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Unified Command HQ in Counter Insurgency and Role of Intelligence in J&K

Dr Bhashyam Kasturi*

India today faces a host of internal security challenges. Primary amongst them is the cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir. Transnational terrorism has afflicted the state for over a decade making it difficult for the administration to cope with both the internal and external aspects of this security challenge. To that extent, those tackling this crisis face a difficult task. By its very nature this transnational challenge defies a singular conceptual framework. It has been variously called a proxy war, low intensity conflict and cross-border terrorism. From the view of each force fighting insurgency the problem has different connotations. For instance, the Indian Army identifies this as a low intensity war, but with the passage of time the type of weaponery being employed by the terrorists makes it look more like a regular war.1

From the perspective of the Indian state, this is a multi-dimensional problem. First, there is an internal crisis of governance and political dissent. Second, there is a crisis of relationship with Pakistan because of the latter sponsoring cross-border terrorism in Kashmir. All aspects are at once separate and yet inter-linked. This is so because the very nature of the crisis relates to making policy to handle several dimensions simultaneously. It is in this setting that this analysis sets out to trace and examine the working of the unified command set up for coordinating anti-insurgency operations in the state of Jammu and Kashmir. This analysis also seeks to understand the crucial role that intelligence plays, both in tackling cross-border terrorism and in the successful conduct of the unified command.

Jammu and Kashmir is not unique in having a unified command. The North-East has had it for some time now. Assam started the trend, with Operation Rhino in the early nineties witnessing an initiative in joint civil-military handling of insurgencies. For the army Operation Rhino demonstrated that it was possible to work in tandem with the civil administration. At the highest level, Corps Commander (4 Corps) and the Assam government got together on a regular basis, setting out policy objectives and at lower levels the district administration and local military and para-military officers got involved in coordinating operational matters. This ad hoc arrangement was institutionalised in January 1997 into a Unified Command.2

But in Kashmir, where the Unified Command has been in place since 1993, the results have been different. This is partly because of the lack of "unity of purpose", i.e. defination of the political objective regarding Kashmir. Secondly, lack of "unity of command" and the role of the unified command in meeting this objective. To this end, any system in place for combating insurgency must have clearly defined roles and it must have the requisite authority to function.

A word about terminology. Unified Command means different things to different people. The exercise of command can cover a whole range of issues from the declaration of war to deciding how many companies to be sent to occupy a certain military control. Command is also "a mixture of example, persuasion and compulsion by which you get men to do what you want them to do, even if they don’t want to do it themselves."3

This is relating to leadership, the human aspect of command. When translated into institutional parlance it means, exercise of authority to coalesce existing forces and powers to fulfil a common aim or goal. In this sense, the Unified Command in Jammu and Kashmir or in any other state, should be more than just a coordinating agency. It should be the nodal planning agency, working on a pre-defined goal.

Control is a term that describes the channels or "lines of command" through which a commander orders, advises, admonishes and queries his forces. These channels reflect responsbility, as well as military force and technicalities of execution.4 In this sense, how the command exercises its authority, legislated or otherwise, will determine how forces who find a place on board, cooperate.

An army officer closely associated with the unified command opines that it was set up as a coordinating agency, with no "command" functions. The view taken by this insider is that the system has had   aberrations because  of  the  inter-play  of   some personalities.5 The concept flows from the "unity of effort" which is essential in any military endeavour, "a synergisation of the activities of the different elements for the achievement of the overall goal."6

The Unified Command in Jammu and Kashmir is presently headed by the Chief Minister of the state, Dr Farooq Abdullah along with the Corps Commanders as the security advisors. Also part of the team is the chief secretary of the state, civil intelligence heads and police chiefs. There are separate unified commands at the Corps level and down the line. But the real task is with the Command at Srinagar whose task is to lay down operational orders for forces fighting insurgency and to ensure that political objectives are met by the civil administration.

Thus three immediate tasks are apparent. First, provide a platform to share intelligence, and lay down broad operational guidelines for counter insurgency (COIN) operations. Second, establish civil authority in the cities and rural areas through such commands running down the line. And finally to act as a clearing house for civil-military issues in the context of counter insurgency.

Origins of Unified Command

The unified command was set up in mid-1993 as a result of, the minister of state for internal security, Rajesh Pilot’s efforts to have greater central control over Kashmir affairs. For this purpose he sought the appointment of former army chief General KV Krishna Rao as Governor. He also put in place a Unified Command Headquarters, which operated on military lines. A former Corps Commander, Lt Gen Zaki was brought in as Advisor (Security).

Part of Pilot’s aim was to get direct control over Kashmir by-passing SB Chavan, Union Home Minister with whom he had differences. Pilot appeared more willing to open channels of communication with the militants. The Governor, Girish Saxena, a former chief of India’s external intelligence agency Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) did not share Pilot’s proclivity towards negotiations.

Pilot managed to get Narasimha Rao to change governors and in March 1993 General KV Krishna Rao took over from Girish Saxena. Ashok Jaitley was appointed Advisor along with General Zaki, who was put in charge of a unified command that sought to coordinate efforts of the army and the para-military forces. The command HQ composed of the additional Chief Secretary (Home), the Divisional Commissioner, the Director General of Police and Inspector General of Police, Kashmir.7

But it was only in May 1993 that Pilot, after a meeting of top security officials in Srinagar, put forth the consensual proposal to the Governor on the actual structure and working of the unified command. It was suggested that this command would be headed by Zaki, who was in fact already in place. Valley-wide operational control would be exercised by the army’s 15 Corps Commander, Lt Gen Surinder Nath. It was proposed that Srinagar city would remain under the charge of the Border Security Force (BSF).

It was not until the end of May 1993 that Rao’s cabinet in New Delhi approved of the plan. The problem right from the beginning was that no one wanted to share power with anyone else, more so the army. The military wanted to have the largest share of the cake, insisting that this was a low intensity conflict demanding a military response. The BSF having been in the thick of things since 1990 felt they could handle the situation and said so. And the state government was most unhappy at having to see its authority diluted further. There is little doubt that under Governor’s rule, under a former army chief, coordination worked and results were visible.8

General Zaki, then advisor to the Governor told American writer Robert Wirsing that the unified command system worked well. The command held daily meetings (in the morning) with overall direction coming from Pilot in New Delhi. Thus central control came through the Governor down to Zaki whose mission was to operationalise policy. What thus happened was the army’s role in internal security was expanded but not its authority.9

The problem with the working of the system lay partly in Srinagar and partly in New Delhi. In Delhi, Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s inability to take decisions, frequent ministerial changes, in-fighting within the party and the Chavan-Pilot clash created problems in terms of setting national objectives for Kashmir.10

This had twin consequences. First, there was no single objective to works towards. Second, it allowed the army to assert itself and undermine the very concept of a system it advocated in the first place. The command under Zaki did do well. It met during Hazratbal and other crisis. But by 1994, when the burning of Charar-i-Sharif took place, it was apparent that Srinagar had run out of ideas. During the siege of Hazratbal itself, the crisis meeting took a pre-arranged decision, obviously inspired by the Centre.11

General Saklani a former advisor to the Governor between 1993 and 1996 opines that the unified command played a significant role in coordinating matters between the civil administration, the police, para-military forces, the army and politician in the fight against militancy. The officers in the unified command had authority - status of State Cabinet Ministers, and were serving or retired military officers. The chain of command was military in nature and thus each understood the other’s needs. The point that Saklani emphasises is that Governor or Chief Minister simply does not have the time to go into details and deal with day-to-day security challenges on the ground. It is to tackle this that the unified command was created.12

Another Kashmir-observer notes that the concept itself is little understood and therefore poorly implemented. The army also feels that civilian administration machinery is inadequately equipped to deal with the concept in its entirety. It also opines that the army is the only institution capable of functioning and is indeed functioning with clear directives in the Valley. The other organisations are simply muddling along fighting the crisis as it appears. The unified command principle has yet to attain the desired "unity of purpose."13

A year after the unified command was instituted, the Governor, Krishna Rao was described as a man who had a "good grasp of the situation in Kashmir." The Advisor (Home) Zaki was observed to have exceptional knowledge of Kashmir, but noted to guide operational planning down to the minutest detail. This resulted in "over supervision" and led to resentment by those in charge of actual security operations.14

Another source pointed out that while Zaki was a good soldier he had been physically present when on 21 January 1990 the troops had opened fire indiscriminately on Kashmiri crowds gathered in Srinagar to protest. "Zaki is resented by all of the security forces he is supposed to coordinate... ."15

"The aim of the unified command was to lay down objectives for security forces and to coordinate operational plans. This concept was perceived by the army as undermining its chain of command. The army therefore asserted its legislated autonomy and while, functioning as an adjunct to the unified command, did not take directions from it. Numerous institutional biases have undermined the efficiency of the unified command."16 Why was this so? This was because the unified command did not have legal sanction, did not have administrative directions and the Government never spelt out its power and responsibilities or prescribed its charter of duties.

When Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah took over in 1996 he automatically became the head of the unified command and the Corps Commanders became security advisors. Inclusion of serving officers only increased problems of coordination.

This was part of an increasing trend in insurgency- infested states of India to put senior commanders in the posts of advisors to the chief minister. A unified command was institutionalised in Assam at this time with 4 Corps Commander as the advisor. The problem was that it took the Corps Commander away from his main task, countering infiltration at the border and countering insurgency. In other words, they became tied down to "security" (read law and order problems) as opposed to their regular focus on "operations."

Even then it was suggested that it was better to let a retired army or police officer act as the advisor. And the army depute to the unified command a Major General nominated to the joint command set-up. Alternatively it was suggested that chief of staff at Corps HQ could do the job.17

Another report in end-1997 cited a MHA report suggesting that the army in Jammu and Kashmir was dabbling in political anti-secessionist operations rather than restricting itself to combating violence and armed mercenaries. The report also noted that the army frequently editorialied on administrative and development matters."18

What of intelligence in the unified command? The military intelligence representative, the RAW (special branch) representative and IB person are in the unified command structure, but rarely share information of value with each other. In other words there is little input sharing that can provide an overall picture. One source writes that all agencies report to their superiors directly. "The distrust is evident in the meetings of the unified command in Srinagar." During Kargil in mid-1999, the meetings of the unified command saw constant arguments between intelligence representatives over perceptions of the scale of the intrusions.19

19 May 1999 witnessed a meeting of the unified command in Srinagar to focus attention on the Kargil intrusions. Present were Chief Minister Abdullah, 15 Corps Commander Kishen Pal, IB and RAW representatives and other senior officers. General Pal said infiltration in Kargil was a "localised affair." He went so far as to say there was no concentration of troops on the Pakistan side. Abdullah who was present at the meeting had a different story to tell and voiced his disagreement with Pal.20

This showed the diverse range of assessments being made at different levels. It is even more surprising to read the RAW representative talking of infiltration from Nepal when the Kargil hills were full of Pakistan Northern Light Infantry personnel. Intelligence at the base was either poor or those assessing the information missed the wood for the trees.

The Kargil Review Committee reported that unified command HQ’s intelligence structure was lacking in "timely and continous analysis and assessment" of intelligence, "which is critical for the success of CI operations."21

During the Kargil war, the DG Rashtriya Rifles (RR) was appointed security advisor as the 15 Corps Commander was focusing on the battlefront. Two problems arose in this situation. First, the CI grid collapsed making it easier for Pakistani infiltration in this region. Secondly, several para-military forces refused to be placed under command HQ controlling RR forces.

Soon after Operation Vijay the DG (RR) returned to Delhi and 15 Corps Commander resumed his place in the unified command. A 1999 appreciation of the working of the unified command asserts that several disparate security agencies operate within the overall CI grid under differing "rules of engagement" and "legislated authority" without the legislated means to induce coherence in implementing the CI management plan.

The unified command is said to meet once in two or three months and all it does is reaffirm the geographical disposition of forces. "Not even a broad plan or policy to coaleasce security forces in the state, in terms of time and space has been discussed or formulated."22

The two essential pre-requisites thus obtaining from this situation is that unification must flow from singularity of "command and control" in pursuit of larger objectives. This assessment states that all forces must put aside their differing operational status and respond to the orders issued by the "commander." What has thus resulted in Jammu and Kashmir is a system with no legislated authority, functioning more as a coordinating agency and with little or no political direction. It is thus natural that this institution is going waste.

Role of Intelligence

It is possible to make two posits straightaway in this regard. Intelligence at the top, unless collated and disseminated by a joint staff at the unified command is of no use. Disparity of intelligence agencies acting in their own areas is a waste of effort.

The other issue relates to kind of intelligence. Jammu and Kashmir is specially important for its trans-border character. Thus inputs from across the border and within have to be collated and analysed in order to feed the larger political objective.

What are the present trends in this field in the state? There are IB and RAW operatives in Srinagar, who report to New Delhi. There are outposts of IB and RAW in the Valley, Kargil and facing the Chinese. The RAW has a detachment of Special Frontier Force in Ladakh facing the Chinese.

The military operates both Human Intelligence, humint, and Signal Intelligence, sigint, in the counter-insurgency grid. The former is based on people providing information as well as from captured militants. The same applies to civil police and intelligence agencies. Sigint in the Valley plays a crucial role in collecting intelligence from across the border, but it is of tactical value. The equipment used is mainly ex-USSR, though in recent times, West European direction-finding and interception equipment has started coming into Divisional level operations, improving counter-infiltration operations.23

Thus intelligence is available from a variety of sources. Both New Delhi and Srinagar get a variety of inputs, but as input sharing is missing at both centre and state level, to expect wonders from the existing system in Srinagar is to expect miracles. As Kargil demonstrated there is plenty of raw information going round, its proper assessment and utilisation is sadly missing in the Indian system.

Intelligence for Kargil and CI operations within the military has also had its share of problems. The Kargil Review Committee report and other sources provide evidence of the military’s inability to distinguish intelligence relating to "infiltration" and "intrusion". Also much of the intelligence reaching the top was obviously "intelligence to please" not hard information. Only this syndrome can explain the remarks of Gen Kishen Pal at the 19 May unified command HQ meeting cited earlier.24

The intelligence structure in the army in Jammu and Kashmir is based on a combination of humint and sigint and rests along the counter-insurgency grids. Assessments are made by the MI locally, and strategic direction comes from the Army Commander and his staff in Udhampur.

Successful search and cordon and counter-infiltration operations in the Valley are due to the availability of hard intelligence. Signal interception often provides for greater contacts on the line of control and interception of communications during the Hazartbal crisis are evidence of useful operational sigint. Humint is more useful inside the Valley and in the rear areas. But the larger problem is lack of coordination at the highest level.

It is appropriate to analyse the various kinds of intelligence needed in COIN operations and the organisation needed to deal with this. In counter-insurgency and anti-terrorism operations, specially when cross-border terrorism is involved, intelligence is required at all levels. Strategic intelligence on geographical neighbours motives and actions, intelligence on patterns of infiltration, and intrusion is needed for taking broad political decisions and to provide mission direction.

Tactical or area intelligence is needed by forces involved in cutting off infiltration at the Line of Control (LoC), for operations in the rear areas and for establishment of what the Indian Army calls "area dominance." This is so in a large geographical area with differing terrains. Thus equipment has to be area- oriented.

Information that is actionable can be gainfully used by special forces and others tasked with COIN operations to effect. Local information from people for forces to make them oriented with the area and on militant hideouts is essential for success in operations.

The flow and ebb of intelligence from human sources within the Valley is often treated as a major sign of militancy reducing or increasing. But collating all secret and open source information is time consuming and thus often the larger picture gets clouded. Intelligence can be of use to guide policy only when there is a larger political objective. This brings us to where intelligence fits into the unified command structure in Jammu and Kashmir. As seen above the unified command in J&K has been functioning thus far in an ad hoc manner, and intelligence sharing often ignored by those giving and those receiving. Each agency reports directly to its superiors in Delhi, thus diluting the value of intelligence available.

The British in Malaya

A word here about the British handling of the communist insurgency in Malaya. When the UK government under Winston Churchill appointed General Sir Gerald Templer as High Commissioner to Malaya in 1952, the prime minister told the General, "You must have power - absolute power - civil power and military power. I will see that you get it. And when you’ve got it - grasp it firmly. And then never use it. Be cunning - very cunning. That’s what you’ve got to be!"

When Templer went to Malaya, he was both High Commissioner and Director (Operations). He also appointed a Director (Intelligence). This Director had no authority and could only report. In the official order it was stated that Director’s (Intelligence) role was "to coordinate the various intelligence agencies including the Special Branch of the Police, the Navy, Army and Royal Air Force intelligence services and security intelligence. He will evaluate the intelligence provided by the services... ."

Templer’s biographer notes "The very fact that he (Director) had no executive authority was a positive advantage in his coordinating role. He was free to assess, look ahead and coordinate rather than to administer." Coordination was exercised through a Federation Intelligence Committee, of which the Director of Intelligence was the Chairman. This committee produced briefs and assessments, thereby taking a load off the Special Branch (SB) and worked closely with the Combined Emergency Planning Staff, who used these briefs as the basis for planning operations."25

This gives us an indication of the imperative role intelligence plays. There is another aspect of intelligence coordination from Malaya that should find mention here. Prime role in intelligence machine was the Special Branch, both centrally and in the field. MI officers were appointed to work under the direction of the senior SB officers. Their task was to collate the material produced by Special Branch into a form for army to use, to run the joint army/police operations room, to organise counter-sabotage measures; but not to collect intelligence.

The priority to intelligence in Malaya was such that Sir Gerald ruled that if there was a conflict between the requirements of military operations and the need for strategic intelligence penetration of the enemy, the latter must take precedence.26 In fact the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir in 1994 made the suggestion that "more effort should be laid on ‘Special’ intelligence operations including those of infiltrating militant ranks"27

This is indeed illustrative of India’s efforts, wherein the stress is on intelligence for COIN operations. This assumption is being based on India’s weak penetration capabilities. While sigint is a useful penetrator and has often yielded results, in the insurgency war of cadres and cells, specific information is harder to come by.

The Future

The above clearly highlights the need for clear thinking, joint planning and integrated intelligence assessment. But this can happen only when the unified command is a legislated body with a clearly defined political objective. For this the following steps are needed.

  • By legislative or executive order create a Unified Command with a broad political objective. Its task should be dissemination of information about overall objectives, coordination of security forces operations, intelligence input sharing, and planning.
  • Towards this end, it must be headed by the Chief Minister or Governor, and in command must be an officer titled Adviser (Operations), whose job it is to coordinate operations. The other adviser should be as present - Home. As mentioned earlier, the police should handle "security", meaning law and order. Under the Adviser (Operations) should be a Director (Plans) and Director (Intelligence). They will form nucleus of a joint staff for the command to provide broad guidelines.

As seen above, it is not enough to appoint officers from different branches of government, but the unified command must be headed by a person whose coordinating faculties are above average. As was witnessed in Malaya, Sir Gerald Templer’s real contribution to anti-communist operations was coordination. He not only toned up intelligence, police-political warfare and the armed forces, his principal achievement was as coordinator of all these activities.28

  • The unified command or more appropriately called Joint Command should have representatives from state government, including additional chief secretary (home), state police chief, para-military forces’ DGs, intelligence representatives and so on. But the real input should be to and must come from the joint staff, who should produce plans for operations within the larger objective.
  • Adviser (operations) should be a retired army official or else chief of staff Northern Command. In this sense, the officer is free to provide information on the whole area.
  • The unified command must meet twice a week, more often if necessary. And produce plans that are implementable. Remember political establishments act within their own constraints. Operate within that dynamic.
  • The key remains intelligence. Director (Intelligence) should be Brigadier (equivalent in police) officer whose legislated mission should be to collect and collate information from all sources. From military formations, intelligence agencies and para-military sources. He should only assess and not have authority to make policy.
  • In India, just as the para-military forces erk if they have to work under the army, the intelligence officers will face the same problem. Thus army will not work under the police or special branch (RAW). Rather, instead of all agencies reporting to Delhi, it should be possible to get them to share their information with the Director (Intelligence) in Srinagar?
  • Mission statement, from the centre has to be on the following lines. Kashmir will remain a part of India, with the objective of securing for the people of Jammu and Kashmir a purposeful peace. And the government will endeavour to stem the tide of militancy for which it seeks the cooperation of the people. This the prime minister Atal Behari Vajpayee has done partly in his speech in Parliament on 22 February 2001.29

India faces difficult choices ahead in Kashmir. It must thus put in place a joint command with a mission. Those tasked with the mission must be clear in their minds about the objectives and the final results that will ensue. The outcome of this experiment will serve as an lesson for tackling cross-border terrorism.

As seen above this system has worked in fits and starts. It is supposed to provide a "common meeting point" for the exchange of information. And help in coordination of intelligence sharing. This seems to have rarely happened. What it did do was to occasionally be useful during crisis management, like during Hazrat Bal, but failed during Charar-i-Sharif, both for institutional and personality reasons.

The principle issue is both theoritical and practical. The system titled Unified Command HQ has no command functions.30 And yet the army wanted command and control of all the forces. This was resented by all in the Valley. One perspective on this argues that "command is best left to the leaders of different forces", thus what is needed is a united headquarters, not a command.

"What this means is that each force must function under its respective commander in a manner best suited to its organisation and ethos. At the same time, they must coordinate their actions and respond to an overall plan."31 The concept is sound, but difficult to practice. The security forces are functioning under their heads. Even when the command system came into place, the army and other para-military forces had their own commands and operated in different areas.

In fact, what the army sought was overall operational control of all security forces in the Valley. What is needed is a command system that has dedicated staff, has plans and works with leglislated authority toward a single national objective. Control of forces and unity of effort should flow from this. In a way, how to command authority without creating civil-military infruction and improving military-security forces interface should be the main aim of the unified command.

Any working unified command must be organised to meet local needs and challenges. Several issues relating to civil-military relations have to be sorted out prior to insitutionalising such a system. Indian experience, whether in Assam or in Jammu and Kashmir demonstrates that tension between the para-military forces and the army is the main cause for non-functioning of the unified command. Civil-military relations often bedevil successful counter-insurgency operations at the highest level. This challenge lies at the heart of revitalising the unified command system.

As a coordinating agency, a unified command requires several crucial pre-requisites for functioning smoothly. They require a coordinator whose skills in this field are more important than in any area. The command has to have mandated authority that will help it make decisions that are practical and implementable. The command requires an intelligence unit that collates intelligence rather than makes policy.

Intelligence in the larger counter-insurgency situation must emphasise on strategic penetration of militant groups, whilst ensuring adequate input sharing at the unified command level for operations. This is crucial for in Jammu and Kashmir, experience has shown that it is the ability to penetrate which often results in success.


NOTES

* The Author is currently the Associate Editor, Jawahar Lal Nehru Memorial Fund, at New Delhi.

1. Brigadier Vijai K Nair. Nuclear Terrorism: The South Asian Scene. Aakrosh Asian Journal of Terrorism and Internal Conflict. January 2001, Volume 4, Number 10. pp. 22-23.

2. Rajesh Rajagopalan. ‘Restoring Normalcy’: The Indian Army’s Counter-insurgency Doctrine. Small Wars and Insurgencies. Volume 11, Spring 2000. No. 1. p.62. Kargil Review Committee Report. From Surprise to Reckoning. Sage Publications New Delhi 2000. p. 245 para 13.67 notes that while these unified commands have been working in Assam and J&K for some time now, the problem appears to be frequent tension between army and para-military forces and between the civil and military authorities. "This is an unhappy state of affairs and should not be allowed to linger."

3. Lt Gen Mathew Thomas. Some Thoughts on Command. Indian Defence Review. January 1992. p. 83.

4. David Miller. Battlefield: The Skills of Modern War. London 1990. pp. 116-17.

5. Major General Arjun Ray. Kashmir Dairy: Psychology of Militancy. Manas 1997. p. 185.

6. Dipanker Banerjee. Internal Security In Jammu and Kashmir: An Agenda for the Future. Kanti Bajpai et. al. Delhi Policy Group. March 1999. p. 45.

7. Sumit Ganguly. The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War Hopes of Peace. Woodrow Wilson Centre Press. Cambridge University Press 1997. p. 117.

8. Manoj Joshi. The Lost Rebellion: Kashmir in the Nineties. Penguin Books India 1999. p. 228.

9. Robert G Wirsing. India, Pakistan and the Kashmir Dispute. On Regional Conflict and its Resolution. St Martin’s Press New York 1998, p. 177.

10. Manoj Joshi. op.cit., p. 286-87.

11. Ibid. p. 254 for Hazratbal affair and pp. 352-355 for the burning of Charar-i-Sharif.

12. Lt Gen DD Saklani. Kashmir Saga: A Bundle of Blunders. Lancers 1999. p. 113.

13. Maroof Raza, Wars and No Peace over Kashmir. Lancer Publishers Pvt Ltd. New Delhi 1995. p. 95.

14. Indian Defence Review. Kashmir: An on the spot study summer 1994. Vol. 9(3) July 1994; p. 31. (Hereafter IDR)

15. Wirsing, op.cit.

16. IDR July 1994, op.cit.

17. Indian Defence Review, IDR Comment, Jan-March 1997. Vol. 12 (1). p. 8.

18. Indian Defence Review, IDR Comment Oct-Dec 1997. Vol. 12 (4). p. 7.

19. Harinder Baweja. A Soldier’s Diary, Books Today 1999; pp. 38- 39.

20. Praveen Swami, The Kargil War, Signpost 2 Issues That Matter. Leftword 1999; pp.23-27 for record and minutes of the 19 May meeting.

21. Kargil Review Committee Report. op.cit. p. 245. para 13.66.

22. Brigadier Vijai Nair. Jammu and Kashmir: An Assessment. Agni. Studies in International Strategic Issues. Volume V. No. 1 January-April 2000. pp.60-61)

23. Observations made by author during visit to Kashmir in the summer of 1998.

24. Bhashyam Kasturi. Kargil and the Intelligence Process. Indian Defence Review. July-September 2000. pp. 116-122.

25. John Cloake. Templer, Tiger of Malaya. Harrap: London 1985. p. 229.

26. ibid., p. 230.

27. Girish Saxena. The Realities and Complexities of the Challenges in Kashmir. USI Journal April-June 1994, vol. CXXIV no. 516. p. 147.

28. Cloake, op.cit., p. 251.

29. Text of the PM’s speech on ceasefire extension. (PTI) The Hindu, 23 February 2001. Friday, New Delhi.

30. Arjun Ray. op. cit., p. 185.

31. Dipanker Banerjee. op.cit., p. 44.

 

 

 

 

 

 
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