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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 29, February 2, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Political Realignments and Peace
Efforts
Guest Writer: G H Peiris
Senior Professor, University of Peradeniya, Sri Lanka, and
Senior Fellow, International Centre for Ethnic Studies
The electoral
alliance of January 20, 2004, between the Sri Lanka Freedom
Party (SLFP) and the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) - the
two largest parties in Sri Lanka's present parliamentary
Opposition, both with their support bases mainly in the
Sinhalese segment of the electorate - has been subject to
intense analysis and debate, producing a wide diversity
of mutually irreconcilable views on its possible impact
on the country's prospects for peace, stability and progress.
To its main architects the alliance represents the 'dawn
of a new era' - one that would rescue the nation from imminent
disintegration, anarchy and enslavement. The Memorandum
of Understanding signed by the SLFP and the JVP commences
with the assertion that " … as a result of the wrong policies
followed by the ruling United National Front, the country
faces the prospect of losing its territorial integrity,
(and that) the foundations of a vibrant national economy
are being systematically destroyed and a new economic configuration
based on crony capitalism, racketeering, corruption and
subservience to international financial institutions is
being rapidly established." Spokesmen for the alliance have
also stressed the need to halt the process of naïve appeasement
being conducted by the United National Front (UNF) in the
guise of a peace effort.
Propaganda and rhetoric apart, there could hardly be any
doubt that the principal objective of the newly forged SLFP-JVP
pact, at least in the short run, is to dislodge the UNF
Government, beleaguered by the stalled peace process, widespread
trade-union unrest, indiscipline in its ranks and, more
generally, an all too obvious inability to govern. In that
sense, the alliance could, indeed, be seen as a further
step in the Opposition onslaught against the ruling party
- a continuation of the process that commenced with the
presidential take-over of three key Ministries last November.
The partners of the alliance will obviously increase the
electoral support they had in December 2001 when, as rival
contestants, their aggregate of votes amounted to 46.3%
of the total poll, against the 45.6% secured by the UNF.
The alliance has drawn endorsement from several smaller
political groups. These include the National Unity Alliance
(NUA) headed by Farial Ashroff (widow of the founder of
the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress), presently having two seats
in the legislature and with an expanding vote bank in the
predominantly Muslim areas of the Eastern Province; and
the Mahajana Eksath Peramuna that has a numerically small
but assured support base in Colombo District. Among the
Tamil groups that have made gestures of support towards
the alliance are the Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP)
with two seats in the present Parliament, and the People's
Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) represented
by one MP, both of which have acquired a measure of prominence
in the political scene for their defiance of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
All these parties, along with the SLFP and the JVP share
in common a strong antipathy towards the LTTE.
The different strands of response from the UNF to the SLFP-JVP
alliance have not been mutually consistent. Interestingly,
the posture of the UNF leader, Prime Minister Ranil Wickremesinghe,
has probably been intended to convey the impression of a
self-confident lack of serious concern. Some of his senior
colleagues, however, have reacted loudly with sarcasm and
disdain, highlighting both the contradictions they perceive
in the commitments of the alliance partners as well as their
past rivalry; recapitulating, in particular, the assassination
by the JVP, during the course of their insurrection of the
late-1980s, of Vijaya Kumaratunga, whose widow, Chandrika
Kumaratunga, is the leader of the SLFP and President of
the country. More generally, it appears, UNF activists have
also reacted with intense fury, as evidenced, for example,
by their crude exercise of violence (including homicide)
sporadically targeting participants of the celebrations
that accompanied the signing of the memorandum.
The all-important reaction which the SLFP-JVP accord has
evoked from the LTTE was, initially, one of unqualified
hostility. Anton Balasingham, leader of the LTTE delegation
at its peace-talks with the Government of Sri Lanka up to
April 2003, condemned the alliance with characteristic bluntness
as "a racist Sinhala outfit", and warned that the "…formation
of the alliance might create objective conditions for (the
resumption of the secessionist) war". Whether the statement
reported to have been made about a week later by Thamilchelvan,
the head of the LTTE's political wing, to the effect that
the LTTE hopes to continue with the peace talks regardless
of the transformed political configurations in Colombo,
signifies a change of stance following sober assessment
of all implications of the new alliance, or whether it represents
the usual Tiger ploy of transmitting mixed signals from
different places at different times, is not quite clear.
What could be said with certainty, however, is that, since
both the SLFP and the JVP have categorically rejected the
LTTE proposals of November 2002 on an 'Interim Self-Governing
Authority' for the northern and eastern provinces of Sri
Lanka (the establishment of an interim government for the
north-east is a precondition the LTTE has set for the resumption
of peace negotiations), the LTTE would prefer the resumed
negotiations, if any, to be conducted with the UNF rather
than with the new alliance.
The 'Tamil National Alliance' (TNA, a conglomerate of parties
operating within the political mainstreams), taking its
cue from the LTTE, have voiced strong opposition to the
agreement of January 20; and, in order to counterbalance
possible electoral gains for the SLFP and the JVP resulting
from the agreement, worked towards the formation of a grand
alliance of all Tamil parties in the country operating under
the guidance of the LTTE. Both the Tigers as well as the
leaders of several other Tamil political groups, it must
be noted, have generally preferred the leadership of the
Sinhalese to remain fragmented on party lines, both for
the effect such fragmentation has always had of enhancing
the influence of the minority communities in electoral politics,
as well as for the fear that a cohesive majority community
would be swayed by the more ardent forms of Sinhalese-Buddhist
ethno-nationalism.
Among the other prominent responses and reactions to the
newly formed alliance is the circumspection shown by diplomatic
representatives of the countries that have been associated
with Sri Lanka's peace efforts. They, along with Colombo's
business elite, and influential city-based civil society
organisations (the so-called 'liberal lobby'), perceive
in the alliance the danger of enhanced JVP influence on
both economic policy as well as ethnic relations. What most
of these groups desire, instead, is a UNF-PA/SLFP coalition
- one that would provide leadership to a 'national government
of reconciliation' which could reactivate the peace negotiations
and furnish, with their combined parliamentary strength,
constitutional expression to a settlement of the ethnic
conflict worked out with the LTTE. In sharp contrast, there
is the guarded optimism about the alliance from perspectives
of national interests among a fair number of influential
Buddhist opinion leaders, including certain prominent members
of the Sangha.
In the complex and incoherent mass of opinion and interpretation
on the SLFP-JVP alliance, it is possible to discern certain
simple but significant facts that are of salience to an
assessment of its potential significance. The first of these
is that the agreement, reached through prolonged and arduous
negotiation, is not unprecedented. It may be recalled, for
instance, that, following the departure of the Sri Lanka
Muslim Congress from the Government parliamentary ranks
on June 20, 2001, and the consequent loss of the parliamentary
majority held by the People's Alliance (PA, headed by President
Kumaratunga), the JVP (then in the Opposition, holding 10
seats) offered conditional support to the PA. The main conditions
stipulated were the re-summoning of Parliament, which the
President had prorogued in order to avoid likely defeat
on an Opposition sponsored no-confidence motion; the cancellation
of a national referendum announced by the President to seek
a popular mandate to formulate a new Constitution, the specificities
of which were kept vague; and the formation of a 'probationary'
caretaker Government to function over a one-year period,
during which independent commissions should be established
for conducting elections, and for the judiciary, police,
media and public administration, the political control of
which, as experiences of recent memory had shown, facilitates
large-scale rigging of elections. Though there was disagreement
within the PA on the grant of these conditions, a broad
consensus reached by two parties culminated in a Memorandum
of Understanding entered into in October 2001. However,
since further defections from the PA ranks, once again,
eliminated its majority in Parliament, the promised JVP
support to the Government became redundant, prompting the
President to abandon the JVP link and to dissolve Parliament.
One of the main obstacles in the way of an electoral alliance
between the PA/SLFP and the JVP, as the 2001 episode of
their collaboration demonstrates, is that of working out
either the modalities of a no-contest pact, or the formulation
of common lists of candidates to contest in the different
electoral districts. There is, on the one hand, considerable
overlap in the electoral power bases of these two parties.
On the other hand, a common PA-JVP platform would also mean
that a fair number of aspiring politicians presently in
the ranks of the SLFP would be required to make way for
those from the JVP, first, in the selection of candidates,
and later, if elected to office, at various levels of Government.
Thus, despite the likely overall electoral gains that would
accrue from an alliance for both parties in their confrontations
with the UNF, the losses at an individual plane for those
of the PA would certainly be greater than for those of the
JVP. Self-sacrifice is, of course, hardly ever a behavioural
trait towards which politicians are readily inclined.
There is, in addition, yet another more formidable 'personal'
problem that would persist with the newly forged alliance
over the coming months in the form of what President Kumaratunga
herself stands to gain and/or lose from the link-up with
the JVP. It has been increasingly evident in the recent
past that one of her principal concerns relate to her own
political future - the fact that she (still only 59 years
young) cannot, under the present constitutional dispensation,
remain at the apex of Sri Lankan affairs beyond 2006 when
her second successive presidential tenure would come to
an end. Accordingly, the only prospect of her continuing
in a position of supreme authority would lie in a major
constitutional reform that resurrects the Prime Ministerial
system of government that existed prior to the promulgation
of the Constitution of 1978. It is inconceivable that a
PA/SLFP-JVP alliance, even with a substantially increased
number of seats in the legislature produced at the next
elections, would add up to the minimum parliamentary strength
(two-thirds) required to initiate the type of constitutional
reform personally beneficial to the President, especially
in the context of the inevitable loss of support to the
President and her party from certain minority political
parties that the JVP link would bring about.
This provides an explanation for what is perhaps the most
conspicuous feature of the trumpeting and fanfare that have
hitherto accompanied the emergence of the alliance - namely,
President Kumaratunga's carefully maintained low profile.
She was absent from the ceremonial signing of the Memorandum
of Understanding on January 20, ostensibly for 'security
reasons'. According to Press reports, she declined to grant
an audience to the shadowy JVP chief, Somawansa Amarasinghe,
who returned to the island from his self-imposed exile in
England, apparently for the purpose of strengthening the
JVP component of the alliance. The President also kept away
from the massive inaugural public rally held in Colombo
on January 29, to launch the alliance programme. Apart from
what these gestures signify, the President has persisted
with her efforts to reach an understanding with Prime Minister
Wickremesinghe which, in the unlikely event of culminating
in a 'government of reconciliation' the diplomatic corps
and the 'liberal lobby' in Colombo have been hoping for,
would probably mean the end of the SLFP-JVP link.
If the alliance partners do succeed in overcoming the obstacles
and constraints referred to above, and if they win a sufficient
number of seats in Parliament at the next elections to form
a Government, the PA/SLFP-JVP coalition will still need
to formulate a coherent policy vis-à-vis the 'national question'.
In this context, what could be observed is that, having
pledged (Section 9 of the MOU) to "eliminate discrimination
on grounds of race, religion, language or culture"; to …
"combat and defeat separatism"; and to seek a negotiated
settlement of the ethnic conflict "through a correct
dialogue with the LTTE and other relevant groups and communities",
they have agreed to 'remain disagreed' on the stance with
respect to the secessionist challenge. In this, while the
SLFP has reiterated its commitment to the principles of
devolution of power within a 'provincial' frame, the JVP
has adhered to the view that the objectives of ensuring
equality to all ethnic groups and of safeguarding their
rights could be achieved through administrative decentralization
to the local authority level. While the former is not inconsistent
with the basic principles enunciated in the Draft Constitution
presented to Parliament by the PA government in 1999 (but
withdrawn in the face of fierce opposition to which both
the UNP as well as the JVP contributed in ample measure),
the latter is in harmony with the proclaimed conviction
of the JVP leadership that devolution of Government power
to the LTTE over a claimed 'exclusive Tamil homeland' extending
over the northern and eastern parts of the country will
strengthen the efforts to dismember Sri Lanka. The indisputable
validity of the JVP viewpoint notwithstanding, as matters
stand at present, it is inconceivable that any compromise
could be worked out between such a position and the LTTE
demands.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
January 26-February
1, 2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
4
|
1
|
1
|
6
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
9
|
1
|
18
|
28
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
0
|
0
|
1
|
1
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
2
|
Tripura
|
1
|
1
|
5
|
7
|
Total (INDIA)
|
10
|
2
|
30
|
42
|
NEPAL
|
1
|
0
|
2
|
3
|
* Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BANGLADESH
Sky
marshals
to
be
introduced
on
Biman
Airways:
Bangladesh
has
agreed
to
deploy
armed
guards
on
Biman
Airways'
US-bound
flights
in
response
to
America's
terror
fear.
This
decision
was
conveyed
by
the
State
Minister
for
Civil
Aviation
and
Tourism,
Mir
Mohammed
Nasir
Uddin,
to
US
Ambassador
Harry
K.
Thomas,
in
a
meeting
on
January
26.
The
US
decision
to
carry
armed
guards
came
amid
renewed
fears
that
terrorists
may
be
trying
to
use
aircraft
to
stage
a
new
attack.
But
Mir
Nasir
claimed
that
no
US
pressure
was
there
on
the
Government
to
take
the
decision.
Daily
Star,
January
27,
2004
INDIA
Deputy
Inspector
General
of
Police
shot
dead
in
Jammu
&
Kashmir:
On
February
2,
unidentified
terrorists
shot
dead
the
Deputy
Inspector
General
of
Police
(Crime),
Kashmir,
Mohammed
Amin
Bhat,
in
Barzullah
area
of
Srinagar.
Bhat
was
attacked
when
he
came
out
of
a
mosque
after
prayers.
Indian
Express,
February
2,
2004
Jammu
&
Kashmir
Government
announces
surrender
policy
for
terrorists:
The
Jammu
&
Kashmir
Government
has
launched
a
new
rehabilitation
policy
to
facilitate
the
return
of
terrorists
who
are
willing
to
surrender.
The
scheme,
which
has
been
cleared
by
the
Union
Government
and
funded
through
security
related
expenditure,
was
approved
by
the
State
Cabinet
on
January
31,
in
Jammu.
In
a
briefing
on
the
cabinet
decisions,
Chief
Secretary,
Dr.
Sudhir
S.
Bloeria,
said
that
the
policy
aims
at
providing
an
opportunity
for
return
of
those
terrorists
who
have
undergone
a
change
of
heart
in
the
fast
changing
atmosphere
for
peace
in
the
State,
and
who
want
to
shun
the
path
of
violence
to
join
mainstream.
However,
those
involved
in
the
heinous
crimes
will
not
be
entitled
to
benefits
under
the
scheme,
he
added.
The
Chief
Secretary
said
that
under
this
rehabilitation
scheme,
the
government
would
provide
Rupees
150,000
as
rehabilitation
incentive
in
the
shape
of
Fixed
Deposit
Receipt
(FDR)
that
would
be
drawn
only
on
completion
of
3-years
of
normal
life
with
good
behavior
after
the
surrender.
For
the
sustenance
of
the
surrendered
terrorist,
Rupees
2,000
would
be
paid
as
monthly
stipend
after
the
surrender.
Daily
Excelsior,
February
1,
2004.
156
terrorists
surrendered
in
Assam:
On
January
31,
156
terrorists,
including
53
United
Liberation
Front
of
Asom
(ULFA),
91
National
Democratic
Front
of
Bodoland
(NDFB),
Four
Bengali
Tiger
Force
(BTF)
and
four
Muslim
United
Liberation
Tigers
of
Assam
(MULTA),
cadres
surrendered
at
a
rehabilitation
ceremony
organised
by
the
Army
at
Tamulpur
in
the
Nalbari
district.
At
the
time
of
the
surrender,
the
terrorists
deposited
56
assorted
weapons
including
pistols,
revolvers,
AK
rifles,
.303
rifles,
sniper
rifles,
Chinese
assault
rifles,
12
bore
guns,
Universal
Machine
Guns,
Light
Machine
Guns,
Rocket
Propelled
Grenade
Launchers,
Chinese
grenades,
and
explosives.
Northeast
Tribune,
February
1,
2004
Bru
National
Liberation
Front
delegation
in
Aizawl
for
talks
with
Mizoram
Government:
A
six-member
delegation
of
the
Bru
National
Liberation
Front
(BNLF)
led
by
its
'president',
Surajmani
Reang,
arrived
in
the
Mizo
capital,
Aizawl,
on
January
28,
to
hold
the
tenth
round
of
talks
with
the
Mizoram
Government.
The
BNLF
delegation
included
its
'general
secretary',
Solomon
Prophul
Ushoy,
'army
chief'
Hmunsiama,
and
'communication
secretary'
Bruto
Meska.
The
delegation
of
the
Bru
Welfare
Association
(BWA)
of
Mizoram
would
also
participate
in
the
talks.
Sentinel
Assam,
January
29,
2004
Indo-Pak
official
talks
to
commence
on
February
16:
On
January
27,
India
and
Pakistan
announced
that
the
two
sides
would
"commence
the
process"
of
composite
dialogue
with
three-day
official-level
talks
in
Islamabad
from
February
16.
The
talks
will
first
be
held
at
the
level
of
Joint
Secretaries
on
February
16
and
17,
followed
by
a
one-day
meeting
between
the
two
Foreign
Secretaries
on
February
18,
the
External
Affairs
Ministry
spokesman
Navtej
Sarna
said
in
New
Delhi.
A
similar
announcement
was
made
by
the
Pakistan
foreign
office
spokesman,
Masood
Khan
in
Islamabad.
He
said
the
agenda
for
the
dialogue
would
be
decided
during
the
talks.
During
the
three-day
parleys,
the
two
sides
would
discuss
the
modalities
for
the
composite
dialogue.
While
the
Indian
spokesman
said
"Joint
Secretary-level
talks
on
February
16-17
will
be
followed
by
a
one-day
meeting
of
Foreign
Secretaries
on
February
18",
the
Pakistani
spokesman
said
that
the
Foreign
Secretary
level
talks
will
be
preceded
by
the
meeting
of
the
Directors
General
(Joint
Secretary
level).
The
Hindu,
January
28,
2004
NEPAL
Joint
Working
Group
between
India
and
Nepal
on
Border
Management
held
in
Kathmandu:
The
fifth
meeting
of
the
Joint
Working
Group
(JWG)
between
India
and
Nepal
on
border
management,
concluded
on
February
1
in
Kathmandu.
Both
sides
reiterated
their
commitments
not
to
allow
their
respective
territories
to
be
used
for
activities
directed
against
each
other
and
to
curb
the
terrorist
activities
along
the
border
areas.
Further
views
on
the
treaty
of
extradition
and
mutual
legal
assistance
in
criminal
matters
were
also
discussed
in
the
meeting.
Also
the
two
sides
have
agreed
to
hold
the
JWG
meeting
once
in
six
months
and
the
district
level
coordination
meetings
every
three
months.
Nepal
News,
February
1,
2004
Maoist
'Division
Headquarters'
captured
in
Rukum
district:
Security
forces
have
captured
the
Maoist
'division
headquarters'
at
Thabang
and
Rangkot
in
the
Rukum
district.
Royal
Nepal
Army
(RNA)
official
Kaji
Bahadur
Khatri
said
that
a
large
number
of
security
forces
were
deployed
in
the
region
and
RNA
was
ready
and
capable
of
safeguarding
any
corner
of
the
country.
Nepal
News,
January
30,
2004
PAKISTAN
Army
General
Headquarters
to
be
shifted
from
Rawalpindi
to
Islamabad:
The
Pakistan
Army
is
shifting
its
General
Headquarters
(GHQ)
from
Rawalpindi
to
Islamabad
as
part
of
a
plan
to
enhance
security
for
President
Pervez
Musharraf.
It
is
for
the
first
time
that
the
GHQ
was
being
shifted
to
Islamabad
since
its
establishment,
and
is
being
set
up
in
the
E-11
sector
of
the
city,
which
has
already
been
acquired
by
the
Army
for
various
installations.
Various
law-enforcement
agencies
had
suggested
that
the
President
shift
his
residence
from
Rawalpindi
to
Islamabad
because
the
VVIP
route,
which
fell
in
the
densely
populated
area
of
Jhanda
Chichi,
was
not
safe
for
his
movement.
Also,
in
view
of
the
recent
attacks
on
the
President,
a
new
security
department
for
the
President
and
Prime
Minister
was
being
established.
Dawn,
January
31,
2004
Proscribed
outfits
seek
donations
despite
ban:
Although
there
is
a
ban
on
seeking
donations
for
jihad
in
Pakistan,
several
jihadi
groups
plan
to
collect
the
hides
of
animals
sacrificed
on
the
Muslim
festival
of
Eid-ul-Azha
for
their
cause.
An
estimated
three
million
animals
were
sacrificed
last
year
for
Eid.
The
net
value
of
the
hides
of
these
animals
was
an
estimated
Rupees
1.8
billion.
The
banned
Tehrik-e-Khuddam-ul-Islam
(TKI)
has
assigned
workers
to
contact
sympathisers
on
Eid
and
get
them
to
donate
hides.
The
banned
Jamaat-ul-Fuqra
and
Millat-e-Islamia,
and
other
groups
like
the
Al
Badr
and
Tehreek-ul-Mujahideen
that
are
not
banned
but
are
believed
to
have
links
with
jihadis,
have
similar
plans.
The
Al-Rasheed
Trust,
an
organisation
not
banned
in
Pakistan
but
on
the
United
States
"terror
list",
collected
roughly
Rupees
40
million
worth
of
hides
last
year.
The
trust's
publications,
the
Daily
Islam
and
weekly
Zerb-e-Momin,
are
urging
readers
to
donate
hides
to
the
trust
this
Eid.
Daily
Times,
January
29,
2004
Former
Taliban
Provincial
Governor
arrested
in
Chaman:
A
close
aide
to
the
Taliban
leader,
Mulla
Mohammad
Omar,
was
arrested
by
security
personnel
in
Chaman,
a
town
near
the
Afghan
border.
Pakistan's
Interior
Minister
Faisal
Saleh
Hayat
said
that
the
man
arrested
near
the
border
town
of
Chaman,
some
470
kilometres
southwest
of
Islamabad,
was
Abdul
Mannan
Khawajazai,
a
former
provincial
governor
during
Taliban
rule
in
Afghanistan
from
1996
to
2001.
Saleh
Hayat
added
that
the
arrested
Taliban
leader
would
not
be
extradited
to
Afghanistan,
as
it
did
not
have
an
extradition
treaty
with
Pakistan.
Dawn,
January
29,
2004
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