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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 45, May 26, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Reassessing the War on Terror
K.P.S. Gill
President, Institute for Conflict Management
The 'Global
Village' has moved much closer from rhetoric to reality:
a terrorist attack in forgotten Morocco or insular Saudi
Arabia now echoes instantly across the Americas, Europe
and every corner of Asia, among peoples who had little awareness
even of the existence of these distant places some years
ago. It is useful to hear and understand these echoes, and
place them in an objective context - separating their emotive
and partisan content from the realities of the ground.
The dominant theme that reverberates after every major incident
of international terrorism in the age after 9/11 - and which
resonated clearly after both the Riyadh and Casablanca attacks
- is an almost celebratory chorus, virtually a gleeful claim
of vindication, among those who have been asserting that
US-coalition interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and
the 'global war against terror', would result in a groundswell
of 'Muslim rage' and necessary and virulent retaliation.
Interestingly, while this is an argument that is certainly
articulated by many in the 'Muslim world', its most passionate
advocates are numbered among those who consider themselves
liberal democrats, and who are currently engaged in constructing
the thesis of American neo-conservative Imperialism. Whether
this is intended or not, these arguments - irrespective
of their source - provide some of the most powerful justifications
and, indeed, advocacy of Islamist extremist terrorism and
constitute critical inputs in the dangerous intensification
of the propaganda war against the US-led war on terror.
A significant and persistent undercurrent in this campaign
of misinformation is the reflection of a near-total denial
of Islamist terrorism and its virulent ideological underpinnings.
This broad campaign - intentionally in some cases, inadvertently
in others - has a direct impact on the US will and commitment
to fight terrorism in the world, wherever it is to be found.
It is, consequently, useful to determine its match with
the realities of the world today.
-
The first and most significant
point to note is that it cannot conceivably be anybody's
case that, had the US not gone into Afghanistan after
9/11, or subsequently into Iraq, Islamist terrorists
would simply have abandoned their campaign against the
US and the 'decadent West'. Indeed, the dangers of a
far more violent campaign would have been infinitely
greater in the wake of any evidence of weakness or conciliation
on the part, particularly, of the US, but generally
of all existing and potential targets of terrorism.
-
An objective assessment
of the course of terrorism would bear out the fact that
- while the risk of random incidents against soft targets
cannot, and should not be expected to, be eliminated
- the impetus of terror has, indeed, weakened as a result
of Afghanistan and Iraq, and this development needs
further consolidation rather than any dilution of the
war against terrorism and the campaign against political
extremism, authoritarianism and rogue states in different
parts of the world. America's withdrawal into an isolationist,
inward-looking defensive posture is very certainly no
longer an option. Fighting and defeating terrorism is
not a 'policy choice' for the civilized world; it is
a survival goal.
-
At a tactical level,
it is useful to note that the attacks in Riyadh and
Casablanca reflected very poor economies of scale from
the terrorists' perspective. It took at least nine suicide
cadres in Riyadh to inflict 25 civilian casualties.
Ten suicide bombers in Casablanca killed 29 civilians.
This kind of rate of attrition for low priority targets
is neither sustainable nor can it be projected for long
as a 'great victory' for the 'cause'.
-
These two attacks have
also done irreparable damage to the Islamist terrorist
movement. The countries where these attacks were mounted
have now been lost as secure bases for the terrorists,
as their Governments abandon their past postures of
ambivalence and tacit support to the Islamist extremist
factions. This is crucial. For all their defects as
authoritarian oligarchies, these countries - with their
scant regard for human rights and judicial processes,
as well as the barbaric punishments they inflict - are
far better equipped to neutralize terrorists once they
decide to do so, than democratic nation-states ever
will be.
-
The terrorists' apologists
have consistently sought to undermine effective counter-terrorism
initiatives on the argument that these would provoke
'retaliation' of a greater virulence against soft targets.
But not only do these views falsify the ground reality
of declining trends in terrorism, these views also fail
to correctly reflect the mood among the vast majority
of the people. Among Muslims - and certainly in South
Asia - 9/11 and the campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq
may have aroused a measure of resentment in limited
segments of the population, but they have equally provoked
unprecedented introspection and the open questioning
of the fundamentalist-extremist leadership's goals,
methods and authority. Indeed, a close reading of the
pronouncements even of the Islamist extremist leadership
in South Asia demonstrates that they now increasingly
acknowledge the dangers of the pathways they have adopted
over the past decades. These views tend largely to be
ignored by the outside (Western) observers, especially
here their experience is confined to the urban and metropolitan
centres, where opinions are strongly ideologically slanted
and often contra-factual. Delhi and Islamabad are cases
in point where small groups of isolated 'intellectuals',
policy- and opinion-makers engage in an unending and
incestuous discourse that fails entirely to accommodate
an objective assessment of realities on the ground -
and it is this discourse that is picked up by Western
diplomats, journalists and other observers, who seldom
have access to a wider sample of public opinion. Even
among populations where some sympathies for the Islamist
extremist cause may have existed in the past, the majority
view in South Asia today - cutting across religious
and political affiliations - is swinging away from continued
support to the terrorists.
-
Pakistan has, by no
means, remained unaffected by these trends, despite
its persistent duplicity in the war against terrorism.
This response is, moreover, compounded by a rising dread
of the Talibanisation of the country. There are, of
course, some dangers that arise out of the 'Islamisation'
of some sections of the Army that have given rise to
speculation of a coup by this extremist element against
General Musharraf. These threats are, however, vastly
exaggerated - though they may constitute a possibility
for Musharraf or a successor military regime several
years hence. Within the proximate future, however, there
is little danger of a military revolt. The fact is that,
though the Pakistan Army has been responsible for several
coups against civilian Governments, the Force
has never broken internal discipline and has remained
constant and loyal to its military commander. Musharraf
is, consequently, under no extraordinary or imminent
risk of an internal coup from within the Army and will,
when international pressures mount beyond a particular
level, be able to contain and neutralize radicalised
elements within the Army and the Inter Services Intelligence,
as well as the Al
Qaeda linked terrorist organisations that were created
by and affiliated to these institutions in the past.
-
The 'peace process'
between India and Pakistan has been spurred by these
transformations in the international and domestic context,
and, while it is not a 'brokered' process, it has certainly
been pushed forward by US pressure. Unfortunately, any
peace that may result can only be temporary under present
circumstances, where the entire infrastructure of terrorism
in Pakistan remains virtually intact, and where the
agencies of the State continue to support - albeit selectively
- a large number of virulent Islamist terrorist groups
and their ideological and political affiliates, and
as long as the structure of power in the country remains
bound to the revanchist military-jehadi-feudal
complex that has dominated its politics since Independence.
The combined
force of these facts must lead to the conclusion that the
shared, eventual and unvarying goal of the civilised world
must remain the destruction of the terrorists' assets and
ideologies, and, while a wide range of political, social
and ideological initiatives are needed in the comprehensive
strategy of the global war against terror, such initiatives
do not undermine or dilute the enormous need for a continued
and focused military response to the immediate dangers of
global terrorism.
Manipur: Surrogate Wars
Guest Writer: Pradip Phanjoubam
Editor, Imphal Free Press
For almost a week last fortnight, after clashes between
two underground militant organizations, the United Kuki
Liberation Front (UKLF) and the United National Liberation
Front (UNLF)
in the Chakpikarong sub-division of the Chandel district,
in Manipur, residents of a number of villages were subject
to widespread fear, forcing many to flee their homes. Although
the exact numbers are not known or disclosed, both the underground
organizations acknowledged having suffered casualties. Clashes
between underground organizations are not altogether new
in this area, but the tragedy has been not so much theirs,
as it has been for the unarmed and hapless public, most
often impoverished villagers in sparsely populated peripheries
of the State.
But the Chakpikarong clashes have other very strong undercurrents
of old tensions running below the obvious surface. Although
the physical clashes were between the UKLF and the UNLF,
in spirit it was between two old time antagonists, the National
Socialist Council of Nagalim - Isak-Muivah (NSCN-IM)
and the UNLF. The latter, drawing its strongest support
from amongst the Meitei community in the Imphal Valley,
is the only Meitei militant organization that has come out
openly to challenge the NSCN-IM's demand for a 'Greater
Nagaland', which the Naga militants aspire to create by
splintering Manipur and other neighbouring States. Others
too are opposed to the move, but none of them have demonstrated
their opposition publicly, unwilling to risk their relationship
with the NSCN-IM - by far the most well-armed and powerful
insurgent organization in the region. Most Kuki underground
organizations, particularly the Kuki National Front (KNF),
and the Kuki National Army (KNA), are also opposed to the
NSCN-IM's vision of an integrated Naga homeland carved out
of land that is also home to the Kukis. It is to the credit
of the military strategists of the NSCN-IM that, amidst
this open and emotive opposition to their homeland move,
they have been able to set up their own satellites deep
within communities that are hostile to its political ambitions.
The UKLF, a relatively new Kuki militant group in the Chandel
district bordering Myanmar, is one such, and came into being
not long after the bloody Kuki-Naga feud in the mid 1990s.
The NSCN-IM has also set up another Kuki extremist group,
the Kuki Revolutionary Army (KRA) in another Kuki stronghold
- the Sadar Hills Autonomous District Council (ADC), in
the Senapati district in the north of the State - and likewise
has also been patronizing similar organizations among other
communities, both in the Manipur Hills and the Meitei dominated
Valley.
The recent Chakpikarong clashes must be seen against this
background. The Chandel district is within the areas that
the NSCN-IM considers as Naga contiguous territories, and
hence part of its vision of the contentious Greater Nagaland.
In reality, it is a mixed-population district, with many
small communities, most of them now politically aligned
to the Naga identity, although many among them share close
ethnic affinity with the Kukis, their immediate neighbours
in the district. Much to the chagrin of the Nagas, Kuki
intellectuals refer to the Naga tribes in this district
as 'Old Kukis' who have switched identity affiliation. This
dichotomy between political and ethnic identities throws
up a number of obvious social tensions and it is no coincidence
that some of the worst clashes between the Kukis and Nagas
during the feud in the 1990s occurred in the Chandel district.
Further, valley based underground organizations, particularly
the UNLF have been making deep inroads into the Kuki inhabited
areas of the district, a fact viewed with resentment and
suspicion by the NSCN-IM. Before the Naga ceasefire, clashes
in the area used to be directly between the NSCN-IM and
the UNLF - NSCN-K
(the rival Khaplang faction of the NSCN) combine. Ever since
the Naga ceasefire in 1997, however, the NSCN-IN can no
longer risk open encounters, as these would violate the
'Ground Rules' of their agreement with the Union Government.
Its satellite organizations are, consequently, pressed into
action under direct or indirect goading. In the present
instance, the UKLF became the instrument in an attempt to
neutralize the presence of the UNLF in the Chakpikarong
area. What is unfolding is thus a war for the control of
territory and, in a distant way, one prompted by the unresolved
and explosive question of the NSCN-IM's Greater Nagaland
dream - a war in which one of the parties is fighting by
proxy.
The proxy war aside, one other player is conspicuous by
its absence - the law. The entire Chakpikarong area, as
in much of the rest of Chandel district, as well as the
adjoining Sugnu subdivision of the valley district of Thoubal,
have become virtually a 'liberated zone', where the writs
of many different rebel organizations are the only law.
At present, unless overwhelming numbers of Central Forces
are brought in, it is difficult for the Government to bring
the situation under control. It is not very far from here,
in the Sajik Tampak, that underground forces of the UNLF
repelled advancing Border Security Force (BSF) soldiers
after a pitched three-day battle in January 2003. In these
areas, the Government has, as a policy, even disarmed its
police forces, since it had become routine for police stations,
most of them under-manned and ill-equipped, to be overpowered
and robbed of weapons by militants who were vastly superior
in numbers and armament. Thus, the Chakpikarong police station,
for instance, has only about three unarmed policemen. Three
times the number of unarmed policemen is present at the
Sugnu police station, and they - for obvious reasons - have
not been able to make a difference in the situation. Not
only are the law enforcement agencies absent, there are
also no signs of direct government presence. The fair-weather
roads in the area remain in a pathetic state of disrepair
for years together; the public health centers are without
doctors; the sub-divisional offices are without officers;
general scarcities are endemic, and the only things not
in short supply are diseases and epidemics of malaria, cholera
and dysentery. In such a vacuum, it is only natural for
parallel structures of government to sprout up and assert
themselves. It is a situation, as T.S. Chonghring, an Anal
tribal chief in Chakpikarong, told Imphal Free Press,
a case of the government abandoning the people, driving
them into the hands of laws and forces other than the Government's
own.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts
in South Asia
May 19-25, 2003
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Civilian
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Security
Force Personnel
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Terrorist
|
Total
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INDIA
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Assam
|
1
|
0
|
6
|
7
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Delhi
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
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Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
18
|
4
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36
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58
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Left-wing
Extremism
|
4
|
0
|
4
|
8
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Meghalaya
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
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Tripura
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
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Total (INDIA)
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24
|
4
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50
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78
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PAKISTAN
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
SRI LANKA
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
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* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BHUTAN
Bhutan
raising counter-insurgent force to tackle
Indian terrorists: The Bhutanese Government
is reportedly raising a counter-insurgent
force to tackle Indian terrorist outfits
on its soil. Reports have indicated that
the Government has initiated a move to enlist
'volunteers' for the purpose. King Jigme
Singhye Wangchuk reportedly said, "When
the security and sovereignty of our country
is under threat, the true sons of the soil
must step forward and not wait to be called
upon to serve their country." According
to Dozin Batoo Tshering, a spokesperson
of the Royal Bhutan Army, approximately
800 men, aged between 18 and 45 years, were
ready to join the 'militia force' from Paro
district of Bhutan. Assam-based United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA)
and National Democratic Front of Bodoland
(NDFB),
and an outfit active in West Bengal, the
Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO)
maintain their base camps in Bhutan. Kuensel
Online, May 17, 2003.
INDIA
60 terrorists
killed and 90 hideouts destroyed in Operation
Sarp Vinash in J&K: Approximately
90 terrorist hideouts have been destroyed
and at least 60 terrorists from various
outfits were killed during Operation
Sarp Vinash (annihilation of snakes),
a massive counter-terrorism drive launched
by the Indian Army, in the areas of Surankote,
Chanderkot and Nanan in Poonch district
of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). While the first
phase of the operation began on January
29, 2003, it was during the third phase,
which commenced on April 21, that a move
was initiated to clear the Hill Kaka region
where Pakistani terrorist groups, including
Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM),
Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT),
Al
Badr and Hizb-ul-Mujahideen,
(HM)
had set up 'fortifications' in a large area
of strategic importance to interdict Indian
Army supply lines with impunity, said official
sources. Meanwhile, some reports have indicated
that Operation Sarp Vinash 2 has
been launched in the Doda district of Jammu
region. Daily
Excelsior, May 26, 2003.
824 NGOs in the North East under scrutiny
for suspected terrorist links: The Union
Home Ministry has reportedly put approximately
824 Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs)
operating in the North East and Sikkim under
surveillance for their suspected links with
various terrorist groups active in the region.
The Ministry has also passed on information
to the Governments of Assam, Manipur, Meghalaya,
Sikkim, Nagaland and Tripura in this regard.
The Ministry suspects that there could be
as many as 323 such NGOs in Meghalaya, 197
in Manipur, 151 in Assam, 82 in Nagaland,
69 in Tripura and two in Sikkim. Telegraph
India, May 24, 2003.
12 infiltrators killed at LoC in Nowgam
sector, Jammu and Kashmir: Security
forces foiled a major infiltration attempt
on May 22, 2003, by killing 12 terrorists
near the Line of Control (LoC) in Nowgam
sector of Handwara in north Kashmir. Official
sources said that, on the basis of radio
intercepts and field inputs, SF personnel
laid an ambush in a forward area between
Eagle Post and Tootmari Gali in the Nowgam
sector. In the ensuing encounter, while
12 infiltrators were killed, an unspecified
number of them reportedly escaped. Daily
Excelsior, May 23, 2003.
No slackening of terrorist infiltration
across Line of Control, says Army Chief:
While indicating that India would continue
to adopt a "wait and watch" strategy on
Pakistan's commitment towards ending cross-border
terrorism, Army Chief General N.C. Vij said
in Delhi on May 21, 2003, that there was
no slackening of infiltration of terrorists
from across the Line of Control (LoC), south
of Pir Panjal in the Jammu region. He also
said that it was too early to evaluate infiltration
levels across the LoC, with the snow-melting
north and south of Pir Panjal and added
the next few months would be carefully monitored
for infiltration levels. Daily
Excelsior, May 22, 2003.
Terrorism-related violence shows significant
decrease in J and K, indicates report:
Terrorism-related violence in Jammu and
Kashmir (J&K) has shown a significant decrease
from January 1 to May 15 this year compared
to the corresponding period last year, official
sources were quoted as saying in a media
report. The total number of terrorism-related
incidents registered a decrease of more
than 17 per cent as only 110 acts of violence
were recorded in the State this year, compared
to 134 last year. There was a 20 per cent
decrease in civilian deaths as 288 persons
were killed in various incidents compared
to last year's 364 for the corresponding
period. Deaths of security force personnel
also registered a downward trend as 96 of
them were killed since the beginning of
year 2003 as against 110 for the last year.
The report added that fewer terrorists -
a decrease of approximately 32 per cent
- were killed this year compared to year
2002. The sources said though only 474 terrorists
were killed since the beginning of 2003
compared to 696 last year, security forces
have killed as many as 60 terrorists in
the first fortnight of this month. However,
the number of bomb blasts in J&K increased
marginally, recording a 10 per cent increase.
During the current year, terrorists exploded
as many as 152 grenades and Improvised Explosive
Devices compared to 138 explosions for the
corresponding period last year. Further,
district-wise, Pulwama in the Kashmir Valley
witnessed the highest number of incidents
of violence since the beginning of the year
followed closely by Rajouri in the Jammu
region. Sources added that Jammu and Kathua
districts were the most peaceful of all
districts in the State as only two incidents
of terrorism-related violence were recorded
in each district since January 1, 2003.
Outlook
India, May 21, 2003.
PAKISTAN
Interior Minister
denies reports on proscribing Hizb-ul-Mujahideen: The Interior
Minister Faisal Saleh Hayat on May 20, 2003, denied having any
authority to ban terrorist groups not operating within Pakistan.
He clarified in Islamabad that "The government has not banned
the Hizbul Mujahideen [HM],
as it has no presence in Pakistan." He further said the Hizb
was a Kashmir-based group and the authority to ban it lay with
the Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) government. However, he
added that restrictions have been imposed on the group's activities
within Pakistan. According to him, "Pakistan's policy is crystal
clear as far as terrorism is concerned. The government will
not allow any individual or a group of organisations to use
its territory for launching terrorist attacks on any third country.
The government will never tolerate any individual or groups
trying to disrupt law and order in the country." Meanwhile,
Hizb spokesperson Saleem Hashmi claimed that HM chief Syed Salahuddin
was a Kashmiri and based somewhere in Kashmir and he had not
been banned to enter PoK. Separately, two HM terrorists were
booked for carrying arms in Rawalpindi on May 19. Police said
in Islamabad on May 21 that the Hizb cadres reportedly appeared
at a public ceremony of the group at a hotel in Rawalpindi where
its 'supreme commander' Syed Salahuddin gave away 'honour certificates'
to families of terrorists killed in the Indian State of Jammu
and Kashmir. Jang,
May 22, 2003; Daily
Times, May 21, 2003.
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