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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 34, March 8, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Crises within Crises
Guest Writer: Ameen Izzadeen
Deputy Editor, Sunday Times, Colombo
By calling a snap general election on April 2, President
Chandrika Kumaratunga has played into the hands of the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
even as the rebel group is rocked by a rebellion within.
It was not in her reckoning when she dissolved Parliament
that the LTTE would turn the campaign into a referendum
to legitimize its claim as the 'sole representative' of
the Tamil people and assert its right to control the affairs
of the merged Northern and Eastern provinces.
The President's February 7 decision to dissolve Parliament,
in spite of the fact that the United National Front (UNF)
Government commanded a majority, caught the LTTE unawares.
Yet, in a profound display of political prudence, the LTTE
was quick to issue a statement that it would continue to
honour the ceasefire agreement, whatever the crisis in the
South, and whatever Government was in office.
And soon it got into action and came up with a game plan
that would certainly become a headache or create a Catch-22
situation for whichever party that forms the next Government.
Psephological analyses say that no party will be in a position
to win the minimum 113 seats required to form the Government.
Neither the UNF of Premier Ranil Wickremesinghe nor President
Kumaratunga's new United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA)
will be in a position to form the Government or continue
in office without the support of the Tamil National Alliance
(TNA), which the LTTE has endorsed as its political vehicle.
However, the LTTE plan has suffered a major setback with
its eastern leader Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan alias Karuna,
who claims that more than 6,000 cadres are with him, demanding
more authority for himself, and challenging the decisions
of leader Velupillai Prabhakaran, who is not known to tolerate
dissent.
In its determination to sweep the entirety of the North
and the East at the elections, the LTTE warned Tamils against
contesting from either of the south-based mainstream political
parties - the UNF and the UPFA - which are still capable
of winning some Tamil votes. And the warning was unmistakable.
After a Tamil UNF candidate contesting the eastern district
of Batticaloa was shot dead, four other Tamil candidates
contesting on the UNF ticket withdrew from the contest.
As a warning to other anti-LTTE Tamil parties such as the
Eelam People's Democratic Party (EPDP), a suspected LTTE
pistol gang killed an EPDP member at Valachchenai in the
Batticaloa district on March 1, and a couple of days later,
another EPDP member was shot at. It is said that V. Anandasangaree,
the besieged Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) leader,
who defied the LTTE dictates and runs as an independent
candidate in the Tiger stronghold of Jaffna, is also under
LTTE threat.
The LTTE aiming at a Tamil political monopoly wants no Tamil
to be elected from the North and the East unless he or she
is a candidate of the TNA. The TNA says it is confident
of winning about 23 of the 31 seats at stake in the Northern
and the Eastern Provinces. To maximize the TNA's share of
the electoral cake, it also seeks to divide the Muslim votes
by fielding Muslim candidates on its list. With the main
Muslim party, the Sri Lanka Muslim Congress being hit by
internal squabbles and divisions, it will not be difficult
for the TNA, a four-party alliance, whose candidates were
screened and approved by the LTTE, to help the LTTE achieve
its goal. If no south-based mainstream party secures a sufficient
number of seats to form a Government on its own steam, the
kingmaker will be the LTTE-backed TNA. This gives it the
power of making or breaking the next Sri Lankan Government
and of dictating terms to any party that seeks TNA support.
TNA support will be a sine qua non for any minority
Government to win a vote of confidence in Parliament. Even
if either the UNF or the UPFA are in a position to form
a majority Government, with or without the help of fringe
parties such as the Ceylon Workers' Congress which is a
force to be reckoned with among Sri Lankan Tamils of Indian
origin, the strong TNA presence in Parliament will give
the LTTE enough muscle to bargain for concessions and greater
political power. It will also create a platform for the
rebel group to put up a democratic façade. Thus, whatever
the reasons for the dissolution of Parliament - whether
it was a coup by Kumaratunga aimed at capturing power, or
a necessity to safeguard national security as the President
claimed - the move has only strengthened the hands of the
LTTE.
The LTTE does not want its plans to go haywire with Karuna's
rebellion. Karuna's recalcitrance has been attributed to
a variety of factors, ranging from differences between the
northern and eastern Tamils, to his opposition to the killing
of political opponents, as well as his reported ambition
to run an autonomous administration in the Batticaloa district,
which has virtually come under the LTTE control largely
due to the Wickremesinghe Government's policy of pursuing
peace at any cost.
Karuna, in an interview with the Associated Press,
said he was seeking a separate truce. Such a move, analysts
say, could complicate the peace process. The Government,
on its part, is playing it safe. It has rejected reported
requests for protection, made by Karuna from his hideout
in the Thoppigala jungle in Batticaloa, and indicated that
it will abide by the ceasefire agreement it signed with
the LTTE. Karuna, reportedly playing the peace card, is
said to have objected to Prabhakaran's request to send 1,000
cadres to the rebel heartland of Wanni, questioning such
a need during peacetime. "There is no question of reconciliation,
everything is beyond reconciliation. In future we will have
a full self-administration (in the east)," Karuna told AP.
"We'll receive no more command from the Wanni administration
or Mr. Prabhakaran," he said, adding that his group would
respect the current truce until the Government signed a
new one with his group. Echoing the age-old rift between
the Tamils of the North and the East, Karuna alleged that
northern cadres were favoured for positions, while more
than 2,000 Eastern Tamil cadres paid with their lives to
build up the organisation and achieve their dream of Tamil
Eelam.
Amidst electioneering, the President and the Prime Minister
have been kept informed of these developments. Both leaders
have adopted a cautious approach towards the emerging scenario
in the east and indicated that their dealings are with the
LTTE led by Prabhakaran. Political analysts in the south,
however, first treated the rebellion as an LTTE ploy to
gain full control of the East. They believed the Karuna
faction would renege on the ceasefire agreement and resume
the war in the East. This would enable the LTTE-led by Prabhakaran
to blame the Karuna faction for the war in the east, while
it would continue to 'abide' by the ceasefire.
It now appears that there is more to the crisis than meets
the eye, though the LTTE says the problem is being solved.
Acknowledging the mutiny, the LTTE has described it as 'a
temporary problem'. However, Prabhakaran wasted no time
to take counter-measures with the twin purpose of damage-control
and stripping Karuna of his powers. The LTTE does not tolerate
dissent. Many fear that what befell Mahendraraja @ Mahattaya,
the group's one-time Number Two, will befall Karuna as well.
Mahattaya was killed in mysterious circumstances in 1994.
But the LTTE, aware that its every move is currently monitored
by the international community, is said to be taking "other
measures" to deal with Karuna, an LTTE hero who had won
many battles for the organisation.
In all events, the unfolding circumstances in the east do
not augur well for Sri Lanka or the peace process. If the
LTTE succeeds in bringing the situation under control, it
could still put its plan into operation and reap the benefits
after the coming elections.
The main charge of the President and her Marxist Janatha
Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) ally was that Premier Wickremesinghe's
Government was compromising on national security and paving
the way for a division of the country. This was the justification
offered by President Kumaratunga for the dissolution of
Parliament. It is, consequently, no surprise that the peace
process has become the main campaign issue in the run-up
to the third General Election in less than four years. Adding
to the sense of overwhelming uncertainty that the President's
snap polls decision has created in the country, is the confusion
the average voter in the south of the country is bogged
down in. The voter-confusion is as much over the uncertainty
of the outcome of the general election as it is over the
fate of the peace process.
Aware that the people are worried about the peace process,
the People's Alliance (PA) led by President Kumaratunga
and the JVP - the two main parties in the newly formed UPFA
- were compelled to make drastic policy concessions with
regard to their stand on the LTTE and its proposals for
an interim self-government authority. Initially, the two
main partners of the UPFA held diametrically opposing views
on a possible solution to the country's burning national
problem. The JVP vehemently opposed devolution of power
- which the PA has accepted - and articulated decentralization
of power by strengthening grassroots representative institutions.
However, both the PA and the JVP had flatly rejected the
LTTE's interim administration proposals. Yet, when the campaign
started and the two parties realized the importance of the
peace factor, a softening-up process began, with the two
parties declaring that a future UPFA Government would talk
to the LTTE and honour the ceasefire agreement, which the
Wickremesinghe administration signed with the LTTE. The
two parties have even gone to the extent of describing the
LTTE, which they had, not long ago, accused of violating
the ceasefire agreement at will, as a disciplined group.
Whether such a softening of stances is an election gimmick
or a genuine desire to continue the peace process remains
to be seen.
In many respects, the impending election is different from
any previous election this country has seen since Independence.
For the first time in Sri Lankan political history, more
than 250 monks have entered the fray on the Jathika Hela
Urumaya (JHU, National Sinhala Heritage Party) ticket. Their
entry into national politics, observers say, will eat into
the vote bank of the PA-JVP alliance, which had the backing
of hardliners opposed to the Wickremesinghe peace process.
With myriad political parties, projecting diverse policies
on issues ranging from the ethnic conflict to the national
economy, in the fray, the stage is being set for horse-trading
once election results are out.
The Enemy Within
Kanchan Lakshman
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management; Assistant
Editor, Faultlines: Writings on Conflict & Resolution
Even as its military regime comes to terms with the global
fallout of the country's role in nuclear proliferation,
Pakistan was once again rocked by radical Islamist violence.
At least 47 persons are reported to have died and more than
150 sustained injuries when a procession of the Shia sect
was attacked by rival Sunni extremists at Liaquat Bazaar
in Quetta, capital of Baluchistan, on March 2, 2004. President
Pervez Musharraf's call for an 'enlightened moderation'
in Pakistan is, if events in the past few months are any
indication, threatened by the very forces that have long
been nurtured by successive regimes in the country. Recurrent
Islamist violence, it appears, will remain a significant
element in the churning process within Pakistan in the proximate
future.
Over the past nine months, Quetta has witnessed a number
of lethal incidents of sectarian violence. Among the most
serious was the June 8, 2003, incident, when thirteen trainee
police personnel belonging to the local Hazara community
of the Shia sect were killed during an attack in the Sariab
Road area. And on July 4, 2003, at least 53 persons were
killed and 57 others wounded as three armed terrorists,
including a suspected suicide bomber, stormed a Shia mosque
during Friday prayers.
The latest Quetta attacks also coincided with the explosions
in the Iraqi cities of Baghdad and Karbala, which left nearly
200 dead. These attacks also targeted Shias, who were observing
Youm-i-Ashur, the 10th day of Muharram (the annual
Shia commemoration of the martyrdom of Imam Hussein, the
grandson of Prophet Mohammad). Although direct linkages
between these two incidents are yet to be established, there
is a definite pattern of association among the various theatres
of jehad across the globe. The spread of disorder
and violence are currently being orchestrated by the same
forces whose ideological worldview supplements the essential
logic and dynamic of their operations.
The near simultaneous attacks at Karbala, Baghdad and Quetta
are a clear indication that the Iraq trajectory is crucial.
The failure of the US to 'manage the peace' in Iraq and
continuing instability in Afghanistan, along with a considerably
stretched troop commitment by the United States during an
election year, will have critical impact on the future of
terrorism in general. No strangers to the advantages of
guerilla warfare, warriors of the global jehad are
currently seeking to harness the operational possibilities
created by the "target-rich environment" in Iraq. A truly
global jehadi enterprise will be quick to seize the
chances of escalation in the immediate future, and the Muharram
incidents are portents of troubles to come.
Subsequent to an attempt on his life on December 14, 2003,
General Musharraf had stated that the security of Pakistan
was threatened more from within than by outside forces.
Pakistan has witnessed a long history of violence between
the Sunni and minority Shiite sects (Sunnis constitute approximately
77 per cent of the population and Shias, 20 per cent), most
of which has been perpetrated by groups that emerged in
the 1980s during General Zia-ul-Haq's rule. Between 1989
and 2004 (till March 5), at least 1,531 people have been
killed and 3,572 wounded in 1,822 incidents of sectarian
violence by these homegrown jehadis in
Pakistan.
A deeper scrutiny of the sectarian
trajectory in Pakistan indicates patterns of
uncertainty as well as resilience. There are, indeed, periods
of apparent calm between high-intensity attacks. For instance,
between the July 4, 2003, carnage and December 31, 2003,
there were only five incidents of sectarian violence across
the country, in which 14 lives were lost. Similarly, between
January and July 2003, there were 16 incidents resulting
in 36 fatalities. In the first two months of 2004, there
was only a single incident in which one person died and
four others were wounded. Further, these sectarian jehadis
have survived both democratic state structures and military
regimes, demonstrating great resilience over extended periods
of time. They have also been able to systematically expand
their geographical support base and target areas. The Punjab
province and Pakistan's commercial capital, Karachi, in
the Sindh province, have for long been the primary hubs
of sectarian violence. However, continuing violence in places
like Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan, suggests an extension
of the sphere of sectarian strife. Moreover, the task of
security agencies is rendered more complex during religious
festivals, since large processions in public spaces are
always easy terrorist targets. And attacks on mosques at
prayer time, and on other religious gatherings, when potential
fatalities are high, have been a key tactic of sectarian
terrorists.
In the current environment, the apparent failure of the
Musharraf regime to counter Islamist extremism and sectarianism,
according to many a Pakistani analyst, is all the more inexplicable,
since the country has handed over more than 500 Al
Qaeda operatives to the US authorities since
the war on terror began. The will to contain Islamist extremist
groups that are not on America's list of priorities appears
to be absent, and a significant number of such groups continue
to operate within the country, many of them with apparent
immunity. The leadership of several such groups, most visibly
the Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM),
the Lashkar-e-Toiba (LeT),
the Harkat-ul-Mujahideen (HuM)
and the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen (HM)
- despite an official ban on the first three - is regularly
reported in the Pakistani media to enjoy full freedom of
movement. Complex linkages exist between some of these groups
and the Sunni sectarian groups, such as the Sipah-e-Sahaba
Pakistan (SSP)
and the Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ).
Ambivalence and piecemeal stratagem have marked the state's
response to sectarianism in Pakistan. An Anti-Terrorism
Act (ATA) against sectarian violence was passed only in
1997, despite the fact that the cycle of sectarian violence
dates back to the mid-1970s. Sectarian groups were not outlawed
until 2002. Raising serious doubts about the ATA being an
effective tool in curbing the sectarian menace, a Pakistani
analyst pointed out that, "More emphasis seems to have been
put on catching the culprits who actually carried out the
attacks rather than on catching the masterminds behind them
or squashing the infrastructure that breeds, trains, funds
and protects the terrorists."
Aileen Qaiser writing in the Karachi-based Dawn on
October 20, 2003, noted that, although thousands of people
are known to have been detained under the ATA during the
past several years, they have been released within days
or weeks. According to a report in July 2002, many of the
cases which were actually brought before the Anti-Terrorism
Court (ATC) have led to acquittals: the ATCs in Punjab acquitted
91 people and convicted only 56 between April and June 2002
for cases involving sectarian violence. It was also reported
in June 2002 that there was reluctance on the part of the
authorities (who cited security reasons) to initiate cases
against many detainees, especially activists of the banned
extremist religious groups in the Punjab. Strikingly, a
day after Maulana Azam Tariq, leader of the outlawed SSP
and Member of National Assembly, was shot dead on October
6, 2003, Dawn reported that the Sectarian Terrorists
Activity Record, a body formed in 1998 to gather data on
sectarian groups, monitor their activists and suggest remedial
measures, had failed to delineate the causes of sectarian
strife in Pakistan.
General Musharraf, by his own admission, no longer controls
the jehadis that the state had long supported, and
the self-proclaimed 'holy warriors' are far from ready to
call it quits. The foundations of sectarian terror share
their ideological platform with Islamist extremist groupings
engaged in a wide range of international terrorist movements,
and it is evident that the operational capacities of both
these are yet to be significantly eroded. The present regime
may 'cast away' some of its former protégés, but these groups
appear to be determined to challenge their creators in more
ingenious ways than one.
The military regime under Pervez Musharraf has, of course,
had some notable successes against sectarian terrorists,
but the demobilization of these groups has been rendered
difficult because the end-game of the state remains ambivalent,
and that of the extremists does not allow any place for
withdrawal or compromise: there is either victory or martyrdom.
Solutions to Islamist terrorism, including the sectarian
offshoot, will remain elusive as long as the infrastructure
of terrorism located in Pakistan, and supported by the state
structure, is conclusively and irrevocably dismantled and
destroyed.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
March 1-7,
2004
  |
Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
7
|
0
|
4
|
11
|
INDIA
|
Assam
|
0
|
2
|
6
|
8
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
8
|
5
|
20
|
33
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
3
|
0
|
8
|
11
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Meghalaya
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
Tripura
|
0
|
0
|
3
|
3
|
Total (INDIA)
|
11
|
7
|
44
|
62
|
NEPAL
|
9
|
37
|
51
|
97
|
PAKISTAN
|
44
|
5
|
0
|
49
|
SRI LANKA
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
|
BANGLADESH
ISI
using
Bangladesh
to
create
Islamic
state
in
northeast
India:
An
Asia
Times
Online
report
quoting
Indian
intelligence
sources
has
said
that
Pakistan's
Inter-Services
Intelligence
(ISI)
is
attempting
to
realize
its
plan
for
a
sovereign
Islamic
state
in
India's
Northeast
with
support
from
fundamentalist
elements
within
the
Bangladesh
Government,
army,
bureaucracy
and
intelligence
agencies.
Quoting
unnamed
sources,
the
report
added
that
after
the
cease-fire
on
the
Kashmir
border,
terrorist
outfits
are
increasingly
using
Bangladesh
as
the
training
ground
rather
than
Pakistan
occupied
Kashmir
(PoK).
Pakistani
nationals
owing
allegiance
to
different
terrorist
outfits
have
been
allegedly
using
Dhaka
as
a
transit
point
for
entering
India
and
Nepal,
and
also
as
an
escape
route.
Asia
Times
,
March
6,
2004.
INDIA
Seven
persons
killed
in
Fidayeen
attack
outside
jail
in
Jammu:
Seven
persons,
including
four
police
personnel
and
two
under-trial
terrorists,
were
killed
and
six
persons
sustained
injuries
when
a
lone
suicide
terrorist
(Fidayeen)
attacked
a
police
bus
carrying
13
under-trials,
mostly
terrorists,
from
the
district
jail
to
the
Court
complex
in
Jammu
on
March
3,
2004.
The
lone
Fidayeen
was
shot
dead
within
a
few
minutes
of
the
attack,
thus
thwarting
the
terrorist's
attempt
of
facilitating
escape
of
the
under-trials,
said
Deputy
Inspector
General
of
Police
(DIG
Jammu-Kathua
range)
Farooq
Ahmed.
He
said
that
the
terrorist
appeared
outside
the
district
jail
at
around
10.10
AM
and
started
indiscriminate
firing
on
the
security
picket
and
a
police
vehicle
in
which
the
13
detenues,
including
three
Pakistanis
and
other
terrorists,
were
being
taken
to
the
Courts
for
hearing.
Before
being
killed,
the
terrorist
had
injured
12
persons,
including
three
police
personnel
and
two
detenues.
All
were
rushed
to
the
Government
Medical
College
Hospital
where
five
of
them
were
declared
brought
dead.
Two
of
the
injured
succumbed
to
injuries
later.
The
jail,
located
at
Amphalla
in
Jammu
city,
houses
500
inmates,
about
100
of
whom
are
undertrials
suspected
to
be
involved
in
terrorist
activities.
Daily
Excelsior,
March
4,
2004.
952
civilians
killed
in
Tripura
in
last
five
years:
According
to
a
statement
by
the
Chief
Minister
of
Tripura
in
the
State
Legislative
Assembly
on
March
2,
2004,
952
civilians
and
182
security
force
(SF)
personnel
were
killed
in
the
State
in
the
last
five
years,
between
1998
and
2003.
A
total
of
633
civilians
were
injured
and
1269
were
abducted
by
terrorists
of
whom
332
are
still
in
captivity.
During
the
same
period,
183
service
weapons,
including
65
Self-Loading
Rifles,
twenty
nine
.303
rifles,
18
carbines
and
10
Kalashnikov
rifles
were
looted
by
the
terrorists.
According
to
the
Chief
Minister,
who
is
also
in
charge
of
the
State
Home
Department,
43
major
massacres
were
carried
out
by
the
terrorists
and
836
terrorists
have
surrendered
between
1998
and
2003.
Tripura
Info
,
March
3,
2004.
NEPAL
32
soldiers
and
37
Maoist
insurgents
killed
in
Bhojpur
district:
Reports
quoting
the
Minister
for
Home
and
Information
and
Broadcasting,
Kamal
Thapa,
said
that,
in
a
fierce
battle
between
security
forces
(SFs)
and
a
group
of
Maoist
insurgents
numbering
around
1500
to
2000,
32
SF
personnel
and
37
Maoist
insurgents
were
killed
in
the
Bhojpur
district
on
March
3,
2004.
The
insurgents
also
looted
an
unspecified
quantity
of
rocket
launchers,
self-loading
rifles,
semi-automatic
rifles
and
other
weapons
from
the
troops
before
fleeing.
They
also
reportedly
caused
damage
to
properties
worth
Rupees
25
million.
Nepal
News,
March
4,
2004.
PAKISTAN
US
court
convicts
three
Lashkar-e-Toiba
cadres
for
terrorist
conspiracy:
Three
American
Muslims
belonging
to
what
the
US
Government
calls
a
"Virginia
jihad"
were
convicted
on
March
4,
2004,
of
conspiracy
to
wage
war
on
America
and
provide
material
support
to
the
Taliban,
charges
that
carry
a
possible
life
sentence.
US
Attorney
General
John
Ashcroft
said
in
Washington
that
the
convictions
were
handed
down
against
Masoud
Khan,
Abdur
Raheem
and
Seifulla
Chapman
in
US
District
Court
in
Alexandria,
Virginia,
by
Judge
Leonie
Brinkema.
"The
defendants
convicted
today
were
associates
of
Lashkar-e-Taiba,"
said
Ashcroft.
Hindustan
Times,
March
5,
2004
Jaish-e-Mohammed
responsible
for
December
2001
attack
on
Indian
Parliament,
says
former
ISI
chief:
Senator
Lt.
Gen.
(Retd.)
Javed
Ashraf
Qazi
said
in
Islamabad
on
March
5,
2004,
that
the
outlawed
Jaish-e-Mohammed
(JeM)
was
involved
in
the
December
2001
attack
on
Indian
Parliament.
"We
must
not
be
afraid
of
admitting
that
Jaish
was
involved
in
the
deaths
of
thousands
of
innocent
Kashmiris,
bombing
the
Indian
Parliament,
Daniel
Pearl's
murder
and
attempts
on
President
Musharraf's
life,"
said
Senator
Qazi,
who
is
also
a
former
Inter-Services
Intelligence
(ISI)
Director
General.
Participating
in
the
debate
on
President
Musharraf's
address
to
the
joint
sitting
of
parliament,
he
said
that
the
proscribed
Sunni
group
Lashkar-e-Jhangvi
(LeJ)
"…are
producing
zombies
to
kill
their
Muslim
brothers."
He
also
said
that
the
intelligence
agencies
knew
about
10,000
religious
institutions
which
were
inciting
Shias
and
Sunnis
against
each
other.
Daily
Times,
March
6,
2004.
47
persons
killed
and
150
injured
during
attack
on
Shia
procession
in
Quetta:
At
least
47
persons
were
killed
and
more
than
150
wounded
when
a
procession
of
the
Shia
sect
was
attacked
by
rival
Sunni
extremists
at
Liaquat
Bazaar
in
Quetta,
capital
of
Baluchistan,
on
March
2,
2004.
Homes,
businesses
and
a
mosque
used
by
Sunni
Muslims
were
set
ablaze
by
rioters
following
the
attack.
Eyewitnesses
said
that,
as
the
Shia
procession
was
passing
through
a
busy
shopping
area
in
Quetta,
a
grenade
was
thrown,
followed
by
firing
from
automatic
guns.
"I
was
present
near
the
procession
when
we
first
heard
an
explosion
and
then
some
people
fired
shots,"
said
Quetta
Mayor
Abdul
Rahim
Kakar.
At
least
five
police
personnel
are
amongst
those
reported
dead.
No
group
has
claimed
responsibility
for
the
massacre
thus
far.
Meanwhile,
in
another
shooting
incident
during
a
Shia
procession
in
Punjab
province,
two
persons
were
killed.
Separately,
at
least
40
persons
were
injured
following
clashes
between
Shias
and
Sunnis
in
Phalia,
a
small
town
600
kilometres
north-east
of
Quetta.
Dawn,
March
4,
2004.
SRI
LANKA
LTTE
splits
as
'Colonel'
Karuna
defies
chief
Prabhakaran:
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam's
(LTTE)
military
leader
for
the
East,
'Colonel'
Karuna,
has
quit
over
alleged
differences
with
his
leader
Velupillai
Prabhakaran.
Karuna
had
reportedly
refused
to
send
1,000
armed
cadres
to
the
North
as
ordered
by
Prabhakaran,
the
Sri
Lanka
Broadcasting
Corporation
stated
in
its
news
bulletin
on
March
3,
2004.
After
quitting,
Karuna
alleged
that
cadres
from
the
North
enjoy
all
the
privileges,
while
on
the
other
hand,
LTTE
members
from
the
East
have
been
suffering
and
nearly
2,300
had
died
in
the
protracted
ethnic
conflict.
He
also
said
that
he
would
operate
separately
with
a
breakaway
group
of
LTTE
members
in
the
East
and
promised
to
continue
observing
the
cease-fire.
Meanwhile,
LTTE
Political
Wing
leader
S.P.
Thamilselvan
announced
at
a
news
briefing
in
Kilinochchi
that
Karuna
had
been
removed
from
his
post.
In
a
series
of
new
appointments,
the
LTTE
high
command
has
appointed
T.
Ramesh
as
the
'Special
Commander'
of
the
Batticaloa-Amparai
region
(the
LTTE's
nomenclature
for
their
eastern
region)
in
place
of
Karuna,
while
Kaushalyan
has
been
appointed
as
the
Political
Wing
leader.
Ram
and
Prabha
have
been
appointed
as
the
deputies
of
Ramesh
in
the
military
wing.
Daily
News,
March
4,
2004
and
March
7,
2004.
|
Sectarian Violence
in Pakistan
Year |
Incidents
|
Killed
|
Injured
|
1989 |
67
|
18
|
102
|
1990 |
274
|
32
|
328
|
1991 |
180
|
47
|
263
|
1992 |
135
|
58
|
261
|
1993 |
90
|
39
|
247
|
1994 |
162
|
73
|
326
|
1995 |
88
|
59
|
189
|
1996 |
80
|
86
|
168
|
1997 |
103
|
193
|
219
|
1998 |
188
|
157
|
231
|
1999 |
103
|
86
|
189
|
2000 |
109
|
149
|
NA
|
2001 |
154
|
261
|
495
|
2002 |
63
|
121
|
257
|
2003 |
22
|
102
|
103
|
2004* |
4
|
50
|
194
|
Total |
1822
|
1531
|
3572
|
* Data till
March 5
Source: Computed from English language media. |
|
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