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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 26, January 12, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Another Peace Gambit
K.P.S. Gill
Publisher, SAIR; President, Institute for Conflict Management
It would
be tedious to list out how many times India and Pakistan
have 'agreed to talk', and the disastrous record of failure
and recurrent violence. The Indian Prime Minister, Atal
Behari Vajpayee, noted rightly, at the South Asian Association
for Regional Summit Cooperation (SAARC) at Islamabad last
week, "History can remind us, guide us, teach us or warn
us. It should not shackle us."
It is, however, not history that 'shackles' India and Pakistan
to violence in Kashmir, but ideology: the unrelenting ideology
of extremist Islam that underlies the creation and existence
of Pakistan - expressed in the two-nation theory that holds
that Muslims and non-Muslims cannot coexist within the same
political order - and that fuels the jehad factories that
continue to feed the supply lines of terror across much
of the world. This ideology, and no other legal or historical
entitlement, is the basis of Pakistan's 'claim' on Kashmir;
this again, is why the violence does not end.
Cynicism, however, is not a particularly productive perspective,
and it is useful to examine how the rhetoric of the unscheduled
joint Indo-Pakistan
Press Statement, which hijacked the agenda at
the SAARC Summit, is to be assessed. What, realistically,
should be our expectations from the current 'peace process'?
An examination of the harsh realities of the ground in Jammu
& Kashmir (J&K) provides insufficient evidence of a radical
discontinuity with past trends in terrorist violence. Violence
did, of course, decline in year 2003, as compared to 2002,
even as 2002 represented a decline against 2001 (Total fatalities,
2001: 4507; 2002: 3022; 2003: 2542). This downward trend
is overwhelmingly seen as a consequence of a radically altered
international context, and the increasing difficulty of
managing the internal contradictions of the situation in
Pakistan. There is sufficient evidence in the actions and
statements of the Pakistani state and its leadership, which
demonstrates no fundamental change in ideology, perspective
or strategic intent.
Nevertheless, for those who focus intently and exclusively
on the 'ground realities', it is sometimes useful to remember
that sentiment itself is part of this ground reality. And
there are many, particularly in the English language Press
in India and Pakistan, who believe that the sentiment has
changed in South Asia, and that there is a genuine desire
for peace and coexistence between the people of the two
countries. Little of this was evidenced in the commentaries
of the various Pakistani 'experts' who were allowed to swamp
the Indian media during the SAARC summit, and who exhibited
no dilution of the rigidity and stridency of their positions.
Nor, indeed, does the average Indian believe that there
is a possibility of a lasting peace between the two countries,
given the track record of the past over five and a half
decades. Indeed, with the large number of security personnel
who have been dying in action against the Pakistan-sponsored
terrorists in J&K, anger against Pakistan is high particularly
among the rural population, from where most of India's soldiers
are drawn. With each returning coffin, stories about those
who die are repeated in the villages and in marketplaces
across the countryside, and these have deeply influenced
the thinking of common folk.
There are, of course, some voices for peace in Pakistan,
and the new 'doves' are most voluble in the English language
media. But what is, again, ignored, is the sentiment of
the masses, which finds more accurate expression in the
vernacular Press. Thus, writing after the Islamabad Summit,
one commentator in the Urdu daily, Nawa-e-Waqt, fumed:
"We took a u-turn in Afghanistan to please America; we got
our old friends killed by the Americans, and also killed
them ourselves; but the whole advantage is going to India,
and we are being pushed against the wall… we are going to
take another (u-turn) on Kashmir, then, perhaps, our atomic
programme (God forbid) will also be sacrificed to the u-turn.
After so many u-turns, what will the people get?" The author's
'solution', in brief, was a 'thousand cuts', an old theme
in the strategic community in Pakistan. These are sentiments
that have been widely repeated in the Urdu media in that
country. The assembly lines of the jehad, moreover,
are still to be dismantled in Pakistan, and for the average
Pakistani, the country's nuclear arsenal still remains its
primary national asset, reflecting the degree of perversion
the national psyche has undergone.
But the strategy of a 'thousand cuts' against India has
failed, and will hopefully fail wherever else it is tried.
The truth is, there have been very significant transformations
in South Asia, though the most momentous of these may not
be the ones that the euphoria of the 'peace process' carries
our attention to.
For one, Musharraf, it must be explicitly recognised, has
for some time now, been in dire need of relief. The international
pressure - particularly after a continuing succession of
disclosures relating to Pakistan's role in nuclear proliferation
in North Korea, Iran and Libya, as well as on the potential
leakage of such technologies to non-state terrorist entities
- was becoming unbearable. There is, at present, almost
a report, editorial or article a day in some of the most
prominent American newspapers focusing on Pakistan's transgressions,
both in connection with nuclear proliferation and international
terrorism, as well as on Pakistan's deceit and duplicity
with regard to its purported 'cooperation' with America
in the 'global war against terrorism'. Internally, moreover,
a range of economic and political pressures have been acting
on Musharraf, and these peaked in two apparent attempts
at assassination, which seem to have shaken the dictator's
confidence in staying the course on Pakistan's enterprise
of strategic overextension and sponsorship of terrorism.
Under the circumstances, unfortunately, the deal at Islamabad
has virtually let Pakistan off the hook, abruptly restoring
a legitimacy that had steadily been eroded over the past
more than two years. Indeed, the case that India had built
against Pakistan over this period has virtually been dismantled
through this single action, and it would be possible (though
he may not choose this course of action in the immediate
future) for Musharraf to continue his support to terrorism
in J&K, even as he projects himself as the first target
and victim of terrorism, creating an impenetrable veil of
'credible deniability' that will only be gradually worn
away by repeated and extreme transgressions. Worse, it is
now clear that, even if there are major acts of terrorism
on Indian soil and their source identified to be located
in Pakistan, the possibility or legitimacy of any strong
reaction by India - including the suspension of talks and
'confidence building measures' - has substantially been
eliminated. Musharraf would simply argue, as he has in the
past, but more credibly now since his position has in some
sense been validated by a 'peace process' with India, that
these are lawless jehadis, acting without any official
support, and that Pakistan and he personally were also targets
of the same extremist elements.
In this, it is useful to understand the degree to which
India has yielded its past position, starting from the 'hardline'
adopted during Operation Parakram. The Prime Minister had
said that there would be no negotiations till Pakistan demonstrably
ended support to terrorism and stopped cross border infiltration;
till the infrastructure of terrorism in Pakistan had been
dismantled; till those who were on India's 'list of 20 most
wanted' had been handed over by Pakistan. Not one of these
conditions has been fulfilled. But India has entered into
talks with Pakistan now.
Clearly, both parties in the process are, in the main, buying
time, and there is little by way of a concrete strategy
for resolution. The most significant element in this process,
in fact, is not any possible set of 'solutions' that may
be defined, but essentially the passage of time and the
possible de-escalation of violence in the region while the
two countries engage in 'confidence building measures'.
Eventually, Kashmir will be resolved, not by good intentions
and neighbourly values, but by the necessity of changing
circumstances in a world that is growing impatient with
terrorism. There is now at least some evidence of fatigue
and fear in the Pakistani leadership, and an increasing
conviction that the adventurism of the past is not only
unsustainable, but would, indeed, attract extreme penalties.
The very existence of Pakistan is, today, under threat.
This, and not the absurd and artificial 'formulae' that
have, from time to time, been proposed for the resolution
of the 'Kashmir issue', is the key to the future.
Increasing Pressure
Wasbir Hussain
Associate Fellow, Institute for Conflict Management, New
Delhi; Consulting Editor, The Sentinel, Guwahati
The presence
of Indian insurgents in safe havens in Bangladesh has never
been in doubt, considering the volumes of hard intelligence
input that New Delhi has. If confirmation was needed, a
spate of reports relating to multiple incidents on January
2, 2004, and Dhaka's subsequent responses, gave confirmation
to India's long standing complaint that its neighbour was
being less than honest on the issue.
-
On
January 2, Bangladesh Rifles (BDR) raided a hideout
of the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT)
and captured six of its cadres and seized some weapons
and a mobile telephone set. According to media reports
originating from Bangladesh, the NLFT camp that was
raided was located near Karisapunji village under Chunarughat
upa-zilla (sub-district) in Habiganj district.
The United News of Bangladesh (UNB) identified those
arrested as Kokek Tripura (22), Philip Debbarma (24),
Manjak Debbarma (20), Bukhuk Debbarma (24), Satish Debbarma
(25) and Shoilen Debbarma (25).
-
In
another incident on January 2, the rebel All Tripura
Tiger Force (ATTF)
chief Ranjit Debbarma's residence in Dhaka was attacked
by rocket propelled grenades (RPG). Indian media reports
said five ATTF rebels were killed in that attack and
eight others, including Debbarma, were wounded.
-
On
January 2, Bangladeshi security forces reportedly arrested
as many as 34 rebels belonging to the United Liberation
Front of Asom (ULFA)
from different parts of Dhaka. Some Bangladeshi newspapers,
including Jugantar, quoted police officials as
saying the militants were arrested after raids at different
places including Mohammedpur, Green Road and Gulshan,
all upmarket localities in Dhaka. According to Jugantar,
four people who were caught while making bombs at a
house in the city's Mohammedpur area, had received treatment
at the Suhrawardy Hospital, under concealed identities.
-
Intelligence
sources indicated that the January 2 'rocket attack'
- actually two grenades lobbed into Debbarma's residence
- took place in the Shamoli building apparently owned
by a leading Bangladeshi political figure. The chiefs
of the ATTF and ULFA were reportedly staying in this
highly secure building. After the attack on the building's
2nd floor, where the ATTF chief was allegedly staying,
the local police swung into action and rounded up almost
everyone in the building. Some of those picked up were
supposed to have been Bangladeshi intelligence operatives.
Four injured persons were taken to hospital. Later,
all those picked up were released by the police. Sources
claim that top officials of the Directorate General
of Forces Intelligence (DGFI, Bangladesh's Military
intelligence agency) intervened to secure the release
of these men. It is claimed that many of those arrested
were ULFA cadres, and that this is the same incident
that the local media reports in Dhaka were referring
to, when they mentioned the arrest of 34 ULFA men. It
is also claimed that members of a local mafia group
called 'Seven Star' were behind the rocket attack. No
independent confirmation of this incident was immediately
available.
How did Dhaka
respond to these media reports? While it preferred to remain
silent on the reports relating to the raid and the arrest
of six NLFT rebels as well as the bomb attack on the residence
of the ATTF chief, Bangladesh came out with a formal denial
of reports about the arrest of 34 ULFA militants from Dhaka.
"We would like to categorically state that the reports (about
the ULFA rebels' capture) are false, baseless and concocted
and have been fabricated to strain the friendly relations
between Bangladesh and India. No such incidents took place
in the capital city of Dhaka," a Home Ministry Press Release
issued in Dhaka on January 3 said. The Bangladesh Home Ministry
statement added: "We would also like to reassert the well-known
position of the government of Bangladesh that Bangladesh
has never allowed or assisted insurgent groups of any country
for acts against that country and this policy was being
pursued by the government consistently and rigorously."
Bangladesh certainly is on the back-foot, and its official
position vis-a-vis the Indian insurgents is not coming in
handy anymore in view of the changing global and South Asian
counter-terrorism scenario. Further, the case against its
support to Indian insurgent groups is gradually being independently
validated. For instance, the location of the NLFT hideout
that was raided by the BDR on January 2 tallies with a location
mentioned in the latest list of 194 Indian insurgent camps
inside Bangladesh submitted by the Indian Border Security
Force (BSF) to the visiting BDR team in New Delhi only last
week (during the meeting between the two border forces from
January 6 to 9, 2004). The Indian list says that the NLFT
has a transit camp at Thakurgaon under Chunarughat Police
Station in the Habiganj district of Bangladesh. Again, the
very fact that Dhaka has not denied the raid and subsequent
capture of six NLFT rebels goes against its official position
that there are neither camps nor any Indian insurgent cadres
operating from within the territory of Bangladesh.
Denials aside, Bangladesh, by reliable accounts, may in
fact be waking up to the need to rein in these foreign militants.
This report in a leading English daily from Dhaka, The
Daily Star (Internet edition, January 5, 2004), makes
interesting reading: "The Home Ministry at a high level
meeting with paramilitary BDR and intelligence agencies
yesterday (January 4, 2004) asked them to step up border
security and watch on Dhaka to stem infiltration of Indian
terrorists. The Ministry officially denied discussion on
steps to tackle infiltration of the operatives of the ULFA
and other outfits, but meeting sources confirmed the agenda.
They said Home Minister Altaf Hossain Chowdhury and State
Minister Lutfozzaman Babar asked the DGFI and NSI (National
Security Intelligence) agencies to keep an eye on suspicious
people in hotels and rest houses in Dhaka. The ministers
also asked the agencies to strengthen vigilance in the porous
bordering areas of Cox's Bazar, Bandarban, Rangamati, Khagrachhari
and Sylhet."
There is some speculation that Dhaka may, in fact, have
been stung by Bhutan's year-end crackdown on anti-India
separatist camps on its territory, a move for which the
Royal Government in Thimphu has received widespread appreciation
from nations in the forefront of the global war on terror.
But any actions that Dhaka may be initiating, do not appear
to have been triggered off simply because another South
Asian neighbour has shown the way by launching an assault
on anti-India rebels in the Kingdom, or because New Delhi
has been persistent in its claim that an increasing number
of camps of Indian insurgents are located inside Bangladesh.
It is, rather, the rising pressure of international opinion
that is forcing a reassessment in Dhaka.
The publication in part, on December 10, 2003, of a report
on Bangladesh, prepared by the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service (CSIS), and an advisory issued by the US State Department
to its citizens and officials posted at or visiting Bangladesh,
have been particularly embarrassing for Dhaka. The CSIS
report prepared in December 2003, said that the Bangladesh
Government was not taking enough measures to prevent the
country from becoming a haven for Islamist terror groups
in South Asia. The report expressed concern over the activities
of terrorists suspected to be connected with Osama bin Laden's
Al Qaeda network. The CSIS report added that Dhaka was not
willing to crack down on terror, and expressed fear of dangers
to Canadian aid workers in Bangladesh. Significantly, the
report also said, there have been a number of serious terrorist
attacks on cultural groups and recreational facilities in
Bangladesh, but Prime Minister Khaleda Zia's Bangladesh
Nationalist Party (BNP) has been blaming the opposition
party (the Awami League of former Premier Sheikh Hasina)
for such criminal activities as a matter of routine, rather
than zeroing in on the real people or group behind such
acts of violence.
Dhaka has rejected the observations made in the CSIS report
and has been consistently denying that Bangladesh has become
the latest hub of Islamist terror groups, including the
Al
Qaeda. The fact remains, however, that a local
terror group, the Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami, Bangladesh
(HUJI-BD),
led by Shauqat Osman, with the avowed objective of establishing
'Islamic rule' in Bangladesh, is indeed active in the country.
Western media reports suggest this group has an estimated
15,000 cadres.
With increasing international attention focused on terrorist
and insurgent activities in Bangladesh, Dhaka's past pretence
is becoming progressively unsustainable. Nevertheless, the
flow of insurgents from India to safe havens in Bangladesh
continues. Indeed, with ULFA having lost its bases and once-secure
staging areas inside Bhutan, it is expected to turn to two
obvious alternate locations, Myanmar and Bangladesh. But
Yangon is already supposed to have turned on the heat on
Indian insurgents in the country, leaving Bangladesh the
only place that rebels like those of the ULFA have to hold
on to. This , too, may not be easy anymore. Dhaka might
continue to push ahead with its stand that no Indian insurgents
are located or operating from the country, but may have
to move as quietly as possible to neutralize these rebels
and choke them off within its territory to escape a possible
foolproof indictment by the international community as a
nation that has not done enough to combat terror.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
January 5-11, 2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
2
|
0
|
3
|
5
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
2
|
1
|
0
|
3
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
9
|
0
|
23
|
32
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Tripura
|
1
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
Total (INDIA)
|
12
|
1
|
29
|
42
|
NEPAL
|
2
|
7
|
19
|
28
|
PAKISTAN
|
0
|
4
|
0
|
4
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
Government
bans
books
published
by
the
Ahmadiyya
sect:
The
Home
Ministry
banned
all
publications
of
the
Ahmadiyya
Muslim
Jamaat
Bangladesh,
a
day
before
the
end
of
an
ultimatum
given
by
the
anti-Ahmadiyya
alliance,
Hifazate
Khatme
Nabuwat
Andolon
(HKNA),
to
declare
the
Ahmadiyya's
'non-muslims'.
In
a
press
release,
the
Ministry
said
that
the
ban
was
imposed
"in
view
of
objectionable
materials
in
such
(Ahmadiyya)
publications,
which
hurt
or
might
hurt
the
sentiments
of
the
majority
Muslim
population
of
Bangladesh."
Daily
Star,
January
9,
2004
No
terrorist
camps
exists
in
the
country,
claims
BDR
Director-General:
On
the
second
day
of
the
annual
conference
between
the
Bangladesh
Rifles
(BDR)
and
India's
Border
Security
Force
(BSF)
that
began
in
New
Delhi
on
January
6,
2004,
Bangladesh
maintained
that
no
terrorist
groups
from
India's
Northeast
operated
from
its
soil.
"We
have
no
camps
of
any
insurgent
outfit
in
our
territory,"
claimed
Major
General
Mohammed
Jahangir
Alam
Chowdhury,
the
BDR
chief.
"If
you
can
pinpoint
a
single
camp,
I
will
personally
ensure
it
is
destroyed,"
he
added.
He
has
also
reportedly
asked
the
BSF
Director
General
Ajay
Raj
Sharma
to
provide
any
map
indicating
areas
that
India
alleges
to
have
been
used
to
run
terrorist
training
camps.
Meanwhile,
BSF
Director
General
Ajai
Sharma
was
quoted
as
saying
that
he
has
given
BDR
a
list
of
194
camps,
which
is
an
increase
from
the
last
time
the
two
sides
met.
At
least
40
new
camps
have
reportedly
been
added
to
the
earlier
list
given
to
BDR.
However,
Bangladesh,
while
denying
the
claim,
has
alleged
that
India
was
operating
39
terrorist
camps
for
Bangladeshi
insurgents,
on
its
soil.
Telegraph
India,
January
10,
2004;
Daily
Star,
January
7,
2004.
34
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
(ULFA)
cadres
arrested
in
Dhaka:
Delayed
media
reports
stated
that,
on
January
2,
security
forces
arrested
atleast
34
terrorists
belonging
to
the
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
(ULFA)
from
different
parts
of
Dhaka.
The
terrorists
were
arrested
after
raids
at
different
places
including
Mohammedpur,
Green
Road
and
Gulshan
in
Dhaka.
On
the
same
day,
the
Bangladesh
Rifles
(BDR)
raided
a
hideout
of
the
National
Liberation
Front
of
Tripura
(NLFT)
located
near
Karisapunji
village
under
Chunarughat
upazilla
(sub-district)
in
Habiganj
district
and
captured
six
of
its
cadres
and
seized
some
weapons
and
a
mobile
telephone
set.
Daily
Star,
Jugantar,
January
3,
2004.
INDIA
National
Liberation
Front
of
Tripura
-
Nayanbasi
faction
expresses
willingness
for
talks
and
surrender:
The
National
Liberation
Front
of
Tripura
-
Nayanbasi
faction
(NLFT-N)
has
reportedly
sent
a
proposal
to
the
Tripura
Government
to
start
a
dialogue
for
surrender
of
arms
and
to
come
overground.
Additional
Director
General
of
Police
(ADG)
Pranoy
Sahaya,
confirmed
that
that
the
State
Home
Department
received
the
letter
from
Nayanbasi
Jamatiya,
chief
of
the
faction,
on
January
10,
in
which
he
expressed
his
desire
to
participate
in
peace
talks.
Telegraph
India,
January
12,
2004
78
persons
killed
in
Naxalite
violence
in
2003,
says
Chhattisgarh
Police
report:
According
to
the
Annual
Report
of
the
Chhattisgarh
Police,
at
least
78
persons,
including
31
police
personnel,
were
killed
in
103
encounters
in
the
State
in
Naxalite-related
violence
during
year
2003.
"A
total
of
103
encounters
took
place
between
Naxalites
and
police
in
the
year
2003,
in
which
31
security
men,
three
government
employees
and
35
civilians
were
killed,''
police
sources
said.
The
People's
War
Group
(PWG)
and
the
Maoist
Communist
Center
(MCC)
were
active
in
96
police
station
areas
of
the
State
spread
over
about
seven
districts,
and
there
was
an
increase
in
Naxalite
activities
in
2003
compared
to
the
previous
year,
the
report
added.
The
Hindu,
January
7,
2004
NEPAL
'Brigadier
Commander'
of
the
Maoist
outfit
surrenders:
A
'brigadier
commander'
of
the
Maoist
'People's
Liberation
Army',
Hom
Prakash
Shrestha,
surrendered
to
the
administration
in
Bheri-Karnali
division
of
western
Nepal
on
January
11,
2004.
Shrestha,
so
far,
is
the
senior
most
Maoist
insurgent
to
give
up
arms.
He
was
involved
in
Maoist
attacks
on
various
police
posts
and
security
camps
in
different
parts
of
Western
Nepal.
Along
with
Shrestha,
Janu
Chhantyal,
the
Maoist
'company
commander'
in
the
Seti-Mahakali
division,
has
also
surrendered
with
arms.
Nepal
News,
January
12,
2004
PAKISTAN
| |