Despite shrill
assessments across the board and an enveloping sense of apprehension
promoted by polarizing politics, the past year has been astonishingly
peaceful in India in terms of terrorist and insurgent violence.
Total terrorism/insurgency related fatalities across India at
772, are at a dramatic low – certainly the lowest since 1994,
when the South Asia Terrorism Portal began maintaining
data
for this category. Indeed, since 2012, total
fatalities across the country have remained below the ‘high intensity
conflict’ threshold of a thousand fatalities per year. It is useful
to recall that fatalities remained above 2,000 for 18 of these
22 years; out of which they were above 3,000 for 11 years; above
4,000 for five years; and over 5,000 in 2001.
Indeed, in Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K) alone, fatalities remained
above the critical ‘high intensity’ threshold from 1990 to 2006
– and had risen to 4,507 at peak in 2001.
Cumulative totals
of the multiple insurgencies in India’s troubled
Northeast, similarly, remained above the ‘high
intensity’ threshold in 2007 and 2008, but have declined enormously
since, with 273 killed in 2015.
The Left
Wing insurgency saw a thousand-plus fatalities
in just a single year, 2010, (at 1,180), which have declined continuously
since, to 251 fatalities in 2015.
With the spectre
of Daesh (the Islamist State, formerly Islamic State of Iraq and
al Sham) dominating the global discourse, and with al Qaeda declaring
its new project – al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS, or
Jamaat Qaiadat al Jihad fi Shibhi al Qarrat al Hindiya or Organisation
of the Base of Jihad in the Indian Subcontinent) – in September
2014, commentary on the threat from these sources, and from ‘Islamist
terrorism’ at large, has bordered
on the hysterical. A map of Daesh’s imagined
Khorasan region, including India, and various declarations of
intent have been repeatedly cited as cause for grave alarm, as
have occasional cases of individuals travelling or attempting
to travel to Syria or Iraq to join the terrorists there. The reality,
as far as India is concerned, is astonishingly reassuring. Just
23 Indians are confirmed to have joined Daesh, of whom six are
dead and another two have returned to India and are under detention.
This leaves just 15 Indians actually fighting alongside Daesh
in Iraq-Syria. Significantly, just six of these 23 went from India;
the remaining 17 had been residing abroad for extended periods
of time before they joined Daesh. Another 30 youth have been stopped
from travelling to Iraq-Syria to join Daesh – in many cases on
the basis of information provided by family and friends – and
35 have been deported from various countries for activities linked
to Daesh. These are minuscule numbers in view of the 175 million
Muslims in India. Alarm bells also went off when a series of arrests
in January-February 2016 neutralized an incipient Daesh-linked
formation, Junood-ul-Khalifa-e-Hind (JuKH, Army of the Caliph
in India). The group had been recruited by Shafi Armar, the brother
of Sultan Armar, both of the Indian Mujahiddeen and located in
Pakistan since 2008. Sultan Armar had broken away from IM and
formed the Ansar-ul-Tawhid (AuT, Group for Monotheism in the land
of India) that subsequently pledged allegiance to Daesh; he subsequently
joined Daesh fighters in Syria and was killed there. Shafi Armar
then took over the group and initiated online recruitment, picking
up the remnant threads of the Students Islamic Movement of India
and IM in India. The 15 persons recruited by him into the newly
formed JuKH were among a total of 26 arrested for Daesh links
across India since 2014. Latest reports indicate that Shafi Armar
may now have been killed in a US drone strike in Syria. These
occasional and dispersed arrests, detentions and deportations
are the sum of the Daesh ‘footprint’ in India.
Al Qaeda has been
making efforts to extend it so called jihad to India at
least since 1996, when Osama bin Laden referred to India in general,
and Jammu & Kashmir and Assam in particular, among the regions
where the Muslims were living under 'oppression', and as legitimate
theatres of jihad. Numerous similar exhortation followed
including, prominently, bin Laden’s articulation, in 2006, of
the theory of a global 'Crusader-Zionist-Hindu' conspiracy: "It
is the duty for the Umma… to give away themselves, their money,
experiences and all types of material support, enough to establish
jihad, particularly in Iraq, Palestine, Afghanistan, Sudan,
Kashmir and Chechnya." The project failed utterly, and nearly
18 years after its initiation, al Qaeda issued a video and pamphlet
directed at the Indian Muslim, titled “Why is there no storm in
your ocean?” Nearly two years after the formation of AQIS, moreover,
AQIS 'chief' Asim Umar aka Sana ul Haq, again interrogated
the Indian Muslim in a video, demanding, “Will the land of Delhi
not give birth to a Shah Muhadith Dehlvi who may once again teach
the Muslims of India the forgotten lesson of Jihad and inspire
them to take to the battlefields of Jihad?”
The threat of Islamist
extremist terrorism in India, consequently, remains confined to
the proxy formations of the Pakistani state and its military intelligence
wing, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). These groups remain
active in J&K, and have made occasional forays beyond, though
the intensity, effectiveness and frequency of attacks has been
dramatically diminished – in part, as a consequence of a shift
in Islamabad’s more urgent ‘strategic’ priorities of fomenting
terrorism in Afghanistan; in part, as a result of sustained operational
successes by Indian intelligence and enforcement agencies; and
in part, finally, because of a growing disillusionment of the
radical fringe among Indian Muslims in the idea, ideology and
aspirational status of Pakistan. Nevertheless, 174 persons were
killed in terrorist-linked violence in J&K through 2015, and
another 43 have died in 2016 (data till April 24). It is significant,
however, that this includes a comparatively low figure of 20 civilian
fatalities in 2015, and just one civilian killed, till date, in
2016. Crucially, the last major attack (involving three or more
fatalities) on record in the State dates back to December 5, 2014.
when militants had exploded a grenade in the Tral town of Pulwama
District, near the Bus Stand, killing one person and injuring
another 12. One of the injured persons died later the same day,
while another succumbed to his injuries on December 12, 2014.
A range of other
indices demonstrate declining terrorist and
extremist activities and violence in the State. There is, however,
sufficient evidence to suggest that Pakistan’s long-term intent
remains unchanged, and that terrorist formations continue to be
provided safe haven, resources, weaponry and training by the ISI
and military – including cover of cross
border firing for infiltration.
While terrorist
operations have diminished enormously, subversion and political
mischief continues in the State, taking advantage of the significant
administrative
and political disarray, despite the rejection
of the separatist groups by the wider Kashmiri community. Violent
protests have been repeatedly provoked by separatist leaders,
and partial data compiled by SATP indicates that at least three
protestors were killed in alleged Security Force (SF) firing on
violent demonstrations in 2015, as against two in 2014. Eight
persons have already been killed in five such incidents in 2016.
Pakistan backed
Kashmir-oriented groups also executed two major attacks in Punjab
– the assault on the Indian Air Force (IAF) Base at Pathankot
through January 2, 2016, and January 3, 2016; and the strike at
the Dinanagar
Police Station in adjacent Gurdaspur on July
27, 2015 – exposing tremendous vulnerabilities in Punjab and gaping
holes in national Counter Terrorism (CT) response protocols, capacities
and capabilities. The Pathankot incident was particularly worrisome,
providing an index of the extraordinary weakness in the protection
of the country’s critical strategic assets. The IAF Base constitutes
the frontline air defence for any confrontation with Pakistan,
and yet the terrorists succeeded in penetrating into the campus
and inflicting significant casualties. This was despite nearly
20 hours of clear warning, a definitive identification of the
intended target, and a systemic response that had been initiated
fairly early on January 1, 2016.
In addition, 11
SIMI cadres were gunned down by the Telangana Police in three
separate incidents between April 1 and April 7, 2015, in Nalgonda
District in Telangana. On November 2, 2015, two persons were killed
by masked gunmen, believed to be linked to fugitive Dawood Ibrahim
– residing in Karachi under ISI protection – in Bharuch town,
Gujarat.
Significantly,
the Government informed the Rajya Sabha (Upper House of
India’s Parliament) on March 9, 2016, that Central and State agencies
had arrested 46 Pakistani ISI agents between 2013 and 2016. Further,
according to partial data compiled by SATP, at least 159 ISI modules
have been neutralized across the country between 2004 and April
24, 2016, indicating Pakistan’s sustained efforts at subversion
and destabilization.
The dramatic contraction
of Left Wing Extremism (LWE) – in terms of geographical areas
of influence, violence and capacities – has primarily been the
result of successful intelligence-based operations launched by
Security Forces (SFs) over the past years, which have helped neutralize
top cadres among the rebels. According to the SATP database, between
2010 and 2016, at least 677 leadership elements of the Maoists
have been neutralized (84 killed, 391 arrested, 202 surrendered).
According to Union Ministry of Home Affairs (UMHA) data, the total
number of LWE cadres arrested between 2010 and 2015 stands at
11,608. At least 633 LWE cadres surrendered over the same period.
As the SFs establish
dominance over increasing areas of erstwhile LWE dominance, efforts
at civil consolidation have also increased. UMHA has now claimed
the implementation of the Fortified Police Stations (PSs) scheme
for construction/strengthening of 400 Police Stations in 10 LWE
affected States at INR two million per Police Station on a funding
pattern of 80 (Central share): 20 (State share) basis. 284 PSs
have been completed thus far. Further, in an effort to improve
the communication network in LWE-affected areas, the Department
of Telecom has been implementing the Construction of Mobile Towers
Scheme for construction of 2,199 mobile towers in 10 LWE affected
States, of which 1,424 mobile towers have been put on air up to
February 2, 2016. The Ministry of Road Transport and Highways
(MoRTH), under the Road Requirement Plan–I (RRP-I), that has been
under implementation since February 2009 for improving road connectivity
in the 34 worst LWE-affected Districts in eight States, has constructed
3,904 kilometers of roads (till January 31, 2016). A total of
5,422 kilometers of road are to be constructed under this plan.
Moreover, respective State Governments – Andhra Pradesh, Bihar,
Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Maharashtra, Odisha, and Telangana –
have also taken several steps to counter the LWE threat.
Despite the pressure
they are under, LWEs continue to resist. Sustained efforts, both
on the part of SFs and the civil administration will be necessary
to ensure that recent declines in Maoist activities are not merely
a tactical retreat, as the Maoists claim, but a permanent setback
that will gradually be compounded into the irreversible defeat
of this enduring movement of violence.
The multiple insurgencies
of India’s Northeast have seen dramatic deceleration and disintegration
over the years, bringing violence across the region down to some
of the lowest levels in the past two and a half decades. Numerous
challenges, however, persist, as the region has seen cyclic
surges and recessions in insurgent activities
over decades. The region is marked by extraordinarily poor governance,
and is home to 13 of the 39 terrorist formations currently banned
by the UMHA. According to the SATP database, apart from these
13 major extremist outfits, 30 other groups remain active in the
region, and another 23 are presently in uncertain peace talks
or have signed ceasefire agreements with respective State and
the Union Governments. The ambiguity surrounding these various
agreements and processes is illustrated by the ‘historic
accord’signed between the Government of India
(GoI) and the largest rebel Naga group, the National Socialist
Council of Nagaland–Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM)
on August 3, 2015, which, far from bringing peace to the State,
has provoked greater instability, causing the rival Khaplang faction
(NSCN-K)
to abrogate
its cease fire agreement with the Government
and revert to violence against the SFs. NSCN-K is also spearheading
a movement to bring all insurgent formations in the region onto
a united platform, the United National Liberation Front of Western
South East Asia (UNLFWESEA).
With the easy availability of weaponry in the region, the potential
for destabilization remains significant, particularly in view
of the polarizing identity politics that most parties in the region
engage in, and the multiplicity of unaddressed administrative
and developmental issues that continue to plague the region.
Indeed, while the
immediate challenge of terrorism and insurgency has receded across
the country and across the ideological spectrum, the conflict
potential in India remains high, and is often exacerbated by state
policy and partisan politics. Crucially, first responders, the
State Police Forces, as well as most Central SFs and the intelligence
apparatus, remain ill-equipped, poorly-trained and under-strength.
Despite enormous emphasis, particularly after the Mumbai 26/11
attacks in 2008, technological capabilities of Police, Intelligence
and specialized CT Forces remain poor. Critical projects such
as the Crime and Criminal Tracking Network and Systems (CCTNS),
National Intelligence Grid (NATGRID) and GPS-based surveillance
of sea vessels, among others, have been fitfully funded, and implemented,
as a result of which the cumulative impact of limited capacity
augmentation on capabilities to secure the nation has, at best,
been marginal. Further, a rising demographic burden, resource
crises, growing unemployment, and adherence to a growth model
that has limited potential to address the aspirations of the overwhelming
mass of people, continuously exacerbates tensions, leaving the
country ripe for the picking for new or resurgent movements of
violence.
India is fortunate,
at this moment of grave global crisis, to have secured dramatic
relief from multiple movements of violence, but its leadership
has failed, in the past, to demonstrate the sagacity to take advantage
of such good fortune and consolidate governance in sufficient
measure. There is little evidence of any deviation from this ruinous
pattern at present.
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