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Kashmir Today
Real and Shadow Wars
There are few certainties in the miasma
of unending violence in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), and the truth
is hard to put a finger on. Overwhelmingly, it is the theatrics of each
new political statement or posture that defines the popular assessment
of the trajectory of events, and the most recent of these has sought
to focus on the ‘historic breakthrough’ of Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s
meeting with President and General Pervez Musharraf at New York on September
24, 2004, and the unexpected joint statement issued as a result. The
optimist points, equally, to the ‘progress’ that has been made in the
negotiation process, the continuing ceasefire along the Line of Control
(LoC), the confidence building measures agreed upon, and the declining
– though still distressing1 – levels of
violence in the State.
The enterprise of terror has certainly
suffered some reverses over the past three years and this has impacted
visibly on J&K. There are, of course, many claimants to the multiple
‘successes’ that are supposed to have contributed to these trends. Indian
diplomatic, military and ‘political’ initiatives are all variously touted
as factors that have wrought the necessary transformations that have
‘beaten back’ the terrorists and their state sponsors across the border.
The truth, however, is that these trends
have been independent of, or even, in cases, in spite of, Indian policy,
and are the consequences, primarily, of global developments and their
specific impact on Pakistan. This is borne out by the fact that the
trends remain ‘secular’, and have persisted despite several phases of
alternating ‘escalated tension’ – including the massive military mobilisation
of Operation Parakram – and of ‘détente’ between India and Pakistan.
At no point during the post-9/11 period have the killing rates in J&K
demonstrated any consistent correlation with shifts in Indian policy.
Significantly, moreover, it is crucial
to understand that these trends are not unambiguous and do not represent
a necessary and permanent reversal of the movements of, and support
to, terrorism in J&K. Indeed, a wide and countervailing dynamic
is currently unfolding in various theatres across the country, in the
region, and globally, and this could create unprecedented vulnerabilities
that would lend themselves to exploitation by the sponsors of Pakistan’s
proxy war and by various Islamist extremist forces.
As regards Pakistan and the Islamist
extremists, it must be clear that there has been, over the intervening
years, no change in strategic intent and ideological perspectives or
objectives. The changes that have been witnessed are essentially tactical
and coerced by the circumstances emerging in the post-9/11 world order.
What emerges, consequently, is a pattern
of the calibration of terrorist violence in J&K at volumes that
best conform to Pakistan’s transient interests and intent, on the one
hand, and its fluctuating capacities, including the scope of ‘deniability’,
on the other. Within this context, the ‘cease fire’ along the Line of
Control (LoC) and the ‘peace process’ are simply used as instrumentalities
to press for a ‘resolution’ of the ‘core issue’ of Kashmir in Pakistan’s
favour. Under present circumstances, with a clear ‘victory’ impossible
on the ground, rising international intolerance of terrorist adventurism
and its state sponsorship, and increasing internal pressures within
Pakistan, an extended process of ‘negotiations’, even if it remains
no more than a charade, creates the spaces that may yield future opportunities
for gain, even as it generates occasions to keep the issue ‘alive’ and
in international focus as one of the unresolved and ‘dangerous’ conflicts
between ‘nuclear powers’ within a ‘volatile region’. Terrorist activities,
within such a tactical framework, are calibrated to the exigencies of
both bilateral and international developments, but tend to be held at
maximal levels at which ‘credible minimal deniability’ can be maintained.
This naturally implies certain changes
in the patterns of terrorist activities. State support by Pakistan to
terrorist organizations, and their visible presence and activities on
Pakistani soil, have been driven deeper underground; some symbolic –
but ineffectual – action has been taken against some of the groups to
demonstrate Pakistan’s ‘seriousness’ in ‘tackling terrorism’; cross
border movements into J&K have diminished, and more circuitous routes
for terrorist ingress and egress may gradually be adopted – including
increasing movement through Nepal and Bangladesh, as well as across
the Western borders in Rajasthan and Gujarat. Over time, terrorist strikes
will increasingly be engineered outside J&K to project the idea
of ‘oppressed Muslims’ in ‘Hindu India’ resorting to extremism as a
result of their political frustrations, and to create a greater distance
between Pakistani sponsorship and acts of terrorism in India. Pakistan’s
intervention in the troubles in India’s Northeast, with the active collaboration
of the Bangladeshi Directorate General of Field Intelligence (DGFI),
are also known to be rising, testimony of the unwavering and hostile
intent with regard to India. Within Kashmir, these tactics translate
into somewhat lower levels of terrorist violence, but any such decline
tends to be retained at the minimum possible within the scope of international
‘deniability’. Transient escalations and declines are, moreover, often
engineered to coincide with specific international events, with regional
political developments, and with stages and schedules of the ‘peace
process. Spurts in both infiltration rates and in terrorist activities
have also been used to indicate Pakistani dissatisfaction with the pace
of the ‘peace process.’
These patterns have been backed by Pakistan’s
overt interventions in the internal politics of the overground secessionist
All Parties Hurriyat Conference (APHC), and every effort has been made,
in this context, to strengthen the hardline pro-Pakistan faction led
by Syed Ali Shah Geelani, as also to force a ‘re-unification’ of the
splintered organisation on his terms. A campaign of intimidation and
selective assassination – including the murder of Moulvi Mushtaq Ahmad,
the uncle of the ‘moderate’ Mirwaiz Maulvi Umer Farooq, in May this
year – has also been orchestrated to secure the compliance of the ‘moderate’
faction. While the more voluble elements among the moderates have, consequently,
been stifled, Pakistan has not been altogether successful in securing
its objectives in this regard.
In all this, Pakistan understands clearly
that the eventual ‘resolution’ of the ‘Kashmir issue’ will depend entirely
on the equation of power between the contending parties, and has used
every available lever – including a sustained campaign of terrorism
– to enhance or maintain its own relative strengths in extraordinarily
adverse circumstances. And these circumstances have been steadily worsening
for Pakistan, though continuous tactical manipulation and enormous external
support has allowed the Musharraf regime to continue to project the
illusion of ‘progress’ towards ‘enlightened moderation’ and economic
consolidation. In truth, wide movements of political violence are currently
sweeping across much of the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) and
Baluchistan; Karachi has also seen a resurgence of sectarian and fundamentalist
terrorism. Political discontent and public protests are at an unprecedented
high in the neglected Northern Areas – and though the miniscule populations
here constitute little security threat, the embarrassment such protests
can cause Islamabad is potentially enormous. Musharraf’s own physical
movements within Pakistan – indeed, even within Islamabad – moreover,
have been severely restricted by a succession of assassination attempts.
While none of this constitutes a threat of imminent collapse, it does
provide an insight into Musharraf’s rather plaintive declaration at
New York: "Too many fronts have been opened, too many battle lines
drawn. The time for closing fronts has come."2
While an unblinking realism – coloured,
no doubt, by persisting geopolitical ambitions – has been the defining
character of the Pakistan’s tactical shifts, India has been constantly
swayed and diverted by its own rhetoric of peace and good intentions,
though this proclivity may have been somewhat diminished under the new
United Progressive Alliance Government, as compared to the trend under
the predecessor National Democratic Alliance regime. Nevertheless, the
Manmohan Singh-Musharraf meeting at New York has once again revived
a substantial and delusionary discourse on the ‘imminent prospects of
peace’.
It is useful, here, to see how all this
is played out in Musharraf’s shifting statements and stances. At New
York itself, Musharraf made it abundantly clear that he was engaged
in something of a cat and mouse game. "You can talk about terrorism,"
he said, "We can say it is freedom movement. You can say we have
terrorist camps in Pakistan. We can say India is violating human rights
in Kashmir."3 He made it clear, moreover,
that he believed that he was negotiating from a position of relative
strength, and unambiguously rejected any proposal to convert the LoC
into an international border: "My mind is closed to this proposal.
The LoC cannot be the solution to the Kashmir dispute. The Line of Control
has been the dispute we have fought wars for. What are you suggesting
is that a conflict should be the solution. Isn't it unnatural?"4
He added further, that he was "giving bilateralism a final chance."5
The last statement cited deserves greater
scrutiny, as its significance has largely been missed out in the burgeoning
commentary on the New York interlude. Internationalisation and third
party intervention in the ‘Kashmir dispute’ has been a long-standing
objective of Pakistani policy, and this has been pursued by all means
possible – including, during periods of extreme tension, a threat of
nuclear war.6 This is the objective that
Musharraf seeks to realize in the proximate future, and New York was
another step towards its consolidation. Clearly, if ‘bilateralism’ can
be demonstrated to have failed in what is packaged – and, hopefully
(from a Pakistani perspective), sold to the ‘international community’
– as its ‘final chance’, the only remaining option is, naturally, multilateralism
and third party intervention. This thesis gains ground when Musharraf’s
posture at New York is juxtaposed with his statement in July that, "A
year-and-a-half, could be the reasonable timeframe for resolution of
the Kashmir issue."7 After this period
has elapsed, it will, consequently, be ‘reasonable’ to begin clamouring
for third party intervention to ‘immediately resolve’ the Kashmir issue,
and it would be altogether possible to hoodwink an extraordinarily ignorant
‘international community’ that such a course of action is necessary
to address a conflict that would, by then, have persisted for nearly
six decades. It is significant that this position has not been effectively
contested by Indian diplomacy, and if this logic is allowed to drift
in existing directions multilateral intervention or mediation may be
presented to India as a fait accompli. It is essential, consequently,
that India initiate immediate and effective action to challenge the
Pakistani position on this count.
Other aspects of the Pakistani mindset
are also reflected in Musharraf’s varying remarks. For one, he has stated
clearly that the many aspects of the ‘peace process’ that are most emphasised
by the Indian interlocutors are, in fact, peripheral to the negotiations.
"Some people might say if there was movement on cultural exchanges,
then there would be a better spirit of goodwill and it might be easier
to resolve the Kashmir issue. That is putting the cart before the horse.
Anybody who is saying this is not realistic."8
Trade, culture, buses to Muzaffarabad, economic ties and gas pipelines
are all very well, but the stark centrality of the Kashmir issue in
the Pakistani scheme is inescapable: "Kashmir runs in our blood.
No Pakistani can afford to sever links with Kashmir. The entire Pakistan
and the world know this."9 And, as
has been repeatedly emphasised, the conflict in Kashmir is, at base,
not just about Kashmir. It is, in fact, "based on deep rooted structures
of governance and social organisation in Pakistan, and on an ideological
confrontation with India that cannot be resolved by ‘concessions’ or
even by a redrawing of the map."10
Where Musharraf stands on Islamist terrorism was clarified further in
Musharraf’s implicit threat at New York, "…justice must be offered
to Islamic peoples in the form of resolution of all outstanding international
disputes which affect Muslims. There is no time to lose. Action has
to be taken before an iron curtain finally descends between the West
and the Islamic World."11 It is useful,
here, to recall that, as far back as 1999, and soon after the Lahore
Summit, Musharraf had unambiguously stated at a gathering in Karachi
that a ‘low intensity conflict’ with India would continue even if the
‘Kashmir dispute’ were resolved.12
There is, here, a clear identity of
perspectives with the Islamist extremist ideological position on contemporary
conflicts – though there is some obvious and emerging tactical disagreement
on the methods most appropriate to secure shared ends. For all his ‘enlightened
moderation’, Musharraf remains entirely committed to the failed ideology
of political Islam. This is not surprising. This ideology lies at the
very foundations, not only of the terrorist enterprise sourced in Pakistan,
but of Pakistan itself. The changes that are being sought in Pakistan,
by India and by an uncomprehending Western world, are not changes in
specific patterns of behaviour, action or operation, or in the institutional
structures and processes of governance, but rather changes in fundamental
belief systems. Such a transformation is the most difficult to secure
in any society, and has historically been imposed only through the inexorable
force of external circumstances, and seldom, if ever, by the will to
transformation within the target culture.
This unyielding doctrine is confronted,
on the India side, by complete incoherence of intent and perspective.
The negotiation process with Pakistan has, by and large, displayed the
character of a walk in the park, where Indian interlocutors follow the
attractions of the moment, the direction of their proximate and passing
fancies; the result is that they are easily led down the path of their
antagonists’ choice by the selective location of lures, enticements
and decoys. Within J&K, the peace process is a fishing expedition,
which throws out the same uncertain bait to shark and minnow alike.
In all, the gamble – and it is a gamble, not a strategy – is that the
enveloping circumstances will eventually change in India’s favour, and
make Pakistan’s support to terror unsustainable.
Delay is at the heart of both the Indian
and Pakistan perspective, and the peace process is a politically correct
and internationally acceptable tactic of delay. On Pakistan’s side,
the motives for delay can be identified in the ‘countervailing dynamic’
that is currently manifesting itself in dispersed theatres across the
world. The American failure in Iraq and Afghanistan (less visible in
the latter essentially because of the enormity of what is happening
in the former) could catalyse wider movements of Islamist terrorism,
diverting American and international attention from South Asia, and
creating the spaces for the escalation of the proxy war in India. Such
calculations are encouraged further by the consolidation of extremist
Islamist opinion – though not, yet, terrorist activity – in many parts
of Europe; as well as by repeated calls by the extremists to the ‘faithful’
to attack American and Western interests wherever they are, and not
to restrict the jehad to its current areas of concentration.
This call was reiterated on October 1, 2004, by Ayman Al Zawaheri, and
if this strategy is realised in widely dispersed terrorist actions across
the world, it is currently impossible to predict the degree of institutional
paralysis such a campaign would inflict on target societies, and the
extent to which global counter-terrorism capacities would be undermined.
India, moreover, to the close and motivated
observer, must seem increasingly fragile, despite its vaunted economic
resurgence. It is useful to note, within this context, that at least
212 districts in the country (just 12 of which are in J&K) – out
of a total of 602 – are currently afflicted or targeted by insurgencies
and terrorist movements across the ideological spectrum, and the sphere
of disorder has been widening continuously over the past decade.13
With more than a third of the country reeling under the impact of extremist
mobilisation, the unrelenting jehadi mindset will certainly focus
on the opportunities for engineering further disorder and eventual disintegration.
Unlike their democratic counterparts in India, whose strategic and policy
perspectives cannot imagine a world beyond the next elections, the Pakistani
leadership has long been speaking of a ‘thousand year war’, and of ‘bleeding
India with a thousand cuts’. Transient fluctuations of fortune are easily
taken in stride within such a perspective, especially when an eternity
is believed to be at stake.
These calculations cannot be upset by
anything that can realistically be offered by India at the negotiating
table. It is, in fact, only external pressure – to the point of a threat
of extinction – and growing internal problems and preoccupations, which
can force the necessary transformations on the systems within Pakistan’s
state structure that support and sustain Islamist terror in J&K
and across the globe.
- 1,302 persons were killed
between January and August 2004, as against 1,671 over the same months
in year 2003. Total fatalities in 2003 were 2,542, down from 3,022
in 2002 and 4,507 in 2001. Source: South Asia Terrorism Portal,
www.satp.org.
- Musharraf’s address
to the UNGA, September 22, 2004.
- Musharraf’s news conference
at the United Nations, New York, September 23, 2004.
- Ibid.
- Musharraf’s address
to the UNGA, September 22, 2004. Emphasis added.
- Musharraf had declared
on December 30, 2002, that Pakistan would have used its nuclear weapon
had even a single Indian soldier crossed the LoC or the International
Border during the 10-month long stand-off called Operation Parakram.
See "‘Unconventional’ warning averted war: Musharraf," Daily
Times, Lahore, December 31, 2002.
- Pervez Musharraf, Interview
to Pakistan Observer, July 31, 2004.
- Pervez Musharraf, Interview
to Sunday Telegraph, June 21, 2004.
- Pervez Musharraf, Address
to the nation on January 12, 2002. For full text see, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/pakistan/document/papers/2002Jan12.htm
- Ajai Sahni, "Countering
Terrorism: The ‘Core Issue’ is Pakistan", http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/ajaisahni/DefTech0103.htm.
- Musharraf’s address
to the UNGA, September 22, 2004.
- http://www.peace4world.org/articledetails.asp?id=98
- Ajai Sahni, "Bad
Medicine for a Red Epidemic", South Asia Intelligence Review,
Vol. 3, No.12, October 4, 2004, www.satp.org.
(Edited version published in Defence & Technology, Volume
III, No. 29, October 2004, pp. 43-47, title Successess and failures:
Kashmir as threatre.)
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