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Technology, Terror
&
A Thoughtless State
K.P.S. Gill*
Policing in general, and counter-terrorism operations
in particular have, in India, remained trapped in a low technology cul
de sac for decades. Indeed, it would be safe to say that, on the
threshold of the twenty-first century, a bulk of the police forces in
the country are operating at technological levels that date back to
the early twentieth century or, at best, to the post-World War
II colonial era. The primitive lathi (bamboo stick) and the bolt-action
.303 are often the only instruments of authority that the police wields
in an increasingly volatile context that comprehends constantly widening
areas of escalating civil strife.
The situation has been compounded infinitely by terrorism
and low intensity warfare that have become a permanent feature of Indias
internal security scenario over the past two decades. In this time,
the technologies available to terrorists have improved continuously,
albeit along a linear, accretionist scale, dramatically increasing their
firepower, mobility, communications and surveillance capabilities. The
response pattern of the security forces to these incremental gains has
lagged significantly and consistently behind. Virtually no shift in
the technologies available to the terrorists in any theatre has been
presaged and countered in advance of its introduction into the theatre
of conflict even where the direction of change is clearly predictable
and inevitable.
The introduction of cellular phones and later, of Iridium
technology, are cases in point. India woke up to the cellular phone
technology well after it was already entrenched, not only in the advanced
nations of the West, but in most of the market economies of South Asia.
The potential for misuse and abuse of cellular communications by criminals
and terrorists was not only evident, but substantially documented in
many of these countries well before the cell phone found entry into
India. And yet, when these instruments were introduced into the terrorist
inventory, or to run criminal networks (in some cases even from within
the states prisons), enforcement agencies responded with inept
amazement, and it was some time before they began to turn the technology
to their own advantage, setting up the requisite facilities to monitor
calls on these networks and to identify and locate terrorists and criminals
by tagging suspect connections. The legislative response has been even
tardier. Far from establishing an adequate regulatory mechanism to prevent
abuse of this technology, laws do not even provide for any failsafe
methods to ensure that connections on cellular networks are not acquired
under false identities, or anonymously.
The matter does not end here. The slow creep of Iridium
technology, heralded by a long drawn international media blitz, caught
intelligence agencies as completely unprepared and ill-equipped as its
precursor, the cell phone. Another potential opportunity had been squandered,
with the advantage, once again, surrendered to the forces of disorder
and violence.
Similar patterns are visible in weapons technologies
available to terrorists. Kalashnikov Assault Rifles, RDX and sophisticated
timing devices, shoulder fired rockets and missiles, Unmanned Arial
Vehicles (UAVs) for surveillance and attack the introduction
of each of these in the Indian theatre of low intensity warfare was
easily predictable and inevitable, given regional geopolitics and the
prevailing supply situation. Yet, on each occasion, the security forces
and with them, every other institution of governance, has been caught
entirely unprepared.
The responsibility for this failure cannot squarely
or correctly be laid on the security forces, the legislature, or any
specific institutions or arm of governance. It is, in substantial measure,
structural. The flow of information between the vast governmental apparatus
of research and various field and operational agencies, as also state
and central legislatures, is mediated or perhaps more accurately,
obstructed by a bureaucratic maze that destroys all possibilities
of proactive, or even efficiently reactive, response. The reverse flow
of information from the field regarding specific problems and
challenges emerging from technological shifts in terrorist capabilities
is similarly inhibited.
More than a century ago, George Bernard Shaw had wryly
remarked, "The British soldier can stand up to anything except
the British War Office."1 The statement
describes perfectly the relationship between the Indian jawan
and the formless, faceless bureaucracy that defines the conditions and
circumstances under which he must serve. Bureaucrats by and large, prefer
to deal with problems they understand and feel they can succeed with.
In general, they do not understand low intensity warfare and terrorism,
are largely ignorant of the ground situations in which forces are required
to operate, and of the character and role of modern technologies in
contemporary conflict. To the extent that this is the case, they tend
to undervalue, neglect and ignore threats emanating from this direction,
preferring conventional responses, such as the shuffling around of forces
in a reassuring demonstration of their own power. That this demonstration
feeds nothing more than their own flagging confidence is increasingly
evident in the rising casualties terrorists are inflicting, both on
civilians and on the SFs themselves, and in the widening gaps that exist
between technologies and materials accessed by terrorists and those
that have been made available to the SFs. Denial, I have had occasion
to note in another context, marks the bureaucratic response to the emerging
challenges of a world in transition. Bureaucrats lack, and have stubbornly
refused to acquire, the specialised skills that contemporary technological
changes have made imperative, turning themselves, at a stroke, into
ill-adapted anachronisms fated to extinction.2
The problem is not, as most bureaucrats would immediately argue, one
of the allocation of scarce resources. It is primarily a problem of
perceptions, and of the growing inadequacy of a predominantly generalist
bureaucracy in an increasingly specialised world. Most of our administrators
and policymakers lack the requisite technical knowledge, or even the
general awareness of technological shifts occurring in the field of
conflict and, much more, on the outer periphery of technological innovation
and research.
At least part of the problem is also the contempt in
which the lives of personnel in the uniformed services are generally
held. The predominant attitude appears to be that, since these men have
volunteered for service in the police, para-military forces, or the
army, they should accept even the most extraordinary and often
avoidable risks and hardships without complaint, and must expect
to be killed. This characterisation may sound uncharitable to all but
those who have actually been involved in the thankless task of negotiating
with the bureaucracy on behalf of the fighting men of this country.3
I have, in the past, cited the example of the impact
of the introduction, in May 1987, of the Kalashnikov (AK-47) in the
Punjab terrorists arsenal, and my requests for an upgradation
of the SFs firepower.4 The police
and SFs were, at that time, armed with the obsolete .303 Lee Enfield
rifles, or the equally obsolete bolt-action 7.62s. The CRPF were slightly
better equipped, with 175 Self Loading Rifles (SLRs) per battalion
although the SLR was no match for the AK-47. When no new supplies seemed
forthcoming, I requested that the large number of Light Machine Guns
(LMGs) then lying unused in police armouries all over the state be deployed
against the terrorists. Completely ludicrous arguments were advanced
to obstruct this move among them the assertion that such weapons
may be used by the police against unarmed crowds and would contribute
to the possibilities of human rights violations. This reflected
such ignorance of police procedures that, had it not been articulated
at the highest levels of governance, it would not even deserve explanation.
The fact is, every police station is armed with a mix of weapons, and
each of these is issued for specific use. Teargas would be issued for
mob control; rifles, only when these were required. I cannot imagine
a police officer in India who would authorise the issue of machine guns
for any kind of crowd control or management of unarmed demonstrations.
Suffice it to say that, eventually, after the LMGs were deployed, far
from these being used against civilian crowds, the SFs in Punjab never
found it necessary to use any kind of firearms for crowd control. This
was the case even through the turbulent 1990-91 period when tens of
thousands of agitated Sikhs gathered in quasi-religious demonstrations
to protest the "martyrdom" of various prominent terrorists.5
The fact is, better arms and equipment with the SFs do not lead to human
rights violations or police excesses. If anything, the reverse may be
true, as inadequately equipped forces confront a better equipped enemy,
and succumb to the inevitable frustrations of a war of attrition which
they see themselves fighting with their hands tied down.
Take another example. For the past decade, on an average,
nearly a thousand security men have been killed each year most
of them in terrorist conflicts, or while confronting well-equipped criminals
from organised networks. Indias vast technological resources,
research establishments and immense manufacturing capacities are capable,
we are constantly reminded, of putting satellites into space, of building
nuclear bombs and missiles for their delivery across continents, and
of creating supercomputers. Yet they cannot, or have not been tasked
to, produce a lightweight, safe and economical bulletproof jacket that
could protect its men in action. Instead, police administrators in the
past have been forced to depend on their own inventiveness and the resources
of the market to fabricate a crude jacket of steel plates. This may
weigh as much as 9.5 kilos (the maximum permitted by MHA specifications),
inhibits movement, and offers limited protection against the high density
fire of the Kalashnikov assault rifle. The DRDO has developed a BP Jacket
that weighs 7.8 kg, and this is now issued to many of the SFs. Is this
the best we can do against the imported jackets that come up to a few
hundred grammes, and are safer?
This is critical. The fighting capabilities of a soldier
are not measured in terms of firepower, mobility and communications
alone though these may be the most important parameters. Indeed,
bureaucratic indifference and neglect is reflected most dramatically
and persistently in the personal effects and protection that are standard
issue to each jawan. Dramatic changes in design have resulted
in the development of rucksacks that can redistribute weight from the
shoulders to the waist, and could significantly diminishing both the
burden and discomfort of carrying the 5 to 20 kilo standard issue that
each jawan must bear in various situations, and at little incremental
cost. But the forces in this country have failed to move beyond the
crude World War I backpack the pitthoo that cuts
deeply and painfully into the shoulders if carried for any length of
time. Nor has there been any change in the heavy, clumsy and comfortless
boots that jawans wear. Only a fraction of the personnel serving
in high altitude areas are issued imported alpine jackets; most must
make do with the cold comfort of the bulky and relatively ineffective
Indian issue. The recent Kargil conflict exposed the somewhat bizarre
predicament of the army of a Nuclear nation temporarily
paralysed by the lack of suitable mountain footwear for its soldiers.6
Hasty imports were needed to resolve that problem. And yet, India has
been fighting the highest altitude war in the world on the Siachin Glacier
since 1984; paramilitary forces have also been fighting terrorists at
high altitudes in J&K for nearly a decade. Can we not even produce
a suitable pair of shoes for our fighting men?
The question is not of technological competence, but
of attitudes. The fact is that, even today, the jawan is thought
of as a sort of combination of coolie and cannon fodder, not
only by policy makers and bureaucrats, but by many of his own officers
as well, and by much of the public at large (except in brief periods
of national crisis where excessive sentimentality dominates the public
response). These attitudes have been able to survive at the threshold
of the 21st century largely because a burgeoning population
of the rural poor keeps our armed forces supplied with poorly qualified
manpower, and because we have, till now, been able to measure our strengths
purely in terms of crude numbers.
This, however, will not do in the new century. We are
now on the verge, not only of an unprecedented acceleration, but of
a radical discontinuity in the linear trajectory that terrorist technologies
have followed over the past decades. Indeed, we must now prepare for
a paradigm shift in the very nature of low intensity warfare and terrorism.
The stubborn courage, the dedication, the unquestioning obedience and
spirit of sacrifice of our Forces may have sufficed in the past, but
these will need to be backed with far greater technological competence,
equipment and infrastructure and more importantly, far greater
prescience and planning if we are to succeed against the emerging
"capacity for hyperviolence"7
that is passing progressively into the hands of the terrorists.
The character and potential scale of this "capacity
for hyperviolence" has not yet been adequately understood by our
bureaucrats and policymakers. The sheer enormity and swiftness of the
changes that threaten us in this sphere make not just the decisions
of the past, but the decision-making process itself, entirely obsolete.
Alvin Toffler notes in connection with the non-state actors
in the emerging international political scenario that:
Governments find it increasingly difficult to deal with these
new actors on the world stage. Governments are too bureaucratic. Their
response times are too slow. They are linked into so many foreign relationships
that require consultation and agreement with allies, and must cater
to so many domestic political interest groups, that it takes them too
long to react to initiatives by drug lords or religious fanatics and
terrorists.8
The terrorists themselves, however, are entirely free
of constraints or compunctions.
By contrast, many of the Global Gladiators,
guerillas and drug cartels in particular, are non- or even pre-bureaucratic.
A single charismatic leader calls the shots quickly, and with chilling
or killing effect.9
The Global Gladiators capacity for hyperviolence is, today, finding
increasing potential for expression in two distinct trends: i. the rapid,
though linear, improvement of technologies available to terrorists and
the widening gap between these and the technologies available to counterterrorist
forces; and ii. the radical leap in technologies for low intensity warfare
including weapons of mass destruction (WMD) that is now
imminent. Both these will demand unique patterns of response, and neither
can be neglected, if we are to survive as a nation. Our success will
depend entirely on our ability to understand and predict the character
and dimensions of these changes, and to initiate responses well in advance
of their realisation.
Linear Developments
The primary sources of arms and communication technologies
for terrorists in various parts of the country, till the mid-eighties,
were weapon snatching, theft or robbery, raids on police armouries,
ambushes on SF patrols and convoys and a trickle of arms and equipment
acquired in the black market abroad and smuggled into the theatre of
conflict. There was, consequently, a certain symmetry in technologies
available to terrorists and those used by the SFs, with an advantage
of numbers and assured supplies accruing to the latter.
Pakistans direct intervention in terrorism on
Indian soil specifically in Punjab in the mid-eighties
brought about an irreversible change in this situation. For the first
time, agencies of a nation-state, with their enormous resources and
legitimate access to high military technologies, guaranteed supplies
to non-state terrorist groupings. For some time, these supplies had
to be paid for by the militants, usually in funds mobilised through
extortion or the drug trade; after 1989, however, they not only came
free of cost, but in a far greater number than ever before. Initially,
the sheer enormity of this change was not realised in India beyond the
limited circle within the police and military leadership who had to
confront and counter the escalated threat. Indeed, even today, when
Pakistans covert agencies are offering weapons to any and every
militant group irrespective of ideology and wherever they may
be active, in J&K, the North East, even Bihar and Orissa
there are many in the civil administration who persist in the belief
that the problem can be confronted locally, and through conventional
law enforcement measures based on assumptions of the minimum use of
force.
A decade-and-a-half ago, terrorists in India had access
to an arsenal that comprehended single shot rifles, pistols, a few SLRs,
carbines and sten guns, hand grenades and crude bombs. Today, they have
graduated to sophisticated assault rifles, high velocity telescopic
sniper rifles, Light and Medium Machine Guns, armour piercing incendiary
ammunition, RDX and PETN based explosives with complex triggering devices
including trip-switches, remote control mechanisms, light differential
relay switches, high frequency based triggering devices, time pencils
and electronic timers. They have access to virtually unlimited supplies
of ordinary and anti-personnel grenades, anti-tank and anti-personnel
mines, grenade- and rocket-launchers, mortars, anti-aircraft guns and
Stinger surface to air missiles. Sophisticated communications and surveillance
equipment, including unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are also in use.
They are now reports that some form of chemical weapons may also have
been introduced into their armoury, though these have not yet been used.10
The rate of improvement in the terrorist armoury,
moreover, has undergone continuous acceleration, keeping pace with the
most recent developments in the technologies available on the international
market both legal and underground. In contrast, the states
response remains inexcusably sluggish and often erratic, if not entirely
whimsical.
In the post-Kargil era, this judgement may seem somewhat
harsh, especially in view of the quick decision to upgrade equipment
for counterinsurgency operations and the defence of the LoC at a proposed
cost of almost Rs. 40 billion. If anything, however, this decision merely
confirms the ad hoc, knee jerk character of our responses, and
provides a suitable example for analysis of the standard governmental
response in the aftermath of a crisis.11
The projected upgradation, reportedly to be realized over
the next seven years (a fairly long period in terms of present rates
of technological change), represents little more than a lavish buying
spree that will bring in automatic grenade launchers, sniper rifles
and flame throwers from Russia, multi-grenade launchers and mine-protected
vehicles from South Africa, under-barrel grenade launchers from Bulgaria,
C-90 disposable rocket launchers from Spain, and bullet proof vests
from UK and Germany.12
This is, presumably, a partial and unconfirmed list
of the actual acquisitions to be made. Consequently, it would be infructuous
and inappropriate to go into the merits of any of the items on the proposed
procurement list. There are, however, several prima facie problems
with the upgradation plan.
- It is evidently based on perceptions of what is required to counter
the current patterns of attack to which the SFs are being subjected
and the levels of technology presently available to the terrorist.
To the extent that these acquisitions are to reach the field in phases
over the next seven years, many of them will be outdated and ineffectual
by the time this happens. Any long-term acquisition would have to
be based on projections however tentative these may be
of emerging technologies, and must attempt to outstrip the terrorists
rate of acquisition of technologies if they are to be effective. I
cannot think of a single example where this has been the case in the
sphere of counter-insurgency technologies in India.
- To the extent that this is a wish list largely dreamt
up by military and civilian bureaucrats at Delhi, many of the acquisitions
may prove ineffective or inappropriate in the field. There are already
reports in the Press, for instance, that suggest that the anti-mine
vehicles purchased from South Africa, some of which have already been
deployed in the field, are unsuitable for J&K their principal
destination since they are "built for the plains and the
cabin is so high up that it is almost impossible for the driver to
see a road in mountainous terrain. It requires an escort party to
show the way."13
This is a recurrent theme in technological acquisitions
for the army and SFs. Part of the problem, of course, is the pervasive
blight of corruption, as a result of which the acquired systems are
not subjected to a transparent and objective process of evaluation.
The greater problem, however, is a failure on the part of bureaucrats
and technical advisors who act at a sanitized distance from the actual
theatre of conflict, and are, consequently, in no position to make
a correct evaluation of the utility of specific systems.
Weapons and technologies have to be situation
and threat specific, and should facilitate a resolution of an existing
or emerging problem in the quickest possible time, with minimum damage.
During the Punjab campaign, an elite commando group was deployed for
night ambushes in Tarn Taran in 1989. They were expected to have an
overwhelming advantage, since they were equipped with night-vision
devices. Unfortunately, the experiment was a failure, with the number
of casualties canceling out on each side. This was because no one
had anticipated the impact of artificial light on night-vision devices,
and most of the villages in the Punjab are electrified. The commandos
went in blind into an engagement where they thought they would have
the devastating advantage of sight over their adversaries.
The problem was, and frequently remains, that
the selection of weapons and technologies is based on theories and
books, not on direct discussions with field commanders or on operational
requirements and experience.
- Many, if not most, of the technologies that we are shopping for
all over the world are available, or can be developed, within the
country at costs that would prove to be a fraction of the price of
imports. To the extent that they are made to specifications defined
in the field, and can be continuously modified to confront emerging
shifts in the pattern of terrorist movements and attacks, they would
meet the short-term requirements of the forces far better than unitary
systems imported from foreign manufacturers.
It is important to remind ourselves once again, in
this context, that not all the proposed imports are high-ended weapons
or communication systems, and that many of the very expensive (and reportedly
overpriced) items including the anti-mine vehicles have
already been developed and used within India in other theatres. The
problem, however, cannot be resolved within the present institutional
system. The flow of technologies from scientific and research establishments
has been fitful and capricious, often as divorced from the ground situation
as the wish lists of the Central bureaucracy. The Defence
Research & Development Organisations (DRDO) alone, I believe, would
be sitting on an entire treasure house of technologies that could be
translated into force multipliers on the ground. But what actually reaches
the Forces is defined through the same convoluted, irrational bureaucratic
process that robs it of all possible efficacy, and condemns immense
resources and research efforts to absolute futility.14
The problem, moreover, is not just of bridging the
immense gap between Indias premier defence laboratories and the
SFs in the field. Indeed, there is much that could be done at levels
of innovation of which students in our technological institutes and
colleges are perfectly capable. It is my firm conviction that many of
the required technical inputs could be sourced locally, if a mechanism
could be devised where students and faculty of these institutions are
specifically tasked to solve problems locally confronted by SF commanders.
There is a story doing the rounds apocryphal, no doubt
of a police officer in J&K who used the skills of a local television
repair mechanic to fabricate a crude though effective and very
cheap Direction Finding Device to identify and locate militant
wireless facilities.
Unfortunately, none of the SFs or enforcement agencies
in India has the wherewithal, the orientation, or, ordinarily, even
the authority, to make their own technological choices. More than six
years after terrorism was defeated in Punjab, the lessons of that campaign
remain poorly understood and largely ignored. Nevertheless, the salutary
consequences of programmes that place actual, even though limited, technological
initiatives in the hands of the SFs, were more than adequately demonstrated
there.
With mounting casualties under a sustained, increasingly
sophisticated and devastating terrorist offensive, a small "special
cell" was set up in February 1990 under the charge of K. K. Attri,
DIG, and in coordination with Dr. Gopalji Misra, Director, Forensic
Sciences Laboratories (FSL), Punjab. The Cell was to undertake a continuous
and systematic assessment of the operational skills of the terrorists
and the technologies available to them. The Cell also established a
working alliance with universities, national laboratories such as the
CSIO and TBRL as well as with research facilities of the DRDO all over
the country. Liaison was also maintained with the National Security
Guard (NSG) and the Special Protection Group (SPG).
Traditionally, the FSL had only been involved with
casework and the related forensic examination of evidence. It now undertook
the study of terrorist weaponry, explosives and initiators, and mobility
aids, including optical devices, vehicles, etc. On this basis, a thorough
threat assessment was made, and the deep involvement of Pakistans
covert agencies in arming the Punjab terrorists was also established.
This evaluation was collated and disseminated through the operational,
monitoring and planning levels in the Police and other wings of Government
involved in the war against terrorism, and contributed significantly
to logistics and operational planning of the SFs. This was, to my mind,
a unique and unparalleled experiment in this country. It was, however,
only a beginning.
The Special Cell also began a process of developing
appropriate technologies to confront specific challenges posed by the
various weapons, communications and other systems available to the terrorists,
as well as solutions to specific problems that arose out of their modus
operandi. The FSLs work included R&D on bullet-proofing
materials, including steel, glass, Kevlar and polycarbonates, as well
as projects to develop optical, electrical and electronic devices. Some
of the innovations proved exceptionally helpful in the fight against
terror, either resulting in specific breakthroughs, or minimally ensuring
dramatic cost reductions and improved operational effectiveness. They
included the following:
- The Infrared Filter Glass Torch: Toughened glass was coated with
a combination of dyes to check the visible light and allow the filtration
of infrared radiation. This coated glass was used on dragon lights
and allowed for visibility of about 250 metres with the help of night
vision goggles during dark nights. A heavier coating on such glass
used over aeroplane landing lights increased visibility upto 700 metres.
Each such light, fitted into portable wooden boxes, and connected
to two 12 volt truck batteries, was found extremely useful for watching
terrorist movements at night without giving any indication of the
police position.
- Infra-red filter head- and parking-lights: The headlights and parking
lights of police vehicles were similarly treated to permit the vehicles
to be driven at night without disclosing their position from a distance.
- Parabolic sound enlarger: this device allowed tracking of the movement
of terrorists during the night in forested areas or across water bodies
through the directional focusing of a parabola that amplified sound
that could be monitored on headphones.
- Mechanical clock detector: to detect mechanical timing devices for
bombs concealed in closed packages, boxes or luggage. The device was
developed at a cost barely 7 per cent of similar devices available
on the market.
- Electronic timer detector: While the mechanical clock is relatively
easy to detect, the silent electronic timer is a greater challenge.
The detector could locate a timer concealed in any kind of packing,
behind walls, and from a distance of upto 15 inches. In 1992, when
this device was developed by the FSL, no similar mechanism was available
in the international market. The first such device to be made available
commercially came in 1994, with a price tag of Rs. 290,000. The Punjab
Police detector cost Rs. 10,000.
- Poison detection kit: A simple kit that could be easily operated
by a police constable, and which gave its results within five minutes,
was developed to identify potassium cyanide or arsenic in water or
food.
- Country-made bullet proof jackets: Various steels were tested and
tempered to develop plates that could protect against the AK-47. Crude
jackets, with these steel plates stitched into in strong cloth provided
a degree of protection to a large number of SF and police personnel
and, despite their weight, contributed enormously to their operational
efficiency and confidence. These jackets cost a fraction of factory
made BP jackets, and the design is still in use in other theatres
of LIC.
- Bullet Proof Mobile Morchas: Three plates of 6mm tempered
steel were shaped into a simple structure that could be carried and
installed anywhere through a hooking system. Each plate was provided
with a firing port. These mobile morchas or posts proved very
useful during encounters/ambushes, and were strong enough to stop
AK 47 bullets. A pair of such plates (size: 46"x27") was
also sufficient to protect an LCV passenger vehicle or Gypsy.
- Bullet proofing of vehicles: Steel easily available on the market
was tempered to produce economical bullet proof Gypsies, Jeeps, Ambassador
cars, LCVs and police trucks. At the peak of terrorism, Punjab had
more than 650 BP vehicles. Bomb protected flooring also saved lives
against the increasing use of IEDs and landmines during the later
phases of terrorism in the State.
The impact of such innovations was dramatically illustrated
by the development of the BP Tractor. The sugarcane fields in Punjab
gave the terrorists excellent cover for ambush and escape, and had
proven to be a major headache for the police. So great was their advantage
that the militants forced farmers on pain of death to sow sugarcane
all along the roads and their clandestine routes. After an attack,
the terrorists would simply run into the fields, and if the police
tried to follow, they would simply be picked off one by one. When
the first BP Tractors were pressed into operations, this advantage
simply vanished, and the sanctuary of the sugarcane field was lost,
forcing irreversible tactical changes on the terrorists. Later, the
terrorists got hold of armour piercing bullets and inflicted a few
casualties on policemen in the armoured tractors, thus neutralising
the advantage. By then, however, the time for sugarcane terrorism
was over.
- R&D on BP materials: R&D on materials, including various
steels and alloys, glasses, composite materials and polycarbonates,
led to the replacement of Kevlar pads on the floor and in the ceiling
of Ambassador cars, resulting in a saving of as much as Rs. 100,000
per protected vehicle. Tempered steel, similarly, reduced the cost
of bullet proofing of LCVs and police trucks, as compared to the cost
of Jackal steel previously in use. The design of innovative door-catches
for protected vehicles added to their security under attack. The replacement
of the Ambassador engines by an Isuzu 1800 petrol engines acquired
in the second hand market also proved to be a highly cost-effective
way of improving efficiency.
- R&D on Ammunition: At each stage, exhaustive studies were carried
out on various types of ammunition used by terrorists in order to
develop appropriate protection against them, and save valuable lives.
- Simple and panel periscopes: Simple periscopes with three backup
mirrors were developed for observation from secure positions without
exposing the observer. The system survived even if the mirrors were
hit twice, as the third angled mirror remained intact.
- Protective viewing window: A protected, BP viewing window, with
a visibility angle of 140o, was fitted into BP patrol vehicles
and BP mobile morchas. This constituted a quantum leap over
the periscopes that had been devised earlier.
- Riot Control Shields: made out of polycarbonate shields ranging
between 4mm and 12 mm. The material did not break even if beaten with
iron rods and could not be penetrated with a knife. Polycarbonate
sheets of 6 to 8mm thickness could stop 12 bore shots and lead projectiles
from small fire arms, including revolvers and pistols.
Some of these innovations would, to those who are focused
on the hi-technology end of defence research, appear to be crude, even
primitive though others involved fairly sophisticated R&D
with special materials and alloys. It is, however, impossible for such
distanced observers to estimate the sheer and overwhelming impact that
each of these developments had in the fight against the terrorists in
Punjab.
It would be equally difficult for such observers to
imagine the sheer enormity of the constraints under which these developments
took place. There was unrelenting resistance from the bureaucracy and
audit institutions to every unorthodox initiative, often forcing absolutely
ludicrous decisions. A small group had been constituted to work on steel
wool, which would have been lighter and stronger than the material then
being used for bullet proofing. The project had to be given up, largely
due to an ingrained fear of innovation. The in-house cost of effective
bullet proofing of a vehicle was under Rs. 400,000. Yet, a costlier
alternative, involving the established system of open tenders and outside
manufacture, had to be adopted, since audit objections would subsequently
be raised against a manufacturing activity that did not fall within
the departments mandate. Indeed, such strong inhibitors to unorthodox
development exist within the prevailing administrative system that it
was well nigh impossible to secure funds for such projects.15
This system will have to be dismantled if the hyperviolence
of future terrorism is to be effectively neutralised. A continuous system
of unmediated coordination between field commanders and R&D personnel
at various levels will have to be created so that the time lag between
emerging trends in terrorism and counterterrorist initiatives is diminished.
This will demand extraordinary efforts, since the technological advantages
of state players are being progressively eroded by the terrorists
free access to advanced technologies.
There is, consequently, a need for a dual response
that requires both local level facilities and efforts that do not go
beyond tinkering with existing technologies, on the one hand, as well
as highly sophisticated research at the very limits of contemporary
scientific knowledge, on the other.
This, however, will not be enough. It is no longer
sufficient to constantly run close on the heels of the terrorist. He
must be overtaken and outmanoeuvred if his increasing and potentially
devastating power is to be neutralised.
In general, CT (Counterterrorism)
planners have been successful when they were able to match or exceed
the technological skills of their terrorist adversaries
(T)he
forces of order no longer enjoy an inherent advantage in the competition
with those who would prevent the orderly functioning of society. Therefore,
their success will not be a function of privilege or position but rather
the reward for their greater ingenuity and resourcefulness.16
This requires even deeper levels and more complex structures
of coordination and research, and a technological perspective that must
define as minutely and accurately as is humanly possible
the direction and character of future weapon systems and enabling technologies
that will be deployed in low intensity wars. Once such a perspective
has been constructed and even as it is constantly reviewed and
revised research, developmental and manufacturing initiatives
must create the technologies to counter these systems well before they
are accessed by the terrorist. In war, surprise is a critical ingredient
for victory and it is imperative that the Indian security establishment
is not taken by surprise.
As stated earlier, the mere development or theoretical
availability of a technology has no impact on the ground. Systems for
its timely production and deployment are just as important. In this,
the private sector can and should be co-opted, though some precautions
may be necessary to ensure that sensitive technologies are not exploited
for purely commercial ends. Nevertheless, it is important to remind
ourselves that those who draw their salaries from the state do not have
a necessary monopoly on patriotism, nor, for that matter, an exclusive
duty to fight the nations wars.
Our approach, however, must comprehend much more than
weapon systems and technologies. While it is well beyond the scope of
this paper to discuss the issue in any detail, it is essential to recognise
that the manpower resources and training requirements that will create
the low intensity warfighter of the 21st century, will be
radically different from the ill-equipped and poorly trained jawan
of the 20th. It must, equally, be recognised that changes
in manpower and training policies today will significantly impact on
the constitution and character of the security forces several years
hence. There is, consequently, no more time to waste in this regard.
Leaping the Abyss
Procrastination is a luxury that we can afford
even less in view of the "great leap forward" that weapons
of mass destruction now offer the terrorist. The slow-bleeding warfare
that has been inflicted upon us, particularly over the past two decades,
has cost the nation thousands of lives, billions of rupees. Yet, even
at our present levels of engagement, it is entirely possible to contain
its impact within levels that are considered by an increasingly
brutalised and unresponsive public and political leadership "acceptable",
and without a compelling proximate threat of national disintegration.
All this changes with the paradigm shift that must be anticipated in
the technologies of terror in the new millenium.
The Pokhran II tests of May 1998, and the retaliatory
demonstration in Chagai, heralded a new phase in the precarious strategic
equilibrium that prevails in the Indian subcontinent. A great deal has
already been written about this momentous development and the advent
of the perilous nuclear age of Asia. The debate, however,
remains trapped within the paradigms of deterrence defined by the West
over decades of the Cold War, and fails to distinguish, or even acknowledge,
the unique circumstances that prevail in South Asia.
Critically, current Indian strategic perspectives on
the issue end with capabilities to ensure a retaliatory strike that
would inflict destruction that the "aggressor will find unacceptable"
if nuclear weapons are used against us. This is nothing but the regurgitation
of classical deterrence postures and the infamous Mutually Assured Destruction
(MAD) doctrine a doctrine that, no doubt, kept the superpowers
out of nuclear conflict for nearly five decades of an intense Cold War
that often expressed itself through proxy wars and direct confrontations
in other countries. Nevertheless, it is important to understand the
circumstances that made MAD so effective in assuring nuclear peace.
The first of these was the fact that all nuclear powers of the Cold
War period had long standing and entirely stable institutions of governance
with clear chains of command and elaborate systems of checks and balances
that forced a rational decision on all the players in this confrontation.
Secondly, the projected nuclear strikes in case of a conflagration were
of such an intensity and number that there were no possibilities whatsoever
of either nation surviving; indeed, there was little chance of life
certainly human life surviving on this planet. In effect,
the calculations played out in the war games of both the superpowers
engaged in the Cold War ensured an absolute No Win situation. There
was no calculus or alternate rational scheme that could tempt either
to risk actual use of their arsenal, whatever the aggravation.
The situation is made infinitely more complex by the
advent of a range of other weapons of mass destruction (WMD)
including chemical and biological weapons where the barrier to
acquisition is much lower than the one that inhibits access to nuclear
technologies. The destructive potential of these weapons is well known
in a restricted circle of scientists and strategic scholars in India,
but the larger community of administrators and policy makers remain
oblivious of their dangers. A small package of chemical agents, for
instance, is estimated to be 40 times more effective as a weapon than
a comparable package of conventional explosives.17
But this is just an insignificant fraction of what biological weapons
can do.
To gain an understanding of the lethality of
these toxins, the brevity of their production time-frames, and their
ease of concealment, consider that with merely a flask of culture medium
and a few anthrax spores, a terrorist with college-level laboratory
skill can produce one kilogram of anthrax bacteria in just eight days.
One half a gram about 0.02 ounces comprises enough doses
to kill five million people. Butulinum toxins are equally fatal.18
Indeed, "college level laboratory skills" may also be fairly
redundant, as "rogue states
wield nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons through the vehicle of terror surrogates as a practically
untraceable tool for covert proxy war."19
A chilling reminder that this is no Cassandras call is the fact
that the list of nations known to currently possess biological weapons
includes a number of unstable regimes and many that are present sponsors
of terrorism. The list of biological weapons nations includes Russia,
Iraq, Iran, China, North Korea, Egypt, Syria, Taiwan, Israel, and, critically,
Pakistan, but "The threat lies not in the length of this list but
in the fact that many of these nations reject the political and territorial
status quo and are more likely to use such weapons to advance an aggressive
agenda."20
The assumptions of classical deterrence theory, consequently
and obviously, cannot apply to the Indian sub-continent. Classical deterrence
may work most of the time against stable nation states, but it has no
relevance to the non-state nuclear weapons player, or, for that matter,
to a rogue state acting through such a player. These are very real possibilities
and may be realised in a number of alternative scenarios, all of which
cannot be examined here. Nevertheless, there are two explicit dangers
that need to be immediately recognised.
- The first of these arises out of the character and the increasing
influence and stridency of what is described as Islamic Fundamentalism
and Militancy in the region. As with all millennial faiths,
the calculus of those who subscribe to such an ideology differs strikingly
from what we and classical deterrence strategies would
regard as rational. Nevertheless, the millennial rationality
has its own internal coherence and must be understood and confronted
as such.
For those who believe that they are fighting on Gods
Command and for the establishment of His Empire on earth and
believe this with absolute and uncompromising ardour the lives
of their fellow men, and indeed their own lives, do not have the value
that is placed on them by liberal-democratic rationality. Nor indeed
does the mujahiddeen mindset yield to the imperatives of traditional
nationalism. It is entirely possible that, were such individuals placed
in positions of control over nuclear, chemical or biological weapons
of mass destruction, they would accept the possibility of the annihilation
of their own nation if they could believe that the Empire of
God (or, bluntly, the Islamic World) could be expanded.
Such a calculus would, moreover, be applied in a
situation that differs radically from classical deterrence assumptions
in that the scale of destruction projected is lower. The intended
damage would substantially be confined to India and Pakistan, though
it may flow across their borders in limited measure. Nevertheless,
it would had the potential to "Free" the subcontinent of
the power of the "Unbeliever" and open it up to a final
"Islamic Conquest" from Central Asia.
It must be recognised that the influence of what
is described as Islamic Fundamentalism is increasing enormously in
Pakistan and, if present trends continue especially with the
consolidation of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan it
is inevitable that they will eventually seize power in that state,
irrespective of the opinions and desires of the more moderate population
who may incline towards peace with India.
While no quantitative probabilities can be assigned
to the possibilities of the use of WMDs against India by such a future
regime, it is essential for acknowledge this possibility, and to discover
means to defeat the calculus of this millennial rationality.
- A second threat, possibly more insidious than the one described
above, arises out of the character and patterns of Pakistans
sustained strategies against India over the last decade and a half,
and is exacerbated by the new paradigm of the combined use of regular
forces and terrorists that has been exposed through their recent actions
in Kargil. It is certain that irrespective of the outcome in
Kargil Pakistan will continue in its efforts to expand the
sphere of low intensity warfare within India. If any regime in Pakistan
were to convince itself that regional, communal and political fragmentation
in India had reached a stage where the destruction of a few critical
centres of authority would effectively ensure the disintegration of
the nation, it is possible that it would gamble on the use of small
nuclear devices the notorious "suitcase bomb"
or other WMDs smuggled in and deployed by terrorists.
Such a calculus is not based on and does not
need millennial rationality, though such thinking would certainly
heighten the dangers. The power elite and an influential segment of
the Pakistani Establishment conceive of Indias disintegration
as an end in itself, even if no territorial advantages accrued to
it. To the extent that such a strategy would also offer the possibility
of at least partially escaping responsibility by crediting such actions
to Freedom Fighters within India, it becomes all the more
attractive.
We cannot pretend that there are any easy solutions
to these problems. Nevertheless, there are general directions that need
to be explored if we are to obviate the threat they constitute.
The first of these refers to the boundaries of our
strategic perspective. Clearly, it cannot end with an assured retaliatory
strike, for the extremist calculus would not necessarily be deterred
by such a possibility, nor, indeed, would it be clear as to who such
a strike is to be directed against.
Only if those who contemplate nuclear or biological
aggression against us are convinced that India would not only survive,
but that their own sphere of influence would significantly shrink, would
such extremist elements be deterred against an adventure using WMDs
against us. Such a deterrent must be based on the creation of political,
administrative and institutional structures, processes and procedures
that would survive such a catastrophic strike. These must comprehend
the identification of possible target cities, plans for evacuation,
the containment of a panic that could reach unprecedented proportions,
the restoration of order within the surviving populations of these target
cities and provision of medical and other relief to them at a scale
that has never been envisaged in the past, and the preservation of order
in the most far flung areas of the country. Equally, they must include
a clear chain of surviving command and a plan for retaliatory strikes
based on prior identification of possible perpetrators, and mandatory
punitive protocols. While such identification may not be perfectly adequate,
knowledge that such intelligence exists would work as a deterrent on
the entire and highly interdependent network of terrorist organisations
and their sponsors.
This is, clearly, only a crude outline of what is needed,
and an enormous exercise would be required to define and implement the
necessary plans. Our strategic perspective must, however, at least identify
the directions that such plans must follow and initiate the processes
that would lead to their realisation. Such an exercise has already been
initiated in nations where the terrorist threat is at much lower levels
in comparison to the situation in India.21
There is, in the observations above, an overwhelming
focus on the threat of unconventional aggression by Pakistan and by
militants based in, or connected with, that state. This is a product,
perhaps, of our present situation, as of a personal perception. This
threat, however great it may presently be, does not exhaust the dimensions
of the dangers of attack by WMDs that India faces. Indeed, our future
strategic doctrine must identify potential adversaries and define their
varying calculii every adversary would not use the same calculus
and our projected responses must accommodate these variations. Nor,
indeed, is it sufficient to base our strategic perspectives on present
perceptions of who our potential adversaries are. In a rapidly changing
world, these relationships will shift, even as access to unconventional
weapons and delivery systems widens. Each such possibility needs separate
examination if it is to yield valid strategic options. And a continuous
and intense exercise to identify and play out each potential scenario
must be undertaken if we are to defend ourselves against every emerging
eventuality.
Virtual Wars
There is one more danger that is currently exercising
counterterrorism strategists across the world. It is variously referred
to as Cyberwar, Netwar, or Information Warfare and Terrorism. Its potential
for destruction in the coming century is immense. Scenarios have been
drawn up that link narrowly targeted attacks with a cumulative potential
to disrupt complex electronic command and control systems across continents.22
The destructive potential of cyberwarfare is expected to increase exponentially
with the progressive computerisation of all systems in business, social
services, governance and defence. The degree of vulnerability can be
estimated by the fact that, during recent tests, computer specialists
demonstrated their ability to crash the computer systems of both the
New York Stock Exchange and the social security system. One expert estimates
that as many as 80% of the Fortune 500 companies have been electronically
penetrated by hackers.23 A 1997 survey
by the Computer Security Institute and the FBIs International
Computer Crime Squad found that 75% of the respondents reported financial
losses due to various computer security breaches.24
Even the most secure defence establishments have been
hacked, and this includes the US military nerve centre at The Pentagon
where computer systems were reportedly under "an unprecedented
and concerted series of external attacks" in March this year.25
Several successful breaches are known to have occurred, including one
by an "18-year old Israeli computer enthusiast with a lot of time
on his hands, and two teenagers from California who were using readily
available software tools downloaded from the Internet to discredit the
Pentagons computer security."26
Representative Curt Weldon, who chaired the subcommittee of the US House
Armed Services Committee that heard testimonies relating to the US Defence
Department computers is reported to have stated, "This Y2K thing
is a piece of cake compared to this."
Cyberwarfare, moreover, creates another critical shift
in the character of terrorism. The idea of the one man army
is more completely realised in the identity of a well informed hacker
than it ever has been through any other technology. A single individual,
with the right knowledge and skills, and working on a simple computer
hooked to the internet a computer indistinguishable from ones
commonly used by students, professionals or businessmen, and freely
available at an extremely modest, and declining, price could
realise his own anarchical agenda without help from, or complicity of,
any other agency or group. This would make detection difficult, if not
impossible, and there would be no physical risks even at the moment
of engagement. And the damage could be done to massive national
infrastructure, commercial, information and defence systems across continents.
This single factor has the potential to force fundamental and comprehensive
revisions in our concepts and strategies of the future of counterterrorist
warfare.
In India, all this may still seem to be in the realm
of science fiction. Computers have, of course, entered the office space
in every sector of the economy, of governance and of defence. But they
are, as yet, far from the integrated systems of command and control
whose disruption could bring the life of a nation to a standstill. Indeed,
at this point of time, even where computers are integral to critical
operations, their disruption would, at worst, cause a temporary setback
before operations were resumed under traditional technological and command
structures. Cyberterrorism, consequently, remains a distant prospect,
given low levels of computerisation in most core sectors. Information
Warfare is, as a result, widely interpreted by Indian planners
within the traditional categories of propaganda, with the difference
that, now, a new electronic medium is available.
This situation cannot, of course, persist for long.
If India is to follow a vigorous programme of economic development,
it will have to adopt contemporary technologies including computerisation
and global networking of all critical operations. And as it does so,
its vulnerabilities to the malevolent hacker will grow.
It would be foolhardy to believe that we will have
time enough to respond when the danger manifests itself. Indeed, it
is now that preventive action must be initiated, so that safety is built
into the very architecture of the nations expanding private and
public networks to the extent that this is possible. How this
can be done is, of course, a matter for the experts. That it needs to
be done, however, is something that bureaucrats and planners will have
to realise and concede, before the experts can get down to their jobs.
The cumulative impact of technological change in terrorist
warfare is truly terrifying and contains within it the seeds of the
destruction of many a nation at the hands of even the most insignificant
minorities.
In a world of satellites, lasers, computers, briefcase weapons,
precision targeting, and a choice of viruses with which to attack people
or computers, nations as we now know them may well find themselves up
against potent adversaries, some no more than a millionth their size.27
The politics of rage and vengeance has closed avenues
of rational negotiation with radical groups whose motivation no longer
attaches value to traditional notions of national or self-interest.
The sheer speed of transformations, and of potential attack, the multiplicity
of potential sources of aggression, the anonymity and degree of dispersal
with which a terrorist offensive can be planned and executed, all these
will make the world a dangerous and unstable place in the new millennium.
The source of all these dangers is a growing pool
of widely available knowledge of weapon systems, of information
that was traditionally monopolised by governments, and of skills to
translate such information into subversive action. There is only one
possible protection against these, and that, again, is to secure greater
knowledge, continuously upgraded intelligence, skills and technologies
that keep us far ahead of the forces of disorder.
At this point of time, however, we appear to be
lagging well behind.
* Mr. K.P.S. Gill is the publisher and editor of Faultlines, the founding
President of the Institute for Conflict Management, and a member of
the National Security Advisory Board (NSAB). An officer of the Assam
cadre of the Indian Police Service, he served in a number of theatres
of civil strife and low intensity warfare. As Director General of the
Punjab Police, he led the successful campaign against terrorism in that
state. Among other activities after his retirement from the Police,
he writes on internal security, political and developmental issues for
a number of newspapers and magazines.
-
SHAW, G.B., "The
Devil’s Disciple", cited in Norman F. Dixon, On the Psychology
of Military Incompetence", Jonathan Cape, London, with BI Publications,
New Delhi, 1976, p. 110.
-
Cf. K.P.S. Gill, "Bureaucracy
must emerge from its maze," Pioneer, 23.1.99.
-
See Manvendra Singh,
"Years after request, Army still awaits counter-insurgency
equipment", Indian Express, 12.12.97, which describes a five-year
wait for ‘inexpensive’, ‘lifesaving’ and ‘operation enhancing’ equipment.
Snowmobiles case
-
"Endgame in Punjab:
1988-93," Faultlines, Vol. 1.1, ICM-Bulwark Books, May 1999,
pp. 13-14.
-
Ibid., pp. 41-44.
-
See; also see J G Nadkarni,
"The Army needs modernisation: We love quantity", The
Indian Express, 11.8.99; "How well equipped are the jawans",
Times of India, 9.6.99, which speaks of the equipment available
to soldiers of the Indian army, who are, by and large, much better
off than the para-military and state armed police forces.
-
TOFFLER, Alvin, Powershift,
Bantam Paperback Edition, 1991, p. 417.
-
Ibid., p. 453.
-
Ibid.
-
"Militants possess
chemical weapons", Pioneer, September 27, 1999; "Pak Militants
‘May’ Use Poisonous Gases", The Tribune, September 27, 1999.
-
VAID, Mahendra, "Rs
4,000 cr worth of weapons, equipment for infantry," Times of
India, October 22, 1999; GUPTA, Shishir, "Govt okays upgradation
of weaponry," Hindustan Times, October 22, 1999.
-
VAID, Ibid.
-
JOHN, Wilson, "Army
buys second-hand junk for a fortune," The Pioneer, October
22, 1999.
-
Cf. for instance,
though in a different context, the report that the Indian Air Force
ignored indigenous radar technologies for over a decade because
an "influential lobby" favoured imports. THOMAS, Wg. Cdr.
Joseph, "IAF Ignored Reconnaissance Radar", in Bharat
Verma (Ed.) Indian Defence Review, Vol. 14 (3), July-September 1999,
pp. 93-94.
-
Information available
to me suggests that most of these projects were wound up after my
departure from Punjab. The crisis had passed, and the Establishment
lapsed into its habitual stupor.
-
BOWERS, Stephen R.
& KEYS, R. Kimberly, "Technology and Terrorism: The New
Threat for the Millennium," Conflict Studies 309, Institute
for the Study of Conflict & Terrorism, 1999, p. 22.
-
BOWERS & KEYS,
op. cit., p. 16.
-
FOXELL, Joseph W.,
Jr., "The Debate on the Potential for Mass-Casualty Terrorism:
The Challenge to US Security", Terrorism and Political Violence,
Vol. II. No. 1 (Spring 1999), p. 102.
-
Ibid., p. 99
-
BOWERS & KIMBERLY,
op.cit., p. 13.
-
Cf., for instance,
the US Department for Defence Plan for Integrating National Guard
and Reserve Component Support for Response to Attacks Using Weapons
of Mass Destruction, Prepared by the DoD Tiger Team, January, 1998.
-
DEVOST, Matthew G.,
HOUGHTON, Brian K. & POLLARD, Neal A., "Information
Terrorism: Can You Trust Your Toaster?", Sun Tzu Art of War
in Information Warfare, Institute for National Strategic Studies,
http://www.ndu.edu
-
DeBORCHGRAVE, Arnaud,
cited in Bowers & Kimberly, op.cit., p. 6.
-
Sword & Shield
– Cyber Crime Rap Sheet, http://www.sscs.net/cybercrime.html.
-
MARTINEZ, Michael
J., "Pentagon Attacks Overblown?", http://abcnews.go.com
-
Ibid. See also Barbara
Starr, "Pentagon Cyber-War," and Laura Myers, "Pentagon
Computers Vulnerable" http://abcnews.go.com.
-
TOFFLER, op.cit.,
p. 453.
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