

From Shaykh ((Mahmud))/(TN: Report on) Senior shaykhs and other issues pertaining to the Arabian Peninsula

(TN: In red lettering) This file contains messages from one of the trusted brothers who is a middleman for me in the Arabian Peninsula and is a religious student with ties to the senior shaykhs and clerics.

My Dear Shaykh ((Abu 'Abd-al-Rahman)),

Peace be upon you, and God's grace and his blessings. I met with a group of well-known senior shaykhs who signed on to the recent Statement of Victory of the Sunnis in Iraq over the Safawis (TN: derogatory reference to the Shi'a-majority government). I asked them their impressions of your latest statement and of the statement by the brothers in the Islamic State of Iraq (TN: ISI). I also showed your message to them to all but one person, and I have begun building bridges with them. I met other people, as well, and showed them the statement.

The senior shaykhs with whom I met included Shaykh 'Abd-al-Rahman al-((Barrak)) (who was very moved by your message to him); Shaykh ((Abu Zafr)); Shaykh Sa'id Al ((Zu'ayr)); Shaykh Muhammad al-((Habdan)); Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-((Jalil)); Shaykh Yusuf al-((Ahmad)); and Shaykh Muhammad al-((Farraj)) (I went to his home twice and prayed at his mosque, but it was unable to meet with him).

They shared with me important information and their reflections on current events. The most important thing of value pertained to Shaykh Abu Zafr; we agreed to meet together over several sessions to determine the structure of several reports about certain matters that must be brought to your attention after I return from the pilgrimage, God willing.

There are many details that I will share with you regarding the statement about supporting the Sunnis in Iraq and the story behind it, as well as what precisely took place during the meeting, and who wrote it. I will also tell you about who wanted to have a statement issued about the attacks against the ISI saying it's not a legitimate organization, etc.

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I have indeed begun writing the report and I've finished the main point in it and the beginning of it. All that remains is writing the bulk of the details and drawing the connection

between what was said by the various shaykhs. I will begin wrapping up the report after my return from the pilgrimage, because I'm traveling tomorrow, God willing.

There is an urgent piece of information that Shaykh Abu Zafr asked me to relay to you: He wants you to ask your friend, whom you will send to Abu Zafr, to stop demanding the report about the senior shaykhs in the Arabian Peninsula. This is because the shaykh says that the courier that you use is good, and we consider him a good man, but he cannot be trusted with such secret information because he is weak when he is in custody. The shaykh asked around about him, and was told that when that brother was in jail, he gave up all the brothers' secrets in no time. He cannot keep secrets, and with the slightest bit of pain, he gives up everything he has. There may be someone in Medinah who could be called upon for a favor and the blessings of whose worthy prayers would be sought, but the person who told this story would not allow them to be spoken of. So the shaykh doesn't mind if the brother comes, but he is not to be given any secret information of any importance. Many casualties resulted from this brother having been in jail in the past, and from his many confessions and his having revealed the secret of our activity. So ask him quit asking the shaykh for the report for the time being, because the shaykh is busy and doesn't have the time right now to write it, so he shouldn't keep insisting on it.

In general, Shaykh Abu Zafr and I agreed that we will prepare the complete report about the senior shaykhs and then they shaykh will put the final touches on the main points. I will then put it in its final wording. The shaykh mentioned to me his position regarding your statement and the statement from the brothers in the ISI. In general, the shaykh did not support their recommendation because they will be turned against you, particularly the statement from the brothers in the ISI, which included the general vouching that was at odds with your statement, in which you vouched for only two people who had no issues.

Naturally, the shaykh knows my true name and my home address. I agreed with him on a code word for communicating in the future. None of those senior shaykhs knows my alias, the one by which you know me. I am very careful to make sure neither side knows the other name, be it my true name or my alias. It's enough that each side knows one of the two, for reasons of security. There is currently no benefit in their knowing both names. I also met with someone close to Shaykh 'Abdallah al-

((Ghanayman)), who told me some new information about the shaykh.

At any rate, I will begin the report about the response from the senior shaykh to your message and the news they're hearing. These meetings lasted several hours, so I will try to summarize what was said as best I can.

(TN: new message)

My Dear Shaykh Abu 'Abd-al-Rahman,

Peace be upon you, and God's grace and his blessings. May God accept your best works along with ours.

(TN: in blue text) What is the brothers' assessment of Harith al-((Dari)) and the Association of Muslim Scholars?

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Thank you for your explanation about ((Fadl-al-Rahman)), the Politician and Ultimate Holy Warrior. I met a good brother from Sarhad who is a close friend of Fadl-al-Rahman, and I was going to meet The Politician during the pilgrimage, but I ran out of time and wasn't able to meet him. I was deceived by what I'd heard, and your explanation helped. Praise be to God that I didn't meet him. During the pilgrimage, I met two Shaykhs: Muhammad al-Hasan Ould al-((Dadu)) and Safr al-((Huwali)). These were quick meetings, not much more than greetings asking how things were, because circumstances weren't conducive to more. The reason for meeting The Ultimate Holy Warrior was to ensure coordination so that some brothers I know could join the father's group, because I'd heard he had some ties to them. He promised he would do that, but after winter. I wanted to go through you to make them religious students, or just new brothers through him. If you know any trusted brothers who could help them get there, that would be great. There is a group of brothers that want to join with the brothers in Khorasan. The best of them is a religious student in a European country who has wanted to join the brothers ever since things got more difficult for him in his country. The last one, I know only from the network, because he is a deputy of the Amir (TN: senior leader) of the Worldwide Islamic Media Front. Do you have a way to help in this matter for brothers with no experience?

Is there a trusted brother from among the Mujahidin who can record tapes of the brothers in the Arabian Peninsula in his own voice? They need to provide commentary to videos, but everyone is afraid to reveal his voice. So is there anyone suitable for this on your end whose voice is suitable for commentary during films and whose accent is that of the peninsula region?

I want to ask you a question about the veracity of what a very close friend of Shaykh Yusuf al-((Ayiri)) told me. He said that Shaykh Yusuf was expelled from al-Qa'ida, or to be more precise, that he was removed from al-Qa'ida leadership in the Arabian Peninsula after rejecting the bombings. I was told he sent a secret letter of counsel to ((Abu 'Abdallah)) about the matter. The decision to remove him was made by ((Sayf al-'Adl)), and news was handed down via the Doctor. Shaykh Yusuf's friend told me that this news reached him from Shaykh Yusuf via a middleman working between the two men. Do you have any information about this? He vehemently denied it.

How true is what I hear from people aligned with religious students, who may be biased, that Shaykh Ayman al-((Zawahiri)) is the most influential man in the organization, and that Abu 'Abdallah is like a puppet on his hand, and that Abu 'Abdallah has given authority to Zawahiri to run everything, though the former disagrees with some of Shaykh Ayman's behavior? (This is what some of the enemies or hated families in the peninsula and elsewhere are saying). This really has me agitated, and I don't accept it. But I wanted to verify with you the role of Shaykh Ayman. Has al-Qa'ida been tinged with his ideology and opinions, and is Abu 'Abdallah not the most influential man in the organization?

Thank you so much for the explanation about the senior shaykhs. If you don't mind, I would like you to include among them Shaykh 'Abd-al-Qadir (('Abd-al-'Aziz)) and Shaykh Abu Muhammad al-((Maqdisi)). I have been eager to ask you about this, because I recognize in you a balanced judgment of character, and I trust your opinion and think of you thus, though God is the ultimate judge, and my recommendation of you does not come before His.

While I was on the pilgrimage, God deemed that I should meet two people: Muhamamd al-Hasan Ould al-Dadu and Safr al-Huwali, but they were quick meetings that consisted of little more than greetings and small talk about goings on. I had wanted to meet a group of senior shaykhs during the pilgrimage, but I didn't get the chance.

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What is the truth in what is being said about Harith al-Dari having been targeted more than once by my brothers in the Mujahidin Shura Council? Is this only between Harith al-Dari and myself?

(TN: in red text) Very important explanation about the statement in support of the Sunnis in Iraq against the Safawis, for which I praised you:

The statement was adopted by the senior shaykhs of al-Qasim, led by Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Ghanyman. It was written in approximately ten pages that have been abridged to roughly four. The part about denouncing differences and arguments and the importance of closing ranks was written by Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Jalil, as he himself told me (this portion was supposed to appear in a separate statement, but because of the disagreement about the wording, they decided to add it to this statement). The statement was signed during the meeting that takes place every four months that included the most well-known of the peninsula's senior shaykhs. 70 senior shaykhs attended the meeting, where they were presented with the statement. Only 38 agreed to the statement; the rest refused to sign it for various reasons, including an objection to the wording or fears that it would lead to greater pressure on them, along with other reasons, despite the shared apprehensions regarding the State's fears about Iran's intentions. The statement had included four lines containing an attack against the ISI, saying it was an illegitimate state, that sort of thing. A group of the senior shaykhs, chief among them al-Barrak, were adamant that the lines be removed, and the rest of the shaykhs were forced to oblige their wishes because of the importance of the signatures from the dissenting group, especially that of al-Barrak.

In truth, there was much talk from the shaykhs in these meetings because they lasted for so many hours. I will give you a heavily abridged presentation of the finer points:

The shaykhs with whom I met included:

1. Shaykh 'Abd-al-Rahman al-Barrak
2. Shaykh Sa'id Al Zu'ayr
3. Shaykh Bashr al-((Bashr))
4. Shaykh Muhammad al-Habdan
5. Shaykh Yusuf al-Ahmad
6. Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Jalil

7. Shaykh Muhammad al-Farraj (I wasn't able to meet with him; I prayed in his mosque and went to his home several times, but he wasn't there)

They all welcomed further contact and each read the message, with the exception of one to whom I did not show the message or bring up its subject because the situation wasn't appropriate for it. This is a positive indication, in addition to what al-Jalil and al-Habdan both said about how happy they were with your statement and the statement from the brothers in the ISI.

1. Al-Barrak: The shaykh was quite moved by the message and said, "May God keep you well, Brother 'Atiyah. Really, you have lifted me above my home, and I am but a lowly worshipper." He prayed for victory and ability for the ISI, which is being hounded by worshippers of the cross and their lackeys, and he said he will work on the matter of Shaykh (('Umar)) as much as he can.

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2. Bashr al-Bashr: He was pleased with your message and appeared comfortable when he was dealing with me. He said, "I would recommend that Shaykh 'Atiyah and the ISI not post a statement praising those men. They will turn on you. They are generally against you, as is a majority of the Senior Shaykhs in the Arabian Peninsula. Shaykh (('Atiyatallah))'s statement is better because it praises al-Barrak and al-Ghanayman, unlike the other, more general one that praises those undeserving of praise." I have a lot of important, secret information that the Shaykh will record, and which I will send to you, God willing. He will give me the main points, and I will take care of the wording. He mentioned that there is a wicked campaign to have a statement issued against the ISI laying bare its practices, and saying that it is expanding its takfir and killings and that you issued a fatwa to the nation unilaterally announcing them to the State, etc. However, this campaign met failure, praise be to God, as both he and Shaykh Sa'id bin Zu'ayr informed me. Several senior shaykhs in Riyadh are taking over developing the campaign, along with representatives of the factions in Riyadh. I will send you a report explaining this matter further, with exactly what was said, etc.

Tell me everything you want me to relay to al-Bashr, because I'm going to go see him soon, God willing.

The two most watched people in Riyadh are al-Bashr and Abu Malik 'Abdallah al-((Rays)). The latter is the biggest supporter of the Jaysh al-Islami (TN: Islamic Army), and his opinion of al-Qa'ida is well-known: Shaykh al-Bashr was assigned full time to secret work roughly a year ago.

Shaykh al-Bashr told me that three senior shaykhs - 'Abdallah al-((Sa'd)), Yusuf al-Ahmad, and Muhammad al-Habdan - supported the Mujahidin, but he doesn't think they are able to be of much benefit to the Mujahidin at present in consultations, etc., because some of them are more concerned with accountability, denouncing vice in the marketplace and the media, and other such things.

He mentioned that he met the Amir of the Jaysh al-Islami in Iraq on two occasions, and that he also met with a delegation from the Islamic Courts, whom he advised to crush the transitional government in Baidoa before Ethiopian support could arrive.

Shaykh Bashr is with you, heart and soul, and he told me that he would inform me of any updates he had, which I will send to you.

The name of Shaykh 'Abd-al-Rahman al-((Mahmud)) was recommended to me by al-Jalil, and Shaykh Bashr agreed to go see him. He told me not to go to Abu Malik al-Rays because of his well-known position, which I had not known of.

Meeting with one of al-Ghanayman's students: I met with a student of Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Ghanayman, and he told me that the shaykh was in good health and was one of those who had tried to hasten the dissenting statement. The shaykh relies on the students close to him for help, as he is an elderly man and needs people to move him. The biggest problem facing al-Ghanayman is that his students aren't devoted to their shaykh. Otherwise, if this weren't the case, I would have seen something else, and the shaykh's signature would have been put on it. The shaykh had promised himself that his books wouldn't be printed until after his death, but his students recommended to him that the books be printed, and all the money be sent to the Mujahidin. The shaykh was really happy with this suggestion, and said that if the money was going to be sent to the Mujahidin, then he would recent his earlier position. It is said that he had refused to welcome Shaykh Salih al-((Fawzan)) into his home, but I think that's unlikely. But perhaps he didn't welcome him in the usual way, or not in a way suitable to man of al-Fawzan's notoriety, because Shaykh 'Abdallah thinks

that al-Fawzan has gotten more involved with the Sultans than is necessary. On a sidenote, I asked one of Shaykh

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Salih al-Fawzan's students about the shaykh's relationship with the State, and he told me that the shaykh was terribly afraid of the Salul family. I told him that was strange, and that the shaykh was a man of conviction, particularly when it comes to the Mujahidin and the Islamic groups, and to sticking to the Salafist path. What he was saying about matters of jihad was completely unacceptable, and he was supposed to be a man who stood firm in confronting the Sultans. The student said I was right, but the reality was that the shaykh was totally unable to confront the State.

Perhaps I will have a private meeting with Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Ghanayman, God willing, about matters, and maybe I'll also meet with students of Shaykh 'Ali al-((Khudayr)). There is a famous quote from Shaykh Nasir al-('Aql), who is well-known for his knowledge of doctrine. He said he didn't know anyone under the sun who knew more about Salafist doctrine than did Shaykh 'Abdallah al-Ghanayman.

3. Sa'id Al Zu'ayr: He prayed for Shaykh 'Umar, and he said to me, "Tell Shaykh 'Atiyah that the reason the brothers have stopped is the lack of a practical means on the horizon to achieve victory for the shaykh, and statements do no good." The shaykh was advising consulting the senior shaykhs of the Arabian Peninsula because most of their hearts were not with the Mujahidin, and because those who are sitting should be sending their questions to the Mujahidin.

It was strange when he told me a bit of information that differs from what I know. He told me that there is a need for Mujahidin in Khorasan and Iraq, and that no one says there isn't a need except for the failures. The shaykh told me there are representatives from Khorasan and Iraq that he meets with regularly.

He also said that there are many religious students on the front lines in Iraq; Shaykh Bashr had mentioned this same point to me, and had advised that I doggedly peruse the volumes of fatwas and true believers.

He said there are three pieces of advice that he thinks are very important for the brothers in the ISI: The first one is to be



very wary of newly-joined members. No matter their status or capabilities, they must not be placed in leadership positions in the shura council, as there are many dangers lurking. Victory lies ahead, so one must remain on the lookout for penetrations and be extremely wary of newcomers. Benefit from them, but just don't put them on the shura council, for example.

The second piece of advice is to remain eager to draw in the largest number possible of soldiers from other factions to the Promised State. Honor their arrival and know that the base of jihadist groups wants what God has, and wants martyrdom. These groups have no particular ambitions or special opinions. So honor their arrival and the arrival of any of their commanders that come, so that we might not lose victory. Whoever of the senior shaykhs of Riyadh tries plainly to ruin this will see their efforts met with failure, praise be to God.

The third piece of advice is to not consult the senior shaykhs of the Arabian Peninsula. There is no good in consulting them. They rest on your victory, and they let you down. It is a sinister person who lowers the necks of the Mujahidin for someone sitting around to ride upon them. Put the affairs of the Jaysh al-Islami in order now with Safr al-Huwali and Nasir al-'Umar, who got in trouble when their necks were lowered.

4. 'Abd-al-'Aziz al-Jalil: He really responded when we started communicating, and he asked me a bunch of questions to be sure of me. He prayed for Shaykh 'Umar and for Muslim prisoners, and he said that they had reached the stage in which they hope there will be a brother with whom they can meet to confirm some things, and so they can convey some things. I was supposed to meet him in Muna, as well, but things didn't work out then, either.

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5. Muhammad al-Habdan: He responded when we started communicating and told me that he has an open channel with al-Barrak at a moment's notice to stay in touch with him, and he is prepared to serve you as he is able.

6. Yusuf al-Ahmad: He is the one person I didn't show your message to because circumstances didn't allow, and it wasn't a suitable time. But I did ask him about the dissenting statement, and he told me some of the information I mentioned above, which I gathered from the senior shaykhs to better explain the issue of writing the statement.

He said that there are representatives from some of the factions that attended the meeting, or more precisely some senior shaykhs who support well-known factions and have close contact with their representatives. They told them some stories against the ISI, saying they did this and that, and that Abu Hamzah al-((Muhajir)) is the problem and ((Zarqawi)) is heaven compared to him. They said Abu Hamzah is much more bloodthirsty and more enthusiastic about takfir, is tyrannical in his dealings with others, and has no patience for anyone who disagrees with him, etc. The stories say that they kill shaykhs and proselytizers who disagree with them, be they from different factions, brothers, or what have you. Unfortunately, the ISI messenger did not come to respond. On a separate note, Shaykh, the brothers have a representative and he went to several of the senior shaykhs like al-Barrak and al-Bashr. But to the pro-ISI shaykhs, any word they say can be counted against them. So the Jaysh al-Islami or the 1920's Revolutionary Brigades, etc., are not like the ISI. The accusation of supporting al-Qa'ida is there.

In order to better illustrate the position of some senior shaykhs who support jihad but oppose al-Qa'ida, I give you an article written by one such shaykh who follows this approach. May God help you as you read this; it will require effort and patience. The words will raise your blood pressure and arouse your anger; in fact, a draft of the article before the final copy even included an unconfirmed accusation that takfir book used by the Taliban and Bin Laden was written by Zarqawi, and to which ((Abu Qatadah)) responded. It was supposed to be published in Mufakkirat al-Islam, and they agreed to do so, but then they decided against publishing it before the Eid holiday, saying that the ISI would kill all the publication's correspondents if it published it (this is the essay that was called the Essay on the Family of Perversion).

Shaykh 'Abd-al-'Aziz (('Abd-al-Latif)) was recommended by one of the brothers as a good person to visit.

For your benefit, here are the links to the web pages of senior shaykhs mentioned in this secret report:

Al-Barrak:

<[http://www.islamway.com/?iw\\_s=Scholar&iw\\_a=lessons&scholar\\_id=166](http://www.islamway.com/?iw_s=Scholar&iw_a=lessons&scholar_id=166)>

Al-Bashr

<[http://www.islamway.com/?iw\\_s=Scholar&iw\\_a=lessons&scholar\\_id=194](http://www.islamway.com/?iw_s=Scholar&iw_a=lessons&scholar_id=194)>

Muhammad al-Habdan

<[http://www.islamway.com/?iw\\_s=Scholar&iw\\_a=lessons&scholar\\_id=177](http://www.islamway.com/?iw_s=Scholar&iw_a=lessons&scholar_id=177)>

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Sa'id al-Zu'ayr

<[http://www.islamway.com/?iw\\_s=Scholar&iw\\_a=lessons&scholar\\_id=106](http://www.islamway.com/?iw_s=Scholar&iw_a=lessons&scholar_id=106)>

Yusuf al-Ahmad

<[http://www.islamway.com/?iw\\_s=Scholar&iw\\_a=lessons&scholar\\_id=242](http://www.islamway.com/?iw_s=Scholar&iw_a=lessons&scholar_id=242)>

Al-Farraaj

<[http://www.islamway.com/?iw\\_s=Scholar&iw\\_a=lessons&scholar\\_id=244](http://www.islamway.com/?iw_s=Scholar&iw_a=lessons&scholar_id=244)>

Your student and admirer in God.

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In the name of God most merciful

To Shaykh Mahmud, may God protect him,

I hope that this letter finds you while you and your family are in good health

I offer my condolences to you for the death of our beloved brothers. May God have mercy on their soul and consider them among the martyrs.

This is the path of Jihad. God said, "You will sacrifice you money and yourselves for the sake of God."

They struck us and we will strike them back. Anyone who looks at the enemies in NATO, especially America, will know that they are in big trouble. This year has been the worst year for them in Afghanistan since they invaded it. The number of their dead has never been this high according to their own reports. Their financial crisis continues. Britain has lowered is defense budget and America is reducing the budget of the Pentagon.

Anyone who knows the world and knows politics, knows that it is impossible for them to continue with the war. There is no difference between them and the Soviet Union before it withdrew from Afghanistan. As for the local enemies, as you know, they are in big trouble and the government is in danger of falling, especially after the floods and the increase in the number of those who are suffering from the financial crisis. Their difficult situation was the reason for the crisis between them and NATO.

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You know of the size of the disagreement between the two sides after they closed the border. Through the generosity of God, the situation is moving in the direction of al-Mujahidin. You should be patient and strong and God will reward us.

-Regarding the brothers in Wasiristan in general, whoever can keep a low profile and take the necessary precautions, should stay in the area and those who cannot do so, their first option is to go to Nuristan in Kunar, Gazni or Zabil. I am leaning toward getting most of the brothers out of the area. We could leave the cars because they are targeting cars now, but if we leave them, they will start focusing on houses and that would increase casualties among women and children. It is possible that they have photographed targeted homes. The brothers who can keep a low profile and take the necessary precautions should stay, but move to new houses on a cloudy day.

A warning to the brothers: they should not meet on the road and move in their cars because many of them got targeted while they were meeting on the road. They also should not enter the market in their cars.

Note: there is no comparison between the fortification of Kunar and Zabil and Gazni. Kunar is more fortified due to its rougher terrain and the many mountains, rivers, and trees and it can accommodate hundreds of the brothers without being spotted by the enemy. This will defend the brothers from the aircrafts, but will not defend them from the traitors.

Also, the brothers should enter those areas to fight and attack the enemy.

-As for you, if you think that it is dangerous to move by car, then you can stay in the area, but you need to do your work through two brothers, and only one of them should carry your messages to the brothers. The key individuals for your work are your first deputy, second deputy, military commander, and four or five other brothers.

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They can through their own ways deliver the messages to the other brothers. The brother should visit you no more than once or twice a week.

The other brother comes to you only for necessary issues only, even if this slows down the work. We pray to God for things to change. You should know the locations of the brothers, but they should not know your location, except for the carriers.

Note: tell the brothers that the ban is not only to those who come by car. The amir should not meet anyone except the two carriers. The Americans have great accumulative experience in photography of the area due to the fact that they have been doing it in the area for so many years. They can distinguish between houses frequented by men at a higher rate than usual. Also, the visiting person might be tracked without him knowing. This applies to locals too.

Inform the brothers that this is the arrangement for every amir at this time.

It is important to have the leadership in a faraway location to gain expertise in all areas. When this experienced leadership dies, this would lead to the rise of lower leaders who are not as experienced as the former leaders and this would lead to the repeat of mistakes. Remind your deputies that all communication with others should be done through letters.

-In a previous letter I asked you to get an oath from the brothers that would include:

- 1-Obediance and jihad for the sake of restoring the caliphate
- 2-Keep the secret of work
- 3-Safeguard the work that they are responsible for and provide advice to the leadership

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Take the oath even from brothers who gave the oath in the past.

Regarding the first and second deputy, send me the text of the oath and let me know which brothers can take on this responsibility in the future.

-Regarding brother Muhammad Shawqi Abu-Ja'far, if he arrived at your location, please arrange for him a safe place and explain to him in details the danger in moving and all security precautions.

If he is on the road, then make the arrangements for him, he might be with the brothers in Kunar. Explain to him in details about the situation in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Wasiristan. Then, he can give you his opinion about the location that he is in. He should be informed of the nature of work and he should be consulted on things that are being discussed.

-In your letter, you talked about your relationship with Abu-Salman al-Baluchi. I know that he is good Mujahid and got detained in the past, but some of the Baluchi people that he knows work for the Pakistani intelligence. Therefore, I advise you to be careful and not talk to him about your news and secrets. Also, for that reason, my son Hamzah should not be at his place or anywhere near him.

Regarding my son Hamzah and his mother, I wish you take all the security precautions that were mentioned before in order to disrupt surveillance on him. He should move only when the clouds are heavy. Then, 'Um-Hamzah goes to the middle-man on my side. I asked him to make all the remaining arrangements. I also asked him to make sure that they read the letter before they go in order to alert them to some security precautions including not taking with them any of the things that they had in Iran, such as their suitcases. As for Hamzah, if you find my companion that we talked about, please send him to Peshawar and the surrounding area and ask him to arrange a house that can hold two families in addition to his family. He should stay there with Hamzah. If you did not find him yet, then please have a trusted Pakistani brother accompany him. Make sure to tell Hamzah that I am of the opinion that he needs to get out of Wasiristan if he is there, and he should not go there if he is not there. What I said regarding Hamzah applies to 'Uthman and Muhammad if they come from Iran.

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Regarding the deputy position, Shaykh Abu Yahya should be the one for a year from the date of the appointment of Shaykh Sa'id (may God rest his soul), but he should give his greatest attention to the issue of shari'a research that we talked about in the past especially for Somalia and the Islamic Maghreb. The brothers in the Islamic Maghreb might experience divisions. To avoid this, the research that you said that you are going to prepare on dealing with the apostates should be sent to them. It should be complete and comprehensive and it should include the opinions of the scholars. This is a very important issue. I have attached a letter from myself to Brother 'Abd-al-Rahman. You can look at and it contains my order to him to be your second deputy. Our situation cannot accept baseless excuses from anyone. Do the same thing with 'Abd-al-Jalil. Appoint him as a second deputy if you need to for a year from the date of the arrival of your letter to him with the possibility for renewal.

I have sent you also a file named Attachments for Shaykh Mahmud and it includes parts of the Yemen message. Since you lived there with the brothers for a while, please read it and make some adjustments in it to make it appropriate for your area. If possible, please add it to the files of brother 'Abd-al-Wadud or you can send it to them as part of your correspondence to them. Please let us know which sections you will send to them. Do not send the parts that I sent to them in the letter of the general policy.

-We did not receive the letter from shaykh Abu-Yahya which mentions the Islamic Maghreb.

-In the last letter when I used the term "external work," I meant the work of shaykh Yunis and the work inside western countries.

-It seems that there is a misunderstanding regarding the issue of Jihadi media. It is a main piece of the war and I did not mean that it should be abandoned. I just wanted to point out that the level of interviews did not reach the desired level and I called on you to do better.

-Regarding the program Witness to History (TN: a program on al-Jazirah), I do not like it because the host of the program uses improper language sometimes.

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-Regarding my letter to brother Basir, if you get any important comments from Shaykh Abu-Muhammad on the letter in general, please send them to me. Also, if you or shaykh Abu-Muhammad have comments on any of the paragraphs, you can delete these paragraphs and send the letter to brother Basir.

If you did not get anything from Abu-Muhammad due to the difficulty in communicating between you two, and if you do not have any important comments, then go ahead and send it to Basir because it contains a request to the brother to provide us information on the situation in their area and clarification on some of the events that took place in the Muslim world.

Regarding the negotiations for the release of the Afghani prisoner in your area, you should be careful in the way that you deal with the negotiators. Many mistakes can happen when you receive the money. This also applies to donation money. You should take all security precautions. My suggestion is to rent a house in Peshawar and the money should be delivered in it. After the mission, the brother leaves the house.

Make sure to get the money exchanged at money exchangers. You should also get rid of the bag that the money was in because it might have a chip. The brother should take the money, get in a taxi, and go to the center of the market and get to a roofed section of the market. Two brothers should be waiting for him there and he should give them the money to bring it to you. The money should be in euro or dollars. After that, he should evade surveillance and stay away from the brothers that he gave the money to.

Negotiators should not be met in Wasiristan (the area where the American aerial photography is active), unless there is a perfect plan that would prevent the enemy from tracking those negotiators or the brothers. You should know that the news of the negotiations might reach the Americans.

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Note: the brother should not be one of the leaders.

-Perhaps you monitored the trial of brother Faysal Shahzad. In it he was asked about the oath that he took when he got American citizenship. And he responded by saying that he lied. You should know that it is not permissible in Islam to betray trust and break a covenant. Perhaps the brother was not aware of this. Please ask the brothers in Taliban Pakistan to explain this point to their members. In one of the pictures, brother Faysal Shahzad was with commander Mahsud; please find out if Mahsud knows that getting the American citizenship requires talking an oath to not harm America. This is a very important matter because we do not want al-Mujahidn to be accused of breaking a covenant.

-Due to the abundance of blessings, you need to establish a special section for planning military operations at the fronts. It should have experienced brothers and you should provide them with the latest equipment. You should also task some brothers with summarizing books on warfare and publish these summaries and give them to the brothers and the leaders. As for the brothers who are in charge of planning, they should be kept in a safe location outside the battlefield. They should conduct studies and preparations before operations. They should also film and document operations in order to learn from mistakes and avoid them in future operations.

Also, attention should be paid to the medical aspect, especially during withdrawal after the operation.

-Please have brother 'Azzam translate the book the Most Important Things About al-Qa'ida by Robert Fisk and then send the translation to me.

-The tenth anniversary to the attack 9/11 is coming and due to the importance of this date, attention should be paid to start preparing for now. Please send me you suggestions on this.

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We need to benefit from this event and get our messages to the Muslims and celebrate the victory that they achieved. We need to restore their confidence in their nation and motivate them. We should also present our just cause to the world, especially to the European people. We will have a lot to show, therefore we should not depend on one media outlet to cover that event. If al-Jazirah shows responsiveness, we should contact the correspondent of al-Jazirah Arabic and English and tell them that we are willing to cooperate with them in the area of covering the tenth anniversary by answering any questions that you think the public is interested in. You can point out to them that this way they will be showing the other opinion. Note: all correspondence, letters, and negotiations should be in the name of al-Sahab.

We should also look for an American channel that can be close to being unbiased, such as CBS, or other channel that has political motives that make it interested in broadcasting the point of view of al-Mujahidin. Then, we can send to the channel the material that we want the Americans to see. You can ask brother Azzam about the channel that you should send the tape to and let me know your opinion and his.

I also think that you should write to 'Abd-al-Bari 'Atwan and Robert Fisk and tell them that the tenth anniversary is coming and it is the harvest of a fierce war between al-Mujahidin and America. This is a chance to explain our motives for continuing the war. The wise people would tell you to give people their rights in order to be able to focus on other vital issues such as global warming. They have the option to stop the war, but we do not have any option, except to defend our nation. This is a conflict between the biggest cultures in the world at a time when the climate is changing rapidly.

Tell them that we suggest that they make a documentary on this anniversary and we will provide them with printed, audio, and video materials.

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Please have them give us their video material and the names of specialists that they will use in order for us to establish a vision for the film and to be able to clarify the events. We should shed light on the fact that In some past documentaries on a-Jazirah, some specialists confirmed that the events of 9/11 are the main reasons for the financial crisis that America suffers from.

-Regarding what the brothers in al-Sahab-Urdu mentioned in the statement on the floods, I am in support of giving advice and constructive criticism even when it is directed at me, for this is the duty of Muslims. Thank you for letting me know what the brothers wrote.



I also need you to read the statement and read the comments that the brothers added, but pay attention to the following:

A- All talk about climate change and the catastrophes that were caused by it. After the Copenhagen conference, they stated that the main reason for these catastrophes is the sins.

B- The attack was not directed at the victims who lost their children and money.

C- We dealt with relief organization during the Afghani Jihad and we have never seen what the brother mentioned. I am not saying that it did not happen, but I think that the brother is exaggerating. I called on Muslims to establish an organization that would be guided by the principles of Islam. As Muslims, it is our duty to save those Muslims.

D- Reminding the people of Pakistan to repent and return to God. This is an issue that I wanted to talk about. During those events, I was thinking these floods were caused by sins, but I did not say it because I wanted to be sensitive to the fact that some parents were able to save two children and watched their third drown. For that reason I wanted to talk about helping those who are in need.

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One of the main criticisms toward the brothers is that the brothers were saying that floods were caused by sins.

The Prophet never told anyone that they are in pain or crisis because of their sins, but he did call on them to join Islam. That was the case of the Jewish man with the sick child, who the prophet invited to Islam, but did not tell him that his son was sick because he was not a believer.

E- Regarding the talk about a network of pipelines and wells in the Gulf especially in the land of the two sanctuaries (TN: Saudi Arabia), the reality is that water is getting drained by agriculture and most countries are getting their water from a few water desalination stations on the gulf. Whenever a war starts in the region and some oil tankers gets attacked, the oil will get in the water and pollute it. Also if the stations themselves get attacked, 20 million Muslims will be at risk of dying out of thirst. You know that rebuilding a damaged station would take a long time. For that reason, I highlighted this issue so that people can take some steps on their own. The presence of apostate regimes should not keep us from alerting Muslims because they could be harmed. For example, If we know that the high dam in Egypt is about to crumble, we should inform the millions of Muslims of this danger. It is our duty to support and save the Muslims whenever we can.

You know that prophet Yousuf warned the people of Egypt of the deadly famine that was coming at them and he saved them from it.

You also know, that a statement should not be taken out of context s and no statement is independent of what is before it and what is after it. In summary, talking to the Muslims about repenting and abandoning sin is a duty, but the statement was not directed toward the victims of the flooding. Please study the matter and let me know what you find.

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-Enclosed are the letters to Shaykh Abu-Muhammad and to brother Abu-Mus'ab 'Abd-al-Wadud. Please give these letters to them.

-I want the brothers in Islamic Maghreb to know that Planting trees helps al-Mujahidin and gives them cover. Planting trees is not expensive and it should be done immediately after rain. They should ask people to keep animals and livestock away from them. Trees would give al-Mujahidin the freedom to move around especially if the enemy sends spying aircrafts to the area.

It is best if they can get the trees from a plantations or they can even create their own plantation.

-Please send me the America Statement by Shaykh Abu-Muhammad. Also, please send him a copy of the letter of Sahib al-Tayyib to me and a copy of my letter to him. Also, please send me a copy of my letter to brother 'Abd-al-Wadud in the exact format that you will send it to him in.

-Please send to the brothers in Algeria the file that was written by Shaykh Bashir al-Madani about the Islamic Maghreb and which I sent to you in my previous letter. Ask him for his comments on it and see if he has as any information on this issue.

-Please let me know regarding what you mentioned in the past about arranging a direct way to deliver information to the brothers in the media.

-Al-Jazirah mentioned that some newspapers reported that one of the methods that al-Qa'ida uses to kill Americans is to put razors (TN: plow) on a truck and the driver pushes it to between them. Please let me know if this accurate and let me know the source of it.

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-Regarding the separation of Southern Sudan, I am thinking about what you said and perhaps we will know something about it in the coming days through the media.

-As for what you said about the chaos, I am not in favor of it and if we were together you would know that you and I are in agreement on this. I might write to you about this in details.

-Enclosed is a special chip for the media. It contains Statement to the American People. With it is also a letter from my son Khalid to the brothers at the media. It is important to have it and the statement delivered to them. Tell the brothers that this statement should be broadcasted before the American congressional election. Also, a copy of the statement should be given to the correspondent of al-Jazirah-English. Also, another copy of it should be given to an American news agency. Tell the three channels that we want to broadcast the statement on 29 October. If the channels do not broadcast the statements, the brothers should be ready to broadcast it on the internet on 30 October.

-Regarding what you mentioned about informing the middle-man that you received the money that he sent, it is OK to do that if you write on a very small piece of paper that can be folded very tightly so that it would not get noticed.

-In your letter, you mentioned that you did not receive the chip. This true, we did not send it because of a problem with it and due to the shortage on time, I was not able to change the letter. I apologize.

-Enclosed is the article attributed to our brother Sayf al-'Adl.

-Regarding the money, I like for them to be in Euros. I do not see a problem in sending them all at once.

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Finally, let me know how the widows and the orphans are doing. Also, please let me know how the children of Al-Jufi (may God rest his soul) are doing. Please make sure to keep the children and all the families away from the areas that are being photographed and bombed.

I pray to God almighty to protect you and protect all the brothers around you. May he grant you success.

God's peace mercy and blessings be upon you.

Your brother, Zamray  
21 October 2010

Page 1

In the Name of God, Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate  
Thanks to God, the God of all, God bless our prophet Muhammad,  
His Family, and His friends.

To the Generous Brother Abu Basir, God bless you  
Peace and Mercy upon you

I hope you will get this letter and all brothers and their  
families are in good health and working your way to God  
Almighty.

We received your letter and our brother's letter (Abu Hurirah  
al-San'ani) through our brothers (NFI). We were very happy to  
receive your letter that answered our questions. The letter  
provided us with information about you and your situation, and  
we were following your news very closely through the media.  
In reference to your statement, "If you want Sana'a, today is  
the day," we want Sana'a to establish an Islamic State, but  
first, we want to make sure that we have the capability to gain  
control of it. Even though we were able to militarily and  
economically exhaust and weaken our greatest enemy before and  
after the eleventh (TN: September 11), the enemy continues to  
possess the ability to topple any state we establish.

Page 2

Our greatest enemy is unable to provide stability in those  
countries and the mujahidin, with the help of God, are fighting  
it (TN: greatest enemy) with its allies. At the same time, we  
have to remember that the enemy toppled the Taliban and Saddam's  
regime. Additionally, you know the experiences in (Syria, Egypt,  
and Libya) and the enemies' alert in Yemen can't be compared  
with the enemies' state of alert in Afghanistan. The enemies  
considered Yemen as one of its own because of its geographical  
location, which is in the heart of the Gulf where the largest  
store of oil is in the world. We do not want to trouble  
ourselves and our families in Yemen concerning this matter at  
this time. Things needed to be prepared and will organize for it  
(NFI) to be successful because if we fail, people will not help  
us the second time. I believe that Yemen should be peaceful and  
kept as reserved military for the Ummah (TN: Islamic State). It  
is well known that wars need reserve military and to keep the  
enemy in the open fronts until the enemy becomes weak, where we  
would be able to establish Islamic State. Therefore, the more we

can conduct operations against America, the closer we get to uniting our efforts to establish an Islamic State, God willing.

Page 3

Based on this, our opinion is to appoint scholars and tribal shaykhs to accomplish a practical truce among them, which will help the stability of Yemen. Even though we learned that 'Ali 'Abdallah ((Salih)) will not be able to agree on the truce, proving that the government is escalating the situation to an internal fight and the government has no authority. Therefore, the people of Yemen will continue supporting the mujahidin. The government will be responsible for the war, not us, and it will show the people that we are careful in keeping the Islamic Ummah united and the Muslims safe on the basis of peace.

- We do not see escalation as necessary at this point because we are in the preparation stage; therefore, it is not in our interest to rush in bringing down the regime. In spite of this regime's mismanagement, it is less dangerous to us than the one America wants to exchange it with. 'Ali 'Abdallah Salih has been unable to suppress the Islamic activity and has been considered to be a non-Muslim man and supporter of the West during the past years. On the contrary, the salafists and the jihadist salafists were able to take advantage of his regime and target America from Yemen, as some of the mujahidin went to Somalia or traveled to us, which allowed us to assign our brothers to conduct international operations.

Page 4

If the government does not agree on a truce, concentrate on the Yemeni emigrants who come back to visit Yemen and have American visas or citizenship and would be able to conduct operations inside America as long as they have not given their promises not to harm America. We need to extend and develop our operations in America and not keep it limited to blowing up airplanes.

- We would not be able to send you a brother to help you at this stage. We should keep our movement low for security reasons and not move unless under extreme, necessary circumstances, especially the leadership, who are in the media. They need to avoid meeting people. If they need to move, they have to stay away from gas stations and restaurants. The driver should have plenty of gas and food before leaving the city to avoid stopping on the road. The intelligence services place officers in the gas stations, rest areas, restaurants, coffee shops, etc.

- Avoid killing anyone from the tribes.
- It is crucial to have one of the organization's leaders in the south.

Page 5

- Do not target military and police officers in their centers unless you receive an order from us. Our targets are Americans, who kill our families in Gaza and others Islamic countries. The soldiers (TN: Yemenis) need to be careful and not protect the Crusaders. We have to protect ourselves, especially if they try to stop us during an attack on the Crusaders. This is a very important point, which allows people to support the mujahidin and will reduce the soldiers' morale.
- It is important to attempt to take a vow and truce from supporters of al-Qaida without enforcing it and accept them as your coworkers. With time they might join you.
- The first commanders should be screened well (TN: background investigation).
- In reference to the issue of abandoning weapons, this would never happen because, with education and iron, our religion will be victorious. Weapons are part of our survivors and history. Men without weapons are incomplete, and any men who leave their weapons have no respect by others.

Page 6

I need to remind you about the general politics of al-Qaida concerning the military sector and media. Al-Qaida concentrates on its external big enemy before its internal enemy. Even though the internal enemy is considered to be a greater nonbeliever, the external enemy is more clearly defined as a nonbeliever and is more dangerous in this stage of our life. America is the head of the nonbelievers. If God cut it off, the wings would be weakened as 'Umar, peace be upon him, asked al-Harmazan, as he knows more about the land of Faris (TN: Iran). He replied, "Yes, the Faris of today has one head and two wings." He asked him, "Where is the head?" He replied, "It is in Nahawand." Then he mentioned the location of the two wings. He suggested to the commander of the faithful, "If you cut the wings, the head will fall down." 'Umar replied to him, "You liar. You, the enemy of God, because I will go straight to the head, and I will cut it

off, as has been said, if God cuts the head off the wings will be weakened."

Even though these politics are clear in the minds of our leader brothers, it is very important to remind all of our brothers about it with a note to the new generation, who joined the jihad road and were not advised about this issue. Thus, they conduct separate operations rather than concentrating on the main objective as we heard in the news about operations in Ma'rib and 'Ataq against the government forces. I hope these operations were important for the mujahidin's self-defense only.

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I provide an example to clarify al-Qaida's general political policy in concentrating on America, which means that the enemies of the Ummah, for example, is a malicious tree with a huge trunk of 50 cm around and has many different sizes of branches, including the countries of NATO and other regimes in the regions. We want to cut this tree at the root. The problem is that our strength is limited, so our best way to cut the tree is to concentrate on sawing the trunk of the tree. We need to concentrate on cutting around 30 cm in the bottom of America's leg (trunk). Even though we have the chance to attack the British, we should not waste our effort to do so but concentrate on defeating America, which will lead to defeating the others, God willing.

Here is an example for you, the mujahidin were able to cut the root of the Russian tree, and after that, all the branches fell one after the other, ...

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...from the south of Yemen to Eastern Europe, without spending any effort on these branches at that time. Therefore, any arrow and mine we have should be directed against Americans, disregarding all other enemies, including NATO, and concentrating on Americans only.

For example, if we were on the road between Qandahar and Helmand and army vehicles of Afghanis, NATO, and Americans drove by, we should choose to ambush the American army vehicles, even though the American army vehicles have the least amount of soldiers. The only time you are allowed to attack the other army vehicles is if those army vehicles are going to attack our brothers. In other words, any work to directly defend the mujahidin group

will be excluded from al-Qaida's general politics policy because the mujahidin group should be able to carry out its mission, which is striking American interests.

Page 9

Anyone following up with the latest events should know that our work and messages concentrate on exhausting and straining the American, especially after September 11. We will continue to pressure the Americans until there is a balance in terror, where the expense of war, occupation, and influence on our countries becomes a disadvantage for them (TN: Americans) and they become tired of it, and finally withdraw from our countries and stop supporting the Jews.

It is very important to remember that timing is very important, as the present history confirms. We should realize by now that in order to establish an Islamic State, we should destroy the international infidels because they are against an Islamic State no matter how little it (TN: State) is, as happened in Morocco. Shaykh al-Khatibi established an Islamic Emirate in Morocco, but the Crusaders blockaded and terminated the Emirate. The reason they do not want an Islamic State is because they know that Muslims are special, and for a short period of time during Prophet Muhammad and his successors, the whole world respected the Muslims.

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Today, the head of the infidels (TN: America) is controlling and supporting the countries in the region. Additionally, it has the ability to topple the Islamic State in Afghanistan and the Iraqi regime. Even though it is exhausted, its strength to destroy an Islamic State in the region remains high during this time. The most important thing is that local and international professional adversaries are planning to destroy the Islamic movements; therefore, we need to be proactive and face all of their plans and continue to deplete and exhaust it throughout the open battlefield in Afghanistan and Iraq to get it to a weaken point, which will stop it from destroying the country that we want to establish. Also, we might have to wait for a year or longer to establish this objective (TN: Islamic State) through the Muslims' unity and their effort to join the jihad.

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You know that many jihadist groups did not succeed in gaining their objective because they concentrated on their internal enemy. Therefore, the Syrian Muslim Brothers got themselves in trouble, especially in Hama, when thirty years ago the event (NFI) shocked the people. Additionally, other events took place as of the Islamic group attempt in Egypt, including the situation with our brothers in Libya, Algeria, and the Arab Peninsula. Even though some of the work was targeting the American centers, not the regime, and was useful in getting America to leave its huge military bases in Saudi Arabia and in educating young men about the jihad. Then the jihad started facing problems for the abovementioned reasons.

Meanwhile, the resistance movements against the foreign occupation enemy were able to accomplish huge successes during the last ten years in the Islamic world, and the latest one was in Afghanistan. The reason for this success is that...

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...the Russian occupation of Afghanistan allowed us to gain the people's heart. It was very important to us to gain the Afghanis' support because the people's support to the mujahidin is as important as the water for fish; therefore, any movement has to have the people's support in order to survive, as happened in Gaza when all the people supported the Islamic Resistance Movement; even though, the people are unaware of the wrongdoing by the mujahidin. The enemy entered Iraq without any knowledge of the area or the Iraqi people, who have a strong tribal background; therefore, the Iraqis supported the mujahidin. Many Iraqis joined the mujahidin against the Americans until some mistakes happened when some of al-Anbar tribe's children were attacked without a reason of self-defense (they were not a threat to the mujahidin), but they were registering in the security force compound. This attack resulted in the tribe working against the mujahidin. At this time, the mujahidin learned their lesson, which is not to kill any of the tribe members.

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There is a very important point that needs to be addressed and understood, which is that God's law needs to be obeyed by all the mujahidin stating that there was no imminent threat from the tribe's members, and they were going to join the security forces for financial reasons. This lesson should be taken into consideration because members of the tribe were planning to join

the security force and might be a threat in the future, but they would not kill themselves to protect Americans. Additionally, these people have no problem killing their own cousins; therefore, if they attack us and we kill one of them, we will have no problem with them. But we should avoid killing a group of them during their presence in the security force compound to avoid any desire for revenge against us. It is important to study all the mujahidin's attempts and efforts to learn from their mistakes.

It is clear that the Arabs are in the depths of intolerance and revenge. Some of the mujahidin brothers worked with us in the past and returned to Yemen and got involved in some of the tribes' fights.

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They were unable to separate themselves from this culture (revenge). America pressured the Yemeni government to attack the tribal areas as happened in al-Mahfad and Shabwah, which led some of the tribes to be against the government. On the other hand, the mujahidin were able to work with the tribes and establish a good relationship with them because the mujahidin have a good understanding of the meaning of revenge among the tribes. As Prophet Muhammad ordered Abu Hudhifah not to kill al-'Abas Bin 'Abd-al-Mutalab, but Hudhifah refused to abide by the order.

A friend of Prophet Muhammad, 'Abdallah Bin 'Abdallah Bin Abu Bin Salul, asked the prophet if he was going to kill 'Abdallah Bin Abi and requested to kill him.

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He stated that he would not be able to see his killer because he would kill his killer and go to hell. The prophet told him that we will be his friend as long he is with us. When 'Umar became the leader of a tribe (Ibn Abi Majazatah), Prophet Muhammad asked him "How things with you 'Umar? If I had killed him when you told me to kill him, you would have honor, and if you order me now to kill him, I would kill him." This hadith proves that anyone fighting under the American flag against the Muslims should be killed, but the argument here is the timing as Prophet Muhammad stated, "If I had killed him when you told me to kill him."

The time to establish an Islamic State is near, and the jihadist ideology is spreading abroad, especially among the youth and the new generation in comparison to other Islamic movements that did not fulfill the redundancy among the Ummah except the jihadist Salafi ideology that works well with Ummah issues. We should develop the speech of al-Qaida to be convincing, easy and clear. Additionally, it has to be sensitive to the people's issues and suffering and to the general public.

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Some of our brothers might have provided harsh statements to some of the Salafists, God bless them, concerning the establishment of an Islamic State. We need to understand our present circumstance, which is different from theirs, and we need to understand the difference between our strength and our weakness. We have to concentrate our statements on the most important, which is the meaning of only one God, and steer people away from praying to more than one God. Also, we need to pay attention to the words and meaning of our statements in order to avoid words that could be used for different meanings within the Islamic law without giving up any of our principles by using words that will relate the intended message, for example, using the word "clients" rather than the word "agents." During this stage, we need to relay the truth to the people in the easiest and nicest words. Some people do not like the word agents and consider it insulting. Therefore, if we use the word "clients" instead of the word "agents," and say that they (clients) betrayed their religion and their Prophet instead of using the traitor rulers, it would help more Muslims listen to us. That way we would be able to alert the Muslims about their loyalty to oppressor rulers, which is our goal.

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...We need to stay away from words that will affect the people's support to the mujahidin. Additionally, the mujahidin should feel that they are in the international Crusaders' propaganda against them, which is concentrating on giving the wrong impression about the mujahidin to Muslims. Therefore, it is important to carefully write our statements in order to avoid all accusation against us from the enemy, who accuse us of being animals and killers. The Muslim people should feel that they are part of the battle, and they are in need of speeches that fit their conditions without forgetting that the Ummah (Muslims) are the main supporters of the mujahidin. Thus, we should be careful and provide statements that would be welcomed by the people and

stay away from flagrant attacks, criticism, or disrespect of the opponents.

In reference to Hamas, we should understand that Hamas has many supporters who are supporters of Islam even though they forgot the meaning of some of the important Shari'ah law. We do not want to help the devil against them. As time passes, we will explain their leaders' mistakes, which will help them to pay attention to their mistakes and avoid them (NFI).

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We need to understand that a huge part of the battle is the media, and the cable channels today play a stronger role than the Hja'in poets during the ignorant era. If the cable channels concentrate on promoting a specific person, they will have success, and the opposite is correct. If those channels do not want that person to be successful, they will destroy him. This shows that we are at odds with most of the channels and al-Jazeera has a different agenda than ours. It would be better for us to stay neutral, even though this channel sometimes commits mistakes against us. These mistakes are limited, and if we confront it, al-Jazeera will raise propaganda against us and could hurt our image within the Muslim world. Therefore, it is important not to have an enemy in the moderate poets if there is no reason to do so.

Conclusion: Even though the government is weak and might fall, the opportunity to let it fall and establish a different government is open to others but not to us. The reason for this is very simple: It is not possible to compromise on any part of our religion or bargain on our religion in order to satisfy America to support the new government. Many people will say anything and leave their religion under the pretext of being in the best interest of al-Da'wah. Please discuss the matter of conducting a truce with government with the others.

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...If you decide on the truce, you should announce it with its justification and its conditions, which includes the closing of the American counterintelligence offices, expelling all American security and military forces in Yemen, and preventing the Americans from violating the sovereignty of Yemen through the Yemeni scholars and the tribal shaykhs, so people will understand your position and their position.

Finally, I would like to remind you that America will have to withdraw during the next few years because of many reasons, the most important of which is America's high deficit.

In closing, I send my greetings to all of our brothers in your area, and I ask God to help us all for what He wants and likes us to do, make you follow the correct directions, make you stay in your area, keep us on the road of jihad, and give us victory against the infidels. I hope to meet with you in the near future, God willing. God bless our prophet Muhammad, his Family, and his friends, and the last of our prayer is thanks to God.

**Page 1**

..Except that I would like to point out how important it is for us to keep in mind the views of the Muslim Ummah (TN: Muslim population) on getting involved in a comprehensive war against the enemy. The Ummah is fighting an internal enemy, which are the leaders of the Arab World. The Ummah is also fighting an external enemy, which is America. Although the former is far more blasphemous, the latter is clearly the unbeliever.

At this stage of our war with our enemies, America poses a greater threat to the Ummah than any other enemy.

America is the head of the infidels. If God wills it, America's head can be cut off. Once the head has been removed, then it would be easier to cut off America's wings. This is exactly what Omar, may God be pleased with him, said about the Persians.

When the Muslims were at war with the Persians, Omar consulted with Hurmazan, who was supposedly the expert on Persian affairs. Omar asked Hurmazan about the best way to attack Persia. Hurmazan replied, "Persia's power today can be described as a power with a body, head, and wings." Omar asked, "Where was the head?" Hurmazan replied, "Nahavund." Hurmazan also told Omar about the two powers which represented the wings. Hurmazan then told Omar, "Oh, Emir of all believers, I have the answer to your question on how to defeat Persia: Cut off the wings, then the head becomes easier to remove." Omar immediately replied, "You tell a lie! You are the enemy of God. I must cut off the head, first, then the wings will be easier to remove."

I have come up with my own scenario on the situation. I have probably mentioned this before. The enemy can also be described as a wicked tree. The trunk of that tree is 50cm wide. The tree has many branches, which vary in length and size.

The trunk of the tree represents America. The branches of the tree represent countries, like NATO members, and countries in the Arab World. We, on the other hand, represent a person who wants to cut down that tree. Our abilities and resources, however, are limited, thus we cannot do the job quickly enough. The only option we are left with is to slowly cut that tree down by using a saw. Our intention is to saw the trunk of that tree, and never to stop until that tree falls down.

Assume that we have cut up 30cm of the trunk of that tree. We, then, see an opportunity to use our saw to cut into one of the

branches. Say a branch that represents the United Kingdom. We should ignore that opportunity, and to go back to sawing the trunk of the tree.

If we are to allow ourselves to be distracted by sawing this or that branch, we could never finish the job at hand. We will also lose momentum and, most importantly, waste our jihad efforts.

We want to saw the trunk until the wicked tree is down. God willing, once the tree is down, its branches will die thereof.

You saw what happened to the Russians in Afghanistan, when the Mujahidin focused on sawing the trunk of their wicked tree. Their tree fell down, then its branches died out, from South Yemen to Eastern Europe. Mind you, the Mujahidin had done very little to help kill those branches.

We must then aim every bow and arrow and every landmine at the Americans. Only the Americans, but no one else, be it NATO members, or other countries.

Assume that we are on an ambush mission between Qandahar and Helmand, and we have just spotted enemy forces. The enemy forces consisted of three separate convoys. One convoy belonged to the Americans. One convoy belonged to the Afghan army. One convoy belonged to a NATO-member. Also, assume that the Afghan and the NATO-member convoys carried far more troops than the American convoy.

What should we do? The rule is that we must only attack the American convoy, but no one else.

Of course, there are exceptions to this rule. Not to state the obvious, if the Mujahidin knows that a non-American force was on its way to attack their positions, and that force was not on a regular patrol mission, the Mujahidin must intercept it.

Accordingly, the Mujahidin in every country will use force against the local authorities only if they come under direct attack. The Mujahidin need to preserve their strength, so they could use it in their fundamental mission. That is to attack Americans and their interests.

One must leave room for the possibility that Americans, or their interests, may not be present in some countries or regions. Also, when Americans exist in fewer numbers in a given country, they tend to be under heavy protection. So each country or

region has its own variables as far as targeting Americans and/or their interests.

When Americans or their interests are not found in a given country, the Mujahidin group in that country must look for American targets in neighboring countries or regions. The Mujahidin group in that country should not opt to attack NATO members and/or NATO interests, because they happen to be vulnerable targets in their country.

Also, to avoid targeting conflicts between the al-Qaida branches, each Mujahidin group must be certain that it is the only al-Qaida group operating in a country where it intends to target Americans.

You may find it suitable to target Americans in South Africa, because it is located outside the Islamic Maghreb. Also, South Africa is not covered by the brothers who are located outside that region. The same can be said about other African countries.

The Muslim land has been spoiled by America's hegemony, and the leaders who rule that land. The leaders of that Muslim land had totally given in to America's hegemony, in exchange for favors which only serve their interests. Those are the same leaders who also abandoned the Law of Islam.

The road is open for us to resurrect the religion, and to restore dignity to the Muslim people. To restore dignity to the Muslim people, the Muslim land must break away from that American hegemony.

It is that same hegemony which had forbidden any government in its sphere to rule with God's law.

To break away from America's hegemony, we need to involve America in a war of attrition. The war must be enduring, however. The goal is to weaken America until it can no longer interfere in Muslims affairs.

Once the American enemy has been defeated, our next step would be targeting the region's leaders who had been the pillars of support for that American hegemony. These are the same leaders who not only abandoned the Islamic Law, but also helped America extend its hegemony all over the Muslim land.

Once those leaders have been defeated, God willing our next step will be building our Muslim state.



Going back to the earlier question about fighting the apostates. I say: You know that throughout history, many resistance movements in the Muslim world had fought and won against many foreign enemies. The last of those fights was in Afghanistan. The reason the resistance movement in Afghanistan had won was because it had the support from the Afghan public. The Afghan public was highly charged, and it supported the mujahidin with every possible means, to expel the Russian infidels who had occupied Afghanistan.

The public support to any resistance movement is extremely vital. A resistance movement cannot last without the support of the public, just like a fish cannot live without water. Also, when the movement's public support is diminished, the standing of that movement is diminished, too.

Most people in Gaza rallied behind the Islamic resistance banner, because they had a common foreign enemy. Although at the time, the Gazans had known little about the shortcomings of their leaders.

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In Iraq, the enemy entered the country and then occupied it. The enemy, however, made a very big mistake when it ignored the Iraqi tribes. The enemy was also ignorant about the region and its people.

The enemy, in one way or another, had stirred up the Iraqi tribes, which led them to declare unification. As a result of that unification, the Iraqi public became united against a common enemy. Then, the Iraqi public became supportive of the Mujahidin, who were also fighting that same enemy. The Iraqi public had sacrificed tens of thousands of men who fought side by side with the Mujahidin. (Translator note: Here, the author is making reference to the Sunni tribes and Sunni public.)

The Mujahidin made a few mistakes in Iraq. The mistakes were committed because of hasty and poor decisions by some of the brothers. Those mistakes involved a number of military operations. If the Mujahidin had closely examined those military operations beforehand, the situation would have been better. Those who were in charge of those military operations had totally ignored anticipating the benefits or drawbacks those operations might generate.

The biggest mistake was made when the Mujahidin targeted and then killed members of the Anbar tribes near a police recruitment station. The Mujahidin could have easily chosen not to carry out that operation. The Mujahidin were not under direct attack by those members of the Anbar tribes. Also, the members of the Anbar tribes were not on their way to attack the Mujahidin in their hideouts. That attack had caused the tribes to withdraw their support for the Mujahidin. The attack also stirred up very bad feelings.

As you know, a killing of a tribesman is taken very seriously by any tribe and it often becomes a leading cause for all sorts of vengeful wars.

Imagine the general Iraqi political climate at the time. Also, imagine what was the tribes' reaction when they first heard about the Mujahidin killing hundreds of their tribesmen.

It is extremely important to pay close attention to timing. Timing is everything. This saying has been proven to be true now and then.

We must fully understand that now is the time to begin the work toward building our Muslim state. To do that, we first need to tackle the guardian of the universal hypocrisy, America. We need to deplete America of its power.

The body of the international hypocrisy has always been highly unreceptive to the creation of any Muslim state, and no matter how small or big that state was. There are many examples which can attest to that.

When Shaykh Khitabi created a Muslim state in Morocco, the crusaders quickly reacted, then reorganized their forces and besieged that state. The Khitabi state was defeated soon after that siege. That took place well before the crusaders had a foothold in the Muslim world.

Despite our deep disagreement with the Algerian Salvation Front (FIS), to make a point, the Front was also harmed by that body of universal hypocrisy. When the Front overwhelmingly won the first round of elections in Algeria, which meant that it was going to win the general elections, the top French officials drafted a plan to move in against the Front, if the Algerian government wished it to. The United Kingdom and all of Europe were standing by to help the Algerian government defeat the Front and, if necessary, by force.

The West greatly worries about a resurfacing of a Muslim state. The West understands what sorts of potential the Muslims have; potential that has been implanted by Islam in its followers. Such potential is not present among followers of other faiths.

Because of this Islamic potential, the Muslims were able, in a very short period of time, to spread Islam throughout the world. That short period of time was between the time of the Prophet, Mohamed, may peace be upon him, and the time of the first four Wise Caliphates.

The maps which had been drawn by the Sykes-Picot Agreement and other more recent maps have been acknowledged by all world leaders. However, if a new Islamic state is to emerge, these maps will become something of the past. The Islamic state will be seen as a threat, and the West will deal with that state as if it had taken over some of its own territories. So, the West and other continental and regional countries will likely band together to defeat any new Islamic state.

Today, America, the guardian of the West, is by far the most influential country in the region. America is the lifeblood of that region. America is also the biggest supporter of that region's status quo. America is strong enough to have toppled the Iraqi regime, and the Islamic government in Afghanistan. Since then, America may have been weakened, perhaps, tremendously, but it is still powerful enough to topple any state and anywhere, particularly any newly founded Muslim state. Our work, hence, must go on until we exhaust and weaken America to the point where it could not threaten or defeat any state which we create.

So, it is rather urgent to work hard at organizing the Muslim people, to unify their efforts and resources. Some of the Muslim people may have not experienced a call to Jihad because of one excuse or another. Nonetheless, the Muslim people must be united first before the preparation for building a Muslim state begins, God willing; even if we have to put off the creation of that state for a few years.

There is another important issue which must be fully understood. That is the intent for applying Islamic Law is to create an environment in which God's codes are supreme to any other codes in a given land. Our duty is to ensure that such a condition exists. We also have to evaluate, and very carefully, our

decisions, which had taken into consideration the common good perspective within the domain of the Islamic Law.

It is common among ordinary people to enlist in the armed forces for monetary incentives. Once enlisted, if these people are ordered to step forward to a battlefield and fight, they would likely do so. These people, however, would not fight on behalf of America, even if they had been ordered to do so. These people would not have the motivation to kill their own cousins whom America wishes to destroy!

Assume that some of those enlisted people, who often would belong to this or that tribe, would be willing to fight us. Also, assume that during one of their offensives, we kill one of them. The reaction of the tribe, to which the deceased belonged to, would likely be insignificant in this case, because the incident only involved one person and, after all, it happened during an offensive operation. Imagine, however, that same tribe's reaction if we were to initiate an attack against a group of tribesmen, then kill many of them as they were trying to enlist with some unit of the armed forces. That tribe's reaction would be undoubtedly severe. That tribe would press hard against us.

The killing of a greater number of tribesmen often boosts tribes' vengeful attitudes. The Mujahidin, hence, must be extremely careful about initiating operations to which they know little about the consequences. The Mujahidin should also study past mistakes so they may learn from them.

Tribal wars have often undermined the stability of many communities. Tribal vengeful attitudes at times could be intense and uncontrollable. Many tribal wars throughout history can attest to that. Even some of our Mujahidin brothers had been sucked into tribal wars. When some of the Mujahidin left us to go back to their homeland, they found their tribes at war, and so, they joined in. They put their faith to the side, then joined an ignorant bunch. Those Mujahidin had always been true to their faith, to say the least, but they could not abandon the tribesmen's ignorant and vengeful attitudes.

Many governments in the region also made big mistakes when they ignored tribal attitudes. Those governments, and because of outside demands, would often kill their own countrymen without given enough thought to the consequences of their actions. As outside pressure increased on those governments, those governments, in return, intensified their actions against their

own tribes. That led many tribes in those countries to turn against the governments.

If the Mujahidin treat the tribes well, the tribes will likely be on the Mujahidin's side. The tribal communities take the spilling of blood within its community very seriously. You know the story about Abu Huthaifa, may God have mercy on his soul. Remember what Abu Huthaifa said during the Badir battle. When Abu Huthaifa learned the Prophet's instructions about not to kill al-Abbas Bin Abid al-Mutalib, Abu Huthaifa said, "We are to kill our fathers, our sons, our brothers, and members of our tribes, but ignore Abbas! By God, if I am to face Abbas, I would kill him!" Abu Huthaifa then regretted having said that.

You also know the story about Abidallah Ibn Abidallah Ibn Abi Salul. Abi Salul, who was a companion, may God have mercy on his soul, had this dialogue with the Prophet, peace be upon him. Abi Salul: "I heard that you were planning to kill my father, Abidallah Ibn Abi Salul. If you are still determined to do it, then let me do it. I would bring his head to you. Oh, by God! The Khazraj had never known a man to be more loving to his father than me. I am afraid that if you let another Muslim kill him, I would avenge my father's killing, because I would not be able to stand seeing a killer of my father walking freely among the people. So, if I decide to kill the killer of my father, that puts me in line with the sinners, because I killed a Muslim man, because he had killed an infidel."

The Prophet said to Abi Salul, "Instead of all of that, we need to treat your father well and we can also have a good relationship with him, but as long as he stays with us."

The Prophet then instructed the tribe of Ibn Abi, the tribe of Abi Salul, to be in charge of Abi Salul senior, and to punish him if he did wrong. The Prophet, peace be upon him, then turned to Omar, may God be pleased with him, and asked, "what do you think, Omar? If I had killed Abi Salul senior, as you had suggested, I would have started a vengeful tribal war. Look at the situation now! If I ask the Abi Salul's own tribe to kill him, they would do it."

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You know that any Muslim who fights against other Muslims on behalf of America, NATO counties, or the apostate states, must be fought back. This, however, should be done at the right time.

The timing issue can be understood if we look at an incident during the battle of the Trenches. That incident involved Huthaifa Bin al-Yaman, may God be please with him, and Abu Sufian. The Prophet, peace be upon him, said to Huthaifa, "Go to those people, then live amongst them. Learn as much as you can about those people, and what they are doing. Do not talk to anyone about this, however, until you come back to us." Huthaifa said, "May God be pleased with him." While there, Abu Sufian said, "Oh, Qurish people! Your prestige is at stake, and you are living in a land where your livestock has disappeared. Banu Quridhah tribe has held back, and today we have just learned about their unpleasant stance. We are confronted with a storm (the Muslim people forces), as you see, which appears unwilling to die down. We cannot start our fires or protect our homes from the strong wind. So, get ready to move, because I am." Abu Sufian then jumped on his camel while it was still at rest. He struck the camel hard, then the camel stressfully stood up. Whenever Abu Sufian's camel stopped, Abu Sufian would not wait for his camel to sit, instead, he would jump off, and quickly. Abu Sufian was always in a rattled mood. If it was not for the Prophet's instructions 'not to talk to anyone about this until you come back to us.' I could have easily killed Abu Sufian with an arrow."

Abu Sufian was the head of the infidels. Also, it appears that there is no doubt that killing the head of the infidels at the time would be in the interest of Islam. However, killing Abu Sufian had proven to be not in the interest of Islam, especially during that period of history. There were so many reasons not to kill Abu Sufian. One of reasons was that killing Abu Sufian would have given his tribe, Qurish, an incentive to avenge him, then launch a war on the Prophet, and his followers. That was mainly why the Prophet instructed his followers not to target Abu Sufian, to spare the Muslims any additional burdens.

The same can be said about fighting the infidels, or holding peace agreements with them. When the Muslims are strong, they fight the infidels until they either become Muslims or pay a penalty (the jizyah). When the Muslims are weak, our Prophet, peace be upon him, taught us to do what is in the best interest of the Muslim people.

The Prophet, who never uttered nonsense, taught us the following. During the battle of the Clans (Ahzab), the Prophet, peace be up on him, offered the Ghatfan clan one third of the city of Medina's harvest, in exchange for the clan not to fight the Muslims, and to go back to their territories.

Instead of the Muslims taking the wealth of the Ghatfanis, the Muslims gave them one third of their economy's output! The city of Medina where the Muslims were living at the time enjoyed a strong economy, and its harvest was counted among the best. So, a Muslim leader must do what the Prophet did, to compromise in difficult time. The duty of the Muslim leader is to ensure implementation of God's commands, and to defend God's religion.

Also, we need to learn about what the Prophet, may peace and blessings be upon him, did during the Hudaibiyah peace agreement with Qurish. Qurish at the time was the head of the infidels in the Arabian Peninsula. The Hudaibiyah peace agreement produced great and positive results for the Muslims.

As we are on the Jihad path, we need to do what the Prophet had done and to put God's religion above everything else. Our desire is to do just that -- to create a Muslim state, which would rule by the Almighty God's commands. This is feasible, God's willing.

Creating a Muslim state, however, cannot happen overnight. We need to be realistic about so many factors. Some of the factors include having to build the proper foundations for the state.

God did not send the entire holy Quran to the Prophet at once, although the Quran had been complete in Heaven. The Sword verse, for example, had existed in Heaven, as the Muslims were instructed by another verse "to hold back their hands (from fighting)." There is no doubt that God indented that "hold back" verse to serve certain goals which were to be for the benefits of the Muslim people.

I believe that another of God's goals was that the Muslims at the time did not possess the proper resources to create and be able to defend a Muslim state in Medina. Then, when God willed it, the Muslim state was created in Medina with the help of the Ansar supporters. Despite the fact that the state was considered too vulnerable and perhaps subject to what could be devastating wars. It was the Ansar supporters, may God be pleased with them all, who stood firm with the Prophet, and his state in Medina. This shows how important it is to ensure having the necessary support and loyalty of the people before building a state, be it ordinary, or influential tribesmen.

Note that when the Ansar, may God be pleased with them, decided to support the Call to Islam (Da'wa), they were told that all other non-Muslim Arabs would unify against them. Note that the

Ansar had not been told that "the whole world would unify against them!"

We must gain the support of the tribes who enjoy strength and influence before building our Muslim state. When God sent his prophets, may peace and blessings be upon them all, it was their tribes who were the first to reject them. Those were the prophets who enjoyed the support of God and His miracles!

This is part of God's worldly reality in which His own prophets had to experience. If God wishes to change that reality, He would have done it for His prophets! We, on the other hand, must understand this reality and plan our work accordingly.

If it is unfeasible to gain the trust of an influential tribe in a certain area, we should create a new Mujahidin group within that tribe. The basis for the tribal Mujahidin group is faith and not financial compensation. The tribal group must be based on similar foundations which had been used to create the Mujahidin groups. We think it is the best option. God knows best!

The group should consist of as many members as possible. We must urge members of this group to unify, and to trust one another. Members of the tribal group should agree to pledge allegiance to jihad, to assist in the creation of a Caliphate-based Muslim state. If some members of the group do not wish to pledge, however, this should not be an issue.

You must have an open mind with members of the tribes. You must also accept the members as part of your work. With time, and as long as the members find you inspirational and forgiving, they will come to your side.

You must give special consideration to members who have special status among their tribesmen. Also, you should make use of the members' skills and qualifications.

Creating a new tribal group, based on faith and brotherhood, God willing, will help us establish better relationships with the tribes. This will eventually help us build strong ties with the tribes, similar to what tribesmen have which are, for the most part, based on natural instinct.

It is important to study every issue that is involved in our work. Also, every aspect of a foundation which we want to use to build our state must be thoroughly examined. The work we want to



undertake is a just cause, but we must be realistic every step of the way.

God has ordered us to be clever about planning for our future, as we depend on Him for assistance. I would like to support this point with an example.

Assume that the Mujahidin are on a Da'wa mission to spread the word of God but they had to stop because of a river in their path. The Mujahidin must build a bridge if they are to cross the river. The engineers decided that, to build the bridge, they needed the following material and labor: Two tons of iron ore, one thousand ton of cement, one thousand square meters of wood, two thousand tons of crude iron, two thousand tons of sand, and two hundred workers.

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The Mujahidin, however, did not have all the materials ready, but they decided to build the bridge anyway. The bridge then collapsed as they were building it, due to the insufficient and missing building materials.

What the Mujahidin has done was a double failure, because they wasted material, as little as they were, and time. If the Mujahidin, however, waited until they had all of the material ready, then built their bridge, they would have succeeded.

Also, having a great number of Mujahidin laborers who are very eager to build the bridge is not enough to do the job. Having a good cause and the willingness to endure hardship for the sake of God's religion is not enough to do the job either. God is the Almighty, most powerful!

I have to point out that one of the things the local and foreign enemies are good at is the ability to destroy Muslim movements. They are experts in this area. The enemies know how to weaken a Muslim movement by provoking it to step into a fight which is beyond its strength. The enemies understand when to lure a Muslim movement into a fight, especially during the time when a movement is in the process of building itself up.

When a movement gives in to enemies' provocation, while knowing it does not have the resources to fight, the enemies will quickly have the upper hand in deciding the time and place for that movement's destruction.

Having a highly motivated force is an important factor in wars, but it is not the only factor. The leadership should not, thus, be driven by its force's high motivation while ignoring other equally important factors.

(Translator note: a poem)

"Making a decision must be made before heroes' enthusiasm,

Making a decision is a priority, and it is

Second!"

(Translator note: The word "second" in the poem was possibly in reference to the decision being second to God's, and to the Prophet's guidance.)

We must find Islamic alternatives that will help us avoid falling into enemies' provocations, and so not to waste our efforts and resources. The alternatives should include plans to help us build the future Muslim state. Also, the alternatives should include plans to help us topple the apostate leaders and stop them from returning to power.

That was one issue. The other issue, far more important, is to accumulate enough resources to help defend the future Muslim state.

A future Muslim state can defend itself only if it has the public support and has been meeting the demands and needs of its people. That is an important factor in sustaining and defending any future Islamic state.

The enemies will fight any future Muslim state that we create. In addition, the enemies, to say the least, will impose all sorts of sanctions against our state.

You know that most Arab populations have been living under so-called modern states. Such states have long abandoned the Muslim traditions of early history. Some of the Muslim state's functions in early history included applying the Islamic Law as the law of the land, providing internal security, and defending the state from foreign powers. The society, on the other hand, provided for itself.

In a modern state, the public expects the state to provide it with jobs and financial assistance. Indeed, this has become a

tradition in many modern state societies. Modern states intentionally make their populations dependent on them, so as to control them. But when the state is unable, or refuses, to provide what is expected of it, the people in that society revolt, and the state becomes unstable. Also, note that many of the things that were considered complimentary in the early days are now part of the essentials.

A revolutionary movement today needs more than just the military might to topple a government or control a country.

While putting aside the external enemy, a movement needs to have the resources in place to meet the needs and demands of the society, as it makes its way to controlling a city or a country.

A movement cannot expect, however, a society to live without for a long time. Even if that society happens to be a great supporter of that movement. People often change when they see persistence in a shortage of food and medicine, and the last thing they want to see is having their children die for lack of food or medicine.

Also, a Mujahidin movement must remember that it needs to provide the basics for its mujahidin fighters or so-called logistics support.

Economic factors are very important. The Mujahidin may win a war against the enemies, but they may lose what they gained in that war due to economic sanctions. Imposing economic sanctions are one of the enemy's favorite nonconventional weapons.

As for Afghanistan and Somalia, they are the exception to the rule. Somalis, for two decades, have been providing for themselves. Somalis have not asked any government to step in to provide basic necessities. Somalis live their daily lives the same way their ancestors did, and before the creation of the modern state. They farm, raise livestock, and trade. In Afghanistan, 20% of its population raises livestock, which is among the highest percentages in the world. The total expenditure for the Muslim Emirate in Afghanistan was little compared to what other modern and poor countries had.

The Afghan population is considered to be outside the modern-state system, and unlike Arab populations.

When the Islamic group in Egypt (the Muslim Brotherhood) killed Sadat, they had a plan to topple the government and then

establish a Muslim state. Their plan was to have their members throughout the country, control government buildings, the mass media, and so on and so forth.

If God had willed for the Islamic state to be born in Egypt, it would have not probably lasted more than a few weeks. The Egyptians, who were about sixty million at the time, needed about 150 million loaves of bread, per day. That was just bread alone! Assume that the Muslim state in Egypt had come under international sanctions. So, what would happen when Egypt could no longer import wheat from its major supplier, the United States? Egypt has been dependent on American wheat for many decades, especially after it had abandoned helping the Egyptian farmers plant more wheat, or coming up with alternatives. Egypt has made its citizens so vulnerable to world's wheat producers, mainly the United States. Egypt's wheat reserve was good for two weeks during that time. So, how could a newly Muslim state meet the wheat demands of the Egyptian population while it was under international sanctions? How long would the public tolerate having to go without? That has nothing to do with whether the Egyptian public liked or disliked the Islamic state. A dangerous shortage of food causes death and people do not want to see their children die of hunger.

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Before building a Muslim state, the Brotherhood could have thought about food security for the Egyptian people. Sudan, for example, would have been an ideal supplier of wheat, considering that Sudan was controlled by a Muslim government. The Brotherhood could have worked with the Sudanese to help it grow more wheat well before it thought about toppling the government. The Brotherhood could have also maintained a two-week reserve system for wheat.

The same can be said about the rest of the Arab countries. Most Arab countries are totally dependent on world's wheat suppliers.

I would like to point out that it is rather important not to expect people, and tribes in particular, to endure more what they can handle. For example, we cannot expect the public to endure constant enemy's air bombardments. We are not talking about a war in which men can show off their prowess, but a war in which air bombardments do not differentiate between a man, a woman, or a child.

Our Waziristani brothers, for example, said that they were frankly exhausted from the enemy's air bombardments. The enemy has been given almost a worldwide approval to violate the air space of other countries and to attack anyone whom it views as its enemy. The enemy does all of that under the pretense of chasing al-Qa'ida. The time will come, and soon, when the enemy will not be allowed to violate other countries' airspace.

It is known that they teach in military and war science that if a war breaks out between two countries, the two countries do not send all of their forces to the front line. Instead, they hold back some forces, especially forces with special training.

Today, the Muslim Ummah as a whole can be viewed as an army with several regiments. The Ummah uses these regiments in a wise manner. So, if an opponent attacks the Ummah with tanks, the Ummah then advances its artillery regiment, to counter the opponent's tanks. If an opponent begins an air strike campaign, the Ummah then advances its anti-aircraft regiment. The anti-aircraft regiment must also deceive the enemy about the location of the other regiments since they would be most vulnerable to the air strikes.

Praise be to God, the jihad war is ongoing, and on several fronts. The Mujahidin work, and may God give them the strength to endure on the jihad path, will continue to target the guardian of universal apostates, America, until it becomes weak. Once America is weak, we can build our Muslim state.

The more operations are carried out against America, God willing, the closer the time will be to organize the resources, and unify the efforts to establish the state of Islam. Only then, the Ummah will be able to change its status quo of weakness, degradation, and disgrace.

The Ummah should put forward some, but enough, forces to fight America. The Ummah must keep some of its forces on reserve. This will be in the Ummah's best interests. The Ummah will use the reserve in the future, but during the appropriate time.

In the meanwhile, we do not want to send the reserves to the front line, especially in areas where the enemy only uses air strikes to attack our forces. So, the reserves will not, for the most part, be effective in such conflicts. Basically, we could lose the reserves to enemy's air strikes. We cannot fight air strikes with explosives!

We have plenty of time to view and examine the appropriate time to begin our jihad work against the apostate regimes in the region. God says, "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into the hearts of the enemies, of God and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom God doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of God, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly." (60).

We still have a powerful force which we can organize and prepare for deployment. The organization process and the preparation for deployment will need time.

Let us assume that the ideal time to build a Muslim state in the region will be three years from now. So, it would be unwise to begin fighting the apostate regimes in the region now when the pre-requisites and conditions for the Muslim state have not been met.

Our main goal, and yours, is to resurrect the religion of Islam, and to build a Caliphate-based state in every Muslim country. So, for now, we do not need to be diverted from our goal by going to war with the apostate regimes in the region. This is not the time for it.

Our goal is to build our state, then spread God's Call to the rest of the world. We can, God willing, accomplish this goal, as long as we stay put on the path of jihad.

We need to concentrate our jihad efforts in areas where the conditions are ideal for us to fight. Iraq and Afghanistan are two good examples. We do not have to rush to other areas of conflict, especially in areas which appear to have unfavorable jihad conditions.

We just do not want to see our jihad become fruitless. We need to fight in areas where we can gain points toward the creation of the Caliphate-based state. A state which has the essential foundations to function and defend itself. If our state is not supported by the proper foundations, the enemy will easily destroy it.

Building a state without proper foundations is like building a house in the middle of a torrential stream. Every time the water destroys the house, we rebuild, then we rebuild until those who help us with the rebuilding give up on us. So, our state must be

built on strong and proper foundations. Otherwise, the trust the mujahidin put in us to build a state will disappear.

The impact of losing a state can be devastating, especially if that state is at its infancy. The devastation would be even harder on those who had been directly involved in the building of that state.

The public often has all sorts of interpretations for the word failure. Nonetheless, the public does not like losers. The public is only interested in the results and it often ignores the details and conditions which led to one's success or failure. If the public stigmatizes a group, the group will likely fail to rally that public for support, be it to build or defend a state.

In Yemen, they often read a poem which says:

"If Ali Bin Salim wins, they say: He is a marvel!  
And if Ali Bin Salim loses, they say: He is ignorant!"

The point is that people tend to be in favor of a winner rather than a loser. Accordingly, in the poem, people described Salim as a "marvel" because he had won and as "ignorant" because he had lost. Salim's characteristics in both situations, however, were the same. Salim cannot be both marvel and ignorant at the same time.

One must look closely at all requirements and suitable conditions. This is a very important and necessary step.

Accordingly, it appears to me that the requirements and suitable conditions for building a strong Muslim state have not been met in many of the Muslim countries.

Those requirements and suitable conditions will fall into place, however, only if America becomes weak. In other words, a weaker America means a weaker apostate regime in every Muslim country. The Mujahidin, then and only then, will be able to build a Muslim state and defend it. A state in which Muslims can live under the umbrella of a Caliphate-based authority.

Keep in mind that what the enemy fears the most is to see the Mujahidin succeed in creating a strong Caliphate-based state, in which God's code is being enforced.

The Muslim populations throughout the Muslim world will likely support the Mujahidin when they declare their intent about creating a new Caliphate-based state. The Muslim populations will see the Mujahidin as part of them. Some of the Muslim populations, however, may become subject to hostilities, due to their support for the Mujahidin. The worst part of those hostilities may include indiscriminate and persistent air strikes against their communities.

Again, the Mujahidin must have all the requirements and suitable conditions in place before attempting to declare their intent about building a new Muslim state anywhere. The Mujahidin cannot begin a new war in a country just because they hope that the population in that country will support them. If the Mujahidin only rely on that hope, they will likely fail in that country. This happened, for example, in Syria, Egypt, and Yemen.

In Yemen, the communist group failed there, because when they declared their new state in South Yemen they had not sought the support or approval of the local Yemeni tribes and communities. The communists had all the necessary institutions to run a government. The communists had the military, security forces, and major financial institutions on their side. The communists even had the political as well as the economic support from the

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West (headed by America), and from the Arab world (headed by Riyadh). One of the reasons the communists rushed into declaring a new state was because their leaders were being assassinated, and fast. Some of those assassinations were carried out by the Mujahidin. Another reason was that the communists were paying too much money to the President, to buy his support.

We must not get involved in conflicts, especially conflicts which may drag us in deeper. If a few of our brothers happen to get killed in a given place by a given opponent (may God have mercy on the souls of all of our brothers), we are not to rush in and declare an all-out war in that area.

Again, the requirements and suitable conditions must be met before we get involved in any conflict and in any country.

Remember what Khalid had done during the Mu'ta battle, may God be pleased with him. Khalid withdrew his troops during the Mu'ta battle when the Muslims needed him most. Khalid even took with him a few of the Prophet's companions, may God be pleased with



them all. Also, Khalid left behind Zaid (the Prophet's favorite), Jaafir (the Prophet's cousin), and among others, may God be pleased with them all.

The reason Khalid withdrew his troops from Mu'ta was to assist another Muslim army, the Companions Army, which was fighting the Romans. When Khalid got to the Companions Army, he helped them safely withdraw from the battle with the Romans.

Khalid's decision to withdraw from Mu'ta led to the rescue of the Companions Army. The Companions Army was too small compared to the army which the Romans had put forward on that battlefield. Indeed, without the help of Khalid, the Romans could have crushed the Companions Army.

The Prophet, peace be upon him, had instructed Khalid to go to Mu'ta. The Prophet never instructed Khalid to withdraw from Mu'ta or to help the Companions Army. The Companions Army, on the other hand, was unaware that Khalid was on his way to help them.

Based on the above, it appears that Khalid had defied the Prophet's instructions, but this was not the case. Khalid had made the right decision. This was what the Prophet, peace be upon him, said after everything was over and done with.

The Prophet, peace be upon him, said this about Khalid: "He won when he withdrew his army." Khalid had made the right decision, despite the possibility that the Muslims could have lost Mu'ta, and conditions worsened thereof.

Khalid saw a priority in rescuing the Companions Army, and that Mu'ta was important; but it was not a battle, if lost, which could bring devastating results upon the Muslims. Also, when he helped the Companions Army withdraw from that battlefield, he knew that the Romans were not dangerously close to vital Muslim positions. In the end, the Prophet praised Khalid and his troops for what they did. The Prophet said, "They withdrew, but they did not run away."

Khalid then participated in many battles which led to the defeat of the Romans in the Fertile Crescent region.

On the Day of Hudaybyah, when the Prophet heard that Othman, may God be pleased with him, had been killed, he said, "We will not rest until we punish the killers." The Prophet decided to go to war right there and then. When the Prophet came to Hudaybyah, he

had no intention in going to war. On that day, the Muslims only had their swords, but no other fighting gear.

I say that this incident resembles an analogy with difference (TN: An "analogy with difference" is a jurist's term which means deduction by analogy based on two similar but different events. The second event being the incident with Khalid). The minimum requirement for the battle existed, which was the availability of fighters. On the day of Hudaibyah, the Prophet had a total of one-thousand four-hundred people. The unbelievers' army (who had been accused of killing Othman) had twice as many men as that of the Prophet's army. The Muslims were allowed to fight the unbelievers, and whoever agreed to fight the unbelievers had to take on ten men. Also, the Muslims had their swords, which were considered the fighter's main weapon.

I would like to say that the time to resurrect the Muslim state is getting closer. Also, the spread of our Jihad thought, especially among the younger generation, in comparison to other Islamic groups and movements, has been to our advantage. Other Muslim groups and movements have been unable to satisfy the demands of many of the Ummah's youth. Our Salafi jihad thought, on the other hand, has been appealing to the youth, simply because it tackles the Ummah's causes.

Many American reports, aside from stating the obvious, are talking about a decline in America's economic, military, and political powers. The decline of the United States, and the advance of the Mujahidin, God willing, will lead us to reach an equilibrium point with the enemy, during which time we could build and defend our state.

Based on the above, it is clear that the time to build the Muslim state is not here yet, because we still have other greater duties to complete, which include making suitable preparations for that future state. God willing, the state will be the nucleus for the Caliphate ruler-ship model.

It is also clear that the goal of the Islamic Maghreb's freedom-fighter Mujahidin, who are spread throughout the Islamic Maghreb, is to build the foundations for the Islamic state. The Maghreb Mujahidin should not, however, jump any of the stages. Also, the Maghreb Mujahidin should not get distracted by indulging in any conflict with the apostate governments.

The most important objective at this stage is:

To spread our ideas, especially important ideas on teaching fellow Muslims about Islam. People should understand what their religion says about the meaning of, for example, "there is no God, but one God." This should be the backbone to all of our appeals to the public. People should learn about how to avoid falling victim in the hands of the unbelievers. People should learn about what other Muslim groups think, and how they had given in to apostate leaders. People should learn about some of other Muslims groups' perspective on authority, which is in contradiction to the Islamic codes, as well as to the scholars' views on judgeship-and-jurisdiction (Hakimaya).

You should exercise caution, and calmly approach the public. You do not want to turn people off, especially people who may already think highly of other Muslim groups. We need to build wide public support, and as much as possible.

What we want is to resurrect a state which rules with the Almighty God's codes. You know how important it is to have public support if we are to accomplish this goal.

There has to be a wider and greater call for public support. For the most part, the call should be directed at people who appear to be far more accepting of our ideas.

We should not just seek the support of people who live in difficult terrains, which would be hard on the enemy to penetrate, but other areas as well.

You may want to find someone who enjoys doing call-to-Islam work (Da'wa). Ask this person to help you reach out to the public. You should use books, video, and audio material, and as needed, publish them in different languages, so you could reach all the populations of the countries in your region. The written material must be clear and in concise language, so the public can understand it. We must pay close attention to the Da'wa work, which is to explain to people the need to understand the Unity of God and other Muslim concepts.

This, for now, is our strategy for the area. Our work must focus on the long-term objective. A quick work might be fruitful in the short run, but it is not what we need to do. The outcome of any work must be viewed within the overall long-term plan. That plan is to create a Muslim state. So, the Da'wa work is a start toward that end, God willing.

For every country where the materials are to be disseminated, you should pay close attention to the overall public taste and opinions. The considerations to public taste and opinion must be weighed within the Islamic Law, however.

The Prophet, peace and blessings be upon him, had done the same thing. The Prophet said, "If it was not for the fact that your people have just emerged from the age of ignorance, I would have renovated the Ka'aba, and gave it two doors." (Narrated by al-Tarmathi).

All public announcements must be carefully evaluated. When issuing a public announcement, ask the question of what sort of positive or negative impact this announcement will generate for us? Being careful and considerate in our public announcements will also widen our appeal and boost our image among the Muslim populations. We want to ask the Muslim people to stop living in the shadow of the oppressive leaders.

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The brothers must understand that their job is to educate the public, but not to incite it to a general call to arms. As you know, the situation in the mountains, particularly now, cannot take in more people, especially in greater numbers.

Having to bring in more people to the mountains, and now, will be a burden, rather than a help to the Mujahidin. So, those who sympathize with our views must be told that "we want what is best for you. Our most important message to you is to live a Muslim life, similar to the life which our most favorite generation had lived (the Prophet's companion generation.) You must stay put, and if we need you, we will call on you. For now, you should call upon God to help us, God willing."

View the list of countries which had deployed troops to Afghanistan, to help the Americans there. Then, kidnap citizens of those countries, especially diplomats. The kidnapping of diplomats of a country is far more embarrassing to that country than the kidnapping of ordinary citizens. The pressure on that country to free its diplomats is far greater than to free ordinary citizens.

The negotiation must be based on the demand: Withdraw your troops from Afghanistan, then we release the hostages. The intent is to leave America with as little support as possible, and, God willing, will push it to depart Afghanistan for good.

The announcements containing the terms of negotiations must be clear and concise, so that impartial and independent spectators judge for themselves. The announcements should also include the unjust acts which had been committed by those countries whose citizens are being held hostages, and that the hostages are servants of those countries. The announcements should also point out that a war is a joint responsibility, and that Muslims are not interested in harming anyone whose country was never involved in hostile activities against the Muslim people.

Other public announcements on operations which involve targeting Western interests should point out the unjust acts of Western countries in Afghanistan, too.

It is absolutely vital to study and analyze the Arab revolutions against the apostate governments in the region. The analysis should focus on the reasons behind the successes, as well as the failures of Arab revolutions. The majority of the revolutions that had succeeded in the area were secular. The secular revolutions succeeded because they had, for the most part, the support of the military. In any country, the military is considered to be a power breaker. The secular revolutions crept out of the military, then turned the military power to their advantage. The Islamic revolutions, on the other hand, mostly failed, because they had far fewer resources than their opponents. The Muslim Brotherhood in Sudan, for example, had the support of the army, and it was able to topple the government in a *quo d'état*. It soon became apparent, however, that only the army personnel had taken charge of the country, but not the Muslim Brotherhood.

Other examples of failed Islamic revolutions include the attempt made by Shaykh Marwan Hadid, may God have mercy on his soul, to topple the Syrian regime.

Hadid began his jihad life when he went to Jordan to train at one of the Palestinian Fida'in's camps. Hadid wanted to use his training to fight a jihad war against the Jews in Palestine. During his training, the September Event took place and the ruler of Jordan attacked the Fida'in camps, then killed a big number of them. The majority of the Fida'in left Jordan after most of their training camps had been destroyed. Hadid, may God have mercy on his soul, decided to go back to Syria.

Whatever military experience Hadid had learned in Jordan made him feel confident about himself. Hadid wanted to use his

training to do something for his religion. Hadid decided that he could no longer live under the Syrian apostate regime. His little experience and his age did not help him make the right decision, however. Hadid was able to recruit a number of people, so he could begin his work against the Syrian regime. Hadid did not want to wait for the right time. Also, Hadid did not have the essential resources to topple the regime. A few more people joined his group, and among them were members from the Muslim Brotherhood.

The Hadid group was able to assassinate a number of Syrian officials. When the Muslim Brotherhood leadership found out that some of its members had been involved with Hadid, they decided to terminate their membership.

As Hadid succeeded in launching more operations against the regime, the fear factor among his followers began to dissipate. Even the Muslim Brotherhood started to take Hadid seriously, and it thought of ways to turn his work into its advantage. The Brotherhood felt that it, too, could help topple the Syrian regime. The Syrian government, on the other hand, saw this as an opportunity to demolish the Muslim Brotherhood, and forever. That was what one of the Syrian officials said at the time. Indeed, the Syrian government began a national campaign to demolish the Brotherhood. The Syrian regime treated the Brotherhood as if it was the one who assassinated its officials. The regime knew though that it was not the case. The regime also knew that the Brotherhood members who had joined Hadid had been terminated by the Brotherhood's leadership.

The conflict then entered a new phase. The Brotherhood became serious, and it called for the removal of the regime, and to create an Islamic government. The Brotherhood never bothered to calculate, however, what it needed to accomplish all of that. The Brotherhood had not been realistic about its own resources, and capabilities, in comparison to what the opponent Syrian regime had. Even by looking at the number of people the Brotherhood had compared to what the Syrian regime had, there was a huge difference between the two.

The Almighty God says, "O Apostle! Rouse the Believers to the fight. If there are twenty amongst you, patient and persevering, they will vanquish two hundred: if a hundred, they will vanquish a thousand of the Unbelievers: for these are a people without understanding. For the present, God hath lightened your (task), for He knoweth that there is a weak spot in you: But (even so), if there are a hundred of you, patient and persevering, they

will vanquish two hundred, and if a thousand, they will vanquish two thousand, with the leave of God. for God is with those who patiently persevere." (65-66, al-Infal.)

The Brotherhood's calculations were unrealistic. The Brotherhood even thought that after it was able to topple the regime, it would take on Israel. Also, the Brotherhood did not have enough personnel who had the expertise or prudence to lead their military operations.

The Brotherhood went to war and it lost big. The Syrian regime used missile launchers to destroy the Brotherhood's threshold in Hama. The regime killed about twenty thousand people in Hama alone. Many people were arrested, including women and children. The regime had also used all sorts of torture methods against the Brotherhood. There is no might, nor power, except with God.

After that awful experience, many members of the Brotherhood went into shock, and jihad became their last resort. Many thought that they had to make the best of it while living under the regime.

The Brotherhood in Syria had lost an entire generation, which it could have wisely deployed for jihad work under better conditions and times. After the Hama experience, the Jihad work had totally stopped, and for twenty years. With the birth of a new generation, which had not lived that awful experience of Hama, a new light of hope emerged. We saw that most of the Syrians who joined the Mujahidin in Afghanistan and Iraq were young. Most of them had not experienced the Hama shock. Other older Syrians, who probably wanted to join the Mujahidin, could not do it because the Hama experience was still on their minds, even thirty years later.

One cannot ask people to bear more than what they can handle. Otherwise, the results might be devastating, and more people would fear going to jihad.

A Muslim movement, in particular, should not ask people to bear more than what they can handle, especially in areas where the movement is anticipated to be met with unrestrained violence from its opponents, just like what happened in Hama. Any movement must keep this in mind, either during the process of building a new Islamic state or afterwards.

The failure of the Brotherhood in Syria was not surprising, and that was the view of many experts. For example, experts like

Shaykh Abid al-Aziz Ali Abi Usama. Usama thought that the Brotherhood would fail to topple the regime. The Brotherhood, on the other hand, was in a dream world. The Brotherhood thought it could build a Muslim state which would become a model in the Fertile Crescent region.

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There was also the Libyan experience. The brothers in Libya failed because, firstly, they did not listen to any of the advice they were offered. The al-Qa'ida advised them to wait, so did the Jihad Group and the Islamic Group. All the brothers advised the Libyan Mujahidin that they did not have the basic resources to topple the Libyan regime. Not to mention, the timing did not add up.

As you know, jihad is a duty, but it does not require Muslims to launch jihad battles everywhere and anytime. Also, jihad does not require Muslims to fight in areas where the conditions are obviously not in their favor.

Jihad is a means by which the sustainability of the religion is ensured. Jihad can be put aside as an option, due to lack of resources. Muslims, however, must continue to accumulate necessary resources until the conditions for jihad are improved.

The Shaykh of Islam -- Ibn Taymayah -- may God have mercy on his soul, agreed with the above view on jihad. Ibn Taymayah wrote, "... that is so, if the jihad experts agree that the conditions for jihad had not been met. Experts often analyze the jihad variables against these conditions, then draw conclusion to whether the outcome is positive or negative."

The excessive enthusiasm among the Libyan brothers about creating a Muslim state in Libya made them lose focus. Then, the Libyan brothers suffered tremendously as they entered into a conflict with the Libyan regime. Thousands of our Libyan brothers went to jail. Many of them were tortured and persecuted. May God grant our Libyan brothers a speedy release from prison.

(TN: End full translation)



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In the name of God the most merciful

Honorable shaykh,

God's peace, mercy, and blessings be upon you

This is a letter from a loving brother whom you know and who knows you and who accompanied you on some business and programs, but conditions prevented us from communicating. My heart is full of love and appreciation to you; it gets happy for your happiness; and it hurts for your sadness; it longs to meet you, and still loves you in God. If we disagree on some of the issues, this disagreement should not keep us from communicating and offering each other advice. Instead, it should strengthen it and make offering advice an obligation.

Based on that, I wrote to you this letter, which I hope that you will receive with love, appreciation, and an open heart, especially when you know who the sender is. Regardless of the hardships and adversities, brotherhood in God will always grow stronger.

You know that previous crises showed that loyalty between the faithful continues, and admiration and forgiveness continue regardless of the differences in points of view.

Honorable Shaykh,

At this era, everyone knows about your unprecedented contributions and great efforts in the field of jihad, the revival of the spirit of jihad in the nation, and mobilizing its energy and cadres to carry out this obligation. You have indeed become the chief innovator in this field at this day and age.

Among the most prominent landmarks of accomplishment is breaking the American illusion, uncovering the truth about its fake strength, reviving the confidence of the nation in itself and its capabilities, and targeting with precision the greatest enemy and the head of the snake without getting distracted by opponents and enemies who are only some of the poison and secretions of that snake.

As your Eminence knows, the greatest thing that one can win in this life is God's pleasure; anything less than that would be considered limited gains that might have bad consequences. One

does not leave his homeland, money, and family behind except for seeking God's pleasure. We consider you one of those who dedicated his life and his money for the sake of God, but God is the ultimate judge. Careful consideration, self-examination, requesting guidance from God, and striving to reach truth and virtue and abiding by them are among the greatest reasons for success.

Also among the great reasons for success are consulting others, getting to know their opinions, even if they differ from yours, and considering those opposing opinions because some of them might lead to the right path and truth.

God said, "Consult with them on the matter." Here you notice that even the one who received the revelation and who communicated with the angel Gabriel ordered consulting others and seeking their opinion.

No doubt that one's distance (due to security situation and other reasons) from reality can weaken his precise vision, and it makes it harder for him to detect reality in a subjective manner, which sometime might affect the accuracy of his opinion.

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The reason is that he bases his opinion on general information given to him by admirers and sympathizers who mix up wishful thinking and reality.

This is like asking people to give you their opinion regarding a specific event. They might give you the number and identities of those who agree with them and understate those who disagree with them. We have noticed something similar among those who agree with you and who inform you of the situation.

You can overcome this problem by listening to the opinions of those who are neutral on the issue or even those who disagree with you in order to get a clearer picture of people's points of view and evaluation of the event. Getting various vantage points is in our interest and can serve the decision, opinions, and positions that we form.

Being chased, besieged, and distant is not the best environment for thinking and for forming the right opinion and decision. In this case, one should seek the opinion of brothers who are outside of the hardship that he is in and should be wary of his own opinion, which could be subject to influences that he is not

aware of. None of us believes that he is immune from making mistakes, and we should apply this belief by reexamining and reconsidering our opinions.

One can see his weakness and deficiency when he examines old decisions that were later proven to be mistaken or assumptions that turned out to be wrong. Returning to the truth and backing away from an opinion once you discover its falsehood is a reason to be proud and is honorable. That is the tradition of the companions of the Prophet, the faithful scholars, and leaders of our nation. Retraction does not take away from the person; to the contrary, it elevates him in this life and in eternity.

One can make a mistaken decision, but he will be excused for it. However, once he becomes aware of the mistake, but insists on his decision, there will be no excuse, and that might be a reason for his failure in what he does.

A quick review of the journey of work and the changes in it during the last twenty years reveals the effects of circumstances and variables that are out of one's control, but which one had to deal with based on the facts that were available to him at that time. Sometimes one makes the right decisions and sometimes does not, but one should benefit from this enormous experience (including the right and the wrong) in future work and correcting the course.

To complete the picture, here is a short review of the journey of work and the accompanying changes and transformations over the last twenty years.

-Work started with supporting the Afghani jihad, sacrificing everything, deploying youth to the fields of jihad, and placing great hope on the Islamic state in Afghanistan, which was considered a starting point for moving to all other countries in the world.

-After a period of Afghani jihad and the attrition of many of the cadre and money, the idea of establishing an international Islamic force, which is not only based in Afghanistan, and Afghanistan is not its top priority, came to being.

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Most of the work in Afghanistan turned to the goal of luring and preparing youth.

-Then the Gulf crisis and Iraq's invasion of Kuwait took place. You offered your services to Saudi Arabia to defend it in confronting the Iraqi regime in order to not use the foreign forces, and you asked the youth from the peninsula (Yemen, Saudi Arabia, and other Gulf countries) to return to their countries to participate in confronting the Iraqi invasion.

-After that phase, the goal became more precise and your approach and focus turned to attacking the head of the snake, America. You abandoned all jihadi work for the sake of this. America became the main enemy, and you declared a war against it and demanded it to get out of the lands of the Muslims and stop its dominance over Muslims.

-Immigrating to Sudan and calling on others to do the same and placing great hope on the Sudanese regime, which subsequently pressured you to abandon the political and jihadi approaches.

During this phase, your approach was:

--This phase was not conducive to jihadi work due to the many challenges, pressures, pursuits, and siege. Instead that phase was a phase of spreading the faith, building the culture, instilling the doctrine of "there is no god but God" in the hearts of the nation, and teaching renunciation of worldly things in order to prepare for jihad. Based on this conviction, the Association of Mus'ab Bin-'Umayr for Preaching was established and headquartered in Sudan.

--As pressure increased, you decided to move to Afghanistan. You were not keen on fighting alongside Taliban or supporting them until Taliban took control of Jalalabad, Kabul, and the rest of the country. You got to know them better, you accepted them and got comfortable with their approach, and pledged allegiance to Mullah 'Umar. That phase was the phase of working on completing the control over the rebellious north and deepening the roots of the infant Islamic emirate, which revived the ambitions that were on the verge of collapsing.

--Before the state was able to stand on its feet and complete its control of the entire country, you started to operate externally by targeting the head of the snake. You were moved by the youth who were gathering, eager, ready for sacrifice, and whose numbers at training camps were increasing. Then came the operations of Nairobi, Cole, and then 9/11, which ended the government of Taliban (the Islamic Emirate) on which many hopes were hanging.

These phases were accompanied by ideological changes and transformations that I do not wish to talk about or evaluate because this is not the place for that. My intention is to talk about the phase that we are in, which is the phase of work in Muslim countries in general and the Peninsula in particular.

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Before I get into the details of the matter, I wish to ask a question here: Why the peninsula only? Do you only care to protect yourself and your security and let the entire world burn down?

I wish to say:

First: We think that you should not work inside Muslim countries, even if it is directed against the head of the snake, because this can cause great harm to Muslim people and can inflict great damage on various areas, including preaching, charitable work, dependence on God, and other areas. It also gives a chance for the head of the snake to get stronger and spread its poison in a greater manner.

Second: We think that the best places and most effective places for attacking the head of the snake are the locations in which it explicitly got involved militarily, such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Concentrating efforts in those areas is better than dispersing them and prevents the harm that could accompany them.

Third: There is no doubt that the peninsula is unique and different in terms of supporting jihad through cadre, financially, and morally. The peninsula is considered the rear base for all jihadi work in the world, starting from Afghanistan and Chechnya, all the way to Iraq and Palestine. Attacking this base has a very clear and apparent effect on all jihadi work.

Fourth: The best way to prevent the shedding of impermissible blood and not killing faithful people is to not work inside Muslim countries. I am sure that your Eminence knows that God said, "If it were not for faithful men and women among them, we would have punished them harshly." If faithful swords stopped fighting for fear of hurting the few faithful in the nonbeliever society, can you imagine the ruling when we talk about Muslim population in a Muslim society?

Fifth: Some of the brothers, who were among the veteran mujahidin and who dealt with some of the leaders of the organization, feared that the events in the peninsula might be influenced by anger, envy, and hatred toward citizens of the peninsula because of some past positions.

Sixth: When looking at the justification for the events, one has to wonder why this is not taking place in Pakistan in spite of the fact that it is closer geographically, easier to reach, known for its strict position toward the mujahidin, handed over some leaders and others to America, overtly supported the American occupation, and actively participated in toppling the Islamic emirate. I do not think that you should target Pakistan, but I am just saying that to make my point clear. Why didn't this take place in Kuwait and Qatar when they are the greatest agents and collaborators for the Americans?

The phase of working in the Arabian Peninsula:

It seems that those who know you well say that you did not support working inside until recently. Perhaps the start was based on personal efforts and initiatives that you were not aware of, especially because when we wrote to you in the past, you expressed that work inside would be inappropriate and would cause great harm. At any rate, events showed that it was a mistaken decision that had very dire consequences, including:

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-Harming jihad and the mujahidin in all arenas.

--The nation lost many of the leaders and cadre who were killed or arrested because of these operations.

--Pressuring those who support jihad in Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, and other places and completely cutting off the funding, which caused great damage to jihad there.

--Banning youth from joining jihad and tightening the security on all passage points that lead to jihad, and arresting people going to jihad and returning from it.

--Detaining a large number of youth and sympathizers around them and exposing them to temptation that might be detrimental.

--Going after and perusing anyone who has ties to jihadi work.

--Suffering by many families of killed, detained, and wanted individuals.

--Banning any talk or promotion of jihad through lectures, sermons, and forums.

--People repulsed by the word jihad and its enemies continue to defame it.

--The jihadi stream lost many of its honest and faithful scholars and preachers who defended jihad and adopted its causes.

- Damaging the charitable work around the world and in all fields:

--Shutting down several charitable organizations that were carrying out relief work all over the Muslim world, such as al-Haramin Charitable Organization.

--Banning the collection of donations from individuals, organizations, and companies under any name and for any activity.

--Freezing bank accounts of charitable individuals and organizations. These accounts had great amounts of money that the poor were deprived of.

--Arresting anyone who is suspected of collecting money and supporting a charitable project that does not belong to an official organization.

--Stopping many charitable and relief efforts that were vital for needy Muslims all over the world (digging wells, building mosques, orphanages, education, health, clothing, and so on).

-Damaging the spread of the faith and fear of God.

-Giving an excuse to the deviated approaches to attack Islam in general and jihad in particular and push forward the projects of Westernization and secularism.

-Giving the enemy a chance to get involved more than before and pushing the state to jump into the lap of the enemy.

-Force official entities to deal with counter-terrorism in a much stricter way, change curriculums, and impose censorship on media in accordance with the so-called American campaign on terrorism.

-The great damages inflicted on Muslims' lives, properties, and freedoms.

Things are moving for people in a way that they did not want or seek. They even used to condemn people if they did any of the following:

You used to condemn any act that did not target the head of the snake and used to consider it unjustified and a waste of capabilities, but now because of the latest events, the battle has shifted from the head of the snake to its tail and from America to the regimes. This was a colossal strategic error that caused many losses in exchange for a very limited number of gains. These gains do not compare to what was sacrificed for them.

One can notice the lack of precision in predicting the position of scholars and the public toward the events inside. Perhaps the picture that is being conveyed to you is different from reality. I would like to say to you in all honesty, I do not know anyone who is a scholar, an intellectual, or a preacher who supports these actions or views them as legitimate. Many of the veteran mujahidin and the public stand against these actions. The most that is happening is some sympathy toward those who are innocent but were arrested and somehow hurt, or for believing that these youth were falsely accused of carrying out these actions.

The reality is that many of the actions of the youth and your statements, such as your call to target oil, turned people against you, especially scholars and intellectuals. If criticism against you would not be viewed as support to your crusader enemy, you would have seen much stronger open positions against you. Many of those who are quiet are doing so because they do not want to cause more problems.

Public opinion polls in the Muslim world prove that support to you among the Arab and Muslim people has shrunk after you targeted the peninsula.

It is not appropriate for an honest person to think that he is always right and that those who disagree with him are ignorant,



hypocrites, or agents. Perhaps these people are correct on some issues.

Such belief leads a person to have hatred, bad intentions, and suspicion toward brothers. I told some brothers more than once, "You are more worthy of the accusations that you throw at those who disagree with you. You would not like it if those whom you insult for disagreeing with you, responded to you in the same way in terms of suspicion, insults, and accusations of being agents."

The solution:

Honorable Shaykh, I suggest that you get out of this crisis by conducting a review of this past experience and its apparent negative consequences.

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You should go back to the principle from which you started and that is focusing on the head of the snake and targeting the greatest enemy of the Muslims, and not scatter the efforts and strength outside the target. The process of targeting should be governed and should not be conducted inside Muslim states in order to prevent the negative consequences I talked about earlier.

The regimes do not get hurt by targeting Americans in their countries. Instead, these attacks are confirmations that they are with the Americans and that they are working against the enemies of America and that they are being targeted like America.

As you know, one of the countries was about to be listed as a sponsor of terrorism and was about to be listed in what Bush calls the "Axis of Evil," but after the events, it went on to top the list of countries fighting terrorism and won the recognition and praise of the Congress for its efforts in this field.

Also, the political jurisprudence, which expanded to include dealing and having common interests with the Safawis who have a dangerous Persian project that threatens the presence and the future of the Muslim nation, will not be hampered by marginalizing and weakening the collaborating regimes that do not have any control. Any attacks on those countries negatively affect the Muslim people in the first place.

Some observers think that these acts help the interests of the head of the snake because they give legitimacy and justification to many of the projects that have been in the planning phase for a while and gives it (TN: the head of the snake) a chance to implement them. These acts convinced the world and the people that the American war on terrorism is just.

These acts did not only target infidels and enemies of Islam, but they target security and sources of energy. These sources of energy are one of the most important sources of income and source of prosperity that that Muslims in these countries enjoy. If these sources of energy are damaged, all people get hurt and their religious and worldly interests get damaged.

As for your statement about targeting oil because the ones who benefit from it are the enemy, it was not a good or an acceptable statement, unlike your statements and your talk in support of the persecuted and to incite attacks against the occupiers of Muslim lands.

Targeting oil can lead to great negative consequences, including:

1-It is the property of the nation and does not belong to a segment or even the ruling regime, for it is the main source of income. Establishing beneficial service projects for all Muslim people, hospitals, roads, communications, salaries, and infrastructure, depend on revenues from it. To make this picture clearer, you can compare between the infrastructure and prosperity in oil-producing countries and those in non-oil producing countries.

The enemy benefiting from oil and the regimes taking a large amount of the revenue from it are not a justification or a reason that would make the people accept and support targeting it.

2-The targeting of oil creates an excuse for foreign powers to intervene and impose international dominance over energy resources and get involved the country's security affairs and beyond, to include intellectual, cultural, minority, and sectarian affairs.

3-The damage inflicted on innocents working in these facilities and those around them in terms of their lives, property, and honor as result of targeting them was prohibited by God.

Therefore, I suggest to you:

1-Issue a clear and unequivocal statement to anyone who listens to you and accepts your opinion to direct the work and focus it on the head of the snake in its home or in areas that it occupies, such as Afghanistan and Iraq, and to dedicate all capabilities toward this goal. Also, stay away from operating inside Muslim countries in order to protect the reputation of the mujahidin, protect their acceptance within Muslim societies, prevent any harm to the mujahidin and supporters of jihad, prevent the secularists and liberals from exploiting these events, and direct the souls of the youth for the great battle against the head of the snake.

2-Issue your orders to your cadre to immediately abandon all work inside Muslim countries and move on to conduct jihad against the occupier in Iraq and Afghanistan.

3-Call on Muslims, especially the scholars, intellectuals, dignitaries, and businessmen, to stand beside the mujahidin against the great enemy that directly or indirectly stands behind every catastrophe inflicted on the Muslims.

This would also show the truth to all Muslims about the regimes that claim to be fighting terrorism because they are getting attacked and the regimes that pretend to be crying over the Muslim blood. This would place these regimes in a position where they will have to choose between standing in the trenches of the enemy and continuing to support them against the mujahidin or stand on the sidelines and open the way for the mujahidin to deal with their enemy.

In closing:

1-Hopefully God will give you honor in this life and in eternity and use you for improving the situation of the Muslims in general and the mujahidin in particular. I am writing to you based on my knowledge of you, your desire for the truth, and my intention to not see you accused or blamed by anyone. I pray to God to guide you because you went for jihad on His path, seeking His pleasure. God said, "We will show our paths to those who conducted jihad for us."

2-The mistaken decision by Khalid Bin-al-Walid (may God be pleased with him), which led the Prophet (peace be upon him) to say, "O God, I am innocent of what Khalid did," did not prevent Khalid from becoming God's sword against the infidels. Also, Khalid's stature did not keep the Prophet (peace be upon him) from criticizing him openly. Also, 'Usama Bin-Yazid, who made a mistake and the Prophet (peace be upon him) criticized him and scolded him, was later chosen by the Prophet (after making a mistake and admitting that he made a mistake) to lead the first army to leave Medina after the death of the Prophet (peace be upon him). The army included the shaykhs of immigrants and locals.

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We salute those who help secure Muslims, keep harm and fear away from them, win their prayers, and support the oppressed and defend them from harm.

O God, the lord of Gabriel, Michael, Israfil, the creator of heaven and earth, you know the unknown, and you are the judge of your worshipers when they disagree with each other, guide us to the truth and to the right path.

I pray to God through His generosity to protect you, guard you, preserve you from the harm of the infidels, bless you wherever you are, use you to support His faith, and make you one of His victorious loyalists who have no fear or sadness.

The one who loves you,  
Riyadh  
14 September 2006

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(TN: Religious opening, then:)

Dear Brother Shaykh Mahmud, God protect him,  
Peace be with you, and God's mercy and blessings.  
I hope this letter finds you, your family and all the brothers  
well and in good health, and closest and most obedient to God  
Almighty.

I begin this message with condolences for myself and you on the  
death of our dear brother Shaykh Sa'id, God rest his soul. May  
the Almighty honor him with what he desires, accept him as one  
of the martyrs, and count his forbearance and steadfastness  
among his good deeds.

God bless him, he spent nearly three decades in the theater of  
Jihad aiding the religion of God.

(TN: Rest of paragraph is a eulogy of the life and deeds of the  
above Shaykh Sa'id.)

I also offer condolences on the deaths of our dear brothers Abu-  
'Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu-Hamzah al-Muhajir and those who waged  
Jihad with them until they died. We ask God Almighty to  
compensate us for our hardship and bring some good from it for  
us, and that he

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accept them among the martyrs and let them dwell in Heaven, for  
He is most capable of that.

(TN: Paragraph seeking God's protection and guidance for all the  
Mujahidin, then:)

In keeping with the words of the Prophet on forbearance, and to  
fulfill our duties regardless of the hardship faced, I begin my  
words with you on Jihad activities in general.

First, I wish to inform you that you have been appointed  
successor to the departed Shaykh Sa'id for a period of two years  
from the date on which you receive this letter. I ask Almighty  
God to help you carry out this responsibility well, and augment  
your success, forbearance, piety and good character which if the  
leader possesses, his followers will benefit all the more so.

As you well know, the best people are the ones most agreed on by the people, and the key attributes that bring people together and preserve their staying behind their leader are his kindness, forgiveness, sense of fairness, patience, and good rapport with him, as well as showing care for them and not tax them beyond their ability.

What must always be in the forefront of our minds is: managing people at such times calls for even greater wisdom, kindness, forgiveness, patience and deliberation, and is a complex task by most any measure.

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But, to begin again talking about Jihad activities:

We are now in a new phase of assessing Jihad activities and developing them beyond what they were in the past in two areas, military activity and media releases. Our work in these two areas is broad and sweeping, encompassing the headquarters and regional areas.

I put before you some ideas in my mind that time has enabled me to, so we can brainstorm and improve on them, in addition to a document that was attached to your message under the name "attachment for Shaykh Mahmud," which contained some of what I had sent to Shaykh Sa'id, God rest his soul, about this new stage.

Regarding military activities:

The conditions that grew more serious after the attacks on New York and Washington and the Crusader campaign against Afghanistan filled Muslims with sympathy toward their fellow Mujahidin, as it became patently clear that the Mujahidin are the vanguard and standard-bearers of the Islamic community in fighting the Crusader-Zionist alliance that has caused the people to endure various forms of pain and degradation.

One indication of that is the wide-scale spread of Jihadist ideology, especially on the Internet, and the tremendous number of young people who frequent the Jihadist websites—a major achievement for Jihad, through the grace of God, despite our enemies and their efforts.

On the other hand, after the war expanded and the Mujahidin spread out into many regions, some of the brothers became

totally absorbed in fighting our local enemies, and more mistakes have

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been made due to miscalculations by the brothers planning the operations or something that arises before it is carried out, in addition to some who have expanded the "barricade argument" (TN: on whether it is acceptable to kill Muslims being used as human shields by the enemy) which has resulted in the killing of Muslims (we ask God to have mercy on them and forgive them, and compensate their families). I reckon that the barricade argument was been debated centuries ago amid circumstances different from those of today, and it needs to be revisited based on the modern-day context and clear boundaries established for all the brothers, so that no Muslims fall victim except when it is absolutely essential.

Amongst the mistakes made were the killing of some, the Muslims did not understand the justification behind allowing their killing. As you may know, one of the principles of Shari'ah is to bring in the interests and repulse evil. This is what the Messenger of Allah, Peace and Prayers be upon him had done with the head of hypocrisy 'Abdallah Bin Abi; not to underestimate the fact that these issues, amongst others, led to the loss of the Muslims sympathetic approach towards the Mujahidin. What also led to the loss of the Mujahidin was exploitation of the foes to several of their mistakes and tainting their picture before the crowds of the nation; the purpose was to split them from their popular bases, and needless to say that this issue involving the loss of the nation's audience paralyzed the Jihadist movements.

Here is an important issue that we should pay attention to; carrying out several attacks without exercising caution, which impacted the sympathy of the nation's crowds towards the Mujahidin. It would lead us to winning several battles while losing the war at the end. It requires an accurate criteria for the ramifications of any attack prior to carrying it out; also weighing the advantages and disadvantages, to then determine what would be the most likely to carry out.

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There is the need to collect anything within the capacity to collect - such as information, especially the Afghanistan commando operations carried out by the Mujahidin or others, the

Palestinian Liberation Organization; also to study the advantages and disadvantages as the study would include two aspects:

The aspect of the operational steps required to ensure the success of the operation, or the hindrances leading to its failure, as well as the impact on the foe.

The other aspect involves the impact on the nation's impression towards the Mujahidin and being sympathetic towards them. The operations that bear extreme negative impact on the partisans of the Jihad include targeting the apostates in mosques or nearby - such as the assassination attempt of Dustum during the holiday worship location, and the assassination of General Muhammad Yusuf in one of the Pakistani mosques. It is extremely sad for an individual to fall into the same mistake more than once.

I would also like to seek your advice on an opinion as follows: whatever exceeds our capability or what we are unable to disburse on attacks inside America, as well as on the Jihad in open fronts, would be disbursed targeting American interests in non-Islamic countries first, such as South Korea. We shall avoid carrying out attacks in Islamic countries except for the countries that fell under invasion and direct occupation.

There are two major reasons to avoid carrying out attacks in Islamic countries as follows: the first involves attacks amongst the Muslims which would increase the possibility of victims amongst them; even though the brothers were previously warned not to expand the shield issue (TN: possibly killing Muslims who are being used as human shields by the enemy), that was not made clear to them. The operational fact continues to expand in terms of the shield.

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Firstly, it holds us responsible before Allah, praise and glory be to him, while in reality it holds us responsible for the losses and damages in the call to Jihad.

The second reason is the extremely great damage that impacts the brothers in the region where the work begins, following the alert of the state against the youths who are engaged in the Jihad work or even the preaching work. Tens of thousands are being arrested, similar to what happened in Egypt, and the arrest of thousands such as in the country of the two holy sanctuaries (TN: Saudi Arabia), while the issue is one involving



time. The fact requires that we maintain the attrition of the head of disbelief (TN: Kufar) and the life artery of these apostate organizations on open fronts without bearing additional losses on the Jihad; by that, eliminating the ruler's despotism with these large numbers of devoted youths and Muslim prisoners.

When the global disbelief reaches the level of attrition, it would lead to its collapse; we would then engage in a conflict with the rulers, after they have been weakened following its weakness. We would then find the brothers there with their entire strength and energy.

Some of the disadvantages in carrying out attacks against the Americans in Islamic countries, where the components for success had not been prepared and the removal of the ruler is in an effort for the Americans not to accuse it of failing, the regime shall have a huge reaction towards the Mujahidin; this would lead to defending themselves and avenging the regime. The brothers and the regime would then engage in a war which we did not begin against it, because the power of the brothers is not ready for it, as such it would be one result.

The disadvantages in engaging as previously mentioned would change the general line - meaning to avoid wasting our energy with these regimes at this stage; that, in addition to losing the sympathy of the Muslims towards us.

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This is when we lose the perception of the Muslims towards us, which is that we are the ones defending the Muslims and fighting their biggest enemy, the Crusader Zionist alliance - without killing those that the general public consider Muslims.

So, if we fight the rulers while being in this situation, and we do not respond other than with direct defense during their offense against us, and this issue is being repeated several times, it would appear that we are wronged and the rulers are the tyrants; it would increase the hatred of the people towards them and make them feel that the rulers did not defend our brothers in Palestine, Iraq and Afghanistan. They were not content with that, but they fought the Mujahidin that defend our people there.

However, if we engage in a fight against the rulers outside the direct defense, we would have eliminated the damage the rulers would have carried out in their fight against us; the reason is

that it would reveal the truth, and the media shall demonstrate to the people that we are the ones fighting the government and killing the Muslims. Between the roar of the killing and the fight, the people shall forget who began the fight against the other - as such we shall lose the people and strengthen the stance of the government without cutting its hostility against us.

What aids the success of our fight against the Americans in non-Islamic countries and reducing its cost, is for limited groups, distanced from the Muslim and devout circles, to launch from countries with the Mujahidin presence without announcing their launching location; this is to avoid the reaction against the Mujahidin in that country. Given the potential for the foes to reveal that issue, it would be better for the training to be carried out and launched from the open fronts where naturally the foes would be exerting their utmost efforts.

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Amongst the opportunities to be exploited in targeting the Americans is the state of security laxity found in countries where we had not carried out any attacks.

Given that the difference of the impact of attacks against the foes inside or outside of America is substantial, we need to confirm to the brothers that every effort that could be spent on attacks in America would not be spent outside of it.

The overflow of the work (TN: meaning attacks) outside of America and the work in non-Islamic countries could be spent in targeting the U.S. interests in the Islamic countries where we have no bases or partisans or Jihadist Islamic groups that could be threatened by danger. The Islamic groups there would express their stance against us and renounce us - a fact that would prevent the regime from retaliating against them following our attacks. The condition is to be extremely cautious and take necessary measures to avoid misleading the Muslims in these operations.

With respect to the media publications, I would say: It is important for you to focus a portion of your interest on the Mujahidin publications; provide them with advice and guidance to avoid the mistakes that would impact either the reputation of the Mujahidin and the sympathy of the nation's masses or that would impact the mind and the character of the youths - who rely mainly in their culture on the publications

issued by the Mujahidin and their partisans. Needless to say, the substantial damages that this fact would have and the loss of great opportunities from a proper care and valuable guidance to millions of youths who listen to what the Mujahidin have to say in their lectures, movies and writings.

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Based upon the aforementioned: I request that you prepare a memorandum that would include general guidelines on how the Mujahidin publications should be; focus on the basics and the Shari'ah literature (TN: rules) such as violation of the Muslim blood and their honor, as well as the importance in committing to the Hadith of the messenger of Allah, peace and prayers be upon him (not he who believes in stabbing, in blasphemy, the obscene, and the disgusting) as narrated by al-Bukhari.

Once the memorandum is prepared, we shall discuss it and send it to all the regions, along with sending the general policy in the military work. We shall then inform you of the committee that we are in the process of forming (I sent its formation to Shaykh Sa'id - May God have mercy on him); that committee will have the privilege of reviewing and postponing any publications assessed to be outside the general policy that we sought to keep in conformity with the Shari'ah teachings and which, God willing, would achieve the interest of Islam and the Muslims.

We ask every emir in the regions to be extremely keen and focused on controlling the military work and not to expand the barricade, due to the several attacks carried out by the Mujahidin whereby several Muslims had fallen; we could have reached the target without injuring the Muslims with some effort and deliberation. Also the need to cancel other attacks due to the possible and unnecessary civilian casualties - for example, the attacks targeting several infidel Imams during their visits to public locations where most of the Muslims are located, as they should be targeted away from the Muslims.

Making these mistakes is a great issue; needless to say, the greatness of the Muslim blood violation in addition to the damage impacting the Jihad. As a result, the alienation of most of the nation from the Mujahidin.

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For the brothers in all the regions to apologize and be held responsible for what happened. They would be questioned about

the mistake causing the flaw that occurred and about the measures to be taken to avoid repeating the same mistakes.

With respect to the human error outside the human will, as it is repeated in wars, the need to apologize for these errors and be held responsible, as the aspects of the flaw would be explained. Perhaps some of those killed and who were killed mistakenly were amongst the immoral; there is no need to reveal their immorality while the people are wounded and the foes are keen in demonstrating our indifference about them.

Should some of the brothers in the regions fail to carry out their duties in this respect, we should then assume the responsibility and apologize for what had happened.

The need to confirm to all the Mujahidin brothers the importance of clarity, honesty, loyalty and promises and be cautious of the betrayal.

The emirs in the regions would also be requested to task one of the qualified brothers with them, to follow up on the media section from all aspects as mentioned in the memorandum: from a Shari'ah standpoint - care for the general taste of the nation's crowds, so long as it does not conflict with the Shari'ah.

The same brother would be requested to always seek the development of his aptitude and his knowledge in all arenas associated with his mission, such as: reading books on dealing with the people because he would be largely dealing with the brothers, reading books concerning the production.

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The purpose is for the Mujahidin publications to be a good potential for the competition and to gain the crowds. The main goal is to spread awareness amongst the people of the nation, to rescue them from the aberration of the rulers.

He, in turn, would seek to improve the aptitude of the brothers contributing in the media section; he would also provide advice in general for those issuing the statements, lectures, books, articles and those who comment on the Jihad films. He would be appointed as the Jihadist media individual in this region, characterized by objectivity and accepted by the people of the nation.

This brother would be in charge of the media as is the case in the regions - otherwise the position of the General Manager of the Media divisions would be updated in every region; no publications would be made unless he reviews them, to include the leadership speeches. He would have the right to stop any publication that includes a term considered outside the general policy, whether in the context or timing. The subject would be reviewed with the individual who issued it, and he would be informed of its conflict with the general policy; as well as the dispersion of the nation's views from the larger Mujahidin goals, such as the case of Palestine, while appointing the foe to defame the reputation of the Mujahidin - therefore the fear of the Mujahidin during this phase is substantial with respect to their conduct and expressions.

Some of the examples to this was when the general populace were in the peak of dealing with the Freedom Fleet heading towards Gaza to break the blockade and deliver the civil relief to our people there, and at the time when the Jews stopped it with an armed force and killed several of those in it, activating Turkey in this respect.

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The Freedom Fleet attack dominated the media in a very large way, as the western politicians were forced to discuss it; they criticized the Israelis for publishing on one of the websites a speech for the deputy of Abu Basir in Yemen, our brother Sa'id al-Shahri. What was shown in the media was his speech concerning the arrest of one of our sisters in the country of the two holy sanctuaries and the Mujahidin demanding to carry out kidnappings against the westerners, the princes of Al Sa'ud (TN: the Sa'ud family) and the senior security employees in exchange for her release.

Following the issuance of this speech, al-Arabiyah Television channel exploited it widely and focused on it. It made it the number one piece in its news reports and hosted men and youth from the general populace on the streets as they had claimed. That to include (TN: the hosting of) several ill-informed scholars and state men - no doubt they accept each other, especially those who ignore their status amongst the people; the purpose was to discuss the tape, showing honesty and each mentioning individually that the Mujahidin are not interested in the Palestinian cause, and the blockade of our brothers in Gaza - rather that their concern is to fight, corrupt and argue with the security men and not with the usurper Jews.

No doubt, issuing this lecture was driven by jealousy of the blood and honor of the Muslims; however it was not in conformance with the events. The reason was because there were one and half million Muslims at that time under siege, and most of them were women and children. They have more than ten thousand prisoners with the Jews, many of whom are sisters and children in tragic circumstances. The issuance of this speech, especially at this time, conflicted with our policy of focusing on the bigger foe, and concealed our interest in the main issues that were the main reasons in initiating the Jihad.

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It announced to the people that we are in a fight and argument with the rulers to avenge our brothers, those that were killed and detained far from the cases and interests of the general nation, due to which it held our brothers responsible for the killing and imprisonment. It also gave the Muslims an impression of us that we were overcome by the region-like command or parties or both; they heard our brother talk about the sister from the Arab Peninsula and from al-Qa'ida organization, but they did not hear him talk about our sister in Palestine - this is contrary to our reality and our general policy, as it weakens our stance when we say that we are an international organization fighting for the liberation of Palestine and all of the Muslim countries to erect an Islamic caliphate that would rule according to the Shari'ah of Allah.

This mistake was repeated, in a statement in which the brothers in Yemen adopted the big operation, the operation of 'Umar al-Faruq - May God release him when they said, it was a reaction to the U.S. bombing of al-Mahfad; linking this large operation with other than the Palestinian cause covers some of the stances that show the victory of the brothers in Yemen for the Palestinian cause. That, in addition to their absorption on a daily basis in the fight against the Yemeni government and the strong focus on the key figures of the Peninsula rulers in their lectures; it drew the people's attention, that the first and biggest foe of the Mujahidin in the Arab Peninsula are the rulers of Yemen and the country of the two holy sanctuaries.

This was repeated in the comments of the brothers concerning the attack of our brother Humam al-Balawi, may God have mercy on him, when they mentioned it was a revenge for the murder of Mahsud, may God have mercy on him. It was necessary to discuss Palestine first.

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In an effort to avoid such stances the international perception and the general policy should be present and clear in our minds; as such we would avoid being distracted or absorbed in its expansion at the expense of what is more of a priority and importance.

The priorities in the preaching work are to clarify the meaning of the term al-Tawhid (TN: monotheism) and its requirements and to warn the people from falling in its contradictions; that, to include the instigation of the Jihad against the Crusader Zionist alliance.

The priority in the military work is to focus and provide the lion's share for the head of international disbelief or to focus on the apostate and excessively talk about them which the people of the nation do not understand; consequently they would not react to it, as many of them would repel from it. This would make us the splinter in an environment that does not harbor the Jihadist movement, and does not provide us with support to pursue the Jihad and its continuity.

I believe there is a need to look into publishing pictures of the apostates' killing those of the apostate organizations who deal with the Americans against the Muslims.

Once the brothers in the regions are committed to the memorandum, it would be advisable for you and for Shaykh Abu Yahya to write some articles and provide advice to those working in the Jihad media in general to include the author partisans to the Mujahidin on the internet. Shaykh Yunis wrote to me about the importance of preparing a memorandum indicating our stance on the Takfir issue without the Shari'ah criteria. I wrote to him and told him I would send him what you had sent. I had attached it in the last letter, and asked him to follow up on sending his comments to you so you could write it in your style, in light of the fact that the foes know his true personality through the prisoners who also recognize his style when they peruse his articles on the internet.

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Before concluding the discussion concerning the media publications, I would say:

We are in need of an advisory reading, with constructive criticism to our entire policy and publications at the center and in the regions internally; as such have two available brothers ready for this mission.

From abroad, seek safe routes to achieve a contact with one of the knowledge seekers so long as he is credible and trusted; inform him that we are in a new phase of amendment and development and require an advisory reading and development of our entire policy and publication at the center and in the regions. The purpose is to amend our mistakes and develop our Jihadist work according to their suggestions and opinions, especially in corresponding with the masses of the nation in context and shape.

Taking into consideration the importance not to publish it and the importance of the secrecy in all of that, as we ask God to grant us success.

Important comment: After you provide me with your opinions and suggestions, and after we consult amongst each other, we need to send what we agree upon to the brothers, the leaders of the regions and ask them for their responses to what we would be sending them.

I intend to issue a statement, in which I would discuss starting a new phase to amend what we have issued - as such we would regain the trust of a large portion of those who had lost their trust in the Mujahidin; we would increase the lines of communication between the Mujahidin and their nation.

This would require, prior to telling and reassuring the people that the intent from all aspects would have become clear to the brothers in the center and in the regions - that it would be established and implemented on the ground; the purpose is not to contradict our statements with some of our conduct. First, for all the brothers contributing in the media of al-Qa'ida in the center, the need to commit to avoiding everything that would have a negative impact on the perception of the nation towards the Mujahidin; also ensure everything possible that would bring the Mujahidin and their nation closer.

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The basis for that is to take into consideration the general opinion or the general taste within the Islamic Shari'ah criteria; it is a very important issue that the Messenger of



Allah, peace and prayers be upon him had done - as was said in the Hadith (if your people were not newly ignorant, the Ka'bah would not have been destroyed and would only have two gates) narrated by al-Tarmazi.

The issues taking over the public opinion are the alienation from harshness and leaning towards friendliness and objectivity; also repulsion from repetition in lectures unless it is absolutely necessary.

It is therefore necessary to focus on expansion, and increase the knowledge in factual jurisprudence and developments of the events; the purpose is for our lecture to touch the crowds of the nation and their aspirations, while treating the important doctrinal issues.

In summary: committing to the general lines, designed according to the Shari'ah policy in our Jihadist operations and our media publications is an extremely important issue; it will achieve, God willing, great gains for the Jihadist movement - most importantly gain the crowds of the nation, correct the wrong impressions in the minds of the Mujahidin. Additionally, an increase in the attrition of the head of disbelief, because the plan was to focus more on it.

I add here two issues that appear important to me in the stability of the Jihadist work and its progress. I would like for you to research it amongst you- first: the need to circulate a new administration arrangement, sent to all the regions after we discuss it amongst us, and which would include the following points:

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A. If any contingency situation results in the absence of the Emir from his leadership of the Mujahidin, the Deputy Emir will automatically and temporarily take on the responsibility of managing the affairs of the Mujahidin for several days, with his title being "Acting Emir". The Mujahidin in his territory will be informed of this, and he is not to be called "The Emir". Furthermore, he will not be announced in the meeting except after consulting with the brothers and gaining their agreement to that or some other action.

Consultation among brothers in any region will take place internally, though they will also consult with "Central al-Qa'ida). This term was coined in the media to distinguish

between al-Qa'ida in Afghanistan and Pakistan and al-Qa'ida in the other territories. In my opinion, there is no problem with using this term in principle in order to clarify the intended meaning.

B. The term of an Emir chosen by the influential people in each territory, in consultation with the central group, shall be two years, with the potential to be renewed. If there is delay in consulting with the central group due to a difficulty in communications, the term shall be one year, also with the potential to be renewed. It shall be taken into consideration that this term is most similar to the leadership of a Wali (TN: governor) in Muslim territories during the time of the caliphate, and is not like the grand imamate.

C. The Shura council in each territory will provide the Emir with recommendations and will write an annual report to be sent to the central group detailing the local situation, to include the progress of the local Emir in his activity and his dealings with the Mujahidin.

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I also think that if the brothers in any territory deem to elevate the position of any of the brothers to a position of importance, such as First Deputy or Second Deputy, then that should be done in consultation with the central group. If there is a problem with communications, then the matter will be temporary until consultation can be completed.

This is with the stipulation that the CV of the brothers nominated to the position is sent.

Second: Attention should be paid to creating command structures and devising plans to develop and refine the energies called upon for Jihad. The Muslim Nation, in general, suffers from a lack of qualified leadership, and it comes as no surprise to you that the fields of Jihad are where leaders are made.

Finally: I want you to inform me of your recommendations that will help with elevating the level of activity on all fronts and in all territories. You no doubt understand the great importance of the progress of our work in the territories through general policies that are controlled by Islamic law in order to achieve our interests and reject corruption.

I reviewed your opinions regarding the issue of establishing an Islamic state before the elements of success have been completed and the issue of escalation in Yemen. I wanted to share with you my opinion in these two matters in order to establish a fruitful and constructive discussion, God willing.

However, talking about them brings sorrow, and I am compelled to talk at length about them and their importance and the risks in them. If I am unable to give these matters their due time within these pages, then perhaps I can finish the discussion in the next message. I'll begin with the matter of escalation in Yemen. To begin I would say that Yemen is the Arab country most suited to the establishment of an Islamic state, but this does not mean that the necessary fundamental elements for

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success for such a project have yet been realized. Henceforth, we must increase our efforts to preserve Yemen and not drag it into a war before the necessary preparations are made on a number of important fronts. I anticipate that we will not escalate in Yemen for the following reasons:

A. Escalation in Yemen would siphon off a large portion of the energy of the Mujahidin without doing the same to the head of the infidels (America) directly. Thus, the majority of harm would be inflicted on the Mujahidin in general, and would impact the greater war between the infidels and Islam. Yemen represents an important center of gravity in supporting fronts with men, and if war broke out there, then the supply lines to other fronts would be disrupted or weakened.

Furthermore, Yemen represents a focal point in terms of supplies, as a reserve force for the Mujahidin, and it has become a proven fact in military science that in a war between two sides, neither side should commit all its forces to the fight; rather, it is important for a force to remain as a fork with several prongs in reserve. It seems to me at this point that Yemen remains a force of supplies and reserves for the Mujahidin at the open fronts, and a powerful tool to restore the caliphate when circumstances are conducive to doing so. Thus far, circumstances are not yet suited to opening up a front in Yemen that would bring about the desired results. The Islamic nation, as an army, has several battalions. So when the enemy's tanks advance, we need to advance anti-tank battalions, and when the enemy's aircraft conduct raids, our anti-aircraft battalions must show themselves, all the while camouflaging and concealing

our other battalions in order to protect them from being bombed, so as to not lose them.

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So this is the state of things in our battle with the infidels of the world. We want to cause him to only bleed in this mission, while preserving the other armies as a reserve force that enters the battlefield at the appropriate time.

B. The emergence of a force in control of the Mujahidin in Yemen is a matter that provokes our enemies internationally and locally and puts them on a great state of alert, which is quite different from the emergence of the strength of the Mujahidin in any nation not in the heart of the Islamic world, despite the enemy's increased alert posture at the appearance of the Mujahidin in any location.

Thus, their situation in Yemen would be like that of anyone fighting for his life, for Yemen is the launching point toward all other oil nations. Control of these nations means control of the world, so they are willing to die and make every effort to break the backs of the Mujahidin there. At the same time, the capabilities of our brothers there are not yet such that they can enter this sort of struggle, neither in terms of their administration or their financial resources. The finances do not permit them to provide the basic life support services to whomever would take on the burden, whether they want to or not, particularly since Yemen is suffering from a food and health services crisis even before entering into a war, and all that this implies. The issue of providing for basic needs is a matter that must be taken into consideration before taking control of nations or cities. If a controlling force, that enjoys the support of the majority where it has taken control, fails to provide for the basic needs of the people, it will lose their support and will find itself in a difficult position that will grow increasingly difficult with each passing day. People will not bear seeing their children die as a consequence of a lack of food or medicine. This is in addition to providing necessities to fighters and what we call logistical support.

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I would add that the initiative is in our hands, and we have the room to look for the appropriate time to begin Jihad in Yemen. In the words of Almighty God, "Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war,

to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of God and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom God doth know. Whatever ye shall spend in the cause of God, shall be repaid unto you, and ye shall not be treated unjustly." (60). We still have a large force we are able to gather and prepare, and if we suppose that the suitable conditions for establishing an Islamic state in Yemen that can be preserved are realized in three years, for example, then beginning Jihad before that time is unwise because the forces would be squandered and it would take longer to prepare, all while not achieving their primary goal, which is to establish the religion.

It is our desire, and the desire of the brothers in Yemen, to establish the religion and restore the caliphate, to include all the countries of the Islamic world. God willing, that will be followed by other conquests that we are able to achieve by continuing to wage Jihad at the fronts that are prepared for combat, while holding off at the fronts that are not yet prepared, such as Yemen, until they become prepared and until combat at those fronts will produce results that aid in establishing a guided caliphate, God willing. What demonstrates the dangers in beginning a fight before the necessary elements have been put in place is the failure of the coup attempted by the socialists in Yemen, which was due to their haste in beginning before putting in place the elements necessary to success. These included securing the loyalty of the surrounding tribes and other such items, despite the fact that what pushed them to do this was the increase in assassinations among their cadre, be it assassination by way of murder at the hands of the Mujahidin or the assassination by granting money from the president, which drew them to him.

As you know, the duty of Jihad does not mean establishing it in every territory, including the territories in which the elements of success have not been achieved. Jihad is a means to establish the religion, and it might

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be brought down by an inability to do so without being brought down by the preparation for it. This would be the case if most of those with experience in Jihad decided that the elements necessary for success had not been achieved such that the desired results could be realized.

By God's grace, Jihad is underway at several fronts, and these are sufficient, by His will and His glory, as well as by the steadfastness of the Mujahidin there, to perform the function of bleeding the head of the infidels, America, such that it is defeated, God willing. Then, the Islamic Nation will be able to expel that which has stricken it with weakness, servility, and degradation.

The interest of the Mujahidin in knowing that which effects the enlightenment of the people of the Islamic Nation and is met with acceptance by the people is sufficient, God willing, to rescue the nation from the oppression of the ignorant and the misled.

Thus, the plague that exists in the nations of Muslims has two causes: The first is the presence of American hegemony and the second is the presence of rulers that have abandoned Islamic law and who identify with the hegemony, serving its interests in exchange for securing their own interests. The only way for us to establish the religion and alleviate the plague which was befallen Muslims is to remove this hegemony which has beset upon the nations and worshippers and which transforms them, such that no regime that rules on the basis of Islamic law remains. The way to remove this hegemony is to continue our direct attrition against the American enemy until it is broken and is too weak to interfere in the matters of the Islamic world.

After this phase comes the phase in which the second cause - rulers who have abandoned Islamic law - are toppled, and this will be followed by the phase in which God's religion is established and Islamic law rules.

The focus must be on actions that contribute to the intent of bleeding the American enemy. As for actions that do not contribute to the intent of bleeding the great enemy, many of them

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dilute our efforts and take from our energy. The effect of this on the greater war in general is clear, as is the resulting delay in the phases leading to the establishment of an Islamic caliphate, God willing.

Based on this, there is no overriding pressure or great need to exhaust and deplete the front in Yemen before the elements of success there have been achieved. Putting reserve forces and

supply lines for the Mujahidin into the quagmire is a difficult thing, for the reasons I've already mentioned, including that the scope of the struggle will be greater than the capabilities in a number of ways.

So it seems to me that halting the escalation in Yemen is in the general interest of the Mujahidin and is similar in many ways to what took place in the Battle of Mu'tah, as the Prophet described it, and the actions of Khalid Bin al-Walid. He achieved victory when he withdrew the army; the victory in the circumstances of that battle came in his rescuing the companions (TN: of the Prophet Muhammad) from the destruction of their army in the battle. Their army was completely outnumbered by the Roman army, and there were no elements in place for success, and they weren't on the verge of a complete disaster. They had the ability to go and regroup, much like we do now. They even had the ultimate Prophet, who eventually praised them, telling them they were fighters, not fleers.

As for the matter of establishing the state before putting in place the elements necessary for success:

A. It seems to me that being deliberate in this matter is a good thing, and to explain further, establishing the state before the elements necessary for success are put in place most often will lead to aborting the effort wherever it takes place, because establishing a state and then toppling the state represents a burden that exceeds the energy of the people.

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Weighing people down with something that exceeds their energies is fraught with negative results and leads to the shock of Jihad for the people of a territory in which the movement is suppressed, and it may exceed them. This is true whether the movement was suppressed after establishing the state or while it seeks to do so, as was the case in Syria when the Muslim Brotherhood tried to begin their Jihad and establish an Islamic state before they were prepared to do so and before the elements necessary for success were in place. This led to a shock for the Muslims in Syria at the emergence of Jihad, and many people decided it was less harmful to remain with the current regime than what would happen to them if they took part in the Jihad.

Following this shock, Jihad lost a generation of men who had been passionate about the victory of the religion, including men who had given their lives for this cause. The winds of Jihad

were still for nearly twenty years in Syria until a new generation came along that had not experienced that shock. The overwhelming majority of those who answered the call to Jihad in Afghanistan and Iraq were those who had not witnessed the Hamah experience and the murder committed by the regime there.

B. Jihad as a means to bring down countries and to gain control of them does not require beginning such a plan based on the hope that people will fight to establish a nascent state. Instead, it requires close study and inspection and confirmation that the elements necessary to success are in place. And it requires searching for the appropriate time. So we cannot waste a golden opportunity, and we must not begin before the appropriate opportunity is at hand. A man might measure the results of establishing an Islamic state before toppling its enemies against the results of the fall of the Islamic emirate in Afghanistan, which we pray to God does not happen again. Such a comparison shows a big difference, due to a number of factors. The first factor is that the people of the Islamic world are divided into

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two groups, the Arabs and the non-Arabs. Given that the enemies have knowledge of and experience with the Arabs and their history, they have learned that Arabs have dangerous qualities that make them suitable to quickly carry out the call to Jihad, and that the Qur'an and the Hadith are sufficient to justify that. On top of that is the speed with which they comprehend the texts of these without the need for translation. Based on this knowledge, the enemies have focused the bulk of their campaign against the Islamic world on the Arabs, particularly in the destructive media bombardment against Arab culture and their characteristics. This all serves the interests of the west; sufficient proof of this lies in the fact that the first language in which BBC broadcasts are transmitted after English is Arabic. This, when Arabs represent 2.5% of the world's population, while other people, including China by itself, represent a fifth of the world's population. The same is true for the Indian sub-continent, which represents another fifth of the population, while the number of Muslims in India is greater than the number of all the Arab Muslims. It was possible for the voice of the British Empire to reach 40% of the world's population through just its broadcast, but their primary concern was with destroying the Arabs via the media.



The second factor is the continued American occupation manifested in military forces on the ground. This is a very important factor in awakening people and inciting them to continue fighting, as opposed to the situation in countries in which the external enemy brings down the Islamic state established there without putting its military forces on the ground. Instead, they are satisfied to support the local or regional enemy, particularly if the country hasn't been destabilized by significant internal dispute, as is the case in Iraq.

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The third factor is that the Afghan people are religiously devout by nature and live spartan lives. They are extremely sensitive to the presence of foreigners in their country, where there are many primitive villages in the mountains and rural areas cut off from the cities. The residents in such areas are aware of their freedoms and their strength, and know they are far from the control of the security forces that are weak even in the major cities.

These factors are important in completing the elements necessary for successfully establishing a Muslim state, but they do not apply to all countries in the region. The people in many of these countries are still not prepared to enter the fight against governments and to bring them down. Many people have no idea how they would respond, and those who do understand that or who want to do away with these governments for some other reason, such as poverty or administrative corruption, do not believe that the solution is to fight them and to bring them down, because America is the dominant force in the region and will bring down any state that is established after its representatives are toppled.

In this phase, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Somalia are exceptions to the countries in the region.

Here we have an important issue, which is that one of the most important factors that will aid in the success of Jihad and its continuation is calling on Muslims to fight the enemy whose hostility they know and whom they know it is permissible to fight against, as is the case with the American enemy. As for the local enemy, such as if the Yemenis were to begin a long battle against the security services, this is a matter that will weigh on the people. As time goes by, they will begin to feel that some of them have been killed and they will start to want

to stop the fighting. This would promote the ideology of secular governments that raise the motto of pleasing all sides.

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Our goal is not to expend our energy in Yemen, to use the greater part of our strength in supplies and reserves, and to wear down and ultimately topple an apostate regime, only to establish another apostate regime.

This is on the assumption that the people would revolt with us to topple that regime. However, while it is the nature of tribes to be daring in fighting among themselves, they are cautious and hesitant to enter a struggle against a sizeable opponent. (They will do so only) after they make sure that the force and timing sufficiently predicts that the revolution has a good margin of success. This is when one of the most important factors for establishing a stable Muslim country in Yemen is dependent on substantial tribal support and adoption and gaining their trust so that they enter the struggle and contribute to establishing the government and protecting it. It is worth mentioning here that the entity that the tribes are going to confront in their fight will be just the Yemeni government, it will be international and regional apostasy.

It is also worth mentioning that the situation on the ground imposes the importance of differentiating between the North and the South, as the situation in the South cannot wait any longer. This is due to the people's intense anger toward the government and the huge amount of injustice inflicted on the people by the government, in addition to the mobilization conducted by al-Hirak. These two factors made large sectors of the people in the South dare to revolt, prepare for armed confrontation, and fight against the government. As for North Yemen, I see that it is in the same condition as the rest of the countries in the region, as far as the people not being ready to fight against the government. So I see that we do not seek a truce in the South, as it goes against the fabric of the people in their movement to lift off the injustice put upon them. It will lead to us losing most of the government opponents; we should not follow their lead, but we benefit from the tense atmosphere in spreading our call to Allah among the Muslim ranks in the South.

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This is because the current anger is led by al-Hirak, and it is allied to the United States and the Gulf states. Accordingly,

not declaring a truce does not mean that we escalate against the government in the South and enter into a fight against the military, as it would not bring the desired outcome. This is because the sons of the northern tribes will be targeted in the fight. The commoners in these tribes do not realize that the military are apostates. So the tribes will think that we increased the bloodshed, and people will talk among the tribes saying that al-Qa'ida kills a lot. This would distance many people from us and might lead to a tribal uprising to fight against us in revenge for their sons. This also means that we do not jump to establish an Islamic state in the South at the first chance of the government losing control in the South. The reason for this is what we mentioned earlier, that we are not yet ready to cover the people with the umbrella of Islamic rule. The reasons are that the people have needs and requirements, and the lack of these requirements is the main reason for their revolt against the ruler. We cannot provide for these needs in light of the battle and siege of the whole world against us. It is human nature that they will go with whoever better provides them with these needs and requirements. The animosity of the world and its siege against the Mujahidin is well known to the people, so no matter how much they love the Mujahidin, they will not stand beside them under these circumstances.

It is apparent from this that most people in Yemen, if given a choice between a government formed by al-Qa'ida or a government formed directly or indirectly by any of the Gulf states - such as if they give support to 'Ali Salim al-Bayd or any other who has administrative ability - they will choose the government that is formed by the Gulf states, either in the North or the South. The simple reason for this is

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that they think that these are Muslim governments and that they have the ability to provide them the necessities of their livelihoods. These are the demands of the people.

To stay away from wishful thinking and hope, we have to look at the people's revolution in the South like it is a boulder rolling down the side of a mountain. It is a benefit to whoever takes it; however, stopping it to our benefit is difficult, as it naturally will end up with the person who has the ability to control it, and who is at the current time, the Yemeni opposition, which is supported by the Gulf states.

However, looking at the indications, it seems that at the time the US is weakening - and accordingly, its agents are weakening - the Mujahidin are preparing to cover the people with the umbrella of the Caliphate. We will be the prime choice nearest to them, as they are Muslims in Muslim countries, and it is natural for that environment to receive the Mujahidin to reestablish the Caliphate and rule with Allah's Shari'ah. This is what scares the adversaries more than the Mujahidin; they are scared of the rejectionists (TN: the Shi'a).

Based on the above, we should not begin to attempt to establish a government in Yemen, even if the people revolted against government and toppled it, either in South Yemen or in all of Yemen. This is regardless of how bad the nominees to control that government are, because the outcome will be worse on Islam and Muslims if we start something that does not have all factors of success put together. This would put us in trouble with the people and put the Mujahidin forces in the sights of the enemy fire. This is because in the view of the rulers of the Land of the Holy (Mosques) (TN: Saudi Arabia), we are their worst enemies and our presence in Yemen threatens their royalty's existence, in addition to their abiding by the American wishes for them to fight us, so they will pump huge funds into recruiting the Yemeni tribes to kill us.

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They will win over the swords of the majority, which will put the Mujahidin force in Yemen under enemy fire and in a very serious situation.

Miscellaneous Points:

1- Please give me the news about the condition of the sons of our brother Shaykh Sa'id, Allah have mercy on his soul. (Tell me) how he was martyred and how the enemy discovered his location. I had been planning to mourn him and talk to the nation about him; however, I did not get a confirmation of the news from your side.

Please relay my regards and condolences to Shaykh Abu Muhammad, and give me the news about his condition. For several months, I have been sending messages to him, and Shaykh Sa'id told me that he had not yet received a courier from him. It then became noticeable that he has not been heard in the media in recent times. I hope that the problem is something good, and I advise that he get a companion (TN: bodyguard) from the Arab brothers.

2- I had mentioned in several previous messages to Shaykh Sa'id, Allah have mercy on his soul, the importance of the exit from Waziristan of the brother leaders, especially the ones that have media exposure. I stress this matter to you and that you choose distant locations to which to move them, away from aircraft photography and bombardment, while taking all security precautions. Also work on bringing out the brothers who have distinguished talents after they have been battle hardened, either by exposure to a big battle or by staying at the front for approximately one month.

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3- It would be nice if you would send me the names of some who are qualified to be your deputy.

4- It would be nice if you would nominate a brother to be responsible for the general duty of the external work in all the regions. If it is not possible to nominate someone for this, then you take over that responsibility.

Knowing that Shaykh Yunis (Var: Younis) is the official responsible for external work in Africa and west Asia, please inform him of that.

I sent a message in the past to Shaykh Sa'id and to you about the importance of external work, I hope it has reached you. In any case, I have attached it to your messages.

5- It would be nice if you would nominate one of the qualified brothers to be responsible for a large operation in the US.

6- It would be nice if you would pick a number of the brothers, not to exceed ten, and send them to their countries individually, without any of them knowing the others, to study aviation. It would be better if they are from the Gulf states, as study there is at the government's expense. They have to be picked with the utmost care and with very accurate specifications, one of which is that they are willing to conduct suicide actions and are prepared to do daring, important, and precise missions that we may ask of them in the future.

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So please pay top attention to this matter due to its utmost importance. Establish a mechanism to monitor and follow up on

the brothers going to study aviation so that we reduce the chances of them slackening from conducting Jihad.

7- It would be nice if you would ask the brothers in all regions if they have a brother distinguished by his good manners, integrity, courage, and secretiveness, who can operate in the US. (He should be able to) live there, or it should be easy for him to travel there. They should tell us this without taking any action and also tell us whether or not he is willing to conduct a suicide operation.

8- It would be nice if you would send the message to the brothers in all regions, without exception, that whoever has an operation outside the region where he is located must coordinate with you. This is so there will no conflicts between operations or failures where the brothers could be exposed or captured.

9- It would be nice if you would send two messages - one to Brother Abu Mus'ab 'Abd-al-Wadud, and the other to Brother Abu Basir Nasir al-Wahishi - and ask them to put forward their best in cooperating with Shaykh Yunis in whatever he asks of them. Hint to the brothers in the Islamic Maghreb that they provide him with the financial support that he might need in the next six months, to the tune of approximately 200,000 euros.

These two messages are to be coordinated with Shaykh Yunis, and arrange a name for him that does not divulge his nationality. Arrange for a secure method of communications and coordination between them and Shaykh Yunis. Stress the utmost secrecy in work and restrict

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the knowledge of Shaykh Yunis affair to the leadership in the regions in which he has to work with the brothers.

Also indicate to the brothers in Yemen when talking about coordination before conducting any work outside the peninsula, that working in the sea, even within the territorial waters of the peninsula, is to be considered external work that requires coordination with you.

Pay attention to explaining the importance of coordination, as well as the dangers of neglecting it, to all the brothers in all the regions. In general, it would be good to clarify the wisdom or the reason behind this in most of what we ask the brothers for, unless it exposes operational secrets.

10- Please write a report about Brother Shaykh Yunis at the first opportunity. Include (information on) his birth, education, social status, his best qualifications and experiences, as well as his manner and dealings with the Mujahidin and his relationship with them, the date of his becoming religiously adherent, and his joining Jihad. If it is not easy on you that the report be complete and comprehensive, it is alright to ask the brothers in the Islamic Maghreb for help after you send me whatever you already have.

11- In a previous message, we asked the security official, Brother Abu al-Wafa' and also his deputy for a report about the conditions on your side; however, we have not yet received them, it would be good if you would follow up on this matter.

12- Please report to me in detail about the financial situation on your side and about your vision and plans to improve it.

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Your earmarking of the budget should set aside enough salaries for the brothers and the families for a year, regardless of the financial forecast for the coming days.

13- It would be good of you to provide us with detailed information about our brother Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who was appointed as a replacement for our brother Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi, Allah have mercy on his soul, and his first lieutenant and deputy al-Nasir Lidin Allah, AKA Abu Sulayman. It would be better for you to ask several sources among our brothers there, whom you trust, about them so that the matter becomes clear to us. I also would like that you ask our brothers in Ansar al-Islam Organization where they stand on the new Emirs, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and his brothers.

I do remind you to put forward your maximum effort to achieve unity and resolve any conflicts between all of the Jihadi entities in Iraq.

In these efforts to achieve unity, there should be a special message directed to our brothers there that stresses the importance of unity and collectiveness and that they maintain a basic foundation of the religion, so it must get precedence over names, titles, or entities if they obstruct the achievement of that great duty.

14- I want to remind them of the importance of the people's first impression of who is addressing them, especially when he bears great responsibility. Since we carry the responsibility of a call that we want to deliver to the people, this takes care to find out what suits the people and the path from which you can reach them, deliver the faith to them, and convince them with it.

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Part of this is to eliminate any strange appearance that will make them wonder and to adopt what they are used to, such as appearing in the media in true name, even if just a first name, and also appearing in Arab dress, as it is closer to the people than the dress of the people in these areas. (I also want to remind you that) people like short audio and video speeches and to disseminate what you can on the Internet.

These are just opinions and I am open to your opinion.

15- You should send (a message) to the brothers in all the regions saying that a minimum of two brothers should be sent for suicide operations; they should not send a single suicide brother. We have experienced this in many operations where the percentage of success was very low, due to the psychological effects that overcome the brother in such cases. The most recent of which was the operation in which our brothers targeted the British Ambassador in Yemen, and one of our brothers, Allah have mercy on his soul, conducted it. Regardless of the heroism of the brother and his steadfastness, the psychological factors that affect the person in such cases necessitate the presence of a companion that will support and bolster him.

Some people will say that some of the Prophet's companions conducted operations alone. This is a very different example: They were not suicide operations, and that is where the big difference lies.

16- I asked Shaykh Sa'id, Allah have mercy on his soul, to task brother Ilyas to prepare two groups - one in Pakistan and the other in the Bagram area of Afghanistan - with the mission of

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anticipating and spotting the visits of Obama or Petraeus to Afghanistan or Pakistan to target the aircraft of either one of them. They are not to target visits by US Vice President Biden,



Secretary of Defense Gates, Joint Chiefs of Staff (Chairman) Mullen, or the Special Envoy to Pakistan and Afghanistan Holbrook. The groups will remain on the lookout for Obama or Petraeus. The reason for concentrating on them is that Obama is the head of infidelity and killing him automatically will make Biden take over the presidency for the remainder of the term, as it is the norm over there. Biden is totally unprepared for that post, which will lead the US into a crisis. As for Petraeus, he is the man of the hour in this last year of the war, and killing him would alter the war's path.

So please ask brother Ilyas to send to me the steps he has taken into that work.

17- It would be good if you coordinate with our brothers of the Pakistan and Afghanistan Taliban in regards to the external work, so that there is complete cooperation between us, and tell them that we started planning work inside America many years ago, and gained experience in that field, and we and they are brothers so we should not fall into the error that hurts the Muslims and benefits the enemy, due to lack of coordination between us. So, for example, the operation of brother Faysal Shahrazad, Allah release his imprisonment, was possible to avoid his capture and the errors that happened easily by one who had experience

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in that area, so if a brother purchased the vehicle and then travelled from America to Waziristan before the operation, it would have made it difficult to capture the brother that fast, and based on that, draw their attention to the importance of cooperation among us and the possibility of the two sides adopting the operation reduces the possibility of these errors, after which the Americans commented that the Mujahidin have become unable to conduct a large operation that is well planned.

18- You have to keep in mind the possibility, though remote, that the journalists may be involuntarily monitored, in a way that we or they do not know about, either on ground or by satellite, especially Ahmad Zaydan, and it is possible that a tracking chip could be put into some of their personal effects before coming to the meeting place to conduct any business with them, or to conduct an interview with one of the brothers, and as you know Ahmad Zaydan has interviewed a number of the Taliban leaders and also with Shaykh Sa'id Allah, have mercy on his soul, and the Americans did not kill any of them or know his

location from surveying Ahmad Zaydan except that it may be a matter that might attract their attention, as they identified the house where the brothers Abu 'Umar al-Baghdadi and Abu Hamzah al-Muhajir Allah, have mercy on their souls, were staying in, across satellites, by monitoring some brothers who were released from prison and who went to them after that. And based on that, it would be prudent and a defeat to the enemy to avoid any meetings with journalists.

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And paying attention to aircraft and satellite surveillance cannot be avoided with training on counter surveillance or changing vehicles or conducting meetings with journalists in a place away from the location of the Mujahidin, or bringing the journalists by night so that they do not find the way and the other procedures like that.

But you should use the secure means in contacting the media and journalists which are using the mail.

So please inform our brothers of the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan about that for fear on their safety.

19- It is obvious that remaining on the same M.O. in communications between us makes it weak from a security point of view, as it makes it easy on the enemy to find out the method that we use in communicating, so initially we have to employ the following steps:

A- That the two brothers' couriers from my side and yours should not meet to exchange messages except in a closed market or mall.

B- That the brother who is bringing the messages out of Waziristan report to you after every trip to inform you if the security situation is normal or elevated and changed, like increased scrutiny, questioning, or photography, whether aimed at specific persons or at all the passersby

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or that the search elements have been replaced with elements that are more alert and attentive.

20- Regarding our brother Abu Talhah al-Almani, Shaykh Sa'id Allah, have mercy on his soul and accept him among the martyrs, told me that the brother was on his way to a suicide operation, so if he has executed the operation, we ask Allah to take him

among the martyrs and put him in paradise, and if his operation has been delayed and you see that he has a special talent that is lacking in the external work section, then it would be good to tell him that, and that if he postpones his desire to conduct a suicide operation that he write to me his vision of external work.

21- It would be nice to ask our brothers of Pakistan Taliban to deny their connection to the recent operation in Lahore against (phonetic: al-Briluwiyah). (TN: possibly referring to: (The News Online, 2 Jul) Lahore: Two back-to-back suicide bombings and a cracker blast killed at least 42 people and injured over 175 inside the crowded shrine of Data Gunj Bukhsh in Lahore on Thursday night.)

And also ask them about the truth in the news that talks about beginnings of negotiations and truce talks between them and the Pakistani government, and what is theirs and your opinion on that, knowing that much of what I have said about Yemen can be applied to the situation on your side.

22- It would be nice to inform us of the truth about what was mentioned of arresting our brother 'Azzam al-Amriki.

23- It would be nice if you can send us the book of Shaykh Abu Yahiya (Enemy Usage of Bystanders in Present Jihad), and his book (Studies in Decisive Unanimity) and it would be better that you provide us with each theological work published by you.

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24-Enclosed is a message for Shaykh Yunis, please deliver it to him if he is on your side or if he has travelled, but there is a secure mode of delivering it; and if there is no secure method to deliver it, then please destroy it.

25- It would be nice to inform me of whom you have of the brothers who have no objection to accompanying me, and they are natives of this country and their situation is suitable for that matter. I asked Shaykh Sa'id Allah, have mercy on his soul, to tell me who he has and he mentioned some of the brothers, except that their situation, security wise, was not suitable to our conditions, and it seems that he had limited choices, so please continue the search and provide me with names and resumes of the brothers that you think are qualified. You know the features that they must have, like being tested until there is no doubt and that he is not wanted by the authorities for lawsuits or

crimes, and that he owns an official ID card that is valid or can renew it if it has expired, and that he is able to rent houses and purchase requirements.

And that he be secretive even from his family and friends, and to be well-mannered, quiet, patient, aware, and knowledgeable of the enemy tricks, and able to stay away from his family if that becomes risky.

And that he is not from an area known to have many Mujahidin and that he does not inform you of his real name or the location where his family lives.

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And please pay attention to that subject and inform me within two months, as the notice that my companion has given me is limited.

26- Brother 'Abdallah al-Halabi ('Abd-al-Latif) informed me that my family in Iran is on the way to come to the brothers in Pakistan or Waziristan, so as a precaution and to safeguard everyone, we have to assume that their arrival will be different than what we are used to when our brothers arrived who were coming from Iran in the past, for several reasons of which is that my son Ladin has been allowed by the Iranians to exit Iran and go to Syria as a show of good will to the rest of the detainees, and that they will be released, and he will be keen on informing the family that his brothers will be exiting soon from Iran. No doubt that such news will be exchanged over the phone, while the phones are monitored, thus the information will be available to the adversaries. Accordingly, if the intelligence commander in the area is aware, he will think that they are headed to me and will survey them to find the place that they will settle in.

And regardless of the possibilities in monitoring them, we have to be on the cautious side and take the following steps to break the surveillance:

They will go to the tunnel between Kuhat and Peshawar, and arrange a meeting between them and another brother. The meeting must be precise in timing and it will be inside the tunnel, and they will change cars inside the tunnel, so they will ride in the car with the brother that they will meet instead of the car they were riding in, and the brothers who are going to drive the car must be instructed on the strict adherence to the timings.

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After changing cars, the brother who is driving the car that is subject to surveillance will drive to an area that is unsuspected, and the people coming from Iran will go to Peshawar, go to one of the closed markets, and change cars again, then head to a safe place in Peshawar until we arrange for them to come, with Allah's will.

The main thing about succeeding in avoiding surveillance is to go to the tunnel and to move after getting out of it in overcast weather, even if that would lead to them waiting for some time, knowing that the Peshawar area and its surroundings is often overcast.

They also should be warned on the importance of getting rid of everything they received from Iran, like baggage or anything, even as small as a needle, as there are eavesdropping chips that are developed to be so small that they can even be put inside a medical syringe; and since the Iranians are not to be trusted, then it is possible to plant chips in some of the coming people's belongings.

This process will be done only with Um Hamzah. As for my sons 'Uthman and Muhammad, it would be nice to arrange a safe place for them in Pakistan.

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And it is preferred that we communicate with the Iranians if they release my family and do not release my daughter Fatimah, as they promised that after the release of their prisoner with us that they will release my family, which includes my daughter Fatimah, and she is connected to her husband, and it is not fair to separate women from their husbands, so she should be released with her husband and his wife Um Hafs (TN: his other wife).

As for what concerns my son Hamzah, you had an opinion that the arrival of the brothers to us be stopped due to the current difficult situation, so after thinking it over, I sent to Shaykh Sa'id Allah, have mercy on his soul, an opinion that he agreed on with me, which is that we receive all the brothers arriving, so that they remain as a lifeline and replenishment for what we lose of talents and cadres, and to limit the time that they remain in Pakistan to two or three weeks, whereby they are given a quick training course that is heavy on ideology in addition to

weapons usage basics, and through that we get to identify the talents and abilities of the coming brothers, so that whom we find is distinguished and capable on call and recruitment. We will send him to his country to conduct specific missions like inciting for Jihad over the internet, collecting donations, or recruiting some distinguished brothers, and we will keep a limited number of them to develop their energy with you in Waziristan. As far as the rest of the youth, you send the ones that show toughness and discipline, and adherence to Islamic manners to the front with the Taliban, and you tell him that he will live like they live and those that you notice who do not have it, then you apologize to them and tell them that when the conditions improves, we will send a call out for him and his like to respond and join.

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And based on that, there is an issue that I wanted to consult with you on, which is that my son Hamzah be sent to Qatar, where he studies religious sciences, and perform the duty of informing the nation and delivering some of what we ask him to deliver to the nation, spread the Jihad doctrine, and refute the wrong and the suspicions raised around Jihad within the freedoms allowed there.

There is no doubt that the nation needs to be approached and closely interacted with, and the knowledge of its realities and the approaches that need to be used in delivering the information, while the Mujahidin do not get that opportunity because of their distance and the apostates chasing them worldwide, which denies them the chance to find out the needs of the nation and to respond to these needs.

Except that Hamzah is one of the Mujahidin and he bears their thoughts and worries and at the same time he can interact with the nation, as it is difficult to indict him and to ask Qatar to extradite, him because he was imprisoned when he was a child, so there are no crimes outstanding against him.

27- In the past, I watched some of programs about me, the most recent of which was "al-Islamiyun" program (TN: the Islamists). In one of its episodes was a repeated matter that relied on incorrect information, and in some case inaccurate information, and as you know, if the person does not disclose his history then the media people and the historians will make up some history for him with whatever information is available to them, whether right or wrong.

So in order not have a mix-up on that subject, I thought that you could arrange with Ahmad Zaydan to prepare a program documented by us with real information, which I might send to you in a future message.

And part of the agreement is that the work would be joint between al-Jazeera and al-Sahab, so that they have the copyrights preserved to them.

In closing: We wait to hear your news and messages, and we pray to Allah to guide us all on what he likes and on what pleases him, and to get us together with his help and will, and cover us with his mercy, and praise Allah.

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Your brother Zamrai.

--The attached is what Shaykh Yunis wrote:

Our status and the two pitfalls endangering us which we need to eradicate.

Presently we are experiencing the most favorable atmosphere in the history of the Islamic nation. There is a base of youths adopting our teachings and following our path without any efforts on our parts to teach them the faith. They are ready for anything posted for them on the "spider web" (TN: Internet), after validating the source.

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It is the main principle of the empowerment strategy, as the saying goes; swords conquer and knowledge enlightens; and capturing the hearts comes before controlling nations. It makes the establishment of the religion easier; and the best example is the model of Fayruz al-Daylami, who accomplished his task without seeing the Prophet Muhammad. Also, because Fayruz knew in his heart what was needed to be done, and did it. Therefore, spreading our cause and simplifying its principles so it is easy to understand and clarify its applicability in answering all the mundane and religious questions. The model will speed up the conquering, the victory, and uncover any hidden surprises from the unexpected in our midst, which is a point realized by the enemy of God among the Christians. They have found a class of

followers in our countries who are educated in their culture to work for them. It behooves us to facilitate the Jihad road before our eyes in unimaginable, easy, and clean-to-achieve ways; and to protect against two dangerous pitfalls: one is security related and the other is inflexibility and narrow-mindedness, on which I will elaborate later.

Having the youth base represent the right soil for our cause, without having to publicize our activities. The leadership cadre here in Khurasan has been praised and trusted by everyone, and it is doing that on our behalf, allowing us freedom of movements and innovation in the methods, the ways of smuggling, and counterfeiting; and mastering these skills, will allow us to teach the art of mingling among the people executing our strikes and hiding without a trace.

Now the pitfalls:

1- Security pitfall: I will issue a small guideline, signed by the organization, for awareness and directions for anyone thinking about Jihad to prevent the brother from burning himself before burning the enemy. I will also add a suggestion to indicate they are preparing the stage for the coming nation, to

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disguise our intentions from our enemy, leading him to thinking it is a dream attributable to the demise of our cadres and the adversity we are under. We will utilize the right individual at the right stage, either before or after the creation of the nation. The format of the guideline will be video, audio, written and translated to all languages available to us. It will save time in training and make any newcomer an arrow ready to fly.

2- We have to make our position unequivocally clear on the issue of inflexibility and narrow-mindedness; and must have concise, written instructions published for all of the awakening youths to know our stand. The benefits are undeniable on having a guideline to abide by, for ourselves as well as our friends, and to rid ourselves of the accusation of inflexibility and narrow-mindedness, and it will also broaden the horizons of our brethren. We are approaching a stage where narrow-mindedness is a killer, and ignorance of Shari'ah is damning. Lately, the term "the Salafist approach to Jihad" is spreading on the Internet, accusing individuals of not following the approach. It is a very dangerous situation, especially because it is attributed to us



and the rise of new groups advocating for a stringent form of the faith.

The certainty in issues related to Jihad is mere guessing used to typify and classify people in a way that is not free from the hands and intervention of state security apparatus. It is a possibility that cannot be ruled out. This typifying (TN: religious stereotyping), boasting with titles, isolates and segregates us from the

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nation. You have experienced it in Peshawar and have seen its outcome in Algeria. If this concept gains footing, it will put the individuals in a situation where they refrain from speaking the truth for the fear of typifying (TN: religious stereotyping). Therefore, it is a must to eliminate it while in its infancy, and expand peoples' horizons, guiding them gently to the truth. We are not monopolizing the Salafi way or any other doctrine, but we are members of the entire nation, reciting the words of its scholars on righteousness, and we do not hold any grudges or are unreachable by the followers of any dogma. We are all from one nation and we are all held by our words, and none but the ones descried in the Cow verse are left. The matter of the practical Jihad operations is vast, and the issues we are facing now are agreed upon by the prominent scholars of our nation.

We must avoid the stigma of being a one-dimensional sect, opposed to all others. We are Muslims following the teachings of Islam and we are not the owners of the Salafist way, and must avoid typifying (TN: religious stereotyping) each other. It is important to have a memorandum issued from Shaykh Abu-Yahya and Shaykh Mahmud clarifying the issues of penitence, atonement, and the virtue of patience; refraining from accusing and judging without being qualified to judge; in addition to expanding the awareness of the followers in the arenas of politics and Shari'ah, which I believe publishing a letter in the form of questions and answers well help greatly.

(TN: No signature, or date)

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