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Kargil
A Window of Opportunity
Sudhir S. Bloeria*
During the first week of May 1999, Pakistan unleashed
a storm of unprecedented magnitude in the little known Kargil area of
Jammu & Kashmir (J&K). Even though India has been inured to,
and conditioned by, the last one decade of Pakistan-inspired proxy-war
in the State, these belligerent incursions across the Line of Control
(LoC) came as a rude shock, taking both the government and the security
forces completely by surprise. It took India over two months to clear
this transgression. Operations involved considerable concentration of
troops with over one thousand soldiers killed and wounded and strenuous
diplomatic effort and enormous costs. There have been differing accounts
of the Pak forces occupation of Indian territory, but one observer
has comprehensively summed them in these words:
The Pakistan army had established posts on seven prominent
features dominating the National Highway the lifeline connecting
Kashmir valley to Ladakh. The closest feature was Tololing located barely
two km from the highway and about four km from the Line of Control.
Tololing is so close to the highway that a medium machine gun with a
range of 1,800 meters is enough to stop vehicular movement. What the
Rajputana Rifles troops discovered atop this dominating feature were
well prepared bunkers with roofs made of corrugated galvanised iron
(CGI) sheets as also long angle iron pickets to erect obstacles. The
Pakistanis had separate bunkers for living and gun positions. Since
these were located on the reverse slopes, artillery firing was not so
effective. It was good work, good planning. It would have taken
them three to four months to build, said an officer".1
Since May 1999 there has also been criticism as well
as analysis of the failure of the army and the intelligence agencies
to detect the occupation of Indian territory by Pakistan, and the handling
of the Kargil Operation, in all its manifestations, by the Government.
Some defence analysts and strategic thinkers maintain that the Indian
response to the challenge posed by Pakistan was, once again, muted and
lacking in the sting that such an adventure should have attracted.
The Region
Whatever the other manifestations and fall out of these
incidents have been, Kargil emerged as a prominent entity on the national
scene and briefly captured and held world attention as well.
Kargil, with a geographical area of 14,036 square kilometres,
is one of the two districts of the Ladakh region of Jammu & Kashmir,
the other being Leh. It has an estimated population of eighty-one thousand,2
and is subdivided into two tehsils, seven blocks, 65 panchayats
and 129 villages. Kargil is the only town in the district.
The Kargil district was carved out in Ladakh in June
1979, and shares boundaries with Leh in the East, Himachal Pradesh in
the South, and with Doda, Anantnag and Srinagar touching its western
confines. Towards the North lie the Pakistan occupied territories of
what are called the Northern Areas, including Skardu and Gilgit. The
majority of the population is Shia Muslim, with very few Sunnis,
as is the case in the Northern Areas as well. The Buddhists come next
and are concentrated in the Zanskar tehsil. The district presents
a composite tapestry of Balti, Ladakhi, Purki, Dardi, Zanskari and Shina
cultures. Irrespective of their ethnic identities all these communities
speak the Kargali language with ease.
Considering the cold desert conditions, mountainous
terrain and difficulties of communication, infrastructure and civic
services in Kargil district are relatively well developed. All but three
of the 129 villages have been provided with drinking water and 79 villages
are electrified; there are 478 kilometres of surfaced and 198 kilometres
of un-surfaced roads, connecting 92 villages. 358 educational institutions
are functioning in the district and there are 97 health institutions,
including one district hospital and six primary health centres (PHCs).3
As in the rest of the Ladakh region, the terrain is mostly rocky and
mountainous with heights ranging from eight thousand to eighteen thousand
feet above mean sea level, mostly barren and devoid of any vegetation,
with greenery existing only in Valleys and patches irrigated by fast
flowing streams. The main population concentration, as also the cultivable
area, is in the Suru Valley, which is drained by the Suru River. The
district receives snowfall varying between two and five feet, with hardly
any rainfall. Drass is said to be the second coldest inhabited place
in the world, after Siberia in Russia.
Before 1947, Kargil was part of the erstwhile Ladakh
Wazarat, which included areas of the present Leh and Kargil districts
and the Skardu area. Gilgit in the North was a separate administrative
unit. This entire Himalayan highland region was generally known as the
Northern Areas, extending right up to the Karakoram Pass.4
The strategic importance of this region had been realised by the British
over a century ago in the context of Russian expansionist ambitions
towards the South of their empire. Lord Curzon called Gilgit one of
the Northern gates of India. Describing its importance, E.F. Knight,
who had travelled in the region in 1891, wrote, "Gilgit, the Northernmost
outpost of the Indian Empire, covers all the passes over the Hindoo
Koosh, from the Easternmost one, the Shimshal, to those at the head
of the Yasin river, in the West
"5
Now, whatever position we take with regard to the debatable lands beyond
the Hindoo Koosh, there can be no doubt as to what our course of action
should be on the Southern slope. Our influence should at least extend
up to that great mountain range which forms the natural frontier of
India. It is necessary for the safeguarding of our Empire that we should
at any rate hold our side of the mountain-gates; but unless we looked
to it, Russia would soon have both sides under her control.6
Kashmir has been called the northern bastion of India. Gilgit
can be described as her farther outpost. And hard by Gilgit it is that,
in an undefined way, on the high Roof of the World what more
fitting a place! The three greatest Empires of the Earth meet
Great Britain, Russia, and China."7
The Defence of India Plan prepared in the 1920s considered these areas
to be of "vital importance".8
Most of the Northern Areas in this strategic region,
consisting of a huge land mass of more than seventy thousand square
kilometres of what was J&K territory, was illegally occupied by
Pakistan in 1947. The occupation followed a successful revolt against
Maharaja Hari Singh by the Gilgit Scouts, supported by two British Officers,
on October 31, 1947. Ever since, fully realising its strategic importance,
Pakistan, has never loosened her grip on the region. Significantly,
the entire recent operation by Pakistani forces in the Kargil sector
was carried out from bases and training centres spread in Pakistans
Northern Areas around Gilgit and Skardu, with the forward base at Olthingthang.
Successive Pakistani Governments, over the past five
decades, have ruled this area with an iron hand leaving its inhabitants
without political identity, civil rights or even constitutional status.
Large populations of Afghan and Pakhtoon settlers have been inducted
into the region to alter the demographic Shia character of the region.
In stark contrast, policy framers in India appear to
have failed to realise the importance of the Northern Areas from a national
security perspective and practically no efforts were made to regain
Skardu and Gilgit during the 1947-48 conflict with Pakistan. In fact,
even Leh and Kargil were saved from Pakistani occupation by skin of
the teeth.9 This area continued to be neglected
subsequently as well, which has resulted in major gaps in Indias
knowledge of the Northern Areas. Indian intelligence was better informed
on Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (PoK), but had difficulty in collecting
human intelligence in the Northern Areas. Unfortunately, till recently,
not only successive Governments but also the intelligence community
itself gave low priority to this area, even in terms of strengthening
technical intelligence capabilities.10
The single-minded pursuit by Pakistan of its disruptive
designs and the less than adequate Indian response has not been confined
to the KargilGilgit region alone, or to the period of, and immediately
preceding, the Kargil War. The pattern has, unfortunately, been consistent
in respect of the entire J&K area, right since 1947. To understand
the full implications of Pakistans Kargil misadventure an over
view of the contours of Indo-Pak conflicts since Independence is necessary.
Pakistans Involvement since 1947
Pakistan was born on August 14, 1947, a "moth
eaten, truncated" country emerging out of political chaos, economic
ruination, colossal transmigration, and dripping in the blood of communal
violence. The Muslim League, which was responsible for the countrys
creation, and its leadership headed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, also laid
the foundations of the evils that have since afflicted that nation.
Jinnah concentrated all effective power in the hands of the Governor
General, a post he chose to occupy himself, thereby heralding the beginning
of authoritarian rule, a legacy that persists. The country has been
under a military dictatorship for more than half of its independent
existence. Two other developments have simultaneously taken place with
comparable consistency: an ever increasing dependence on foreign aid,
both economic and political, and a continued devaluation and erosion
of democratic norms and constitutional propriety. These trends have
severely undermined Pakistans State structure. In spite of internal
problems, financial difficulties and a fragile political edifice, however,
Pakistan has been constantly, and consistently, focusing on gaining
control of the J&K state through any means possible.
Unlike most of the rulers of the princely states in
India, Maharaja Hari Singh of J&K found it difficult to decide on
the issue of accession before the formal lapse of British paramountcy.
Instead, he made the offer of a standstill agreement to
both India and Pakistan, on 12 August 1947. No agreement was signed
with India prior to the States accession on 26 October 1947. However,
a standstill agreement was executed with Pakistan. Postal and telegraph
facilities in the state were placed under the control of the Pakistan
Government, which also promised to continue the existing arrangement
by which the state imported rice, wheat, cloth, ammunition, kerosene
oil and petrol from West Punjab. However, Pakistans rulers had
soon put into operation plans to force the Maharaja to accede to Pakistan.
The strategy for achieving this was a multi-pronged approach based on
armed invasion, subversion of the Muslim populationincluding
military personneland economic blockade of the state.
The invasion of Kashmir by tribals was meticulously
planned, carefully timed and competently executed. The main attack,
Operation Gulmarg, was planned and launched by the Army Headquarters
of Pakistan. The British Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army personally
signed the orders within a few days of the creation of Pakistan. The
main force consisted of tribals from the North West Frontier, who were
organised into units of about 1000 each, called Lashkars, under the
command of their respective Chiefs called Maliks; Pakistani Army personnel
joined these tribals as stiffeners. Each Lashkar was provided with an
army Major, a Captain and ten Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs). Major
General Akbar Khan, who was given the code name Tariq,11
assisted by Brigadier Sher Khan, commanded the entire force. The operational
plan envisaged six Lashkars to advance along the main road from Muzaffarabad
to Srinagar via Domel, Uri and Baramulla. Two Lashkars each were to
make subsidiary moves from Haji Pir Pass to Gulmarg and Tithwal to Handwara,
Sopore and Bandipore, with the twin objectives of securing large chunks
of territory as also to protect the flanks of the main column. The D-day
for Operation Gulmarg was fixed as October 22, 1947.12
The main attack was launched, as planned, on the night
of October 21/22, 1947, at Muzaffarabad. The raiders made a dash for
Baramulla and Srinagar. A valiant and courageous rearguard action by
Brigadier Rajinder Singh,13 Chief of Staff
of the State Forces, and a handful of his men delayed the advance of
the hostiles by four crucial days. This gave the Indian Army time to
land its troops in Srinagar on the morning of October 27, after Maharaja
Hari Singh had signed the Instrument of Accession. The Indian Army fought
some spirited actions around Srinagar city, the most noteworthy being
the battle of Budgam and Shalteng. These actions resulted in the complete
rout of the hostiles, who were chased by the Indian Army to Uri and
beyond.
During the summer of 1948, Pakistan tried to enlarge
the area of conflict by opening two more fronts in Gurez and Ladakh.
In a bold and wide sweep, its forces struck simultaneously at Drass
and Kargil, and launched a drive towards Leh. Gilgit was by then already
under Pakistani occupation and the Skardu garrison was effectively surrounded.
The latter finally gave up on August 14, 1948, after a resistance lasting
over six months. State Forces very thinly defended all three. Kargil
was captured on May 19, while Drass was occupied a little later. By
the second fortnight of May, the hostiles were practically knocking
at the doors of Leh and had simultaneously reached Machoi near the mouth
of Zojila.14 The entire Ladakh, Baltistan
and Gilgit region had, thus, fallen into the raiders hands, with
the exception of Leh to its East. The bid to capture Zojila and roll
down from there into the Valley was made towards the last week of May,
when 1 Patiala took up the defence of Zojila, together with a Company
of 6 J&K Infantry already stationed there.15
There was no change in the position prevailing in the Valley during
the latter part of 1948. With the Indian advance stalled at Uri and
Tithwal, Muzaffarabad remained an elusive target. Indian successes in
the Ladakh area, however, were more notable. In a significant operation,
brilliantly planned and heroically executed, the Indian troops broke
the Pakistani stranglehold over Zojila on November 1, 1948, with an
almost super-human effort, conducting tank operations beyond 11,000
ft. and fighting in temperatures as low as minus 200C. This
success was quickly exploited by moving further to recapture Drass
on 16 November, and Kargil on 21 November, 1948. Another Indian
column had proceeded from Leh and, brushing aside enemy resistance in
Nimu and Khaltsi, joined with their own troops at Kargil on November
24. With this link up, the Leh and Kargil areas had been saved from
falling into Pakistans hands. Skardu, the rest of Baltistan and
the entire Gilgit region, however, could not be retrieved and remain
under Pakistani occupation.
With India accepting the UN proposals for a cease-fire
and Pakistan following suit, hostilities came to an end at midnight
on December 31/January 1, 1949. India had lost over a third of the J&K
States territory amounting to 78,114 square kilometres. This included
the strategic region of Baltistan-Gilgit in the Northern highlands,
Muzaffarabad district in the Jehlum Valley, Mirpur District of the Jammu
division, and half of the Poonch Jagir a tremendous loss by any
standards.
During the entire period of conflict the Indian government
always gave an impression that it was dealing with Pakistan at two different
levels. At worst, Pakistan was an adversary in the limited context of
J&K; in other matters, the dealings between the two countries continued
at the normal pace. The transfer of substantial amounts of money to
Pakistan, as well as the flow of defence material to that country continued
even while the two armies were engaged in open combat in one
part of India. Not even once, during the entire period of operations,
did the Government of India initiate any move by which Pakistan could
feel threatened for her misadventure in J&K. On the contrary, it
appears that efforts were made to reassure the adversary that the entire
conflict would remain localised. Not even a threat was held to strike
at the vulnerable areas of Pakistan outside J&K. Even within the
State, i.e., within Indian territory, the Indian Air Force (IAF) was
made to operate with its hands practically tied behind its back.
The second war with Pakistan, again caused because
of her obsession with J&K, took place in 1965 when the military
dictator Ayub Khan was at the helm of affairs. His adventurism was matched
equally by his fiery and impulsive foreign minister Z.A. Bhutto. Both
had convinced themselves of their military superiority, and the operation
was to be, in a way, a repeat enactment of the 1947-48 bid. The guerrilla
infiltration by Pakistanis into J&K, planned under the code name
Operation Gibraltar, was noticed on August 5, 1965. Effective
and vigorous counter action by the Indian Army followed and a large
number of infiltrators were eliminated or arrested. The dismal end of
Operation Gibraltar failed to deter Ayub Khan and Z.A. Bhutto,
and in fact had an opposite effect. With General Moosa, the Pakistani
Commander-in-Chief, they decided to launch a full-scale invasion along
the cease fire line. In response, the Indians attacked and occupied
the tactically important and heavily defended Haji Pir Pass on August
24. On the morning of September 1, 1965, the Pakistani forces launched
a massive armoured thrust, backed by a large-scale infantry assault
and heavy shelling in Chhamb in the Jammu sector. Pakistan had
launched Operation Grand Slam as a last and desperate gamble.
India gave a befitting reply across the International
Border, striking Pakistan in the Lahore-Sialkot sector on September
6. In the ensuing seventeen days, the Indian forces reached the outskirts
of Lahore and of Sialkot City. The subsequent declaration of ceasefire,
and the events that followed, however, were to prove that the ignoble
performance of Pakistans military machine was more than counter
balanced by its impressive performance in the field of foreign relations
and diplomacy. Pakistan not only managed to retrieve her lost territory
but also got back the strategic Haji Pir Pass.16
The 1971 war between India and Pakistan was occasioned
by latters internal problems with her Eastern wing, and the all
consuming desire of the ruling classes of Pakistan to perpetuate its
stranglehold on that less fortunate territory. The ruling elite, with
Bhutto as the leader of the largest political party in West Pakistan,
were not prepared to allow Mujib-ur-Rehman, a Bengali, to form the government
at the centre despite the clear victory of the Bengali dominated Awami
League in the national elections. The story of Bhuttos intransigence,
the armys brutal repression and the civil war in East Pakistan,
which led to the creation of Bangladesh, is well known. The two-nation
theory, founded in the genteel living rooms of Uttar Pradesh, was finally
laid to rest in the paddy fields of Bangladesh. 17
During this conflict, major operations were conducted
in J&K, particularly in the Jammu sector where the Pakistanis again
took the initiative by attacking the Indian forces on December 3, and
succeeded in occupying the areas right up to the Munnawar Tawi, including
the village of Chhamb. In the Kargil sector, Indian troops succeeded
in capturing some important enemy posts overlooking Kargil town,18
thus removing the threat to the Srinagar-Leh Highway, as also to the
town itself, which was under direct observation from the posts on this
feature.
After the fiasco of 1971, resulting in the loss of
its eastern wing and the defeat of its armed forces, Pakistans
prestige, with its economy and military capacity, touched rock bottom.
Nevertheless, the abundance of petro-dollars in West Asia and Pakistans
deft use of the Islamic card helped stabilise her economy within a few
years. During this period, Pakistans flirtations with democracy
proved short lived and the Army once again assumed control of the country
in July 1977. General Zia ul Haq ruled his country with an iron fist
during the following eleven years, till his death in an air crash. Out
of his own acute religious beliefs, as also the domestic compulsions
of containing the deteriorating internal situation, Zia actively encouraged
the spread of fundamentalist and sectarian organisations within Pakistan
and later outside the country as well. The Russian intervention in Afghanistan
in December 1978 and the rise of Ayotullah Khomeni in Iran towards the
beginning of 1979, once again, brought into emphasis Pakistans
role as a front line state and the most favoured ally in
the eyes of the United States and her global interests. These factors
further helped Pakistan consolidate her economy and build up military
capabilities. The Inter Services Intelligences (ISIs) considerable
and active involvement in organising and sustaining anti-Soviet resistance
by armed groups in Afghanistan provided Pakistan with enormous supplies
of unaccounted arms and explosives, slush money and expertise in organising
and spreading armed insurgency, experience that was applied with telling
effect in the Indian Punjab.
The experience gained in organising and sustaining
militancy in Punjab was synthesised with the lessons learnt in the two
abortive attempts to annex J&K in 1947-48 and in 1965. A blue print
of activities, as outlined in what has been revealed as Operation
Topac, was prepared and set into motion by the beginning of 1988.
It aimed at creating disturbances in the State by appealing to the Muslim
sentiments of the population. The magnitude of activities acquired a
new scale in order to enlarge the base of sympathisers. Pakistan provided
arms, explosives and training to the militants to begin a new round
of insurgency. The third and by far the most sinister and cunning
attempt to annex and appropriate the State of J&K had commenced.19
Pakistan-inspired militancy erupted during the middle
of 1988 and gathered momentum slowly, assuming full-blown proportions
by the beginning of 1990. This low-cost proxy war thrust on India by
Pakistan has inflicted untold miseries on the people of the State, and
a tremendous strain on the resources of the nation and on the Indian
Security Forces. From January 1990 to the end of September 1999, 43,305
incidents of terrorist violence had taken place in the State, resulting
in the death of 11,307 civilians, 10,429 militants and 1962 security
forces personnel.20 Forceful counter measures
by the security forces, and the increasing alienation of the local population
from the militants, brought the situation sufficiently under control
to ensure the peaceful conduct of Parliamentary and State Assembly Elections
in 1996. With the installation of a popular government, whatever little
support the militants could muster amongst the local population shrank
further to insignificance. This was a serious set back for Pakistan,
and delivered an almost terminal blow to the apparatus of militancy
that had so assiduously been built by the ISI. With the local elements
amongst the militants decreasing progressively, Pakistan embarked on
an alternative course, inducting foreign mercenaries in ever-increasing
numbers. By 1997-98 the command and control of militancy had been taken
over by these mercenaries, mostly belonging to Pakistan and Afghanistan,
with a smattering of militants from countries including Sudan, Lebanon,
Iran, and some of the Central Asian Republics. These mujahideen received
their training and indoctrination in the fundamentalist seminaries
madarsas of Pakistan. The experience of the Taliban
experiment in Afghanistan was now being applied in J&K. This shift
of emphasis from local to foreign elements, who were undoubtedly better
trained, experienced, and more committed, did raise the levels of violence
and the frequency of clashes with the security forces. But the primary
objectives of disrupting the life of the people and discrediting the
elected government were not realised. Even after sustained efforts of
over a decade, Pakistan had not achieved anything beyond hurting and
alienating the people of the State. It was against this backdrop that
Pakistan appears to have focused her attention on Kargil.
Kargil: The Response to Pakistans Machinations
Pakistans repeated attempts to establish a foothold
amongst the people of Kargil and subvert their loyalties to the nation
have been thwarted by the local population right since 1947. In 1948,
the raiders had occupied almost the entire Kargil area for few months,
but they were not able to get any support or co-operation from the locals.
The spontaneous welcome and enthusiasm that greeted the Indian liberating
forces amply demonstrated the attitudes of the population. Pakistan
made no further attempts in this area, even in 1965 when large-scale
infiltration was engineered along almost the entire length of the ceasefire
line in rest of the State. During the 1971 Operations, a couple of villages
were part of the area where the Indian Army had made advances. The response
of the people of these villages towards the Indian troops, as also the
civil administration, was sufficient indication of their sense of relief
on having become part of India again.21
A bulk of the population of Kargil is very religious,
professing an orthodox Shia faith. They have nothing in common
with or sympathies for, the rulers of Pakistan. On the contrary they
have always mistrusted and disliked them. There is no commonality between
the Kargalis and the people of Pakistan apart from religion.
Even this tenuous link does not create much leeway because of the deep
Shia-Sunni divide. In fact, the Kargil population is of
the same stock as the people of Baltistan. The oppressive rule Pakistan
has perpetuated in the entire Northern Areas since 1947, has alienated
the Kargil population even further. For the interpretation of the tenets
of their faith, the people of Kargil have traditionally looked up to
the famous Islamic institutions and renowned theologists in Iraq.
Against this backdrop, Pakistans modus operandi
for infiltration across the LoC in the Kargil area could not conform
to the pattern that has been followed in other parts of the State. Tactics
such as creation of cells comprising sympathisers among the local population,
subversion of local youth, and use of fundamentalist front organisations
to undermine the sentiment of the local population did not precede infiltration
in Kargil. Instead, infiltration was effected without any support whatsoever
from the locals. Indeed, clear evidence exists to shows that Pakistani
troops entered the area and occupied positions in such a manner as to
deliberately avoid any contact with the local population. Over the past
decade the people of Kargil have shown no interest in Pakistani designs
on Kashmir, and the stray attempts made by the militants to use the
Kargil territory for infiltrating into Kashmir have also failed, with
heavy loss of men and equipment to them. This has probably been the
most important reason why Pakistans troops initiated and sustained
intensive artillery attacks on Kargil town and the villages around it
over the last few years, with considerable damage to life, limb and
property in the area. The Pakistani shelling from across the LoC assumed
serious proportions during 1998 and rose to a crescendo in the autumn
of that year. According to an analyst, "Kargil town itself was
devastated, and 17 civilians lost their lives. In a desperate attempt
to ensure that the conflict did not escalate to the point where it would
sabotage nascent efforts for a rapprochement with Pakistan, the
Indian Army Chief, General V.P. Malik, is believed to have been instructed
to ensure that his troops did not retaliate Pakistani fire with heavy
caliber guns, including the 155-mm Bofors howitzers."22
Towards the latter half of 1998, Pakistani firing and
shelling had seriously disrupted the life of the local population, especially
between Drass and Kargil, and more so of the people of Kargil town.23
Certain stretches of the road between Drass and Kargil, where Pakistan
observers could see the traffic on the road, were so systematically
brought under enemy fire that almost the entire vehicular movement on
these stretches used to take place in the dark, with all lights, including
the tail lights of vehicles, switched off. Kargil town wore a deserted
look, and few shops would open even during the day. Shopkeepers and
people working in Government offices would move for safety to adjoining
villages as soon as night fell and the local populations resentment
against Pakistan had reached an all-time high. The shelling from across
the border continued, at considerable intensity, till the end of October,
tapering off thereafter to a practical standstill during end-November
1998. It picked up again only as the crisis broke out in May 1999.
Operation Vijay
It is now evident that Pakistani Army regulars along
with the Lashkar-e-Toiba and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen were
responsible for crossing the LoC and occupying important heights as
well as areas of tactical importance, right from the Mushkoh Valley
to Chorbat La in Batalik and beyond and to Turtuk in the North. Though
the exact timing of this ingress and occupation, and the preparation
of defences in respect of each of the positions occupied, is yet to
be reliably determined, it is safe to assume that this was done during
autumn 1998 and spring 1999. Ironically, at the time of the Lahore-Bus-Diplomacy,
and the meeting between the Indian Prime Minister and his Pakistani
counterpart, in February 1999, considerable effort and resources of
the Pakistan Army had already been expended towards creating trouble
across the LoC in the Kargil sector. The confrontation between the Indian
Army and Pakistani forces, which commenced in early May 1999, continued
for two and a half months and even threatened a much wider conflagration
at certain points, before the situation was defused in the second fortnight
of July. During this period, the Indian Army, under Operation Vijay,
used air power for the first time since 1971, although on a restricted
scale and under considerable constraints. The salient features of the
Kargil confrontation during this period comprise the following elements.
Trouble began on May 5 when two army patrols in the
snow-clad Yaldor area in the Kargil region spotted a group of men, apparently
from PoK. A larger patrol, which went to crosscheck, was ambushed and
lost four soldiers.24 A week later, based
on the reports of the number of patrols sent along the LoC in this sector
and on the basis of aerial reconnaissance, the army realised that the
ingress by Pakistanis was fairly large and widespread on the ridges
and areas of tactical importance in Mushkoh valley and facing Drass,
Kaksar, Kargil and Batalik. Tentative Indian attempts to clear some
of the positions attracted heavy bombardment by Pakistani artillery.
The army also realised that, apart from the extensive scale of the operation,
the Pakistani soldiers were not there with the narrow intention of infiltration,
but had established regular positions with attendant defences and fortifications
in most of the locations. Clearly, the situation was extremely serious
from the Indian point of view although the extent of the Pakistani intrusion
had not yet been fully realised.
By the middle of May, the army was discovering fresh
Pakistani-held positions on an alarmingly regular basis spanning the
entire Kargil sector; from the Mushkoh valley in the West to Chorbat
La in the East.25 Overseeing these operations,
the 15 Corps Headquarters acknowledged that, by May 20, the Indian forces
had lost 15 soldiers, with another 30 injured. 40 infiltrators had also
been reported killed in the operations till that date. As the clashes
between the two forces increased with the attendant intensity of shelling
across the border, civilian life in the area was totally disrupted.
Drass and eleven villages surrounding it were completely deserted. The
Kargil town and villages around it registered a migration of more than
50 per cent of the population to safer areas, further south in the Suru
Valley. The Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir, Farooq Abdullah, flew
into Kargil on 18 May to reassure the local population, supervise relief
work, and ensure an efficient functioning of the civil administration.26
On May 25, the countrys Cabinet Committee on Security met for
the first time to review the prevailing situation.27
More than 50 Indian soldiers were, by then, dead.28
The situation in Kargil entered a new phase when the
IAF was brought in, though on a limited scale in a ground support role,
on May 26. MiG fighter-bombers and helicopter gunships struck twice
on that day against enemy formations in the Drass sector. All the targets
engaged by the IAF were well on the Indian side of the LoC. The air
strikes continued into the next day. Two MiG aircraft were lost, with
one MiG-27 M crashing after its pilot ejected following engine trouble;
Pakistan captured Flt. Lt. Nachiketa.29
A MiG 21, on a location and rescue mission, was shot down and the pilot,
Sq. Ldr. Ajay Ahuja, was captured and shot in cold blood. The IAF also
lost one Mi-17 helicopter gunship and four crew the following day, after
which attack helicopters were withdrawn from air operations and Mirage
2000s were pressed into service for aerial reconnaissance and special
missions. The Mirages pounded the positions of the infiltrators with
telling effect, especially in the Mushkoh valley, using laser-guided
rockets and cluster bombs. The Mirages superior avionics helped
evade the Stinger missiles that had threatened earlier operations. The
use of the Airforce came at a critical moment in the operations, when
the Armys actions against the enemy were just picking momentum.
The air strikes boosted the morale of Indian soldiers, with an opposite
and desired impact on the enemy, even as they helped soften targets
for eventual reoccupation by the infantry.
In addition to the deployment of the IAF, the Indian
Navy was also put on high alert, and a certain repositioning of its
ships undertaken, even though no occasion arose to use the fighting
capabilities of Indias sea power. Towards the end of May, the
Indian Navys Strike elements were moved from the Eastern to the
Western seaboard, and during the first week of June most of the Eastern
Fleet was also moved to the Arabian Sea. These steps were intended to
avoid any surprises and convey the kind of strategic threat that the
Indian Navy could pose to Pakistan. The moves caused substantial concern
in Islamabad.30
By June 6, troops and logistic build-up by the Army
had been sufficiently achieved to launch effective counter-strikes in
Kargil and Drass sectors with the immediate aim of clearing the threat
to the vital line of communication on the Srinagar-Leh highway. June
9 was a dark day in the ongoing conflict when the mutilated and tortured
bodies of Lt. Saurav Kalia and five others were received from Pakistan.
These six Indian soldiers had been missing since May 14 while on a patrol
in the Kaksar sector. "It was clearly aimed at causing a national
outrage and provoking India further. It was just the most recent example
of Pakistans determination to prolong its Kargil offensive and
escalate the war on Kashmirs borders and focus international attention
on the dispute."31
The Indian counter-offensive produced its first significant
result in the capture of Tololing Peak in the Drass Sector on June 13.
It was on the same day that Prime Minister Vajpayee visited Kargil.
He and his entourage had a near escape from Pakistani shelling. On July
2, Naik Inayat Ali of Pakistans 5 Northern Light Infantry was
captured in Batalik sector, providing concrete and irrefutable proof,
if any proof was needed, of the Pakistan Armys presence and involvement
on the Indian side of the LOC. By the beginning of July, considerable
headway had been made in Mushkoh valley and Drass Sectors. However,
the progress in Kaksar and Batalik was comparatively less, even though
the army had maintained constant pressure.
American efforts to defuse the tension between India
and Pakistan, and disengage the two armies, had started on June 15,
with President Clinton urging Prime Minister Sharief to withdraw his
countrys forces from Indian territory. During the next three weeks
intense diplomatic activity followed, including a visit by General Zinni
to Islamabad. American pressure, widespread condemnation from the world
community including China, and the Indian forces gradual but unmistakable
advances forced Nawaz Sharief and the Pakistan Army to back off. On
July 11, Pakistani elements began retreating and the Indian territory
was reportedly fully vacated on July 16, 1999. Two days before this,
the Indian Prime Minister declared Operation Vijay a success.
In any military conflict it is almost impossible to
exactly find out the resources used by the contending parties, and only
rough estimates are possible. One report, quoting Lt.Gen. Krishan Pal,
General Officer Commanding (GOC) 15 Corps, mentioned that, in all, nine
battalions, including two teams of 9 Para, were deployed in Drass and
Mushkoh sub-sector, six battalions in Batalik, while one battalion was
used in Kaksar.32 Pakistani manpower in
this sector appeared to be in the range of eleven battalions, including
Pakistan Army regulars, Northern Light Infantry Units, SSG troops and
mercenaries.
The Indian Army also reportedly deployed 300 artillery
pieces, including 100 Bofors guns. The IAF logged 550 strike missions,
150 reconnaissance missions and 500 escort missions. Besides, 2,185
chopper sorties were also conducted. The cost of the conflict in monetary
terms, for India, has been projected at Rs. 11.1 billion. In terms of
manpower, the most precious national resource, 407 soldiers were killed,
584 injured and 6 missing. Pakistani casualties were estimated to be
at 696 killed.33 In the final analysis,
identifying the most important assets, a war-veteran of this area wrote,
"Kargil proved that both young officers and the Bofors were a winning
factor".34
The Assessment
Expert comments on and analyses of the Kargil operations
have ranged between high praise for the Indian forces and stinging criticism
of the failure of commanders and units in not being able to track enemy
ingress sufficiently in advance and take immediate counter measures.
The higher direction of operations, both at the military as well as
the political level, also came under criticism. It would be useful to
go through some representative samples of the post-operations assessment
made by experts in the field. According to a former Vice-Chief of the
Army Staff:
Local commanders also ought to have been maintaining contact
with the local village communities who have excellent information on
any unusual movements in the area. I am totally mystified and perplexed
as a military professional, how something of this kind could have happened.
Frankly it is incredible I am unclear whether there were helicopter
patrols in winter, which we used to have in our time. If there were
such patrols they should have certainly spotted something I cannot
believe a thousand to two thousand infiltrators could not be detected
by routine physical patrolling.35
In a similar vein, Prem Shanker Jha, pointed out that
the Indian Intelligence "has at least one and possibly two operatives
in Switzerland [;] it failed to get even an inkling of Pakistans
purchase of 40,000 pairs of snowboots, ultra-light rucksacks, down-filled
parkas and snow goggles last summer. Similarly, if it has an operative
in Baltistan, that operative must have been fast asleep. For, the Pakistanis
were improving roads and strengthening bridges to the LoC and building
supply camps at its base all last summer." He also pointed out
a serious gap in Indian armament, thus: "It is not only that Pakistani
soldiers were far better equipped. It is that 80% of all our deaths
occurred in Pakistani artillery fire we couldnt suppress[,] as
the army lacked a counter battery, or weapon-locating radar (WLR, which
Pakistan has had for 15 years)."36
K.Shankar Vajpai has opined that we cannot afford to handle security
with our habitual slackness.37 Another
view on the enemy forces indicates:
Pakistan relied primarily on troops from the Northern Light
Infantry
because soldiers of this regiment are mostly young local
men from the mountainous regions of Skardu, PoK, Baltistan, Gilgit and
the North West Frontier Province. They are fully acclimatized to military
activities at high altitudes. They were ordered to shed their uniform,
put on salwar kameez, grow beards and wear skullcaps. Regular
Pakistani army officers and soldiers carried out most of the military
operations. Pakistan had also deployed squadrons of its helicopters
and artillery to give cover to the military offensive. The Forces Commander,
Northern Areas (FCNA) and the higher command of the 10th
Corps of the Pakistan Army provided command and control and back-up
for the military operation. We are dealing with a Pakistan army, which
is a force indoctrinated in religious dogma and extremism without commitment
to normal military norms.38
There may be important lessons for us in these observations.
Commenting on Pakistans strategy, Lt. Gen. V. R. Raghvan (Retd),
former Director General of Military Operations, stated: "In this
conflict Pakistan has chosen a ground or theatre of operations where
Indias military might cannot be brought to bear. It is not possible
for India to use its strike Corps, tank divisions or air force to full
advantage in these mountainous heights. The second factor to be borne
in mind is that Pakistans gambit of using a small element of its
regular force with huge ballast of irregulars has succeeded in drawing
a minimum of three Indian Divisions into a small pocket of Drass to
Batalik."39
The Pakistani perspective on this conflict is also
interesting:
The finest institution in this land, the bedrock of our existence,
is now directly under attack because an initiative was not fully thought
out as to possible consequences. More than a hundred officers and men
of this magnificent army have paid a terrible price in blood for this
negligence. On the other hand, though belated, we have begun to recognise
the sacrifice and valour of the Northern Light Infantry (NLI). This
was a must. No single unit of our Army has inflicted such damage on
men, morale and equipment of the Indians in their history as the NLI
has done, a handful holding at bay for weeks a force at least sixty
to seventy times their strength. They deserve battle honours collectively
and recognition of their valour individually. Though in sacrificing
their life and limb they took a tremendous toll of the enemy in many
times their own dead and wounded, because of mishandling the Indians
have turned their military disaster on the ground into a victory in
the media.40
Former Pakistan Army Chief General Aslam Beg has said that those who
thought Kargil a misadventure "are cowards, the mujahideen
have acted in a calculated way. Now it will be difficult for the international
community and India to push Kashmir under the carpet".41
The Indian army, in addition to the lack of resources
in the initial stages as well as the extremely difficult task of dislodging
a determined adversary from well defended mountain heights, had to reckon
with other disadvantages. Ideally the army would have adopted the "encircle
and squeeze" tactic to evict intruders. "But it [had] strong
orders not to cross the LOC into POK which mean[t] that it [could not]
really cut off the Pakistan armys supplies to the intruders at
many of the key ridges. Also given the inhospitable terrain, which is
almost like Siachin, the Indian army was initially ill prepared to take
up such a large scale intrusion. Almost half of its front line troops
were without what is known as "Glacier Clothing" to withstand
extreme weather in the high reaches and fresh supplies took time in
coming. Equipment malfunctioning and accuracy of fire was affected."42
K. Subrahmanyam, the noted defence analyst, commented thus, on the higher
direction of the national security issues:
Kargil proves that national security cannot be handled as
a part time vocation. It requires full time attention of a National
Security Advisor and a fully and adequately manned National Security
Council Secretariat and well-coordinated procedures to ensure that there
are no lapses in intelligence assessment, policy formulation and purposeful
direction in matters relating to countrys security. That calls
for a total revamping of our national security set up, which has to
be undertaken after the elections.43
He also showered high praises on the leadership qualities
of young officers who led from the front and who took casualties disproportionate
to average ratios, in terms of officers to jawans, in normal
infantry battles, a view that was widely echoed.44
An Overview
Going by the deliberate nature of the defensive positions
that the Pakistani troops had prepared in a number of places that they
had held on the Indian side of the LoC, it is abundantly clear that
the decision to cross the LoC and occupy territory on the Indian side
was not taken in a hurry, but was a deliberate and calculated move.
An enterprise of such proportions, which is likely to have long-term
and serious implications on Indo-Pak relations, could only have been
put into operation with the authority of the highest levels in Pakistan,
both military as well as civililan, as Nawaz Sharief was not a push-over
Prime Minister. The apparently calculated strategy appeared to be aimed
at flogging dying militancy in Kashmir as also to put J&K back on
the international agenda.
The Kargil operation was meticulously planned by the
Pakistan Army and effectively executed. Its timing appears to have been
motivated by Pakistans acquisition of an overt nuclear status.
It is no accident that the trans-border movement and occupation of territory
by militants sent across by Pakistan, duly backed by troops without
the involvement and support of the local population, had taken place
for the first time after 1965. This view is supported by Maj.Gen.(Retd)
Afsir Karim:
The likelihood of a conventional war between India
and Pakistan had gradually receded over the years due to Indias
growing in military superiority in conventional warfare and Pakistans
involvement in Afghanistan. The newly acquired nuclear capability
of India and Pakistan has, however, changed the situation. Pakistan
now feels confident enough to violate the LOC in strength without
fearing serious reprisals or enlargement of the conflict. Pakistan
is now secure that India cannot enlarge the conflict and attack Pakistans
heartland as it did in 1965.45
Irrespective of the motives and resources put behind
the endeavours in the Kargil sector by Pakistan, the fact that Indian
troops in that area were completely taken by surprise is a matter that
cannot be overlooked. Obviously, something has been seriously amiss
both at the strategic as well as the tactical level. The planning, briefings
and preparations for operations of such nature and magnitude take months
and a number of individuals and agencies do get involved at various
stages. Also, troops would have had to be moved, equipped and trained
for operations at such heights, and in difficult terrain. Equipment
and supplies would have been moved and stocked at bases at Astore, Skardu
and forward locations. That all this was done without any of the Indian
intelligence agencies Research and Analysis Wing, Intelligence
Bureau and Military Intelligence learning of it is a telling
comment on the monumental failure on this count. These three premier
agencies, apart from a few other minor players in the field, do have
fairly significant resources and assets across the border. Each one
of them must now have initiated appropriate corrective measures, but
Kargil should also provide the impetus for co-ordinated functioning
and better interaction between these agencies; something that has been
lacking in the past.
Apart from the complete failure of the intelligence
gathering mechanism, two other modes of collecting such information,
viz. aerial surveillance and field patrolling were certainly
not pressed into service to the desired extent. For these lapses and
shortcomings, responsibility has to be shared by officers from the Unit
Commander-level, upwards. There could be some justification in not being
able to detect the movement of Pakistani troops in certain pockets on
such a wide front, during the months of February or March, when movement
on foot is extremely difficult. There is no valid reason for the infantry
failing to get an inkling of the enemys activities, which took
place before the onset of winter, in 1998. Something as basic as routine
patrolling to cover the front and inter-post contact patrolling had
been either overlooked or not conducted with seriousness and requisite
professionalism. Inappropriate and avoidable public controversy between
the GOC, Leh Division, and the Commander of the Kargil Brigade also
damaged the Armys image.
It is also surprising that even a fortnight after the
Pakistani ingress was noticed on May 5, 1999, the army was not able
to comprehend the serious nature of the infiltration and its motives.
At this stage it appeared that the army knew nothing about the scale
and character of the intrusion and even less about the structure of
the war that was to follow. Furthermore, the GOC 15 Corps claimed that,
the situation was local and would be defeated locally. These
observations were made at the Unified Headquarters meeting in Srinagar,
on May 19, 1999, chaired by the States Chief Minister. In fact,
the CMs appreciation of the situation was nearer the truth. He
opined that the recent infiltration was not a short-term plan
but a sinister design of Pakistan aimed to isolate certain areas and
cut off Kargil-Leh from the Valley, as was being done in Rajouri-Poonch
area, and that these were not mere militants but supported
by some Pakistani regulars too.46
The infiltration appears to have taken place in two
phases. The first, and the deliberate one, must have commenced sometime
during the summer of 1998 and culminated in preparation of regular defences,
stocking and arrangements for occupation of these new posts during the
long and harsh winter. In the next phase, the intruders either took
possession of some of the Indian positions vacated during the winter,
before these could be re-occupied by Indian troops, as per established
routine, or moved forward and laterally from the prepared defences to
enlarge the arc of infiltration.
It, however, does go to the credit of the army that
after the details of infiltration became available and the seriousness
of the incursions became evident, it reacted swiftly and decisively,
not taking any further chances. According to reliable sources, almost
five additional brigades were moved into the area of conflict, along
with elements of specially trained commandos. Enough artillery, comprising
field guns, howitzers, multi-barrel rocket launchers, etc., were positioned
and used with telling effect. The logistics and administrative back
up for such large-scale movement and maintenance thereafter were managed
competently.
During the entire period of the conflict the media
was given unprecedented access to the field of operations, in addition
to regular briefings held at New Delhi down to local formation headquarters.
The electronic media, with its extensive coverage, brought the war virtually
to peoples homes. The movement of such a large body of troops
into Kargil necessitated the shifting of a number of units, which were
engaged in the counter insurgency operations, from the Valley. Although
some additional battalions of the Border Security Force and the Central
Reserve Police Force were inducted, these were fewer in number an their
impact poorer. Thus, Pakistans moves in Kargil did seriously jeopardise
the efficacy of the security forces drive against militants, giving
the ultras the necessary time to regroup and rework their strategy.
The increased activity and effectiveness of the militants strikes
in the Valley and some parts of the Jammu division can, in no small
measure, be attributed to this aspect.
The presence of men from certain militant organisations
operating along with Pakistani troops in Kargil has introduced a new
element into the ten-year-old militancy in the State. The Indian state
will now have to contend with Islamic fundamentalism and the Afghan
factor. It is well known that the Islamization of the Pakistan Army
was assiduously undertaken by General Zia-ul-Haq, and that officers
recruited during his time are now occupying middle-level positions,
motivated and guided by some of the top generals. The Pakistan Armys
involvement in Afghanistan has been quite substantial and has continued
over a long period. This has further strengthened its links with fundamentalist
forces. According to some analysts, there is a speculation that the
Pakistan Army may be creating an entity within itself, composed of Afghans,
which may come in handy for use in J&K or other areas. This would
enable Pakistan to harass India, and, at the same time, claim that it
is not involved.47 Masood Khalili, who
represents the exiled Afghan Government in New Delhi, feels that the
same combination of Pakistans forces, under its Inter Services
Intelligences control and Arab mercenaries operating with the
inspiration of Osama bin Laden, are fighting in both Kargil and Kapisa.48
Indian defence planners will have to take into account factors
such as the Afghan links of the Pakistani Army and also the fact that
it is imbued with religious fundamentalism. Having tested the waters
in Kargil, such a misadventure by Pakistan cannot be ruled out in other
isolated valleys like Gurez-Tilel, Machhil and Tangdar.
In the ten years of terrorist activities in Kashmir,
Pakistan had never attempted such a venture, and this strategic shift
demands a re-examination of Indias approach towards Pakistan.
An incoherent policy must make way for a cogent policy.49
Such a re-examination does appear to be under consideration and the
Government of India had instituted an inquiry into the events that led
to Pakistans incursions into Kargi. If these developments result
in a comprehensive reassessment and reappraisal of the entire gamut
of Indias policies towards Pakistan the crisis in Kargil could
well prove to be a window of opportunity.
The Options
India has had to deal with Pakistan as a difficult
neighbour and a source of constant trouble, mostly an irritant, but
at times downright dangerous. It would be a useful exercise to take
a broad overview of developments, particularly over the last ten years
and the more recent Kargil conflict, to analyse and understand the broad
contours of policy formulations and the pursuit of Indias national
objectives in relation to Pakistan. The Indian response to the Kargil
intrusion must be understood in the overall perspective of ongoing militancy
in J&K, as well as the continuing stand-off in the icy-heights of
Siachen. According to a former Chief of the Indian Army:
As part of its prolonged jihad against India, peace
is perceived as a temporary phase, to last only until preparations for
the next round can be made. We must heed this strategic lesson of the
last fifty years, and plan our long term national security Pakistans
hostility will stay with us for a long time and the nation must be prepared
to sleep next to its weapons for the foreseeable future.50
Any country dealing with an inimical neighbour has
a number of options, which can be resorted to, singly or in combination.
These include diplomatic, economic and military measures. A panoramic
appraisal of Indias dealings with Pakistan during the last fifty
years indicates that India has depended upon diplomatic initiatives
and accepted norms of international behaviour far too much and far too
long. Commencing with Indias recourse to the United Nations in
January 1948, down to the involvement of the US President in June 1999,
it has been a long and tortuous journey down the diplomatic alley. Indian
diplomatic endeavours and negotiations in relation to Pakistan have
primarily resulted in perpetuating the status quo, with
the end result weighed in favour of Pakistan. The fact is, diplomacy
can be used as an effective tool to safeguard national interests only
if it is backed by credible military strength. Besides, a clear signal
needs to be sent to the adversary that military means would be used,
where necessary. There is, thus, an urgent need for a fundamental shift
in Indias application of diplomacy as a tool for securing vital
national interests.
The military option must, of course, be kept open.
At the same time, India can continue to explore ways and means to achieve
its goals of stalling, blunting and neutralising Pakistani machinations
in diplomatic encounters at different international gatherings, UN fora
and multilateral groupings. This is in addition to a strategy of diplomatic
containment and isolation of Pakistan through closer ties with Iran,
the Central Asian Republics and Russia, as these countries are adversely
affected by Islamic terrorism.
The Kargil episode also unmistakably points towards
the growing dangers of Pakistans Afghan connection and its dangerous
implications for Indias security. In a way, Kargil has been an
extension of the policy pursued in Afghanistan by Pakistans rulers
over the last two decades. Pakistan has not only been able to put its
creation, the Taliban, in a pre-eminent position of power in
that state, but is also on the threshold of acquiring the much needed
strategic depth that it lacked so far. Pakistan is also indulging in
wishful thinking, hoping that it may have finally solved one of its
abiding problems the Durand Line dividing the two countries which
no Afghan ruler or government has ever accepted for over a century.
Even during his most difficult period, Najibullah did not accept Pakistans
demand for the recognition of the Durand Line. India has always maintained
extremely cordial relations with all the governments and rulers in Afghanistan,
with the exception of the Taliban. Kargil must act as a catalyst
and prompt India to make all efforts to become a major player in Afghanistans
affairs and, to that extent, revamp its Pakistan policy and make it
an integral part of its Afghanistan policy. Such a focus can help wean
Afghanistan away from Pakistan and deal a blow to the main centre of
Islamic fundamentalism, drug trafficking and international terrorism
that this region has become. The anti-Taliban forces and elements
could be taken as allies in this endeavour. There are also reports that
the Khalq and Parcham factions of yesteryear have not
been entirely obliterated, even amongst the Taliban.
Apart from managing to divert a good number of Indian
units and formations to the Kargil sector, Pakistans exertions
there have imposed a very high economic cost on India. India cannot
afford to let the troop deployment in this area cause depletion in its
strike and reserve forces, beyond a short period. The raising of more
units is, consequently, inevitable, with attendant logistics, cost and
efforts required for occupation, maintenance and fighting at such heights
and in extreme climatic conditions. The cost of suitably clothing and
outfitting a single soldier is estimated at Rs.200,000. Added to this
would be the cost of the establishment of a requisite number of border
posts, hardware in terms of guns, vehicles and equipment. These troops
will also require special devices like night vision gadgets, battlefield
radar, satellite surveillance, etc to operate in that area. According
to one estimate, the total cost would be in the range of Rs.24 billion
annually. Against this, the additional expenditure by Pakistan in this
field would be practically negligible. This asymmetrical situation must
change and India needs to engage Islamabad in an arms race by raising
its defence expenditure from 2.3 per cent to 4 per cent of GDP. This
will force Pakistan either to spend nearly 70 per cent of its budget
on defence, or reach an accommodation with India. The Soviet Unions
example shows that while nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles may secure
the country from external aggression, they cannot prevent internal discontent.51
General Parvez Musharraf, Pakistans military
ruler, announced in mid-December 1999, that Pakistans defence
expenditure would be reduced by Rs. 700 billion. This may have been
a statement made for the benefit of the international community, specifically
international lending agencies, which have been blowing a whistle on
Pakistan. Purely in terms of national economic indicators, India is
in a much better position than ever before to enhance its defence budget.
After a decade of nearly 6 per cent growth, India is strong enough to
take on Pakistan both on the battlefield and in the market place. After
years of persistent economic troubles, and now in the throes of a serious
balance of payments crisis, Pakistan will have to pay an unaffordable
price to wage a larger war.52 Instead of
continuously reacting to Pakistan, therefore, forcing an increase in
the allocation of her scarce financial resources to its security apparatus
would be far more effective.
To any informed observer and analyst, Pakistan is at
best an enigma. A nation created on the basis of religion has already
been divided by a nationalist movement in its Eastern part. None of
the four provinces in West Pakistan supported its creation almost till
the mid-1940s. The official language of Pakistan, Urdu, is not the spoken
dialect of any of its provinces. Right from the beginning, Punjab has
ruled over the other provinces. Not only the religious minorities but
Muslims professing a faith different from the orthodox Sunnis
are treated as second class citizens and feel unsafe. A significant
number of lives have been lost, some even while offering prayers in
mosques, in the clashes between the protagonists of militant elements
of the Shia and Sunni sects. Baluchs, Sindhis, Muhajirs
and even the Saraiki segment of Punjab are all restive against Punjabi
domination; the list is endless and so are the centrifugal tendencies
inherent in Pakistan. If this country has been consistently trying to
create problems for India by manipulating a small section of the latters
population, it is time that it was paid back in the same coin.
In addition, and even more importantly, India should
be prepared to use the military option and send clear signals to this
effect. According to Lt.Gen. Satish Nambiar (Retd), India should buy
time, make up the deficiencies in equipment, spares, etc., fine-tune
plans and prepare to launch the offensive at a time and place of its
choosing. India has reacted to Pakistani moves for far too long. Things
now have to be done in such a manner as to make Pakistan react to our
moves. Whether this entails crossing the LOC or the international border
is an option that should remain open.53
The GOC of 15 Corps has also spoken in a similar vein emphasising that
Pakistan is not going to stop its anti-Indian activities. It wants to
carry on with the low-cost war, which has already become a great burden
on India. Unless India raises the costs for Pakistan, in whatever way
it chooses, it will be very difficult to put an end to this low-cost
war. The covert war is lucrative for Pakistan, both militarily and strategically.54
India has depended excessively on the sympathy of the
international community by presenting itself as a victim and hoping
for some kind of reward, which has not come its way. In fact, at each
important turn of events effecting Indias national security, India
emerged as the net loser. Every nation has to take measures to secure
its own interests. The more a nation asserts itself, the more it is
respected in the contemporary world. India should be prepared to act
decisively, retaliate comprehensively and make any adventure on the
part of the adversary prohibitively expensive. K. Subrahmanyam has succinctly
outlined this approach: "What India has to focus on is how to deal
with this militarised polity with nuclear weapons, sponsoring cross-border
terrorism, being obsessed with Islamic extremism and harbouring a visceral
hatred for India. Till now India has largely been on the defensive with
Pakistan taking the offensive on the Kashmir issue. A time has come
when India has to take the initiative."55
The Strategy
In essence, India should realise the limitations of
diplomacy and international support to its cause and vital national
interests in light of the experience of the past fifty years. India
needs to give a fresh look to the ties and linkages with Afghanistan
and the friendly elements there, aiding, supporting and bolstering them.
It must be remembered that the security of the Indian landmass is best
ensured on the Karakoram and the Hindu Kush and that Afghanistan
is necessarily a very valued ally there. India should make Pakistan
spend so much on her defence effort that the economy gets a shattering
blow, in a befitting response to the latest cost escalation forced due
to Kargil operations, as also the militancy for last ten years in the
Valley. India should wrest the initiative from Pakistan in all security-related
matters in the future. "So far the lesser state is in the drivers
seat."56 Lastly, India should follow
an active policy along the LoC and plan and prepare to strike at a point
of her choosing, which would yield maximum results.
The Kargil conflict gave India an opportunity that
it was unprepared to turn to its advantage. India should be ready in
the next round to secure optimum results. Pakistan will certainly create
another opportunity. At this stage, India can make deep penetration
strikes to register its military superiority as well as national resolve
and drive home an unmistakable lesson in language that is understood,
that the cost of tampering with its security would be prohibitively
high. Other attendant measures on diplomatic initiatives and costs can
be taken in tandem with this decision.
In forecasting aggressive postulations the Indian planners
will be faced with the choice of concentrating the main thrust of the
military forces on the international border, the POK or the Northern
Areas. In so far as the international border is concerned, efforts and
resources utilised can give us the benefit of hitting at Pakistans
war machine and making a serious dent. But the long-term benefits may
not be very tangible, as international pressures would make India withdraw
from the territory that might fall in its hands, as has happened in
the past. Pakistans nuclear capability is also a relevant factor.
It might well be the first to mount a nuclear strike and argue before
the world that, as a much smaller country, it had to do so for its own
sheer survival. Irrespective of the retaliatory measures that India
might take, the damage to Indias armour and personnel would be
very considerable.
In PoK, any Indian advance would have the advantage
of bringing the territory under Indias control. But this is an
area where the Pakistan Army would react very strongly this has
been the pattern right from the beginning. Pakistan occupied the Haji
Pir Pass at the first possible opportunity during the winter of
1947-48. In the offensives in the Tithwal sector, in June 1948, the
only position occupied by the Indians across the Kishanganga river
was Ring Contour, which was taken back by Pakistani troops in a determined
counter-attack. Similarly, during the Indian forces bid to recapture
Muzaffarabad in the summer of the same year, an important feature, Pandu,
was captured, facilitating further advance. Pakistani troops made
strenuous efforts in recapturing that hill position, thereby stalling
Indias advance towards Muzaffarabad. Pakistan has always considered
PoK as vital for its security. In April 1948, Lt.Gen.Gracey, the then
Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army, explained Pakistans interest
in this area:
An easy victory of the Indian Army, particularly in the
Muzaffarabad area, is almost certain to arouse the anger of tribesmen
against Pakistan for its failure to render them more direct assistance
and might well cause them to turn against Pakistan
If Pakistan
is not to face another problem of about 750,000 people uprooted from
their homes; if India is not to be allowed to sit on the doorsteps
of Pakistan to the rear and on the flank, at liberty to enter at her
will and pleasure; if civilian and military morale is not to be affected
to a dangerous extent; and if subversive political forces are not
to be let loose within Pakistan itself, it is imperative that the
Indian Army is not allowed to advance beyond the general line Uri-Punch-Nowshera.57
By employing different means, including military, diplomatic
and personal influences at that time, the British establishment in India
ensured that the Indian advance was checked precisely along this line.
Since then, the importance of PoK has considerably increased from Pakistans
point of view. The Mangla Complex has to be protected, and this region
is proximate to its nuclear establishments and the capital Islamabad.
The mountainous terrain and difficult communication in PoK would make
a significant Indian advance there a difficult proposition. The population
composition and its negative attitude towards India would also be a
factor that has to be taken into consideration.
The third possible sector where an Indian advance could
be considered is the Northern Areas. It is the nomenclature given to
the huge land mass more than seventy thousand square kilometres
of the States territory illegally occupied by Pakistan
in 1947. It comprises the Himalayan tableland of Baltistan, Gilgit and
areas further North. The people of the Northern Areas are directly ruled
by the Centre from Islamabad a regime that has been harsher and
more degrading to human dignity, life and property than the Pakistans
control over PoK. Successive governments, over the past five decades,
have followed a policy that left its inhabitants with no political identity,
civil rights or even constitutional status. They are denied the right
to vote, have no legislature and do not have access to justice in the
form of appeals to the High Court or the Supreme Court.
The Northern Areas have been divided into five districts,
namely Gilgit, Skardu, Diamer, Ghizer and Ghanche; the sixth unit being
Hunja-Nager. The administration is practically headed by the Joint Secretary,
Ministry of Kashmir Affairs in Islamabad, with the help of six officers,
all non-natives and deputed from outside. These apart, other officers
include the Commissioner, the Inspector General of Police, the Deputy
Commissioner, the Judicial Commissioner and the Chief Engineer, Public
Works Department. The Northern Areas are being ruled under the provisions
of Frontier Crimes Regulations, left behind by the British, who considered
the locals as half savage and half criminal. With a population of 1.5
million, literacy is dismally low at 14 per cent for males and 3.5 per
cent for females. There is one school for 4,000 children and one doctor
for 6,000 people; protected drinking water outside important towns is
a dream and more than two-thirds the population has no access to electricity.
Deprivation of the rights of the people, a deteriorating
economy and subjugation, coupled with active efforts of the government
to alter the demographic pattern by settling increasing numbers of persons
from the North West Frontier and Afghanistan, have made the local population
restive. Shias and Ismailis form the bulk of the population
of the Northern Areas. With the rise of Sunni fundamentalism
and the Talibanisation of Pakistan, they have been subjected
to increased discrimination based on sectarianism. Lately, there have
been signs of social tension manifested periodically in various forms,
especially since the summer of 1996.
Contrary to Pakistans sustained interest in the
Northern Areas and the realisation of its strategic importance, the
Indian interest in this region has always been peripheral. During the
1947-48 operations, little attention was paid and military resources
were not made available to wrest the region back from Pakistani occupation.
Even during the subsequent decades, Indian intelligence agencies have
not tried hard enough to create assets there. This, in spite of the
fact that the local population has not been very favourably disposed
towards the rulers in Islamabad.
Thus, in comparison to the international border and
PoK, the political situation and the ground conditions in the Northern
Areas are far more conducive to a determined military push, as and when
required. The Pakistani misadventure in Kargil has given an opportunity
to India to increase its military presence in the Ladakh region, to
which Pakistan cannot make any objection. Force levels has already been
raised to a Corps Headquarters, with three Infantry Divisions. Land
communications on the Indian side are much better. According to Lt.Gen.
Moti Dhar, former Vice Chief of the Army Staff, Pakistan has very
poor and stretched lines of communication in this area. We always used
to consider Kargil an excellent theatre of offensive operations for
India because of its superior communications infrastructure. The fact
that we have a highway there should be seen as an asset than a cause
for concern.
The infrastructure created and installations developed
here could be used to increase the build up to the desired level and
use the present deployment as a springboard for future operations. Of
course, considering the terrain and the difficulties of living and fighting
at high altitudes and bleak mountain tops, the troops staying there
and those who would be required to undertake operations there would
have to be specially trained and suitably acclimatised. The usefulness
of stepping up the enrolment of the local population in the forces can
hardly be over- emphasised. The fighting qualities of the Ladakh Scouts
and local troops, right since 1947, and more recently during Kargil
operations, have been amply proved.
In the Ladakh area, Suru and Nubra Valleys could be
developed as bases and launching pads for offensive operations into
the Northern Areas. Another alternative from the Valley side can be
the Gurez-Burzil Pass-Deosai plateau axis. In fact, Gen. Thimaya had
planned Operation Snipe in the summer of 1948 to recapture Skardu
along this line, pushing ahead from Gurez. For this purpose, he had
asked for a brigade to be maintained by air for one week. Since that
was not made available Gen. Thimayas plan was not executed.58
Moreover, the willingness of Pakistans generals to commit resources
for the defence of the Northern Areas, by shifting forces from the hinterland,
is also in serious doubt.59
Pakistans much vaunted nuclear capabilities would
pose minimum danger to the Indian troops operating across the Northern
Areas, as compared to those operating in the other two sectors. Moreover,
due to the terrain, the damage to the Indian forces would be so little
that Pakistan would have to think twice before launching a nuclear first
strike as the Indian response would inflict much greater and unacceptable
destruction.
Apart from physical preparations, the Indian Army will
also be required to change its tactics and mindset for achieving success.
For too long, Indian response to Pakistani unorthodox tactics and unconventional
use of forces has been in the form of traditional and predictable set-piece
moves. Even during the last eleven years of militancy in J&K, the
Army's efforts to meet Pakistani terrorism have not indicated adequate
appreciation of non-traditional and unorthodox tactics on the part of
the troops. Beyond doubt, Kargil has proved the bravery, leadership
qualities and fighting spirit of Indian soldiers and young officers.
An appropriate change of mindset and due support from higher commanders
would be a pre-requisite for making bold forays into Indian territory
being illegally held by Pakistan since 1947. Indias ultimate aim
should be to not only teach a lesson to the constant acts of aggression
by Pakistan but also to push its borders Northwards to the natural frontiers
of India.
Summation
Who has been the winner in this conflict and where
do we go from here? India can consider the outcome in Kargil only in
a limited sense and of pyrrhic nature. The adversary was not defeated,
and no territory was gained. India was only able to get its territory
vacated, that too, not all of it, at the point of the bayonet, and at
an enormous cost in terms of men, material and money. For Pakistan,
it has been much less costly and affordable to even induce it to undertake
similar adventures in the future, unless the cost of any such rash actions
are raised beyond acceptable limits to the perpetrator. The pattern
established from 1947 onwards and refined during the last decade will
continue to be followed. The events at Kargil should make India reassess
its dealings with Pakistan. This can only happen if unambiguous signals
are sentthat the nations patience has reached a threshold.
The proxy war launched by the ISI in the State of Jammu
and Kashmir since 1988 culminated in the Kargil conflict.
Pakistans adventure in Kargil has been condemned
by the world at large. The USA exerted pressure on Pakistan to withdraw
its forces from Indian territory, which it subsequently did. Despite
these, Pakistan has not shown any let up in its efforts to continue
to create problems in J&K.
The taking over of the reigns of power in Pakistan
by the military once again may or may not be attributable to its involvement
in Kargil. But, the future course of action is likely to be pursued
even more resolutely by Pakistani agencies involved in fomenting trouble
on the Indian side. This has been amply proved and the process goes
on.
In spite of its small size, weaker economic base, internal
dichotomy and smaller armed forces, Pakistan has initiated three wars
against India, followed by a decade-old militancy in J&K leading
to the Kargil conflict, and has come out as a net gainer. This has been
achieved through a combination of artful use of guerrilla tactics and
conventional warfare, a highly skilled pursuit of foreign policy, coupled
with diplomatic finesse.
Pakistan came to realise very early that it pays to
be aggressive and belligerent. It is pursuant to this realisation that
it has succeeded in only retaining its illegitimate gains of 1947-48
and repeating the policy of adventurism in 1965, and, then, again in
the current round. In the proxy war launched by the ISI in the State
in 1988, the operating principle was to mislead the youth, subvert the
civilian population and keep the Indian forces bleeding, so that political
and public opinion in India would buckle under constant losses and accept
the futility of the holding on to the State. A failure to achieve its
primary aim seems to have spurred Pakistan into going ahead with the
Kargil misadventure; the onslaught on Indias security continues
unabated. As has been once again confirmed recently by Indian military
authorities, the incidence and viciousness of militancy in India has
increased after the army took over in Pakistan.60
What should be of particular concern to Indian policy
makers is that there has been a paradigm shift in Pakistans hostility
towards India. In the beginning, the anti-India tirade was more or less
confined to the ruling elite, but over the decades, an increasing segment
of the population is getting sucked into this phenomenon. Presently,
large sections of its civil society, political and religious organisations,
the military, the intelligence and scientific community are irrational,
and motivated by a burning desire to teach India a lesson. These irrational
elements advocate what they call the doctrine of permanent jehad
against India, till India breaks into "a million pieces" (to
quote Qazi Hussain Ahmad, the Amir of Jamait-e-Islami Pakistan).61
The underlying philosophy of Pakistans current phase of onslaught
on Indias security interests was amply summed up by Mushahid Hussain
on 18 May, 1991, when he said, "Pakistan has apparently adopted
in regard to Kashmir an Afghan model, essentially a protracted war which
has made Kashmir into a bleeding wound for India, raising the political,
military and psychological costs of its occupation".62
In contrast, Indias responses have been passive,
reactive and defensive. India has not only lost much of its territory
but also failed, more than once, to take advantage of its military strength
in forcing a lasting solution to the problem during the conflict in
1947-48, and repeated the same attitude in 1965 by returning the Haji
Pir Pass. Even being the decisive victor in the 1971 war, Indias
magnanimity was boundless and unilateral. As in the military field,
Indias position at the United Nations, and with the world community,
has continuously been defensive and reactive. If India wanted to teach
a lesson to Pakistan and pay it back in the same coin, a window of opportunity
had certainly been created by the Kargil episode to launch a massive
and coordinated campaign against terrorists. India failed to wrest the
initiative and militants are striking once again in J&K, with considerable
regularity and effectiveness. According to KPS Gill, "The terrorist
handlers in Pakistan must be congratulating themselves on the success
of their current strategy as the death toll in Jammu and Kashmir mounts,
and as the terrorists deliver blow after blow against the morale of
the security forces".63 According
to analysts, there has been persistent worsening of the ratio of security
force to militant casualties. This ratio has declined from 1:5.79 in
1997, through 1:4.54 in 1998 and further to 1:3.20 in 1999. Worse, with
the thinning out of the security forces, in the wake of Kargil and subsequent
escalation in Pak-backed terrorist activity, this ratio fell to 1:2
in June 1999.64 The time has come to call
Pakistans bluff. Indian riposte should be quick, effective and
decisive.
In all the problems that have been created for India
by Pakistan, the Pakistan Army has been a common denominator. It has
also been a constant factor in the power equations in Pakistan, even
when civilians were governing the country. The armys influence
over the government and the people of Pakistan has been has been all-pervasive.
Under General Parvez Musharraf, the Government of Pakistan and the army
are going to be even more inimical to Indias security interests.
The army is more fervently committed to jehad against India than
any other section in Pakistan. India should do well to remember that
the power there has now fallen to the architect of the Kargil conflict.
The crying need for India is to take urgent and effective steps to control
Pakistans mischief making capacity. This has been brought out
by an editorial in the Times of India, in these words:
A society which does not feel a sense of threat after the
loss of over twenty thousand lives over ten years of terrorism directed
by a neighbouring state, after having fought a limited war involving
more than 450 fatalities, and after being continuously engaged in
a proxy-war, is bound to be subjected to further acts of terrorism
and aggression. Its complacency and casualness actually ask for it.65
As a society, government and nation, India has not
only not taken any firm action against Pakistan, whenever it was forced
to take arms against it, India has not shown any willingness to fight
to the finish or take the fight into the enemys camp; India has
constantly displayed a lack of ruthlessness. The age-old and ancient
Indian psyche of fighting the war along certain time honoured principles
and rules has done incalculable harm down the ages, and continues to
afflict it even today. This must change. Chanakya, the great
Indian strategist, had once said that except in matters of the security
of the State, means are as important as ends. As a nation India never
desired or worked towards the destruction of Pakistan; but to keep it
intact at its own peril would certainly not be a sensible preposition.
Preservation of Pakistans integrity and its survival as an independent
nation in friendship with India is certainly a desirable objective to
work for, but not at the cost of Indias own security, integrity
and its very existence. India should, therefore, be prepared to take
bold initiatives, decisive action and conclusive exertions in the next
round, an opportunity that may present itself quite soon.
Kargil has caused India a lot of anguish; it has also
stirred its soul. Kargil can now become a defining moment, a watershed
and a new beginning, spreading a beacon to the new avenues and opportunities
that lie before this nation. The sacrifices of those who died for the
nation and the mourning of those left behind cannot be allowed to go
in vain.
-
Dr. Sudhir S. Bloeria
is an IAS Officer of the J&K cadre. He served as SDM Kargil
between 1974-76 and Development Commissioner, Ladakh during 1978-1981,
and is presently Principal Secretary, Health & Medical Education,
Government of J&K. He is the author of the book The Battles
of Zojila––1948, New Delhi, Har Anand, 1996 and Pakistan’s Insurgency
vs. India’s Security: Tackling Militancy in Kashmir, New Delhi:
Manas, 2000.
-
KUMAR, Dinesh, The
Times of India, July 16, 1999.
-
This is the estimated
population in 1991 as no Census was conducted in J&K State due
to disturbed conditions. The population figures of this area during
1981 Census were 61,990.
-
JAMMU AND KASHMIR,Government
of, Information Department, District Profiles, Srinagar, 1998, pp.
381-82.
-
In fact, the territories
of the Princely State of J&K extended to areas beyond Gilgit
and included principalities like Chitral, Hunza, Nagar, Chilas,
etc.–– including some areas even North of the Karakoram Pass.
-
KNIGHT, E.F., Where
Three Empires Meet, London: Longmans Green & Co., 1919, p. 290,
p. 289 and p. vii.
-
Ibid., p. 289.
-
Ibid., p. vii.
-
Defence of India Policy
Plans, New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1963, p.23.
-
BLOERIA, S. S. Battles
of Zojila – 1948, New Delhi: Har Anand, 1996, p. 174.
-
RAMAN, B. Frontline,
July 30, 1999.
-
Tariq is the name
of a legendary military commander who led Arab forces into Spain
in the Seventh century. On landing on the coast of Spain he had
burnt his boats to spur his troops to fight for victory. As is evident
in his book, Raiders in Kashmir, General Akbar Khan (he was, in
fact, a Brigadier then) relished his code name.
-
PRASAD, S.N. and DHARAM
Pal, ed., History of Operations in Jammu and Kashmir (1947-48),
New Delhi: Government of India, Ministry of Defence, 1987, pp 17-19.
-
Brigadier Rajinder
Singh was posthumously awarded the first Maha Vir Chakra of independent
India.
-
In the native language
"Zojila" means "Path of Blizzards," a befitting
name for the Pass, as would be sufficiently evident after studying
its topography. Also, the Zojila is known by other names such as
Seojila, Baltal Kotal, Dras Pass, Zogila and Swaje La, etc. In the
great Himalayan mountain range starting from Mount Everest in the
East to Nanga Parbat in the West, Zojila is the lowest depression
at 11,578 ft. above mean sea level. All other passes are over 14,000
ft. For the major part of the year, all these Passes, including
Zojila, remain closed due to snow and avalanche.
-
1 Patiala, under the
spirited command of Lt. Col. Sukhdev Singh, Vr.C., MVC, fought a
series of successful actions against the enemy, earning six MVCs
and 12 Vr.Cs. during its six months-stay at Zojila.
-
Haji Pir Pass is an
important military feature and its occupation also implies the availability
of an alternative land route between Jammu and the Kashmir Valley,
via Poonch.
-
ALI, Tariq, "A
General Paralysis," Sunday, Vol. 11, no. 4, August 14-20, 1983.
-
The most important
of these heights was a mountaintop known as 13,620––the figure being
the height in feet of the feature. This ensured the security of
Kargil town as well as the Leh-Srinagar road in that sector. This
height, in fact, was so near to Kargil town that it was jokingly
said that any Pakistani sitting with binoculars at that post could
become a referee in the badminton match being played in the officers’
mess of the Brigade Headquarters at Kargil.
-
BLOERIA, S.S., Pakistan’s
Insurgency vs. India’s Security, New Delhi: Manas, 2000, pp 93-94.
-
Data provided by J&K
Police.
-
I was SDM, Kargil,
in 1974 and had interacted with these people on a number of occasions.
My observations are based on sustained contact with them.
-
SWAMI, Praveen, "The
Kargil War: Preliminary Explorations", Faultlines: Writings
in Conflict & Resolution (New Delhi), Vol. 2, 1999, p.31.
-
I was on a visit to
Leh and Kargil during September 1998, and was witness to the damage
caused as I travelled by road from Srinagar.
-
VINAYAK, Romesh, in
India Today (New Delhi), May 11, 1999, p. 31. According to SWAMI,
Praveen, Frontline, July 30, 1999, p. 7, local grazers established
the first physical contact with Pakistani troops and regulars in
the Kargil sector on Jubbar heights on May 3.
-
n-20, p-4.
-
In fact, J&K Chief
Minister Farooq Abdullah made a number of visits to Kargil during
the two-and a-half months of the conflict. His frequent on-the -spot
study of the situation helped restore confidence amongst the local
population and exerted a salutary pressure on the civil administration
so that it carried out its functions fairly well under exceptionally
trying circumstances.
-
n-20, p-6. According
to SWAMI, Praveen, this meeting took place a day after Farooq Abdullah
visited New Delhi to beg the Prime Minister to take the Kargil issue
seriously. "It says not a little about the chaotic management
and poor strategic appraisal that characterised this period".
-
Ibid., p.14.
-
On June 3, 1999, Pakistanis
returned the Indian pilot ‘as a gesture of goodwill’.
-
The United Service
Institution (USI) Director, Lt. Gen. (Retd) Satish Nambiar, cited
in KALYANARAMAN, S., Beyond Kargil: Compilation of a panel discussion,
USI Journal (New Delhi), Vol. 129, No. 537, July-September 1999,
p.333.
-
JOSHI, Manoj and CHANGAPPA,
Raj, in India Today, June 21, 1999, p.21.
-
KUMAR Dinesh, Times
of India, July 19, 1999.
-
DASGUPTA, Swapan,
in India Today, July 26,1999, p.32.
-
Personal Communication
from SINGH, Brig. Sukhdev (Retd),Vr.C., M.C, who commanded 1 Patiala
during the historic battles for Zojila in 1948, October 15, 1999.
-
Lt.Gen. Moti Dhar
(Retd), quoted in Frontline, August 27, 1999, pp.22-23. Gen. Dhar
also commanded a brigade in Ladakh area and had been the Brigade
Major of the Kargil Brigade.
-
Outlook (New Delhi),
August 9, 1999, p.34.
-
Times of India, June
12, 1999.
-
DIXIT, J. N., in Indian
Express, July 22, 1999.
-
n-27, p.336
-
SEHGAL, Ikram, The
Nation, 31 July, 1999, as reported in Times of India, August 1,1999.
-
Narula, Sunil, in
Outlook, June, 21,1999, p.99.
-
Joshi and Changapa,
op. cit., p.26.
-
Times of India, July
26, 1999.
-
KUMAR, op. cit.
-
Times of India, June
4, 1999.
-
Swami, Praveen, in
Frontline, September 10, 1999, pp. 33-34. The quotes have been supported
by photocopies of the minutes of the UHQ meeting.
-
n-27, p.347.
-
Cf. VED, Mahendra,
Times of India, August 31, 1999.
-
BARUAH, Amit, in Frontline,
June 5-18, 1999, p.15.
-
Gen. Shankar Roy-Chowdhury
(Retd.), former Chief of the Army Staff, in Times of India, June
20, 1999.
-
MALIK,.Mohan J., in
Hindustan Times, September 21, 1999.
-
BARU, Sanjay, in Times
of India, July 14,1999. It has been estimated that during 1995-98
India’s GDP rose 7 per cent after inflation while Pakistan’s rose
at 3 per cent.
-
n-27, pp.334-335.
-
PAL, Lt. Gen. Krishan,
quoted in Frontline, August 27 , 1999, p.36.
-
Times of India, November
1, 1999.
-
KARNAD, Bharat, "A
New Strategy for the LoC & Low-intensity Warfare in Kashmir",
Faultlines, Vol. 2, 1999, p.118.
-
MADAN, Lt. Gen. Vijay,
"Jammu and Kashmir Operations, 1947-48: The other version",
USI Journal, July-September, 1992, p.315.
-
n-10, pp-349 and 367.
-
n-53, p-124.
-
Daily Excelsior (Jammu),
January 4, 2000, quoting Maj. Gen. H.S. Kanwar, Chief of Staff,
Headquaqrters, 16 Corps. While briefing the newsmen he said ever
since the Army take over, Pakistan has further intensified its proxy
war in Jammu and Kashmir. Today, the entire equation has changed
and Pakistan’s intelligence agency, ISI is even more responsive
to the Army. This change over at the top had a direct bearing and
has given a major boost to the insurgency in the State.
-
Raman, B., Institute
for Topical Studies, Chenai, 18 August 1999.
-
Quoted by NOORANI,
A.G., in Statesman, September 21, 1999. Mushahid Hussain has been
a leading media person of Pakistan, an ideologue of Pakistan Muslim
League and was Nawaz Sharief’s Information Minister in his last
government.
-
Daily Excelsior, November
23, 1999.
-
n 20, p.42.
-
Times of India, January
3, 2000.
|