately filed habeas corpus petitions before the Court (the remaining two did not appeal their internment, and presently remain in jail). Another set of the SPA Government’s decisions, based on the recommendations of a ‘judicial commission’ set up to investigate the ‘suppression of the peoples’ movement’, that have a strong residual destabilizing potential is the decision to remove from office a number of senior Government officials, including three top police officers of the country, and a number of other senior police administrators. A similar recommendation for the removal of the Army Chief of Staff, General Pyar Jung Thapa, was, however, not acted upon (though early reports suggested that the Cabinet had suspended him as well), presumably for fear that the Army may prove somewhat more recalcitrant than the Police.
It is useful, within this context, to remember that the current democratic leadership in Nepal has an extended and disastrous record of administration and infighting, and is substantially responsible for the chaos that now prevails in the country. Unless it has radically re-educated itself over the past months, it can well be expected to discredit itself in the months to follow.
Moreover, as the King is swept into the sidelines, the ultimate winners in the churning process presently underway are the Maoists and not the Parliamentary parties or the present Government. The new dispensation at Kathmandu has allowed the Maoists to dictate terms and the Maoist roadmap to power is being substantially followed.
On May 13, 2006, the Communist Party of Nepal–Maoist ((CPN-Maoist) Chairman, Pushpa Kamal Dahal @ Prachanda, made public his Party’s roadmap for dialogue with the Government. Its principal stages were:
A ceasefire had already been announced by the Government on May 3, and a 25-point Ceasefire code of conduct was agreed upon on May 26; a three member talks team was formed on both sides, and the first round of talks were held on May 26. Some 467 Maoist prisoners were released, including two senior leaders, Matrika Yadav and Suresh Ale Magar. Conceding these Maoist demands has been apparently painless on the part of the Government, but the next ‘milestone’ in the roadmap has thrown up differences.
In a Press Statement on May 29, senior Maoist leader Baburam Bhattarai reiterated the demand for immediate dissolution of the House of Representatives (HoR) and of the present Government and called for the formation of an Interim Government, and the replacement of the existing Constitution by an Interim Constitution. The political parties are unsurprisingly against such a move, as the dissolution of Parliament would mean losing the only vestiges of power that they have managed to secure over the years. Moreover, by refusing to concede this demand, the Government would seek to project itself as strong enough to resist Maoist pressures.
In a move that is bound to further increase friction, the Government has reportedly decided to revive the local governing bodies which were dissolved in 2002. Maoist negotiator Dina Nath Sharma has warned that "the ongoing peace talks would collapse altogether" if the Government went ahead with this move. "We are strongly opposed to the revival….If that happens, the talks may collapse altogether," he pronounced ominously. Local Development Minister Rajendra Pandey said the Maoist warning made “the whole thing complicated”.
It is not just the local bodies issue that has complicated matters. The Maoist machinery continues to operate in its usual manner, though without explicit violence, but retaining its fullest capacities for violence. Reports of massive extortion by the Maoists continue to pour in from different parts of the country. Amid huge extortion threats by the Maoist trade union wing, the All Nepal Trade Union Federation (ANTUF), one of the largest joint venture companies in the country, Dabur Nepal Pvt. closed down its manufacturing unit at Rampur Tokani of Bara District between May 18 and 21. A report from Dolakha district said that Maoists are continuing with the collection of forced ‘taxes’ from various Government and non-government organizations. A meeting of Maoist District-level ‘government’ leaders also passed a proposal to this effect in May 2006, and made it mandatory for International NGOs and Government organizations to register with their party. Similarly, the Maoists have extorted sums of money, ranging from NPR 10,000 to NPR 150,000, from local businessmen at Phidim, District headquarters of Panchthar. In Biratnagar, the Maoists have intensified their ‘donation’ collection campaign, saying that they need money for staging a ‘democratic peoples' assembly’ at Biratnagar. Maoist District Secretary, Sushil, speaking at a Press Conference in Biratnagar on May 15 said the Maoist cadres have been urging people to provide donation ‘willingly’. A daily newspaper obtained copies of a letter sent by the ‘chief’ of the CPN-Maoist Special Central Command, Anant, on May 14, instructing over a dozen private banks to give NPR 2.5 million each as ‘donation’. The letter, which was, however, not sent to the two Government-run banks, the Nepal Bank Limited and the Rastriya Banijya Bank, asked for financial support from the private banks to help ‘push the people’s movement to a new high’.
Matters came to a boil in Birgunj, when traders and industries shut down operations following demands from the ANTUF. The President of the Birgunj Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) Bijay Sarawagi, declared, “We can’t pay taxes both to the Government and Maoists.” His Vice President Sushil Mittal added, “cadres of the Federation (ANTUF) enter the factory premises forcibly, organize mass meetings and even manhandle promoters and senior officials. Industries simply cannot continue operation in such a situation.” Operations were restarted only after the ANTUF and BCCI signed an eleven-point agreement on May 23.
Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister K. P. Sharma Oli has expressed alarm at these various developments: “While the government has been expressing its firm commitment to the six-point agenda endorsed by the seven-party alliance and to the 12-point understanding reached with the Maoists to restore peace, what sort of negotiations do the Maoists want by continuing their extortions, intimidations and recruitment for their militia?” He added that armed Maoists in combat attire were intimidating people, extorting one million rupees from the Communist Party of Nepal-United Marxist Leninist (CPN-UML) District level cadres and forcing them to attend Maoist functions.
Irrespective of any ‘agreements’ with the SPA or the present Government, however, extortion and intimidation will remain an essential part of Maoist activities through any phase of negotiations. Maintaining an army requires funds, and the Maoists have no intention of disbanding theirs. According to a 2004 study based on direct interviews with Maoist fighters, it costed Rs. 17,000 annually to provide one armed guerrilla with clothes and other basic necessities. During the hostilities in early 2002, a former Maoist district commander had estimated that the Maoists needed to spend about Rs. 10 million every month to keep the war going. Any impediment to their systems of ‘revolutionary taxation’, would mean dismantling their army, which would simply destroy the very basis of their power and their negotiating strength. If the talks fail to yield what they expect, the Maoists have time and again demonstrated, the option of a return to the ways of war will be kept open. A warning to this effect was sounded during a mass meeting at Chakari in Makwanpur District on May 29, when Prachanda declared that a “violent storm” of protests would sweep the country in case the talks fail.
The manifest Maoist disregard for the 25-point Ceasefire Code of Conduct was also visible when armed Maoist cadres turned out in military combat gear to exhibit their military tactics at Prakashpur in Sunsari District on May 29, 2006. This display violated the clauses of the ceasefire code of conduct which read: “Both sides shall refrain from mobilizing, displaying and using armed forces that would spread terror among the people” and “Both sides shall not be present in combat dress while organising public meet, gathering, conference, ceremony or political activities.”
The Maoists are evidently, and will remain, unwilling to give up arms. A call for United Nations involvement in cease-fire monitoring, assistance in decommissioning of Maoist arms and ‘witnessing’ of the ongoing Government-Maoist talks has, consequently, gained momentum within the Nepali establishment and some sections of the ‘international community’, though, officially, the current Government continues to reject UN mediation as ‘unnecessary’.
The Maoists, of course, have expressed themselves in favour of UN intervention in the past, though they have maintained a measure of ambiguity on the issue since the advent of the SPA Government, with the Party’s ‘chief negotiator’, Krishna Bahadur Mahara, declaring that the Maoists would ‘adopt a flexible policy and not a rigid one’ in this regard. The UN option, in any event, may well be a recipe for further confusion and potential disaster, given the organizations spotty record in Rwanda, the Balkans and Sudan. Further, third party intervention is no guarantee that the rebel army and militia would disarm, as is demonstrated in the case of Sri Lanka, where the presence of Nordic monitors has failed to ensure that the rebels giving up arms and terrorist activities, or in the case of Northern Ireland, where de-commissioning of weapons continues to be a sore point.
Despite the enormous optimism that has swept across Nepal in the wake of the ‘people’s victory’ and the restoration of Parliament, the equation of power within the country remains immensely unstable. The King appears, presently, to have been emasculated, but just weeks ago, that was the visible condition of the now-triumphant SPA. The democratic parties appear to be abruptly more potent, but their power is substantially an illusion based on fickle popular perceptions. The Maoists appear to be accommodating of the democratic spirit, but continue to consolidate their political base and military capacities. Unless the Maoists are completely disarmed, and the political parties secure greater constitutional legitimacy and administrative control over the entire country, the current ‘roadmap’ for peace may well be a short detour on the larger Maoist ‘roadmap’ for protracted war.