SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 2, July 28, 2003

INDIA

Manipur: Insurgent Show of Force
Praveen Kumar
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The unsuccessful attack on the life of the Chief Minister Okram Ibobi Singh of the Northeast Indian State of Manipur on July 27, 2003, has only underlined the widespread threat that insurgencies constitute to the lives of the people, including important political leaders and security force personnel. The Chief Minister's convoy was ambushed by the cadres of the suspected People's Liberation Army (PLA) at the Wangjing market area on the journey back to Imphal, the State capital, after inspecting the construction of a dam in his constituency, Thoubal. Ibobi Singh, a leader of the Indian National Congress who leads a four-party coalition under the banner of the Secular Progressive Front, escaped unhurt, though two security force (SF) personnel who were part of the convoy and travelling in a separate vehicle were killed and five other persons were injured in the incident. The State's Irrigation Minister W. Brajabidhu Singh, was also accompanying him when the incident occurred. Sources from Manipur indicate that initially the terrorists attacked the district police chief of Thoubal, Clay Khongsai's vehicle in the Chief Minister's escort, and then fled towards Selungpham, where an Improvised Explosive Device (IED) was triggered off, targeting SF personnel chasing the insurgents. This incident brought the total of persons killed in insurgent violence in 2003 (till July 27) in the State up to 84, including six civilians, 17 SF personnel and 61 cadres of various insurgent groups.

Commenting on the incident, Brigadier E.J. Kochekan, the Commander of the Nine Sector Assam Rifles at Thoubal, said that PLA 'Lieutenant' Gojen Singh was leading the group that attacked the Chief Minster's convoy. The PLA is one of the 39 rag-tag terrorist groups whose presence has been noted in Manipur. The group was established under the leadership of N. Bisheswar Singh on September 25, 1978, with a purported objective of 'organising a revolutionary front' in the entire Northeast, among others. In 1989, the PLA also created a 'political body' called the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF). The PLA is alleged to have five camps in the Sylhet district of neighbouring Bangladesh and two camps in Myanmar with a combined strength of approximately 1,000 cadres undergoing training in disruptive activities in these camps. The organization is reported to have close contacts with Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI), besides linkages with other insurgent groups active in the Northeast.

The immediate objectives of the attack on the Chief Minister are still unclear. However, Chief Minster Ibobi Singh noted, ''It could be one of the many attempts by the militant group to prove its existence in the face of increased pressure by the security forces.'' The Chief Minister also reiterated, "Guns cannot bring solutions. We have been offering talks to all underground groups in Manipur. We are still for talks. If they don't come forward for talks, then the government should also look for another alternative."

This was the first attempt by any insurgent group in the Northeast on the life of a Chief Minister in the year 2003, though there have been several such attacks in the past. The Assam-based United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) had carried out an abortive bid on the life of then Assam Chief Minister Prafulla Kumar Mahanta in Guwahati in October 1997. Then Nagaland Chief Minister S.C. Jamir had escaped at least three attempts on his life by suspected cadres of the National Socialist Council of Nagaland-Isak Muivah (NSCN-IM) during his 10-year tenure as Chief Minister prior to February 2003, the most recent of these on November 29, 1999, at Piphema in the Kohima district.

The attack on Ibobi Singh appears to be part of the strategy devised by three terrorist groups in the Northeast to carry out strikes under a "Coordinated Regional Military Offensive for liberation of the Region from Indian colonial occupation", code-named Operation Freedom. The Manipur People's Liberation Front (MPLF), of which the PLA is a constituent [other constituents of the group are the United National Liberation Front (UNLF) and the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK)] is one of these groups. The MPLF along with ULFA and the Tripura People's Democratic Front (TPDF), a front outfit of the All Tripura Tiger Force (ATTF), operating in Tripura had jointly signed a statement to carry out attacks under Operation Freedom. According to reports, ULFA had initiated the strikes under this Operation on June 17 in Assam's Darrang District, with an attack on an Army patrol in which an Army Major was killed. Three hardcore ULFA terrorists were also killed in this clash.

These attacks indicate that the PLA and its affiliate groups are not inclined to join any peace process that the Government is currently offering. On its part, however, the Government has kept the door open for talks, despite the attempt on the Chief Minister's life. It is evident, however, that the multiple insurgencies in the region cannot be tackled individually, and within individual States, since many of the groups are linked across the region and appear to operate under a common strategy. Most of them, moreover, have established safe havens across international borders, and are in many cases supported by the covert intelligence establishment of Pakistan and Bangladesh. Clearly, a wider strategy, comprehending these various factors, under the aegis of the Union Government, and involving the various State Governments of the region, is needed if the relentless and purposeless violence is to be brought to an end.

INDIA

Shadow-boxing in Meghalaya
Guest Writer: Anirban Roy
Senior Correspondent, Hindustan Times

On July 24, 2003, intelligence inputs from the Assam Police led to a raid on the house of the former Minister of the Congress Party K.C. Boro by the police in Meghalaya, in which four militants - three of the National Democratic Front of Bodoland (NDFB) and one belonging to the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) - were arrested. Even though the first wife of the minister (the second wife was killed in mysterious circumstances in June, allegedly by suspected NDFB militants, though the Police believe the Minister is a prime suspect) pleaded ignorance about the profile of the arrested youths, she admitted that they had been 'working as cooks' in the Minister's house for some time.

The picturesque North Eastern State of Meghalaya has always been one of the most politically instable provinces in the country, and is now probably marching towards another episode of major political uncertainty, as a result of accusations and counter-accusations of proximity with the militants. However, not withstanding the twists and turns of the current episode, a great degree of political shadow boxing is widely expected over the serious nature of the politician-insurgency nexus in the State.

The insurgency in Meghalaya is still in a nascent stage, but has begun to acquire a menacing image mainly because of the patronage it receives from some politicians, who have been exploiting the situation for their own gains. In addition to the consolidation of their organisational structure, the cadres of the two insurgent groups - the Hynniewtrep National Liberation Council (HNLC) and the A'chik National Volunteers' Council (ANVC) - have been able to carry out hit-and-run operations, to a large extent, due to the 'blessings' of political masters.

A Minister directing Government officials to divert developmental funds to the militants' exchequer has been nothing unusual in Meghalaya. Ensuring safe movement of militant leaders in VVIP cars within the State and even outside has also been common. There was a time when a legislator from Shillong even inaugurated a bus stand donated by the HNLC. However, the 'assistance' to the militants is not always for political gains; some political favours go out to the militants mainly because of their social commitments, since cadres-in-arms are often their brothers, nephews, party members or 'boys from the village'.

But the wheel of the political theatre took a full circle in December last year when the then Chief Minister Flinder Anderson Khonglam opened up a Pandora's Box when he quoted intelligence reports to claim that four senior politicians of the State had been 'maintaining close proximity' with the militants. Khonglam's statement was a bolt from the blue for many pundits of Meghalaya's political history and the controversy murkier when he refused to divulge the names of the accused politicians on the pretext that it was 'too early'.

Initially, political observers were of the opinion that the doctor-turned 'immature' Chief Minister had raised the issue of the politician-militant nexus to maintain pressure on his coalition partners, who were set to destabilise the then ruling coalition. Some claimed that the issue of the politician-militant nexus had been 'unnecessarily hyped' by Khonglam during the run-up to the State Legislative Assembly elections. Any confusion over the veracity of the claims was, however, short-lived, and the evidence began to pile up after April 6, 2003, when the State police seized a State pool car allocated to the former Cooperation Minister and senior Nationalist Congress Party (NCP) leader Adolf Lu Hitler R. Marak, when it was being used to ferry ANVC cadres. Marak, however, opened up another chapter of controversy in his attempt to bail himself out of the crisis. While the former Minister said that the vehicle was taken away without his knowledge, he also asserted that he and the former Lok Sabha (Lower House of Indian Parliament) Speaker Purno Agitok Sangma had been requested by Mizoram Chief Minister Zoramthanga to persuade ANVC leaders to come to the negotiating table. Infuriated with Sangma's and Zoramthanga's efforts to keep the State Government out of the 'peace process', Chief Minister D.D. Lapang and the Home Minister Robert G. Lyngdoh practically declared an open war. Setting aside the agenda of restoration of peace, the State Government set about to prove that the peace initiative by Sangma and Zoramthanga was totally misleading. Armed with a letter from the Union Secretary of Ministry of Home Affairs, N. Gopalaswami, the ruling Meghalaya Democratic Alliance (MDA) coalition accused Zoramthanga and Sangma of being 'self-styled' facilitators. Lapang claimed that, as law and order was a State subject, any unauthorised move to initiate peace in Meghalaya with the two banned guerrilla outfits - the HNLC and ANVC - would be dealt with 'iron fist', and threatened to initiate legal action against his Mizoram counterpart and former Lok Sabha Speaker for their unauthorised role as negotiators.

On June 26, 2003, the State Government pushed further, arresting NCP leader Marak on charges of 'aiding and abetting' the ANVC. But, the arrest of the former minister appears to have materialised at a wrong time, with the NCP claiming that the arrest was a 'political vendetta' by the Congress-led ruling Government, intended to malign the largest opposition party. The NCP has 16 members in the 60-member Meghalaya Legislative Assembly.

The NCP also alleges that the ruling Congress was only acting to protect its own members, who have been maintaining close links with the militants, and have demanded the arrest of the former Congress Minister and Vice-Chairman of the Muwmluh-Cherra Cement Limited (MCCL), K.C. Boro, accusing him of maintaining links with the banned NDFB. Boro has also been accused of killing his second wife, Cheina Singh. The decomposed body of the former Minister's wife was found from Ramchaigre Kua jungle under Lakhimpur Police Station in Goalpara district in Assam on June 21.

In the meantime, the State police department has filed cases against as many as 200 businessmen and 31 Government officials for extending financial assistance to the banned HNLC. The cases were based on documentary evidence that was seized from the Khasi outfit's hideouts. Political observers expect that the Government's move to crack down on the militants' funding channels would expose more skeletons in the days to come. If both the Chief Minister and Home Minister stick to their commitment that "no one is above the law", the political theatre is likely to witness many more interesting events. Government officials accused of funding the militants have reportedly told their interrogators that they had diverted development funds to the militants' exchequer following 'instructions' from Ministers. As a result, three Ministers serving in the ruling MDA Government have been brought under surveillance by the intelligence agencies. Officials of the Public Works Department (PWD), Public Health Engineering (PHE) department and the Directorate of Mineral Resources (DMR) feature prominently in the list of those aiding and abetting the extremists. Though the Chief Minister claims that there was no tension in his Cabinet over the issue, there is a great deal of pressure - both political and business - to force the Government to 'soft paddle' on the move against the 'nexus'.

There is, however, evidence of some changes in the attitude of the State Government, politicians, businessmen and Government officials, who may have come to realise that aiding the militants financially and logistically is creating problems for themselves. For the insurgents, this is definitely the beginning of a troubled era. With arrests of a number of senior cadres, the plugging of funding channels, and lukewarm support from sympathisers, the insurgent outfits, especially the HNLC, are being pushed to a position of no return.

In comparison to the HNLC, the ANVC, which is strategically located on the border with Bangladesh, is much better placed and is believed to be capable of carrying out successful operations in the three Garo hill districts of Meghalaya mainly because it has been working in tandem with several other fraternal insurgent groups of the Northeast, including the NSCN, NDFB and ULFA. ANVC militants, taking advantage of the long and porous frontier, often sneak into Bangladesh to evade arrests after carrying out operations in the State. Meghalaya shares a 443 kilometre long border with Bangladesh, and the ANVC runs half a dozen training-cum-procurement units in the Netrokona and Mymensing districts of Bangladesh.

The ANVC has been operationally active in the three Garo Hill Districts mainly because of the State police force, which has been fighting a losing battle. A former Home Minister of the State had reportedly directed the police personnel in the Garo Hills to turn a blind eye to the movement and activities of the banned organisation, and the police have been inclined to 'act softly' against the extremists, knowing well that 'a criminal today, may be their boss tomorrow'. In addition to the pressure from their political masters, police personnel lack training in, and are not equipped for, counter-insurgency operations. During the past years, ANVC militants have killed several police personnel. The poor performance of the police force against the Garo militants has also been due to the hostile terrain and the lack of adequate Force. There is only one battalion of the Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) deployed in the entire Garo Hills area.

While the politicians remain occupied in their game of shadow boxing, the common people of the State are the main casualty of growing militancy and its political patronage. There are clearly no easy solutions, and the issue could easily lead to another political crisis. While the people of the State want peace, they would definitely not be euphoric with any more toppling of Governments over this or any other political issue, since the State has already seen as many as seven Governments during the last 67 months.

SRI LANKA

Sri Lanka: Peace Process Under Threat?
Guest Writer: Ameen Izzadeen
Deputy Editor, The Sunday Times and Daily Mirror

As Sri Lanka last week marked the 20th anniversary of a dark event that changed its destiny, leaving a permanent scar on its body politic and history, the quest for peace assumed not only added significance but also added urgency.

July 23, 1983, was a black day that marked a new and bloody chapter in Sri Lanka's history, after 13 Sinhala soldiers were killed by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), sparking off Sri Lanka's worst ever race riots. Twenty years later and after 65,000 deaths, the national question remains unresolved though a fragile cease-fire between the Government and the LTTE keeps the country suspended between war and peace.

A couple of weeks ago, the people feared that the country would be plunged back to war. The Navy's sinking of a rebel ship believed to be carrying weapons, the setting up of an LTTE camp in the Government-controlled area, the LTTE's refusal to abide by the ruling of Scandinavian truce monitors, the continued killings of members of Tamil parties opposed to the LTTE and of military informants, and the Government's arms-buying mission to Israel, prompted questions as to whether the country had been dragged back to the brink of war.

Although the majority Sinhala community is irked by the LTTE's uncompromising posture vis-ŕ-vis many a contentious issue, none, save a few hardline parties and groups, wants a return to open hostilities. The 20 years of war have cost the country more than 600 billion rupees (US$ 6 billion) in terms of defence expenditure alone. Economist S. S. Colombage has been quoted in a recent article as saying that if not for the war, Sri Lanka's growth rates would have been 7 to 8 percent and the per capita income around US$ 2,000 by now, instead of the present US$ 870.

Aware that the country cannot afford to go back to war, most Sri Lankans, especially the Sinhala majority, grudgingly give their nod to the Government's accommodation of LTTE demands, though this is seen as something of a humiliation.

But the questions many are now asking relate to the LTTE's unwillingness to show any flexibility. Although the LTTE regards its willingness to agree to a federal structure as a major concession for the sake of peace, in terms of concrete action, its contribution towards confidence building has been wanting. On the contrary, it has teased and provoked the Sri Lankan Government with its high-handed actions in an apparent bid to set off a possible return to war. On June 23, the day anti-terrorism police inspector Sunil Thabrew was killed in a Colombo suburb, allegedly by an LTTE double agent, the LTTE stormed a Government prison in Batticaloa to rescue one of its cadres facing murder charges. The LTTE also continues with its much condemned child recruitment process, which includes the abduction of children, although it has given umpteen assurances to international human rights groups to the contrary.

The LTTE has also raised several demands, which the Government is unable to accede to. These include the demand for the withdrawal of security forces from the High Security Zone (HSZ) in Jaffna; and the allocation of a section of the eastern sea for its Sea Tiger wing to conduct naval exercises - terms that cannot be met by the Government without compromising on national security.

To its credit, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe's United National Front administration has exercised utmost restraint in dealing with these irritants. This was evident in its handling of the current crisis over the LTTE's refusal to dismantle a camp set up in a Government-controlled area despite a ruling by the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission that the LTTE action violated the cease-fire agreement. Even the Navy, which has been accused of sabotaging the peace process by some peace activists - after its numerous encounters with the LTTE - has acted within the parameters of the cease-fire agreement and in accordance with international maritime laws.

The Wickremesinghe administration, on July 16, took another major step to reactivate the peace process stalled by LTTE's unilateral pullout from it in April, supporting the demand for an interim administration for the Tamil-dominated Northern and Eastern Provinces. Government circles are optimistic that the LTTE would respond positively to its latest proposals on the interim administrative structure. However, the LTTE had previously rejected earlier communications regarding the interim administration, claiming that they contained little. The latest proposals, have set off a political storm in the South, are currently being studied by an LTTE legal team, and Government negotiators, especially Constitutional Affairs Minister and chief negotiator G. L. Peiris, are confident that there would be a breakthrough this time. Peiris has disclosed that the proposals are a basic 'Discussion Document' aimed at not only drawing an LTTE response, but also getting the rebels back into the peace process. He says further details can be discussed at the negotiating table.

While the Discussion Document has stirred new hope among peace-loving people, President Chandrika Kumaratunga and the main opposition People's Alliance (PA), which is working out a political alliance with the leftists-turned-nationalists Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), a party that has rejected peace with the LTTE, have dropped a bombshell. On July 25, President Kumaratunga's party rejected outright the Government's latest proposals for an interim administration, saying it was premature to talk of such a move when an overall political solution to the ethnic conflict was nowhere in sight.

Adding to the crisis and confusion, presidential advisor and former foreign minister Lakshman Kadirgamar also accused the Wickremesinghe Government of misleading the President and the nation by sending one document to her and a significantly a different one to the LTTE. Government spokesman G.L. Peiris claimed on July 24 that the differences in the two documents were insignificant. But the PA claimed a substantive issue was involved.

While Premier Wickremesinghe has maintained a clear course and commitment, a disturbing feature in the opposition is President Kumaratunga's regular change of stand. On July 23, she was due to address the nation, but it was put off at the last moment because she had apparently not made up her mind on her position regarding the interim administration and because she was apparently displeased with the differences in the documents. On July 24, it was reported that she was closely studying the sensitive issue and would keep her options open. But the next day, her top advisor announced an outright rejection of the latest proposal, leaving the country wondering where its executive president and the main opposition party were wandering on key issues.

The question has now deepened the crisis within the 'cohabitation Government' that has seen more conflicts than cohabitation in its two-year existence. It appears that party interests are taking precedence over the country's interest, which is at the moment in the peace process. The success of the peace process not only depends on the LTTE's commitment to peace but also on the willingness of the two main political parties to shed differences and work together for peace.