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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 50, June 30, 2003

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal



ASSESSMENT

INDIA
PAKISTAN

J&K: Fidayeen Strike at Sunjwan
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Special Correspondent, Frontline

General Pervez Musharraf watched stone-faced as United States President George Bush announced a meagre US$ 3 billion aid package for Pakistan, and shot down that country's demands for new F-16 combat jets. It opened him up to a barrage of criticism from his domestic critics, Islamist and democratic, who charged that he had given away too much to the United States and received little or nothing in return. Four days after the Bush-Musharraf press conference at Camp David, two fidayeen terrorists cut the fence protecting the perimeter of the 36 Infantry Brigade's camp in Sunjwan, on the outskirts of Jammu. The terrorists made their way to a barracks, and shot dead a dozen soldiers, most in their sleep.

Clear cut? Not quite.

Two major explanations have been put out for the timing of the Sunjwan suicide attack. First, it took place on a day President Abdul Kalam was due to visit the Hazratbal shrine in Srinagar, a political and religious signifier of unequalled import in the Kashmir valley. Second, commentators speculated, the attack could have been intended to signal that Musharraf simply 'could not contain' jihadi groups until India and the United States gave larger concessions to Pakistan. Commentators in Pakistan pointed out that even the US Central Command had conceded that Pakistan had lost US $10 billion by allowing the use of its air and land to US Forces. Zia-ul-Haq, it was pointed out, had secured aid worth US$ 4.2 billion and 40 F-16s for his acquiescence to the United States' war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, while Benazir Bhutto secured US$ 4.6 billion and 60 F-16s.

Both explanations are plausible, but not wholly satisfying. For one, the thesis that the Sunjwan attack was intended to send a signal to India rests on the assumption that Jihadi groups can strike at will, and at intensity levels of their choosing. That simply isn't the case. Since January 2003, seven attempted fidayeen attacks have been reported in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), six of them on security force installations. In only one incident was the number of security personnel killed greater than the number of terrorists eliminated during the response to the attack. This was on April 25, when a Border Security Force (BSF) camp near Bandipora was attacked, leading to the loss of three soldiers and the elimination of two terrorists. In several instances - an assault on the 24 Rashtriya Rifles camp at Dragmulla, Kupwara, on April 29, or a May 1 attack on the BSF near Tral - the attackers were shot with no security force losses at all. In one instance in February, the Army intercepted and killed Peshawar resident Rizwan Khan even before he could commence his planned suicide strike near Jammu.

Put crudely, setting off bombs on buses or massacring villagers are time tested and relatively more reliable means of 'sending signals': fidayeen attacks, for all their drama, just aren't as sure or effective. Over the years, Indian security forces have developed fairly well drilled systems for dealing with suicide attacks and the figures show that these have generally operated with success. An April 26, 2003, attempt on the Radio Kashmir building in Srinagar attempted to mimic the tactics adopted in the attack on India's Parliament by using an explosives-laden car with an official beacon. Central Reserve Police Force guards, however, refused to allow the car into the complex, compelling the terrorists to detonate outside the building. Three terrorists were killed, with none of their objectives achieved. That fidayeen tactics are loosing their shock value is also evident from the fact that, while 2001 registered 28 fidayeen attacks, the number fell to just 10 in 2002.

An internal investigation has been ordered to find out just why the perimeter guards in Sunjwan were unable to detect the terrorists who cut their fence, but it is clear the lapse is not part of a general pattern. What does seem probable is that the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT), which is believed by intelligence officials to have carried out the attack, used its not-inconsiderable assets in Jammu to plan the attack and provide shelter to the fidayeen for some time in the vicinity of the Sunjwan army camp. Just last June, the Jammu and Kashmir Police had arrested Pakistani national Zulfikar Rana, who also used the name Mir Husain. A top Lashkar operative, Rana had purchased a large home in Jammu's Ustad Mohalla area, a short walk from the Sunjwan camp. He spent over Rs. 2 million on the home, and acquiring fake identification and 'state subject' papers. Posing as an inconspicuous businessman, Rana ran a broad Lashkar network operating in the Rajouri, Poonch and Doda districts.

But the fact remains that the Sunjwan attack has shattered a brief lull that set in after the end of April, when the India-Pakistan peace process seemed briefly to be gathering momentum. Now, Musharraf may well acquiesce in a sharp escalation in hostilities, hoping to convince the United States that he can only rein in Islamist groups if India makes significant progress towards concessions on Jammu and Kashmir. Musharraf's persistent tactic has been to make covert alliances with the jihadis, and use the threat they present to seek concessions from the United States. Now, however, there is some evidence that the jihadis are starting to resent being used, and asking for payback. In a June 29 television interview, top Islamist leader Fazl-ul-Rahman described the General as "the American ambassador."

There are also signs of dissent in the Pakistan Army. Some reports suggest that Lieutenant General Mohammad Aziz, a senior military figure known for his Islamist leanings, who was 'kicked upstairs' under US pressure in 2001, has now begun to campaign against Musharraf. Accompanied by retired Major General Mohammad Anwar Khan, the President of the 'Azad Kashmir' region of Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (which excludes the 'Northern Areas'), Aziz has been holding meetings in the remote tribal regions of northern Pakistan, delivering speeches that are 'virulently critical of India and Hinduism' and that 'also give hints of his disapproval of Musharraf's refusal to shed the post of COAS.' The Islamist Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA), which Musharraf helped bring to power, is now starting to growl at its creator, and is demanding that the General demit either his role as Pakistan's President, or its Chief of Army Staff.

It is much too early to say, of course, whether the Musharraf-Mullah honeymoon is truly approaching an end. What is clear, however, is that Pakistan is once again in flux - and, as a consequence, Jammu and Kashmir is more than likely soon to be subjected to uncomfortably 'interesting times'.

ASSESSMENT

INDIA

Assam: More Pressure on the ULFA
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati

Around the same time as the then Prime Minister Chandrashekhar got Assam's regional satrap Prafulla Kumar Mahanta sacked as Chief Minister on the night of November 27-28, 1990, leading to the clamping of President's rule, the Army's military machine moved into an otherwise sleepy, but dense jungle around Lakhipathar, in eastern Assam's Tinsukia district, 550 KM from Guwahati, the State capital. That was an assault - codenamed Operation Bajrang - on the general headquarters of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) located inside that heavily wooded forest. The Operation had been necessitated by the reign of terror that the separatist rebels had created in the State, targeting its tea industry, its officials, vital installations and its business and trade. Operation Bajrang was also the first counter-insurgency offensive by the authorities against the ULFA, the separatist organization that has sought to create a 'sovereign, Socialist Assam' since its formation in 1979.

Nearly 13 years down the line, Lakhipathar is again the focus of a major counter-insurgency operation, as Army troopers from the 2nd Mountain Division once again moved into the area on June 23, 2003. The General Officer Commanding (GOC) of the Division, Major General H.S. Batra told this writer from his base in the area that a large number of troops had been deployed to surround the dense forest and track down an ULFA hit-squad that was holed up there. General Batra did not disclose the number of soldiers put into the 'special operation' that has no code name, but several hundred Army men, it is learnt, have been put on the job in the same area that housed the ULFA's general headquarters, discovered and smashed in the winter of 1990. Reached by telephone, Brigadier B.K. Gulati, who is directly heading the operation, disclosed that helicopters had been used to scan the forests and track the movement of the rebels. Till the time of writing on Monday morning, the hunt was still on.

The latest turn of events has raised a number of questions: Is Lakhipathar back on ULFA's map? What could be the strength of the rebels hiding in this vast forest? Why is the Army undertaking such a major location-specific 'special operation' since normal anti-insurgency offensives have been a continuous process across the State? ULFA's military chief Paresh Barua and his aides escaped the 1990 Indian Army 'clean up' because, on that occasion, he was at Saraipung, the rebel group's central training camp, and not at the GHQ in Lakhipathar, a four-hour trekking distance away. During the 1990 assault the troops had apparently focused only on Lakhipathar and, consequently, came into fire-contact only with the ULFA's '2nd line' leadership. Today, however, the area is securely in the grip of the Army and other security agencies, and it is unlikely that Lakhipathar could have re-emerged as a safe staging base. Nevertheless, considering the thick forest cover and access to the militant-infested Tirap and Changlang districts in the adjoining State of Arunachal Pradesh, and then on to northern Myanmar, the Upper Dihing Reserve Forest, around Lakhipathar, will always be a temporary and preferred transit route for ULFA or other rebels.

The GOC of the Army's IV Corps, Lieutenant General Mohinder Singh, who heads the unified operational command of security forces in Assam, has put the number of ULFA rebels currently inside the Lakhipathar jungles at just 30. He told journalists last week that these rebels, from ULFA's '28th battalion' (known to comprise some of the rebel group's best fighters) had sneaked into the area from their hideouts in Myanmar with the aim of attacking security forces, and had split themselves into three groups. In fact, rebels from this 30-member strike force were said to have carried out the night-raid on an Oil India Limited (OIL) storage facility at Nagajan, near Tinsukia, on June 20, 2003, killing two soldiers of the paramilitary Central Industrial Security Force (CISF), wounding another and losing one of its men in a shootout that followed. The rebels had waylaid a bus carrying OIL personnel to the Nagajan facility on their way to relieve their colleagues at the end of their work shift. The rebels had also fired a rocket-propelled grenade at an overhead crude storage tank. Three days later, on June 23, ULFA rebels lying in wait ambushed an Army column near village Juriapool, close to Lakhipathar. A civilian driver of the hired Army vehicle was killed, and nine soldiers were injured in that attack.

Counter-insurgency authorities in Assam may have opted for such a 'special operation' primarily with a view to deny ULFA an opportunity to set up even a semi-permanent base in the dense and strategically located Lakhipathar jungles once again. Besides, the offensive is aimed at either capturing or eliminating the ULFA strike force, which is armed with RPGs and other weaponry, in view of the latest spurt in their violent activity. With Independence Day on August 15 approaching, the counter-insurgency authorities are aware that the ULFA would try to launch noticeable strikes on security forces or other symbols of state authority as it has been doing for the past several years now.

The Lakhipathar area acquires additional significance in view of reports that the rebels in six major ULFA bases inside the Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan would try to shift to the Arunachal Pradesh-Myanmar border in the event of a military crackdown against them by Thimphu (Indian intelligence sources at one stage had information of the existence of as many as 36 camps of the rebel group inside Bhutan). Already, Army scouts have noticed the existence of huts on the periphery of the Lakhipathar jungles where ULFA men, engaged in hit-and-run strikes or on reconnaissance missions, may have stayed. The areas bordering Myanmar in Arunachal Pradesh would be the next best choice for the large ULFA contingent in case they have to move out of Southern Bhutan. Access aside, the Myanmar border is under the influence of several northeast Indian rebel groups, including the Khaplang faction of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (NSCN-K), with which ULFA has a working understanding.

Both Indian and Bhutanese authorities have denied speculations in a section of the media that a military offensive against the ULFA has already begun inside the Kingdom. But, Thimphu has formally set June 30 as the deadline for the rebels to make a peaceful withdrawal from Bhutanese territory, and has threatened the use of 'military force' to expel them if they do not pull out on their own. With New Delhi commanding tremendous influence over Thimphu, ULFA is not taking the Bhutanese threat lightly. Besides, the Indian Army is known to be in the know of exact details of the locations of ULFA camps, the arsenal at their disposal, their strength and capabilities. It is actually Bhutan's fear of retaliation by the ULFA on its citizens - who have to pass through Assam territory to reach parts of the landlocked kingdom - that is preventing Thimphu from agreeing to a joint assault with the Indian Army to expel the rebels. Since the area on the border with Myanmar could be where the ULFA rebels might be looking to shift, lock, stock and barrel if all options were to die out, the counter-insurgency authorities may be trying to step up the heat to prevent any such attempt. Things on the ground are, however, far from simple, and the outcome of the present operations, and developments beyond the June 30 Bhutanese deadline are still entirely in the realm of speculation.

 

NEWS BRIEFS


Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts in South Asia
June 23-29, 2003

 
Civilian
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total

BANGLADESH

1
0
2
3

INDIA

     Assam

2
0
4
6

     Jammu &
     Kashmir

16
18
34
68

     Left-wing
     Extremism

5
0
7
12

     Manipur

0
0
3
3

     Meghalaya

0
2
0
2

     Tripura

0
0
2
2

Total (INDIA)

23
20
50
93

NEPAL

0
0
1
1

SRI LANKA

1
1
0
2
*   Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.



BANGLADESH

Huge cache of arms and ammunition recovered in Bogra: In the largest ever ammunition haul in Bogra district on June 27, 2003, police seized 115 kilograms of 'high powered' explosives and 62,100 rounds of live bullets of Chinese rifles during separate raids in an unnamed village under Kahalu upazila (administrative unit) of the district. 31 kilograms of the explosives and 12,000 rounds of bullets were recovered from the residence of a local Awami League leader. The police also recovered 84 kilograms of explosive and 50,100 of bullets from a truck that was parked nearby in subsequent searches. The police also arrested five persons in this connection. Daily Star News, June 29, 2003.


INDIA

12 soldiers killed in suicide attack on army camp in Sunjwan, Jammu: In the first major terrorist strike since Prime Minister Vajpayee's April 18-peace initiative, two fidayeen (suicide squad) terrorists attacked an army installation at the Dogra Regiment camp in Sunjwan on the outskirts of Jammu city on June 28, 2003, killing 12 soldiers and injuring seven others before being killed by the troops. Two suicide terrorists wearing army uniforms reportedly stormed the army camp in the early hours hurling grenades and firing indiscriminately, killing two guards at the main gate. While one of them entered the ground floor barrack and commenced indiscriminate firing on the sleeping soldiers with an AK rifle, the second terrorist took position outside the barrack. The terrorists were later shot dead by a quick reaction team of the Army. Two AK-47 rifles with Pakistani markings and carrying Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) symbols, besides 13 magazines, 470 rounds of ammunition, 23 grenades, some explosive material and Rupees 1,800 in Pakistani currency were recovered from the slain terrorists. Meanwhile, a lesser-known terrorist group Al Nasreen, claimed responsibility for the attack. One Abu Salim Mehmood, claiming to be the spokesperson of the outfit, called up the Press Trust of India office from Srinagar and said that three Al Nasreen cadres had carried out the attack. Daily Excelsior, June 29, 2003.

No mediation on Kashmir issue, says outgoing US Ambassador Blackwill: The United States on June 28, 2003, rejected Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's call to mediate on the Kashmir issue as part of his 'roadmap' for normalization of India-Pakistan ties. "The decision makers are India and Pakistan, so there will not be a third chair at the table," outgoing US Ambassador to India Robert Blackwill told the Sahara Television channel. Musharraf's suggestion for a West Asia-type peace 'roadmap' involving the US on the Kashmir issue, put forward during his visit to Washington, has already been rejected by India. "There is no middle path, we are not going to mediate. What we will do is just facilitate the two countries and that is substance, it is not a roadmap, it is not a game plan and it is not a blueprint," the Sahara Television quoted him as saying in a release. Rediff, June 29, 2003.

US indicts 11 Lashkar-e-Toiba terrorists for plotting terrorist attacks: A 41-count Federal Grand Jury indictment has been turned against 11 Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorists who have been charged with conspiracy to "prepare for and engage in violent jehad" against foreign targets in Kashmir, Philippines and Chechnya. The 11 include eight persons arrested by agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in Maryland, Virginia and Pennsylvania on June 27, 2003, and three others believed to be in Saudi Arabia. All are said to be members of the LeT that has been formally designated by the US State Department as a Foreign Terrorist Organisation in year 2001. Nine of the 11 charged have been identified as U.S. citizens. "Right here in this community, 10 miles from Capitol Hill, in the streets of northern Virginia, American citizens met, plotted and recruited for violent jehad", U.S. Attorney for the eastern district of Virginia, Paul McNulty, said at a news conference. "These indictments are a stark reminder that terrorist organisations of various allegiances are active in the United States and these groups exploit America's freedom as a weapon to recruit and position themselves on our shores, in our society'', he remarked. The Hindu, June 29, 2003.

Prime Minister rejects Pakistan President's suggestion on US-sponsored 'roadmap' to solve Kashmir issue: Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee on June 27, 2003, rejected Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's suggestion for a US-sponsored 'roadmap' on the lines of West Asia to resolve the Kashmir issue. "I do not see the possibility or the necessity (of such a plan)," he said during a press conference at Shanghai on the last day of his visit to China. Musharraf had earlier told an American TV channel that he would like US President George W Bush to involve himself in a West Asia-style 'roadmap' on Kashmir, but feared India would not allow that as it wanted bilateral resolution "of everything". Meanwhile, answering another question, Vajpayee said "very few issues" connected with Pakistan had been raised during his discussions with the Chinese leadership. "My visit wasn't Pakistan centric," the Premier added while acknowledging that certain issues related to Pakistan had emerged while discussing the South Asia situation. Daily Excelsior, June 28, 2003.

Kargil war sabotaged efforts to solve Kashmir issue, say two former Pakistan Premiers: Describing President Pervez Musharraf as a "traitor", former Pakistan Prime Minister Nawaz Sharief has said that he and Indian Premier Atal Behari Vajpayee "almost" decided on a deadline to resolve the Kashmir issue, but the process was sabotaged by the Pakistan military by staging the Kargil war. In his first interview on record ever since he was exiled to Jeddah in Saudi Arabia in 2000, Sharief said that he along with Vajpayee had decided to resolve the Kashmir issue peacefully through the Lahore peace process. "I can only say here that Vajpayee and myself had almost decided a deadline for a peaceful resolution of the Kashmir dispute," he told Pakistan's Daily Times from his exile. "Vajpayee's visit to Lahore was a link in the chain. Had it not been for Kargil whereby all our plans were sabotaged, the issue of Kashmir would have reached an historical resolution long ago," he said. Separately, another former Prime Minister, Benazir Bhutto, while terming Pakistan's Kargil incursion as an "absolute disaster", claimed that Pervez Musharraf as a senior army commander had brought the plan to her when she was in power, claiming he would put Pakistan's flag on Jammu and Kashmir. "I asked (Gen) Musharraf what would happen when the Kargil plan was put up to me and he said he would put the flag of Pakistan on the Srinagar Assembly," recalled Bhutto in an interview to 'Worldview India' programme on the Indian television channel Doordarshan. Bhutto said that she had vetoed the plan because she knew that "ultimately we would have been asked to go back to where we were and that's exactly what happened". Daily Excelsior, June 26, 2003.


PAKISTAN

Pakistan Army deployed in PoK to quell protests against Islamic curriculum: The Pakistan Army has been reportedly deployed in Gilgit town as protests swept across the northern areas of Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK) over the past few days against the Federal Government's decision to introduce the 'Islamiat' curriculum in educational institutions. The local administration was reportedly unable to control the violent protests that erupted, when local people expressed their dissatisfaction at the decision to change the curriculum, a change, which they said "conflicted with their 'school of thought'" (the local population is predominantly Shia, while the proposed curriculum is said to impose Sunni interpretations of Islam) The situation turned worse when a mob allegedly tried to close down an army-run school in Gilgit town last week. The Army and Frontier Constabulary had to be deployed following violent protests and a boycott of classes in which several people were injured. Meanwhile, the local administration said discussions between the leaders of the Shia community and officials of the Federal Education Ministry are underway, in a bid to resolve the issue amicably. Daily Excelsior, June 30, 2003.

President Musharraf assures US of hundred percent efforts to end cross-border terrorism: The visiting Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf reportedly assured US President George W Bush that he would make a 'hundred per cent effort' to end cross-border terrorism against India. "Musharraf has committed to a hundred per cent effort at trying to end cross-border incidents", a senior Bush administration official said while briefing reporters on the talks the two leaders held at Camp David on June 24, 2003. According to the official, Musharraf said he had moved against cross-border infiltration and that he had made sure there were no terrorist camps inside Pakistan occupied Kashmir (PoK). When asked whether the US was willing to mediate on the Kashmir issue, the official said, "We are not getting into that because nobody has asked us yet. When and if the two sides think we have a role to play, we will play that role that the two sides agree on." He also added that the US three billion dollar aid package to Pakistan was conditioned on "Pakistan working vigorously with the United States in the war against terrorism, working vigorously to ensure that there is no onward proliferation and moving smartly towards democracy." Meanwhile, in an interview to the ABC television on June 25, President Musharraf has said that he would like the US President to involve himself in a West Asia-style 'roadmap' on Kashmir, but feared India would not agree to that, as it wanted bilateral resolution "of everything." Jang, June 26, 2003; Outlook India, June 25, 2003.


SRI LANKA

LTTE preparing for war, says President Kumaratunga: On June 25, 2003, the Sri Lankan President Chandrika Kumaratunga reportedly warned that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which pulled out of the peace talks on April 21 was preparing for war. She further said that security forces are ill prepared to meet any eventual offence in the northern peninsula of Jaffna. According to the President's spokesperson, Harim Peiris, she also expressed that the LTTE might repeat the events following the 1995 peace process when, after abruptly pulling out of the negotiations, they returned to war. Daily News, June 26, 2003.

 

The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that brings you regular data, assessments and news briefs on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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