SOUTH ASIA INTELLIGENCE REVIEW
Weekly Assessments & Briefings
Volume 2, No. 49, June 21, 2004

 

SRI LANKA

Perilous Stalemate
Guest Writer: Ameen Izzadeen
Deputy Editor of the Colombo-based Sunday Times

The message was clear in Brussels when aid donors early this month warned Sri Lanka that the country would lose billions of dollars in aid if the peace process was not resumed.

The message was clear also from the rebel headquarters in northern Sri Lanka, with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) warning the Sri Lanka Government of dire consequences and a bloodbath if the interim administration it was seeking was not forthcoming, and if the Government did not stop collaborating with the breakaway LTTE faction led by 'Colonel' Karuna.

However, the message, emanating from the Janadhipathi Mandiraya (President's House), was ambiguous or indecisive, giving rise to fears that the relative calm prevailing in the country since the February 2002 ceasefire agreement could be shattered any moment.

Handicapped by its lack of majority in Parliament and politically blackmailed by an anti-devolution and ultra-nationalist ally, the United People's Freedom Alliance (UPFA) Government of President Chandrika Kumaratunga is in a proverbial Catch-22 situation.

The Government desperately needs the US $ 4.5 billion aid package, which the donors pledged in Tokyo exactly one year ago, to salvage a sinking economy that has been badly hit by high oil prices and the fast-depreciating rupee.

To get the aid, the peace process needs to be revived. To revive the peace process, the Government has to agree to the LTTE condition that talks must focus only on the Interim Self-Governing Authority (ISGA) for the North-East, and the Government must abandon its rider that parallel talks should also be held on the final solution to the 21-year ethnic conflict. If the President says okay to the LTTE condition, the Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which accounts for one-third of the UPFA's strength in Parliament, has warned that it would leave the alliance.

It is this picture of no-war-no-peace that looms large over the country and it is against such a backdrop that President Kumaratunga invited a delegation of the LTTE-backed Ilankai Tamil Arasu Katchi, popularly known as the Tamil National Alliance (TNA), for a crucial meeting on June 10.

The Tamil MPs, obviously attending with LTTE approval, stuck to their guns and thought they had extracted what they wanted. President Kumaratunga reportedly told them that she would study ways of bypassing Parliament and use her constitutional powers to meet the LTTE demand for an ISGA and agreed to defer the talks on the final solution - a major breakthrough or turnaround.

Alas, it was not to be. On Saturday evening, the state TV broadcast a pre-recorded policy statement by the President. Apparently under pressure from hardliners within the ruling alliance, the President again linked the talks on the ISGA with talks on the final solution, in a speech marked by ambiguity.

The President's apparent backtracking coincided with a statement posted on the LTTE peace secretariat website. It accused the President of political duplicity and warned of consequences that could lead to a bloodbath. The Government declined to comment on the LTTE statement, saying it would only respond to an official LTTE letter, and reiterated its unwavering commitment to the peace process.

The main opposition United National Party (UNP), meanwhile charged that the UPFA had endangered the peace process by allowing internal contradictions within the ruling party to derail policy and described the President as a bundle of confusion.

Some observers say the President, who was flying out of the country to London while the state TV was broadcasting her address, is playing for time till the provincial elections are held on July 10, to go ahead with a move that is not so popular with the majority Sinhala people, and who went along with the UPFA's claim that the previous Government had conceded too much to the LTTE and voted the UNP out of office in the April 2 general elections.

But the LTTE appears to mean business and it continues to jolt the shaky truce, keeping the Scandinavian ceasefire monitors busy. Mannar was tense on June 14 and 15 after an attempt by the Army to search two female LTTE cadres led to a near-confrontational situation. Tension is also building up over the Navy's refusal to accede to the LTTE's request for safe sea passage to transport cadres from Mullaitivu to Verugal, the base from which the LTTE launched its offensive against the breakaway Karuna faction fighters in April.

It is not only tension that is building up but also war-preparedness by both sides. The LTTE continues to recruit child soldiers while Air Force fighter planes have begun test flights. What is more alarming are the occasional discoveries of bombs in the city. Police on June 17 discovered the second bomb in as many months containing the same type of explosives. It is not clear as to who planted these bombs. The LTTE could have done it in a bid to send a strong message to the Government. The Government intelligence could have done it to send a message to the hardliners to win their support for peace moves - or even to the Tamils because, after the detection of the second bomb near a school, the area was cordoned off and scores of Tamils were arrested for questioning in scenes reminiscent of the situation prior to the truce.

These may appear to be routine activities of a rebel group and a Government, but given the powder-keg situation in the country, they give the impression that both sides are drifting away from peace.

It is perhaps such a perception that prompted donors who met in Brussels to urge, in the strongest possible terms, a rapid resumption of the peace negotiations and warn that there should be no drift and no delay. "With so many other demands on donors, the record pledge of US $ 4.5 billion (or around 441 billion Sri Lankan rupees), may otherwise go elsewhere," the donors, including the United States, the European Union, Japan and Norway, warned.

Be that as it may, besides the July 10 provincial elections, there are two other factors, which are contributing to the slow approach of the UPFA Government to the resumption of the peace talks - the Indian factor and the Karuna factor.

The Sri Lankan Government has been heartened by the positive response it is receiving from India's new Congress-led Government. The Manmohan Singh Government has given the green light for an Indo-Lanka defence agreement, while it has expressed its commitment to Sri Lanka's sovereignty, territorial integrity and the search for a solution within a federal system that would satisfy all sections of the people of Sri Lanka.

The thinking in Government and political circles in Colombo is that the new Indian Government, though its Lanka policy overtly is no different from its predecessor Vajpayee Government, may act in a manner favourable to Sri Lanka, because of the Congress Party's strained and blood-stained relationship with the LTTE over the killing of former Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

The LTTE is not unaware of this. In an apparent move to counter the Indian factor, the LTTE has turned to the international donor community to apply pressure on the Government to accede to the ISGA, which it sees not only as a de facto autonomous political entity, but also as a mechanism to gain full control of the Eastern Province.

Though the LTTE has militarily crushed the Karuna rebellion, it is still not comfortable in the East - with Karuna's men striking at will in what is seen as a guerrilla war within a guerrilla war.

It is in this context that the Karuna factor assumes significance. The LTTE alleges that the Karuna faction has a collaborative relationship with the armed forces - a charge the Government vehemently denies. However, it cannot be ruled out that the Karuna faction would be in the Government's reckoning in the event that hostilities break out.

The LTTE is getting increasingly restless over incidents in the Eastern province where two prominent supporters of the Wanni leadership were killed by suspected Karuna faction members in the last week of May 2004. The two sides have also launched a propaganda war that has extended to the worldwide web as well, with a pro-Karuna group launching its neruppu.com website to counter numerous pro-Prabhakaran websites. As in any other war, truth appears to be the first casualty. A good example are the recent reports about scores of pro-Prabhakaran cadres being killed by the Karuna faction. These developments are certainly indications that the LTTE is not as comfortable as it used to be in the Eastern province.

In a statement issued following the cold-blooded killings of Eastern University dean P. Thambiah on May 24, and journalist Aiyathurai Nadesan on May 31, 2004, the LTTE issued an official statement that cannot be dismissed as mere rhetoric. The statement, which was the first of the hitherto-released two official LTTE releases containing a warning after the UPFA assumed office, said:

"Killing of intellectuals, journalists and friends of Tamil people is abominable. Even during this time of peace, anti-peace forces are engaged in barbaric activities. These actions are bound to lead the people of this island to a period of calamity and destruction. Sri Lanka security forces and the militants who are assisting them must realise the consequences…"

A "period of calamity and destruction": the message is abundantly clear - and was repeated on Sunday, June 13, when the LTTE declared that the foundation for peace laid with international assistance during the past three years would be shattered, and Sri Lanka would again be subjected to a bloodbath. It accused the President of duplicity and trickery to mislead the donors and get the money so that she could wage war again.

Parallel to issuing warnings, the LTTE is also seeking direct aid from UN agencies and international non-governmental organizations for rehabilitation and reconstruction work in the war-ravaged North and East, with its planning and development secretariat functioning as the pivotal body. There is a warning to the Government in this move as well. If the Government delays the setting up of the ISGA, which the LTTE ostensibly needs to facilitate the rehabilitation and reconstruction process, the LTTE will resort to mechanisms and devices of its choice to get the donor funds.

Amidst these threats, Sri Lanka epitomizes what constitutes a stalemate in every sphere. There is a stalemate at the peace front. There is a stalemate in Parliament, which has seen no bills but only blows since April. There is a stalemate in the economy, which is slowly losing the steam that it derived during the two-year investor-friendly and pro-peace UNF regime.

The never-say-die Norwegian facilitators, in the meantime, have intensified efforts to keep the peace flame alive with shuttle diplomatic missions to Colombo, London and New Delhi.

 

INDIA

Andhra Pradesh: Another Throw of the Dice
Nihar Nayak
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management

The ongoing cease-fire between the Andhra Pradesh (AP) Government and the Left Wing extremist (also called Naxalites) of the People's War Group (PWG) raises a number of questions. The PWG has remained unwavering in its ideological commitment to 'class annihilation', to capturing power through revolutionary warfare on the Maoist pattern, and in its rejection of Parliamentary democracy. This strategy entails building up of bases in rural and remote areas and transforming them, first, into 'guerrilla zones', and then into 'liberated zones', even as an area-wise seizure is consolidated, and cities are 'encircled'. Within the theoretical constructs of its 'people's war' strategy, as well as the PWG's past practices, moreover, negotiations have been used as a tactic and opportunity for recovery, consolidation and expansion. Under the circumstances, it is not clear what significant gains the State Government expects to secure through a new phase of negotiations.

On June 16, 2004, officially, the AP government declared a three-month ceasefire against the PWG, with immediate effect. It also accepted the remaining three PWG proposals - constitution of a supervisory committee, initial dialogue with mediators and final discussions between ministerial representatives and PWG State committee representatives. The official announcement came a day after the PWG state secretary, Ramakrishna, had laid down conditions for taking any steps to initiate talks with the Government. The Government and the political parties have consistently appealed to the Naxalite groups, especially the PWG, to shun violence and carry out their struggles as partners in the democratic set up. But each time in the past, talks have failed due to lack of faith between the negotiating parties and because of PWG conditionalities.

The process of trying to seduce the PWG back into the 'mainstream' has a long and futile history. N.T. Rama Rao initially adopted a soft approach towards the Naxalites, describing them as desabhaktalu (patriots) and annalu (elder brother) in 1982. The result was that, during the 1983 Assembly election campaign, he secured significant advantage as a result of Naxalite support to his party. After the elections, the Naxalites were given free rein to consolidate their activities, and there was a spectacular surge in their strength. However, by 1985, a series of ambushes of police parties and official convoys had made political accommodation impossible, as did the PWG's escalating demands. A Special Task Force was established and armed police posts were created in the worst-affected areas, as the security forces were given a 'free hand' to deal with the terrorists. By 1989, the Naxalites were in flight under sustained security forces' pressure.

Relief came with elections, once again. The PWG had begun flirting with the Marri Chenna Reddy led Congress-I during the elections of 1989, and Chenna Reddy unilaterally withdrew all restrictions on the activities of the PWG immediately after his Government was sworn in. At this stage, the Naxalites had articulated three conditions for talks: the freeing of all Naxalite prisoners who had undergone long spells of incarceration without trial or conviction; allowing freedom to the extremists to hold public meetings; and restraining the police from interfering with the 'legitimate activities' of all shades of Naxalites. No talks, however, commenced, though relaxation of the state's pressure on the rebels continued. Once again, the PWG took full advantage of the Government's 'soft approach', consolidating its strength before its excesses forced Chenna Reddy's successor N. Janardhan Reddy to re-impose the ban on the organization, on May 21, 1992, by which time the Naxalites were virtually running a parallel government in their areas of influence.

N. T. Rama Rao returned to power in 1994, setting into motion another phase of the 'soft' policy against the Naxalites. In 1995, the proscription on the PWG was relaxed for three months. A phase of galloping consolidation for the PWG followed, as a new generation of sophisticated arms, explosives and timing and triggering devices became easily available. There was also an expansion of linkages with other extremist organizations in the country, as well as with the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, and the revolutionary communist parties in Nepal and the Philippines. Linkages were also established with some ideologically incompatible terrorist groups in India's Northeast.

The successor Chandrababu Naidu regime re-imposed the ban on the PWG on July 22, 1996, and a policy of armed confrontation with the rebels was re-established. Nevertheless, intense public pressure and an Andhra Pradesh High Court order to initiate 'proper measures' to contain the continuing violence compelled the outgoing Telugu Desam Party (TDP) Government to invite the PWG for talks in January 2000. The PWG, however, turned down the Government's offer for a dialogue, pointing out that talks could not be held as long as the state continued its 'repression' of the 'mass movement'.

The peace process was brought back into focus in April 2001, once again in the context of elections, this time, to the local bodies in the State. The Committee of Concerned Citizens (CCC) on April 17, 2001, appealed to both the State Government and the PWG to hammer out a plausible way for unconditional talks. In turn, the PWG leadership had responded through a public statement that proposed five conditions for holding talks with the AP Government, including, inter alia, a lifting of the ban on the group and action against officials involved in alleged 'fake encounters'. Responding to the PWG's charter of demands, the then TDP Chief Minister Chandrababu Naidu - now in his second tenure - ruled out prospects of holding talks with the PWG unless the outfit was ready to give up arms.

Subsequent efforts by the same Government, were, however, initiated on January 28, 2002, when the police were instructed not to resort to "unwanted and unnecessary action" against the PWG. The Naxalites reciprocated by declaring a unilateral ceasefire. The Government made an offer of talks, and the PWG named revolutionary writer P. Varavara Rao, and balladeer Gaddar as its representatives in preliminary negotiations to determine the modalities for holding talks. The group also suggested that the CCC, headed by S.R. Sankaran, should act as observer during the talks. The peace process, however, received a jolt when four Naxalites of the PWG were killed in an encounter at Narella village, Karimnagar, while the talks were on. The PWG set a deadline of July 20, 2002, for the Government to announce a cease-fire, a demand that was rejected by Chandrababu Naidu, who declared that those violating the law would be dealt with resolutely. The Government also alleged that the Naxalites had been using the talks as a 'smokescreen' for expanding their base.

This, then, has been a regular pattern: the PWG has used the 'peace process' and periods of 'cease-fire' as opportunities to consolidate its position and expand its bases into new areas, and this has particularly been the case when it comes under pressure. Recent years have seen a massive expansion of the Naxalite movement, both within Andhra Pradesh, and in other States, through consolidation of the PWG's activities, as well as alliances with ideologically compatible partners. However, the PWG has been significantly weakened within its own traditional area of domination. In several villages in north Telengana, long considered PWG strongholds, its dalams (armed squads) have suffered badly as a result of frequent police action, and cadres have surrendered in large numbers. There has also been a thrust on development and people's participatory activity, which has helped in neutralizing the Naxalites' influence on villagers.

The current ceasefire and soft approach in Andhra Pradesh will have necessary and serious repercussions in neighboring Orissa and other States. The PWG has long worked to consolidate its position in Andhra-Orissa Border Special Zonal Committee (AOBSZC) areas, and, with some relief within AP can be expected to divert significantly greater energies to Orissa. Other States, which may be more or less affected include Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra and Karnataka. The Naxalite problem cannot be treated as a problem of a particular State or region alone. The Naxalite presence has already reached disturbing proportions in nine states, where they seek to establish a 'Compact Revolutionary Zone' (CRZ) extending from Nepal through Bihar and the Dandakaranya region to Andhra Pradesh. Apart from their traditional strongholds, there has been a significant expansion of Naxalite activities into new areas such as North Bihar, North Orissa, central Chhattisgarh and eastern Uttar Pradesh. A ceasefire in AP, far from solving the problem, may, in fact, compound it further, creating opportunities for further extension of the 'people's war'.

These difficulties notwithstanding, the AP 'peace process' appears to have set a trend in motion, with the Jharkhand Government also offering a unilateral cease-fire with the PWG on June 19, 2004. The PWG's response, in this case, was a list of demands, including the immediate removal of paramilitary forces from extremist strongholds, investigation of alleged 'fake encounters' and the lodging of criminal cases against the guilty, withdrawal of all Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA) cases against cadres, and lifting of the ban on the PWG - a combination of demands that the State Government would find nigh impossible to accept.

There is, today, an overwhelming need for a consolidated approach to the Naxalite problem, which extends across a number of States. Piecemeal efforts to solve the problem through negotiations in the past have only helped entrench the movement further. This danger needs to be recognized before another ill-conceived political gambit creates additional spaces for further Naxalite expansion. While talks with the extremists need not be entirely ruled out, it is necessary for such talks to be coordinated across States so that a permanent solution is at least visible - however improbable it may be. At present, negotiations are, at best, no more than an interregnum in the rising graph of extreme Left Wing violence.

INDIA

Manipur: Operational Complexities
Guest Writer: Pradip Phanjoubam
Editor, Imphal Free Press

Amidst the din of the preparation for the recently concluded Parliamentary elections, a quite development was taking place in the Sajik Tampak area of Chandel district, bordering Myanmar, in Manipur. This stretch of territory had come to be locally referred to as a "liberated zone" for various underground organizations, most prominently the United National Liberation Front (UNLF), the Revolutionary People's Front (RPF) and the People's Revolutionary Party of Kangleipak (PREPAK). A year ago, militant morale was at an all time high when they successfully repelled a frontal assault by a large column of the Border Security Force (BSF) at Sajik Tampak.

Under cover of the preparations for elections, long convoys of fresh Army troops arrived in April-May 2004, and headed straight for Sajik Tampak, raising intense speculations that a military operation was imminent. The official explanation of the troop movement was 'election security', and this line was maintained for a long time, even after it became known that an encounter, with casualties in the Army, had taken place. Four soldiers, including an officer of the 7 Sikh Light Regiment, who were among the first troops to move into the Sajik Tampak, were killed in an ambush by cadres of the People's Liberation Army (PLA)/RPF, but the Army tried to keep even this information a secret, neither denying nor confirming reports on the incident. No First Information Report (FIR) regarding the deaths was lodged with the police. The postmortem was carried out at a civil hospital under close guard against the media glare late in the evening, and it was only after a week that the Army finally confirmed the fatalities.

In the meanwhile, a brigade (44th Mountain Brigade) had been deployed in the area. Over the succeeding days, though no major operations were conducted, the militants were pushed further into the interiors and area domination by the Army was complete. There have been no further casualties on either side, but the standoff so far has not been without a price. Many villagers from the total of 21 Kuki and Zou villages in the area have fled for fear of being caught in the crossfire. The Army has also restricted their movements, controlled their ration purchases so that none is passed on to the underground cadres, and some school buildings have also been converted into barracks, making many human rights organizations cry foul.

Contrary to wide media speculations, there is still no sign that there will be any large-scale military operations in the Sajik Tampak area. The Army brigade for the moment seems satisfied simply squatting at three strategic locations, a battalion each at Sugnu and Chakpikarong in the vicinity of Sajik Tampak and the third at Sajik Tampak itself, with field guns positioned towards possible insurgent concentrations. Villagers reported consistent pounding in the initial days of the Army's arrival, but today this has stopped and has subsequently been replaced by military public relations exercises, such free medical camps for the villagers, and organizing periodic conducted tours for media personnel, national and local.

The Army's reluctance to go ahead with a flush-out operation seems to be on account of two factors. One, it lost the element of surprise that it obviously was looking for when it entered the area on the pretext of election security. Two, without active cooperation from Myanmar, it would be futile to chase the militants, who have in any case by now already either dispersed or receded deeper towards the porous international border. Unlike the Army, the militants can easily slip in and out of Myanmar, making it practically impossible to corner them. The much-needed cooperation from Myanmar's military junta has either not been forthcoming, or, perhaps, the Indian Government is reluctant to be seen as too close to the military Government, and this is stalling the process. The pressure to remain aloof from the Myanmar military regime would be significant in view of the fact that the Western powers, particularly the European Union, openly align themselves with the pro-democracy leader, Nobel Peace Prize winner, Aung San Suu Kyi. The Straffan summit in Ireland, where terms for cooperation between the EU and ASEAN, Japan, South Korea and China, were being thrashed out at about the time the military buildup was taking place in and around Sajik Tampak, made this adequately clear. Should the international community manage to force a democratic election in Myanmar, the overwhelming chances are, the military junta's opponent, Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy, NLD, would come to power.

The long-term implications of a possible geopolitical shift in the region are too large to be summarized here, but its most immediate outcome may just be what has been witnessed at Sajik Tampak. Much as New Delhi may want a Bhutan-type operation there, it has been forced to rethink. If a regime change becomes imminent in Myanmar, it may not be prudent foreign policy to be seen to befriend the military junta too much.

For the moment, the Government will have to rest content with tackling the insurgents on its own. The strategy seems to be for the military to occupy the erstwhile militant stronghold, forcing them to disperse, and then catch them where they are most vulnerable. It is hardly likely to be a coincidence that the Armed Forces Special Powers Act was extended for another year, not long after the Army moved into the Sajik Tampak area. There has also been a sudden spurt in controversial arrests by the Army under the Act, as well as the killing of militant suspects all over the Valley districts, allegedly in encounters and attempted escapes.

For many in insurgency-torn Manipur today, normal day-to-day life has, indeed, been reduced to a multiple nightmare.