A majority of contemporary terrorist groups operate
beyond the national boundaries of their target states. In the post-Cold
War era, the transnational character of these terrorist groups has
necessarily brought forth certain advantages, viz., global networking
with potential allies, arms suppliers, and other terrorist groups,
as also the generation of transnational support. Instead of resisting
globalisation, consequently, contemporary terrorist groups are actively
harnessing contemporary forces of change.
The transnational support structures of terrorist
groups act as force multipliers. While boosting the military and non-military
capability and capacity of terrorist groups at a strategic level,
they also perform certain diplomatic, political, military and economic
functions both in the domestic and international theatre, at a tactical
level. The transnational terrorist support structures disseminate
propaganda and lobby with governments, intergovernmental and non-governmental
organisations. They network with dispersed segments of the diaspora
and migrant communities; raise funds to hire expertise and train members;
procure weapons and dual technologies; and manage or charter ships
both to transport personnel and supplies to the theatres of conflict.
Most national governments have responded to international
terrorism at a tactical level and not at a strategic level. As a result,
after four decades of combating terrorism, the traditional response
of either eliminating or apprehending terrorists has neither mitigated
nor deterred terrorism. This is largely due to the failure of the
affected states to attack, degrade and ultimately destroy the transnational
support structures of terrorist groups. As domestic infrastructures
are vulnerable to detection and disruption, most terrorist groups
have established support infrastructures overseas. As transnational
terrorist infrastructures are beyond the operational reach and domestic
jurisdiction of the target states, governments, diplomatic, security,
intelligence and judicial co-operation between the various State structures
becomes imperative.
Framework for the Study
There are a number of impediments in analysing
the organisation and operational structures of terrorist groups. Most
academics and policymakers have analysed terrorism from a distance.
Only the security and intelligence agencies of the countries that
are affected by the scourge of terrorism have developed a comprehensive
understanding of the terrorist support structures. By employing technical
and human expertise, some of these agencies have penetrated domestic
groups operating overseas or foreign groups operating on their soil.
As information on support-structures is primarily intelligence-based,
in classified and published literature, information on the terrorist
support networks is limited. Terrorist groups with international support
structures tend to be aware of the technical means of gathering intelligence.
They are, consequently, cautious of developing open communications
network that can be monitored. To transmit important messages, the
Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) employs code sheets so complex
that even the most advanced computers cannot detect them; the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), utilises highly trained human couriers;
and the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK), uses the encryption program Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP) that could not be decoded by government code-breaking
agencies. The agencies that monitor terrorists and
support networks tend to closely protect their source-based
information even from their domestic and foreign counterpart agencies.
Nonetheless, most governments permit foreign terrorist
groups - especially those that do not pose an immediate threat to
their national interests - to operate on their soil. It is, therefore,
within the scope of research to develop a comprehensive understanding
of the support networks by gathering foreign terrorist propaganda
(leaflets, broadcasts, newspapers, Internet sources), attending public
events (protest marches, rallies, and socio-cultural functions) and
interviewing terrorists and their supporters. Occasionally, court
and police records of former terrorists may reveal the details of
banking transfers and procurement. The academic study of terrorist
support structures has been limited to the work of James Adams on
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) and the Palestinian Liberation
Organisation; Yehudit Barsky on the Middle Eastern groups in the US;
John Hogan and Max Taylor on PIRA; and a few others. There are some authors who have also studied
different aspects of terrorist groups demonstrating the significance
of support structures. Nevertheless, at the general level, the
study of terrorist support structures remains a highly neglected area
of research. As the post-fundraising phase of a support network is
the prerogative of government intelligence agencies tasked to monitor
terrorist activities and supporters, this study draws heavily
on published as well as classified sources.
Background
Although international action against terrorism
has improved considerably in the past decade, these efforts have been
largely restricted to Europe and North America. The international
fight against terrorism was largely developed on the criminal side.
As such, states have only addressed the criminal aspects, and rarely
the political propaganda and fundraising aspects of
terrorism. Traditionally, the international political environment,
disparity in national laws, and the lack of international cooperation,
especially on crimes that are politically motivated, permitted terrorist groups to operate across
borders and thrive. Moreover, the phenomenon of globalisation has
enabled many terrorist groups to generate support in one theatre and
fight in another theatre with relative ease. Robust international
support infrastructure makes terrorist groups resilient by enabling
them to weather tactical damage in the battlefield. For instance, the PIRA raised a bulk of
their funds to procure firearms in the US, but waged their campaign
of violence in Northern Ireland and mainland Britain. For every weapon
captured or destroyed by the British, the PIRA procured more than
two weapons. The community of nations had recognized the need for
a co-ordinated response strategy to degrade terrorist-support structures
even during the Cold War. But a formulated multi-pronged, multi-dimensional
and a multinational response became feasible only after the end of
the East-West confrontation. After recognizing this threat, the international
community responded by formulating an international convention against
the financial mechanisms of terrorism. The United Nations (UN) Convention
of 1999 calls upon national governments to suppress the financing
of terrorism through open, front, cover and sympathetic organizations
of terrorist groups operating on their soil. Nevertheless, the impediments
in developing a global strategy to suppress the financial mechanisms
of terrorism still remain.
For decades, due to the prevailing Cold War dynamics,
various host-governments tacitly or actively permitted the overt or
covert operation of terrorist groups. During the Cold War, terrorist
groups gained legitimacy when certain countries categorised them as
freedom fighters. For instance, almost all the Palestinian
groups were supported by the former USSR or its satellite states.
While some governments channelled support directly, others channelled
support through human and minority rights and humanitarian, and other
independent looking organisations. To this date, the conditions
in Europe and in North America remain ripe for any group to establish
a support network and channelise funds to fight their homeland campaigns.
The reality is that most governments permitted foreign terrorist group
to operate on their soil unless the terrorists directly threatened
either the host-governments domestic or international interests.
Sustained support domestic, international
or both enabled the terrorist core and the penultimate leadership
to replenish the wastage in rank and file by recruitment and to boost
its eroding support-base by propaganda. As transnational terrorist
infrastructures are far removed from the theatre of conflict, they
enable terrorist groups to accrue political, economic and military
support under relatively safe conditions. Unconstrained by national
jurisdiction, these terrorist infrastructures disseminate propaganda,
lobby foreign governments and potential supporters, raise funds, invest
funds in trade or businesses, procure weapons and hire expertise,
recruit and train personnel, and transfer personnel, weapon and other
supplies to the theatres of conflict. Disrupting transnational financial
infrastructure constraining access to sophisticated weaponry,
expertise and other resources could appreciably affect the
sustainability of a particular terrorist campaign.
Sources of Support
The PIRA and the PLO pioneered the establishment
of financial infrastructure in foreign countries to sustain their
guerrilla and terrorist campaigns. Although these two trend-setting
groups have currently abandoned violence while exploring the democratic
route to power, the strategies and the practices they developed to
both raise and manage funds are being emulated by various second-generation
terrorist groups.
In most high intensity conflicts, with over 1000
fatalities per conflict per year, the mass internal displacement and
refugee flows led to the formation of a politicized diaspora and migrant
communities. In turn, these diaspora communities are radicalised and
mobilized by the terrorists to support their terrorist campaigns in
the homeland. The terrorist campaigns range from irredentism (e.g.:
reunification of the two Irelands, Pakistan and Kashmir) to separatism
(e.g.: Khalistan in India, Tamil Eelam in Sri Lanka) and autonomy
(e.g.: Kurdistan in south-eastern Turkey). Contemporary terrorist
groups operate internationally through front, cover and sympathetic
organizations. These organizations are often registered as charities
channelling funds for relief and rehabilitation and promoting human
rights and culture. While some groups such as the Hamas in the Middle
East and Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in Asia manage schools
and hospitals, they also siphon a percentage of these contributions
to procure weapons.
The main sources of terrorist financing are diaspora,
domestic, co-ethnic, co-religionist, state, organised crime and investment.
Diaspora support, both individual and corporate, can be a voluntary
contribution or an involuntary mandatory demand. 'Revolutionary taxation'
is often accompanied by coercion, either implicit, employing the threat
of force, or explicit, employing the use of force. In collateral coercion,
force or the threat of force is used against family members in the
homeland to make reluctant members of the diaspora pay. Like diaspora
support, domestic support too can be individual or corporate and voluntary
or involuntary. To prevent inviting the attention of the host law
enforcement agencies, terrorists or their activists operating overseas
prefer to use implicit coercion rather than explicit coercion. Sophisticated
groups like the PIRA did not use coercion internationally, but selectively
used it domestically. Unruly groups like the PKK knifed recalcitrant
members of the community and even bombed Kurdish business establishments
that refused to pay. Groups like the LTTE have invested extensively
in propaganda, aimed at eliciting contributions voluntarily rather
than involuntarily. Unlike a political party requesting donations,
when a terrorist group makes a request for a donation, the consequences
of non-payment are unpredictable. Usually, when one individual is
threatened, assaulted, or killed, the rest comply. Communities with
extended familial networks are reluctant to complain to host law enforcement
agencies, since terrorists are more often than not revengeful, and
even retaliate against those who complain by punishing them or their
family members.
Co-ethnic and co-religionist support includes contributions
from members of an akin ethnie or the same religion. For instance,
some ethnic sympathizers in the Republic of Ireland contributed to
the PIRA. Similarly, Pakistani-born Kashmiris contributed to the Indian
Kashmiri groups fighting the Indian security forces in the Kashmir
valley. Co-religionists contributions' include support from members
of the same faith driven by religious affinity. Some Muslims of non-Palestinian
descent contributed to the Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
and managed charities in the UK and in continental Europe. Likewise,
some non-Egyptian Muslims contributed funds to the Gamaya Islamiya
(GI) and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) and other radical Islamic
groups engaged in terrorism. Several dozen Middle Eastern and Asian
Islamic groups engaged in terrorism have benefited from the donations
of wealthy Arabs. Although there is no conclusive proof, it may be
surmised that the culture of providing such donations originated when
the Afghans fought the Soviets from 1979 to 1989. Despite the personal
wealth of the multimillionaire Usama Bin Laden, his group Al-Quaida
(The Base) continues to raise funds in North America, Europe
and in the Muslim world. The Gulf, the Middle Eastern and North African
states are yet to recognize the impact of their contributions to charities
that have been misused by some groups. For instance, the MILF and
the Abu Saayef Group (ASG) in the Philippines diverted funds allocated
to build Islamic schools and mosques to strengthen their terrorist
and guerrilla bases.
States also contribute funds to terrorist groups
to engage inimical states. For instance, the Republic of Ireland,
through its military intelligence, disbursed about £100,000 to IRA
and to other relief organisations between August 20, 1969, and March
24, 1970. Similarly, the Libyan government contributed nine million
pounds sterling and 130 tonnes of weapons SAMs, AKs GPMG, DHSK
armour-piercing machine guns, RPG launchers, flame-throwers, revolvers,
and Semtex explosives to PIRA in the mid-1980s. In addition
to funds, the Government of India provided the LTTE and several
other Tamil groups that have now joined the democratic process
both military and specialised training. Both India and Pakistan armed
and funded each others terrorist groups. Both Iran and Iraq
have provided funds to several Middle Eastern and Asian Islamic and
non-Islamic groups. Irans financial and technical support to
Hezbollah has contributed to the instability of Middle East. There
are other state sponsors that provide funds under ethnic and religious
compulsions.
Like terrorist groups, most contemporary criminal
organisations are also transnational in reach. To fund their operations,
all well-established terrorist groups engage in organized crime or
low-level crime. Organised crime differs from low-level crime in the
degree of scale and co-ordination. While organised crime is conducted
by an organisation, low-level crime is directed by individuals and
appears disconnected. Organised crime can be broadly divided into
fraud (percentage from prisoner welfare, social security; illegal
logging, cultivating or refining narcotics, video, CD and cassette
piracy; taxi scams such as running unregistered taxis; not paying
taxes), smuggling (cigarettes, alcohol, narcotics, humans), racketeering
(extorting percentages from prostitution, human smugglers, narcotic
trafficking, forgers of identity and travel documents, drinking clubs,
taxi services), kidnapping for ransom, and armed robbery. The groups
that have developed a transnational reach usually engage in organised
crime. With time, terrorist groups through their overseas representatives
break into high-risk and high-profit ventures such as narcotic trafficking,
human smuggling, credit card scams, etc. In addition to developing
a capability to adapt and forge both travel documents and visas, some
groups work closely with criminal groups to transport migrants from
the Global South to the Global North. Some groups such as the LTTE
even own a shipping fleet. During the past decade, human smuggling
netted profits that rivalled profits from narcotics. The MILF engaged
in racketeering, kidnapping for ransom and also in armed robbery in
the Philippines. Certain groups such as the Islamic Armed Group of
Algeria (GIA), operating in small teams of 5 to 10, engaged in credit
card scams and netted Sterling 5,000-10,000 a day. The GIA terrorists
in France spend 50% of their time engaging in low-level crime to fund
their terrorist operations.
Increasingly, more terrorist groups are developing
criminal components to fund their operations. With enhanced international
co-operation denying state sponsorship, the evolution of terrorist
financial networks is likely to proceed along this path. The most
lucrative source of revenue, and one that appears impossible to seal
off, is from narcotics trading. Most
major terrorist groups engage in cultivating, refining and trafficking
in heroin or cocaine, or 'taxing' narcotic traders. They range from
the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC), Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA), PIRA, PKK, the LTTE, Al Quaida and several factions in
Myanmar. For instance, V. Manoharan, the head of the LTTE International
Secretariat, UK, was arrested in Paris for possession of heroin. Manoharan
was fined 120,000 francs and sentenced to three years in prison on
March 25, 1985. Until he was released in September 1987,
the LTTE paid his salary and thereafter appointed him as the LTTE
representative in France. To evade stepped up surveillance, most terrorist
groups prefer to engage in transcontinental trafficking by employing
semi-autonomous units to ensure deniability. Some groups such as the
PIRA and LTTE use merchant vessels to smuggle narcotics and other
merchandise goods. For instance the PIRA-chartered British cargo vessel,
Ramsland, was interdicted with weapons
as well as 36 tons of marijuana to pay for them. Similarly, Valhalla too was engaged in gun running
and narcotics trafficking. FARC exchanged narcotics in return for
weapons from the Russian mafia. Some groups such as the Kashmiri factions
and the Shanti Bahini Movement in the Chittagong hill Tracts of Bangladesh
refrain from participating in either retail or wholesale narcotics
transfers. As Pakistan believes that trafficking in narcotics would
criminalise the Kashmiri campaign, its external intelligence agency,
the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) has ensured that none of its
client groups are engaged in trafficking narcotics.
Money laundering refers to investment aimed at
loosening the dirty track and generating clean money. However, many
contemporary groups launder money to generate high profits both in
safe and high-risk ventures. Through front, cover and sympathetic
organisations, terrorist groups invest in trade, enterprise and in
the stock exchange. In the contemporary context, several foreign terrorist
groups own gas stations, jewellery shops, supermarkets, canned food
industries, printing presses, video and audio parlours, travel agencies,
transportation companies, computer schools, security firms, and phone
card companies in the UK, Germany, Switzerland, France and in Canada.
To make money, terrorist groups hosted cultural and musical events,
organised lotteries, and engaged in unauthorized foreign exchange
transactions. In the UK, groups like the Hamas, LTTE and the PKK own
broadcasting stations, newspapers, restaurants, and development NGOs
to solicit grants, etc.
Other than raising funds by soliciting contributions
and commercial investments, terrorist groups also lobbied against
international aid, trade, tourism and investment. Such terrorist lobbying
affected the sustainability of a target state, especially those economies
dependent on external revenue, to simultaneously fight poverty as
well as terrorism. Through front, cover and sympathetic organizations,
terrorist groups have lobbied with the UN and other Inter-governmental
organisations, governments and host societies, and NGOs, against political,
social and economic intercourse with the target countries. For instance,
the International Educational Development Inc. led by Karen Parker
even attempted to lobby the UN Human Rights Sub-commission in Geneva.
Very few government and private organizations recognized the threat
and responded effectively. However, the United Nations denied the
provision of NGO status to the Tamil Centre for Human Rights (TCHR)
after video evidence sighted one of its representatives, Deirdre McConnell,
addressing a LTTE rally in Switzerland. Law enforcement authorities
in more than one country are investigating whether funds raised by
the TCHR with offices located internationally have been used to procure
weapons for terrorist operations. Often, terrorist groups have dissuaded
NGOs with a US $ 8 billion budget per year from contributing to development
projects by branding the regimes they opposed as engaging in genocide,
ethnic cleansing and in human rights violations. On poor advice, some
affected states temporarily suspended democratic values by imposing
media censorship, curtailing the right of assembly, denying access
to human rights NGOs, etc. Terrorist lobbying projected such over-reaction
as a permanent feature eroding the international image of their opposing
regimes. Failure to counter terrorist propaganda, from leafleting
at the UN to slick websites and influential PR firms, led to a remission
of international aid and arms embargoes affecting the capacity of
a state to wage a sustained campaign against terrorism.
The opportunities open to terrorist groups to generate
funds and attack the economy of their opposing regimes has dramatically
increased and diversified in the post-Cold war period. With porous
borders, stepped-up travel, enhanced communication, and the free flow
of ideas and technologies, the mobility of terrorist groups and the
spread of their ideologies have gradually increased. With the advent
of off-shore-companies and numbered bank accounts, terrorist groups
could operate beyond their theatres of conflict undetected over longer
periods of time accruing power and wealth.
Dynamics of Support
A number of host and homeland factors and conditions
determine the nature, amount and quantity of international support
for a terrorist group. PIRA front, cover and sympathetic organisations
in the US generated about US $ 2.5 million per year up to the mid-1990s. This was about a fifth of the PIRA budget
and a bulk of it was used to procure weapons in the US. PIRA generated
about US $ 3.5 million per year per annum since the mid-1990s.
The PKK budget was estimated between US $50-100 million a year
of which the bulk was from narcotics trading and diaspora contributions.
About 80% of the LTTE budget, estimated at US $ 80-100 million, comprised
diaspora contributions and revenue from international trade, enterprise
and investments. From its diaspora, the JKLF and other Kashmiri
groups raised between US $ 100,000200,000 a year. The volume
of hefty contributions from wealthy Arab well-wishers and the Pakistani
state, and modest co-ethnic and domestic contributions, is not exactly
known. Diaspora contributions depended not only
on events in the homeland but also in the host country. Migrant assimilation
with the host mainstream diluted the ethnicity factor by the second
generation. The world-wide Irish diaspora was about 70 million and
the American Irish diaspora was 40.7 million. Before the Kennedy Presidency,
racism against the Irish prevented integration, preserving Irish nationalism.
Nonetheless, less than 1% of the Irish Diaspora contributed to PIRA
and to the other splinter outfits Irish National Liberation
Army (INLA), Continuity IRA and Real IRA. Although the Irish integrated
and assimilated themselves in the post-Kennedy years, communities
such as the Armenians did not, and therefore were vulnerable to terrorist
propaganda. A higher percentage of the Turkish Kurds, Sri Lankan Tamils,
Indian Sikhs and the Muslim Kashmiris, living in ethnic enclaves isolated
from mainstream host society, contributed to the PKK, LTTE, and to
Khalistani and Kashmiri factions.
In most cases, the international revenue of a group
was much higher than the domestic revenue. If the fighting zone was
economically not devastated, the opportunities for domestic fund raising
and local investment were significant. But if the means of generating
a livelihood in the homeland was remote, the terrorists focused on
generating international support. The dire need to survive determines
the efficacy of international propaganda and fund raising wings. Often
potential supporters had to be socialised into giving by organising
fund-raising drives regularly. To ensure a steady flow, modest monthly
contributions were preferred to large one-time contributions. To galvanise
the support base into contributing, terrorists used propaganda leaflets,
posters, films, lectures, which ideologically indoctrinated the supporters.
The most effective were personal testimonies of persons or family
members who suffered at the hands of the security forces. Those who
were directly affected contributed more than others. The scale of
activity through front, cover and sympathetic organisations modulated
the support levels. Usually international financial support was translated
into military hardware and other supplies, to maintain international
offices, and to meet the expenses of the overseas staff. International
finance was critical for the military survival of most terrorist groups
unless they received partial or full state support. Hard currency
was valuable to procure sophisticated weapons and dual technologies
that would give the terrorists the much-desired edge over the security
forces. The availability of multiple sources of support determined
the dependency of a group on one particular source. For instance,
PIRA, LTTE and PKK were dependent on diaspora contributions to sustain
their military campaign, primarily to procure sophisticated weapons;
but the Kashmiri groups were dependent on state sponsorship both for
weapons and maintenance of the rank and file in the battlefield.
Many economically sophisticated groups such
as PIRA and the LTTE invested their funds in businesses. According
to James Adams, contributions accounting for 50% of its budget in
the early 1970s were invested wisely in commercial ventures. Gradually,
the revenue from the businesses exceeded the contributions. Since
the second half of the 1990s, the LTTE too generated more revenue
from businesses rather than from contributions in the preceding period.
While the PKK made a few income-generating investments, the Kashmiri
groups lacked the economic acumen to develop an independent source
of revenue. While PIRA and the LTTE employed professional accountants,
the PKK and the Kashmiri groups witnessed financial mismanagement
and financial negligence respectively. The PIRA and LTTE cases demonstrate
a trend for terrorist groups to become less dependent on contributions
and to invest in high income generating projects. With relative ease,
registered companies operating on behalf of terrorist groups transacted
businesses, engaged in trade, solicited grants, and laundered funds
in high-risk high-income generating investments. The success of disrupting
terrorist infrastructure was dependent on host capability of monitoring
the range and depth of terrorist front, cover and sympathetic organisations;
key personnel; and international co-operation. Compared to monitoring
contributions, revenue from businesses was more difficult to monitor.
With host legislation increasingly being directed to prevent terrorists
from soliciting contributions, it is likely that the terrorists will
rely more on revenue from businesses, difficult to detect, disrupt
and destroy.
Usually, contributions for terrorist groups were
dependent on certain events in their homeland, which could galvanise
domestic and diaspora emotions. While Irish American support dramatically
increased with the 1969 riots, Bloody Sunday, internment, and the
death of hunger strikers; the Tamil support dramatically increased
with the burning of the Jaffna library, 1983 riots, and large-scale
cordon and search operations. The commitment of the homeland and the
diaspora leadership's determined to a large extent the efficacy of
propaganda and fund raising campaigns. Coercion to solicit funds in
the diaspora increased revenues in the short term, but decreased support
in the long term. Ideally, the terrorists had to reinforce fund raising
drives with sustained propaganda. Only a few groups had the foresight
to co-ordinate and compliment propaganda with fund raising initiatives.
The availability of funds regulated the access
of a group to weapons or to weapon components. With more funds, terrorists
were able to progress beyond procuring the standard automatic personnel
weapons to sophisticated standard high and low trajectory stand off
weapons. The terrorist groups that succeeded in procuring stand off
weapons such as RPG, LAW, SAMs, MBRL, large calibre mortars or dual
technologies such as GPS, closed circuit diving gear, mini helicopters,
mini submarines posed a serious threat to standing armies especially
of the developing world.
With neutralisation
of sources and/or interdiction of supplies, the technical capability
of terrorist groups declined. For instance, when the UK and US governments
successfully disrupted the international arms pipeline to PIRA, PIRA
started manufacturing home-made guns and explosives. Although these
improvised weapons were potent, they were not as lethal or accurate
as the factory-made weapons. Furthermore, with access to finance,
some groups developed or seriously considered developing weapons of
mass destruction. For instance, Aum Shinrikyos Satian 7, who
manufactured the Sarin nerve agent that killed twelve Japanese and
injured more than 5000 in 1995, cost approximately US $ 10 million
to construct. Aum Shinrikyo netted much larger profits
by selling its own manufactured products to its members as well as
by managing several businesses, selling computers, pharmaceuticals,
noodles and real estate. Thus, sources of funds can always regulate
the technical capability of a terrorist group. As such, disrupting
the terrorists' capability to raise funds should be an integral component
of a comprehensive counter-terrorist agenda of a state.
Domestic Response
The US government took the lead to designate a
number of terrorist groups operating on US soil as 'terrorist' in
October 1997. The decision of the US government was prompted by the
influence and the lobbying capacity of the Jewish community and the
State of Israel. Operating through a series of registered and unregistered
charities, they argued that the Hamas, the Palestinian Islamic Jihad
and Hezbollah were raising significant amounts of money in the US.
As the US could not selectively designate just the Middle Eastern
groups as 'terrorist', it also decided to review a large number of
groups from all the regions of the world. The terrorism centres of the US operational
agencies both the FBI and the CIA failed to forecast
the security implications of such a categorisation on its domestic
and international interests. The PKK and the LTTE with the
support of two well-known terrorist lobbyists, R. Fertig of the Humanitarian
Law Project and Karen Parker of the International Education Development
Inc. challenged the US decision in court, especially in the
context of the denial of aid to lawful and non-violent activities
of groups. The terrorist groups lost the two court cases filed in
the district courts of Washington and Los Angeles. While a few other
groups aligned with anti-US state sponsors, some others built terrorist
coalitions to work together against the US. For instance, the Al Quaida
led by Usama Bin Laden built a close network with Pakistani and Bangladeshi
groups and issued a fatwa
against the US.
Many of the terrorist groups also shifted their
information infrastructures to Canada, where the laws were hitherto
as liberal as in the US. Although the co-operation level between Canadian
Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) and the Royal Canadian Mounted
Police Force (RCMP) with their US counterparts has been enhanced,
the lack of legal teeth in Canada has gravely affected Canadian security.
At the pinnacle of audacity, a terrorist front in Canada invited the
Canadian Finance Minister Paul Martin to a fundraising dinner in May
2000. The event was organised by the Federation of Tamil Associations
of Canadian Tamils (FACT), an organisation identified as a LTTE front
both by the US and Canadian governments. The dinner, at C$60 per plate,
was held at the Western Harbour Castle hotel in Toronto. Two days
before the event, a conversation between a Tamil migrant factory worker
and a well-known LTTE fund collector in Toronto Father Francis Xavier
recorded:
Migrant worker:
We work hard in the factory hopefully you will not waste the
money in Canada.
Fund collector:
Do not worry every penny you provide will go to buy arms for the LTTE.
There were other groups that shifted their infrastructures
to South and Central America and to Europe. Although the FBI's domination
of links between the security agencies in Latin America prevented
a truly regional network, it helped to strengthen co-operation within
and outside the region.
Today, for any government to mount a sustained
fight against contemporary terrorist support networks, it should develop
the following seven components. First, political bipartisanship in national
security decision making; second, sustained international co-operation; third, comprehensive database with access
to all national agencies; fourth, professional intelligence organisations; fifth, highly mobile anti-terrorist forces; sixth, appropriate legal framework; seventh, media cooperation.
In the age of globalisation, it has become apparent
that no single country can protect its security without the co-operation
of another state. Just as states co-operate, contemporary terrorist
groups also co-operate with one another. Similar to states exchanging
personnel and sharing intelligence, terrorists also share operational
knowledge and fundraising strategies. Identical to states learning from other
states, terrorist groups also gain operational knowledge from other
groups. Therefore, for effective counter-terrorism strategies to be
operational nationally and internationally, the evolving transnational
character of the terrorist threat needs to be factored into consideration.
For instance, the Islamic Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e-Islami, the
two largest Islamic conglomerations of groups, teamed up to fight
the campaigns in Afghanistan, Kashmir, Tajiikistan, Algeria, Philippines,
Egypt, Chechnya, Dagestan, Bosnia, Xingjiang, and Kosovo.
Although terrorist outfits cooperate at the strategic
and tactical levels, states are reluctant to cooperate fully in certain
areas. Even between the national agencies of allies, release of information
that could compromise their sensitive human assets or counter-technologies
has impeded the common fight against terrorism. Thus, Israel did not
share information with British counterparts; and the British and US
agencies withheld intelligence in certain areas. When requested, the
MOSSAD refrained from presenting evidence of support activities of
Middle Eastern groups on UK soil. Similarly, the UK does not share
information on countering remote-controlled bomb technology with the
US due to fear of penetration of the US national security establishment
by PIRA. National sensitivities will always be an impinging factor
in international co-operation.
Nonetheless, the international community today
is aware that sharing national intelligence is imperative in a globalised
world. If the international community is seriously considering engaging
mobile groups or groups with regional and global networks, international
cooperation becomes critical.
International Response
The terrorist campaigns in Europe ended or declined
with the implosion of the Soviet Empire, their principal sponsor. The groups that survived the Cold War period
were mostly ethnopolitical groups, which had modest to large diaspora
and domestic constituencies. As such the ethnopolitical groups had
more staying power than the ideologically driven groups. For instance,
only the two-ethnopolitical terrorist groups
PIRA
and ETA (Spanish Basque separatists) survived in
Europe. Despite sweeping changes in the international
environment throughout the 1990s, there are more terrorist groups
on the European radar screen today. These are mostly Asian, Latin
American, African, and Middle Eastern groups, using Europe as a launching
pad for support operations. Furthermore, the collapse of the Soviet
Empire has left Eastern Europe, the Caucuses and the Balkans open
to Western Europe. This has opened up twin opportunities for governments
and terrorist groups. North American and Western European governments
have developed new intelligence sources. Simultaneously, terrorist
groups within Eastern Europe, the Caucuses and the Balkans have formed
coalitions with each other and formed working relationships with Western
European groups. For instance, during the PIRA-UK government disengagement,
both the Real IRA and the Continuity IRA procured weapons from the
Balkans.
A comprehensive assessment of the current global
intelligence picture suggests that most terrorist campaigns are fought
in the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and in Latin America. But the bulk
of these terrorist campaigns are sustained by fund-raising in Canada,
Europe and in Australasia. The freedom of association, movement and
demonstration enshrined in the constitutions of many liberal democracies
provides the latitude of operations that many groups lacked at home,
generating political support and economic wealth. While the mature
campaigns already operate steady support bases, the new campaigns
are developing fledgling support bases. Even if disrupted, a well-established
group with a significant support base can rebuild its losses within
a short period of time. Furthermore, as borders within Europe are
porous with the exception of the Irish and mainland UK border
all the European states will have to respond collectively to
any threat. As borders are virtually open within continental Europe,
support structure disrupted in one European country is likely to emerge
in another. The most effective government strategies
are to disrupt the terrorist infrastructure when they are in a formative
phase and collectively. The key to this is to harmonise domestic legislation
and co-ordinate anti-terrorist responses.
Although international action against terrorism
has improved considerably in the past decade, these efforts have been
largely restricted to Europe and North America. Despite the existence
of co-operative legal frameworks, bilateral co-operation has been
limited and multilateral co-operation is largely non-existent. For
instance, the convention on terrorism ratified by the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) members exists only on
paper. Like EUROPOL, an ASEANPOL is in the making. A SAARCPOL is a
distant reality, as a result of disagreements between states primarily
over the Indo-Pakistan conflict on the disputed territory of Kashmir.
Despite the failure of multilateral initiatives outside the West,
bilateral and trilateral initiatives between Turkey and Germany;
the UK and India; India, Nepal and Bangladesh, etc. have helped.
The international experience in this realm, and to this point in time,
indicates that, with the criminalization of terrorist fundraising
and close enforcement by host agencies and authorities, terrorist
fundraising receded. Nevertheless, only a few countries have been
able to criminalize the support networks of certain terrorist groups.
The US has taken the lead by criminalizing 30 terrorist groups. Although
the UK has been able to criminalize the domestic Republican and Loyalist
terrorist groups, the new legal framework is expected to alter the
status quo. In addition
to its domestic groups, India criminalized the LTTE, after an LTTE
female suicide bomber assassinated Rajiv Gandhi, a former Prime Minister,
in May 1991. Germany and a few other European states criminalized
the PKK after the PKK conducted a series of terrorist operations throughout
Europe. Overall, most states have criminalized their domestic terrorist
groups without criminalizing the foreign groups. As terrorist groups
are revengeful by nature, many states are wary about designating foreign
groups as 'terrorist' and implementing a crackdown against them. Thus,
countries like France and Italy permitted foreign terrorist groups
to operate as long as they did not did not target their citizens or
link up with domestic terrorist groups. But with the terrorist threat
to France and Italy increasing, their governments have begun to respond
decisively. This demonstrated that it is the threat level that drives
international security and intelligence cooperation. In sum, the domestic
and international mechanisms and frameworks aimed at combating terrorist
infrastructure, including financial infrastructure has been weak or
non-existent.
Counter-Terrorism Measures
As terrorist groups in the post-Cold War era have
begun to develop an international capability to raise funds, combating
global financial infrastructure has been rendered a complex task.
For instance, despite the US-UK special relationship, UK's success
in persuading the US to disrupt PIRA fundraising and procurement in
the US has been limited. Furthermore, despite the LTTE assassinating
Rajiv Gandhi, the Indian Government's efforts at disrupting the LTTE
infrastructure in South India was not totally successful. But, whenever
countries have heightened the level of co-operation, the concerned
terrorists have suffered. In 1987, when the Germans cooperated with
the French, the French terrorist group Action Direct suffered. In
1992, when the French cooperated with the Spanish, the Basque separatist
leadership was captured. In 1998, when the Kenyans cooperated with
the Turks, the PKK leader Abdallah Ocalan was captured. Similarly,
when the US disrupted PIRA procurement in the 1970s, PIRA started
using home made weapons and fertiliser explosives. When India cooperated
with Sri Lanka in 1993, the LTTE arms carrier, Ahat,
carrying Satasivam Krishnakumar, the head of the LTTE International
Secretariat, was interdicted, and as a result, LTTE international
operations suffered for a few years.
At a global level, there are four formidable intelligence-sharing
networks. However, the building blocks of effective
international co-operation intelligence sharing and exchanging
personnel are cooperation between domestic agencies. Although
technical intelligence can assist, the key to monitoring terrorist
support networks is human intelligence. Most sophisticated terrorist
groups are aware of the technical capability of security services.
To manage an agent-handling network, essential to develop high-grade
intelligence, highly competent, well-trained and dedicated men and
women should be assigned to intelligence gathering, collation and
projection. Intelligence is worth ten of everything else. To quote
the Director-designate of the UK Counter-Terrorism School, Mike Dolamore,
if you get your intelligence wrong, everything goes wrong. Without generating high-quality timely and
accurate intelligence on financial transactions and banking transfers,
it is impossible for domestic agencies to enlist the sustained cooperation
of foreign intelligence counterparts. Host intelligence agencies face
formidable difficulties in penetrating foreign terrorist groups because
of the cultural and language gap. Therefore, success of any information
gathering operation is dependent on the ability and willingness of
a host agency either to work with its foreign counterparts or enlist
migrants able to infiltrate the close-knit support structures of terrorist
groups. Penetrating a support network is the stepping-stone to infiltrating
a terrorist group. Sustained penetration is the key to damaging a
group significantly. But, developing such a capability requires patient,
intelligent and hard work spread over a long period of time, qualities
that are found to be lacking in most agencies in the developing world.
The key to degrading foreign terrorist groups raising
funds is not only to prosecute the collectors but also the group.
The basic tenet of English law is to prosecute the individual. An
examination of the terrorists' modus
operandi reveals that a new member can always replace an old member.
Therefore, targeting both the individual and the organisation is paramount
to degrade terrorist financing infrastructure. This necessitates a
close monitoring of the front, cover and sympathetic organisations
as well as the operatives. However, emphasis on targeting organisations
and not the operatives can prove counter-productive. This is because
a group can create a few hundred fronts, but will find it difficult
to replace an experienced operative.
Degrading terrorist financing infrastructure is
consequently dependent on the ability and willingness of a host government
to mount surveillance and reconnaissance on both organisations and
operatives. As the US and German experiences have demonstrated severe
penalties, including seizure of funds, confiscation of assets and
lengthy prison sentences, are likely to break the morale of fundraising
activists and deter fundraising at least temporarily.
Operationally, linking funds raised in one country
with the commission of a terrorist crime in another country is extremely
difficult to prove in a court of law. Evidentiary information will
have to be tested in court and the judicial systems will have to be
compatible. Successfully tracking the money trail requires high-grade
intelligence that most countries affected by terrorism have failed
to develop. Both the process of investigation and the trials are likely
to be long, hard and costly work. Nonetheless, governments determined
to bring terrorists and their supporting institutions to justice are
likely to make use of this window of opportunity. In return, both
target and host governments will sharpen their thinking and tools
to reactively and proactively address the financing of terrorism across
international borders.
When the US State Department banned 30 groups and
created a legal framework to prevent support for these groups in October
1997, the PKK and the LTTE legally challenged the decision of the
US government. Although they lost the court cases, terrorists are
likely to legally challenge future government actions to close down,
seize assets and imprison offenders. This would be the case despite
the increase in court cases and rising court expenses. However, terrorists
are likely to become more clandestine in fundraising, money laundering,
investment, and foreign exchange courier and electronic transfers.
This is likely to reduce the amount of funds they collect openly.
Dependent on how individual governments respond, terrorists are likely
to shift from generating funds by open collection to clandestine investment.
Nevertheless, the argument that when a terrorist
group is proscribed in a host country, it goes underground and its
activities becomes even more clandestine and hence more difficult
to monitor is flawed. Many intelligence services have argued that
they are comprehensively monitoring the terrorist groups operating
on their host soil. But, without their knowledge, funds have been
transferred from European, Canadian, Singaporean, Australian, Thai,
New Zealand and Australian bank accounts to procurement accounts in
the countries of the Balkans, Eastern Europe, and southern belt of
the former USSR.
Permitting groups to disseminate terrorist propaganda
but to prohibit them from raising funds is not a workable strategy.
Propaganda whips up emotions that are converted into hard cash. Disseminating
propaganda is the key to fundraising. It is thus not impossible to
trace the groups engaged in fund raising. Governments should consider
proscribing the operation of any group that employs terrorism
attacks on civilians and public infrastructure to achieve a
political goal. Proscription of the group, as well as its front, cover,
and sympathetic organisations should be publicised to deter public
support. This should be followed by the intelligence services watching
community organisations that are likely to be newly established or
infiltrated by terrorist groups.
In addition to these specific counter-measures,
there are factors and conditions that could be addressed by long-term
political, socio-economic, educational, and criminal-justice reform. National governments should seek to address
legitimate political grievances and aspirations that drive Diaspora
and domestic populations towards supporting terrorism. Building alternative
political forces, renouncing violence as a means to power, and representing
the broader public interest are central in dissuading support for
violence. The politicisation and radicalisation of a community in
terms of lending support to violence is related to the denial or lack
of access to equal political, socio-economic, and educational opportunities.
Addressing the underlying causes of a marginalized section of the
people can restrain growing support for anti-state activities at an
early stage. Failure to respond can lead a terrorist group to build
significant support and evolve into a larger and a stronger guerrilla
force. Sustained support enables a terrorist group capable of attacking
soft targets civilians and unprotected infrastructure
to engage security forces. Terrorist provocation often leads to security
forces' reprisals that boost terrorist coffers. Security forces should
be trained to win the hearts and minds of communities, especially
where their political leaders have been eliminated or silenced by
terrorists, rather than to exercise counter-productive concepts such
as 'collective punishment.' Reforming the security forces engaged
in counter-insurgency operations by instilling discipline, providing
intensive training, imparting language skills and teaching public
relations is critical to break the actual or potential terrorist grip
on the populace. Therefore, the counter-terrorism measures to restrain
the development of a terrorist and guerrilla capability to raise funds
come within the parameters of general counter-insurgency. The counter-measures
against terrorist financing will have a strategic impact only if the
causal factors and conditions are recognised, identified and addressed.
Even if one source of finance dries up, contemporary
terrorist groups have numerous other opportunities to explore. For
instance, with the arrest of US based PIRA fund collectors and procurement
officers, PIRA turned to Libya in mid-1985. The Libyan connection
provided PIRA sufficient weapons and explosives to last more than
a decade. When several hundred Tamils were arrested in the 1980s for
selling narcotics at a retail level 400 in Italy alone
the LTTE shifted from retail to wholesale operations using their ships.
To earn respectability some groups temporarily abandon trading in
narcotics and explore other avenues of finance generation. But when
conditions and factors demanded more resources, the groups that had
abandoned the narcotics trade recommenced that activity. Similarly,
if legal and quasi-legal incomes dried out and the economic survival
of the group was threatened, the drive to recommence illegal activity
could over-ride other considerations. When a government disrupts the
flow of funds from traditional sources, the propensity for a group
to explore newer sources of funds increases.
Therefore governments should consider all the options available
to a terrorist group before embarking on a programme targeting a specific
source of income. Furthermore, whenever possible a government should
leave a door open for a terrorist group to abandon violence and seriously
seek a negotiated political settlement.
Conclusion
Attacking the lifeblood of a terrorist group should
be an integral component of the comprehensive counter-terrorist strategy
of any affected state. Realising the threat posed by terrorist support
structures, the community of nations has responded by formulating
a UN Convention on the Suppression of Terrorist Financing. The latest
UN convention calls upon states to strengthen their domestic legislation.
This involves formulation of extensive laws and ratifying fairly comprehensive
legislation. In countries like Switzerland, Belgium and
Japan, this will involve lifting banking secrecy and monitoring of
banking services. Although the convention grew out of G8 which
includes Japan - and the Paris and Lyon Summits, initially there was
some hesitation on the part of these three countries to support the
convention. Countries in Scandinavia, where terrorist groups have
established extensive infrastructure, were not forthcoming in their
support for this convention. Due to pressure from human rights and
civil liberties groups, many governments have been reluctant to support
the convention. As a result, this convention is not among the 25 Conventions
recommended to member-states for adoption at the turn of the millennium
by the UN Secretary General Kofi A. Annan. Nonetheless, this Convention
will pressurise and offer guidelines to a number of countries that
have suffered gravely from the threat of terrorism or are tacitly
supporting terrorism elsewhere. For instance, Sri Lanka has lacked
the domestic legislation to fight terrorist support structures. On
a visit to Sri Lanka in 1994, the government arrested the UK-based
Sothilingam Shanthakumar, an LTTE procurement officer who had initiated
purchase of a 60-tonne consignment of TNT and RDX (plastic explosives)
purchase from the Rubezone chemical plant in the Ukraine with funds
raised in the UK amounting to US $ 40,000. Although the consignment
of explosives continued to kill men, women and children by the thousand,
he was given a lenient sentence and released in 1997. The Sri Lankan
Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), modelled on the British PTA of
1974, was drafted before the LTTE developed an international support
network in 1983.
Even with the UN Convention coming into force,
there will be insurmountable legal, political, operational and other
impediments to disrupting terrorist support structures. For instance,
the US legislation forbids the FBI from mounting surveillance on any
particular community. As such, monitoring certain Asian and Middle
Eastern communities that are vulnerable to terrorist penetration is
problematic. Segments of Kurds, Sri Lankan Tamils, Indian Sikhs, Kashmiris
and Palestinians living in North America, Europe, and in Australasia
contribute to the PKK, LTTE, Sikh factions, Kashmiri factions and
to Hamas, respectively. Similarly, some terrorist-infiltrated ethnic
communities exert constituency pressure on Canadian politicians to
legitimize their cause in return for the ethnic vote. Disregarding
the advice of Canadian law enforcement authorities, Canadas
Finance Minister, Paul Martin, attended a fundraising dinner hosted
by the LTTE in May 2000. Although Martin, a possible future Premier
of Canada, earned the wrath of the Canadian media and humiliation
by the parliamentary opposition, he survived the scandal. Canada is
not an exception, although it is likely the worst affected country.
Other liberal democracies in Europe, such as the UK, or in Asia, such
as Thailand, also permitted foreign terrorist groups to raise funds
openly, even issuing receipts to their contributors.
Prior to the drafting of the
UN Convention, and it being open to signature by the member-states
in January 2000, there was no existing multilateral legal instrument
to expressly address such financing. Hitherto, international cooperation between
national governments to disrupt terrorist financing has been ad-hoc
and bilateral. Overall, the national governments were slow and not
forthcoming with the operational powers to regulate the international
financing of terrorism. This was despite UN's recognition of the problem
quite early, and the General Assembly Resolution of December 17, 1996,
calling upon
all
States to take steps to prevent and counteract, through appropriate
domestic measures, the financing of terrorists and terrorist organizations,
whether such financing is direct or indirect through organizations
which also have or claim to have charitable, social or cultural goals
or which are also engaged in unlawful activities such as illicit arms
trafficking, drug dealing and racketeering, including the exploitation
of persons for purposes of funding terrorist activities, and in particular
to consider, where appropriate, adopting regulatory measures to prevent
and counteract movements of funds suspected to be intended for terrorist
purposes without impeding in any way the freedom of legitimate capital
movements and to intensify the exchange of information concerning
international movements of such funds.
Developing a common set of
values and standards in the fight against terrorism is difficult.
In addition, it will require tremendous political will and courage
on the part of member-states to disrupt terrorist support structures
in their backyards. A shift towards far less national secrecy and
the logic of overriding 'national interests' is likely to enhance
true international co-operation and international efforts in this
direction. Although there will never be cent per cent international
cooperation, this is a significant step by the community of nations
to demonstrate their disapproval of the employment of the tactic of
terrorism. The regulation of banking and financial institutions in
host countries is likely to benefit the security of target states
suffering from terrorism as well as the security of host states where
terrorists have built, and operate, their financial infrastructures.
Although the terrorist groups are known to adapt and survive changing
political and security counter-measures, the UN Convention is likely
to be the first comprehensive challenge to disrupt and degrade transnational
terrorist support structures. Only by monitoring the attempts of terrorist
groups to circumvent the new laws can respective governments develop
counter measures to further tighten existing loopholes in their domestic
laws. Due to the enhanced terrorist mobility in search of new opportunities
at the beginning of the 21st century, all states will have
to develop a coherent, effective and a timely response. The failure
of the community of nations to harmonise legislation and respond collectively
is likely to ensure the sustainability of on-going transnationally
supported terrorist campaigns.