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SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 35, March 15, 2004
Data and
assessments from SAIR can be freely published in any form
with credit to the South Asia Intelligence Review of the
South Asia Terrorism Portal
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Arming the Children
P. G. Rajamohan
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
On February 22, 2004, the leader of All Nepal National Independent
Students' Union - Revolutionary (ANNISU-R), the Maoists'
students wing, Kamal Shahi, stated that a decision had been
taken in their January 10-11 party annual meeting to raise
a children's militia of 50,000 by April-May 2004. According
to a report released by Child Workers in Nepal Concern Centre
(CWIN), two-dozen children have died in the past six months
of conflict in the country and around 950 children were
abducted by the Maoist insurgents and taken to their various
training camps. Since the collapse of the cease-fire between
the Nepal Government and insurgents in August 2003, the
country has been witnessing an increased frequency of abductions
by the Maoists, of young school students along with their
teachers, for ideological indoctrination and military training
of the children in the conflict-wracked Kingdom. Some reports
indicate that over 30 per cent of the Maoist militia and
army comprises children below 18 years of age. Most tragically,
they have been used as cannon fodder and human shields in
engagements with the state's Forces.
The intensified conflict between the Maoists and the Government's
Forces has resulted in large numbers of child soldiers being
trained in camps in the Maoist strongholds in mid-Western
Nepal. A report quoting the Maoist sources said secondary
and higher secondary students in many villages were being
trained in secret camps, in line with the decision to increase
the Force strength of child soldiers, and the recent spate
of abductions, particularly in the Achham, Rolpa and Rukum
districts, feed these camps. Some of the major incidents
of abduction of school children since the collapse of the
cease-fire include:
- November 3, 2003: 29 students
were abducted from Mugu district.
- December 5, 2003: 200
children were abducted by Maoist insurgents from two schools
at Achham district in western Nepal.
- January 26, 2004: Maoist
insurgents abducted at least 150 secondary level school
students to participate in their mass meetings from Bannatoli
Village Development Committee (VDC) area in the Achham
district.
- January 29, 2004: Maoists
abducted atleast 140 students from Achham district.
- February 2, 2004: Maoists
abducted 65 students from different places in the Achham
district.
- February 11, 2004: The
Maoists abducted at least 700 people, primarily students
and teachers, to participate in their 'anniversary celebrations'
from the Bhaiswale region of Achham district.
- February 21, 2004: Maoists
abducted at least 300 students and six teachers from a
school at Holeree village in the Rolpa district of western
Nepal.
- February 23, 2004: Maoists
abducted at least 200 people, primarily students and teachers,
from five different VDCs including Thanti, Sodsa, Bindhabasini,
Kuskot and Rishidaha in the Achham district.
- February 24, 2004: The
insurgents abducted 44 school teachers from Sugarkhal
in the Kailali district, six girls from Dhigomandu area
in the Achham district and six other students from Nawalparasi
district.
- February 25, 2004: Maoists
abducted at least 60 school students from Birendranagar
in the Rukum district.
- March 10, 2004: 14 school
students were abducted from the Chimkhola VDC area in
the Myagdi district.
- March 12, 2004: Maoist
insurgents abducted at least 56 people in separate incidents,
including 42 teachers, from the Jogbuda area of Dadeldhura
district.
- March 13, 2004: Maoists
abducted 54 people, including 35 teachers, from Dadeldhura
district and 19 students from Baglung district.
Reports suggest
that the abducted students have been inducted into the Special
Peoples' Military Campaign, which is being implemented in
the Maoists 'model districts' of Jumla and Jajarkot in the
mid-Western region, where the state's power and presence
is almost non-existent.
The training for child soldiers comprises three phases,
which are conducted in 'base', 'model' and 'special' areas
controlled by the Maoists. After selecting the target school
in their stronghold areas, the Maoists first encircle the
school after the students have gathered in large numbers.
Generally, the Maoists invite 'volunteers' to their training
camps, and then select students aged between 12 and 15.
Ordinarily, these students are initially abducted for the
Maoists' political meetings, annual conferences or any other
special occasions, such as the announcement of the formation
of an autonomous region or of a 'People's Government'. At
the same time, students aged between 14 and 18 are required
to undergo military drills and arms training under the supervision
of top Maoist leaders at the insurgents' training bases.
Though most of the abducted students are allowed to return
to their homes after a couple of weeks, the trauma of the
forced ideological and military training they undergo continues
to haunt many of them. They are, moreover, on call for operational
duties, as and when required, and are often directly attached
to the main operational force in their areas. The Maoists
variously use these young recruits as soldiers, sentries,
messengers, cooks, porters and suppliers. The preliminary
training is sufficient for these children to handle light
weapons including .303 and .22 rifles, country-made socket
and pipe bombs, etc., the weapons most widely used by the
Maoist insurgents.
Maoists have intensified the recruitment of children in
their armed cadres to fight against the security forces,
and to create 'revolutionary zeal' among the young participants
in the People's War. Observers suggest various reasons for
children being preferred for soldiering: recruitment and
maintenance of a child militia is relatively cost effective;
children can more easily be used in hazardous tasks like
laying and clearing landmines; children are also more psychologically
malleable, easily motivated and manipulated, and display
a high level of dedication and obedience.
Not all recruitment of children is coerced. As the United
Nations Report on 'Impact of Armed Conflict on Children'
(1996) notes, "One of the most basic reasons for children
joining armed groups is economic." For orphan children,
joining armed groups is attractive and guarantees basic
necessities like food, clothing, and shelter. On occasion,
poverty forces parents to offer their children to insurgent
groups, in return for money. In many cases, parents' affiliations
with the Maoists group results in their children 'volunteering
to join these Forces.
By and large, the Maoists prefer their 'students' policy'
to be implemented through their 'students wing' the ANNISU-R,
which has played a major role in institutionalizing their
cadre base within the student community, including minors.
ANNISU-R Central Committee leader, Kamal Shahi, has accepted
their ongoing arms training campaign and the existence of
a students' military force equal to a battalion in a regular
army. The ANNISU-R has been active in implementing a campaign
for 'one educational institution, one reformed militia',
and boasts that it will soon have a 50,000-strong student
militia and 375,000 members.
At least 300 children have been killed in the Maoist insurgency
since 1996. Young children in large parts of the country
have simply stopped going to school, as the Maoists increasingly
bring their activities into the school premises. On February
18, 2003, two students were killed and another injured during
a 'firing demonstration' by the insurgents in a school in
Baglung district. Terrorist attacks have not spared schools
either. On September 8, 2003, in a serial blast in the Kathmandu
Valley, one student was killed in a school campus. Engagements
with the state's Security Forces also inflict casualties.
During a security force operation in a school in Madbhara
in Doti district on October 13, 2003, for instance, four
students and six Maoists insurgents were killed.
There have been repeated calls by international human rights
organizations and concerned citizens' groups to declare
the school areas as 'zones of peace', and to leave the students
and children outside the bloody sphere of the current conflict.
These pleas have, however, apparently fallen on deaf ears,
and present indications suggest, if anything, a further
intensification of the ongoing Maoist campaign to mobilize
children - voluntarily or otherwise - for greater participation
in their 'peoples' war'. There are reports of large numbers
of schools closing down all over the country, creating long-term
risks of declining quality of human capital, greater unemployment,
and a burgeoning army of the unemployed which will keep
the manpower supply lines to the Maoist cadres alive. At
the present juncture, unfortunately, apart from regular
denunciations from various quarters, of the Maoist practice
of recruiting child soldiers, there appears to be no concrete
set of policies or responses that can bring relief to this
beleaguered country's unfortunate children.
Karuna or Prabhakaran:
Who will Survive?
Guest Writer: Bandula Jayasekara
Correspondent, The Island, Colombo
In July 2002, I wrote (in Frontline)
that the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam's (LTTE's)
eastern commander, 'Colonel' Karuna @ Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan,
would some day tell his leader Prabhakaran "I will look
after the east and you look after the north." In less than
two years, this is exactly what has happened. Not only that,
Karuna wants the east of Sri Lanka recognized as 'Southern
Tamil Eelam'. The LTTE has begun to crack after years of
working as a tight, disciplined terrorist outfit; an organization,
which brutally assassinated Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi
and Sri Lankan President R. Premadasa, and created havoc
in the island. Many Sri Lankans still refuse to accept that
such audacity is possible within the command structure of
the LTTE, and believe Karuna's 'rebellion to be a possible
ploy. The fact, however, is that whatever has happened so
far is very much for real. The cracks were already there
and those who understood the organization knew the breach
was coming. The question, however, is will it continue?
Sri Lanka's Northern Tamils have always thought of themselves
as superior, within the LTTE hierarchy, to the Eastern Tamils,
and this has naturally created resentment among the eastern
cadres. It was Prabhakaran's northern Tamils who first led
the struggle to divide the island nation and create an Eelam
(homeland). Among Prabhakaran's reasons for the armed struggle
was a feeling that high caste Tamils looked down on the
lower castes, including the fisherman community from which
Prabhakaran, and a significant proportion of the LTTE cadres,
hail. The Eastern Tamils joined Prabhakaran in his struggle
without any qualms, at the time. However, in recent years
the predominance of some high caste Tamils of the Northern
district within the leadership structure of the LTTE has
resulted in problems with the Eastern Tamils led by Karuna,
who has been demanding the removal of such leaders.
Unlike the North, the British trained Special Task Force
(STF) of the Sri Lankan police always had the upper hand
and did not allow the LTTE to gain much control in the East.
The scenario, however, changed rapidly with the emergence
of a ruthless easterner, Karuna. He became a hero of the
LTTE, fighting in the North, leading many battles against
the Sri Lankan Army. He made his men from the east tough
as nails and led them into battle after battle in the north,
winning the grudging admiration even of the Sri Lankan generals.
He secured Prabhakaran's trust and rose, eventually, to
the rank of the LTTE's commander for the eastern region.
Many believe that Prabhakaran saw a younger version of himself
in Karuna. Perhaps Prabhakaran failed to realize that Karuna
would, someday, become a threat to him, and dare to challenge
his iron rule and authority.
Karuna's statement indicates that the main difference with
Prabhakaran arose over the former's reluctance to send additional
cadres to the north. Karuna also charged that electoral
candidates opposing the LTTE-backed Tamil National Alliance
(TNA) in the east, were killed without his knowledge, and
that such killings were not acceptable to him. Among the
other issues raised was the complaint that easterners were
not treated well, nor given a proper place in the LTTE.
He also wanted the dreaded leader of the LTTE intelligence
wing, Pottu Amman (wanted in India in connection with Rajiv
Gandhi's assassination), political wing leader Thamil Chelvan
and 'Police Chief' Nadesan, removed from their posts, a
demand which would evidently be unacceptable to Prabhakaran.
In response, the LTTE sacked Karuna and issued statements
that he had rebelled due to 'personality clashes'. He was
warned and offered amnesty, but the behind the scenes developments
within the LTTE remain unknown. An LTTE political wing member,
Kannan, stated from Batticaloa, "This is what we always
wanted.We are with Karuna and the people are behind him."
Kannan claimed to give voice to what most LTTE cadres in
Batticaloa wouldn't dare say openly. Karuna has also been
claiming the support of the east, but an effective demonstration
of support is yet to manifest itself. Given the LTTE's history
of ruthlessness, fear may well be a factor, and the people
may hope that Karuna would take the battle forward on their
behalf.
The split in the LTTE has come at a time when Sri Lanka
is gearing up for elections. Though the LTTE itself is not
fielding any candidates, it has announced its support for
the TNA. Karuna has said openly that he would abide by the
LTTE's decision to support the TNA candidates, and that
they were free to campaign in the east. The TNA is now contesting
under the banner of the Federal Party, since Tamil United
Liberation Front (TULF) leader, V. Anandasangaree, has gone
to court against the use of the TNA party symbol, the Rising
Sun. Despite Karuna's assurance, however, TNA candidates
have slowed down their campaign activities, as some of them
are unsure of the fallout between Prabhakaran and his erstwhile
deputy. Prabhakaran may be the leader whose instructions
the TNA candidates have to follow, but Karuna is the strongman
of the east now. This may reduce the number of seats the
TNA hopes to get in the elections. Tamil sources in Batticaloa
also said that voter participation in the East could also
fall below expectations due to the conflict in the LTTE.
This could result in some advantage accruing to the Freedom
Alliance (FA) led by President Chandrika Kumaratunge and
supported by the Marxist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP),
as well as to Tamil parties such as the Eelam People's Democratic
Party (EPDP), the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation
Front (EPRLF), and breakaway groups of the Sri Lanka Muslim
Congress (SLMC). Further, TULF leader V. Anandasangaree
who is standing alone against the LTTE, contesting the elections
as an independent candidate from Jaffna. It is well known
that Prime Minister Wickremasinghe is banking on the TNA's
support to form a Government, and the fewer the seats the
Tamil coalition captures, the more difficult his task. The
Karuna factor, consequently, is becoming crucial in the
elections, and could indirectly help Kumaratunge. At present,
however, it is evident that neither Kumaratunge nor Wickremsinghe
are willing to be seen as directly or indirectly being associated
with, or supporting 'Karuna Amman', something they may have
been willing to do before the peace process began and when
the war was in full gear.
The elections have currently taken precedence over the peace
process, and the country is now waiting to see the new formula
that emerges in the numbers game of the next Parliament.
Whatever the outcome, it is clear that the winning party
will have to carry on with the peace process. Whether it
is Wickremasinghe and his allies, or Kumaratunge and her
allies, they will now have to deal, not only with Prabhakaran,
but Karuna as well. This would also create problems for
the Norwegian mediators. Karuna has already made a request
for the negotiation of a separate agreement. A situation
in which only Prabhakaran's group participates in the talks,
and Karuna maintains his armed wing in the East, would be
immensely complicated. Karuna would definitely seek a role
in the negotiations. The Sri Lankan Government may take
the stand that it is the facilitator's (Norway's) responsibility
to bring 'one LTTE' together, or as Kumaratunge's party
says, they would want representation of 'all Tamils'.
Everything now depends on whether Karuna can hold on to
his newfound power. Prabhakaran, naturally, cannot be expected
to remain passive and silent, and Karuna must know that
he is already moving. He may accuse Karuna of betraying
the Tamil cause, or the response may be more drastic. Prabhakaran
is still the master of terror, though, with his current
bid for peace and the enormous international visibility
his actions attract, extreme actions against a prominent
target have become relatively difficult. Yet, one cannot
help wondering whether Karuna's days are numbered. It is
probable that only the stronger of the two will survive.
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Weekly Fatalities: Major Conflicts
in South Asia
March 8-14,
2004
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Civilian
|
Security
Force Personnel
|
Terrorist
|
Total
|
BANGLADESH
|
4
|
0
|
6
|
10
|
INDIA
|
Jammu
&
Kashmir
|
13
|
5
|
18
|
36
|
Left-wing
Extremism
|
2
|
1
|
6
|
9
|
Manipur
|
0
|
0
|
4
|
4
|
Tripura
|
7
|
0
|
1
|
8
|
West
Bengal
|
2
|
0
|
0
|
2
|
Total (INDIA)
|
24
|
6
|
29
|
59
|
NEPAL
|
1
|
5
|
5
|
11
|
Provisional
data compiled from English language media sources.
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BANGLADESH
Government
rejects
Indian
proposal
for
joint
crackdown
on
terrorist
outfits:
Bangladesh
has
reportedly
rejected
an
Indian
proposal
for
a
joint
crackdown
on
the
terrorists
operating
from
Bangladeshi
soil
in
India's
northeast
along
and
across
the
Bangladesh-India
border.
A
report
quoting
unnamed
sources
said
that
the
Home
Minister
Altaf
Hossain
Chowdhury
at
a
meeting
in
Dhaka
on
March
10,
2004,
conveyed
his
country's
position
to
Indian
Foreign
Secretary
Shashank
after
the
latter
requested
Bangladesh
to
launch
a
Bhutan
like
crackdown
on
Indian
terrorist
outfits
in
that
country.
The
Daily
Star,
March
11,
2004.
BHUTAN
Bhutan and India
hold bilateral meeting on border management and security
matters: During the first Bhutan-India bilateral
meeting on border management and security matters
in New Delhi on March 9 and 10, 2004, the Governments
of India and Bhutan have reportedly identified several
issues and initiated activities to strengthen security
along the international border running through Assam
and West Bengal, based on their mutual interests and
concern. India has reportedly agreed to provide training
facilities for the Royal Bhutan Police and the Indian
Border Roads Organisation has been entrusted with
the task of upgrading and maintaining the roads from
Assam and West Bengal to Bhutan, connecting Rangia
and Tamalpur to Samdrup Jongkhar, Santhabari to Gelephu,
Barabesa to Kalikhola, and Pathsala to Nganglam. Both
sides have also decided to set up an "institutional
mechanism" between the home ministries to work out
ways to improve coordination between district authorities
on both sides of the border. The next border security
meeting will be held in Thimphu. Kuensel
Online, March 13, 2004.
INDIA
Information
Headquarters'
building
destroyed
during
Fidayeen
attack
in
Srinagar:
Offices
of
the
Press
Information
Bureau
(PIB)
of
the
Government
of
India
and
Directorate
of
Information
of
the
Government
of
Jammu
and
Kashmir
were
destroyed
during
a
fire,
even
as
security
forces
(SFs)
killed
two
fidayeen
(suicide
squad)
terrorists
who
attacked
and
occupied
the
three-storeyed
building
in
the
Press
Enclave
area
of
capital
Srinagar
on
March
9,
2004.
Two
suicide
terrorists
with
AK-47
rifles
appeared
at
the
Press
Enclave
and
lobbed
hand
grenades
on
the
armed
guards
of
the
Special
Services
Bureau
(SSB),
manning
the
entrance
of
the
PIB
building,
at
1830
hours.
Inspector
General
of
Police,
Kashmir
Zone,
K.
Rajendra
Kumar,
confirmed
that
both
the
fidayeen
were
later
shot
dead
by
troops
and
three
SSB
guards
had
sustained
injuries.
The
Al-Mansooran,
believed
to
be
a
front
outfit
of
the
Lashkar-e-Toiba
(LeT),
has
claimed
responsibility
for
the
attack.
An
unidentified
Al-Mansooran
spokesperson
told
the
local
news
agency
CNS
over
telephone
that
cadres
of
his
outfit
had
launched
the
attack.
"By
this
strike,
we
have
brought
it
home
to
the
Governor
that
militants
can
strike
anywhere
and
they
do
have
the
full
capacity
to
conduct
Fidayeen
attacks
on
any
target-howsoever
secure,"
said
the
spokesperson.
Daily
Excelsior,
March
10,
2004.
PAKISTAN
No
Al
Qaeda
network
in
the
country,
claims
Prime
Minister
Jamali:
Prime
Minister
Mir
Zafarullah
Khan
Jamali
said
in
Islamabad
on
March
8,
2004,
that
no
Al
Qaeda
network
existed
in
Pakistan,
but
sometimes
its
operatives
entered
Pakistan
through
the
porous
border
with
Afghanistan.
He
also
said
that
some
of
its
cadres
kept
roaming
in
the
hilly
terrain
along
the
border
with
Afghanistan
and
that
it
was
wrong
to
suggest
that
they
were
on
Pakistani
soil
in
large
numbers.
Jang,
March
9,
2004.
SRI
LANKA
Separate
Tamil
state
is
not
possible,
says
'Colonel'
Karuna:
The
rebel
'eastern
commander'
of
the
Liberation
Tigers
of
Tamil
Eelam
(LTTE),
Vinayagamoorthi
Muralitharan
alias
'Colonel'
Karuna,
said
in
an
interview
to
The
Hindu
that
it
is
impossible
to
create
a
separate
Tamil
state
due
to
lack
of
international
support.
He
also
termed
the
assassination
of
the
former
Indian
Prime
Minister,
Rajiv
Gandhi,
the
"gravest
mistake"
committed
by
the
LTTE's
intelligence
wing.
The
Hindu,
March
13,
2004.
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