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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 44, May 19, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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J&K: The Small Print - Is Infiltration
Up? Down? Just Middling? And Does It Really Matter?
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Special Correspondent, Frontline
Ask any politician,
lawyer, or second-hand car salesman: truth resides in the
small print, and the world works on the assumption that
people won't read it.
The fate of this summer's India-Pakistan détente lies, quite
obviously, in detail, not grand gesture. India has made
it plain that no serious dialogue is possible without an
end to cross-border terrorism. Pakistan has responded by
insisting that there is none. India, like much of the world,
seems deeply confused about how seriously to take the word
of Pakistan's military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf.
Speaking in Bangalore on May 13, India's Defence Minister,
George Fernandes, said that infiltration was "looking down"
for now, although he was careful to add that it this "does
not mean tomorrow it may not go up." Just a day earlier,
Jammu and Kashmir Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed had
rejected the notion that infiltration was down. "I am not
aware of any such trend", the Chief Minister had said.
So just what is going on? The Union Home Ministry's estimates
of infiltration, drawn from a variety of military and intelligence
sources, suggest that cross-border movement from January
to April this year has been considerably lower than in previous
years. The proposition is borne out by the actual levels
of violence in the State, which, along with the killings
of civilians, security force personnel and terrorists, has
indeed come
down during this period . It isn't clear,
however, if this is the outcome of any clear tactical intent.
Unusually high levels of snow and rain from January to March
might, for example, have been a key factor in reducing crossings
across the Line of Control (LoC).
Things aren't helped, as Musharraf never tires of pointing
out, by the fact that there is no real way of reliably counting
just how many people cross the LoC. There is, however, a
way to empirically test whether infiltration is increasing
or declining, one which sadly few analysts have applied
their mind to. Every year, a certain number of terrorists
are killed in ambushes along the LoC, obviously attempting
to cross it one way or the other. If one makes the not-unreasonable
assumption that the Army's efficiency in interdicting terrorists
doesn't change dramatically from year to year, those engagements
ought to roughly indicate the volume of cross-border infiltration.
Consider the case of Poonch, the sprawling western region
of Jammu, which records the highest levels of terrorist
violence of any district in the State. In January, and March,
killings of terrorists on the LoC were lower than in the
same months of 2001 and 2002. That seems to bear out the
proposition of lowered infiltration. But in February and
April, the month when the peace initiative gathered momentum,
killings of terrorists were actually higher than
in past years! Overall, more
terrorists have been killed along the LoC
in Poonch in the January-April period than in the same periods
of 2001 and 2002: hardly bearing out Fernandes' certificate
of good conduct for Musharraf.
But even this data doesn't settle the issue. Climate conditions
had a considerable bearing on infiltration on Poonch. Heavy
rain made the Poonch river impassable for much of this winter,
while snowfall sealed off the mountain passes in the key
passage routes of Mandi-Loran and Saujian. The Army's 16
Corps was able to re-deploy personnel along the remaining
infiltration routes in Poonch, in Mendhar and Balnoi, creating
a second line of counter-infiltration defences. Thus, even
though intelligence estimates suggest that there has been
less infiltration in Poonch in January-April 2003, compared
to the same period in 2002, there has been higher interdiction.
The major success in February and April, where killings
of terrorists showed an upsurge, came with the interdiction
of large groups in these regions, with 8 killed at Hari
Galla on February 23-24, and 9 at Balnoi on April 20-21.
The funnelling of terrorists into narrower belts because
of weather seems to have played a key role through the entire
16 Corps region. Fire contact with infiltrating terrorists,
16 Corps data shows, was higher in January and February
2003 than in January and February 2002, but lower in subsequent
months as the weather improved and more routes began to
become available.
The truth, then, is that we still have no means of knowing
just what the truth is on infiltration. Ground-level experience
of the patters on terrorism in Poonch show that violence
has escalated sharply from May each year, when
warm weather sets in, and then tapers off again each November,
bar in low-snowfall years like 2001. This suggests there
is an organic linkage between infiltration, which reaches
a peak during these months, and security force engagement
with terrorists.
Events this summer, not impressionistic ideas about infiltration
levels, are what New Delhi and the world should be paying
attention to. So far, the peace offerings from Islamabad
have been profoundly deceptive. Reports came in that key
Hizb-ul-Mujaheddin (HM)
camps like Tarbela and Jabbar have been closed down, but
the import of this is less clear than most people imagine.
The closure of Jabbar, for example, is widely believed to
have been the outcome of violent feuding between supporters
of its official head, Mohammad Yusuf Shah @ Syed Salahuddin,
and dissidents grouped under the banner of his assassinated
rival, Abdul Majid Dar. Their latest clash, on May 9 at
Jabbar, is believed to have left a dozen Hizb cadre seriously
injured.
Camps belonging to other organisations like the Jaish-e-Mohammad
(JeM)
and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT),
it bears mention, have not so far been touched; neither,
contrary to the assertions of some media pundits, have their
websites or magazines. On May 14, 2003, Pakistan made a
show of banning Jaish-e-Mohammad chief Masood Azhar from
visiting Pakistan-occupied Kashmir, but he openly harangued
a large gathering there the very next day, evidently unhindered.
Within Jammu and Kashmir itself, brutal killings of civilians
continue unabated, notably among these the May 10 execution
of three People's Democratic Party cadre, including Chief
Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed's relative Gul Mohammad Mir.
We will only really know as the summer progresses, then,
whether Musharraf acts to make concrete his favourite fiction
that "nothing is going on across the LoC." Firm assertions
on infiltration levels, like those emanating from Vajpayee
and Fernandes, are essentially political, not founded on
any testable ground appraisal. So, too, is United States
Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage's description
of Musharraf as "a man of his word." Just over a year ago,
Armitage had secured promises from Musharraf that cross-border
terrorism would end, and that terrorist groups would be
banned. Terrorism declined, and leaders of the Jaish-e-Mohammad
and Lashkar-e-Taiba were arrested - but after the briefest
interval, Pakistan's state-sponsored jihad was up
and running again.
India ought to be paying close attention to the small print
in any deal Musharraf offers: even more so because the conditions,
so to speak, are written in invisible ink. Sadly, there
is no sign that those who matter, in New Delhi, Washington
or anywhere else, have the time or inclination for patient
reading.
Assam: The IM (DT) Act - Of Aliens,
Natives and Politics
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database
& Documentation Centre, Guwahati
The
introduction of a Bill to repeal the Illegal Migrants (Determination
by Tribunals) [IM
(DT)] Act in the Indian Parliament has brought
the issue of illegal Bangladeshi migration and its large-scale
impact on the State of Assam into fresh focus. Whether or
not the Act is finally repealed - given the fact that the
Congress and the Left parties remain opposed to such an
eventuality - it is high time that the seriousness of the
threat is recognised, and the exploitation of this issue
for partisan political objectives and 'vote bank' politics
is brought to an end.
The IM (DT) Act was enacted in 1983 with the purported objective
of the "establishment of Tribunals for the determination,
in a fair manner, of the question whether a person is an
illegal migrant to enable the Central Government to expel
illegal migrants from India and for matters connected therewith
or incidental thereto." Some of the requirements of the
Act have proven discriminatory and biased in favour of illegal
migrants. These include:
- Every application
made against any person 'shall be accompanied by affidavits
sworn by not less than two persons residing within the
jurisdiction of the same police station in which the person
referred to in the application is found, or residing.'
(No authority can, consequently, take cognisance of an
offence under the Act without such a complaint. Such complaints
are rare, since people living close by may be intimidated
or may not wish to antagonize neighbours of a community
that is increasingly numerically stronger, and that is
seen to enjoy substantial political patronage).
- The application
shall be accompanied by a "fee, being not less than ten
and not more than one hundred, rupees, (later fixed at
Rupees Twenty-five) as may be prescribed". (The provision
of a fee is a further deterrent as people refrain from
filing complaints to avoid personal expenditure).
- The onus of proof
lies with the complainant.
There
is no authoritative estimate of the actual number of illegal
migrants in the State. Figures vary from a few hundred thousand
to as much as four million. Former Union Minister for Home
Affairs, Indrajit Gupta had put the figures at four million
in a statement to Parliament in 1997. Nearly two decades
ago, the then Chief Minister of Assam, Jogen Hazarika, had
estimated the number of foreigners in Assam at only 200,00.
At the same time, however, other claims by other organisations
and individuals placed the population of illegal migrants
variously between 1.3 million to 4.5 million, accounting
for between 10 and 50 per cent of the total population in
the State. Former Chief Minister Hiteswar Saikia, on April
10, 1992, indicated that there were three million illegal
Bangladeshis in Assam, only to retract his words two days
later. The Congress party, as the prime beneficiary of this
'vote bank', has always tended to underplay the numbers.
The divergent contentions apart, however, the fact that
cannot be missed by anyone travelling through the State
is that migration has affected the demography of several
districts in Assam.
Migrants are also alleged to be responsible for the denudation
of forest areas, for the encroachment of the living space
of the locals, and for monopolising the service sector by
undercutting local labour. It is, of course, a different
matter that the Assamese have generally been disinclined
towards manual labour. Additionally, it now increasingly
being established that sections of the migrant population
bring the fundamentalist and overtly anti-Indian sentiments
along with them, creating fertile grounds for the designs
of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI). Police
sources reveal that Islamist insurgency in Assam has its
genesis in the unabated migration from Bangladesh. Even
though few would risk asserting a direct co-relation between
Bangladeshi migration and the growth of Islamist insurgent
groups in the State, the fact remains that it is the migrant
inhabited areas that provide a steady recruitment ground
for the organisations such as the Muslim United Liberation
Tigers of Assam (MULTA)
in Assam. The existence of as many as eleven Islamic militant
organisations in the State has significantly widened the
options available to the forces of destabilisation in the
region.
The absolute impact of illegal migration in Assam, however,
is political. Demographic movements are, of course, a fait
accompli, with the State situated in close proximity
to a region that is comparatively less attractive for its
own population in terms of economic opportunities. Many
proud Assamese would agree, albeit silently, that political
power has slipped away from the hands of the ethnic Assamese
over the years. It is noticeable that the Congress party
in Assam, which remains the preferred political party for
the minority community (the indigenous Muslims who are,
according to one estimate, nearly 20 per cent of the State's
population), has systematically extended its sphere of influence
over the immigrant Muslims as well. As a result, the Muslims
of Assam have never felt the need to organise themselves
into communal political groupings (the formation of the
United Minorities Front in 1985 was a localised aberration
and the whole experiment was a failure), unlike States like
Kerala, where parties like the Muslim League have carved
out a niche for themselves. 'Vote bank' politics has made
Muslims in Assam (indigenous as well as illegal immigrants)
more secure under a Congress regime. The enactment of the
IM (DT) Act by the Congress Party at the centre in 1983
was essentially an attempt to protect its traditional vote
bank from harassment and legitimate expulsion.
Political patronage and the demands of realpolitik have
made the makeover from migrant status to 'legal citizens'
of the State relatively uncomplicated. Political leaders
have not only prevented the existing machinery from identifying
and deporting aliens, but have legalised their presence
through instrumentalities like generous distribution of
ration cards and even citizenship certificates.
The IM (DT) Act itself is an anomaly. It is far from judicious
to try to deal with the problem of illegal migration within
one State under a separate Act, while the rest of the country
continues to be governed by the Foreigners Act. It is probably
even more ludicrous to fall back upon an Act which protects
the illegal migrant by putting the responsibility of proof
on the complainant. Given the way successive State Governments
have manoeuvred the setting up of tribunals under the IMDT,
with retired judges at their helm, a Guwahati based English
language newspaper, The Sentinel, in an editorial
in the early 1990s, calculated that 'at the rates the tribunals
were going, it would take 200 years to identify all the
foreigners illegally residing in Assam, even if there was
increase in their (the tribunals') number.' Only 1,501 illegal
migrants had been deported by the tribunals set up under
the IM (DT) Act over the past 16 years, even though an amount
of Rupees 128,928,385 has been spent on these tribunals
(figure quoted by the Minister in charge of Assam Accord
Implementation, Pankaj Bora, in the State Assembly on March
13, 2003).
Assam's illegal immigrants have, over the years, acquired
enormous mobility, and now threaten to impact on the demography
of neighbouring States like Nagaland, Meghalaya and Arunachal
Pradesh as well. Places like Dimapur and Niuland in Nagaland
now have a significant Bangladeshi population, with estimates
putting their numbers around 300,000. The Nagaland Government
claim to have deported 20,000 foreign nationals between
1994 and 1997. The Garo Hills area in Meghalaya is also
being swamped by the Bangladeshi migrants.
In his report on Illegal
Migration into Assam in 1998, to the President
of India, the then Governor of Assam, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) S.K.
Sinha maintained that "as deportation of such a large number
of illegal migrants is no longer a viable option and because
of the numerous infirmities in the IMDT Act which have rendered
its continuation a wasteful exercise, it is imperative that
this Act be repealed." Lt. Gen. Sinha recommended that the
IM (DT) Act should be "replaced by a more just, workable
and fair enactment."
The moot question is: will the proposed repeal of the act
be able to deal with the problem? The answer is probably
in the negative. According to the Deputy Prime Minister
and Union Home Minister L.K. Advani's admission earlier
this year, 20 million Bangladeshis are staying illegally
in India. If the performance of the rest of India, which
is not under a discriminatory Act like the IM (DT) and is
governed by the Foreigners Act, is any indication, ground
realities in Assam cannot be expected to undergo any dramatic
transformation after the IM (DT) Act is annulled. It will
also be foolhardy to imagine that migrants in search of
greener pastures will abruptly be stopped by any successor
arrangement. The repeal of the Act may, however, pave the
way for an atmosphere in which deportation is not handicapped
by the presence of a bad law, and illegal migrants cannot
benefit from their lawless acts to secure the protection
of easy citizenship. The repeal of the Act will also be
consistent with India's dealings with the Government of
Bangladesh, which has recently been accused of providing
shelter to 155 training camps for terrorist and insurgent
groups operating in India's Northeast.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts
in South Asia
May 12-18, 2003
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
2
|
0
|
3
|
5
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
12
|
18
|
26
|
56
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
1
|
0
|
6
|
7
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Tripura
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
15
|
18
|
38
|
71
|
PAKISTAN
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
2
|
SRI LANKA
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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PAKISTAN
Five persons
injured in serial bomb blasts at 21 British, U.S. Gas Stations
in Karachi: Five persons were injured during serial bomb
blasts at 21 British and US gas stations in Karachi on May 15,
2003. Reports indicated that small bombs exploded at 19 Shell
petrol stations and two belonging to Caltex in Karachi. Shell
Pakistan, owned by the Royal Dutch/Shell Group, said one customer,
three station attendants and a security guard received minor
injuries in the attacks. Kashif Jalal, an official of the police
Bomb Disposal Squad, said the explosions were caused by time
bombs, each weighing about 0.4 pounds. Jang,
May 16, 2003.
Jaish chief Masood Azhar defies ban on entry into Pakistan
occupied Kashmir: Maulana Masood Azhar, chief of the outlawed
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM), arrived in Kotli in Pakistan occupied
Kashmir (PoK) on May 15, 2003, despite a ban on his entry. He
was already present in the area before the ban was announced,
said official sources. The Pakistan Government on May 14 had
announced a ban on his entry into PoK and ordered the setting
up of pickets to prevent him from addressing a public rally
in Kotli. Jang,
May 16, 2003.
SRI LANKA
US calls upon
LTTE to participate in Tokyo donor conference: The visiting
US Assistant Secretary of State, Christina Rocca, while speaking
in Colombo on May 14, 2003, called upon the Liberation Tigers
of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) to participate in the Tokyo donor conference
to be held in June. She said that the LTTE should do so "in
the best interest of the peace process, the Tamil people, and
the Tigers themselves." Daily
News, May 15, 2003.
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Terrorists killed
on the LoC in Poonch District
|
2001
|
2002
|
2003
|
On LoC
|
Inside
District
|
On LoC
|
Inside
District
|
On LoC
|
Inside
District
|
Jan |
6
|
9
|
7
|
4
|
5
|
9
|
Feb |
1
|
21
|
9
|
28
|
14
|
6
|
Mar |
0
|
22
|
0
|
17
|
2
|
7
|
Apr |
3
|
21
|
6
|
35
|
15
|
32
|
May |
26
|
22
|
12
|
21
|
|
|
Jun |
22
|
52
|
4
|
20
|
|
|
Jul |
18
|
42
|
8
|
12
|
|
|
Aug |
6
|
14
|
11
|
21
|
|
|
Sep |
10
|
34
|
9
|
21
|
|
|
Oct |
12
|
51
|
10
|
22
|
|
|
Nov |
17
|
78
|
31
|
15
|
|
|
Dec |
8
|
25
|
8
|
14
|
|
|
Total |
129
|
391
|
115
|
230
|
36
|
54
|
Terrorists killed in Poonch District
|
1996
|
1997
|
1998
|
1999
|
2000
|
2001
|
2002
|
2003
|
Jan |
0
|
0
|
2
|
5
|
9
|
15
|
35
|
14
|
Feb |
0
|
0
|
11
|
9
|
2
|
22
|
26
|
20
|
Mar |
0
|
8
|
2
|
6
|
8
|
22
|
16
|
9
|
Apr |
4
|
0
|
1
|
9
|
9
|
24
|
41
|
47
|
May |
0
|
3
|
9
|
22
|
17
|
48
|
33
|
|
Jun |
0
|
0
|
10
|
1
|
21
|
74
|
24
|
|
Jul |
0
|
6
|
16
|
18
|
16
|
60
|
20
|
|
Aug |
4
|
0
|
7
|
12
|
31
|
20
|
32
|
|
Sep |
0
|
2
|
6
|
25
|
60
|
44
|
30
|
|
Oct |
2
|
8
|
23
|
35
|
31
|
63
|
32
|
|
Nov |
0
|
8
|
13
|
8
|
32
|
95
|
41
|
|
Dec |
0
|
20
|
14
|
5
|
11
|
33
|
22
|
|
Total |
10
|
55
|
114
|
155
|
247
|
520
|
352
|
90
|
|
Winter
(passes closed) |
|
Summer
(passes open) |
Source:
Jammu and Kashmir Police
|
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The South
Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that
brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on
terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare,
on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as
on related economic, political, and social issues, in
the South Asian region.
SAIR is a project
of the Institute
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and the
South
Asia Terrorism Portal.
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