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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 13, October 13, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Resurgent Sectarianism
Syed Saleem Shahzad
Correspondent, Asia Times
With crackdowns
continuing in the Pakistani tribal belt, a plan to root
out the jehadi network in Pakistan is on the cards. The
recent killings of Shiites in Karachi and the high profile
murder of Maulana Azam Tariq on October 6, 2003, are closely
linked with likely developments in the near future. The
murder of Maulana Azam Tariq, Member of National Assembly
and chief of the Millat-i-Islamia party [formerly the now
defunct Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP)]
and an ally of the country's ruling coalition, has pushed
Pakistan towards deep turmoil. All the big cities of the
country, especially the federal capital of Islamabad, fell
into the hands of violent crowds that took to the streets
on Tuesday, October 7, 2003.
Maulana Azam Tariq was killed when his car was ambushed
by unidentified gunmen at the Golra Mor in the vicinity
of the high security zone of the federal capital. Although
the Millat-i-Islamia party has registered a First Information
Report in which mostly Shiite religious leaders as well
as a Director of the Iranian Cultural Centre was named,
the hawkish elements in the party - the inner circle - are
convinced that the murder conspiracy emanated from Pakistan's
corridors of power. Maulana Azam Tariq's widow was also
heard saying at the funeral that, a few days ago, Interior
Minister Syed Faisal Saleh Hayat (who was also the Maulana's
political rival in the Jhang area) had threatened Maulana
Tariq, after which Azam Tariq always travelled in disguise.
His security escort had also been recently withdrawn by
the Punjab Government, another example that is being quoted
by sympathizers in the context of allegations that the ruling
establishment was behind the murder.
Apart from various subjective opinions, a closer analysis
of the incident suggests several aspects that are inconsistent
with the premise of a sectarian killing. According to reports,
the assailants fired as many as 92 bullets at the car and
at least 30 bullets hit Maulana Tariq. Eyewitnesses stated
that, as soon as the Maulana's car crossed a toll plaza,
a Pajero jeep overtook his vehicle through the second lane
and stopped. Three assailants came out of the Pajero and
started spraying bullets at the car from two sides. They
continued firing for about 20 seconds and escaped after
confirming that Azam Tariq and his colleagues were dead.
The staff at the toll plaza fled to save their own lives.
One eyewitness mentioned that an assailant also fired three
bullets at one of the staffers at the toll plaza, but he
managed to escape.
Later, the Police recovered the Pajero used in the attack
from Mughal Market, Sector I-8, Islamabad. Witnesses said
that the terrorists had abandoned the vehicle along the
road and had driven away towards Faizabad in a white Toyota
Corolla car.
Contrary to earlier patterns of terrorist attacks, this
was not a sudden hit-and-run operation in which killers
generally fire a few bullets in a haphazard way and flee.
Three persons firing 92 bullets would be expected to have
stayed on the spot for some time, probably several minutes.
This clearly indicates a high level of confidence among
the assassins, and suggests the use of professional shooters.
In most past sectarian killings, the attacks have generally
lasted a little over a minute or a minute and a half, with
the killers staying in their vehicle and firing no more
than 20 to 25 bullets, before they flee. In the present
case, moreover, the killers travelled all through Islamabad,
which is under extraordinarily high security these days,
and left the car in the posh Sector I-8 area, where the
private houses of top bureaucrats and businessmen are situated.
Another theory, however, is that Maulana Tariq became the
victim of a revenge killing for an incident that took place
in Karachi on October 3, 2003, in which seven Shia employees
of the Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission (SUPARCO)
were killed.
Whatever the case, the Maulana's killing has brought the
activists of the banned SSP out of hiding, and they have
taken to the streets in extreme anger. Even the dissident
faction of the SSP, the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ)
group, surfaced and joined in the protests. Most of these
people were trained in Afghan training camps during the
Taliban period, and are wanted by the Pakistani Government.
Well-placed sources indicate that the reaction to Maulana
Tariq's murder and the subsequent street violence may cause
Shia-Sunni riots in parts of the country. If this happens,
the Government can be expected to conduct siege and search
operations in areas such as Jhang, Chiniot, Sahiwal, Karachi,
Hyderabad, Faisalabad and Sargodha, arresting persons who
have any manner of linkages with the SSP. Once such an operation
commences, it is expected to take other sectarian and militant
outfits into its ambit as well. US and other western intelligence
agencies are convinced that, of the two Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
factions, one - the Asif Ramzi group (whose command is now
in the hands of Qari Asad) - is behind many terrorist incidents
in which Western targets were involved, including the May
8, 2002, Sheraton bomb blast in which nine French workers
were killed, the Daniel Pearl killing, and attacks on various
churches, among others.
Though the LeJ and SSP are now separate organisations, US
intelligence believes that there are strong surviving linkages
between the two. At the same time, organizations such as
the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM)
and the SSP are also linked. Both Maulana Azam Tariq and
JeM chief Maulana Masood Azhar together received their education
at the Binori Town Seminary in Karachi. Several workers
of both formations frequently change hats and have, time
and again, crossed over from the SSP to the JeM, and back.
Consequently, if the Pakistani establishment takes action
against the SSP, groups such as the JeM would automatically
attract similar action.
Understanding intelligence agency operations in Pakistan
does not require any deep investigations. Such operations
are conducted on set formulas, and intelligence bosses generally
apply the same rules in all comparable operations. Way back
in the mid-1990s, the then Nawaz Sharief Government had
decided to break the network of ethnocentric parties in
Karachi, which had brought extreme lawlessness and a gun
culture to the metropolis. The task was assigned to the
Intelligence Bureau's (IB) Deputy Director General, retired
Wing Commander Tariq Lodhi. The IB arranged special sharp
shooters from its Simli Dam Training Center, who conducted
random killings in selected areas. In the following days,
the city turned violent, giving the law enforcers a reason
to conduct their search and seizure operations that fixed
on workers of ethnocentric parties, eventually breaking
their networks. It now remains to be seen how much time
the street violence in response to Azam Tariq's murder will
last, before it traps the reactionaries in their own net.
Manipur: Caught In a Homeland War
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
The 'homeland
war' is once again rocking the Northeast Indian State of
Manipur, as the majority Meitei community is gripped by
apprehensions that New Delhi is pushing ahead with a secret
plan to slice off the Naga inhabited areas of their State,
and merge them with the adjoining Nagaland State as part
of a possible deal with the separatist National Socialist
Council of Nagalim (Isak-Muivah faction, NSCN-IM).
The Indian Government is engaged in peace negotiations with
the NSCN-IM.
Stoked by this fear, there has been a fresh Meitei uprising
to protect their State's territorial integrity. The trouble
began early last week, resulting in renewed confrontation
with the Nagas, both within Manipur, as well as in nearby
Nagaland.
The immediate provocation for the renewed Meitei protest
was the haste in which the Manipur Government set free 13
NSCN-IM cadres on Tuesday, October 7, 2003, after they had
been detained by State Police commandos the previous day.
It all started on Monday, when 13 NSCN-IM cadres, including
the outfit's 'home minister' A.K. Lungalang and 'deputy
information minister' K. Chawang, were intercepted by the
Police near Kangpokpi, in Manipur's Senapati district, while
they were on their way to the Naga dominated Tamenglong
town to attend a 'political awareness camp' organized by
some Naga groups. Manipur's Congress Chief Minister, Okram
Ibobi Singh, is on record saying that the NSCN-IM rebels
were carrying arms and ammunition with them, and that these
included AK-56 rifles and M-20 pistols. The rebels were
released as quickly as they were held, and escorted out
of Manipur by a Deputy Inspector General of Police, obviously
under intense pressure from New Delhi, where there is enormous
eagerness to keep the 'peace process' on track at any cost.
The Manipur Police was, in fact, well within its right to
detain the armed NSCN-IM activists, since the ceasefire
between the rebel group and the Indian authorities - which
has been in operation since August 1, 1997 - is confined
only to the State of Nagaland. However, the ambiguous nature
of the ceasefire agreement between New Delhi and the NSCN-IM
has been the cause of several avoidable confrontations over
the past six years. In 2001, the Indian Government had announced
the extension of the ceasefire jurisdiction outside Nagaland,
to cover all Naga inhabited areas in the adjoining States
of Manipur, Assam and Arunachal Pradesh. That had led to
an anti-ceasefire uprising by the Meiteis who thought that
this could be the first step towards their State's dismemberment.
The Meitei uprising of June 2001 culminated in mobs burning
down the Manipur Legislative Assembly building and a number
of other Government properties. The Security Forces retaliated
by opening fire on rampaging protestors, killing 18 of them
in the State capital, Imphal. Under pressure, New Delhi
backtracked, saying that the Naga truce would be restricted
to the territory of Nagaland alone, but has totally failed
to prevent NSCN-IM rebels from roaming about with weapons
in areas outside Nagaland.
The issue of the jurisdiction of the ceasefire has become
enormously sensitive because of the steadfastness with which
the NSCN-IM has been pursuing its argument that the Nagas
in the whole of the northeastern region (in the States of
Nagaland, Manipur, Assam, and Arunachal Pradesh) have the
right to live under a single politico-administrative umbrella.
In other words, the rebel group wants New Delhi to concede
a 'greater Nagaland' as an acceptable solution to bring
the curtain down on the 56-year-old Naga insurrection.
The Meiteis, consequently, see any attempt by New Delhi
to extend the truce to Naga areas in Manipur as a move that
would accord legitimacy to the NSCN-IM argument and demand,
and fear that this would eventually lead to parts of Manipur
being merged with adjoining Nagaland.
Another factor that has made the Meiteis restive once again
were recent and unconfirmed reports in a section of the
media that New Delhi's Naga peace envoy, K. Padmanabhiah,
had proposed setting up a 'boundary committee' to include
the Naga-dominated Ukhrul and Senapati districts of Manipur,
and the Tirap district of Arunachal Pradesh, in Nagaland,
ignoring the mood among the majority Meiteis in Manipur.
New Delhi's lack of transparency on negotiations with the
NSCN-IM, and its unwillingness to comment on the veracity
of media reports on the Naga peace process, have only added
fuel to passions that are already running high in the region.
But New Delhi's biggest failure by far, since it entered
into a truce with the NSCN-IM, has been its inability to
confine the heavily armed rebels to their authorized and
designated camps. This, despite the Government of India
agreeing to hold talks in places outside the country, such
as Bangkok and Amsterdam, in accordance with the wishes
of the NSCN-IM, and being generally soft towards the outfit.
New Delhi has also failed to send out a clear message to
both the rebel group and the other States surrounding Nagaland
that the ceasefire was only restricted to Nagaland, and
that the rebels would not enjoy any immunity outside that
State.
Predictably, the issue of detention and subsequent release
under pressure of the NSCN-IM cadres has led Meitei ethnic
and insurgent groups to close ranks yet again. The United
Committee Manipur (UCM), a conglomeration of several pressure
groups fighting for protection of the State's territorial
integrity, had already enforced a general strike on October
8, leading the Manipur Government to clamp curfew in Imphal
to prevent the situation from getting out of hand, as it
did in 2001. The UCM has threatened to launch a series of
agitations in the days to come and has raised the following
demands: a clear statement from the Government of India
that Manipur's territorial integrity would not be disturbed
while evolving a solution to the Naga problem; a clarification
from New Delhi on whether the ceasefire with the NSCN-IM
was in force 'informally' in Manipur; and immediate action
against those NSCN-IM cadres operating within Manipur, and
engaged in extortion.
As of now, the Chief Minister Ibobi Singh's Congress Government
in Manipur has come directly into the firing line of the
powerful Meitei groups such as the UCM. Terming the State
Government 'inefficient and incapable', UCM spokesman Yuminamcha
Dilip said that his organization would be branded as 'enemies
of the people' if it fails to fight for the rights of Manipur
and the Manipuris. In the troubled Northeast, public sentiments
and influential groups who seek to pursue sub-nationalistic
aspirations have the potential to bring down elected governments.
The Manipur Government, like that of Assam, is against conceding
'even an inch' of their territory to Nagaland. Now, gauging
the public mood, the Ibobi Singh Government in Manipur is
likely to increasingly adopt the same language as the Meitei
groups, and lobby for the State's cause in New Delhi, creating
a new problem for the Union Government, which has generally
shown itself incapable of efficiently handling those already
on its plate. The road to Naga peace remains thorny, to
say the least.
Assam: Resisting Extortion - HLL
Leads the Way
Bibhu Prasad Routray
Acting Director, Institute for Conflict Management Database
& Documentation Centre, Guwahati
Assam's
150-year-old and Rupees 30 billion tea industry, mostly
spread over four districts of upper Assam (Tinsukia, Jorhat,
Dibrugarh and Sibsagar), could be heading for another tempest.
The September 26, 2003, extortion notice of Rupees 20 million
served on the Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL)'s Doomdooma
division in Tinsukia district by the United Liberation Front
of Asom (ULFA)
is yet another element in the environment of insecurity
within which vital industries operate in the State today.
However, the company's resolute attempt to defy the terrorist
group's diktats and to rectify the tea industry's
history of submission to terror, may well herald the unfolding
of an entirely different saga of resistance.
The extortion notice, signed by Achintya Saikia on behalf
of ULFA's Eastern Zonal Council, asked the HLL authorities
to pay up the required amount by October 7. Curiously, though,
the outfit refrained from adding any threats or words of
caution in case their demands were not met. The demand on
HLL, the first since 1990 when a similar threat led to the
company closing down its operations in the State, has been
rebuffed by the management, which has not only intimated
the State and the Union Government, but has also brought
out a public notice expressing its inability to pay extortion
amounts to any terrorist group.
The character of ULFA's extortion from the tea industry
has undergone significant transformations over the years.
Towards the late 1980s, when the group was in need of finance
to fund its expanding terrorist activities, the tea industry
attracted the attention of the rebel leadership, with its
glamour and much publicised investments. Any attack on the
'alien masters of the trade', always considered Assam's
exploiters, also boosted ULFA's standing, both among the
State's ignorant masses as well as among its not so ignorant
intelligentsia.
In the earliest known cases of attack on the Tea industry,
on February 15, 1989, D. Chowdhury, the Assistant Manager
of Ledo Tea Estate, had been hacked to death by ULFA terrorists.
On March 13, 1990, Dr P.C. Scaria of Tata Tea Limited was
killed in a shootout at Nalmari. On April 9, 1990, Surendra
Paul, Managing Director of Assam Frontier Tea Company, was
killed by ULFA terrorists while visiting a garden. And so
the list of abductions and killings went on. According to
one estimate, between 1989 and 2000, 15 persons connected
with the tea industry were killed by the terrorists from
the ULFA and the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB).
And in 1999 alone, 15 tea officials / workers were abducted.
In the most recent case, in August 2003, suspected ULFA
terrorists killed the owner of the Diasajan Tea Estate in
Tinsukia district and his two sons for having failed to
pay up an extortion sum of Rupees 50,000.
In the initial days of ULFA's attacks on the industry, the
rebels' demands for financial contributions were sugar coated
with its stated concern for the uplift and progress of Assamese
society. Echoes of these pretensions persist, and, in the
October 1 issue of its newsletter, Freedom - which
would have been prepared at about the same time as the draft
of the extortion notice to HLL - the ULFA did rake up some
similar issues. In its editorial 'Resentment at Noon', the
Freedom noted: "The act of establishment of tea gardens
upon our land was itself an invasion upon our only means
of subsistence and the present policy of depriving the community
totally depended upon the tea industry from their due salary,
bonus etc. is amounted to hit the social establishment of
Assam (sic).'
The tea industry too, due to a combination of fear and disbelief
in the State's ability to provide security to its personnel
in far flung tea estates - distanced as they are from the
bandobast (police arrangements) in the capital -
have tended to bend backwards to appease the terrorist groups.
In 1997, a major controversy erupted over Tata Tea Limited
(TTL)'s cover up deal with the ULFA to treat its cultural
secretary, Pranati Deka, at a Mumbai hospital. Cops blew
the lid off TTL's plan, as Pranati was arrested at the Santa
Cruz Airport in Mumbai along with her newborn baby. The
then Assam Chief Minister, Prafulla Mahanta had declared:
"It is the moral responsibility of companies to inform the
government, the police or intelligence agencies about extortion
by militants." This time around, the HLL has done just that.
The media glare of the recent incident has forced the State
to announce visibly augmented signs of crisis management.
These include the provision of personal security officers
to senior HLL executives; the deployment of two companies
of the Assam Police at Samdang and Bisakopi tea gardens
in Tinsukia district; and the announcement by the State
Police chief that there has been no security lapse for the
tea major in the State. The officiating Chief Minister in
the State Bhumidhar Barman (acting on behalf of Chief Minister
Tarun Gogoi who is in the United States') is seen to be
doing his best to live up to the expectations of his absent
leader.
Regrettably, payment of large sums of money to the terrorist
groups under duress by various companies in the State, most
notably the tea majors, remains a fact, and has, indeed,
been transformed into a smooth institutionalised mode of
money transfer. According to a senior police official, "Each
of the tea companies, small or big, continue paying extortion
amounts to the outfit." During an interview to a weekly
newsmagazine in April 2000, the ULFA Chief, Paresh Baruah,
had asserted, "Everybody who does business in Assam has
paid up." Media reports, a year ago, quoting intelligence
officials suggested a well regulated mode of 'tax' payment
to the outfit by the companies: since it is otherwise difficult
for public limited companies to account for money paid to
militants, the books of accounts usually show such sums
as 'security expenses.' The terrorist groups in the State
have also used small and medium-sized businessmen as bankers
and custodians of funds.
A significant aspect of ULFA's demand note to HLL is its
sheer timing. The tea industry in the State is not only
facing a crisis over the payment of bonus to its vast labour
force, but is at a critical stage of politicisation of the
issue. The traditional Assam Chah Majdoor Sangh (ACMS),
an old union of the Tea labourers affiliated to the Congress
Party in the State, is of late being challenged by unions
formed at the behest of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP),
the Asom Gana Parishad (AGP) and the Left parties. As a
result, the latest incident is being viewed by some analysts
as an attempt by the HLL 'only to escape the bonus burden'.
This is the first prominent case in which a tea company
has made such an extortion demand public and categorically
refused to pay up. Given the same company's earlier decision
to close down its operations in the State in 1990 following
a similar demand, its new-found confidence appears indicative
of the improved security situation in the State. Despite
its abilities to execute occasional and significant terrorist
strikes, the ULFA is in disarray and the present attempt
at extortion could be a move to augment depleting resources,
so essential to meet its huge operational costs. In the
month of May 2003, extortion notices bearing the signatures
of one Prabal Neog were circulated in upper Assam district
of Sibasagar. Media reports had then suggested that the
group had a target of Rupees 2 billion from the Sibasagar,
Tinsukia, Dibrugarh and Golaghat Districts. This enterprise,
however, appears to have failed. It now remains to be seen
whether the HLL example will have any followers.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
October 6-12, 2003
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
INDIA
|
Arunachal
Pradesh
|
0
|
1
|
0
|
1
|
Assam
|
3
|
0
|
2
|
5
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
6
|
8
|
45
|
59
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
1
|
1
|
1
|
3
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
10
|
10
|
50
|
70
|
NEPAL
|
2
|
9
|
147
|
158
|
PAKISTAN
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Outlawed
left-wing extremists
active in five northern
districts: According
to The Independent,
outlawed left-wing
extremist groups
have become active
in the 19 sub-districts
of five northern
districts of the
Chalan Beel area.
These groups have
called for a guerilla
war through distributing
posters and leaflets
in the markets of
those sub-districts.
Quoting an unnamed
official source,
the report said
that the extremists
are active particularly
in Sherpur of Bogra
district, Atrai
of Naogaon district,
Singra and Gurudaspur
of Natore district,
Chatmohor, Bhangura
and Faridpur of
Pabna district and
Shahjadpur, Ullapara,
Raygonj and Tarash
of Sirajganj district.
Independent
Bangladesh,
October 8, 2003.
INDIA
Al
Qaeda active in
Jammu and Kashmir,
says Army Chief:
Chief of Army
Staff General Nirmal
Chandra Vij said
on October 11, 2003,
that operatives
of the Al
Qaeda
were active in Jammu
and Kashmir (J&K).
''There is a presence
of Al-Qaeda militants
in Kashmir,'' Vij
told reporters during
a visit to Jammu.
He also said that
70 to 80 percent
of terrorists in
the State were "coming
from across the
border and were
foreigners." The
Army Chief added
that "There were
85 rebel training
camps in Pakistani
territory, many
of which were merged
with training centres
for the Pakistani
army." Times
of India,
October 12, 2003.
PWG reiterates
threat to kill Andhra
Pradesh Chief Minister:
According to media
reports of October
10, 2003, the proscribed
left-wing extremists-Naxalites-of
the People's War
Group (PWG)
has reiterated its
threat to kill the
Andhra Pradesh Chief
Minister N Chandrababu
Naidu. In a letter
to the Chittoor
district police
chief, the PWG said
that it would once
again attack Naidu
within a month.
"He might have escaped
in October 1 attack
at Tirumala but
there is no question
of leaving him,"
the letter read.
Some PWG posters
carrying a similar
message were also
found in the Chandampet
area of Nalgonda
district. The
Hindu,
October 10, 2003.
Unrest in Manipur
over the arrest
and subsequent release
of 13 NSCN-IM cadres:
At least 13
National Socialist
Council of Nagaland-Isak-Muivah
(NSCN-IM)
cadres, including
its 'home minister'
(kilo kilonser)
A. K. Lungalang,
were arrested by
the Manipur Police
near Kangpokpi,
in the Senapati
district on October
6, 2003. They were
reportedly heading
towards the Tamenglong
district for a 'political
awareness workshop',
which was to be
held on October
8. Meanwhile, an
indefinite curfew
was clamped on October
8 in and around
Imphal, capital
city of Manipur,
following a general
strike called by
the United Committee
of Manipur (UCM)
over the release
of the arrested
cadres by the State
authorities on October
7. Rediff,
October 7, 2003.
NEPAL
125
Maoist
insurgents
killed
in
Dang
district:
At
least
125
Maoist
insurgents
and
four
soldiers
were
reportedly
killed
in
a
clash
that
ensued
after
the
Maoists
attacked
the
army
base
camp
at
Kusum
in
the
Dang
district
on
October
11,
2003.
Nepal
News,
October
12,
2003.
PAKISTAN
Over
100
sectarian
terrorists
still
at
large,
indicates
report:
The
News
quoting
an
official
report
has
indicated
that
over
100
sectarian
terrorists
wanted
in
hundreds
of
killings
during
the
last
one
decade
in
Pakistan
remained
untraced
by
the
security
agencies
thus
far.
Profiles
of
133
terrorists
from
the
proscribed
sectarian
outfits
-
the
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
(LeJ)
and
Sipah-e-Mohammed
(SMP)
-
wanted
in
sectarian
killings
were
prepared
by
the
security
agencies.
Official
sources
have
indicated
that
thus
far
an
estimated
33
have
either
been
arrested
or
killed
in
encounters
with
the
police.
Further,
many
of
these
wanted
sectarian
terrorists
were
regrouping
after
a
brief
lull
in
sectarian
violence
since
the
fall
of
the
Taliban
regime
in
Afghanistan.
These
terrorists
are
allegedly
responsible
for
the
fresh
wave
of
sectarian
violence
in
Quetta,
Karachi
and
Islamabad.
An
official
report
has
reportedly
revealed
that
majority
of
these
wanted
terrorists
had
been
living
in
the
President
Palace
in
Kabul
during
the
Taliban
regime.
Jang,
October
9,
2003.
Leader
of
outlawed
Sipah-e-Sahaba
Maulana
Azam
Tariq
assassinated
in
Islamabad:
Maulana
Azam
Tariq,
leader
of
the
outlawed
Sunni
group
Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan
(SSP)
and
Member
of
National
Assembly,
was
assassinated
along
with
four
others
in
Islamabad
on
October
6,
2003.
Their
car
was
reportedly
ambushed
by
three
unidentified
gunmen
in
the
Golra
Mor
area
of
the
national
capital.
Besides
Maulana
Azam
Tariq,
those
who
died
in
the
attack
were
his
driver
and
three
security
guards,
said
official
sources.
Inspector
General
of
Police,
Islamabad,
Major
(retd)
Muhammad
Akram
reportedly
confirmed
the
death
after
three
close
associates
of
the
Maulana
and
some
party
colleagues
identified
his
body.
No
one
has
claimed
responsibility
for
the
assassination
thus
far.
Azam
Tariq
won
the
October
2002
National
Assembly
elections
from
Jhang
as
an
independent
candidate.
He
is
reported
to
have
formed
the
Millat-e-Islamia
Pakistan
after
the
Federal
Government
proscribed
the
SSP
on
January
12,
2002.
Meanwhile,
one
person
was
reportedly
killed
as
angry
mourners
indulged
in
violence
in
Islamabad
on
October
7
after
the
funeral
of
Maulana
Azam
Tariq.
The
mob
is
reported
to
have
set
ablaze
a
cinema
hall
and
ransacked
a
mosque,
food
market,
a
bank
and
a
petrol
pump
in
the
national
capital.
Jang,
October
8,
2003;
Daily
Times,
October
7,
2003.
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