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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 23, December 22, 2003
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Going for the Kill
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
At the crack
of dawn, December 15, 2003, King Jigme Singye Wangchuck
unleashed his small military machine, comprising the Royal
Bhutan Army (RBA) and the Royal Body Guards (RBG), to expel
an excess of 3,000 heavily armed Indian separatist rebels
belonging to three different groups - the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA),
the National Democratic Front of Boroland (NDFB)
and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLO).
These rebels had made the Himalayan kingdom their home for
the past 12 years, and from here they launched murderous
hit-and-run strikes on security forces, other symbols of
Governmental authority, as well as civilians, on Indian
soil, in an armed campaign to secure their demands for independent
homelands.
Buddhist Bhutan had last gone to war against any foreign
force 138 years ago, when they fought the British. That
was the Anglo-Bhutanese war of 1865 in which the Crown's
Army defeated Bhutan's then Deb Raja or temporal head, Sonam
Lhendup, and came to exercise much influence on Bhutan's
affairs. That victory also gave the British unhindered trans-Himalayan
access for trade with Tibet. The Royal Government's latest
decision to go to 'war' by using its military, comprising
a strike force of just about 6,000 men, came after six years
of failed talks with the ULFA, NDFB and the KLO in a bid
to persuade them to peacefully pull their armed cadres out
from the Himalayan kingdom.
This was a difficult decision, indeed, for King Wangchuck.
Firstly because, the battle capabilities of the RBA and
the RBG (the RBG is a force actually meant exclusively for
protection of the royal family) were entirely untested,
and could reasonably be expected to be rather rusty, since
these forces had no occasion to fire a single shot, except
during training sessions by the Indian Army that runs a
military training centre inside Bhutan. Secondly, it has
long been feared that a military crackdown could turn the
rebels against the Bhutanese state machinery or its citizens.
This, in turn, would make access into the landlocked kingdom
difficult as most of the roads into southern Bhutan, the
rebels' stronghold, passes through Indian territory, via
the northeastern State of Assam and the eastern State of
West Bengal. But, King Wangchuck could wait no more.
"The military crackdown was our ultimate option. The last
round of talks were held in October-November, 2003, where
the KLO went unrepresented as it did not respond to our
invitation. Middle-level ULFA and NDFB leaders who came
for the meetings said they were unable to leave the kingdom
immediately," Aum Neten Zangmo, Bhutan's Foreign Secretary,
told this writer from Thimphu, the nation's capital. On
the rebels' response during the last round of talks, a Bhutanese
Foreign Ministry statement faxed to this writer stated:
"…The ULFA said that it would be suicidal for their cause
of independence of Assam to leave Bhutan while the NDFB
said that even if they left their present camps, they would
have to come back and establish camps in other parts of
Bhutan..." The Foreign Secretary said even during most of
the earlier 'exit talks' (talks to persuade the rebels to
withdraw from the Kingdom), the rebel groups were represented
by middle-level leaders, while the Royal Government was
represented at the highest level, including that of the
Prime Minister and the Home Minister.
On December 13, 48 hours before the military offensive began,
Thimphu gave a notice to ULFA, NDFB and KLO, through an
item in Kuensel, the country's national newspaper, that
it was left with no option other than entrusting the RBA
"with the sacred duty of removing the militants" from the
country in accordance with the mandate of the 81st session
of the Bhutan National Assembly or Parliament (held between
June and August, 2003). The National Assembly had asked
the Royal Government to try and convince the rebels 'one
last time' to withdraw in a peaceful manner or expel them
by using military force. "The mandate of the National Assembly
was weighing heavily on us. Besides, the rebels' continued
presence was turning out to be a direct threat to Bhutan's
security and sovereignty," Yashey Dorji, Director in the
Bhutanese Foreign Ministry, currently based in the southern
Bhutan combat zone of Samdrup Jhongkar, bordering western
Assam, told this writer. He said schools had to be closed
down, trade and business were hit and the country's social
life was getting 'corrupted' by the militants' presence
in the kingdom.
Ultimatum given, and a strategy put in place in full consultation
with Indian Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee and the
Indian Army, the Bhutanese troops advanced into the dense
sub-tropical jungles of southern Bhutan, bordering the Indian
States of Assam, West Bengal, Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.
The RBA troopers broke the early morning stillness on December
15 by raining 81mm mortars on the heavily mined and well-fortified
ULFA, NDFB and KLO camps while the rebels retaliated with
51mm mortars and grenades, as the chief of the Indian Army's
Kolkata-based Eastern Command Lt. Gen. J.S. Verma disclosed
later. Bhutan said that, on Day 1 of the offensive itself,
the RBA captured ULFA's 'Central Headquarters' (CHQ) at
Phukaptong in Samdrup Jongkhar district. By December 16,
Bhutanese authorities said ULFA's 'General Headquarters'
(GHQ) at Merengphu in Samdrup Jongkhar district, the main
NDFB camp in Tikri, also in Samdrup Jongkhar, the NDFB camp
in Nganglam sub-district and the KLO camps in Samtse district
were overrun. On December 18, all that the tight-lipped
Bhutanese officials at Thimphu, southern Bhutan and New
Delhi would say is that the rebels have been 'dislodged'
from all their 30 rebels camps inside the kingdom (a Bhutanese
Foreign Ministry statement said ULFA had 13 camps, NDFB
12 and the KLO 5) and that the RBA troops were pursuing
them in the dense jungles to flush them out.
Where were the rebels expected to go, as the Indian Army
stands as a virtual wall all along the 380-kilometre Indo-Bhutan
border, remains an unanswered question, or at least a question
not adequately answered by either the Indian or the Bhutanese
authorities.
While the Bhutanese maintained a stony silence on operational
details and fatalities, Indian Army generals gave out some
limited information: On December 18, the Eastern Command's
Lt. Gen. Verma disclosed that between 90 and 120 rebels
were killed, seven RBA soldiers had lost their lives, and
that the Indian Army was only providing 'logistic support',
including making available ammunition and medical supplies
and services, as well as airlifting RBA casualties. Several
RBA soldiers are being treated at Indian military base hospitals,
including the one near Guwahati in Assam. A day later, on
December 19, India's Chief of Army Staff, General N.C. Vij
said that Bhutan has handed over the first batch of seven
captured Indian militants and that more were expected soon.
There were also some Indian intelligence reports of several
top rebel leaders, including ULFA 'publicity chief' Mithinga
Daimary, NDFB publicity head B. Erakdao, and two crack ULFA
'commanders', Bening Rabha and Robin Neog, having fallen
into the RBA net. Mithinga Daimary was among the first batch
of seven rebels handed over by Bhutan to the Indian Army
who, in turn, handed them over to the Assam Police on December
20. Besides that, ULFA's octogenarian political adviser
and ideologue, Bhimkanta Burhagohain, has also died. He
is said to have succumbed to his injuries sustained on Day
1 of the offensive, although a rebel statement on December
19 said he was killed in custody after being captured while
he was leading a group of women, children and injured rebels,
holding a white flag. It is clear, however, that the rebels
have really been pushed to the wall and have lost most of
their key commanders and military planners.
It is interesting to look at the timing of the Bhutanese
assault. After years of vacillation, why did Thimphu decide
to act now? The ULFA has been operating in Bhutan ever since
the Indian Army launched Operation Bajrang in November 1990.
Operation Bajrang was the first-ever military operation
against the rebels in Assam, and it forced them to look
for shelter outside the country. The NDFB joined the ULFA
later. The Bhutanese are now citing the mandate of the 81st
session of the National Assembly to free the kingdom of
the presence of foreign militants. But that has been the
National Assembly's directive for several years now.
It is, in fact, the relatively smaller and rag-tag group,
the KLO, and its affiliations and linkages, more than the
ULFA or the NDFB, that provide the key to the question as
to why Thimphu chose to act now.
Security circles in both India and Bhutan had been rattled
by news of the launching of the Bhutan Communist Party (Marxist-Leninist-Maoist)
on April 22, 2003, the 133rd birth anniversary of Lenin.
Pamphlets widely circulated by this new group in the Bhutanese
refugee camps in Nepal and in areas inside Bhutan itself
revealed that the new party's objective was to "smash the
monarchy" and establish a "true and new democracy" in Bhutan.
That was enough for the Indian and Bhutanese security establishment
to put the ULFA, NDFB and the KLO under intensive surveillance
and scrutiny. It didn't take long for New Delhi and Thimphu
to identify the KLO as the group with a far greater nuisance
value than perhaps the ULFA or the NDFB. The KLO is active
and has pockets of influence in the strategic North Bengal
areas of West Bengal and could act as a bridge between the
Maoist guerrillas in Nepal (the Communist Party of Nepal
- Maoist, or CPN-M) and the newly emerging Maoist force
in Bhutan. Indian intelligence agencies were also aware
of the fact that the KLO had provided sanctuary to fleeing
Maoist rebels from Nepal, that the outfit has acted as a
link between the Nepalese Maoists and radical left-wing
activists in the Indian State of Bihar, and that it had
received help from the Maoists in setting up a number of
explosives manufacturing units in North Bengal. It was these
deepening linkages that forced both New Delhi and Thimphu
to agree that it was time to launch a direct assault on
the rebels in Bhutan before the situation went out of hand.
Cornered in the very first days of the current operation,
the three rebel groups responded by calling a 48-hour general
strike in Assam and parts of West Bengal from the morning
of December 20. In an unprecedented display of the public's
lack of enthusiasm, the strike evoked a very partial response.
The rebels were also quick to put out appeals to King Wangchuck
to bring the operations to a halt in view of the 'traditional
bond' between the people of Bhutan and Assam. Trying to
be diplomatic and perhaps to still keep lines of communication
open, the rebels were initially not very critical of Bhutan,
except in lamenting the launching of the crackdown without
a 'clear ultimatum,' and harping on the fact that 'it is
an Indian Army ploy' to throttle the rebels' movement for
their right of 'self-determination'. By Day six of the offensive,
however, the ULFA's stand had hardened, with the group's
chairman Arabinda Rajkhowa stating to the media that his
group would, from that point on, regard "our enemy's friend
as our enemy."
A war of words alone, however, cannot keep the ULFA or other
rebel groups going in the present situation. As far as the
rebels are concerned, they need alternative bases as soon
as possible, to cool their heels and plan their next course
of action. The jungles of Myanmar, across Arunachal Pradesh,
are one favoured destination. Indications of this came on
December 20 when the Indian Army ambushed and killed three
rebels, two belonging to the ULFA and one from the little-known
Arunachal Dragon Force (ADF), near Namsai in Arunachal Pradesh,
bordering the eastern Assam district of Tinsukia. The chief
of the ADF, Chownomee Namchumoo was captured along with
AK-47 rifles, pistols, grenades and a large amount of explosives
and cash. An Army spokesman told this writer that these
rebels were on their way to a hideout in Myanmar. According
to Khagen Sarma, Assam Police Inspector General (Special
Branch), there are an estimated 400 ULFA rebels in a number
of camps inside Myanmar.
However, if the 1995 joint operations by the Indian and
Myanmarese Armies, codenamed 'Operation Golden Bird,' are
any indication, Myanmar may not be a safe resting place,
and still less a secure staging area, for the Indian insurgents.
Dozens of ULFA and other Northeast Indian rebels were either
killed or captured by troops of the two nations in a pincer
attack during Operation Golden Bird along the Mizoram border.
That leaves two main options for the rebels to look for
as an alternative destination: Bangladesh or Nepal. Neither,
however, is going to be as easy as it had been in Bhutan.
For one, the rebels will not be able to operate such extensive
and well-fortified bases in Bangladesh for lack of sufficient
jungle-covered terrain. Contacts in Bangladesh will certainly
be able to provide the rebels some more safe-houses (top
ULFA leaders have been operating from safe houses in Bangladesh
for years now), but that will not be enough to maintain
a strike force of several hundred, or even several thousand,
people. Secondly, the distance factor and the terrain will
act as impediments to operations. Unlike the Assam-Bhutan
border, the Assam-Bangladesh border is not heavily wooded,
except in the Meghalaya sector, making incursions visible
and thereby detection and response by the Indian security
forces relatively easy. Areas within Nepal that are currently
dominated by the Maoists, and where the Government's presence
is weak, may provide a temporary safe haven. However, considering
Kathmandu's friendly ties with New Delhi, this could at
best serve as a transit base for the Northeast Indian rebels,
and they would eventually be targeted by Nepal's security
forces. As in Bhutan, New Delhi exercises significant influence
over Kathmandu.
Until the ULFA and the other rebels manage to regroup, a
task that is not going to be easy after the reverses they
have suffered in Bhutan, the region can expect to witness
sporadic raids by these insurgents to drive home the message
that they were not yet an altogether spent force. The cat-and-mouse
game is certainly not over, but it is clear from statements
made by the seven ULFA rebels who surrendered to the Assam
Police in the northern district of Darrang on December 20
after escaping from their Bhutan camp on Day 1 of the offensive,
that deep fissures have appeared within the rebel group.
"Our leaders had not given us any indication of an impending
Bhutanese Army attack. We somehow fled and arrived in Assam
after four days' of trekking inside Bhutan. Many more of
our comrades are ready to surrender," Domeswar Rabha, an
ULFA 'lieutenant' who surrendered was quoted as saying to
the Darrang Superintendent of Police, Ejaz Hazarika. There
has long been dissatisfaction among the ULFA cadres based
in Bhutan on the hardship they have had to suffer, while
the top leadership lives in relative security and significant
luxury in Bangladesh. The ongoing Bhutanese assault could
push these strains to breaking point. And to the extent
that NDFB and KLO depend overwhelmingly on ULFA for their
own survival and operational capacities, the weakening of
the principal insurgent group in the region can only leave
them deeply debilitated as well. While the precise direction
of the future can hardly be predicted with certainty, Bhutan's
determined action against Indian insurgents on its soil
will surely be a turning point in the history of several
insurgencies in India's Northeast.
Freedom
from Fear
K. P. S. GILL
President, Institute for Conflict Management
Give Voice
to Moderate Islam
At
a time of great religious polarization and violence
that is sweeping across the world, and a persistent
campaign of terror in the name of extremist political
'Islamism', it is useful to note that the ideology
of extremist Islam is, in fact, being defeated in
many places, and this is happening precisely because
it is a weak and erroneous idea. It prevails only
where the enveloping context is oppressive and does
not allow questioning and criticism in an open discourse…
It is in India that extremist Islam has met with its
most resounding defeat, despite an enormous and sustained
campaign of terrorism, vast financial resources from
a wide range of state sponsors, and continuous support
and encouragement from Pakistan….
The intellectual and cultural accomplishments of Indian
Muslims are far greater than the sum of those of all
other Muslim countries put together, and Indian Islam
is unique in its accommodation, as it lives in peace
within a multicultural, multi-religious and multi-lingual
society….
See
full article: Freedom
from Fear
Published: The Pioneer, December 20, 2003
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
December 15-21,
2003
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BHUTAN*
|
0
|
7
|
120
|
127
|
INDIA
|
Arunachal
Pradesh
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
9
|
9
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
7
|
4
|
22
|
33
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
4
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Tripura
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
11
|
4
|
40
|
55
|
NEPAL
|
0
|
12
|
39
|
51
|
PAKISTAN
|
2
|
1
|
0
|
3
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
*
|
Fatality
figures for the ongoing military operations are preliminary
and are based on media reports from Bhutan and India.
These are liable to change as and when official statistics
are released.
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BANGLADESH
Left-wing
extremists
intensify
activity
in
10
Southwestern
districts:
Outlawed
left-wing
extremists
have
reportedly
intensified
their
activities
in
10
districts
of
the
crime-prone
southwestern
region
of
the
country.
A
report
said
that
these
groups
indulge
in
killing
political
leaders,
businessmen,
teachers,
freedom
fighters,
activists
of
rival
groups
and
others
after
terming
them
as
'class
enemies.'
As
many
as
105
persons
have
been
killed
between
November
1
and
December
6
by
these
outlawed
groups.
Independent
Bangladesh,
December
18,
2003.
Country
is
hub
for
arms
smuggling
syndicates
in
South
Asia:
Referring
to
the
series
of
recent
arms
haul
in
Bangladesh,
Oneworld
South
Asia
has
reported
that
the
country
has
become
a
major
transit
point
for
the
smuggling
of
arms
and
ammunition
to
insurgent
groups
in
South
Asia,
due
to
a
worsening
law
and
order
coupled
with
its
strategic
geographic
location.
There
are
at
least
37
illegal
arms
smuggling
syndicates
active
in
this
region,
the
report
added.
It
further
indicated
that
besides
terrorist
groups
operating
in
India,
Arakan
rebel
groups
of
Myanmar
also
have
bases
in
the
country.
One
World,
December
15,
2003.
BHUTAN
Bhutan
launches
military
operations
against
camps
of
terrorists
active
in
India's
Northeast:
On
December
15,
2003,
the
Royal
Bhutan
Army
(RBA)
launched
military
operations
to
flush
out
an
estimated
3,500
terrorists
of
the
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
(ULFA),
National
Democratic
Front
of
Bodoland
(NDFB)
and
Kamatapur
Liberation
Organisation
(KLO)
from
30
camps
located
in
southern
Bhutan.
The
Indian
Army
too
moved
its
personnel
to
the
380
km.-long
international
borders
with
Bhutan
to
prevent
any
intrusion
of
fleeing
terrorists
into
its
territory
and
is
also
providing
logistical
support
to
the
RBA
in
the
combat
zone.
Within
seven
days
of
operations,
i.e.
by
December
21,
the
RBA
claimed
to
have
demolished
all
the
30
camps
and
reportedly
killed
more
than
100
terrorists.
At
least
500
cadres
are
reported
to
have
surrendered.
Several
key
rebel
leaders
have
also
been
arrested
and
are
being
handed
over
to
the
Indian
authorities.
Among
those
arrested
include
Mithinga
Daimary,
ULFA
'publicity
secretary'
and
top
KLO
leaders
Tom
Adhikary
and
Milton
Barman.
Those
reportedly
killed
during
operations
include
the
KLO
chief
Jibon
Singha
and
one
of
the
founding
members
of
ULFA,
Bhimakanta
Buragohain.
The
RBA
too
have
suffered
casualties,
exact
figures
of
which
are
not
available.
Operations
targeting
the
fleeing/hiding
terrorists
are
continuing
in
the
dense
forest
areas
of
southern
Bhutan.
Kuensel
Online;
The
Hindu;
Times
of
India;
December
15-21,
2003.
INDIA
ULFA
threatens
revenge
attacks
in
Northeast
over
Bhutan
military
offensive:
The
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
(ULFA)
has
threatened
to
launch
revenge
attacks
against
Bhutanese
settlers
in
the
Northeast
if
Bhutan
did
not
call
off
the
ongoing
military
offensive.
"I
would
like
to
warn
the
governments
of
India
and
Bhutan
not
to
play
over
the
dead
bodies
of
our
freedom
fighters,"
Paresh
Baruah,
'commander-in-chief'
of
the
ULFA,
said
in
a
telephonic
interview
with
a
private
television
news
channel
on
December
21,
2003.
"Bhutanese
people
have
no
right
to
stay
not
only
in
Assam
but
the
entire
northeast
region.
These
people
will
now
face
the
consequences,"
added
Baruah.
Separately,
vernacular
daily
Pratidin
has
reported
that
ULFA
has
sent
a
team
of
36
'commandos'
of
its
'Enigma'
group
from
Bangladesh
as
reinforcements
to
make
way
for
the
trapped
cadres
in
Bhutan.
NDTV;
Pratidin;
December
21,
2003.
India
and
Pakistan
to
resume
railway
links
from
January
15,
2004:
India
and
Pakistan
on
December
19,
2003,
decided
to
resume
the
Samjhauta
Express
between
Lahore
and
Attari
in
Indian
Punjab
from
January
15,
2004,
by
renewing
the
existing
agreement.
Running
of
the
bi-weekly
Samjhauta
Express
was
discontinued
from
January
1,
2002,
in
the
wake
of
the
December
13,
2001,
terrorist
attack
on
India's
Parliament.
Muhammad
Iqbal
Khatri,
Additional
General
Manager
of
Pakistan
Railways
and
S.B.
Ghosh
Dastidar,
Additional
Member
(Traffic),
Indian
Railways,
signed
a
joint
agreement
to
this
effect
in
New
Delhi.
Hindustan
Times,
December
20,
2003.
Supreme
Court
upholds
constitutional
validity
of
Prevention
of
Terrorism
Act:
Dismissing
a
batch
of
writ
petitions
on
December
16,
2003,
the
Supreme
Court
upheld
the
constitutional
validity
of
the
Prevention
of
Terrorism
Act,
2002
(POTA),
observing,
that
"terrorism
is
affecting
the
security
and
sovereignty
of
the
nation.
It
is
not
State-specific
but
trans-national."
The
Court,
however,
clarified
that
people
who
merely
supported
a
terrorist
organisation
without
aiding
its
activities
could
not
be
booked
under
the
anti-terrorist
law,
unless
the
accused
had
criminal
intention.
The
apex
court
also
upheld
the
validity
of
Section
14
of
POTA,
which
says
that
individuals
-
including
journalists
and
lawyers
-
or
organisations
were
obliged
to
provide
information
about
terrorist
activities
to
the
police.
The
Court
also
held
that
Parliament,
and
not
the
State
Legislatures,
was
competent
to
enact
such
a
law
to
counter
terrorism.
Further,
it
also
held
that
an
accused
under
POTA
could
seek
bail
under
Section
49
(7)
even
before
the
expiry
of
the
one-year
period.
New
India
Press,
December
17,
2003.
NEPAL
Amnesty
programme
for
Maoist
insurgents
announced:
Nepal
Home
Ministry
sources
said
that
the
Government
has
announced
a
general
amnesty
programme
for
the
Maoist
insurgents
and
asked
the
insurgents,
their
relatives
and
friends
to
eschew
violence
and
surrender
with
or
without
weapons
before
February
12,
2004,
at
any
one
of
the
local
administration
offices
or
security
force
bases.
It
has
also
assured
free
medical
treatment
to
injured
insurgents
and
provision
for
education,
employment
opportunities
at
home
and
abroad
through
rehabilitation
centers
in
Sundarijal,
Kathmandu,
Dhakalthar
and
Tanahu.
Nepal
News,
December
19,
2003.
PAKISTAN
Proscribed
Jehadi
groups
did
not
maintain
bank
accounts:
The
Friday
Times
(TFT)
has
indicated
that
the
Federal
Government's
decision
to
freeze
bank
accounts
of
the
six
Islamist
outfits
banned
in
November
2003
is
not
likely
to
impact
their
finances
since
they
either
did
not
maintain
bank
accounts
or
deposited
money
in
the
names
of
individuals.
TFT
investigations
have
reportedly
revealed
that
none
of
the
six
groups
maintained
any
accounts
under
its
name.
An
unnamed
intelligence
officer
was
quoted
as
saying
that
"They
adopt
ingenious
ways
of
collecting
and
maintaining
funds.
It
is
very
difficult
to
track
down
the
money."
Some
leaders
of
the
banned
outfits
said
that
the
delay
by
the
Government
in
announcing
official
seizures
is
because
it
is
aware
that
these
groups
do
not
maintain
bank
accounts.
The
Friday
Times,
December
19-25,
2003.
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
rules
out
cease-fire
with
India:
The
Hizb-ul-Mujahideen
(HM)
while
ruling
out
a
cease-fire
with
India
has
said
that
it
would
continue
to
attack
military
targets
in
the
Indian
State
of
Jammu
and
Kashmir.
Hizb
chief
Syed
Salahuddin
said
in
Rawalpindi
on
December
15,
2003,
that
"There
is
no
question
of
a
ceasefire
by
us
under
present
circumstances…
As
long
as
Indian
troops
remain
in
held
Kashmir,
the
target-oriented
activities
of
Kashmiri
Mujahideen
will
continue."
Salahuddin
also
said
that
he
was
not
hopeful
that
a
visit
by
Indian
Prime
Minister
Atal
Behari
Vajpayee
to
Islamabad
in
January
2004
would
yield
results.
Jang,
December
16,
2003.
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