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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 1, No. 6, August 26, 2002

Data and assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal




STATISTICAL REVIEW

Terrorism related fatalities in Tripura, 1992-2002

Year
Civilians
Security Force Personnel
Terrorist
Total
1992
59
18
21
98
1993
148
28
7
183
1994
206
22
10
238
1995
178
34
45
257
1996
140
31
18
189
1997
205
50
19
274
1998
214
25
26
265
1999
240
41
22
303
2000
453
16
45
514
2001
239
31
42
312
2002*
71
30
28
129
Total
2153
326
283
2762
Computed from official sources and English language media.
* Data till August 25, 2002

 

ASSESSMENT

INDIA
PAKISTAN

Do Peacemakers Make Peace? US Diplomacy and Conflict on the Line of Control
Guest Writer: Praveen Swami
Chief of Bureau, Mumbai, Frontline

Conventional wisdom has it that the United States' energetic diplomatic activity in South Asia helps ensure that nuclear-armed India and Pakistan do not go to war. Recent events along the Line of Control (LoC) have once again underlined the impression, however, that United States' peacemaking may in practice be encouraging sub-conventional aggression by Pakistan - and protecting that country from a proportionate response by India.

Speaking in Islamabad on August 23, 2002, military spokesperson Major-General Rashid Qureshi - known for his obfuscation and more than occasional dishonesty on the role of his Force during and since the 1999 Kargil war - claimed that Pakistani troops had beaten back a air-supported Indian military offensive in the Gultari area, facing Drass and Kargil on the Indian side of the LoC. Scores of Indian soldiers, he claimed, had been killed in the Pakistani military response to 'Indian aggression'. Qureshi made his remarks at the time when Deputy-Secretary of State Richard Armitage was in New Delhi as part of a larger mission to secure de-escalation along the LoC.

Two questions are key here. First, what actually happened? And second, what did Qureshi hope to achieve by proclaiming that the situation on the LoC was especially fragile?

Towards the end of July 2002, there was, in fact, a clash in which India used air power against Pakistani Forces for the first time since the Kargil war, but it was on the Indian side of the LoC, and followed the discovery that Pakistani Forces had occupied Indian positions. At 1:15 PM on July 29, eight Mirage-2000 aircraft sorties were carried out against Pakistan-held positions at Loonda Post, on the Indian side of the LoC in the Machil sector. 1,000-pound precision-guided bombs were used to obliterate four bunkers occupied by Pakistan, while 155-millimetre Bofors howitzers were used to hit troops who had dug into forward trenches prepared by Indian troops in earlier years. At least 28 Pakistan soldiers, Indian military intelligence officials believe, were killed in the fighting.

It isn't entirely certain just when and how the Pakistan Army managed to take Loonda Post, and those who might know aren't talking. The affair, however, made two things clear. First, India was willing to respond with massive force to any violation of the LoC. If the Pakistan Army believed India would not be willing to risk either horizontal or vertical escalation of localised conflict, the expectation was belied. The fact that the air strikes were carried out in broad daylight was an easy-to-read Indian gesture underlining its determination.

There is, on the other hand, no evidence that the clash Qureshi spoke about ever actually took place, though it is known that the situation in the Kargil sector has been fraught since at least May 2002. Earlier this summer, Indian troops reoccupied Point 5070 in the Drass sector, a peak named, like others, after its altitude in metres. Point 5070 dominates the strategically-vital Mushkoh nullah (stream), to the east of Drass sub-sector, the scene of some of the bloodiest fighting during the Kargil war. Fighting continues over Point 5303 in the Marpo La area, to the west of Drass. The conflict last lead, on August 19, to intense artillery exchanges up and down the LoC in the Kargil sector.

Both these offensives, particularly the effort to recapture Point 5303, have been hampered by Pakistani fire from Point 5353, the highest feature in the Drass area. The mountain was occupied by Pakistan after the end of the Kargil war, as a result of local tactical errors by the Drass-based 56 Brigade, which were compounded by high-level command failings, provoked by the political need not to concede that a crucial position had been lost. The Indian Army, which has lost seven soldiers and nine civilian high-altitude porters in the fight, has been arguing for the use of full-blown artillery and air strikes to regain the position, which gives Pakistan the ability to bring accurate artillery fire to bear on a section of the Srinagar-Leh highway. So far, aware of the possible consequences, the Union Defence Ministry has blocked calls for an assault on Point 5353, but patience is wearing thin.

Qureshi, it seems probable, may have resorted to his Gultari fiction in order to prevent precisely such an assault. His fiction did serve to suggest that any localised conflict along the LoC could spiral out of control - or, indeed, that Pakistan would seek to ensure it did. This stance is at par with the tactical thinking that led to the Loonda Post occupation. Pakistani strategists apparently and deliberately ignored the prospects of a major Indian response, and the potential for the conflict to widen, given that both armies currently have troops massed along their frontiers. They did this, secure in their belief that American 'peacemaking', however well-intentioned, provided a kind of insurance policy for ill-considered and irresponsible military adventures.

Armitage, to his credit, does not appear to have fallen for the Pakistan military's loud protestations. If they are actually serious about de-escalating tensions along the LoC, however, the Deputy-Secretary and his policy-establishment colleagues do need to think carefully about just what they are doing in South Asia, and how their actions impact on the regional conflict and its potential for resolution.

ASSESSMENT

Tripura: The Politics of Ethnic Terror
Ajai Sahni
Editor, SAIR; Executive Director, Institute for Conflict Management

On August 20, 2002, terrorists belonging to a faction of the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), killed 20 personnel of the paramilitary Tripura State Rifles (TSR) in a daylight ambush at Hirapur, in the West Tripura district [Map] of this troubled State in India's Northeast. Clearly acting on inside information, the militants had attacked 25 Security Force (SF) personnel traveling in a single truck, on their way to a hospital where they were taking three of their number for treatment. A shortage of vehicles had resulted in the truck traveling unescorted, against established norms in the area.

The Hirapur ambush was among the worst ever attacks on the security forces in Tripura, but terrorists, particularly belonging the NLFT and the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), have long wreaked havoc in the State, and more than 129 persons, including 71 civilians and 30 SF personnel, have already lost their lives to terrorist violence this year. In addition to the August 20 incident, the NLFT alone has been responsible for at least five major attacks - among a large number of smaller strikes - in 2002.

  • On Janurary 13, they massacred 16 non-tribal civilians at the Singhicherra market near the Khowai sub-division of West Tripura district.
  • On February 5, they gunned down six Mog tribals at West Nalicherra village in the Dhalai district.
  • On May 29, three TSR jawans (soldiers) were killed when NLFT militants ambushed the vehicles they were traveling in from Agartala to Kailashahar, at Ghagracherra under Manu police station in Dhalai district.
  • On July 19, a Border Security Force (BSF) Deputy Commander and a Rifleman were killed by NLFT militants at Behalabari, near Khowai, in a surprise dusk ambush.
  • On July 26, four TSR personnel and two Central Industrial Security Force (CISF) jawans were killed at Debendrasardarpara near Gabardi when the NLFT militants pulled off a surprise ambush. The security persons were escorting Oil & Natural Gas Corporation (ONGC) workers to a drill site.

The persistent violence in Tripura occurs within the context of a deepening nexus between major political parties and terrorist groups. Terrorist groups in the State also have strong connections with other insurgent organisations in the region. These groups, often aided by Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), exploit the 865 kilometre-long porous border with Bangladesh to establish their hideouts beyond Indian territory. The State has emerged as a major corridor for pushing arms into the Northeast, with groups such as the NLFT procuring arms and ammunition from South East Asian countries such as Thailand and Singapore, and depositing them at Cox Bazaar in Bangladesh, one of the major illegal arms centres in the region. Terrorists groups in the State are deeply criminalised and have transformed abduction into a lucrative industry. The State, which has barely 8.29 per cent of the Northeast's population, accounts for over 70 per cent of all abductions in the region.

The State Government has long argued its inability to contain the militancy in the State without greater support from the Centre, and Chief Minister Manik Sarkar has repeatedly blamed the withdrawal of the Army from counter-insurgency operations for the worsening situation. Three Army battalions had been engaged in counter-insurgency operations when they were abruptly withdrawn from the State in the wake of the Kargil war in Jammu & Kashmir in 1999. Worse, the total force guarding the extended and troubled border with Bangladesh has also been halved. Sarkar disclosed that nine of the 18 BSF battalions patrolling this border had been withdrawn by the Centre, making it much easier for the militants to strike and flee into their safe havens across the border. The Chief Minister is also reported to have provided the Union Government with a list of 51 terrorist camps in Bangladesh, including 32 of the Biswamohan Debbarma faction of the NLFT, three of the NLFT Nayanbasi Jamatia faction, and 16 of the ATTF, spread across the Sylhet, Habigunj and Laulavi Bazar districts and the Chittagong Hill Tracts. The ruling Bangladesh National Party (BNP) is known to have been deeply supportive of these groups during its last tenure, and acted in collusion with the ISI to help set up these camps and facilitate insurgent activities against India. The ruling Left Front government at Tripura apprehends that the insurgency in the State will escalate following Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf's recent visit to Dhaka. It is significant that the Hirapur massacre was executed by the Nayanbasi Jamatia faction of the NLFT, and this was confirmed by Jamatia himself in Fax messages to newspapers and an interview to the BBC from Srimangal in Bangladesh. Chief Minister Manik Sarkar says, "We have been repeatedly urging the Central Government to take up the matter of Tripura militant groups having camps in Bangladesh with Dhaka."

Safe havens in Bangladesh and the ISI's machinations apart, the real obstacle to peace in the State lies in the deep vested interests that are now entrenched both within the political scenario and in the operations of militant groups. The unyielding polarisation between the tribal population and the non-tribals has been exacerbated, at once, by electoral politics and by extremist atrocities. There is now incontrovertible evidence of a deepening nexus between major political parties and terrorist groups. The NLFT is said to have close links with the Congress (I), while the ATTF is aligned with the ruling Left Front. There are clear indications that terrorism in the State - with its disproportionate emphasis on criminal activities such as abduction and extortion - is substantially supported and sustained by political patronage.

Insurgency in the State of Tripura has its roots in demographics, and this is the only State in India's Northeast that has been transformed, in recent history, from a predominantly tribal to a predominantly non-tribal State. Tribal terrorist groups specifically target the non-tribal population, whom they call 'settler refugees'. Insurgent violence in the State dates back to the first Communist Party of India (CPI) led movement in 1948-51, but assumed its current contours of tribal vs. non-tribal violence through a succession of militant organisations and movements since the creation of the now defunct Tripur Sena in the early 1970s.

With State Assembly elections due again in February 2003, the volatile ethnic politics, and its exploitation by short-sighted political groupings in Tripura, can be expected to create a crescendo of violence in the State. It is hardly unexpected if this is encouraged further by the interventions of unfriendly neighbours in the South Asian region.

 

NEWS BRIEFS

Weekly Fatalities: Major conflicts in South Asia
August 19-25, 2002

 
Security Force Personnel
Civilian
Terrorist
Total
INDIA
35
27
41
103
Assam
4
2
2
8
Jammu & Kashmir
11
25
31
67
Meghalaya
0
0
1
1
Nagaland
0
0
4
4
Tripura
20
0
0
20
Left-wing extremism
0
0
3
3
NEPAL
1
0
67
68
Provisional data compiled from English language media sources.

 


INDIA

Terrorists massacre 10 civilians in J&K: Suspected Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT) terrorists massacred 10 civilians in two separate incidents in the Thana Mandi and Manajakote areas of Rajouri district of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) on August 23, 2002. In the first incident, approximately 10 terrorists attacked Dudansaballa village in Thana Mandi and killed eight persons, including three women. In another incident, two more civilians were killed at Hayatpur and Kalaali villages of Rajouri. Terrorists also reportedly left behind a note, which warned people against participation in the forthcoming J&K Legislative Assembly elections and against getting recruited in the police. Daily Excelsior, August 25, 2002.

India conveys its concern on cross-border terrorism to US: India on August 23, 2002, informed the visiting US Deputy Secretary of State, Richard Armitage, that Pakistan was not keeping its commitment to permanently end cross-border terrorism in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) and was attempting to push in terrorists to disrupt the forthcoming State Legislative Assembly Elections. Speaking to media after the meeting, a Ministry of External Affairs spokesperson said, "There exists a consonance between the two sides in the assessment of the current trends in J&K." Press Trust of India, August 24, 2002.

Five persons killed by NDFB terrorists in Assam: Four security force (SF) personnel and a civilian were killed in an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) blast caused allegedly by National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) terrorists at Maladhara in Assam's Goalpara district on August 21, 2002. 17 SF personnel were also injured in the attack. Assam Tribune, August 22, 2002.

Terrorism figures prominently at SAARC Foreign Ministers meet in Nepal: The 23rd session of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) Council of Ministers, which began in Kathmandu, Nepal, on August 21, 2002, voiced concern over the resurgence of terrorism in new forms and its viciousness in the region and beyond. The meeting called for redoubling efforts to combat the problem in all its manifestations. At the meeting, India's External Affairs Minister Yashwant Sinha while rejecting Pakistan's fresh offer for resumption of dialogue without pre-condition, added that Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf must honour his commitment to end cross-border terrorism. Earlier, on August 20, ahead of the Foreign Minister's meeting, Foreign Secretaries of SAARC countries agreed to amend their respective national legislation to synchronise them with international laws against terrorism. Press Trust of India, August 21, 2002; The Tribune, August 22, 2002.

50 extremists arrested in Bihar: 50 extremists, including left-wing extremists - Naxalites - of the People's War Group (PWG), Maoist Communist Centre (MCC), Communist Party of India--Marxist-Leninist (CPI-ML), besides cadres of the Ranvir Sena (a private army of landowners), were arrested in Jehanabad district of Bihar on August 21, 2002. A large cache of arms and ammunition, including rifles looted from police, were recovered from them. Times of India, August 22, 2002.

Deputy Premier discusses cross-border terrorism during UK visit: Cross-border terrorism, curbing the flow of funds from Islamist extremists in the UK to terrorists operating in the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and increasing bilateral cooperation to counter international terrorism, figured prominently during Deputy Prime Minister L.K. Advani's three day visit to UK, which began on August 20, 2002. In an interview to Britain's Channel Four Television in London, he said India considers itself "at war" with Pakistan over J&K, though there is no formal declaration of hostilities. He added that there was no point in resuming talks with Pakistan until it terminated cross-border terrorism. Press Trust of India, August 21, 2002.

20 SF personnel killed by suspected NLFT terrorists in Tripura: 20 security force (SF) personnel were killed and four others injured in an ambush laid by suspected National Liberation Front of Tripura - Nayanbasi faction (NLFT-N) terrorists at Hirapur in the West Tripura district of Tripura on August 20, 2002. Outlook, August 20, 2002.


NEPAL

30 Maoist insurgents killed in Rolpa district: Security force (SF) personnel killed 30 Maoist insurgents on August 20, 2002, in Thawang village, Rolpa district. One SF person was also killed and three others injured, while 60 Maoists sustained injuries during the operation. Nepal News, August 21, 2002.


PAKISTAN

Infiltration continuing across LoC, says US Deputy Secretary of State: US Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage said in Islamabad on August 24, 2002, that some terrorist infiltration was continuing across the Line of Control (LoC). However, he also said that Pakistan had assured him that it was not responsible for this. "I can say nothing has changed from the assurances I was given last June when I was here. And there are some obvious infiltrations across the Line of Control, but our friends in Pakistan assured me it is not something sponsored by Pakistan." Armitage added that he had received assurances that Pakistan was doing its best to stop terrorists from crossing into the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. Dawn, August 25, 2002.

Osama, Omar may be in Pakistan, says President Musharraf: President Pervez Musharraf said in an interview on August 19, 2002, that Osama bin Laden and Taliban chief Mullah Mohammed Omar could be hiding in Pakistan's western border-tribal belt. However, he observed, it was more likely they were hiding in Afghanistan. "I won't entirely rule it out," he said, of the chances of the two being assisted by sympathizers in the tribal belt that borders Afghanistan. He also said terrorists may still be crossing the Line of Control (LoC) into the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir. "The possibility is there... it's like the Afghan border, only much worse." Dawn, August 21, 2002.


SRI LANKA

LTTE de-proscription on September 6, 2002: Media reports from Sri Lanka indicated that the ban on Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) would be lifted for a month. A formal announcement in this regard is expected to be made on September 6, 2002, ten days ahead of direct talks between the government and LTTE to be held in Thailand. Tamilnet, August 25, 2002.

 

The South Asia Intelligence Review (SAIR) is a weekly service that will bring you regular data, assessments and news brief on terrorism, insurgencies and sub-conventional warfare, on counter-terrorism responses and policies, as well as on related economic, political, and social issues, in the South Asian region.

SAIR is a project of the Institute for Conflict Management and the South Asia Terrorism Portal.

 

South Asia Intelligence Review [SAIR]

Publisher
K. P. S. Gill

Editor
Dr. Ajai Sahni



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