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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 14, October 21, 2002
 
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Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Fatalities in Terrorist Violence
in India's Northeast - Year 2002
|
|
Assam
|
Manipur
|
Meghalaya
|
Nagaland
|
Tripura
|
Total
|
Cumulative
Total
|
| January |
C |
35
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
18
|
54
|
93
|
| SF |
2
|
4
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
8
|
| T |
17
|
3
|
4
|
6
|
1
|
31
|
| February |
C |
3
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
8
|
12
|
56
|
| SF |
0
|
3
|
5
|
0
|
0
|
8
|
| T |
21
|
4
|
7
|
0
|
4
|
36
|
| March |
C |
0
|
3
|
4
|
0
|
2
|
9
|
56
|
| SF |
0
|
2
|
4
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
| T |
18
|
23
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
41
|
| April |
C |
9
|
11
|
0
|
0
|
17
|
37
|
105
|
| SF |
0
|
10
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
10
|
| T |
28
|
21
|
0
|
0
|
9
|
58
|
| May |
C |
13
|
1
|
3
|
0
|
2
|
19
|
81
|
| SF |
0
|
11
|
0
|
1
|
4
|
16
|
| T |
33
|
10
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
46
|
| June |
C |
18
|
5
|
5
|
0
|
1
|
29
|
82
|
| SF |
4
|
3
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
8
|
| T |
24
|
8
|
2
|
1
|
10
|
45
|
| July |
C |
15
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
13
|
30
|
91
|
| SF |
15
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
6
|
22
|
| T |
35
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
39
|
| August |
C |
3
|
1
|
14
|
3
|
10
|
31
|
92
|
| SF |
4
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
20
|
24
|
| T |
29
|
1
|
1
|
6
|
0
|
37
|
| September |
C |
2
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
6
|
56
|
| SF |
3
|
0
|
7
|
0
|
0
|
10
|
| T |
22
|
9
|
1
|
5
|
3
|
40
|
| October* |
C |
6
|
1
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
9
|
30
|
| SF |
0
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
9
|
9
|
| T |
8
|
4
|
0
|
0
|
0
|
12
|
| Total |
C |
104
|
27
|
28
|
3
|
74
|
236
|
742
|
| SF |
28
|
34
|
18
|
2
|
39
|
121
|
| T |
235
|
85
|
15
|
19
|
31
|
385
|
| Cumulative
Total |
367
|
146
|
61
|
24
|
144
|
742
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* Data till
October 14
NOTE: C=Civilian, SF=Security Force Personnel,
T=Terrorist
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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Armies
withdraw, but peace is a distant dream
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management
Finally, after
over ten months, the largest and most extended mobilization
of forces between India and Pakistan has been called off,
apparently on the grounds that, with the successful execution
of the election process in Jammu & Kashmir (J&K), it had 'served
its purpose'. It is not clear at what stage the electoral
process became a 'purpose' of troop mobilization - which commenced
immediately after the terrorist attack on India's Parliament
on December 13, 2001, and intensified after the Kaluchak massacre
on May 14, 2002 - along the Line of Control (LoC) and International
Border (IB) with Pakistan. The troop mobilization had forced
Pakistan into an expensive mirror deployment of its own forces,
and escalated regional tensions to what was widely perceived
as the 'brink of war' - though coercive diplomacy, rather
than war, had been the intent of the Indian move. The decision
to move troops back from the IB - but not from the LoC - was
taken at a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security on
October 16, after the National Security Advisory Board and
the National Security Council had concluded that the costs
of full-scale deployment were now in excess of the expected
benefits, and continued forward deployment 'may not be the
best option'. Claiming 'vindication' Pakistan has also ordered
a pull-back of its own forces.
The timing and manner of the Indian decision, however, appears
to reinforce the impression that this country's leadership
will remain strictly committed to its posture of passive defense
against Pakistan, and that, in this confrontation, there is
no theory of closure on the Indian side, no end-state that
is being consistently pursued. At various times through the
period of 'full deployment', India had argued that troop withdrawal
would occur only after Pakistan ended the infiltration of
terrorists into J&K, and dismantled the infrastructure of
terrorism on its soil. There is no evidence that either of
these conditions has even partially been met, and though the
J&K elections were successful and secured high rates of popular
participation, it is also significant that these were, by
far, the bloodiest
elections in the State's history. It would appear
that India has exhausted one major policy option without significant
gains, and the initiative has once again been abandoned to
Pakistan's maneuverings.
It is of course the case that the forward deployment was imposing
very significant costs - variously estimated at between Rs.
5 and Rs. 20 billion per month, and unquantifiable losses
in terms of the morale and battle-readiness of troops - on
both sides; but India had the deeper pockets, and Pakistan
was at least being forced to pay some economic price for its
sponsorship of terrorism. There is no substitute strategy
in evidence to inflict a continuous cost, and to debilitate
Pakistan's economy in order to exercise a measure of coercive
pressure to force its military leadership to adhere to the
minimal norms of civilized international conduct. The Indian
'strategy' - if the stop-go measures that pass for policy
here merit this title - appears to invest its entire faith
in the 'international community', the evolving relationship
with the US, and on an inchoate notion of 'coercive diplomacy',
which will eventually have little teeth without hard economic
and military leverage. Clearly, the premise that the electoral
process in J&K would be followed by 'negotiations' is gaining
ground in the absence of a coherently conceived alternative.
Much is, consequently, being read into Indian Prime Minister
Atal Bihari Vajpayee's decision to attend the South Asian
Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) summit at Islamabad
in January 2003, although the Indian government has sought
to project the view that SAARC is a multilateral forum, and
that the occasion would not be allowed to yield space for
an inappropriate discussion of a necessarily bilateral dispute.
Nevertheless, international (read US) pressure to initiate
a process of dialogue is mounting, and the present regime
has displayed a peculiar proclivity for broad theatrical gestures
in the past - a preference that finds frequent resonance in
General Pervez Musharraf's conduct as well (to recall the
dramatics of the famous 'handshake' at Kathmandu during the
SAAR convention last January, reluctantly accepted by Prime
Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee).
Such gestures are not, however, sound basis for policy and
the resolution of conflict between nations, and the very real
equations of power, political will and violence on the ground
will remain the prime determinants of the course of events
in J&K. The 'election' of an unprecedented number of representatives
from Islamist fundamentalist parties to Pakistan's National
Assembly, and to the Provincial Assemblies of the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP) and Baluchistan, moreover, increases
the pressures of radicalization in Pakistan, and will certainly
be exploited by the military dictatorship to ward off international
pressures for effective and drastic action against Pakistan-based
terrorists. America's guarded reaction to the visibly flawed
election process - at wide variance with the European Unions'
sweeping criticism, as well as of strong condemnation within
Pakistan - also indicates that the US will continue to place
its faith in Pakistan's present and predatory regime, at least
in the near term. This bodes ill, not only for "a society
held hostage" within Pakistan, but also for any credible prospects
for a lasting peace and an end to terrorism on the sub-continent.
The
Maoist Maze
Sanjay K. Jha
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
A succession
of recent events along the India-Nepal borders, particularly
in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and West Bengal, has warranted a
rethinking on India's security frontiers with Nepal. There
is an imminent danger that the Maoist
insurgency in Nepal may affect the internal security
scenario in India, with inextricable and strengthening linkages
between the Nepalese Maoists and left-wing extremist groups
- generically referred to as 'Naxalites' - active in different
parts of India.
Following the crackdown in Nepal, Maoist insurgents are
infiltrating into India, mainly through the porous India-Nepal
border in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Uttaranchal, West Bengal
and Sikkim. The 745 kilometer border that Bihar shares with
Nepal has been particularly active in this connection, and
the Bihar police have, of late, arrested a number of Maoist
insurgents, including some prominent leaders, from Sitamarhi,
East Champaran and West Champaran districts bordering Nepal.
Nine Maoist insurgents were arrested by the Bihar police
on September 18 and September 20, 2002. Earlier, in July
2002, three Maoist insurgents were arrested in Madhubani
district.
The arrested Maoists disclosed to the police that several
newly recruited cadres were being given arms training in
special training camps in the forests of Bagha in the West
Champaran district, which have, of late, emerged as a safe
haven for the Nepalese insurgents.
The Bihar police also suspect that one of the top ideologues
of the Nepalese Maoists, Dr. Baburam Bhattarai is hiding
in Bihar. Bhattarai, a product of New Delhi's Jawaharlal
Nehru University (JNU), is believed to have close links
with the Maoist Communist Centre (MCC)
and the People's War Group (PWG).
Reports also suggested that the executive head and Chairman
of the Maoists, Pushpa Kamal Dahal @ Prachanda, had entered
India and held a meeting with the Naxalites at Patna in
May 2002.
After the Bihar's bifurcation, there was a feeling that
most of the left-wing extremism affected districts had gone
to Jharkhand and that the Naxalites had only a limited sphere
of influence in some areas of central Bihar. Succeeding
months, however, have witnessed increased Naxalite activities
in the Northern parts of the State bordering Nepal. The
MCC, which was earlier confined to south (now Jharkhand)
and central Bihar, has extended its activities in Darbhanga,
Madhubani, Sitamarhi, Sheohar, East and West Champaran and
Muzaffarpur districts. All these districts either share
their border with Nepal or are very close to it. On September
22, 2002, a huge quantity of arms and ammunition was recovered
by the police in Muzaffarpur district, following an encounter
with the MCC. Earlier, on September 18, police arrested
three MCC activists at Hayaghat railway station, in Darbhanga
district. The arrest led to the recovery of a landmine.
This was the first time that a landmine had been recovered
from extremists in north Bihar.
Bihar Police sources maintain that the MCC has close links
with the Maoists operating in Nepal, and that the MCC moved
from south and central Bihar to the north to link up with
the Maoists in Nepal, and there are now indications of an
exchange of men and material.
That the Nepalese Maoists have frequently been crossing
over to Bihar and Jharkhand to collaborate with their ideological
counterparts in India is not a recent development. In December
2001, the MCC and the PWG, in their joint meetings held
at an unspecified location in Jharkhand forests, resolved
to support the Moist insurgents in Nepal. In May 2001, a
report indicated that the Union Home Ministry had forwarded
to the Bihar government Nepal's request to flush extremists
who were conducting training camps for Nepali Maoists out
from the State, and noted that there had been a steady trickle
of Nepali Maoists into Bihar's Bhojpur and Aurangabad districts
over the preceding two years. These districts provide an
ideal setting for such camps, as the terrain is hilly and
densely forested.
Apart from Bihar, the northern Indian State of Uttar Pradesh
is also fast emerging as a shelter for the Maoists, particularly
in the border districts of Baharaich and Maharajganj. In
January 2002, the Uttar Pradesh Police seized a truck carrying
arms in Maharajgunj on the Indo-Nepal border. The arms,
procured from Naxalites in eastern UP, were intended for
the Maoists' campaign in Nepal. In April 2002, the UP Police
seized a huge cache of arms in Siddarthnagar near the Indian
border and arrested the couriers, who confessed that the
arms were being sent to the Maoists, and that they had already
delivered three consignments. An increasing number of injured
Maoist soldiers are also sneaking across the border into
Uttar Pradesh for treatment. In May 2002, the police arrested
eight Maoists who had come for medical treatment to Lucknow.
The Maoists are also attempting to establish a network in
north Bengal and Sikkim. Available evidence suggests that
Maoists have been able to penetrate deep into certain border
areas, particularly Darjeeling and Siliguri in north Bengal,
and have been instigating local Nepalese settlers to assert
their 'right to self-determination' in Nepali dominated
areas. The more disturbing trend relates to reports about
Maoist linkages with the Kamtapur Liberation Organisation
(KLO),
which primarily operates in parts of West Bengal and Assam.
The KLO is believed to provide sanctuary to Maoist cadres
fleeing Nepal.
The real significance of the consolidation of linkages between
left-wing extremists in India and Nepal needs to be assessed
within the context of the larger strategy to set up a 'Compact
Revolutionary Zone' extending from Nepal through Bihar and
the Dandakaranya region to Andhra Pradesh. For some time
now, these groups have been trying to work together, and
the Nepalese Maoists, the PWG and the MCC were instrumental
in setting up an umbrella organisation called the Co-ordination
Committee of Maoist Parties and Organisations of South Asia
(CCOMPOSA). The formation of the CCOMPOSA came to light
in a joint statement issued by these organisations on July
1, 2001, which indicated that nine left-wing groups of Nepal,
India Bangladesh and Sri Lanka had joined hands to "unify
and coordinate the activities of the Maoist Parties and
organisations in South Asia."
Coordinated action is now in increasing evidence, and on
January 25, 2002, the Central Committee of the politburo
of Maoist insurgents resolved to launch a campaign against
the proscription of the PWG and the MCC under the Prevention
of Terrorism Act (POTA),
2002. Earlier, they had sent a delegate to the PWG Congress
held in Buzurmad village, in the Dandakaranya forests of
Madhya Pradesh, between March 3 and 22, 2001. At the Congress,
the PWG reportedly resolved to jointly conduct programmes
with the Communist Party of Nepal (Maoist), Communist Party
of the Philippines, Communist Party of Peru and the Communist
Party of Turkey-Marxist-Leninist. An India-Nepal Border
Regional Committee has also been established to 'coordinate'
the activities of the two groups in the border districts
in Bihar.
The Maoist insurgents also have the support of a section
of the substantial Nepalese population living in India.
The Union government banned the Akhil Bhartiya Nepali Ekta
Samaj (ABNES) under the POTA
on July 1, 2002, for its alleged linkages with the Maoists
in Nepal. On September 6, 2002, the police arrested ABNES
secretary, Bamdev Chhettri, an employee at JNU at New Delhi,
for allegedly supporting Maoist insurgents in Nepal.
The idea of a 'compact revolutionary zone' across a significant
swathe of South Asia may, at the present juncture, seem
somewhat fantastical, but the diffuse networks of existing
violence constitute a very serious challenge for security
planners in India and Nepal. Any effective strategy to deal
with the growing and increasingly interlinked networks of
Maoist extremism in the region demands improved operational
co-ordination between the two countries to counter a subversive,
complex and immensely disruptive maze of individuals, groups
and ideologies.
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Weekly Fatalities:
Major conflicts in South Asia
October 14-20, 2002
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Security
Force Personnel
|
Civilian
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
| INDIA |
19
|
24
|
54
|
97
|
| Assam |
0
|
1
|
3
|
4
|
| Jammu &
Kashmir |
14
|
14
|
45
|
73
|
| Manipur |
0
|
1
|
2
|
3
|
| Nagaland |
0
|
2
|
4
|
6
|
| Left-wing Extremism |
5
|
6
|
0
|
11
|
| BANGLADESH |
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
| NEPAL |
4
|
5
|
9
|
18
|
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Provisional data compiled
from English language media sources.
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BANGLADESH
Islamic nationalism
alone can save nation, says former Jamaat chief Azam: Former
chief of the Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, Golam Azam, speaking
at the Bangladesh Itihas Kendra, on October 15, 2002, said that
only complete Islamic nationalism could protect the independence
and sovereignty of the country. Portraying India as a threat
to Bangladesh, he said that those who had very good relations
with it would never be able to save the country. He accused
the Awami League of favouring the interests of the minority
Hindus. Independent
Bangladesh, October 16, 2002.
INDIA
Jammu and Kashmir
brought under Federal rule: The Union government on October
17, 2002, placed Jammu and Kashmir under Governor's rule. The
decision was taken as no party or coalition has staked claim to
form a government in the State thus far. Also, the caretaker government
led by Farooq Abdullah refused to continue as caretaker Chief
Minister after the expiry of the six year-term of the 9th Assembly
after midnight October 17. According to the proclamation issued
from the State capital Srinagar, the Legislative Assembly constituted
on October 13, 2002, shall remain under suspended animation till
such time as this proclamation is revoked or varied in this regard
by a subsequent proclamation. Under federal rule, the Governor
Girish Chandra Saxena has assumed all functions of the State government
and all powers vested in or exercisable by anybody or authority
(other than the powers vested in or exercisable by the High Court).
Daily
Excelsior, October 18, 2002.
Government orders re-deployment of troops from International
Borders: The government on October 16, 2002, decided to re-deploy
troops deployed on the International Border (IB) with Pakistan.
However, the deployment along the Line of Control (LoC) in Jammu
and Kashmir would continue. The Cabinet Committee on Security
(CCS) decided this at a meeting chaired by the Prime Minister
Atal Behari Vajpayee. The CCS decided to withdraw troops following
an interaction, on the same day, between the National Security
Advisory Board (NSAB) and the National Security Council (NSC),
also chaired by the Premier. Basing its recommendations on a 'cost-benefit
analysis' concluded last week, the NSAB told the NSC that continued
full-scale deployment may not be the best option. However, the
government decided not to initiate a dialogue with Pakistan. Speaking
to the media after the meeting, Union Defence Minister, George
Fernandes, said, "We don't interact with Pakistan. There is no
question of a dialogue with Pakistan as long as it supports terrorism."
The
Hindu, October 17, 2002.
Five police personnel killed in landmine blast in Andhra Pradesh:
Five police personnel were killed in a landmine blast triggered
by suspected left-wing extremists-Naxalites-of the People's War
Group (PWG) near Vemavaram village in Guntur district of Andhra
Pradesh on October 14, 2002. New
India Press, October 15, 2002.
PAKISTAN
Pakistan to
withdraw troops from eastern border shortly: The government
after a meeting presided over by President Pervez Musharraf on
October 17, 2002, decided to withdraw troops from its eastern
border in response to a similar announcement made by India on
October 16. "The pullback will commence shortly," a foreign office
spokesperson said in a statement. However, he did not specify
whether all the forces would be redeployed to peacetime locations
or it would be a partial withdrawal. Meanwhile, President Musharraf
said that the withdrawal of Indian troops had vindicated Pakistan's
stance that the only solution to the issues facing India and Pakistan
was through dialogue and not by coercion, belligerence and sabre-rattling.
Dawn,
October 18, 2002.
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The South
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on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare,
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the South Asian region.
SAIR is a project
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and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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