CHAPTER III

Tenure Management: Experiences in the Democratic World

In any democratic set up, the nature and stability of political regimes influences the way the police organization functions and manages its internal affairs. Police organizations in all countries evolve through complex interactions between civil society and political institutions. The internal management of the police is consequently influenced by a host of local factors, including the interests of a wide range of stakeholders in the social and political system. To the extent that this is the case, no ‘model’ of police management in general, or of tenure management of executive cadres, in particular, can be derived from the efficient or successful practices of any one, or a combination of police forces in other countries.

Nevertheless, a general understanding of the experiences of some other countries in broad areas of police management could, in this context, help identify broad structures, processes and criteria that shape the management of police organizations, including transfers and postings, in comparable systems of democratic countries.

Needless to say, the policing systems of much of the developed world are radically different from those that exist in India, and the points of comparison within these, in terms of tenure and transfer, are limited. In the US for instance, the Municipal police, also called the local police
department, dominates the scene.\(^1\) Thus, there are nearly 17,000 law enforcement agencies in the United States, and about 75 percent of these are local. The State and Federal agencies account for 14 and 11 per cent respectively. Most of the police departments operate in small towns. Unlike India where the Director General of police is appointed by the State government, the police chief in most of the towns is appointed by the Mayor, and is not necessarily an ‘insider’, that is a police professional who has grown with the local department. Commenting on Policing system in the US, Yusuf Ziya Özcan and Recep Gültekin observes,

In the majority of jurisdictions today, there is some kind of reliance on the popular vote to obtain some element of community involvement. Although many officers, particularly sheriffs, still have to seek election, the majority of senior police ranks are filled by transfer. The power of transfer frequently lies with the mayor of a town or city and occasionally with a standing committee of the city council (the legislative body).\(^2\)

Moreover, the small size of most of the police organizations has a crucial impact on the character of personnel management. More than 10,000 (59 per cent) of US police agencies have fewer than ten full time sworn officers. Further, there are another 1,600 that employ only one full time officer. These organizations are fairly autonomous and, as a result, in the literature on the US police, there is little by way of any significant

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\(^2\) Yusuf Ziya Özcan and Recep Gültekin, “Police and Politics in Turkey” http://www.britsoccrim.org/bccsp/vol03/ozcan.html
debate on the impact of frequent transfers on the efficiency and effectiveness of police officials.

As far as better human resource management and employee’s satisfaction is concerned, the working of the policing system in Australia does have some points of comparison, and hence, relevance, for India. Policing activities in Australia are predominantly the responsibility of State and Territory Government Police Agencies. The Commonwealth Government operates the Australian Federal Police to enforce Commonwealth law. They also provide a community policing service in the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) on behalf of the ACT government. Each jurisdiction’s police service is autonomous, but there is significant cooperation between jurisdictions, as, for example, between the Australian Police Ministers’ Council, the Commissioners’ conference and the various National Common Police Services.

Most jurisdictions in Australia have introduced some form of output-based management for police agencies. Jurisdictions have been conscious of better human resource management and employees’ satisfaction. For example, research conducted by the Queensland Police Service in 1988 indicated that employees who are fulfilling their career aspirations and who are able to maintain a stable and preferred living environment for their family are more likely to be job satisfied, motivated and productive. As far as internal management of the force is concerned, the Queensland police have adopted the Principle of Corporate

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Governance.\textsuperscript{5} Under this scheme, the Commissioner is responsible for setting the Services’ strategic direction and managing the various functions of the Service. To assist the Commissioner two principal decision-making fora have been established. They are: the Senior Executive Conference and the Board of Management. These bodies outline the strategic focus and direction for the police department.

To support meaningful career development by providing the employee with information regarding their career planning, the Queensland Police has also developed the Career Planning and Management System.\textsuperscript{6} In addition, a strategy within the Queensland Police Service Human Resources Management Plan, 1995-2000, is to establish a service delivery ‘career advisory service’ adding human resource management support to the concept of career planning and management.\textsuperscript{7} As far as management of the transfer process in the Queensland Police is concerned, before 1990, promotion and transfer in the police department were generally based on seniority. The Fitzgerald Report (1989) and the Police Service Administration Act (1990), suggested appointments on the basis of merit alone, as determined by departmental selection boards comprising senior local officers as well as police officers from outside the region. However, the Report on the Review of the Queensland Police Service in 1996, still found widespread dissatisfaction among police officers, particularly with regard to regional bias in promotion and transfer decisions and inconsistent decision-

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\textsuperscript{5} Corporate Governance, http://www.police.qld.gov.au/pr/services/pdf/reports/00_01/corp_gov.pdf)
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making by the selection panels. Based on this assessment, a number of changes were introduced in the transfer process in May 1998. According to these changes, provision was made to have an independent community member on the selection panel to ensure impartiality. In addition, to ensure regular feedback from employees, the police departments have been conducting perception surveys from time to time. The first such survey was conducted in 1998. Again, in May-June 2000, another survey was conducted to assess the response of officials on the promotion and transfer system.

The experience of the Queensland police with professional management of internal affairs of the police department, gives us an understanding of continuous evolution of structures and processes to improve human resource management in a police department.

Unfortunately, most developing countries do not display an adequate concern for the better management of police departments. In such countries, the functioning of the police is marked by highly centralized structures of decision-making and continuous interference by politicians. Turkey is a useful example of such a highly centralized structure of policing, with significant instances of extraneous interference in the day-to-day functioning of the Force. At the top of the policing structure in Turkey, is the Ministry of the Interior with the highest authority. The General Director of Security, head of the police organization, is appointed by and accountable to the Minister of the Interior. Under the control of the General Directorate, and in harmony

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7 Ibid
with national territorial divisions, there are 80 provinces, each of which is headed by a four-star director. Each province, in turn, has sub-divisions in districts and small towns. Local police stations in the districts are the lowest level in the structure. More than 170,000 police officers, spread all over the country, make up this huge national police force. Decision-making on policing matters is vested with the General Directorate of Security.9

Like India, this centralization of the decision-making structure has vital implications for the police-politics relationship. As in India, the police in Turkey are accountable to a civilian elected Minister, and this translates to the near complete control of the police force by the Party in power. There are frequent charges that the ruling party interferes with the police organization in order to further their political goals. In a familiar pattern, whenever the government changes, there is a complete overhaul among the top police officers in the organization. Inevitably, within such a set-up, there are numerous instances of political interference in transfers of police officials.

A study conducted by Yusuf Ziya Özcan and Recep Gültekin10 on the degree of political involvement and interference in the Turkish police organisation, with special reference to promotion and transfers of police officials, found serious deviations from established rules and norms. According to the study, half the officers surveyed believed that rules were not followed in either transfers or promotions. Almost three quarters of the respondents reported fears or anxieties about their promotion. The

findings also point to the negative influence of pressure groups on the policing profession. Politicians ranked first in terms of their negative influence on the police, followed by human rights groups and the media. One third of the officers revealed that a pressure group had interfered in their transfers/promotions. The Özcan-Gültek in study concluded that,

…in countries where the laws are not applied effectively and equally, it is almost impossible to keep the police organisation completely independent of interference from external forces and mainly from politicians.

A law-abiding society, where the rights and responsibilities of politicians and police are drawn clearly and enforced properly, may lessen the potential clashes between politicians and police by making the rules of the game open and transparent. In countries like Turkey, where democratic principles are not settled and internalised fully, it is natural to observe serious deviations from the laws regulating the work of politicians and police.11

**THE UNITED KINGDOM**

It is in the United Kingdom that some continuities in terms of structure and practice can be defined with the system in India – despite the very wide divergence between the policing system the British administered in their own land, and the system they established in their Indian colonies. It is, consequently, useful, to take a close look at British

11 Ibid.
policy and practice in the context of tenure and transfer in the Police services.

In the United Kingdom, policing is founded on a tripartite structure of the Home Secretary, Police Authorities and Chief Constable, with a vital balance between these functionaries. The force is locally administrated but is subject to strong Central government influence and review. Each of the 43 separate police forces in England and Wales, eight in Scotland and one in Northern Ireland has a local police authority, its own Chief Constable who is an independent officer of the Crown; however, the English and Wales forces are part of the responsibility of the Secretary of State for the Home Department, while the Scottish police force and the Royal Ulster Constabulary are part of the responsibility of the Secretaries for Scotland and Northern Ireland respectively. The Central Government, through the Home Secretary, wields immense control over police organizations. The Home Secretary is answerable to the Parliament and the public for the provision of an efficient and effective police service. He monitors overall performance of the Force in terms of the Ministerial priorities and associated performance indicators, policing plans, annual reports and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) report. He is also answerable to the Parliament for expenditure on the police service. He determines the total grant and

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12 All police forces are subject to inspection by HM Inspectors of Constabulary (HMIC), who report to the Home Secretary and whose reports are published. For well over a century, HMIC has been charged with examining and improving the efficiency of the police service in England and Wales. See Organisation and Management of the Police Service in England and Wales in 2001, http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/cjschap3.htm#A.
its allocation to police authorities using a funding formula\textsuperscript{13}. However, the Home Secretary does not interfere in internal management of the force or day-to-day policing. Apart from this, some of the powers of the Home Secretary are informal.\textsuperscript{14} Their aim is to promote uniformity of purpose and professional ability, and to provide the means of exchange of ideas and police experience.

There are other bodies at the national level that contribute to the efficient policing in the country. They are the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) and Association of Police Authorities (APA). The ACPO has members from Assistant Chief Constables or equivalent rank and above from 44 forces in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. It has a role in developing policing policies, carrying out research and publishing guidance for Chief Officers. The APA represents police authorities in consultation on police matters and supports police authorities in their work by providing training, publications and research.\textsuperscript{15} The Home Secretary does not have the power to appoint and remove the Chief Constables.

For each provincial force, the management of the force rests with the Police Authority, of which two-thirds of the members are local

\textsuperscript{13} According to the formula, funds are allocated on the basis of assessment of the relative needs for policing in their areas. The formula is based on an analysis of the activities carried out by the police and socio-economic data. Allocated funds are paid directly to police authorities (except in the case of the Metropolitan Police Authority, where funds are paid to the Greater London Authority and passed on to the Metropolitan Police Authority).

\textsuperscript{14} \url{http://www.police999.com/history/police07.html}.

\textsuperscript{15} \url{http://www.policereform.gov.uk/whitepaper/appendix/appen2.htm}.
councilors and one third are Magistrates.\textsuperscript{16} The architects of the British criminal justice system visualized a police with the consent of the community catering to its needs and aspirations.\textsuperscript{17} The ideal of policing in Britain has been that the public has the right to know what the police have achieved. People can have access to information on how well the police are serving the community. Principally, the police are answerable to democratically elected representatives in the local self-government.

The Police Authority, subject to approval of the Home Secretary, appoints the Chief Constable (in London the post is designated as the Commissioner). He is responsible for the overall direction and control of the force. He is responsible for publishing annual policing plans and annual reports, setting the budget and levying the precept. Each police chief serves until retirement and can only be removed for serious act of misconduct. The police authority cannot vote to remove the Chief from office\textsuperscript{18}. Consequently, the Chief can make decisions based on departmental considerations in contrast to the situation in India, where the preferences of political executive are normally the determining factor. The UK has adopted a doctrine of constabulary independence.\textsuperscript{19} The notion of constabulary independence implies that, in a democratic community, the police are called upon to meet the demands and counter

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{16} The police authority for any area is a body corporate and every police authority consists of 17 members. However, the Secretary of State may by order provide in relation to a police authority specified in the order that the number of its members shall be a specific odd number greater than 17.
\item \textsuperscript{17} “Democratising the Police: Lessons from UK,” \textit{Economic and Political Weekly}, Mumbai, September 30, 2000, p. 3589.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Jafferson and Grimshaw, p. 15.
\end{itemize}
demands articulated by popular representatives, but within the context of complete autonomy in determining the professional strategies and mechanisms of response. Thus the police chief’s freedom in his operational role is matched by his usually high degree of accountability. It is for the chief constable to decide how police operations should be conducted. He is free to exercise his operational responsibilities, but as the Patton Commission on Policing stated, this does not mean that he cannot be “held to account afterwards for the manner in which he/she exercises them.”

We find, therefore, that the structure of the police force itself provides little scope for illegitimate extraneous interference in policing. The tripartite system of control provides for checks and balances that make sure that neither the Chief Constable, the Police Authority nor the Government have unrestrained control over the force. A UK Home office policy document declares, “the balance between the influence of all three means that no one of the three had the power to act as if they have a ‘private police’ force. The public has an important influence on all three parts of the organisation. The goals set by the Home Secretary are based on what the public, as voters, want the police to do.”

In the Indian case, we have witnessed that local politics influences police performance to a great extent. In the UK, such interference is not as frequent because:

20 [www.humanrightsinitiative.org/police/policepublic_article.htm](http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/police/policepublic_article.htm).
21 [www.police999.com/history/police09.html](http://www.police999.com/history/police09.html).
• Firstly, in many areas, the party political balance is quite even and the presence of one third of Magistrates on Police Committees renders these fairly independent of party political considerations.

• Secondly, law and order is usually of considerable local concern and, therefore, neglect of the public interest may alienate the voters.

• Thirdly, the independence of the Chief Constable to direct and control the police ensures that operational police activities are under professional police control.

The role of Home office and Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary also ensure that standards do not fall below an acceptable minimum. 22 Commenting on the autonomy of the police force, the Royal Commission on Police Reforms noted,

The basic soundness of our present police system is not due merely to the fact that responsible people operate it successfully, though that is certainly true. Nor, again, is the system sound merely because it follows a tradition of local policing which is traceable back to many centuries, though that also is true. In our opinion, the present police system is sound because it is based upon and reflects a political idea of immense political value, which has gained wide acceptance in the country, namely the idea of partnership between central and local government in the administration of public service. This idea working itself out in a variety of ways in our education health, housing and other

22 Bunyard, pp. 45-6.
services admirably suits the British temperament. It gives free reins for discussion and ample scope for compromise, thus promoting the growth of an enlightened and mature public opinion.23

MANAGEMENT OF TENURE OF POLICE OFFICIALS IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

In the UK, the individual Force designs and implements a tenure policy to meet its own requirement and circumstances. The issue of the transfer of officers is seen as part of a co-ordinated approach to career development and staff management. As such, transfer of employees is only one aspect of a much broader strategy. Thus, the New South Wales Police have devised a separate transfer policy for commissioned and non-commissioned officers.24 For Non-Commissioned officers, vacancies for lateral transfers are advertised in the Police Services Weekly by the Human Resources Advisory Committee (HRAC) and selections are made using a merit-based selection procedure. All transfer applications are forwarded through the officer’s chain of command after a pre-transfer review conducted by the Commander. Objections to transfers are submitted on a separate form. The HRAC resolves disagreements over proposed and disciplinary transfers, carried out with the approval of Commissioners or Assistant Commissioners. Officers subject to disciplinary transfers have the right to appeal to Group for Research in Employment and Training (GREAT); otherwise no right of appeal exists.

For Commissioned Officers, transfers are considered every two years for Superintendent positions, or every five years for Inspector or Chief Inspector positions, and transfer decisions are made in consultation with Senior Executives, the Chain of Command and staff members concerned, taking into account the overall interests and development opportunities of the candidates. The Commission recommended that the basis for transfers be confined to *proper administrative and managerial considerations*.

According to a study conducted by Gary Mundy for the Policing and Reducing Crime Unit of the Home Department, the decision to adopt the tenure policy in UK Forces was shaped by a number of factors:

- The flattening of the promotional hierarchy within forces, with fewer promotion opportunities leading to less movement within the Force;
- The increasing importance placed upon equal opportunities;
- An approach to policing which increasingly takes officers away from core policing functions and into specialized policing areas and a resultant need to give greater emphasis on ‘core policing roles, compounded by the need to act in the light of some high profile corruption cases within specialist policing squads in which lack of turnover was identified as a contributing factor.

The first high profile national recommendation, which endorsed tenure policies, came from the Police Complaint Authority (PCA) in

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26 Ibid.
1991 as a means of preventing corruption and stagnation in specialist posts. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) subsequently offered guidance to forces on tenure in August 1993. The guidance, however, recommended tenure on a wider human resource development grounds than the reason set out by the PCA. The HMIC stressed that tenure could not stand alone and it should be seen as one part of a broader human resource strategy, which should also include:

- Staff appraisal systems and personal development plans;
- Personnel specifications for the posts, clearly stating skills and abilities relevant to the post that can be measured during the selection process;
- An objective process of filling vacancies within core specialist and specialist policing areas; and
- The recognition that tenure does not remove either the responsibility of supervisors to manage staff properly or for giving career guidance and support to their staff.

While recommending tenure policy, the HMIC identified three types of policing: Core Policing, Core Specialist Policing and Specialist Policing. The Core Policing is a post that is predominantly concerned with work within the core policing objectives of the Force and likely to include regular contact with the common public. Core Specialist Policing is a post requiring further development of core skills or acquisition of

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27 Ibid.
further skills to undertake particular duties. And Specialist Policing is a post that requires additional training and skills that are unique to the position. The majority of Forces adopted these definitions when introducing tenure, the effect of which is to regulate the amount of time officers spend outside of ‘core policing’.

The HMIC recommended that tenure should apply to all non-core policing posts. However, individual Forces were largely left to decide exactly which posts should be tenured and how the policy would be implemented. This includes how departments are classified in terms of the above categories. The HMIC consistently recommended that every Force should develop a tenure policy to help spread talent throughout the organisation. This would help

- Create opportunities for the best people to move into the most suitable jobs;
- Fulfill the need for movement in stressful specialist posts; and
- Give greater flexibility in career development and succession planning.

In one of its reports, the HMIC recorded its apprehension that tenure policies often provoke entrenched and strong feelings. To achieve maximum benefit, policies should be executed within a wider personnel strategy linked to local policing plans. The Personnel and Training Committee of the Association of Chief Police Officers prepares guidance
on tenure policy.\textsuperscript{28} The report stresses that the Service needs to recognise that the mechanism designed to improve equality of opportunity and efforts of individuals to promote them will be ineffective in the long term without an accompanying shift in general attitudes and culture.

According to Gary Mundy’s Study:\textsuperscript{29}

- 36 of the 43 forces in England and Wales had a tenure policy in place.
- Implementation of tenure varies across forces, particularly in terms of
  - posts to which tenure is applied;
  - categorization of departments into core, core specialist and specialist policing;
  - regulations around which officers can be transferred after completing a tenured post;
  - extent to which tenure applied retrospectively; and
  - length of tenure attached to posts.
- The report pointed out problems when a particular Force had taken key elements of other Forces’ policy that were later found to be inappropriate when applied in their own police Force.
- While officers identified that the creation of opportunities, balancing of skills and prevention of stagnation in specialist departments are a worthwhile aim, many disputed whether tenure was the most appropriate way to achieve these.

\textsuperscript{28} Ibid, pp.39-40.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
• Those officers with personnel positions and those officers with relatively shorter services were broadly supportive of tenure, at least in the short to medium term. At the other end, operational officers and those with longer service in specialist departments were more dismissive of tenures.

• All forces, in varying degrees, reported problems with the implementation of their tenure policy. Many of these problems had less to do with the model of tenure chosen than with more general issue of how the process was managed.

• There was a widespread perception that tenure does not operate fairly or consistently and the policy was open to some form of abuse.

• Policy was applied too rigidly and did not allow for changes in individual circumstances. There was little evidence, however, amongst forces with more flexible policies that their popularity was any greater. Paradoxically, an increase in flexibility correlated with an increase in the perception that the policy was not being applied consistently to all officers and that tenure was being used more as a threat to ‘problem’ officers than as a coherent management strategy.

• Most forces felt that other career management policies such as the new staff reprisal system and personal development plans would, if successful, reduce the need for tenure.

    Before adopting a particular tenure model, most of the forces take into account the impact of tenure policy on

• the amount of movement caused by the policy;
• the financial cost of the policy;

• the distribution of skill and experience around the force and resulting impact on police operations; and, lastly

• morale, particularly resulting from disillusionment, de-motivation and feeling of unfairness among employees.

It is up to the individual Forces to make decisions about which posts tenure should apply to and how these should operate. That is, whether to apply fixed time limits, flexible time limits or to set annual turnover targets for each department. Forces sometimes varied the policy in accordance with categories of the posts, that is, those classified as core specialist and those classified as specialist. Most forces – 29 out of 43 – opted for models based on fixed time periods for designated posts. There was variation among Forces on the rank to which tenure was applied. Only three Forces applied tenure up to and including the Superintendent rank. Most of the Forces did not apply tenure practices to superior posts due to the fact that these ranks would already have spent much of their career transferring between departments in order to gain necessary experience for promotions. Therefore, most forces linked the issue of tenure to the larger goal of career development of employees. They perceived tenure as part of an integrated career and operational performance package, and not one that merely focused on moving people. The underlying rationale was that tenure and transfer policies must
improve operational performance by building up individual experience and professional skills.³⁰

Tenure length varies across posts within Forces and for similar posts across different Forces. Different Forces apply different criteria to set tenure length. These include the investment made in officers in terms of training for the post, and time taken for officers to get ‘up to speed’ in the post, among others.

Most of the Forces experienced problems in the implementation of the policy and regulations. The most frequent problem observed was with regard to the amount of notice given to officers about the date on which they would be tenured out of a post, and about the location of their next posting. In most of the Forces, there is a gap between what was stated in the Force policy and what was being implemented. Most of the Forces have policies that stated that officers should be given at least two months advance notice. However, this did not always occur. Also important among officers was the way in which they were informed of the reasons for their post being made subject to tenure. Such experiences indicate that there can be a lack of sensitivity to the degree of difficulties caused to officers as a result of having to move departments for reasons other than their own choice.

Though many officers agree with the idea of tenure in theory, in practice its implementation was often perceived to be inconsistent. Tenure policies require constant monitoring and formal procedures to assess their impact. The best way of doing this is to set clearly defined

targets against which performance can be measured. Forces with greater coordination were successful in identifying problems as they occurred. Where the management was more effective, stagnation and poor performance could be identified and dealt with appropriately, and the volume of turnover and opportunities for lateral career development would increase as under performing officers would be moved out of specialist departments. Moving officers to core policing because of poor performance may act as a threat to officers and thus contribute to improved performance.

In the UK, most of the forces have formal policies in place to regulate the filling of vacancies in posts subject to tenure. For the majority of posts, departments advertised vacancies across the force, and then all applicants were subject to a formal selection procedure which would normally involve:

- an assessment of the extent to which they fulfil the necessary criteria for the post; and

- a formal interview, involving an officer from personnel, to assess the suitability of all applicants and identify the best candidate.

In 1993, the HMIC recommend that tenure should work alongside selection procedures, which advertise vacancies to as many officers as possible, clearly identifying the skills required for the post, and involve applicants being interviewed by a panel of selectors. Whilst all sample Forces in the study had these systems in place, it is not within the scope of the present research to examine the extent to which they were effective or fair.
One of the factors cited as influencing the introduction of tenure was the PCA’s 1991 report into corrupt practices in specialist policing squads. Whether tenure has been able to address this complex problem is not clear. Officers who were susceptible to becoming involved in corrupt practices would be vulnerable in whichever department they worked, although some departments may offer relatively more opportunities than others.

Thus, we find that different Forces in the UK have adopted different tenure policies, which reflect different priorities and circumstances within such Forces. The impact of such policies also varies from Force to Force. It is, consequently, neither feasible nor desirable to develop a model tenure policy, as different types of policies could be appropriate for different Forces and varying local circumstances. However, some common concerns were expressed across the board, including financial, operational, and organisational considerations, as well as difficulties relating to the morale and motivation of officers. No example was found of a policy operating without experiencing difficulties in one or more of these areas. Forces appear to be best able to handle these problems through systems and procedures to continuously monitor the impact of the policy adopted. Systemic monitoring is effective in allowing problems to be highlighted and dealt with promptly. Without such professional and independent monitoring, there is a danger that problems will accumulate to the point at which they begin to undermine the credibility of both the policy and the Force.