SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 26, January 13, 2003

INDIA

Nagaland: A Very Long War Ends?
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

"There will be no more fighting between Indians and Nagas". With these words, Isak Chisi Swu, the Chairman of the National Socialist Council of Nagalim - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM), declared that India's longest insurgency - extending over five decades - was approaching an end, and that a 'peaceful settlement' of this thorny problem was within sight in the present phase of 'unconditional talks' at Delhi. The present negotiations are the first to be held on Indian soil in a peace process which commenced with the declaration of a ceasefire in 1997.

While the hard core of negotiations on substantive issues will be addressed through the current week, the Delhi talks have already achieved much that was unprecedented. For one thing, the delegation of Naga rebels, including Swu and the NSCN-IM's General Secretary, Thuingaling Muivah, agreed to travel to India on Indian passports. After discussions with India's Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Defence, as well as other leaders, both in the ruling coalition and the opposition parties, their public pronouncements have reflected little of the intransigence and hostility of the past, and Swu has emphasised the 'accommodative spirit' on both sides of the present negotiations. Significantly, the insurgent group has given an assurance that it would neither participate nor interfere in the impending Legislative Assembly elections in Nagaland, scheduled for February 26, 2003.

Nevertheless, Swu has been explicit that the NSCN-IM has not abandoned its demand for 'self-determination', and has also reiterated the position that 'there is no greater or smaller Nagaland', and that Nagaland is 'the place of their (Nagas') natural habitation and they are asking for nothing more and nothing less.' This position is irreconcilable with that of the other States of India's Northeast that share boundaries with Nagaland, and who reject the redrawing of maps in the region, and any transfer of Naga majority areas to a 'greater' Nagaland. The June 14, 2001, decision on the extension of the ceasefire agreement between the NSCN-IM and the Government 'without geographical boundaries' had resulted in widespread protests and violence, because it raised apprehensions that this constituted an implicit recognition of a Naga title to contiguous areas in which they constituted a numerical majority. In Manipur, protestors against the extension of the ceasefire torched the Chief Minister's Office, the State Assembly, and a number of other Government buildings, and 18 demonstrators lost their lives in police firing in June 2001. The 'without geographical boundaries' clause was subsequently dropped on July 27, 2001, and, with status quo ante restored, the ceasefire remained effective within the State of Nagaland alone.

The Government of India had prevailed on all other States to drop all charges against Swu and Muivah to facilitate their arrival in India for the current phase of talks, but has failed to convince the Manipur government to follow suit. Indeed, Manipur Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh has threatened to arrest the NSCN-IM leaders 'if they set foot on Manipur soil'. Singh blamed the insurgent group for 'large scale extortion, looting and other unlawful activities'. Manipur had issued an arrest warrant against Muivah in April 1994 and announced a cash reward of Rs. 300,000 for information leading to his capture, and the warrant is still in force. On their part, the NSCN-IM leaders have directed both their military and civil wings to 'be on full alert' in case of a breakdown of the ongoing peace process.

It is, at this stage, premature to speculate on the outcome of the Delhi negotiations, beyond an assessment of these broad trends. It is useful, nonetheless, to consider the potential impact of a successful resolution of the complicated and intractable problem of the Naga rebellion.

The Naga movement is often described as the 'mother of all insurgencies' in India's Northeast, not only because of the magnitude and persistence of violence, but because Naga factions have directly supported numerous other insurgent groups and violent formations operating in other States of the region by providing them arms, training, and temporary access to their camps and safe-havens in neighbouring countries. A multiplicity of terrorist and insurgent groups in the Northeast were thus nursed through their infancy by the Naga factions, and many of these still retain strong linkages with these groups. This is certainly the case with the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), Assam's largest insurgent group, which has had cooperative relations both with the NSCN-IM and its rival Khaplang faction, the NSCN-K. The NSCN-IM also currently extends its support to the Karbi National Volunteers (KNV) and the Dima Halim Daogah (DHD) in Assam; the Bru National Liberation Front (BNLF) in Mizoram; and the Achik National Volunteers Council (ANVC) in Meghalaya, among others. Evidently, if a peaceful resolution is arrived at on the Naga question, this would impact directly on the operational capabilities of these groups, which stand to lose the support of an extensive infrastructure of camps, cross-border safe havens, and supply routes for arms and ammunition, as well as the advantages of joint operations that have been undertaken in the past.

A peaceful settlement would also have a strong demonstration effect on many of the groups that are currently in, or on the verge of entering into, a negotiation process with the Government of India. The NSCN-K, is already engaged in a peace process, and its chief, S.S. Khaplang, is asking for safe passage to India later this year to initiate talks. Khaplang is currently based in Myanmar. A ceasefire has been in place between the Union Government and the NSCN-K since April 29, 2001, though formal talks are yet to commence.

The ANVC in Meghalaya is also due to commence negotiation with the Centre, and talks could commence as soon as early February, as the ANVC has expressed the desire to hold talks before the next Assembly Elections scheduled for February 26.

The Bodo Liberation Tigers (BLT), who operate in the Bodo dominated areas along the banks of the river Brahmaputra in Northwest Assam, are already negotiating the formation of a Bodo Territorial Council which would give them substantial autonomy for local self-governance in over 3,000 villages (the current number proposed for the BTC is 3,070 villages, but the BLT seeks the inclusion of another 93 villages).

The DHD also declared a six month ceasefire, commencing January 1, 2003, to set the stage for a negotiated settlement on its demands and grievances, and the United People's Democratic Solidarity (UPDS), a formation that emerged out of the merger of the KNV and the Karbi People's Front (KPF), and which operates primarily in the Karbi Anglong district of Assam, has also come forward for talks.

The most recalcitrant of extremist organisations in the Northeast are the ULFA and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB), the two groups that have been responsible for the largest number of killings in the region in recent years. The groups have a strong operational relationship, and have remained fairly inflexible on their separatist agenda. Nevertheless, both organisations have in the past, made conditional offers of talks with the Government. Positive signals from the Naga peace talks may well create conditions that push these groups into a peace process as well.

There are, however, significant dangers. The insurgencies of India's Northeast now comprehend a wide range of violent and criminal activities that have become an integral part of the survival of the irregular armed forces that have sustained anti-state movements. The withdrawal of the NSCN-IM from the arena of anti-state violence could create a vacuum that any other opportunistic group or breakaway faction could seek to occupy - this was precisely what happened after the peace settlement of 1975 with the Naga National Council (NNC), at that time the dominant rebel Naga group, when the mantle of rebellion was seized by the breakaway NSCN, which rejected the settlement. Such a space could also be occupied by other existing insurgent groups - most prominently, ULFA - that have recently been seeking to create an umbrella organisation of all insurgent groups in the Northeast, such as the United Liberation Front of the Seven Sisters (ULFSS) that was formed in the context of the opposition to the NSCN-IM's quest for a 'greater Nagalim'.

The success of the talks with the NSCN-IM leadership could, moreover, expose the state to a deeper and more insidious danger. There is an increasing trend of small, often obscure and politically unrepresentative groups resorting to brutal violence and terrorism, and, through this process, being thrust into the centrestage of democratic politics as the state engages with them towards a negotiated settlement. Indeed, there is a widespread sense today that the Indian Government only listens to the violent, and that if (and only if) you kill a sufficient number people, you will be invited to honourable negotiations with the highest offices of the land. If one insurgent group can create a pathway to power along this route (something that has already happened in Mizoram) there is significant probability of generating a rash of copycat aspirants who will come to regard the gun as a useful instrument to short circuit the tedious, uncertain, and often unrewarding processes of democratic selection. This dynamic will certainly, and already has, put democratic forces at a distinct disadvantage in the competition for political power.

INDIA

Manipur Rebels: Timing an Assault
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati

In one of their biggest-ever offensives, an estimated 500-strong army of separatist Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF) rebels engaged Indian security forces last week for a fierce 36-hour gun-battle in the Northeastern State of Manipur, close to the border with Myanmar, in a development that can have serious bearings on the region's political and security scenario. The gun-battle began around 11.30 AM on January 8, after five companies of the paramilitary Border Security Force (BSF), numbering around 400 fighting men, advanced on the rebel stronghold of Sajik Tampak, 100 kilometres south-east of Imphal, capital of Manipur, following intelligence reports that the guerrillas were planning to attack their camp. The BSF sought to seize the initiative instead of waiting for the rebels to strike.

Senior BSF officials who oversaw the operations, including Imphal-based Deputy Inspector General P.K. Misra, informed this writer that the rebels launched the attack first as the BSF troopers were climbing a hill in course of their advance. The BSF men, still climbing, were still not in position when the initial burst of fire came from the rebels. A significant aspect of this attack was the profile of weaponry used by the rebels. The list included: Chinese-made M-80 grenades, rocket launchers, mortars, universal machine guns, an assortment of trajectory weapons, besides para bombs. BSF officials indicated that this was the first time that rebels in Manipur have used para bombs that are fired to illuminate a battle zone.

Assistant Commandant Vivek Saxena and constable Harendar Yadav of the 2nd Battallion died in the early stages of the battle on Wednesday. BSF officials said that at least five to ten rebels had also died in retaliatory fire. The final toll according to the BSF is: two BSF men killed, and two missing, while eight to twelve rebels may have died. The rebels, however, claim that there has been no casualty on their side and that they have killed six BSF troopers. The BSF denies the rebels' no-casualty claim, saying, "We have intercepted desperate radio messages from the rebels asking their colleagues to rush doctors, bandages and other medicines." Radio intercepts by security agencies in Manipur suggest that two BSF men, a head constable and a constable, are alive in rebel custody. The BSF is probing the possibilities either of the two soldiers being held hostage, or of having deserted from the Force to join the militants.

Claims and counter-claims go on. While the BSF says the rebels were forced to retreat after three more companies were pressed into action, the rebels say the soldiers 'fled' the scene of the battle, about 40 KM short of the Myanmar's south-western border.

Understanding why the MPLF, an umbrella group of three of the most powerful insurgent groups in the Manipur Valley-the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK) and the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF)-decided to launch an attack on Indian security forces in such a big way, and at this point of time, is crucial. Sporadic attacks on security forces or other symbols of Indian governmental authority are no big news in Manipur, where as many as 17 rebel groups are currently active (a dozen others exist, but are dormant). But, when a group like the MPLF plans or launches a coordinated and massive attack on the security forces, the event demands a closer look.

The timing of the attack is indeed significant. The gun-battle began hours before the two topmost leaders of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah faction), chairman Isak Chishi Swu, and general secretary Thuingaleng Muivah, were to arrive in New Delhi from Europe, at a crucial stage of the ongoing Naga peace talks. The Meitei rebel groups in Manipur are bitter rivals of the NSCN-IM. Claiming to represent Meitei nationalism and fighting for an independent Manipur, the MPLF, like the common Meiteis in the Manipur Valley, are strongly opposed to the dismemberment of their State as a means to solve the Naga problem. There is a lurking fear that New Delhi may come to accept the NSCN-IM's demand for the integration of all Naga-inhabited areas in the Northeast into a new politico-administrative set up, or merge these with the existing State of Nagaland. There are large Naga inhabited areas in Manipur (four districts in Manipur are dominated by Nagas), Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. The NSCN-IM leaders have now articulated a position that there is 'nothing like a greater Nagaland or a smaller Nagaland', asserting that Nagaland is one, and is a place of habitation of the Nagas. This is, at best, an ambiguous formulation, that creates the space for doubts whether the NSCN-IM would shed its demand for the integration of the Naga areas in the region into a unified 'Nagalim'.

Within this context, it could be the MPLF's intent to send out a message to New Delhi and the world that it remains a force to reckon with in Northeast India's insurgency theatre, and that the Indian Government would be ill-advised to ignore it, or to disregard the views of the majority Meiteis in Manipur, while working out a deal with the Nagas. This apart, the MPLF could also be trying to suggest that they hold sway over large parts of the Manipur Valley, and can take on a regular army of forces like the BSF, which are engaged in counter-insurgency operations in the troubled border State. The Meiteis have made it repeatedly and abundantly clear that they will not part even with 'an inch of our territory', and the June 2001 uprising in Imphal - which resulted in the death of 18 protestors in police firing - is still fresh in their minds. Insurgent groupings like the MPLF capitalize on local sentiments, even as they engage in actions to consolidate their sway and boost the morale of their cadres.

W hatever be the actual motive for this raid, the incident has brought to light a highly disturbing reality - that India's border with Myanmar, at least in the Manipur sector, is totally unguarded. Manipur has a nearly 300 kilometre-long long border with Myanmar and, except for a thin security presence in the commercial township of Moreh, the entire stretch remains unguarded, giving the rebels a free run of the place. It is, consequently, not difficult to explain how the MPLF, which runs its training center near Sajik Tampak, could muster an army of 500 fighters to take on the BSF in that area. It is also not difficult to find out how such heavy military hardware was making its way into Manipur. As a top BSF official said: "Unless a dedicated force is deployed to guard the Indo-Myanmar border, battling the insurgents in the Manipur Valley will always continue to be a difficult exercise." Putting a halt to the trans-border movement of rebels is a must if insurgency is to be contained in Manipur - and indeed, in all of India's Northeast.

SRI LANKA

Translating Confidence into Consensus
Guest Writer: Tyrol Ferdinands
Managing Trustee, INPACT (Initiative for Political & Conflict Transformation), Colombo

The fourth round of talks between the government of Sri Lanka and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Thailand that ended on January 9, 2003 marks a new phase in the peace process. A series of confidence building measures, commencing with a ceasefire almost thirteen months ago, had led to a convivial atmosphere at each round of negotiations. However, where earlier rounds had always ended on a high note of agreement on all issues, the current talks - while marking important milestones on human rights, issues particular to women and their participation and a focus on humanitarian issues - nevertheless saw the two sides agreeing to disagree for the first time. The important sub-committee on de-escalation & normalisation (SDN) stands frozen, pointing to the gap between negotiations at the top and realities on the ground. The time has now come for hard bargaining on the 'messy' nitty gritty that will take the contenders from confidence in each other towards building consensus, not only between the negotiating parties, but with the various other power centres and stakeholders as well.

The earlier phases of talks in 2002 had taken a pragmatic approach reflecting the ground realities, instead of polemical arguments based on a vision for a final settlement around structures and systems. 'Lets start with what we have, not what we want' - seemed to be the approach on both sides, and LTTE demands, such as an interim administration for the North East, which could have led to a constitutional minefield, were successfully sidestepped. It is now quite clear that such an approach, while crucial for the initial stage of talks, would not suffice as a basis for a durable and lasting peace.

Another connected issue is that the motivation for the momentum that had gathered (on both sides) was economic. And not only was a solution being sought on economic imperatives, it is evident that the response will also be economic. The effectiveness of a primarily economic response to an identity-based conflict, however, is a highly questionable theory of change in the light of international experience.

The Oslo talks of early December led to a breakthrough in terms of identifying the principles around which a final solution would be built. For the first time, a Sri Lankan government explicitly committed itself to a federal solution with the LTTE, indicating its willingness to explore such an outcome. But no two federal systems are alike, and the current discussion will have to be placed in the political realities that are particular to the Sri Lankan context. The challenges these create include:

• how the LTTE with an administration, army and navy of its own would be accommodated and integrated into such a federal system;
• how the needs and aspirations of local regional minorities will be accommodated and guaranteed;
• and the manner in which power would be shared at the centre while devolving it to the periphery so as to avoid an irreversible separatist tendency.

It is, consequently, natural that many difficult issues would emerge, and that a phase of hard bargaining would commence immediately after such a framework had been identified.

The issue that raised the present controversy was connected to high security zones (HSZ) of the Sri Lanka Army (SLA) in the Jaffna peninsula, and the resettlement of refugees within these zones. The nature of the SLA presence in Jaffna is problematic even from a military standpoint, since it has no garrisons or barracks, and large areas, including houses, schools and places of worship, were occupied to form HSZ's. In fact 18 per cent of the land area (some of it densely populated or covering rich agricultural land) of 880 square kilometres (amounting to 160 square kilometres) is occupied by the army. The LTTE wants all refugees resettled, and the SLA had demanded a decommissioning of LTTE arms in return.

The SLA contention that the HSZs involved an issue of military security was, no doubt, valid, since any changes to the HSZs would affect the military balance that was frozen by the ceasefire agreement. But, given the reality of thousands of refugees eager to return home after an year of no war, it is one of human security as well. The LTTE has conceded the issue of the HSZs, at least for the moment, agreeing to the resettlement of refugees whose homes are outside HSZs as a first step. The real underlying issue, however, is that, while government forces exercise military control in the Jaffna peninsula, it is the LTTE that exerts political control.

The LTTE's reluctance to consider, at this stage, any surrender or decommissioning of arms, is a pointer to its dominant psychology of the use of force as a matter of course. It is also, however, a clear response to the notorious reputation that Sri Lanka has as a reform-resistant state. Not only have earlier deals with the Tamil community been reneged upon, but two rebellions led by Sinhala youth in the past were also crushed militarily, with no remedial reforms undertaken to deal with the issues that could have redressed the causes of conflict, and thereby ensured non-recurrence. There is a latent feeling in the whole country that a group can get noticed and be effective only if and when it takes recourse to arms.

If dual control in the Jaffna peninsula is a major contradiction that could send the peace process into a tailspin, the dual power centres in the south [with a Peoples Alliance (PA) Executive President and a United National Front (UNF) government] would appear to create the opportunity for ensuring a sustainable peace. The LTTE's agreement to explore a federal solution to the conflict must be seen alongside its deep scepticism of the United National Front government's ability to deliver on any such substantive political settlement. This is especially so in view of the acrimonious politics of the south, where the UNF and PA continue to undermine each other, with no hope of significant state reforms securing the required two-thirds majority in Parliament. It has even been suggested that the LTTE agreed to explore a federal option, being fairly sure that the parties in the south would never agree on, and be able to deliver, such a solution.

Political will has taken Sri Lanka out of the mire of war and created an atmosphere where a settlement can be explored. Will political consensus be given a chance to lead to a sustainable peace?