Project Report
On
Impact of Frequency of Transfers on Efficiency and Effectiveness of Superintendents of Police

THE STUDY

The present study is an attempt to understand and analyse the impact of frequent transfers on efficiency and effectiveness of SPs. An attempt has been made to empirically establish and demonstrate the linkages and correlation between security and length of tenure and performance in crime and law and order management of officials of the rank of SPs. Further, the study has attempted to review and analyse existing literature on the subject, including the experience of the UK. The ultimate objective is to define and evaluate appropriate norms and practices that ought to determine the State's transfer policy with regard to officers of the rank of SP.

THE PROBLEM

Over the past few decades, a degenerating outgrowth in terms of politicization of administrative positions has resulted in the use of public offices for partisan political purposes. Among other negative effects, this has resulted in uncertain tenures, which have, more importantly, dramatically shortened in the case of Superintendents of Police (SPs). Progressively, the political leadership has acquired a definitive say over the continuation of SPs at places of their postings. The consequent politicization of the Police has seriously affected its morale, discipline and performance. This has also resulted in polarization in some States, on religious, caste and ethnic lines, eroding the credibility of the organisation.

The decline in the average duration of a posting at the SP level, and the persistence of a perpetual "Damocles sword of transfer" throughout such a truncated tenure, appears at a crucial juncture when the complexity of tasks and the manpower in an SP's charge are expanding continuously and rapidly. Under the circumstances, the image and authority of the police, despite extraordinary achievements under the most trying circumstances, has suffered tremendously, and has resulted in a tremendous loss of efficiency in the management of law and order situations, and crime. These trends have been compounded by the criminalisation of politics, which has affected police performance more than the performance of any other state institution.

A preliminary survey of literature on police administration in India suggests that the issue of the impact of transfers on the quality of law and order management has remained a grossly under-researched area of study. There has been no conclusive documentation of the frequency of transfers and its impact on the efficiency and effectiveness of the SPs, with the result that existing research on the subject can only shed limited light on the issues involved.

The present study argues that the key to efficiency in police organization is better human resource management and efficient internal administration. Policing involves complex interventions in human and social relations, and subjective elements certainly play a dominant role in choice making, both within the Force, and in its interactions with the general public. In assessing the performance of the police, and the impact of the frequency of transfers, consequently, perceptions of the general public, as well as of specific stakeholders in civil society and the administration, a priori, could provide a fairly reliable index of efficiency and effectiveness of SPs. This premise underlines the research methodology of this study.

HYPOTHESES

Over the past few decades, a degenerating outgrowth in terms of politicization of administrative positions has resulted in the use of public offices for partisan political purposes. Among other negative effects, this has resulted in uncertain tenures, which have, more importantly, dramatically shortened in the case of Superintendents of Police (SPs). Progressively, the political leadership has acquired a definitive say over the continuation of SPs at places of their postings. The consequent politicization of the Police has seriously affected its morale, discipline and performance. This has also resulted in polarization in some States, on religious, caste and ethnic lines, eroding the credibility of the organisation.

1. Increasing politicization of transfers leads to erosion of efficiency in policing and law enforcement.
2. The transfer policy of Superintendents of Police has remained, at best, an ad hoc arrangement, increasingly subjected to the whims of political leaders.
3. A fixed tenure for Superintendents of Police is the best guarantee against the erosion of efficiency and better control over the law and order situation in an area.
4. Allowing present trends to continue would strengthen the forces of disorder, especially organized criminal groups who have a strong nexus with political actors.
5. There is a need to establish clear norms to govern the security and tenure of officers at the rank of Superintendent of Police.

METHODOLOGY

Several methodological principles were applied to establish the system of investigation for the study. Though the unit of observation was the SP, sufficient attention was paid to draw a sample from senior police officials and various sections of civil society - academicians, journalists, social activists and political actors. The reason for such diversity was to secure the quantification of perceptions of different segments - police and non-police - to have a comprehensive picture of the problem under study.

The study was conducted in three distinct phases:

FINDINGS

The findings of the study have been classified in three categories: Pattern of Transfers, Impact of Transfers and Rules and Norms governing transfers.

PATTERN OF TRANSFERS

The findings of the study have been classified in three categories: Pattern of Transfers, Impact of Transfers and Rules and Norms governing transfers.

1. Frequency of transfers

In the three selected States, the frequency of transfer was the highest in Uttar Pradesh. Official figures indicate that in Uttar Pradesh the average tenure has never been more than one and a half-years since 1947. Worse, there has been a sharp decline in tenure since the late 1980s. Figures indicate that between January 1995 and March 2000, in 45 districts the SPs had a tenure between 6-9 months. In another 28 districts, the average tenure was between 6 and 8 months. Only one district had an average tenure of more than a year. (The data includes districts of Uttaranchal, which was formed in October 2000, but were part of UP prior to this).

The high rate of frequency of transfers of SPs in UP was largely attributed to political instability, coalition governments, increasing politicization at the grassroots level, the criminalisation of politics, and the increasing role of caste in State politics. The stability of tenure of an SP was overwhelmingly dependent on political and caste equations prevailing in the State.

Compared to Uttar Pradesh, SPs enjoy a relatively stable tenure in Assam. An analysis of postings of SPs in 23 districts and Guwahati town indicates that, in 20 districts, the average tenure is more than a year. Among them, in five districts, the average tenure was more than 2 years and in four districts it was two years. Only four districts witnessed an average tenure of one year. Political stability, with regard to the continuity of elected governments for their full terms, in the State could be cited as one of the reasons for the relatively moderate rate of frequency of transfer of SP in Assam.

SPs in Andhra Pradesh also enjoy a relatively stable tenure. The general impression gathered during the survey indicates that SPs are allowed to remain in a district for more than two years. However, the relative stability enjoyed by SPs in Andhra Pradesh and Assam does not indicate that these trends are determined by some sound administrative principle. By and large, the personal choice of the Chief Minister appears to be determining the frequency of transfer in these States. In Andhra Pradesh, in the last five to six years under the present regime, there has been a greater stability of tenure, averaging 2-2.5 years.

2. Basis for Transfer

In all the three States, sound administrative principles and an urge for better governance did not significantly influence the decision by the political executive to transfer an SP. The lowest priority was ascribed to factors such as performance appraisal and popularity among the common people.

• In the opinion of SPs, cordial and entrenched relationships with the political executive were the most important factors influencing the tenure and transfer of SPs. Popularity among the common people, performance appraisal and corruption were the least significant factors influencing these decisions. In Uttar Pradesh, caste plays was seen to play the most important role in transfers, and performance appraisal was the least important factor. In Assam, an entrenched relationship with the political executive was identified as the most significant factor. In Andhra Pradesh, a 'cordial relationship' with the political executive was seen to suffice to ensure a measure of security of tenure.

• In the opinion of senior police officials, pressure from politicians is the most important factor influencing transfers of SPs. Pressures from criminal organisations and public protests were not seen to exert extraordinary influence on the processes governing transfers.

• These findings were substantially confirmed by the perceptions of the common public as well, which rated pressures from politicians as a crucial factor influencing transfers of SPs. Monetary consideration were another important factor identified. Secondary sources also indicated that the general perceptions placed significant emphasis on the monetary factor in defining tenures and transfers of SPs.

3. Profiles of officers transferred more frequently

The study found that honest, impartial, and efficient officers, as well as those who were not regarded as being 'convenient' to 'powerful politicians', were prone to be transferred more frequently. Both the response to the questionnaires and the extensive field interviews conducted tended to suggest that the SP had to keep both the local politicians and the political executive 'satisfied', if he / she was to continue in a district. Transfers to districts were perceived as being ordered mostly to accommodate officers who manipulate political pressure for the field job, irrespective of their professional conduct or integrity.

In the perception of the SPs, honest and efficient officers tended to have relatively short tenures. Officers who did not maintain cordial relationships with the political executive and senior officials in police hierarchy were also transferred more frequently. The pattern was almost the same in all three States. In the perception of the SPs, honest and efficient officers tended to have relatively short tenures. Officers who did not maintain cordial relationships with the political executive and senior officials in police hierarchy were also transferred more frequently. The pattern was almost the same in all three States. The common public also endorsed the perception that honest and impartial officers, with good leadership qualities were transferred more frequently than the others.

4. Political Interference in Transfers

In all three States, external political pressure played a defining role in the transfer of SPs. Leaders of the ruling party and local leaders from the district were identified as the most frequent source of pressure on the government for the transfer of SPs. Broadly, chief ministers and other political leaders were seen to be unable to face pressures or dissent from their own party leaders, and tended to succumb to, or accommodate, their demands for variously posting 'convenient' and 'inconvenient' officers into or out of the districts, as demanded by their party colleagues. This trend was the most visible in Uttar Pradesh, with a succession of unstable governments and complex political scenarios creating extraordinary pressures. At the time of the field study, it was found that most of the SPs then posted to the districts had only been transferred under pressure from, or on the intervention of, ruling party politicians.

5. Profiles of districts that have witnessed more frequent transfers

1. Impact on individual officials

Frequent transfers not only result in disillusionment and loss of motivation but also have a negative influence on many of the attributes necessary for effective crime and law and order management. A majority of the SPs interviewed felt that the investigative work of the police was the aspect of policing that was most affected. Since a strict officer tended to be transferred out after a brief tenure, unscrupulous officers begin to manipulate investigations in connivance with perpetrators of crime, organized criminals and their patrons in the administration and the political executive, producing results that further either narrow personal gains or vested political interests. The vulnerability of the SP, consequently, directly hampers the investigative role of the district police organisation.

An insecure tenure also motivates subordinate officials and staff to take advantage of the situation. A glaring anomaly of the current system is that corrupt and ineffective officers at the subordinate level tend to enjoy a longer tenure, while SPs are transferred at a much faster rate. Corrupt and unprofessional subordinate personnel, consequently, tend to go unpunished, since they know that they can simply 'wait out' the tenure of an honest and efficient superior officer. Often, moreover, corrupt subordinate officers develop more entrenched relationships with the local political leaders and other influential persons of the area, implicitly altering the balance of the relationship with their superior officer. An insecure SP is thus unable to extract the best from his subordinates, and may lack the de facto power to effectively deal with the recalcitrant among them.

Frequent transfers also hamper effective distribution of experience, skill and talent available in the Force. Since officials who enjoy political patronage secure the posting of their choice, efficient officers are frequently neglected. The general observation by respondents in the present study that officers with the right political linkages are posted to the districts, while those who do not compromise are given various administrative or other non-field postings. This robs the districts of efficient police leadership, and also deprives good officers of adequate experience in the field.

There is, moreover, a minimum gestation before an SP can formulate, implement and evaluate strategies for crime management and police administration in a new charge. Frequent transfers and brief tenures do not allow this process to come to fruition, and an officer loses out on the experience of a full cycle where he can implement and assess the impact of his methods and strategies. This diminishes the quality of his experience, undermines broader structures of accountability and responsibility, and disrupts the pattern of professional growth that can produce requisite leadership qualities at a later stage in the individual's career.

The current practice of frequent transfers of SPs hampers investigation of criminal cases involving 'powerful persons', contributes to the concealment of crime committed by such individuals, and creates a milieu in which politically motivated and biased decisions in cases of high intensity and organized criminals, the withdrawal of cases for extraneous reasons and the toleration of small acts of lawlessness becomes increasingly frequent.

Senior officers in Assam believed that protection of criminal interests and compromises on criminal investigations were among the SP's functions that were 'least affected' due to frequent transfers. By contrast, senior officers in Andhra Pradesh thought that these functions were significantly affected by frequent transfers. Intuitively, the latter perception would tend to incline to greater accuracy.

2. Impact on law and order management

Frequent transfers not only result in disillusionment and loss of motivation but also have a negative influence on many of the attributes necessary for effective crime and law and order management. A majority of the SPs interviewed felt that the investigative work of the police was the aspect of policing that was most affected. Since a strict officer tended to be transferred out after a brief tenure, unscrupulous officers begin to manipulate investigations in connivance with perpetrators of crime, organized criminals and their patrons in the administration and the political executive, producing results that further either narrow personal gains or vested political interests. The vulnerability of the SP, consequently, directly hampers the investigative role of the district police organisation.

An insecure tenure also motivates subordinate officials and staff to take advantage of the situation. A glaring anomaly of the current system is that corrupt and ineffective officers at the subordinate level tend to enjoy a longer tenure, while SPs are transferred at a much faster rate. Corrupt and unprofessional subordinate personnel, consequently, tend to go unpunished, since they know that they can simply ‘wait out’ the tenure of an honest and efficient superior officer. Often, moreover, corrupt subordinate officers develop more entrenched relationships with the local political leaders and other influential persons of the area, implicitly altering the balance of the relationship with their superior officer. An insecure SP is thus unable to extract the best from his subordinates, and may lack the de facto power to effectively deal with the recalcitrant among them.

Frequent transfers also hamper effective distribution of experience, skill and talent available in the Force. Since officials who enjoy political patronage secure the posting of their choice, efficient officers are frequently neglected. The general observation by respondents in the present study that officers with the right political linkages are posted to the districts, while those who do not compromise are given various administrative or other non-field postings. This robs the districts of efficient police leadership, and also deprives good officers of adequate experience in the field.

There is, moreover, a minimum gestation before an SP can formulate, implement and evaluate strategies for crime management and police administration in a new charge. Frequent transfers and brief tenures do not allow this process to come to fruition, and an officer loses out on the experience of a full cycle where he can implement and assess the impact of his methods and strategies. This diminishes the quality of his experience, undermines broader structures of accountability and responsibility, and disrupts the pattern of professional growth that can produce requisite leadership qualities at a later stage in the individual’s career.

The current practice of frequent transfers of SPs hampers investigation of criminal cases involving ‘powerful persons’, contributes to the concealment of crime committed by such individuals, and creates a milieu in which politically motivated and biased decisions in cases of high intensity and organized criminals, the withdrawal of cases for extraneous reasons and the toleration of small acts of lawlessness becomes increasingly frequent.

Senior officers in Assam believed that protection of criminal interests and compromises on criminal investigations were among the SP’s functions that were ‘least affected’ due to frequent transfers. By contrast, senior officers in Andhra Pradesh thought that these functions were significantly affected by frequent transfers. Intuitively, the latter perception would tend to incline to greater accuracy.

3. Impact on police organisation

Frequency of transfer of SP has a negative impact on some of the vital aspects of police organization as well. The biggest casualty is the lack of communication with subordinate officials. The message that goes down the police rank and file is that personnel can afford to perform indifferently on the crime management front as long as they have political patronage. Often, it is the Station officers who enjoy such patronage, and enjoy powers and protection disproportionate to their rank.

In the opinions of SPs, frequent transfers have the most perceptible impact on leadership, organizational cohesiveness, command structure, discipline and morale of junior officials. This was substantially confirmed by the responses of senior police official, who felt that frequent transfers had a negative impact on leadership, organisational cohesiveness, command structures and discipline. Their opinions suggested that such an impact was most visible in Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh. In the perception of common public, frequent transfers of SPs affects the morale of junior officials the most, followed by command structure and discipline. It also results in misuse/abuse of police authority.

Insecurity of tenure also affects the SPs’ relationships with superior officers in the hierarchy, making them vulnerable to illegitimate pressures from above. A perception of such vulnerability was strongest among SPs in Andhra Pradesh followed by Uttar Pradesh and Assam. There was a general perception among SPs from Uttar Pradesh that some of their seniors had become ‘highly politicized’, while others were deeply influenced by caste affiliations. A common view that emerged during interviews was that senior officers do not oppose political decisions on arbitrary transfers, and that there were frequent examples of senior officials being party to wrong decisions by the political executive.

In all three States, the established rules and norms governing the transfer of SPs were not being adequately implemented, and there was little consistency in the practices adopted by the State governments.

Most of the SPs in the study felt that the current policy was open to abuse. Such a perception was the strongest among SPs in Uttar Pradesh. The general assessment was that seniority and merit were definitely ignored in many, if not most, case, and that extraneous considerations were the most significant in determining transfers and tenure.

The major reason for non-implementation or selective implementation of rules and norms appears to be the centralization of decision-making relating to transfers outside the police hierarchy, and the lack of effective checks and balances. In matters relating to the transfers of SPs, the office of the Chief Minister has emerged as an all-powerful center and the police department, indeed, even the Ministry of Home Affairs, have become relatively insignificant.

In addition to the almost complete dominance of the process by the political executive – particularly the Chief Minister’s office – among other factors identified by respondents were for the collapse of norms for the transfer of SPS were the failure of Police leadership at the DGP level; lack of perspective on the part of the political leadership; and partisan political imperatives, including the desire to ensure ‘favorable’ officers during election processes.

SPs responding to the study also held elements within the police department responsible for the poor implementation of rules and norms. This perception was the strongest in UP followed by Andhra Pradesh and Assam. Most of the SPs agreed that an officer should have a fixed tenure. There was a consensus that SPs should be given sufficient time to adequately apply their professional abilities to produce desired results in a jurisdiction before being transferred out.

Policy options

Transfer of SPs by an impartial body: Recommendations of the National Police Commission should be implemented in this regard. The Commission held that, to help the State government discharge their superintending responsibility in an open manner under the framework of law, a State security committee should be established in each State. It was felt that the transfer of SPs should be left exclusively to such a committee comprising the DGP as chairperson, and one Additional DGP and three IGP’s as members. Selection of DGP: The general perception that emerged during the survey is that the police leadership at the State level can make a difference in transfer policies if he is selected on the basis of merit and seniority. There was, consequently, a feeling that if the selection of the DGP is itself made through an impartial body or process, this would have an impact on the tenure policies affecting SPs. A fair and stable chief would ensure the stability and fairness of the officers under him. Limiting the role of the State government in investigating role of the police: It is desirable that the State government’s control over the investigative role of the police be severely and statutorily limited to ensure that the police perform strictly in accordance with the law. Control of the political executive over professional areas of policing will have to be diluted if improvements are to be secured

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