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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 39, April 14, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Iraq Aftermath:
Wishful Thinking
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict
Management
As the US
led campaign in Iraq enters the mopping up and consolidation
stage, it is becoming clear even to the more obtuse in India
and Pakistan that things have changed; that, even when the
Coalition entered Iraq, ignoring the cacophonic and quarrelsome
'international community' and the United Nations, the strategic
architecture of Asia, indeed, of the world, had been transformed.
This is now being clearly realized even by the leaders of
Islamist terrorist groups, who recognize the possibility
of a shift of American attention from Iraq to other areas
of potential terrorist threat to the national interests
of the world's 'hyperpower'. Nevertheless, it is apparent
that groups based in Pakistan believe that they will still
be able to conceal themselves in the interstices of 'plausible
deniability' and the complexity of the South Asia situation.
As Hafiz Mohammad Saeed, the head of the banned Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT,
now rechristened Jamaat-ud-Dawaa to get around the letter
of the law), declared in an interview to The Friday Times,
"Pakistan will not be next. Saudi Arabia and then Iran,
possibly Syria will come first. Pakistan is a nuclear power,
is very close to China, and is a nation of jehadis. This
should avert disaster for some time."
This, according to Saeed, is time enough for a consolidation
of the jehad: "We must fight against the evil trio of America,
Israel and India," he says, "the need for jehad against
India is paramount," adding further that "a suicide attack
is the best form of jehad."
Saeed is not alone in his convictions. Indeed, Indian intelligence
sources are abuzz with information on an estimated 4,500
jehadi assembled at launching pads in Pakistan Occupied
Kashmir (PoK), ready to infiltrate into the Indian State
of Jammu & Kashmir as the snows melt on the high altitude
passes along the Line of Control (LoC).
At the same time, a strident competition for American attention
has commenced between Islamabad and Delhi, with the latter
projecting a muddled case for 'pre-emptive strikes' against
Pakistan. The Indian case argues that pre-emption against
Pakistan was an even more urgent imperative than action
against Iraq, since Pakistan is in unarguable possession
of weapons of mass destruction; has been guilty of proliferation
of missile and nuclear technologies (with supplies to and
from North Korea); and is a supporter and sponsor of terrorism
- if not, indeed, itself a terrorist state.[India has maintained
a degree of ambiguity on whether it is the US, or its own
Forces, that are to execute the pre-emptive strikes. If
it is the latter, this can be little more than adventurist
bluster - after fifty years of pursuing a policy of military
parity on its western borders, India does not have the overwhelming
superiority that an effective and definitive pre-emptive
strike would require.] Pakistan
has responded with a call for pre-emptive strikes against
India for the latter's supposed 'failure' to implement the
UN Resolution on Kashmir.
Pakistan has, however, kept all its apparent options open.
The Pakistani state's manifest intent to continue with the
campaign of terrorism, and its missile and nuclear proliferation
programmes has been repeatedly emphasised in recent pronouncements.
There is, of course, a degree of divergence between the
tactical perspectives of the Islamist fundamentalist and
terrorist groups, on the one hand, and those of President
Musharraf, on the other. While the former seek action against
the 'enemies of Islam' now, Musharraf has repeatedly insisted
that it is necessary for Pakistan and the Muslim Ummah to
make strategic accommodations, till they have acquired sufficient
power to confront and defeat the 'enemy'. There is little
evidence, however, of any radical divergence in the identity
of the 'enemy', or, indeed, of their eventual strategic
goals. Repeating much of his September 19, 2001, speech
- notorious for the parallel he drew between the tactical
arrangement the Prophet Muhammad entered into "with the
Jewish tribes" under the Charter of Madina (Meesaq-e-Madina),
and the short term imperatives of a Pakistani accommodation
of US interests - General Musharraf, in a speech at a 'Grand
Assembly of the Tribal Jirga' at Peshawar on April 10, 2003,
once again reiterated the need to build up Pakistan's and
the Muslim Ummah's military and economic power before "showing
eyes to the world" (an Urdu expression indicating the display
of aggressive or hostile intent).
Both extremes of the Indian and the Pakistani position represent
a high measure of wishful thinking and a failure, not only
of intelligence, but even of the ability to read some of
the obvious lessons of the war in Iraq. Underlying both
positions is an implicit acceptance that South Asia is now
far more vulnerable to manipulation by the US on the Kashmir
issue. Pakistan is explicitly pushing for an enhanced US
role, while India seeks to initiate another round of coercive
diplomacy to which it believes it owes some past successes.
And while the leadership in Pakistan believes that it can
continue indefinitely to play on its 'frontline' status
in the war against terrorism, even as it exploits all available
ambiguities, the Indian leadership is yet to display the
requisite measure of maturity and confidence in their country's
democratic system and credentials. In sum, both nations
remained substantially trapped in the power equations and
ideologies of the Cold War, and of their own fractious history.
More significant, however, is the failure to recognize the
impact of the unprecedented events in Iraq. Not only has
the Coalition campaign in Iraq completely revised the character
and rules of warfare in perpetuity, it has put every authoritarian
regime in the world on notice. The collapse of the regime
in Iraq reflected, equally, the collapse of a way of thinking.
Witnessing the fallen statues and torn portraits of Saddam
Hussein - beaten with shoes, spat upon, hammered, torched
and shredded - every tyrant and dictator in Asia will have
seen his own image and experienced a wrenching spasm of
dread. In the vanishing myth of the prowess of the Iraqi
Republican Guards, the fidayeen, and the rumoured
armies of Arab mujahiddeen who were to rise and exact
vengeance on the invading 'infidel', the hollowness and
predestined failure of the Islamist terrorist enterprise
has been exposed: terrorists can kill; their supporters
and sponsors can inflict great suffering on the innocent;
but - confronted finally, with clear determination - they
cannot win. The authoritarian regimes of the Islamic world
have long been threatened by Islamist extremism within segments
of their own citizenry - and they have sought to channelise
this incendiary potential away from themselves, and into
terrorist movements across the world. They will now confront
another and rising threat from those whom they oppress;
those who reject their tyranny, their denial of individual
freedom, and the enslavement of entire societies through
institutionalised terror; those, in other words, who now
demand liberty and democracy. The odious tyrannies that
have emasculated the world of Islam and sapped its greatest
civilisations of their creativity, their dynamism, and their
abilities to deal with the universe of continuous transformations
and diversity that we live in, are now all under imminent
threat - and Pakistan is no exception. Dictatorships - or,
less offensively expressed, authoritarian forms of government
- have long been peddled as the institutional arrangement
more uniquely suited to the character of the populations
in the 'Muslim world'. But Iraq - and before it, Afghanistan
- had already given us irrefutable evidence and stirring
images that freedom is desired by all mankind. The eventual
outcome of the war in Iraq will, however, be determined
by the success of post-war arrangements, more specifically,
of the establishment and efficacy of a successor system
based on democracy.
Returning to the subcontinent, it is essential for the political
leadership of this region to understand that Indian democracy
- with all its imperfections and failures - is on the right
side of history; and Pakistan, with its fundamentals based
on an ideology of hatred and religious exclusion, is not.
And to understand that it is myopic, and will eventually
prove entirely counterproductive, to constantly seek international
- and particularly US - intervention for the resolution
of a problem that can and must be solved within the region,
and within the enveloping context of the movement of history.
West Bengal: Fratricidal
Confrontation
Guest Writer: Pinaki
Bhattacharya
Special Correspondent, Kolkata, Mathrubhumi
Internecine
feuds have broken out within the ranks of the Kamtapur Peoples'
Party (KPP), potentially threatening its existence, and
indeed its status as a spearhead for the demand for a separate
state carved out of the northern reaches of West Bengal
and parts of Western Assam. In a dramatic move on March
9, 2003, the party unseated its sitting president, Atul
Roy, and elected Nikhil Roy as a replacement. Nikhil Roy
had been hiding from the authorities for a long time and
was 'appointed' president while he was 'underground'. He
eventually surrendered to the West Bengal police on March
17. KPP insiders say that the undeclared battle for supremacy
between the two camps has confused and divided the rank
and file.
KPP demands that a separate state be created out of the
Rajbongshi community dominated areas of Coochbehar, Jalpaiguri,
Darjeeling, north and south Dinajpur and Malda districts
of West Bengal, and four contiguous districts of Assam -
Kokrajhar, Bongaigaon, Dhubri and Goalpara. Rajbongshis
belong to the scheduled caste category and are socially
and economically backward, even though they were the original
settlers in large parts of north Bengal.
The differences between the two leaders, Atul Roy and Nikhil
Roy, have been brewing for a long time, with roots traced
back to 2001, when Nikhil Roy had made certain independent
moves including the formation of a Coordination Committee
of Kamtapuri organisations, and the call for a 72-hour bandh
in March that year without the knowledge of the then president
of the KPP, Atul Roy.
In turn, resentment against Atul Roy had also been brewing,
ostensibly because of his "unilateral" acts, such as the
dissolution of the Coochbehar and Jalpaiguri district committees
of the party in 2001, and the planning of a joint sit-in
with the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM) in Kolkata the same
year. Atul Roy's greatest failure was possibly his unsuccessful
attempt to get the Election Commission's recognition for
the party on the eve of the State legislature polls in West
Bengal in 2001. The party also failed to garner substantial
mass support even in areas of its influence, though it had
contested the polls, flaunting an informal adjustment with
Trinamool Congress.
This time around, on the eve of the forthcoming Panchayat
(village and local council) polls in West Bengal, the KPP
has declared that it is willing to tie-up with any national
party opposed to the ruling Left Front in the State. This
willingness to join any available bandwagon has sown ideological
confusion within the KPP. Added to that is the 'surrender'
drama that Nikhil Roy staged, and that attracted criticism
from sympathisers of the party who suspect that Roy took
the decision in response to West Bengal Chief Minister,
Buddhadeb Bhattacharya's call to all Rajbongshi activists
to come 'overground' and join the mainstream.
On the other hand, the new KPP president has reportedly
claimed that he surrendered to the West Bengal police after
extensive consultations with the 'central committee' members
of the party. The aim of the action, he apparently claimed,
was to galvanise the party organisation in the run up to
local bodies election.
But KPP watchers in the State feel that this leadership
row will only help the Communist Party of India - Marxist
(CPI-M) led Left Front to consolidate its hold in these
fractious parts of north Bengal. Some State government functionaries
are even applauding themselves over the successes their
'strategy' has notched up. They feel that the two-pronged
campaign launched by the West Bengal Chief Minister, Buddhadeb
Bhattacharya - of addressing the long held feeling of alienation
amongst the Rajbongshis through political and administrative
measures at one level; and isolating and eliminating the
armed militant threat of the more hardened Kamtapur Liberation
Organisation (KLO)
cadres at another - has produced dividends.
The security agencies in the State, however, fear that the
KLO may yet try to mount operations on the eve of the Panchayat
polls, essentially to take advantage of the leadership crisis
in the KPP ranks, and thus re-establish the KLO's domination.
Security agencies are, however, satisfied with the fact
that most of the top leaders of the banned KLO have been
put behind bars, with the exception of Jibon Roy, who is
still at large.
An interesting facet of this internal conflict in the KPP
is the sub-regional influences that have come into play.
The people of Jalpaiguri - educationists, intellectuals,
politicians and government servants - have traditionally
provided the ideological leadership of the Kamtapur movement,
even though Coochbehar had the highest number of Rajbongshis
in the State. But with the rise of Atul Roy and his followers
within the KPP, this locus of intra-party influence had
subtly shifted to those hailing from the Shiliguri sub division
of Darjeeling district. This was also the time when the
so-called 'middle-classisation' of the movement took place.
The clock has now been turned back, so to speak. Nikhil
Roy's main support base stems from the Coochbehar and Jalpaiguri
districts, while Atul Roy dominant status in Shiliguri has
been challenged by such prominent KPP members of the area
like Panchanan Singha and Lalit Barman. The two not only
attended the 'central committee' meeting of March 9, convened
at the Nikhil Roy's urging, which witnessed Atul Roy's downfall,
but were also included in the newly constituted 'central
committee' as members.
Reports also indicate that the KLO also appears to be in
its last throes, with its mentor, the United Liberation
Front of Assam (ULFA)
rife with centrifugal pressures and other exogenous influences,
including the loss of a secure habitat. At the moment, approximately
50 members of the KLO are active and remain in refuge in
the jungles of Bhutan. But with the Bhutanese monarchy under
severe pressure from New Delhi to evict these elements,
time may fast be running for the remaining rump of the KLO
and their fellow travelers. What remains to be seen is whether
the mainstream political elements can fill the vacuum left
by the retreat of extremist forces. An opportunity missed
at this juncture may prove expensive in the future.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts
in South Asia
April 7-13, 2003
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Civilian
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Security
Force Personnel
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Terrorist
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Total
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BANGLADESH
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3
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0
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1
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4
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INDIA
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Assam
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4
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0
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5
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9
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Bihar
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3
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0
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0
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3
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Jammu
&
Kashmir
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10
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0
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27
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37
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Left-wing
Extremism
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5
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0
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0
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5
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Manipur
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0
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0
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4
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4
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Meghalaya
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0
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0
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1
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1
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Nagaland
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0
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2
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1
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3
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Tripura
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8
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0
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0
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8
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Total (INDIA)
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30
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2
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38
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70
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* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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INDIA
Planner
of March 23-Nadimarg massacre arrested in J&K:
The Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) Police on April
10, 2003, arrested a 'district commander' of
the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) group, who is alleged
to have planned the March 23-massacre of 24
Kashmiri Pandits (descendants of Brahmin priests)
at Nadimarg village in Pulwama district. Director
General of J&K Police A.K. Suri said in Srinagar
that the terrorist, identified as Zia Mustafa
alias Abdullah Omar, was a resident of Rawalakote
in Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). Suri said
Mustafa had planned the massacre at the instructions
of 'divisional commander' Abu Omair, who reportedly
had orders from his top leadership to avenge
the killing of Muslims during the 2002 riots
in the western Indian State of Gujarat. In addition
to being the 'district commander', Mustafa had
also reportedly been operating as the 'financial
chief' in Anantnag. Daily
Excelsior, April 11, 2003.
KLA releases abducted German NGO activist
in Manipur: The proscribed Kuki Liberation
Army (KLA) released the German non-governmental
organisation (NGO) activist, Henrich Wolfgang,
on April 9, 2003, at an undisclosed location
in Imphal East, after holding him captive for
18 days. Wolfgang, along with church leaders
and human rights activists, reached Imphal's
United NGO's Mission office. Quoting a KLA spokesperson,
reports said no ransom was taken for his release.
Wolfgang, a representative of the German church
development agency, Evangelishcher Entwicklungsdienst
(EED) was abducted on March 23 near Moirangpurel
village in Manipur. Northeast
Tribune, April 10, 2003.
NEPAL
Government
and Maoist insurgent leaders hold goodwill talks:
Goodwill talks between the Government and Maoist
insurgents were held on April 13, 2003. Government
chief negotiator Narayan Singh Pun met with
the full team of the rebel negotiators led by
Baburam Bhattarai. The talks commenced soon
after the Government released two central committee
members of the Maoists, Krishna Dhoj Khadka
and Rekha Sharma. The insurgents have demanded
that the Government set free five senior leaders
and, thus, create a congenial atmosphere for
the proposed peace talks. The Government is
expected to release insurgent leaders, Bamdev
Chettri, Rabindra Shrestha and Mumaram Khanal,
reports added. Nepal
News, April 13, 2003.
PAKISTAN
Australia
bans Jaish-e-Mohammed and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi: Australia has
included six more groups, including the Pakistan-based Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), in its list of proscribed
terrorist organisations. These groups have been linked to major
terrorist activities in recent years, Attorney-General Daryl
Williams said on April 11, 2003. The JeM and the LeJ have been
blamed for the abduction-cum-murder of US journalist Daniel
Pearl in Pakistan during the year 2002. The other four groups
are reportedly based in Lebanon, Egypt, Yemen, and Uzbekistan.
Jang,
April 12, 2003.
Lashkar-e-Toiba denies role in March-23 massacre of Kashmiri
Pandits: The Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) on April
11, 2003, denied Indian reports that it was responsible for
the March 23-massacre of 24 Kashmiri Pandits (descendants of
Brahmin priests) at the Nadimarg village in Pulwama district
of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. Abu Osama, a LeT spokesperson,
said in a statement, "Mujahideen of Lashkar-e-Taiba never attack
innocents and unarmed. We did not kill Pandits… We have definite
reports that Indian agencies are behind the massacre to defame
the Muslim freedom fighters and ongoing struggle in Kashmir."
He added, "The charge is a bundle of lies... We assure Kashmiri
Pandits that we are not involved in the killing, as per the
principles of Islam. Protecting minority community members is
part of our duty." Jang,
April 12, 2003.
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